Last term problem: Shirking, reputations, and self-policing

Abstract

The last term problem is potentially particularly acute for term limited state legislatures, such as Oklahoma, as a large number of representatives are likely to be serving their last term at any given time. Empirical evidence regarding shirking in the last term is mixed. This article suggests that applying branding theory to the last term problem provides a theoretical basis to better understand whether and how the last term problem might actually be a problem. Evidence, from the first application of term limits to the Oklahoma legislature, suggests that representatives in their last term are more likely to miss votes than those earlier in their careers. But, effects are not universal. Further evidence demonstrates that legislators concerned about their brand (reputation), or at least those who parlay their reputation into a prestigious post-legislative appointment, do not shirk, but that those who have no such concerns often shirk quite substantially. It concludes by offering suggestions for the theoretical application of the last term problem to legislators leaving office.