Operant Subjectivity: The International Journal of Q Methodology
44 (2022): 50-80, DOI: 10.22488/okstate.22.100504

Operant Subjectivity
The International Journal of Q Methodology

Quiddity College: Thomas Jefferson's Legacy for Moral Science

William Stephenson
University of Missouri-Columbia

Definitions: Quiddity. 1. The real nature or essence of a thing; that which makes a thing which it is; 2a. A captious nicety in argument; a quirk, quibble; 2b. Subtlety (of wit); ability or tendency to employ quiddities in argument. (Oxford Universal Dictionary, 1955)

Acknowledgements: My thanks are given to the many graduate students who have entered into the ideas expressed in these chapters . . . The book is dedicated to my wife, Maimie, whose courage, wisdom, and devotion is a source of wonder.

Part 1. Quintessences: Background for Quiddity College

Foreword

The beginnings of all things are weak and tender. We must therefore be clear-sighted in beginnings, for, as in their building we discern not the danger, so in their full growth we perceive not the remedy.

de Montaigne*, 1588*

The quotation from Michel de Montaigne's *Essays* is a reminder that my beginnings in the academic world were indeed full of danger and in need of clear-sightedness: I was Cyril Burt's youthful colleague in the 1930s, with whom I differed about profound methodological matters, the substance of these chapters. Cyril Burt was already eminent, and deservedly so. We now know, however, that about his main interest, the heredity of intelligence, he fabricated data on identical twins to support his views: his work in this respect is now discredited, and his reputation has suffered — but he was indeed a considerable scholar, educator, humanist, mathematician, linguist.

Not that I knew, or suspected, any of his mischief. My differences with him were purely methodological. He remained throughout his life fixed on a 19th century paradigm; I felt that, instead, mine was a thrust into the 21st century, with relativity and quantum theory as its guidelines. I was young and brash, and my tilts at Burt's eminence merely made my views, and myself, "controversial," a difficulty for many decades.

Happily, I have lived long enough to see a sound body of knowledge gathering around my position, some of which enters into the present chapters.

My journey has seen the interweaving of three main pathways: quantum theory in physics because I was a physicist before becoming a psychologist; another the myth of invariance, because of cultural interests; and the third, a search for the explanation of *consciousness*, because of my allegiance to the Spearman School of Psychology in London in the late 1920s. The first led to factor theory, to Q-technique and its methodology; the second to concourse theory of knowledge; the third to the Scottish School of Francis Hutcheson and Thomas Reid, and thence to Thomas Jefferson and his Circle — Rittenhouse, Rush, Paine, Priestley, Barton and Peale. I was able, happily, to solve problems in methodology, including Sir Isaac Newton's Fifth Rule, and to provide an explanation of consciousness in my theory of communicability. All of which conjoined in due course as a basis for a science of subjectivity of which moral science is the exemplar.

The explication of so much within the covers of one volume presented a difficulty, overcome, one hopes, by providing a fictional college for it, approached by way of my prior and deeply rooted interests in education, by which I mean its philosophy and pragmatics. The present chapters were begun during the turmoils of the late 1960s when universities were under siege by students; but the argument is not a defense of the universities in America nor support for student radicals; instead, the chapters end a long search of my own, which took renewed shape because of the unrest in academe.

I have had a long acquaintanceship with students and universities, stretching back to 1920 and continuing today, and I count some years (1926–1929) studying education in London as the most formative of my academic life. During those years I was one of T. P. Nunn's doctoral students, in seminars with peers from all quarters of the British Empire who were privileged to relate to his essays on *Education: Its Data and First Principles* (1921). But I became acquainted in London with other educators, in particular with J. Clerk Maxwell Garnett, influential in factor theory, author of *Education and World Citizenship* (1940) and Secretary of the ill-fated League of Nations. Later, I greatly admired J. B. Conant's writings in the American context, his *General Education in a Free Society* (1945) and *Education in a Divided World* (1948). Clearly my interests lay in purposes, in wide human improvement: I was imbued with a sense of the worth of education for mankind.

Indeed, I had begun as a pupil-teacher for a year, at age 17 years, too young to enter college, to which I went in 1920. After completing an Honors degree in physics (1920–1923) at Durham University in the north of England, I studied for a diploma in secondary education (1923–1924), and was part-time physics master in experimental physics (1924–1926). So it was fashioned for me for the next 50 years, to conjoin science and education.

The Diploma in Education added psychology to the dualism of science and education, made memorable for me, however, more by the sonorous Latin of Renaissance educators — Rabelais, Comenius, and Vittorina de Feltre — than by psychology. Rabelais was enticing, his *Gargantua and Pantagrel* as broad in educational philosophy as in ribald humor. And Comenius was my mentor, the Czech educator whose *Great Didactic* held in it the vision of a universal university, and a system of education open to all: ". . . not the children of the rich and powerful only, but . . . all alike, boys and girls, both noble and ignoble rich and poor, in all cities and towns, villages and hamlets . . ." (Keatings, 1931, p. 41). It is certain that the spirit of Comenius entered into my own small work, *Testing School Children*, published in 1948, after a delay due to my services

with the British Armed Forces in World War II (from 1939–1947 in my case). Throughout these early years, Roger Aschem's *The Scholemaster*, and Machiavelli's *Discourses* were as familiar to me as Sir J. J. Thomson's *Elements of the Mathematical Theory of Electricity and Magnetism* (1921), and Lord Rutherford's *Radioactive Transformations* (1906), the main sources in my Honor's work in physics.

I mention this background and the beginnings of my academic interests to offer an understanding for what is to follow in these chapters, written at intervals over 15 years, most linked to empirical work and not merely outpourings of a wishful thinker. There has always been something of Comenius in my make-up, or so it seems, since I was 16 or 17 years of age. Thus, what will seem esoteric in Quiddity College, and fit only for the "rich, powerful and noble," is far from it — it is for all alike, rich, poor, girls, boys, everywhere and of every intellectual and emotional stature. One of the most profound principles of Q-methodology (with which these chapters are replete) is that of common concourse, that subjectivity is common coinage — and that makes possible a genuine egalitarianism of education.

But there is a long journey to take before this is likely to be acceptable. We return, therefore, to the 1960s for the stimuli which prompted renewal of the above early interests in education. One found Everett Lee Hunt's *The Revolt of the College Intellectual* (1963) of significance, and George F. Kennan's *Democracy and the Student Left* (1968) important for my purposes. Later, *The State of the University* (edited by Kruytbosch and Messinger, 1970), put together essays by leading educators on their common ground — the problems of authority in the university, with Berkely in California as the setting. There was also a set of essays on *Higher Education: Demand and Response* (edited by W. R. Niblett, 1970), the outcome of a seminar of philosophical presuppositions in higher education.

More recently, I turned to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences to guide my reading and research: under the auspices of the Assembly on University Goals and Governance (established in 1969 as a reaction to the unrest in academe of the 1960s), the Academy published *American Higher Education: Toward an Uncertain Future* (two volumes, 1974, 1975). There is also another compilation of essays from the Academy, entitled *Limits of Scientific Inquiry* (edited by G. Holton and R. S. Morison, 1978), with which I shall take issue in the sequel, but which rounded out my preoccupation with the quest on the myth of invariance. In particular, there is an issue which I called "the shame of science" (Stephenson, 1978), shame, not because of harm done by science to the promise of life on earth, but because of its blind rejection of subjectivity as twin to objectivity and worthy of the same scientific concern and involvement. The thesis of these chapters is not to deny value to objective science for its bounties but to bring subjectivity and moral science into its purview as an equal partner.

In this connection, however, I turned to Thomas Jefferson for a legacy of understanding and inspiration, made significant by Garry Wills's *Discovering America: Jefferson's Declaration of Independence* (1978). My journeying has led, before Wills's exciting work appeared, to the discovery of the legacy for Quiddity: Jefferson's roots, I had decided, lay in the morality of the Romanesque revolution, rather than in the Renaissance, in the common sense philosophy of Francis Hutcheson and Thomas Reid of the Scottish School in the 18th century, which in turn, was redolent of Romanesque morality of many centuries earlier. It happened that my training in psychology with Charles Spearman of the London School in the late 1920s was in this same framework of the Scottish Enlightenment — and therein lies the burden of these chapters, with Spearman's monumental *Psychology Down the Ages* (1937) as my guide. This led me to

provide a quantum theoretical basis for all subjectivity, away from a Newtonian to an Einsteinian basis for what we think of as *mind*.

Interlocking themes, therefore, run through these chapters. But the core is an Englishman's discovery of Thomas Jefferson as mentor for a future moral science. That my sojourn with American thought has been rewarding goes without question, as the various chapters of this work will attest. It has indeed been a privilege to share thoughts with students at the Universities of Chicago, Missouri, and Iowa in particular. My musings, however, began at the Universities of Durham, London, and Oxford — now, it seems, so long ago. This is a log-book, for much browsing.

Chapter 1: Synopsis of Western Education

But how shall we prove anything?
We never shall. We can never expect to prove anything upon such a point. It is a difference of opinion that does not admit of proof.

Jane Austen*: Persuasion*

How, I am to ask, can we prove anything about higher education in the western world spanning the past several centuries? We never shall if everything is considered a matter of opinion that does not admit of proof. I shall assume, instead, that there are lines of thought in the scholarly discussion of higher education which are principles, and not merely matters of opinion, and which are useful for any regard of higher education. The principles are far from new but have to be abstracted from the main body of discussion on educational philosophy and given theoretical significance. The context is academe, the colleges and universities of the western world, with direct reference in the conclusion to higher education in the United States.

We begin with a distinction between colleges which owe their nature to English pragmatism, and universities which are rooted in German idealism. The former may be broadly conceived as socializing institutions, and the latter, professionalizing. The modern multi-university, in principle, could embrace both but is heavily weighted in America in the furtherance of schools and colleges of medicine, engineering, agriculture, education, journalism and the like, all with professional objectives, The difference between the two, however, is not as simple as these two designations may suggest, and it is necessary to look at each in detail to distinguish between them. I begin with the college concept.

Education of an Elite Class

The medieval colleges of Oxford and Cambridge were the models upon which were founded Harvard College (1636), William and Mary (1693), Yale (1701), and Princeton (1746). These were for the education of the sons of a small elite class; a few young men were admitted from the ranks of the poor, but the colleges were, and remain, elitist. However, it is a mistake to think of them historically as fountains of knowledge and monuments to truth.

The colleges of Harvard, William and Mary, Yale and Princeton soon became universities, an aspiration of every small-town college in America today. A college has a single function. A university embraces several. But it is worth looking at the medieval model to feel the essence of it, and there are no better examples of it than Oxford or Cambridge in England.

