

## NEWS, NOTES &amp; COMMENT

*Recent and Forthcoming in the  
Political and Policy Sciences*

Panel on "The Use of Q-Methodology in Political Science," Southern Political Science Association, Atlanta, November 1982. Chair, Robert Rood (Dept Govt & Internatl Rel, U South Carolina, Columbia, SC 29208). Papers by: Mark Wattier (Political Science & Legal Studies, Murray State U, Murray, KY 42071), "The Use of Q-Methodology to Identify Empirical Types"; Stanley Feldman (U Kentucky, Lexington, KY 40506) and Pamela Johnston Conover, "Assessing the Structure of Mass Belief Systems: The Utility of Q-Methodology"; and David Gillespie (Presbyterian College, Clinton, SC 29325), "Attitudes and Perspectives of Third Party Leaders: A Q-Methodological Inquiry." The discussant will be David Mason (Mississippi State U, Mississippi State, MS 39762).

Larry R. Baas (Political Science, Valparaiso U, Valparaiso, IN 46383) and Dan B. Thomas, "An Exploration of the Tapp and Levine Theory of Legal Socialization," Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, Louisville, KY, March 25, 1982.  $n = 185$  Q sorts (and  $N = 45$  statements) produced five factors which are examined in light of the Tapp-Levine theory of legal reasoning, which is, in turn, based in part on Kohlberg's theory of moral development. Three of the factors correspond fairly closely to predicted positions built into the Q sample, as exemplified by the following statements: (a) *Preconventional*: "If a person with legitimate authority hands down a law, it is most likely fair." (b) *Conventional*: "A fair law is one which protects the members of the social order from adverse change or destructive behavior on the part of some people." (c) *Postconventional*: "I believe that a person has an obligation to violate the law if the law conflicts with higher principles or moral standards." Two other factors represent mixed positions.

Steven R. Brown (Political Science, Kent State U, Kent, OH 44242), "Values and Development: Appraising

Korean Experience," Policy Sciences Summer Institute, Yale University, July 28-30, 1982.  $n = 39$  Koreans (plus 7 Americans included as controls) provided Q-sort images of Korean character and society using a Q sample ( $N = 48$ ) drawn from contemporary Korean literature and structured according to traditional and modern attitudes cross-classified to include personal, philosophical, social, and political considerations. Koreans defined the first three of the resulting factors; Americans defined the fourth. The *Modernizers* see change, rationalism, individualism, egalitarianism, and other Western inspired values as essential ingredients of today's Korea, as seen in the following statement which received a distinguishingly high score in this factor: "In today's Korea, each man is to be as independent as possible and to be his own master: The freedom of the individual is now the essence of our humanness." The *Alienated* factor is composed of many individuals who were more advantaged under more traditional circumstances (for which they appear to yearn), and the image of Koreans which emerges is consequently negative in tone, e.g.: "Koreans are furiously jealous of persons who are superior to them: They try to crush and undermine the eminent." The *Idealized* factor is rendered disproportionately by the young and contains religious and ethical overtones--e.g., "We believe in committing no evil, and in respecting and putting into practice all that is good," which is a central tenet of Buddhism. All seven Americans were on the fourth factor which tends to emphasize those aspects of Korean society which are in greatest contrast with American society: "They are prone to strong partisan feuding, and lack the spirit of tolerance and compromise." This latter factor contained Q sorts from persons who had been in Korea for only a couple of months as well as those who had lived there more than 30 years, hence appeared to be independent of length of cultural contact, giving substance to the Korean expression "saek tarūn nunūro" (through differently colored eyes).

Ronald D. Brunner (Center for Public Policy Research, U Colorado, Boulder, CO 80309), *The Behavioral Approach Evolves a Successor*, Center for Public

Policy Research Discussion Paper No. 2, April 19, 1982, 21 pp. Q technique is cited as among "a complementary class of methods [which] will be employed more frequently to deal with qualitative questions of meaning," thereby relegating survey and other variable based (R) methodologies to the specialized function for which they were designed--namely, "Estimating the distribution of observations and not what those observations mean" (p. 6). In another paper--Brunner and Al Brooks, *The Impact of Rising Energy Prices on the Colorado Elderly: Distinguishing Household Types*, Center for Public Policy Research Discussion Paper No. 1, March 5, 1982, 29 pp.--Q cluster analysis is employed to identify household types based on patterns of objective characteristics, on the basis of which policy alternatives and options can be devised.

