

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY*

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Perhaps the first question is one of methodology.

Most lawyers use a simple comparative methodology. We compare a set of facts that we're testing for legality with sets known, from statute, decision, or other authoritative precedent, to be lawful. We may analyze and reason, but basically we compare. For reasons of time, we usually do the minimum necessary to be secure in our conclusion.

In comparing the realm of facts called "security" with the realm of facts called "development," we are not seeking legality so much as understanding.

We don't use things like factor analysis--though we might consider it--to add its insights; if we are fortunate, we can employ, like a meta-language, some of the analysis that Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell have taught.

When we compare security and development, we are comparing things not equal; much must proceed by contrast. For example, we divide the world into con-

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trasting regions:

- o The West is developed, and basically secure;
- o The East is relatively developed, and basically *insecure*;
- o The South is not developed, and not secure.

To contrast further: While development promotes security in many ways, *insecurity* tends to promote actions that destabilize, with outcomes that are as likely to involve deprivations of values as their enhancement.

Contrasts make relationships possible.

The West, for instance, can see many ways in which its security is in part a function of developing countries, such as:

- o In the East-West rivalry, developing countries can be strategic;
- o Developing countries are trading partners, and sources of supply;
- o They are voters in all the world's political processes;
- o They are members with us of a common ecological system;

And so on.

In addition to such *facts*, the security of a Western country--or an Eastern one--is influenced by the *feelings* of developing countries toward it, reflected, for instance, in votes in the UN and other bodies. The AID Administrator the other day remarked that the Marshall Plan has become part of the folklore of the world; compare the feeling which that suggests with those of developing countries toward Russia over Afghanistan!

Such feelings have security significance.

Security, of course, originates in feeling: In Latin "secure" means "without care." (In Arabic, the word "salama," from which the word "Islam" derives, means both "security" and "freedom.") Security, nowadays, is partly the *feeling* of being secure, and partly the *facts* we create to get that feeling: hav-

ing an army or navy, joining a labor union, or whatever.

However, development does not so easily divide into a feeling of development and facts of development.

There are plenty of facts on development: Upper Volta has 5% adult literacy, in Bangladesh life expectancy is 46, India's gross national product is \$240 per capita, and so on.

There are *judgments* about development: AID now uses "objectively verifiable indicators" to gauge project success (for instance, 2500 teachers were trained, or 30,000 hectares irrigated); but before they came into use, I once heard an AID evaluation officer ask a health officer how he would know if a project proposed for rural Indonesia had been successful. "Well," he was told, "you go out there, and you look around, and--you can tell!"

So, in development we use many factors like GNP, infant mortality, literacy, etc.

We could use comparable factors, perhaps, to try to gauge a country's security: military capacity measured in soldiers and planes, etc.; self-sufficiency in resources; and so on.

At the personal level, if you ask someone: "Do you feel secure?" you will get an answer; but if you ask "Do you feel developed?" you will get uncertainty.

It is interesting that we have many measurements of development but less internalized feeling for it; and fewer measurements of security, but much internalized feeling about security.

I regard this as hopeful, since internalized feelings are, by and large, more flexible than external facts. It is probably easier to enable people to feel secure than to become developed.

Any country must make trade-offs between its investments for security and for development; even the U.S. AID, in providing certain assistance, is required by the Foreign Assistance Act to consider how much a country spends on its military. The most recent report to the Congress on this found 16 affected countries with military expenditures above the regional norm, but noted that "depriving these mostly low

income countries of basic economic assistance would not in all likelihood affect the judgments of their governments of the needs for their security requirements" (Agency for International Development, 1983).

Let me return to the question of trade-offs later, and say a bit more about development.

Basically, underdevelopment is poverty, and what travels with it: hunger, illness, illiteracy, early deaths, a lot of births. Half of all deaths in the developing world are children under five. As to births, overall the rate of world population growth is beginning to decrease for the first time, but its level still could mean a 50% increase in world population in the next twenty years. That means six billion people by the year 2000. This increase, about two billion, equals the entire world population in 1930.

Pressure of population on resources, within the limits of technology in use, has led to countless security conflicts--as old as Babylon, and as new as along the Bangladesh border with India.

Africa is worst off: Its population is rising at about 3% per year, its food production at 2% per year.

In fact, children are a form of security for poor parents: labor in the field, and support in old age. The basic answer to population growth is development: child mortality falls, technology makes field labor more efficient, the role of a woman diversifies, and so on.

In a developing country, development itself is a search for security. To a family, this means food, shelter, medical care, and the leverage on the future that education represents. To a country, development makes you less at the mercy of others.