The Universities of Oxford and Cambridge are congeries of many separate colleges, now some forty at each university, all copies of one another. Oxford, about which I can say most because I know it better, embraces University (1249) — which suggests that Oxford began as a university not a college — Balliol (1263), Merton (1264), Exeter (1314), Oriel (1326), Queen's (1340), New (1379), All Soul's (1437), Magdalen (1458), Brasenose (1509), Corpus Christi (1516), Christ Church (1546), Trinity (1554), St John's (1555), Jesus (1561), Wadham (1610), Pembroke (1624), Worcester (1714), Keble (1871), Hartford (1874), and a dozen or so more, including the women's colleges of Lady Margaret (1878), Somerville (1879), St. Hugh's (1886) and St Hilda's (1893).

Each college is an autonomous institution, with its own charter, its own endowments, its own buildings in collegiate style, its own library, chapel, dining hall, commons, and residences. Each has its own president, master, or provost (as the top administrator), its own fellows, and dons who tutor the undergraduates, and a professor or two (usually endowed) who don't tutor, but who lecture and pursue scholarly interests. These professors, I should say, may *offer* to lecture, but attendance is entirely voluntary, and many a distinguished scholar has faced empty halls for want of listeners.

The colleges were not just street names for places in Oxford; each had its origin or ties with some part or other of English life and history. Balliol College, for example, has its roots in Henry III's reign in England: Lord John de Balliol fought for Henry against the barons (The Baron's War, 1263), and was captured by the victorious Simon de Montford (begetter of the first representative Parliament in England). Balliol's penance was the founding of Balliol College. At that time Oxford was a progressive center of learning: Bishop Grosseteste and Roger Bacon were there, championing the natural sciences. Lord de Balliol's bailiwick was in Northumbria, for to the north (his son and grandson were later to lay claim to the Scottish crown), and to this day there remain ties between Balliol College and Northumberland — unless things have changed there is still a closed scholarship for a boy from the Royal Grammar School at Newcastle-on-Tyne to Balliol, and until recent times the sons of landed gentry in the north would find welcome acceptance at Balliol. Throughout the country there were, and still remain, College fealties to cathedrals, public (i.e., private) schools, squirearchies and cities, all of historical significance. How useful it was to have ties which made patronage a way of life; but how useful, too, for the young sons of landed gentlemen, baronets and earls, to be brought together in one place, to intermingle, to enter into a common culture which would go with them thereafter into their allotted places in the church, army or state. They were to be proficient "in the skills of communication which were the foundations of social living" (Reeves, 1970, p. 65). Learning for these young men was not a search for knowledge or for truth, but a matter of conversational skills, peer friendships, and gentlemanly prerogatives.

Much has slipped away from this, but what is left is more than merely vestigial. Many patronage links remain. For the first half of the present century the undergraduate entered Oxford mainly from the privileged public schools, most with ties to a particular college. He would proceed to a B.A. degree in three years of residence, for three terms each year, each term for eight weeks. Only 24 weeks in the year! This, of course, will seem outrageous to modern cost-conscious administrators and efficiency experts: to have dons, professors and buildings occupied for less than six months each academic year seems extraordinarily wasteful. But the concern was with young men who had other important things to do during the other months — hunting, farming, travelling, entering society, sailing, and even taking time for contemplation and quiet creative work of one's own.

During terms, moreover, the important matter was not attendance at lectures, but reading at one's will and writing assignments for a tutor. What one chose to read, indeed, told the tutor much. To face him every week for an hour or so, and to have an essay discussed, was the sum-and-substance of the learning process; it was obviously integrative, a matter of putting notions together, conveyed in at least reasonably good English, with appropriate quotations and perhaps some effusions of wit and humor. No quizzes. No grades. No failures — other than in the crossfire of a tutor's disinterest. No examinations, except two, one halfway through the three years (Honours moderations at Oxford, Tripos part I at Cambridge), and one at the end, the finals. The examinations at one time were all oral; but today they are lists of many questions, from which to make a choice — there is no implication that one had to *know* a lot, only *something* about which to exhibit one's skill in argument, one's wit, the breadth of one's reading, the reflection of one's own thinking. It used to be said that the student who knew everything would get a *second*-class degree, and the clever one, who knew less, a *first*. The majority got *third*- or *fourth*-class degrees, and no one failed. If one felt unwell, a doctor's certificate could bring relief from examinations. In addition to a tutor, the student had a moral mentor, another don who entered the picture if the student got into difficulties of conduct meriting attention — a rare event since one was apt to meet such matters in discrete silence.

Following a practice laid down by Comenius (1592–1670), for probably the same good reasons, the mornings before noon were devoted to libraries and writing. The afternoons, thank heavens, were free for every kind of sport in season: everyone played something, cricket, soccer, golf, tennis, or went boating, shooting, strolling. After dinner, one might go pub-crawling (if one had the right contact with an M.A. of the University), or catch up on work, take part in debates, to fiddle-faddle in this or that club — the time was one's own to socialize, in a peer-group, peer-managed context. One could take a bath as well, once each week.

Nor did the student miss mingling with the townspeople. Apart from periodic anti-town and anti-gown rioting, the young gentleman might have had to spend some of his terms in "digs" waiting for his turn to live in college. There he met the commoner, and might indeed, sleep with the landlady's daughter. I myself have had a bishop's wife, and countrymen squires, anxious to see me in Oxford to retrieve their erring sons from such dalliances.

I have not painted too rosy a picture. Many young men, undoubtedly, suffered in these laissez-faire conditions. A son, whose father, grandfather and forebears for generations before were at Balliol, Lincoln, or Christ Church, might wander through his years of residence lost in bars, clubs and periodic trips to nearby London. But that was his affair. Tutors earned well, and in proportion to the number of students they tutored. The procedures cannot be judged (as some American educators seek to do) in terms of the "benefits of small classes," or the high faculty/student ratio, or the "close relationship with professors." There were no obligatory classes. The student might have one tutor throughout a year, though especially promising young men might be switched to particular tutors from whom they can be expected to benefit very greatly. The only professors they would see would be, perhaps, at University lectures. Again, however, the crux of the student's formal education (if we can really call it that) was in the reading *he* undertook, upon which *he* had to cogitate and apply whatever wit and imagination *he* had sharpened at best with some guidance from a tutor. The process was one in which synthesis and integration of ideas were maximized, and learning of this or that (as a fund of knowledge) minimized.

What principles are there to draw from this? It is a mistake to think of these colleges historically as "providing the best education in the world," or as arbiters of knowledge and intellectual truth; instead, they were places *where self-directed reading by students, and not lectures by professors, governed the student's learning*. Reading by students is our first principle, most boldly stated. It implies much more, but that we'll deal with in the sequel. Next, the young man's *self-development* was as cogently taken care of, and largely by their own designing, in peer-group, socializing contexts, occupying fully two-thirds of the daytime, directed at common communicability. They were to be proficient, indeed above all else, "in the skills of communication which were the foundations of social living" (Reeves, 1970, p. 65). Our second principle will stem from this.

In these days, when American students are seeking to find identities in higher education, they should look carefully at the way the English managed this over the centuries of their greatness, and educators should look no less diligently at it. As reading was the foundation of such learning as the students acquired, being left alone to design their selfhoods was the foundation of their socialization, a matter of supreme importance for the coherence and stability of their country. Young men were brought together to live together, from the shires, cities, moors, from every quarter of the country, for the most formative years of adulthood, to absorb common loyalties, common fancies, common styles of speech and dress — in short to acquire a common culture, largely of their own making, but basically to fit them for the nation's services in the army, government, church, law, and commerce, in bonds of common communicability. It was achieved in the only way any culture is created, in "play."

But what a marvel of "play."

Is it not wisdom to see young bulls of men expending themselves in sporting activity? The mornings were devoted, sleepishly, to learning, but every afternoon was freely spent in soccer, rugby, tennis, cricket, and every other sport, *in style*, without a couch anywhere in the process, without grades, without a moment's thought about professionalizing, and where everything except the marking out of playing fields was left to the student body, to play for the fun of it. Who needs gossip and bull-sessions more than such young men? Is it not wisdom to get them to dine together, to drink mild beer at dinner, to meet, with sherry and coffee, in the common rooms and to talk *ad lib* about the state of things in the country, the latest scandal, the newest fad, the most far-out fashion? Who has not heard it said that he learned more over college dinner than from any course of lectures? This, the playground, of sports, gossip, debate, dinner, all socializing situations, was the groundwork out of which the young found themselves, and that gave Britain its soldiers, diplomats, judges, business entrepreneurs, scholars, from the days of Queen Elizabeth I to those — very nearly — of Elizabeth II — not in the sense of men trained as such for these positions, but men acculturated in common, able to converse freely with one another in the college years, and able to do so afterward as freely in the years of service to their nation their own vested interests, by virtue of the common bonds, the common college ties put upon them during these few vergent years. It is not what they learned in any academic sense that mattered — the philosophy, politics, history, languages, or the like — but what they absorbed in the common concourse of the college community, in bull-sessions, drinking parties, pub-crawling, debates, clubs, sports, friendships, and every non-academic, *playful*, self-propelling activity. What counted was a common argotese, of wit, sportsmanship, fair-play, that the sons would carry with them all their lives.

One should take a moment to pause at this self-designing, and to compare it with the recent plan at Stanford in California, where Professor Joseph Katz and his associates

were tailor-making the college curriculum to suit each student's unique needs, life history, ambitions, and capacities! By what extraordinary presumption can any present day psychologist or educator propose that selfhoods can be made like pairs of pants? Have not men and women, down the ages, fashioned *themselves*, and on the whole with remarkable felicity? Thomas Jefferson, by way of Katz and associates, might well have ended up as a country gardener or fiddler! What is there is these schemes for managing the young that loses all sight of history? I draw attention to the second principle upon which Oxford and Cambridge were based — *that culture forms in play, not in work, and that for self-designing and socializing about twice as much of the day is needed as can justifiably be taken up by learning in the formal sense*.

I must add at once, however, that the "play" is not what Americans make of it. It is not dressing-up education in "fun," nor is it contrived, as in the "play factory" of Emporia State (Kansas, see Harper, 1975), nor is it anything described by Harold Cox in *The Feast of Fools* (1969). All such is more puerility than culture-forming. There is nothing puerile in the Oxford self-designing: to this day the Oxford Debating Society is the most famous, and the most electable, in the world. When Oxford students debate it is with wit and literary style, with scant regard for any fact there may be in the world; when Americans debate, it is with both hands and eyes in a card index of facts. The one is "play." The other is merely "work."