James M. Carlson (Political Science, Providence College, Providence, RI 02908) and Mark S. Hyde, "Situations and Party Activist Role Orientations: A Q Study," Midwest Political Science Association, Milwaukee, April 29-May 1, 1982. Based on the works of James Q. Wilson (*The Amateur Democrat*, 1962), E. Gene DeFelice ("Separating Professionalism From Pragmatism," *American Journal of Political Science*, 1981), and Joseph Schlesinger (*Ambition and Politics*, 1966), the authors constructed a Q sample based on the following political party role orientations: (a) *Amateur*, e.g., "Party workers must never compromise their issue positions, even if party leaders ask them to." (b) *Professional*: "A good party worker should support any candidate nominated by the party, even if he basically disagrees with him." (c) *Pragmatic/Candidate Oriented*: "A successful candidate should consider changing his views on a major issue if it means the difference between winning and losing his election."  $n=12$  political activists then produced three Q sorts each describing the stance they would adopt in three different situations: (1) Before a meeting of the League of Women Voters (amateur), (2) before a meeting of party precinct captains (professional), and (3) before a meeting of party activists who had volunteered to work for individual candidates (candi-

date orientation). The five resulting factors revealed an amateur and a professional role orientation, and three varieties of candidate orientation. The factor loadings indicated the extent to which individuals were sensitive to situational demands and altered, or failed to alter, their styles accordingly.

Pamela Johnston Conover (Political Science, U Kentucky, Lexington, KY 40506) and Stanley Feldman, "The Use of Q-Methodology in the Study of Mass Belief Systems," American Political Science Association, Denver, September 2-5, 1982.

Bruce F. McKeown, "Q Methodology in Political Psychology: Theory and Technique in Psychoanalytic Applications," American Political Science Association, Denver, September 2-5, 1982 (abstracted in the April issue).

Kent Redfield, John Bolland, William Gore, and James Foster, *Program Mapping: An Exploration of the Context of Policy-Making in Education* (Columbus, OH: Mershon Center, Ohio State University, September 1981), 302 pp., mimeo and bound. This report outlines a "clinicianship" orientation to policy-making, with comparisons of educational decision-making outlooks among educators and noneducators in Port Angeles, WA; Chillicothe, OH; and Ashiya, Japan. Procedurally, the technique of program mapping is somewhat related to Q, with which it is compared, and is designed to allow the clinician and community members "to examine how individuals and groups in the community perceive the composition and structure of the program's basic activities" (p. 44). Those interested in details should contact the Mershon Center, The Ohio State University, 199 West Tenth Avenue, Columbus, OH 43201.

Jai Ok Shim (Korean-American Educational Commission, Garden Tower #1801, 98-78 Unni-dong, Chongro-gu, Seoul 110, Korea), *A Study of the Prospects of Utilizing the Manpower of College Graduated Women*, master's thesis, Business Administration, Yonsei University, Seoul, Korea (in progress). A P set of  $n = 108$  respondents--military personnel, businessmen and -women, government officials, college professors, and students, plus women participating in a "women in de-

velopment" program--utilized  $N=48$  statements in producing three factors representing different attitudes toward the role of women in the economic development process in Korea. The first factor, which is dominated primarily by women, represents a modern view and assigns significantly higher scores to statements such as the following (translated from Korean): "The premodern concept of female inferiority must be thoroughly eradicated. As long as this kind of thinking persists, there will never be true equality between the sexes." The second factor, dominated almost wholly by men, represents the traditional view and emphasizes statements such as the following: "Educated women say, 'Give us an equal opportunity to use what we've learned for the benefit of society,' but it is extremely doubtful that women are properly suited for participation in society." The third factor is least numerous, but is also rendered primarily by men, and emphasizes the respectability of women's traditional role and, by implication, encourages them to be satisfied with it. Exemplary is the following statement: "Even though housework is not included in the GNP measure, the degree to which women successfully perform their duty will by and large determine the quality of life of the people." Women in Korea are increasingly gaining access to professional educations, but the society has been slow in admitting these college educated women into the work force in nontraditional roles, leading to great waste in educational resources, and this phenomenon is what motivated the present study. Military personnel were included in the  $P$  set because of the military's dominance in public decisionmaking on this and any other topic of significance.