Along the way, getting to be developed can be fun: The sense of unification, of pulling together, and of progress can give rise to feelings of pleasure and pride. Feelings are important to our value choices, with development or with security.

If your choice for security is to "go it alone" as in a fortress, you lack flexibility, a forward defense, or allies. But if you can see others as you see yourself--that you inhabit the same place, share

the same needs and feelings, occupy many of the same inclusive categories--then you can have that legendary source of strength, the ability to understand the other side.

However, it is hard for a country to "go it alone" in development: What you need is what you haven't got. Many regional groupings do reflect the need to share: the Andean pact, the inter-Caribbean group, the Lome convention group, and so on.

But it's slow: When you put three poor countries together, you still have poverty, until comparative advantage takes hold. Also a problem is: Who, for instance, gets the steel mill? A Latin American grouping nearly fell apart on that issue. (I recall that the U.S. helped, in effect, to start Europe's Common Market, by forcing the Coal and Steel Community to decide its steel question.)

As distinct from a country, an entrepreneur, in development, who "goes it alone," has the advantages of undiluted incentive and control.

The entrepreneur, nevertheless, needs security. A friend returned some years ago from Laos, where, he said, American businessmen were reluctant to invest--not for political or military reasons then, but because Laos' commercial and legal patterns were very casual, and security of expectation was low. (You could not count on a contract.)

To return to relationships: The security of developing and developed countries is functionally related, also, by economic interdependence.

Nearly 40% of U.S. exports are bought by developing countries; the harvest from one out of four farm acres in the U.S. goes to the Third World. We rely on developing countries for all our rubber, 96% of our tin, 92% of our coffee, 88% of our bauxite, 75% of our cobalt, and so on.

Political interdependence also links development and security interests. From the U.S., for example, Israel and Egypt receive very large amounts of Economic Support Funding, which has developmental effects although extended for stability purposes. The U.S. is more secure if the Middle East is more stable.

In world security terms, it's good to have a Third

World, not just East and West. Thucydides tells how the war between Sparta and Athens began. A broken treaty was involved, but he says: "The real cause I consider to be the one which was formally most kept out of sight. The growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Lacedaemon, made war inevitable" (in Findlay, 1959: 232). Sparta was strong, but felt insecure--and there was no relevant Third World to help balance the power.

In developing countries particularly, there is often a disparity between haves and have-nots. AID has long tried to see that the poor benefit as directly as possible, rather than letting benefits just "trickle down." When the feelings between haves and have-nots (or those who claim to represent them) reach the kindling point, security interests of the superpowers may be involved, whether it happens in Central America or in Poland.

Differential development--haves versus have-nots--could help explain East-West tensions; perhaps, also, though, decision-makers in a closed society react differently to stress than those in an open society. In a closed society, the leadership, with a greater level of insecurity, will more often react by batten- ing down the hatches, while open society officials under stress are more likely to play inclusive poli- tics.

Insecurities in developing countries often make their politics resemble those in a closed society, unfortunately.

I have always believed that as development takes place, it will move a developing country away from a closed society, towards a more open one: Develop- ment implies that more people will have access to economic and therefore political power, and to ideas and familiarity in the use of ideas.

For me, development is applied ideas: Ideas are highly portable, and relatively cheap. They must be communicated; AID has done some interesting projects in development communications.

Development involves taking risks--to try new seeds, or new cropping patterns, can be risky; the security of a safety net, important. (One project

introduced new seeds by offering them to one farmer in each district, with a guaranty that he'd make as much that year as last. When he succeeded, others followed on their own.)

The feeling of security needed for taking development risks can come in other ways, e.g., from an extended family system or a supportive village culture.

A secure feeling (I once wrote) is like Newton's fulcrum that, with a lever long enough, could move the world.

Development, for a poor country, is a lever on security; it represents the effort to concentrate time, to jump forward through time and catch up. Such a country is short not only of tangible resources, but of ideas, and of the time to put things together in new patterns.

The search for economic security can be poignant: A Peace Corps staffer in Latin America tells of a village family with four children and, a rarity, a horse, which was their livelihood, hauling, taking messages, and so on. A child became ill, needing medicine they couldn't afford unless they sold the horse. They decided to do without the medicine, reasoning that they could always have another child, but it would be extremely hard to assemble the money to replace the horse.

Let me say a word about learning: It is important in development, and for security.

Part of learning is putting ideas into categories, and becoming familiar with categories as such. This involves creating *subcategories* to divide things up, and *larger* categories to link things up--"inclusive" categories, is, I believe, Professor McDougal's term.

An inclusive category can be potent: For instance, the simple categories "us" and "them" lose their potential for hostility--"us" *versus* "them"--and become the much more secure "we," if you can find an inclusive category. The principle was used, I believe, in *Brown v. Board of Education*, declaring that black and white were not two different subcategories of education.