The model, as I have described it, is scarcely that of communities of scholars striving for academic freedom, bent on seeking truth for its own sake (such as Karl Jaspers [1959] asks us to contemplate as an ideal). A few scholars, of course, could become so engrossed, as Roger Bacon was at the outset of Oxford. The description of Oxford, as I have given it, suggests "play" even in the learning activity itself. But it could function only in terms of a well-to-do elite. At some German medieval colleges, as we all know, the students were supreme, hiring and firing their tutors, who were in the same menial role as professors are today in American universities. Not so, however, at Oxford and Cambridge, where the dons and fellows were in league with the young men they tutored — they were of the same elite class, from the same public schools. Writing of Cambridge in the 1780s, Henry Gunning is quoted as saying:

> There were few men amongst the Masters of Arts of pretty high standing, who cultivated the acquaintance of the young nobility, and continued to keep a handsome establishment, without any other apparent resources than their fellowships. Two of the most celebrated (I was near to using the word notorious) were Akehurst and Pulteney, both fellows of Kings. At a dinner given by the Bishop of Llandaff to the Duke of Rutland and some other young men of high rank, the Bishop was pressed by Akehurst to take a seat at a table where there was a vacancy, and at which they had been playing for very high stakes. This was the very significant answer of the Bishop — "I have no estate to lose, Sir; I am not desirous of winning one." (Namier, 1962, pp. 8–9)

The Masters of Arts in this case were college fellows, faculty members in American terminology, who were dons if they undertook tutoring duties, but who held their fellowships in perpetuity, in many cases with income, board and residence, without necessarily serving any college function whatsoever — except to dine, gossip, and be around at times. Many a tutor, from a modest beginning, became a vicar, rector or bishop in the Episcopacy, under the patronage of the nobility he had tutored at college.

It was to rub shoulders with the nobility and the landed gentry that gave college life much of its significance, of course. The learning as such, was often desultory, and indeed

unscholarly, even for the times. The most important professional schools were not at Oxford or Cambridge, but outside the college domain, for example at the Inns of Court in London (13th century) to train the common law lawyers required by the commercial interests of the city, and the College of Physicians in London (1560), to train doctors, practices which have continued in London ever since those early days.

Still less was the college education modeled on that of the education of the Renaissance many-sided princes, the Medicis, the Gonzagas of Mantua described with such eloquence by Vittorina da Feltre. The many-sided man was educated privately, and not in the medieval colleges. Even so, his learning had the same basic purpose as that of the colleges, The prince would study the laws of his land not to become a lawyer and not for the sake of a liberal education, but to hold his own in the everyday conversational matrix and communication of the society at large in which he would live.

Nor was any college concerned with research, for the public or any other good, as useful to the state, even though this was the first broached in Queen Elizabeth's time by Sir Humphrey Gilbert. The research academy he proposed was not modeled on the colleges at Oxford and Cambridge: it was to have been an interdisciplinary institution in which professors from every discipline, and specialists in every important language Spanish, French, Italian, High Dutch — along with librarians and administrators, were to be housed together, and where everyone would be good for *something* (in contrast to the fellows at Oxford and Cambridge who, Sit Humphrey considered, were good for *nothing*). The same holds for Francis Bacon, who wanted to develop knowledge at large, free from the traditional forms of his time; and he never expected to find this in the colleges. He would have signed without hesitation, we may be sure, the Carnegie Commission Report on Higher Education (1970) which calls for the PhD degree to be reserved for research and scholarly purposes, free from the professionalizing function this degree now serves in the United States.

This is not to say that the young student at Oxford or Cambridge would miss any ongoing academic advances. The excitement of the new "math," the developments in astronomy, navigation, and the like at the time of Sir Isaac Newton — who was a professor at Cambridge from 1669 to 1701—were unlikely to pass unnoticed.

It is clear, nevertheless, that maintenance of the status quo was more characteristic of the colleges and the transmission of values more significant than keeping up with innovations and social changes. Reeves writes:

> The historic universities passed on a solid inheritance; when this became irrelevant to a new society, they still passed it on . . . stability was more valued than change. The critical role — so often claimed for universities — was hardly ever practiced. (Reeves, 1970, p. 84)

She remarks in this connection that universities, since the 16th century, have not been the "intellectual growing points" that we assume for them; more often than not these have come from outside the universities, as happened in the case of Francis Bacon, or were only inside them "by the accidents of persons," as was the case for Sir Isaac Newton. Reeves concludes that it is perhaps the "key task" of a university to accept this modest role, of passing along the solid store of inherited knowledge rather than keeping up with every change or need. Only in this way, she argues, can the student be provided with a stable environment in which to pursue his studies.

My response to Reeves is the body of these chapters. I have placed before the reader this collegiate ensemble of history and philosophy to ask whether it is reasonable, even now, to use it as a model for Quiddity College. It is based, however, not merely on

historical roots. Clearly the times have changed, and present-day America is scarcely commensurate with medieval England. Principles, however, do not change so markedly. Culture still is fashioned in "play." And consciousness is still mere communicability, of which reading and conversation remain its basic modus operandi — notwithstanding Marshal McLuhan and the onset of the electronic age (Stephenson, 1969). Thus, when we seek to judge the merits of any proposals put forward for higher education these two principles, along with one other, must be in the reckoning. The one other we shall look at in the sequel — it has to do with a symbiotic relationship between education and the society in which the young are to live. Meanwhile, there are in these principles the suggestion, at least, that perhaps at college level the student could be given very much less to learn, and more to play with for his own self-designing. Reeves would no doubt want the (limited) "store of inherited knowledge" to be found in the classics, for which Oxford was and remains rep-eminent. My own proposal will be very different, though in agreement with hers to the extent that a limit must be put upon the knowledge as such upon which the student can be expected to "play" his learning. Otherwise, "work" in the mornings, as Comenius suggested, leaving the rest of the day for acculturation is something to conjure with: only in such a trifid, three-cleft day, of mornings for learning, afternoons for autonomous sport, and evenings for peer group social concerns — only in this, I would say to Reeves, is an environment provided in which young people, for the crucial years leading into adulthood, can enter into common communicability with their peers, to form their own selfhoods.

The Graduate

Matters of learning were not neglected altogether at Oxford and Cambridge. In earlier times the guild relations between theology, law, medicine, were linked to the baccalaureate — as journalism is today in an American university which offers the Bachelor of Journalism degree. Even now, if one were to enter law at Oxford, Brasenose College would be the college of one's choice, and the Honours School of Politics, Philosophy and Economics (PPE) would serve as entry in graduation with a BA as its foundation; with an additional year of college residence a baccalaureate of law would be added as its professionalizing supplement. One would graduate with two baccalaureate degrees, BA and LLB. But similarly for the other professionalizing avenues — in science, BA and BSc; in medicine, BA and BM; in theology, BA and BD; in the humanities, BA and BLitt. The baccalaureate supplements are all of technical significance, preparatory to the professions, and are of university rather than college concern.

The cleverest possible distinction is made between these degrees and either the Master of Arts or any Doctorate. The Doctorate of Medicine, Divinity, Literature, Science, or Philosophy is given only for distinguished research or scholarship — not for professional practices.

The Master of Arts was and is quite out of line with these degrees. Two years after graduating with the BA degree the graduate became an MA by decree of the university—paying a small fee for the certification. Originally, this signified that one could teach in the university; and I fancy that it is still true that outsiders cannot teach in Oxford or Cambridge without this MA by decree. It certified that one was part of the university, *in esse*. One could vote on university regulations and statutes — indeed for the rest of one's life whether one was at the university or not — and one could vote for the university Burgess, the Member of Parliament for the University, privileges which were ended only within the past several decades, in my own academic lifetime.

The University

The Oxford and Cambridge colleges to this day maintain almost complete autonomy, whether they have only a hundred undergraduates or a thousand, appointing their own professors, selecting their own students, and honoring whomever they want with degrees: the university is essentially appended to them.

The university serves functions common to all the colleges, with a special eye to scholarly pursuits. It maintains the university library, press, museums, and institutes for research and professional training. It organizes the university examinations and scholarships; it, too, appoints its own professors, readers, and lecturers. The body of dons and lecturers, professors and fellows allot themselves into faculties — of which there are now many: theology, law, medicine, litterae humaniores, modern history, English literature, medieval and modern languages and a few more, including the natural sciences — electing members to the boards of faculties by common vote. All university-wide rules and regulations pass through these boards. These in turn elect members to the Hebdomadal Council eight in all, who, with the vice-chancellor, constitute the executive body of the university. The vice-chancellor is chosen from heads of colleges and serves only for three years. Routine administrative matters are in the hands of a secretary and a treasurer with staffs of such diminutive size as to put American universities to shame.

The titular head of the university, the chancellor, is a public figure appointed by royal decree who appears for ceremonial events and whose authority would be exercised only in the direst circumstances detrimental to the university. Basically, then, in spite of the royal keystone, the university is an autonomous institution, a guild indeed, everyone counting alike at voting time, whether vice-chancellor or newest don. Fellows appoint the principal, master, or provost of their colleges. Professorships are made by committees on an ad hoc basis, whether for colleges or the university. University salaries are openly considered by Hebdomadal Council or faculties. Innovations are initiated from above or below, are pursued by committees, and gain by their merits at voting time for the university business.

I know something of this first-hand. As university reader in experimental psychology at Oxford, I took part in instituting the Honours course in Psychology, Philosophy and Physiology (PPP), working upwards through the board of the faculty of biological sciences, of which I was an elected member. Scientific faculty members of the university were on my side, but many literary and philosophical dons were not and sought to block the statutes for the PPP. In due course, with support from the Hebdomadal Council (and finances granted by the then university grants committee of the government), the day came for the voting on the statute. Professor Gilbert Ryle, the notable philosopher at Magdelene College and opponent of the proposal, spoke at length at the university business meeting, giving reasons for blocking the teaching of psychology at Oxford — it was already well-enough represented at Cambridge; and besides, it would be likely to induce an unwanted introspectionism and introversion among undergraduates. The vice-chancellor at the time was Stallybrass of Brasenose, who followed Ryle with a brilliant barrister's imitation of Ryle's slight stammer and a spirited defense of the proposal — "I am not a psychologist," he stammered, "nor am I a physiologist, not a philosopher, nor a phrenologist. But if I had a modicum of knowledge of any of these disciplines I am sure that I could discern an enormous bump of obstinacy on the forehead of Professor Gilbert Ryle." We won, by a narrow margin, in a vote involving over a hundred MAs attracted to the business. That was Oxford.

Chapter 2: The University in America

The university is not a democratic city, it is a place hierarchical because of the necessary rankings among the more knowing and the less knowing. But ideas change . . . I have this other vision of a university . . . (it is) a shining city on a hill . . . whose daily work is truth.

R. Dugger, 1974

The American university is fashioned on German "idealism," with relatively menial faculties and much inflated administrators, deans, chancellors, and presidents. And of course, regents, curators, or trustees who hold, and wield, power.