Mark Wattier (Political Science & Legal Studies, Murray State U, Murray, KY 42071), "Debate Exposure and Issue Voting: An Application of Q-Method," *Southeastern Political Review*, fall 1982. This is a revision of the paper presented under the title "Learning From the Carter-Reagan Debate: A Q-Study of Persuasion, Projection, and Selective Perception," Midwest Political Science Association, Cincinnati, April 1981, and abstracted in the October 1981 issue of

this newsletter. Reprints of Wattier's "Voter Targeting Using the Q-Method" (see Bibliography) can be ordered at \$5/reprint (specify reprint #A8031) from: Reprints, *Campaigns & Elections*, 602 National Press Building, Washington, DC 20045. Volume discounts are available. This article was also abstracted in the January 1982 issue of this newsletter.

*The Joy of Research*--This was the working title of Betty H. Zisk's recent book, *Political Research: A Methodological Sampler* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1981), an undergraduate text which devotes a page to Q technique. Although necessarily skimpy as to details, Zisk's summary is nevertheless more accurate than those found in many other volumes which devote more space to the topic, despite the fact that it is smuggled into a chapter on "Survey Research," in which it is recommended that Q be used "in conjunction with traditional survey research involving a larger (and random) sample of respondents" (p. 121). Zisk's final observation is that Q has been used by only a few political researchers, but her only citation, aside from Stephenson's *The Study of Behavior* (which is cited as one of several "works about surveys"), is to a dissertation by one of her own students: Richard Goldstein, *Empirical Dimensions of Ideology* (Boston University, 1975). The situation needn't have appeared quite so bleak, and perhaps efforts such as those listed above will lead to a modification of this conclusion in subsequent editions of Zisk's book.

Another brief reference is to be found in Theodore H. Poister's *Public Program Analysis: Applied Research Methods* (Baltimore: University Park Press, 1978)--under the heading "Rankings, Q Sort, and Budget Pies"--in which Q technique is referred to as "a quick and effective way of establishing preference patterns and identifying critical problems or factors in a first round of inquiry...the results of which would then be used to channel attention more closely on these factors" (p. 352).

### *The Perpetuation of Error*

Four fairly recent volumes reveal once again the

degree to which aspects of Q technique and its methodology are apparently doomed to misunderstanding and misrepresentation. In his book on *The Self Concept in Theory, Measurement, Development and Behaviour* (London: Longman, 1979), R.B. Burns criticizes several Q sets for their lack of information concerning validity and reliability, but in so doing relies on literature as much as 25 years old--e.g., the Butler-Haigh (1954) Q sample, Bennett's (1964) Q sort for children, and Hilden's (1954) random sets of personal concepts, and most of the supporting literature is also drawn from the late 1950s. This, of course, not only reveals an ignorance of literature which has appeared during the past quarter century, but also reveals a lack of understanding of the broader methodological views of "Stevenson" (*sic*) which are cited but not grasped, and in which validity and reliability play no role equivalent to that which they play in R methodology, whose tenets Burns accepts without question. Q statements do not measure dimensions in the same way that scale items do, hence reliability is not applicable to them. (A person's viewpoint as expressed in a Q sort is to some measurable degree reliable, however, but that is an entirely different matter.) And when a person renders his view as a Q sort, there can be no external criterion by which to determine its validity, although its *accuracy* may be called into question (which, again, is an entirely different matter).

Unquestioned acceptance of scaling assumptions also permeates Louise H. Kidder's major revision of *Selltiz, Wrightsman and Cook's Research Methods in Social Relations* (4th ed.; New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981), in which the brief description of Q technique (pp. 223-224) is smuggled in at the end of a chapter on "Scaling," albeit in a section on "Some Modifications of Scaling Techniques." Those who think of Q in scaling terms would be wise to re-read *The Study of Behavior* where, quite early, Stephenson asserts that "*Scales and tests of all kinds are...widely employed in psychology.... We propose to throw away all such measurement. Yet we shall study man's attitudes [thinking, personality, self,*

etc.]...and all else objective to others or subjective to himself; and we can do all this scientifically, without using any formal scales or measuring instruments of the kind with which psychology is familiar" (p. 5). (More specific comments distinguishing Q from attitude scales are given on pp. 240-241, and in Stephenson's April 1965 paper in *Psychological Record*.) The second edition of *Research Methods in Social Relations* (by Selltiz, Jahoda, Deutsch and Cook, 1959) was perhaps the first major research methods text in which Q was mentioned--F.N. Kerlinger's *Foundations of Behavioral Research* (1964) apparently provided the first chapter length treatment--but even then in the chapter on scaling. This perhaps renders more understandable Kidder's assertion (also to be found in the 1959 edition) that aspects of Q are controversial, for during the past 20 years there has been no noticeable effort by her and her predecessors to examine the situation on the basis of other than false assumptions.