A recent illustration occurred in the Harriman-

Andropov conversations, as reported in the *New York Times*, when the Russian said (to paraphrase): In World War II we had a common enemy, the Nazi's; now we have a common enemy: the threat of war.

Also recently, Russell Train gave AID an example. Environmentalists, he said, tend to fight strongly for "the Environment," and development staff for "Development"; conflicts are perceived. But if, he said, you can express the goal as, for instance, "management on a truly sustained basis of natural resources," both may agree.

In learning we use, in a playful fashion, analogies from all of life to help us handle thoughts across the boundaries of categories. Learning can take place through literature, as well as in the laboratory; it takes place well in people-to-people contacts, at which our private and voluntary organizations excel.

Perceptions of common security interests arise more readily if it is seen that the various inclusive categories that developed countries share with developing ones are more important than the categories that divide us. One shared category is the ecological world. It matters to me that the tree-covered foothills of the Himalayas are being denuded for firewood, and the soil from the hillsides silts up irrigation below. It will matter to my children if Africa has no more wild game; the average Kenyan mother now bears 8.1 children, and some of those game parks are going to make room for people.

Most people in development would agree, I think, with Karl Popper, urging, not necessarily the greatest good for the greater number, but "the least amount of avoidable suffering for all; and further, that unavoidable suffering--such as hunger in times of unavoidable shortage of food--should be distributed as equally as possible" (Popper, 1950: 571). He might be saying: Don't focus on security, but on *insecurity*; not on development, but on *underdevelopment*.

That may sound like a quibble, like saying watch the doughnut, not the hole; or like asking if the glass of water is half full or half empty. But poverty engages the feelings; its absence does not.

In fact, of course, the glass of water is both half full and half empty at the same time, like an inclusive category that covers both secure and insecure, developed and less developed at the same time.

Of course, full and empty are not equivalents like 0 and 1 in a computer's binary system; the lower half of the glass has a fluid reality, testable by your touch, and as to which your mind can say "Quaff!" You may choose to save it, for security; or to cultivate with it, for development; or to share it with a friend, to promote other values; or even to drink it.

The empty half, though, can touch your feelings in a different way. It can stand for the toast "to absent friends!" or can remind you of those who lack enough water. It can represent the unknown future, that we all hope to develop.

But it's the inclusive category of top and bottom together that I find most useful. Remembering that most things are parts of inclusive categories has often dispelled my own hostility over a problem, and let me feel more secure.

Developed and underdeveloped countries are like the two halves of that half-filled glass. We are interdependent, with a common perimeter, and bonded together in many ways: economic, political, ecological, and cultural, among others. Our security is in large measure a function of their development.

Their security is also in very large measure a function of their own development.

In considering its own development and security, a country faces trade-offs, as we said, between investment in each. Development is the key to long-term security; meanwhile, self-preservation is required, by going it alone if necessary, or by pulling the wagons in a circle with others', if friendly wagons are available.

But, security is not all military, to be sure. Sri Lanka, to provide basic food security, had a very interesting rice distribution program of free or heavily subsidized rice. (It was too costly, at one point absorbing one-third of gross domestic product.) I have wondered though, if it promoted, as well as

reflected, the sense of easy kindness that I have always found in Sri Lankans.

If many trade-off questions appear simple in structure, on the "guns vs. butter" model, some are more complex. The world has societies which are developed, secure, and open; but also has societies which are less developed, less secure, and less open.

If you try to apply the lessons of development to the problems of security, you observe that development tends to make a country more open, more pluralistic, in some ways more secure, and therefore more likely to permit mutual engagement in many inclusive categories of interaction. At what point, and in what respects, does it become appropriate for a developed, open country to try to reinforce the potential for becoming more open, which a less secure country has?

To be more specific, apply the rule of experimental science that you should always consider the opposite, also, and see what you get: Are there areas in which one should help to become more developed--in safe respects--countries one doesn't really like, in order to help them move toward pluralism?

Again, if, reversing your field, as it were, you seek to apply the lessons of security to the problems of development, you find, I think, the value of conceiving of things in terms of inclusive categories. It is not necessary that things be equal in order to include them, as with our half-glass of water. This Administration's Caribbean Basin Initiative, for instance, is a good example of inclusiveness serving developmental goals, in part for security reasons. It has three elements: assistance, to help in resource terms; some tariff advantages, to help in trade respects; and some tax and investment advantages, to help in financial respects.

If the United Nations is designed to help political security, worldwide, the Caribbean Basin Initiative is an example of a regional creation to promote mutual economic security; but here, as elsewhere, development and security go hand in hand.

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