The system is simple in principle. Its core is a college of arts and science. Surrounding this is a graduate school and various professionalizing schools and colleges — of medicine, law, agriculture, engineering, education, journalism and the rest. Appended to the latter are institutes for research projects or other worthy programs of training or research. It makes it possible, and most will agree desirable, for the freshmen to enter the core college of arts and sciences for the sake of the liberal education it may provide, as well as for the preparation it can afford for entrance into one or another of the professionalizing schools or colleges. The professional training should ordinarily lead to graduate degrees, the Master's in engineering, education, fine arts, nursing, journalism; and to the doctorates in medicine, law, dentistry, education, etc., i.e., the MD, EdD, LLD, DD, DVS, or the like degrees.

Then there is the PhD degree, meant to be the highest academic award of the graduate school.

The PhD degree, however, has lost this pristine position in America. There is a sense in which the holder of an MD degree or LLD or EdD, who proceeds thereafter to a PhD, can add research and scholarly stature to his vita, and perhaps to the advancement of knowledge as well. But thousands of PhDs are awarded each year at Harvard, Chicago, California and the rest, which fill library shelves, but little else; there is now a "glut" of PhDs in all fields; and the degree itself is receiving a good deal of criticism:

> The American PhD is highly regarded . . . but . . . . Just consider the disjointed conversations which are classed as graduate seminars, or the oral examinations in defense of theses unread by the examiners, or the theses, themselves, which at least in some of the verbal fields, are more exercises in confusing and confused jargon than examples of reflective thought about a subject of some intrinsic significance. (Mayhew, 1970)

The importance of the professionalizing schools and colleges to the nation can scarcely be exaggerated, however, and some in the USA are the best in the world. We have to look beyond the training they provide and the skills they foster to remind ourselves that the professions to which they are directed are essential also to the stability and coherence of a nation.

It is easy to forget that our institutions—the families, churches, schools, universities, courts, armed forces, businesses, hospitals and the rest—serve to stabilize the nation by diffusing *authority* through it. There is no final authority, but a multitude of people exercising portions of it for the good of all. Thus, doctors are expected to maintain ethical and moral standards among themselves, along with acceptable levels of practice, without surveillance from outside agencies. They cannot treat the nation's laws with impunity. But neither can they break a hundred other regulations and professional rules which they impose upon themselves for the orderly conduct of their work. Without such

regulations the profession would be fit for nothing. So it is with every institution: in each there is an allocation of authority for the sake of stability and order. Children, in a well-regulated home, take standards of conduct from their parents, which, in the last analysis, have to be authoritatively imposed; they are simple rules of good conduct, politeness, trust in one another, consideration for the young and old, remembering birthdays, greetings, concern for one another, manners, fair-play in responsibilities, loyalty to the family — not to mention such simple matters as orderliness, tidiness, regularity and the like of a well-run family. In my view, nothing can be further from the truth than the belief, unfortunately widely prevalent in the USA, that such constraints upon children are unpsychological and restrictive of the child's personality. On the contrary, they give structure to the child so that it knows where it is. It is for the sake of order instead of disorder, composure instead of jaded nerves, coherency and stability in living conditions — with no harm to anything or anyone, and much good to all. So it is with every institution: a society, a nation, maintains such consistency as it has through its institutions by the dispersion of authority, the willing acceptance of rules, roles, regulations and the like, for the sake of everyone involved. For this reason, therefore, threats to a nation's institutions, or their breakdown, should be matters for everyone's serious concern. The universities are particularly important, and vulnerable, in this respect. They are important because they train young people for so many of the nation's other sustaining institutions.

The University Symbiosis

The Oxford-Cambridge trifid model was in symbiotic relationship with the English upper class, the nobility, landed gentry and successful businessmen, linked to the state's army, church, government and law, and of course, the Crown, in which patronage was de riguer and taken for granted. Even today, I doubt whether headmasters to public schools, or chaplaincies to cathedrals, can be held by other than scholars of the Oxford or Cambridge colleges to which they hold fealty. It was and is no way considered corrupt — every vicar in Jane Austen's novels seems to have had his living given upon what must have seemed arbitrary patronage to their parishioners.

The symbiosis in America, for its colleges and universities, and especially for its state universities, is almost purely political, in league with industrial, economic and banking interests. Dugger's description of Texas University, is his *Our Invaded Universities* (1974) gives in journalistic detail the raw metal, if not vulgarity, of much of this, of administrators who associate with the rich outside the academic field, and who join with them in their commercial and industrial ventures. In 1972 it seemed that John Connally, by appointing (as Governor of Texas) all nine regents to Texas University, took over "a third of a billion dollars in patronage" in contracts, and thousands of jobs (Dugger, 1974, p. 230). The regents had in their hands a "statewide empire" of educational institutions, whose lands, buildings, and finances offered "real plums" to wealthy businessmen. The regents were (or soon became) chairmen of banks, directors of petrochemical corporations, savings associations, building societies, financial groups, controlling banks throughout the state. In a nation in which economics are supreme, the symbiosis is inevitably in that direction, as one might expect, and although much may be reprehensible, or even scandalous in the power and political structure, it is all of a piece with the overriding authoritative nature of the American university, notwithstanding claims to democratic aspirations. "There is no such thing as faculty autonomy at a state university" says a regent of Texas University: "Authority comes from the top" (Dugger, 1974, p. 230). The power remains at the top, deputed from regents to presidents and chancellors, and from these to deans, who hold all the strings in their hands except that

of teaching — and now, teaching by the clock. Professors are in subordinate environments (not merely inferior positions), in which low salaries, restricted office space, and inadequate resources are endemic. Administrators, and the boards of regents they serve, no doubt do useful work: presidents articulate university purposes; regents gain financial support for the university; and many deans have excellent relations with their faculties. But all too often it is true that the powers act like businessmen, not members of a guild of scholars: "Secretive power among themselves, accounting upward and outward but not downward, obsequiously permitting themselves to be used by those who have the power over their own welfare and authority (Dugger, 1974, p. 114).

There are some 2,500 colleges and universities in the United States, almost one-third new since World War II. Together with the rapidly developing two-year colleges, the sweep of this higher education is tremendous. In the 1960s, nearly 50% of the population of young people were gathered into it, and as many as 80% in California. A "Report on Higher Education" presented to the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (1971), prepared by a committee of California businessmen, teachers and administrators, concluded that the college system had been asked to serve a far wider and more diverse influx of students than had been realized, and that little had been done to meet this problem. The consequence was not merely crass student defensiveness but "dropout" rates of major proportions. Over the nation as a whole, according to the report, perhaps 50% who entered colleges completed less than two years, and as few as 33% completed the AB or BS degree. The university professionalizing schools — in engineering, medicine, law, education, and the rest — are now draining faculties away from the undergraduate college milieu, "at the expense," the Report remarks, "of millions who are seeking education." The "traditional diversity" of American higher education, the report concluded, is disappearing as colleges and universities become larger, more highly structured and bureaucratized." The diversity, it suggested, should be restored.

What Diversity?

But what was the diversity to be restored? The California committee wanted greater significance given to *education*, to undergraduates and graduates alike. Engineers should study English, literature, and chemists, Chinese art.

By what principle, however, is faith in the educative value of knowledge given sanction? It stems from the same Germanic "idealism" upon which the administration of American universities is fashioned, and is described in its precise form in Karl Jaspers' *The Idea of a University* (1959). Jaspers was a psychologist. The primary concern of a university, he maintained, is to provide doctors, lawyers, teachers and the rest for the nation. But this had to be achieved, he held, in an intellectual framework, of a determination to reach truth. The concern was to be with a life-long commitment to faith in the ultimate unity of knowledge. The disciplines and professions were meaningless unless they grasped this unity. Doctor, lawyer, judge, teacher, architect had to become at one with this unity of "man as a whole, and the conditions of human life as a whole." The university could never be properly a mere aggregate of professional training schools, an "intellectual department store, with an abundance of goods for every taste." It must stand instead for "the oneness and wholeness of all knowledge."

There has developed in American universities a degree of interdisciplinary involvement, for example, of collaboration between engineering and medical schools, and of journalism with any other school. Jaspers was not thinking of this direction however: his "oneness" was not a marriage of convenience or opportunity, but integral to knowledge itself. *Truth*, was at issue, to be reached by *method*.

The *method* consisted, for Jaspers, of *work*, indefatiguable work at one's discipline for the rest of one's life, with an intellectual conscience that would brook no self-deception and no cheating of the public faith. But knowledge itself had to be conceived in a Socratic framework: students and academicians were to be in some real sense equal. Students are adults, not children, with full responsibility for themselves. Professors, therefore, should never give them assignments, or even personal guidance.

Every student should find things out for himself; the university merely furnishes the tools and possibilities for the student's free exercise — it directs him to the frontiers of knowledge and leaves him there, to find his own way, to draw his own conclusions, to exercise his own sense of responsibility. The professors had no monopoly of expert knowledge: the students could find their own.

Similarly for the professors in the professional schools. Success there depends more on research projects than on training capabilities — the professor's own research, not the skills of the students.

Jaspers' idea of a university went further: the community of scholars was to be based on friendships, love and marriage — one need scarcely mention the friendships of Schiller and Goethe, and in our time of Einstein, Bohr, Heisenberg, Dirac, and the other great nuclear physicists. We end, with Jaspers, with an intellectual elite, intermarried, intertwined, interlocked in a search for intertruth.

It is not difficult to find this German influence in American universities, though no educational authority in America puts emphasis on the professional training role of universities. All think primarily of colleges. The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education (1971) maintains that a college education "should become more a part of all of life, and less a part of life." It conceives of "all of life" in a *work* context, that "society would gain if work and study were mixed throughout a lifetime" — surely more than an echo of Jaspers' indefatiguable work ethic. And has not Daniel Bell (1966) searched for Jaspers' "oneness" in the proposal to embrace the massive growth of knowledge by reduction to fundamental *concepts*?

A number of Wisconsin professors expressed themselves in the following manner (Potter, et al., 1970, p. 1591):

> The primary purpose of the university
> Is to provide an environment
> In which faculty and students
> Can discover, examine critically,
> Preserve, and transmit
> The knowledge, wisdom, and values
> That will help ensure the survival
> Of the present and future generations
> With improvement in the quality of life

As for motherhood, it is hard to fault this panting poesy. But nowhere in the thought is it clear that though the function of a college may be so extolled, that of a university needs spelling out in terms of its professionalizing role. The primary function of a university, in its professionalizing schools and colleges, is to be supportive of the professional society of America, lawyers, physicians, business managers and the rest. Engineers by the thousands may be required almost overnight. NASA and the aerospace industries made precisely such demands. If America is to remain a technological society these demands are inevitable, and as unpredictable as tomorrow's news. At times, schools will be training thousands of graduates for whom jobs are non-existent in the

professions for which they are trained, as happens for engineers, school teachers and journalists. What creed is there for this? It is scarcely enough to talk of wisdom, knowledge and values in the poetical abstract; and no one argues for strong professionalizing institutions as the core of America's wellbeing. Nor, however, does anyone ask for *less* diversity in training for the professions. Mightn't enough of training be given to students to fit them for *three* professions, such as journalism, teaching and business, or engineering, management and conservation, so that, upon leaving the university, jobs can be taken as opportunity affords, with greater security for everyone, and with greater ultimate freedom of professional choice? As families should (undoubtedly) remain viable and self-developing primary socializing units, so might the case be made that the major professions must seek stability and conservative coherency, notwithstanding fluctuations in demand for their services. But the case is not considered by academe; instead there are concentrations of effort on this-or-that temporary fad. A few years ago it was "excellence" of the professoriate, extolled and sought after by every university in the USA. The excellence was to be in scholarship and research. But now excellence in *teaching* is the fashion, though there is no proof that students learn more of substance from a prize teacher than from any other. Is it not the case that freshmen and sophomore undergraduates are taught (if that is the word) by their own kind, without necessariy seeing a professor in a teaching capacity — a rape of the students, in Duggers' language? Has not Paul Goodman asked where can the student do his own thing? Indeed have not students formed their own T-groups and student-run-taught open universities?