Similarly with respect to numbers of observations and their connection to lawfulness and theory, Fred N. Kerlinger (in *Behavioral Research: A Conceptual Approach*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979) has the following to say:

...the relations of a theory cannot be established with the data of a single individual. One requires more generality than the data of a single individual can provide. Indeed, one of the weaknesses of Q methodology is that the nature of the method...virtually precludes having large groups of subjects.

I believe that the nomothetic-idiographic distinction and the claim...that science is not and cannot be concerned with the individual is in general valid.... I cannot myself see how science can be other than nomothetic.... (p. 278)

But this seems to assume--as Stephenson, a physicist, never has--that scientific theories are merely unproved laws, and that laws are universal truths (or at least statistical regularities of comparatively



high order) independent of time and place. But laws, as Stephenson has said, can also be conceived of as rules which tell the scientist where to look and what to expect, as empirical guides which, at least in the human realm, may change with changing conditions (see pp. 131-132, *supra*). Moreover, exceptions to expected (i.e., lawful) behavior do not necessarily mean that lawfulness does not exist since different laws can interfere with and nullify one another--as when the forward thrust of an airplane induces flight without necessarily invalidating the laws of gravity. In the same way that water does not boil simply on the average, therefore, so must nomothetic behavioral laws apply at the level of the individual case, which--to repeat--is not to say that we will necessarily see what we would expect to see each and every time.

R.B. Cattell's *The Scientific Use of Factor Analysis in Behavioral and Life Sciences* (New York: Plenum Press, 1978) poses a different problem because of the author's unquestioned standing, but in chapter fragments on "The Misspent Youth of Q Technique" and "Choice and Sampling Principles for Relatives and Referees" (pp. 325-329), we find restated many of the same misrepresentations which were originally advanced in the 1940s and '50s, and before that in writings by Cyril Burt, who Cattell approvingly quotes. Cattell is quite explicit, first of all, in considering Q to be the mere transpose of R, which Stephenson went out of his way to deny for reasons which Cattell never addresses. Secondly, he assumes that the scores to be analyzed in Q are derived from objective tests (e.g., intelligence tests involving analogies and classification, or measures of anxiety) rather than scores assigned to synthetic statements of opinion. It is therefore, for Cattell, a matter of mere convenience whether a Q or R analysis is to be pursued: With more variables than people, a Q analysis is appropriate; with more people than variables, R alone is appropriate. Q technique, thirdly, is said to have ignored the sampling of variables (understood as objective traits, not persons), and at this point Cattell goes on to discuss Brunswik's principle of

"representative design" as if the Q methodologist would regard this as new information. Brunswik was, of course, well known to Stephenson, who explicitly incorporated representativeness into Q methodology; likewise, Brunswik grasped Stephenson's intent and made explicit room in his system for the latter's version of Q method.

A longer historical frame will be required before we will be able to determine whether or not Q technique's youth was misspent, but there is little doubt that it would have been had it remained in the foster homes of the Burnses, Kidders, Kerlingers, and Cattells. Fortunately, it escaped at an early age--although the authorities are not as yet fully aware of it--and is enjoying a degree of maturity and continued growth which would otherwise have been denied it had it remained under the suzerainty of R methodology.

### *Subjectivity--Social Indicator and Philosophical Perspectives*

Two recent studies on subjectivity from opposite ends of the technological-theoretical continuum reveal operational deficits which a dash of Q methodology might help to overcome. The conventional R-methodological approach to subjectivity is well illustrated in a recent governmental publication: Dennis F. Johnston (Ed.), *Measurement of Subjective Phenomena*, Special Demographic Analyses No. CDS-80-3 (Washington, DC: Center for Demographic Studies, Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce, October 1981), which is dedicated to the memory of the late Angus Campbell, former director of the Survey Research Center, Institute of Social Research, University of Michigan. Four major essays address methodological issues associated with aggregated responses to issues of public concern, such as confidence in public institutions and the evaluation of neighborhood quality: Allen R. Wilcox, "Dissatisfaction with Satisfaction: Subjective Social Indicators and the Quality of Life," Charles F. Turner, "Surveys of Subjective Phenomena: A Working Paper," Donald C. Dahmann, "Subjective Indicators of Neighborhood Quality," and Tom W. Smith, "Can We Have

