Subjectivity and Behaviorism: Skinner, Kantor, and Stephenson

Main Article Content

Bryan D. Midgley
Edward K. Morris


Since the founding of behaviorism, most behaviorists have stressed the
importance of objectivity for a natural science of behavior. This does
not imply, however, that they ignored or denied subjectivity. Skinner's
radical behaviorism, for example, equated subjectivity with mainly
events inside the skin; Kantor's interbehavioral psychology equated it
with uniqueness; and Stephenson's Q methodology equated subjectivity
with perspective or point of view. This paper clarifies these approaches
to subjectivity and emphasizes their importance in a natural science of
behavior, and places Stephenson's behaviorism within the context of the
others, examining some of the similarities and differences among them.

Article Details

How to Cite
Midgley, B. D., & Morris, E. K. (2002). Subjectivity and Behaviorism: Skinner, Kantor, and Stephenson. Operant Subjectivity, 25(3/4). Retrieved from