The Quadrivium

We should look again, then, at the American university. As to its form, it is a modern quadrivium: it used to be arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music; now it is the undergraduate college, the graduate school, the professionalizing schools and colleges, and the institutes (of research, projects, centers, etc). There are many who want to dismember this quadrivium, radically, separating the undergraduate college entirely from the graduate schools and colleges.

Yet the quadrivium surely has much to be said for it in principle. It brings to one campus the most important aspects of higher education, more merely as subject-matter, but as men and women who are to become the nation's leaders in many fields. The common *socialization* of these students, however, is never examined in the voluminous literature on the philosophy, objectives and purposes of the American university. The discussion, instead, is about knowledge, truth, scholarship, academic freedom and the rest of a professor's preoccupations.

Any discussion of the university is bound to be shortsighted if the above quadrivium is overlooked. Consider, for example, an article by N. S. Thompson in *Change* (1971, p. 27) entitled "The Failure of Pluralism". He says a great deal about what a university is *not*. The university, Thompson proposes, is more than merely a YMCA, serving to protect and nurture the intellectual development of the young. Nor is it a sieve to sift the young into positions of leadership in industry and government. Nor is it a trade school, an "academic union hall" for the learned professions. Nor is it a consulting firm. Nor is it an ivory tower, encouraging reflective and creative thought. Nor is it a "liberal institution" of humanism and humanitarianism — nor yet a haven of self-experience. According to Professor Thompson, it should be a place for *understanding*, for "conceptual innovation," an institution whose primary responsibility should be the "generation and dissemination of new and better ways of thinking about nature, society

and personal experience," that is, concerned with "beliefs and important ideas," to gain a better, fuller, "more timely understanding of the world."

Professor Thompson would act drastically, of course. He would discard academic departments and the traditional disciplines. Departments are to be discouraged because "they set limits on disagreement, and thus on innovation:" people in them are insulated from knowledge different from their own, which breeds narrow specialization. Disciplines are also contraindicated because they are *methods* of study, and these might be proved wrong. What is left is the faculty and the student body. Students have to be treated not merely as adults, but as the essential innovators, the creators, the fountains of the new knowledge, who *prod* the professors along (Thompson uses the word goad for this, the professors being pricked, like cattle to get out of the students' way). Upon leaving the university, the students continue their "conceptual innovation" as prodders, promulgators, and disseminators of new and better ways in the world outside.

It is all souped-up Jaspers. But Jaspers at least kept his feet on the ground by admitting that without *method* there could be no truth or proof of anything. Professor Thompson's fantasy would never be proved wrong, however, all method being barred. With the kindest mind in the world, one must ask what evidence is there, indeed, that the mass of students anywhere can be the fountain of such truth as Thompson assumes: "An endless fountain of immoral drink/Pouring unto us from haven's brink" (Keats, *Endymion*).

The theme is much the same, in the last analysis, in Professor Nisbet's *The Degradation of the University Myth* (1971). A genuine intellectual community cannot exist, Nisbet asserts, without the blessings of an aristocracy that respects ideas, scholars and teachers, and which had its own system of internal authority.

In the 1950s, Nisbet suggests, there was an implied "social contract" between the universities and the public, to the effect that the universities would be free to pursue knowledge and to teach it to students, provided the professors kept out of politics and all areas of controversy in the public domain. Can universities he asks, exist merely as research establishments? Must they set out, the new crusaders, to tackle all the ills of society—in agriculture, medicine, business, labor, foreign policy, the ghettos and urban complexes? Are they merely halfway houses for the masses of middle-class young, newly demanding a college education? Are they really qualified to be keepers of the nation's moralities, wisdom and conscience? Nisbet answers no to his rhetoric, and then continues as follows about the future university:

> I suggest, its most feasible function . . . is essentially what it has been for nearly a millennium: a setting for scholarly and scientific imagination continuously engaged in the joint labor of teaching and research in the learned disciplines. (Nisbet, 1971)

Nisbet has much to say about how to achieve this university. He would put *authority* back where it belongs (he avers) by restoring the power structures of chairmen, deans, and presidents! He would throw away at least 75% of all institutes, centers, research projects, etc., leaving only "research-in-teaching" and "teaching-in-research." He would "depoliticize" the university, and elevate the function of teaching.

Nisbet is at London University, and I cannot but wonder what Percy Nunn would have said to this had been there now. Where is the public contract, in Britain or in America? Is it not, certainly, in America from the early days of its land-grant universities, to the effect that a university is a place from which the state and nation can expect young people to be reasonably prepared for its sustaining professions? Was not

something of the kind implied in the ancient universities of Oxford and Cambridge? What was there, ever, in the professionalizing schools and colleges that meant "tackling all the ills of society?" Surely, they were meant to support engineering, industry, health, business, education, communications, law as these exist in the symbiotic relation to society? On the other hand, is it not possible that research institutions, as outcrops of the other three segments of the quadrivium, might undertake research into cancer and other "ills of society?" What on earth is wrong with such an eminently sensible possibility?" Moreover, as to halfway houses for the young, demanding a college education, what is wrong there, if undergraduate colleges do their work properly?

The trouble, of course, is that these colleges have failed ignominiously, and are in deep trouble. They consume four years of a young person's lifetime, and those the most formative, for 40 weeks or more of the year, and 40-hour or more work-weeks for courses, exclusive of more hours for term papers and preparation for examinations. The courses are peppered with quizzes, computerized scores, grades based on normal probability curves, and spastic examinations, all for a baccalaureate degree. The situation is one which encourages the instructor to set questions week after week largely for grading purposes. It is seen by students as a series of piecemeal hurdles to overcome—a three-hour examination, a 10-page paper, a reading list of four books, all tasks to be mastered and then forgotten. The students, naturally, counter with their own devious stratagems and tactics. They read every other page of an assigned reading, underlining snippets of information that, they guess, may be called for in quizzes; or they do every sixth problem in mathematics, arguing that they will get a "B" at least. Indeed, they now buy term papers (and even MA thesis and PhD dissertations) on the open market. In his *The Hidden Curriculum*, Benson Snyder (1971) observes that students have had to develop such "ploys and adaptive techniques" to keep their heads above the academic quagmire into which professors have thrown them.

There are efforts, of course, to redress these abuses, and a few famous colleges are immune to them — at Bennington, for example, where when I knew it at its best, the PhD degree was conspicuous by its absence among the faculty (as is true of Oxford today). A "great experiment" is underway at Hampshire College (*Change*, November 1971, p. 48); this college, the magazine observes,

> wants to put the fun back into what is really an old-fashioned pastime: learning. This is a massive first-aid campaign, a clever diversionary tactic . . . that liberal arts is a must, and that putting life back into learning will prove not only the form but the substance of its survival.

Note again the ever-present compulsion — to educate, by heaven, even if we have to put fun back into it to achieve it!

A few American universities have been organized recently on the Oxford/Cambridge style as clusters of colleges, notably the Claremont group at Santa Cruz in California, consisting of Ponoma (1887), Claremont University Center (1925), Scripps (1926), Claremont Men's (1946), Harvey Mudd (1955), and Pitzer (1963). It is described as a Californian model of Oxford University. As such it combines the advantages, it is said, of small colleges and a large university: the colleges are independent non-profit organizations; each has its own faculty, buildings, and endowments, and each is fashioning its own traditions. Health services, a business office, theater, computer center, library, bookstore and the like expensive facilities are held jointly by the university.

It has the Oxford form, but not its substance. The central premise at Claremont is that students have increasingly varied background and interests, and that these have to be accommodated by flexibility in the institutions serving them. Each college, therefore, serves special interest groups — business at college X, pre-medical at college Y, and communications at college Z. It altogether misses the key factor in the trifid model at Oxford — that of providing a simple basis of learning, with two-thirds of the time left over for development of peer loyalties, common values, and finding oneself.

To return to Nisbet. His glaucomatous vision lets him see only core colleges of arts and science, to which every kind of goodness has been attributed: to foster intellectual honesty and independence of mind; to make a cultured person, putting him at the height of his times; to provide a concern for art, good literature, poetry, music; to induce existential resourcefulness, strong, independent, game; to fashion models of committed integrity; to be committed to the unfolding of individuality; to make citizens in the best sense; to confront the young with a sense of tragedy (provided they don't commit suicide!), with passion, joy, and delight at the prospect of human existence, and with courage to cope with its inevitable vicissitudes! Notice that in this Pandora's box of human treasures, no student speaks for himself — only the academician Nisbet speaks. Also, that what we are given are end products, the finished paragon of virtues, not any principles on which the young take shape.

As to principles many, of course, have had mention, and some have been sadly overlooked. We should start with one which has suffered this fate in almost every discussion — there is a difference between undergraduate and graduate functions that common sense admits but scholars obfuscate.

Ortega y Gasset (1944), as wise as any, thought of the *ordinary* student and what he *can* be taught with reasonable limits. Paul Goodman (1970) asks why should we expect youth to be rational, and wonders whether, after all, it mightn't be better to return to "old-fashioned" educational theory, to transmit Culture (with a capital "C") and the greatness of Man — by reading a *few* great books. However, we know the fate of Hutchin's great books experiment; and one would be loath to leave the choice of books to a few charismatic scholars as Arrowsmith proposes ("The Shame of Graduate Schools," and "The Future of Teaching," 1967). I would suggest, to cover the need for setting limits upon what one should expect of learning in undergraduate colleges, a *principle of parsimony*, of care to the point of stinginess about the curriculum. At present, what teacher of mathematics would restrict instruction to elementary analysis, with classical algebra, calculus and geometry the only undergraduate concern? What instructor in foreign languages will be satisfied if students can sing Victor Hugo's lyrics and converse modestly in French? What is so alarming about everyone learning a modicum of something? If they had other things to do, students wouldn't mind — and indeed might learn something useful like conversational French. The truth is that the curriculum grows out of the individual interests of professors and, once installed, they live on autonomously (Mayhew, 1969). How wise, therefore, as at Oxford, or at Bennington when I knew it, to have no faculty members with a PhD degree.