Confidence in Confidence? Revisited." In his introductory comments, the editor remarks on the limitations of the prevailing paradigm--"The general impression one obtains from the essays...is that our measures of subjective phenomena are often unable to represent adequately the attitudes or perspectives they purport to reflect" (p. xi)--but goes on to note that objective indicators are also flawed, and expresses the hope that improvements in both kinds of indicators can be made. The alternative approach which Q poses is only too obvious. This 193-page monograph can be obtained for \$5.50 from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402 (GPO S/N 003-024-03167-1). For more information, contact Donald C. Dahmann, Center for Demographic Studies, Bureau of the Census, Washington, DC 20233 (phone 301/763-5844).

At the opposite end of the spectrum is a highly philosophical paper by Marvin Zetterbaum (Political Science, U California, Davis, CA 95616), "Self and Subjectivity in Political Theory," *Review of Politics*, 1982, 44, 59-82, in which the author intends to "set forth the concept of the self as a dominant paradigm of our contemporary understanding of political things" (p. 59). Zetterbaum draws on the phenomenological position advanced in a paper by George Schrader ("Responsibility and Existence") and the ordinary language position explicated by Hanna Fenichel Pitkin (in *Wittgenstein and Justice*) in order to highlight the problems involved in dealing with "Rousseau's legacy"--of the *solitary self* on the one hand, conscious of itself alone and responsible to no one, vs. the *citizen* on the other hand, who is occupied with the regime in which he has membership and for whom participation is at the cost of the genuine self. In the process, Zetterbaum argues that the traditional concern with what is right and good has been displaced by a preoccupation with subjectivity--with self disclosure (truthfulness) providing the basis of moral discourse, and collective self affirmation (identity) the basis of political discourse, and with the good coming to be equated with "responsible subjectivity." Hence contemporary political

man, no less than Rousseau's original man, is entrapped in his own subjectivity--not necessarily in a solipsistic or narcissistic way, but entrapped nonetheless. Consequently, a major task of contemporary philosophy has been "to uncover the basic structure of the self's being-in-the-world and of its relation to others with a like structure" (p. 79).

At one point, Zetterbaum raises problems of methodology and proof, and cites Pitkin's recommendation that we collect "convincing examples" of moral discourse (as in the writings of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Arendt, et al.), ultimately disagreeing with it to the extent it leaves out that half of ordinary moral discourse that is undertaken because it is edifying rather than self-disclosing. He goes no further, but renders enough of a skeletal outline for us to anticipate how Q might provide some operational substance. Any contemporary political issue would suffice: abortion, the Falkland Islands dispute, the federal budget, the Equal Rights Amendment, disarmament, etc. Moral and political discourse becomes manifest as a concourse in Q methodology--e.g.:

Argentina's occupation of the Falklands is illegal.... Nobody wants any escalation of military activity.... All options must be kept open.... Any peace talks must acknowledge Argentine sovereignty.... The blockade is part of Britain's right to self defense.... It's not right to permit a military dictatorship to get away with naked aggression.... Everyone should be concerned with the cause of peace.... (and so forth).

Conditions of instruction (performable, in principle, by anyone) have already been suggested in Zetterbaum's article:

1. *Self* (general), one's own view
2. *Moral self*, the most moral position
3. *Reconciliation*, the view on which all parties are apt ultimately to settle
4. *Public identity*, the American view as "we" (impersonal) might publically affirm it

5. *The public good*, the "right" standpoint, in an ultimate, spiritual sense (old paradigm)
  6. *Responsible subjectivity*, the most responsible standpoint (new paradigm)
  7. *Rational self*, the most enlightened view
  8. *Democratic subjectivity*, the most democratic perspective
  9. *Romanticism*, that view which you would find, privately, to be the most individually fulfilling
  10. *Regime*, the Administration's point of view
  11. *Citizen*, your view from the standpoint of your role as an American citizen
  12. *"Natural self"*, the view which you might secretly hold were you not constrained by considerations of public responsibility and political necessity
- Et cetera.