At the professionalizing level of the training schools and colleges the same holds true. Medical schools, law schools, journalism schools, are served by faculties with professional qualifications, and the PhD is characterized by its absence. The principle of parsimony applies to all such schools and colleges, namely, that limits have to be put on what the *ordinary* graduate can be taught, though medical schools often seem to forget this. There may be a few dropouts from such schools, but failures are rare. And that is precisely how it should be.

The Learning Imperative

It is acknowledged that the American university system is highly bureaucratized, and that politics and money count at its roots. But in searching for a philosophy of higher education, we find that the discussion turns on understanding, knowledge, truth, scholarly imagination, discipline, learning — these are the catchwords of educators, no matter how different their prescriptions for fulfillment of this learning imperative. Even when students are recognized as worth something for themselves, it is worth in learning, creativity, and solving the future problems of the world. It is all so very different from the playful model of Oxford. Nor is there in this any recognition of a communication problem, that if a college is to influence students for their common communicability, it has to be considered. Adults gain commonality from newspapers, television, books, magazines, recorded music, all taken at their leisure, with no self-consciousness that one is being educated. Has higher education to offer as much? Nor is the symbiotic problem critically examined: indeed it is largely ignored. The professionalizing function of training schools and colleges receives no mention, swept under the rug, it seems, so that the floor is clean for learning. Oh, this learning — what a thing it is! (from *The Taming of the Shrew*).

Chapter 9: The 'Playful' Cultural College

Even Bach and Mozart could hardly have been aware that they were pursuing anything more than the noblest of pastimes — dialogue in the Aristotelian sense, pure recreation. And was it not just this sublime naiveté that enabled them to soar to the heights of perfection?

J. Huizinga, *Homo Ludens*

Quiddity College

We are to fashion Quiddity on basic educative principles, to espouse truth-values. The reader will indeed wonder, by now, how much longer must he wait before learning of this remarkable college, fountain of quibbles and quintessence alike! Let us begin, therefore, with the warming symbiosis of the Oxford model, matching undergraduates to the needs of the nation. The young men, remember, were to be *communicable in common* (the basis of social life), achieved as *character*, formed by a "playful" approach to academic life. The formation of a common *creaturehood* (as we might now call it) was of greater significance than being highly knowledgeable. We have need, therefore, to look closely at the "playful" approach.

This itself is a tall order: but let us look at the college, and then the reasons for it can be developed.

Quiddity will be exquisitely traditional in its character, but ultra-modern in its principles. It will not go into isolation, as John Dewey's brainchild did at Bennington in Vermont, but will be associated with a leading university in California, Texas, or Florida. Even so, it will be as autonomous as any college at Oxford in its academic sovereignty, with its own statutes, property and customs.

Its trust could be a consortium of American foundations, which will found the college, provide the land and buildings and a fund in government bonds sufficient for upkeep. The authority of the trustees, otherwise, will be to go no further than to ensure the autonomy of the college. The reader will remember that I have not any expectancy that such a consortium would be both so far-seeing, or so profligate — though the latter, to judge by years of effort in that direction, can perhaps be safely assumed.

Spatially planned, with Thomas Jefferson's Monticello gardens in mind, on a hilltop if possible, planted with fine trees and shrubs, there will be footpaths aplenty in the 30-acre grounds. One cannot hope to intersperse the glades with jasmine, honeysuckle, sweet briar; or keep deer, rabbits, peacocks, guinea poultry, pigeons, etc., in the woods; but benches and seats of rock or turf passim there will be — the grounds will be as meticulously planned as were those for Monticello (as described in Betts and Perkins' small treasure, *Thomas Jefferson's Flower Garden at Monticello*, 1971). Highest priority is given to the grounds in the plans for the college. Without this reminder of Thomas Jefferson's intentionality and delight, there can be no Quiddity.

But why Jefferson? The college is not about to revive Jeffersonianism; but Thomas Jefferson will symbolize for it the very quintessence of the American promise. Besides being statesman, gentleman and scholar Jefferson, as Henry Adams said, "aspired beyond the ambition of a nationality, and embraced in his view the whole future of man." It is an intentionality to be seen over and over again in America's short history, and Quiddity will internalize it no less.

The college will be totally enclosed, but open to the public on set occasions. Its structure will have traditional form, but in architecture to suit the sunny conditions of the South. Dining room, houses of residence for fellows and undergraduates, library, common rooms, lecture hall, chapel (a place of ascetic calm for contemplation, poetry, and music, like the Saarinan Chapel at Stephens College, Missouri, sans any religious proselytizing function — the Saarinan Chapel is one of the most exquisite in America), and the necessary bursar and registry offices — Quiddity will be quietly cool, simple, inordinately pleasing to the eye.

At its foundation there will be a President of the college and six fellows. They will represent the Jefferson Circle, as described by Daniel J. Boorstin in *The Lost World of Thomas Jefferson* (1948). I shall have more to say of this shortly, the Jefferson Circle being Quiddity's alter ego.

The president will be chairperson, wholly responsible for selecting the undergraduates. His fellowship should be in recognition of his scholarly awareness of Thomas Jefferson's mind, and historian probably — a Daniel Boorstin brought to judgment! The Rittenhouse fellow will represent modern astronomy; the Rush fellow, medicine; the Barton fellow, biological sciences; the Peale fellow, the humanities; the Priestley fellow, science and theology; the Paine fellow, political science. Prestigious for scholarliness, these fellows will form the new Jefferson circle. There will be six additional dons, understudies for all but the president, making an academic covey of thirteen, devoted to Quiddity, not to the devil! The bursar will concern himself with administrative matters, including the finances. The president and fellows will be the Hebdomadal Council, meeting weekly, responsible for all actions other than those proscribed for the president. The president will be chosen by the trustees; the fellows by an ad hoc committee of three authorities chosen by the trustees, from the scholarly fields of the fellowships. The Hebdomadal Council will appoint the dons, a librarian, and a gardener for the grounds, of equal status.

The college will be for citizens of the United States, 20–21 years of age upon entrance, who have concluded the freshman and sophomore years of an associated university, and who will spend the junior and senior years at Quiddity. As indicated, they are to be *communicable in common*, and are not separated from the crowd of the university.

They are selected by the president of Quiddity, on the basis of the candidate's family situation, with letters of recommendation from family friends; an interview with the

president and an essay written on that occasion with a different topic for each candidate, to ensure literalness; a good writing and speaking capability in a foreign language, preferably Spanish, French as second in favor — these three elements being equally weighted.

Sixty undergraduates would enter each year, for the two years of Quiddity, each year of three terms, each term of eight weeks — Autumn (October and November), Winter (February and March), Spring (May and June). Men and women would be housed separately, but would dine together, and dinner would be obligatory on specified evenings, say Wednesdays and Sundays.

The library will have a special section devoted to works by and on the original Jefferson circle, beautifully bound and handsome to hold, as well as selected works on the central problems of Quiddity. The chapel, as I have said, will be a place for solitude, for music, sans debate, sans religious proselytizing, sans chaplain: but with a fine organist.

The workdays will be *trifid*, with work in the mornings, afternoon for "play," evening for "socializing." Formal work will be in lecture and tutorial fashion, with practicums as needed. A formal lecture each term by the president will be of central significance. Each "house" will have two conference rooms, and its dining room will double as a departmental library.

At capacity each academician (excluding the president) will be responsible for ten students, five juniors, five seniors. Each fellow, and this includes the president, will be housemaster for 17 undergraduates (give or take one or two), resident in one or other of the seven "houses," and housed *randomly* with respect to the academic years and fancies of the undergraduates. Each fellow will "live in"; will be replaced by a house-mother at his own expense! House rules will be severe: short academic gowns will be obligatory on formal occasions and at the obligatory dinners. There will be no smoking indoors; no connubialities; no hard liquors — sherry and wine excepted; no religious ceremonies, and where "grace" is spoken, as at the formal dinners, it will be a simple thankfulness. Fees would have to be guaranteed for the two years of college. The self of *worth* begins with such structures, and if it seems monklike, so be it. Young people, however, brought together in the conditions herein visioned, have a way out in friendships and imprintings that nothing at Quiddity will sidetrack or seek to limit.

The attachment to the university will be formal: Quiddity students will be able to attend courses at the university; the university library and laboratories will be at hand; and fellows and dons may hold professorships in the university, though more in recognition of their scholarship than as functionaries. Seniors could finish with a college baccalaureate, by arrangement with authorities; but there will be no keeping of academic records for student work at Quiddity, no quizzes, and no examinations except for two essay competitions, one at the end of the first year (Quiddity-I) and the other at the end of the second year (Quiddity-II). These competitions will be obligatory, each lasting five mornings (9 to 12), with essay topics provided by the fellows. Creativity, rather than knowledge, will be encouraged; and there will be access to library, notes, or other resources for the writing of these essays; any deemed worthy of it will be printed and bound for inclusion in the special Jefferson library.

The nature of the trifid day is the substance of the chapters to follow. Weekends will be left to the undergraduates' own designing, which shouldn't be too difficult; the university town, its harbor, mountains, golf courses, theaters, restaurants will be readily at hand. The necessity to appear for dinner on Sunday evenings will give some structure to these freedom-giving weekends! The grounds will be closed at 11pm, open 5am; and

every effort will be taken to keep the undergraduates *in situ*, not away from the outside influence, but not *inter nos*, "between themselves." If it seems elitist, so it will be in its trappings, but not in its substance.

The Cultural Connection

Culture, we shall hold with Huizinga, is fashioned in "play" (*Homo Ludens*, 1950); the plans for Quiddity are in this framework.

I have described play elsewhere in my *The Play Theory of Mass Communication* (1967), and shall not expand upon this here, except to give the reminder that the concern is not with conscious efforts to please, or to entertain, but with *fair play* according to institutionalized rules of conduct.

Everything of genuine play (as communication-pleasure) is to be traditional from the outset at fledgling Quiddity. The academic gowns, painted portraits, obligatory dinners, the trifid days, the high standard of conduct in "house" — all such may seem trivial and outmoded; they serve, however, a most profound function, without which Quiddity would lose its essential power. *There has to be some way to internalize the feeling for fair play at a profound level because all other values depend on it.*

One would expect something of the kind to be coded in the behavior of young people from stable, well-to-do, educationally advantaged homes — as sociologist Basil Bernstein (1965) would no doubt agree. But it has to be reinforced at college because of its profound significance. It would be essential for all fellows to be especially cognizant of the play elements in our own culture: they enter into all our social institutions, the family, church, school, courts, armed forces, professions — apart from the fraternal orders of Masons, Elks and the like!

Consider, for example, law and the courts: the ultimate concern is with a decision in a case rather than with the truth of matters. Justice is subservient to the rules of a legal game, in which the case is tried by a prosecutor before a jury of the accused's peers, with a defense that will try every trick in the courts to win the case. The judge, in wig and gown (in British and other western countries), dispenses the law and watches over the rules of trial; the guilt or not is determined by the jury. Looked at dispassionately, it seems a strange way to dispense justice: it is carried out on a stage, with actors — the judge, defending and prosecuting lawyers playing professional parts, and walk-on witnesses as the plot may demand! In many cases a purely scientific inquiry could determine the innocence or guilt for sure. The jury, however, is confronted with a contest, with playacting by lawyers in their own jargon, conducted with stylized questioning and the high drama of witnesses and carefully controlled evidence, redolent more of the theater than a hall where guilt is to be found and justice done. The more laws, a proverb tells us, the less justice!

It has to be asked, why is the law acted out, as in a play? And wouldn't it be better to put science to work to prove guilt, and not leave it to legal quibbling? It is well known, however, that experts quibble, too, giving contradictory conclusions more often than not. Science, of course, has an ancillary place when matters before a court are really *serious*, as when psychiatrists have to testify as to the sanity or insanity of an accused person: *the qualification, "serious," is an important concept for play theory, to the effect that really serious matters are outside play-theoretical consideration.* The "play" stops dead if an accused murderer is certified to be insane.

The truth is that laws touch us all, and not merely the accused person. There is an ever-present, if implicit, clash between what laws forbid and what people often want or tolerate. Juries can therefore do what seems proper rather than what is just by law, and this is surely a highly significant matter — it leaves the core of justice with one's peers,

not with the law. In this respect the courts, not the law as such, defend the life-style of a society. The play in courts is therefore not vestigial, but inherent in the nature of justice. The panoply of the law, the wigs and gowns and court procedures are a stage on which a trial is played the better to engage *everyone's* interests; and indeed it would be difficult for any playwright to outmatch the solemnity, the wit and humor, of an English court even today, as an institution for trials by a jury of one's peers. But it is more than solemn, more than a contest, more than a clash of wits, more than a vehicle of law; it is intrinsically a recognition that humanity supercedes the law, the "play" being its *modus vivendi*, played for the common man who may know little of the law, but much of humanity. And this is the core, humanity, of civilization.

Anyone who tampers with the jury system, therefore, and with the dignified "play" of courts of law, is being woefully destructive of the very foundations of common law: even if only two important cases were to be tried each year, with the full panoply of wigs, gowns, juries, judges, attorneys, the wigs would be more significant than the attorneys.

The lesson for culture from the history of warfare is no less significant. Over the centuries of Christendom, and before, war was conceived as a "noble game." The nobility has gone from modern warfare, but relics of the play element are still evident. Brilliant uniforms, proudly worn medals, and prancing cavalry still make magnificent military gestures. And civilization owes much to the trappings of knightly tournaments, joustings, vows and dubbings, with associated codes of honor and courtly demeanor: epic poetry, the decorative arts, the splendor of parades and ceremonies, are with us still, and evidence that the sounds of battle are not all blown away with the wind! There is indeed a direct line, Huizinga aptly said, between knights in armor, the "honnête home" of the 17th century, and the 18th century notion of a gentleman. Chivalry and courteous love were interwoven — though it as true that bawdy tale-telling was as prevalent (Brians, 1972). The "noble game" was conducted according to rules and codes of honor; armies confronted each other in full uniforms, and not in rabble cloth; lines of battle were de rigueur. The Battle of Princeton was won by George Washington, as every American schoolchild knows, because American soldiers came from behind the line of battle, and not, as the rules prescribed, by lining up in front of the British mercenaries and facing them point-blank. By the rules of war at the time, it was unfair. It was dictated, no doubt, by the invention of the long-bore rifle with which the Americans fought — the noble game cannot outwit invention! And surely, it will be said, an army fights to win, and that (as General MacArthur said) there can be no substitute for victory, however won.

When battles are won according to rule, however, as between equals, the conqueror wins honor as well as the war. So in recent times British and Australian soldiers fought Malaysians at the latter's own game, guerilla tactics, with honor, and little loss to either side. But nothing of American might and bestial technology could break the will of the North Vietnamese, and America had to suffer both defeat and dishonor. And when Israel ruthlessly despoiled Lebanon and the PLO, it won a war but lost all honor.

Can war, then, still be fought under constraint, as "play," even when people are fighting for their rights, for liberty and justice? Is any course of action, however diabolical, permissible in the name of justice? The question may seem purely academic; but much turns on an answer. *If civilization has to be developed as culture, good faith is an essential ingredient; and faith has to be played, according to rules. Fair play is at the roots of all culture, beyond any consideration of what is right or wrong, moral or ethical.*

This is a most difficult lesson to learn. How foolish can one be, to suppose that fair play can have any part in war! But if presidents and generals were imbued with a sense

of fair play (unlike President Richard Nixon and generals who, like MacArthur, knew nothing of it), their strategies would reflect it. They would not deploy massive forces to destroy a weak nation, but would use strategies to suit the conditions, winning by fair play, and gaining honor by so doing. It is hard to believe that Sweden, or England, would have fought the Vietnamese by the massive and horrible means of the United States forces, not merely on strategic grounds, but more intrinsically out of a sense of fair play.

It is in such terms that the "play" of civilization exists. Its profound function is to maintain social stability under conditions of fair play, that is, such that societal effects are inconsequential in real terms. It doesn't matter much who wins a game, except in the pleasure afforded both sides: it shouldn't matter *too much* who wins (or loses) a war. As soon as any conception of total destruction arises, matters are too serious and have gotten out of civilization's gentle hands.

Which, of course, is where the world stands today, on the brink of total destruction of the civilization it has developed, through "play," since before Christendom.

There is still another lesson to consider. Science itself is "played." Why, for example, does the scientist value *eponymy* so highly, that is, being first to report a discovery? Could nature care who first unravels its mysteries? And why are papers published by tens of thousands one year, never to be read again a year later? That there are "play" elements in such practices is well documented (Hagstrom, 1965); the truth is that thousands of scientists are happy in their laboratories, following this or that fad and fashion like any happy player in a golf course or fisherman on a trout stream. There are only a few scientists at any time whose work is really significant; the others are occupied with details, and could only persist under play conditions — they *enjoy* what they are doing, doing little harm, if little good either, except to maintain a stable scientific institution. A few key discoveries — penicillin, the laser beam, nuclear fusion and the like — alone are epoch-making, from which the playful proliferate. A few physicists discovered the secrets of nuclear energy, a rare event. A few caught the secret of DNA, of life as coded information, in a burst of playful cheating (*The Double Helix*, Watson, 1968).

Scientists widely maintain that they are not involved as scientists in moral questions of what is good, or bad, about the consequences of their discoveries or theories. Their work may make them look like fiends, or dreamers or angels — so said Lord Raleigh at the 1939 meeting of the British Association — but this is neither blameworthy nor commendable. The scientist, most of them would agree, studies nature because he delights in doing so, not because it is beautiful (Poincaré said so). The Marxist, on the other hand, could as easily assert that the same scientists make sure their theories are not dangerous to God, or to capital, i.e., to the *status quo*. Volumes have been filled, of course, on this mater of the nature of science in fundamental moral respects.

In "play-theoretical" terms the volumes collapse into a simple desideratum, as to whether "play" is at issue, or not. If "play," then little harm is done to anything or anyone, and yet science prospers by the insights of an Einstein, a Fleming, a Watson. If the game becomes too serious, as it now has, then the scientist can no longer escape its moral implications.

These considerations, for law, the military, and science, brief though they have been, should afford a sense of the "play-theoretical" approach to which Quiddity is to conform. The trappings of a tradition are not foolish harness put upon education, but are the very heart of civilization. One can only look with a sense of shame, if not horror, at the wanton destruction of the "play" of civilization, because fair play is the ultimate principle of humanity. Quiddity, therefore, will maintain every possible form of play, as

fair play. The name of the game is *quibble*; but it reaches the very quintessence of civilization.

The Play Element in Subjectivity

Huizinga's approach to play was not restricted to institutions in their historical settings; his chapter on "Playing and Knowing" called attention to the play elements in the domain of the human mind. He thought of the mind in terms of knowledge and wisdom, as do many philosophers and psychiatrists today: I think of it differently, as involved essentially in *communicability*, and much of this is playful.

The matter is of first importance for Quiddity. With respect to communicability, this has to replace "consciousness" as the primary concern of understanding: consciousness is a categorical term, which has seriously hindered the proper study of subjectivity. There is nothing we can call "conscious" other than is covered by "communicability"; and the latter alone is testable and falsifiable. An experimental psychologist from Princeton, Julian Jaynes (1976), seems to agree in part with this; he argues that consciousness arrived on the biological scene only 3000 years or so ago, with the development of "written" forms of language. But language is merely communication and men have surely been communicative since the dawn of their kind. All that there is to consciousness is communicability.

Communicability takes two directions, one in relation to "outside" (the real world) and the other "inside" us (the mind), as I have been at some pains to reiterate in the above chapters. Scientific knowledge, up to now, has been with respect to the world outside; there is much talk of a deeper knowledge provided by the mind — I like to think of George Santayana's epigram, "Knowledge is recognition of something absent, it is a salutation, not an embrace." Scientific knowledge is of this nature; the wish amongst philosophers, humanists, theologians, is for something different, an embrace not a salutation.

What is behind this wish? Archaic man conceived of knowledge as in some sense magical, and very different from the practical things which served his needs—the knowledge was "of holy things, their secret names, and the origins of the world" (Huizinga, 1950, p. 100). It was couched in myth, poetry, and riddles, central to sacred festivals. The challenges of riddle-solving enter into Brahmin hymns concerning the mysteries of Being, and not-Being. The *Rig-Veda* speaks of an ancient Hindu tale, of King Yanake, who held a riddle-solving contest amongst Brahmins attending a sacrificial feast, with a prize of a thousand cows — the *play* character of the whole proceeding, Huizinga remarks, is clear as daylight:

> Sacred love is having a game with itself. The degree of seriousness . . . is as indefinable and in the last resort as immaterial as the question of whether anybody really lost his head for being unable to answer a riddle. This is not the most curious thing about it. The chief, the really remarkable thing, is the play-motif as such. (Huizinga, *Homo Ludens*, 1950, p. 109)

From riddles of deep philosophic import ("How does the wind not cease?"), to those of the mirth of six-year-olds today ("What is the difference between a riddle and an elephant sitting on a bun?"), the subjectivity is intrinsically playful. There are rules, of secrecy and the like. All have a play motif, even if (as in the case of "capital riddles") your life was at stake if you failed to solve the riddle. A king could be challenged by his fool — or by anyone, just as a father today is by his six-year-old. The "play" is between equals. The solutions do not depend on reason and logic, but are *sudden* or highly privileged. Contest, challenge, boasting, and gleeful mirth characterize the riddle in any

form or age. Knowledge, indeed, was largely couched in riddle form, knowledge, especially of the mysteries of life. Whence the connections with the sacred, and the most profound problems of man and the universe.