Siding with Pitkin, Zetterbaum notes that the process of moral discourse "combines elements of both objectivity and subjectivity" (p. 74), and, in the above case, conjoins both the good (5) and responsible subjectivity (6), thereby addressing Rousseau's legacy explicitly. The factorization of Q sorts representing the above conditions would therefore put us in a position to examine that very "structure of the self's being-in-the-world" of which Zetterbaum speaks; the relation of that self "to others with a like structure" could, of course, be obtained through additional investigations on a case by case basis. Moreover, comparative operant factor structures of this kind could also put us in a better position to distinguish genuine from spurious moral discourse (Zetterbaum, p. 73), and to determine whether there is any basis for Zetterbaum's concern that "our contemporary zeal for ...self-expression threatens to dissociate the private and public altogether" (p. 81). The way is open, in short, for an examination of the assertions of normative political theory, and for more explicitness concerning the role of the self in our contemporary understanding of political things.

### *Intelligence and Values*

Charles Spearman's factor analytic theory of intelligence (modified) is compared favorably with R. B. Cattell's theory in a series of papers by Johan Olav Undheim under the general title "On Intelligence," *Scandinavian Journal of Psychology*, 1981, 22: "I: Broad Ability Factors in 15-Year-Old Children and Cattell's Theory of Fluid and Crystallized Intelligence" (pp. 171-179), "II: A Neo-Spearman Model to Replace Cattell's Theory of Fluid and Crystallized Intelligence" (pp. 181-187), "III: Examining Developmental Implications of Cattell's Broad Ability Theory and of an Alternative Neo-Spearman Model" (pp. 243-249), "IV: Toward a Restoration of General Intelligence" (pp. 251-265). Concluding that "intelligence cannot be defined apart from the surrounding culture," Undheim goes on to say that "general intelligence *is* good reasoning with the contents of our culture. Not only must the measurement of intelligence reflect the dominant values of the culture in which the measurement occurs in order to be of predictive value in that society...and not only does intelligence, however measured by behavioral indices, develop as a continuous interaction among biological and environmental influences, but the above findings are suggestive of an inextricable, mutual dependence and reciprocity among biological and environmental aspects in observable intellectual behavior" (p. 256). From within the R-methodological framework, therefore, Undheim draws near to the point of view advanced by William Stephenson in "Intelligence and Multivalued Choice," *Psychological Record*, 1973, 23, 17-32, although the idea of factors as operants is missing. Undheim can be reached at the following address: Department of Psychology, NLHT, University of Trondheim, N-7000 Trondheim, Norway.

### *Operantcy Scrutinized*

Vicki L. Lee (Box 6892, Wellesley St., Auckland 1, New Zealand), "The Operant as a Class of Responses," *Scandinavian Journal of Psychology*, 1981, 22, 215-221. Primarily in response to J.G. Rein and F. Svartdal's "Limitation of Skinner's Concept of an

'Operant'" (*Scandinavian Journal of Psychology*, 1979 --cf. *Operant Subjectivity*, January 1980, p. 67), Lee presents a lively and readable conceptual defense of the fundamental nature of the operant (compared, for example, to "action") and its importance to behavior theory. (Professor Lee is in the Department of Psychology, U Auckland.)

A more technical-historical treatment is rendered by S.R. Coleman (Psychology, Cleveland State U, Cleveland, OH 44115), "Historical Context and Systematic Functions of the Concept of the Operant," *Behaviorism*, 1981, 9, 207-226. An effort to effect a rapprochement between B.F. Skinner's radical behaviorism and the interbehaviorism of J.R. Kantor is in Ronald V. Kidd and Luiz Natalicio (Educational Psychology, U Texas, El Paso, TX 79968), "An Interbehavioral Approach to Operant Analysis," *Psychological Record*, 1982, 32, 41-59.

### *Case Analysis*

A recent blurb for this relatively new journal notes that "with emphasis on evaluation of present and prospective social policies and social therapies, development of case study methods and materials is timely. *Case Analysis* is devoted to this and related concerns, including factors and frameworks for case comparisons, and inductive methods for developing theory from data and from practicing wisdom," matters about which Q methodology has much to say. Articles to date have tended to fall in the general area of clinical sociology, and issues appear irregularly: Volume 1, issue 1 appeared in March 1978; issue 4 appeared in fall 1981. Subscription checks should be made out to "Progresiv Publishr" (\$10 individual, \$15 institutional) and forwarded to *Case Analysis*, 401 E. 32nd, #1002, Chicago, IL 60616.

## Q BIBLIOGRAPHIC UPDATE (CONTINUED)

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