We can suppose, as Huizinga does, that these sacred games were originally characterized by both *play* and *seriousness* (the game *really* mattered, as a life or death matter). In due course, it split apart, into mystic philosophy, and play itself. From the former came Greek and modern forms of philosophy, conducted as contests between philosophers — in the days of Queen Elizabeth I the star attractions at the universities were the philosophical contests of its scholars, and much of philosophy even today is quintessentially contestant. Natural philosophy followed, its concern with reality outside us, as our doctorates in *philosophy* (for science) remind us. As we have had to say earlier, much of science is still carried out playfully; but the nexus of dead *seriousness* was always implicit in science and is now deadly serious indeed — as the sacred rites of archaic man were, thousands of years ago, but now with *real* justification. From the play element, likewise, the humanities have taken shape: from riddles and sacred efforts after wisdom, to poems, epics, folktales, and all else of art and literature, the course of what is peculiarly subjective to man has continued, and is as playful today as it was millennia ago. We still, happily, go to Shakespeare's plays, and enjoy every kind of art and music in play-theoretical respects.

Moreover, modern science holds within its protopostulates "the myth of invariance" (de Santillana and con Dechend, 1969), a deeply rooted concern with *numbers*, with measurement and calculation, which we shall see also in the mind of Thomas Jefferson and his times. It qualifies an Einstein as much as a Jefferson; it is at the foundation of quantum theory in nuclear physics, as much as it is in Q methodology. But that is for later. Meanwhile, scientists today, and the positivist philosophers supporting them, think of mind as magic, outside the scientific domain. An eminent scientist, writing in *Science*, states categorically that any consideration of "self" is forever outside scientific understanding ("Limits to Scientific Understanding of Man," Stent, 1975). Alexandre Koyré was wiser; he expected answers to the problem of mind as such, and now, indeed, these answers are at hand. By way of our theories of communicability, everything in subjectivity as such, in literature for example, can now be studied as objectively as anything else in the world.

It is something of this solution to which Quiddity College will attest. Basically, it is very simple. So-called objective science is *informational*; information theory is now at the very core of modern physics (Brillouin, 1962). The "self "has no place in this domain, expect in certain protopostulatory respects to which the philosopher Michael Polanyi (1966) has called attention, which do not alter the basic matter of a science concerned essentially with the inherent relatedness of everything in the world "outside." Subjectivity is now operable, and concerns "self" in every scientific respect — not as a categorical concept (a matter of definitions), but as *operant*, that is part-and-parcel of objective science.

These matters are in the forefront of the understanding of knowledge, in science, the humanities, and common conversation, and it is something of them to which Quiddity attests. It is not that we wish to propagate truth this way, as Karl Jaspers sought to do, but only that respect for the privileged young men and women of Quiddity College makes it incumbent upon their tutor to make them privy to the solution of problems in every aspect of their culture. None will be scholars in the matters — that is left to professors — but all can be informed, in an educated manner.

That the play element and civilization go hand-in-hand is an inescapable conclusion, when by civilization we mean tolerance, charity, fair play, and security in social institutions. This is not idyllic, as though goodness, truth and justice could be everywhere abounding: on the contrary, deception and scheming can be playful, as in love-making; and finagling, intrigue, and pork-barreling re intrinsic to politics — provided the rules of the game are adhered to, and no one is too badly hurt! It is true that America has lost sight of the play in its culture, and indeed is now largely destructive of its social institutions; but this is not to say that nothing can be done to remedy matters. More stringent divorce laws could save thousands of marriages and restore the family to civilized life (not necessarily the happiest or best, but the *fairest*). English-style soccer (now international) is already replacing the much more costly, and brutal, American-style game of football, a simple change that may yet win America future Battles of Waterloo! The law could easily become a backyard affair again, the lawyer everyone's neighbor and not as now, the rich man's privilege and chastity belt, by very simple changes in law practices which make legal representation available to rich and poor to some degree alike. Farmlands could be restored to community homesteads, with Saturday night suppers, dances and homely competitions as in Grange meeting days of not so long ago (Foster Dulles, 1940). The armed forces, which were once a gentleman's duty to serve, could have a *responsible* part in American life again if *all* men had to serve a period in the forces, as in Switzerland: the Senator's son would then go to battle with the plumber's, with no exceptions for educational, religious, professional or other purposes (conscientious objectors could serve as medical orderlies). Only in this way can sacrifices be fair in war. It is not suggested that any of these practices are likely to be instituted; but neither can they be considered as lost causes.

Would Quiddity College, then, be a breeding ground for such causes? The answer is yes and no. Its undergraduates and scholars would have more immediate matters to interest them, to which we are now to attend.

References

American Academy of Arts and Sciences. (1974, 1975). *American higher education: Toward an uncertain future* (Vols. 1, 2.).

Arrowsmith, W. (1970). The shame of the graduate schools, The future of teaching, Idea of a new university. Commencement Address, June 16, Dartmouth College.

Association of American Colleges. (1971). *Commission on liberal learning*. (Graduate Study in the Liberal Arts, Eds. W. Ness and B.D. James). Washington, D.C.

Bell, D. (1966), *The reforming of general education: The Columbia College experience in its national setting*. Columbia University Press.

Betts, E. M., and Perkins, H. B. (1971). *Thomas Jefferson's flower garden at Monticello*. University of Virginia Press.

Bonham, G. W. (Ed.). (1972) *Inside academe: Culture in crisis*. Change Magazine

Boorstin, D. (1948). *The lost world of Thomas Jefferson*. Beacon Press.

Brians, P. (1972). *Bawdy tales from the courts of medieval France* (trans. and ed.). Harper and Row.

Brillouin, L. (1962). *Science and information theory*. Academic Press.

Carnegie Commission. (1973). *Report on higher education*. (Foreword: Clark Kerr) Jossey-Bass.

Conant, J. B. (1945). *General education in a free society*. Harvard University Press.

Conant, J. B. (1948). *Education in a divided world*. Harvard University Press.
Cox, H. (1969). *The feast of fools: A theological essay on festivity and fantasy*. Harvard University Press.
de Montaigne, Michel. (1892). *The essays of Michel de Montaigne*. (trans. by W. Carew Hazlitt, Vol. l). A. L. Bart Co.
de Santillana, G. & von Dechend, H. (1969). *Hamlet's mill: An essay on myth and the frame of time*. Gambit, Inc.
Dugger, R. (1974). *Our invaded universities: Form, reform, and new starts*. W.W. Norton.
Dulles, R. F. (1940). *America learns to play: A history of popular recreation 1607-1940*. Appleton-Century.
Garnett, J. C. M. (1921). *Education and world citizenship: An essay toward a science of education*. Cambridge University Press.
Gasset, Ortega y, Jose. (1944). *Mission of the university*. (Trans. H. L. Nostrand). W. W. Norton.
Goodman, P. (1970). *New reformation*. Random House, Vintage
Hagstrom, W. O. (1965). *The scientific community*. Basic Books.
Harper, G. M. (1975). *The mingling of heaven and earth*. Dolman Press,
Holton, G. & Morison, R. S. (Eds.). (1979). *Limits of scientific inquiry*. Norton and Co.
Huizinga, J. (1950). *Homo ludens: A study of the play element in culture*. Beacon Press.
Hunt, E. L. (1963). *The revolt of the college intellectual*. Aldene Publishing Co.
Jaspers, K. (1959). *The idea of a university*. Beacon Press.
Jaynes, J. (1976). *The origins of consciousness in the breakdown of the bicameral mind*. Houghton Mifflin.
Keating, M. W. (1931). *Commenius*. Cambridge University Press.
Kennan, G. F. (1968). *Democracy and the student left*. Princeton University Press.
Kruytbosch, C. E. & Messinger, S. L. (Eds.). (1970). *The state of the university: Authority and change.* Sage Publications.
Mayhew, L. B. (1969). *Colleges today and tomorrow*. Jossey-Bass.
Namier, L. (1962). *Crossroads of power: Essays on England in the 18th century*. Hamish Hamilton.
National Academy's Committee on Science and Public Policy. (1972). *Physics in perspective*. (Chairman, Harvey Brooks).
Niblett, W. R. (ed.), (1970). *Higher education: Demand and response*. Jossey-Bass, lnc.
Nunn, P. (1924). *Education: Its data and first principles*. MacMillan.
Polanyi, M. (1966). *The tacit dimension*. Doubleday.
Potter, V. R., Baerreis, D. A., Bryson, R. A., Curvin, J. W., Johansen, G., McLeod, J. … & Symon, K. R. (1970). Purpose and function of the university: University scholars have a major responsibility for survival and quality of life in the future. *Science*, *167*(3925), 1590-1593.
Reeves, M. (1970). The European University from Medieval Times. In W.R. Niblett (Ed.), *Higher education: Demand and response*. Jossey-Bass, Inc.
Rutherford, E., (1906). *Radioactive transformations*. Scriber's Sons.
Snyder, B. R. (1970). *The hidden curriculum*. MIT Press.
Stent, G. S. (1975). Limits to scientific understanding of man. *Science*, *187*, 1052-1057.
Stephenson, W. (1949). *Testing schoolchildren*. Longman's Green,
Stephenson, W. (1967). *The play theory of mass communication*. University of Chicago Press.
Stephenson, W. (1978). The shame of science. *Ethics in Science and Medicine, 5*, 25-38.

Thompson, N. S. (1971). The failure of pluralism. *Change: The Magazine of Higher Learning*, *3*(6), 27–32. https://doi.org/10.1080/00091383.1971.10568044

Thomson, J. J. (1897). *Elements of the mathematical theory of electricity and magnetism*. Cambridge University Press.

Watson, J. D. (1968). *The double helix*. Atheneum.

Wills, G. (1978). *Inventing America: Jefferson's Declaration of Independence*. Doubleday.

QUIDDITY COLLEGE:
THOMAS JEFFERSON'S LEGACY
FOR MORAL SCIENCE

Foreword

PART I

The Quintessences

Chapter I: Synopsis of Western Education

II: The University in America

III: Collegium Resartus [The College Re-patched]

IV: Unrest in Academe

V: The Discovery of Subjectivity

VI: Quiddity and Subjectivity

VII: Newton's Rules

VIII: Truth Value

IX.: The 'Playful' Cultural College

X: The Jefferson Legacy

PART II

Quiddity's Curriculum: Modus Operandi

Sartor Resartus [The Taylor Re-patched]

Chapter XI: Literae Humaniores

XII: The Tangled Bank

XIII: The Barton Fellow

XIV: The Priestley Fellow

XV: Political Science?

XVI: The Rittenhouse Fellow

XVII: The Jefferson Fellow: President of Quiddity