PROTOCONCURSUS: THE CONCOURSE THEORY

OF COMMUNICATION*

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CONCOURSE THEORY APPLICATIONS

"A world community can exist," said Hutchins (1945), "only with world communication, which means something more than extensive shortwave facilities scattered about the globe. It means common understanding."

We take the latter word extremely seriously, and wish to give it highest place in science. There is no ethic, no metaphysic, no sentiment in the wish, but merely an abductory approach to what is so obvious that few can see the wood for the trees. Someone has said that we shall never understand one another until we reduce the language of the world to seven words. This we cannot hope to do. But it can be reduced to a relatively small number of schemata--infinitely fewer in number than most people would suppose, and, if these could be recognized, then in course of time the chances of common understanding for us all is by this degree enhanced.

In a series of papers, concourse theory has been applied to understanding in the physical sciences

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* Continued from the previous issue.

(Stephenson, 1972a), to the humanities (Stephenson, 1972b), to intelligence (Stephenson, 1973a), and to other major areas of scholarly concern, especially politics, international communication, advertising, and of course self psychology itself.

With respect to the physical sciences, the application suggests that scientific thinking is largely communication pleasure,[6] rooted in the common conversations of scientists, most of which is opinion and not the vaunted objectivity of that discipline. Conversational communication, one concludes, and not information alone or even saliently, is at the heart of the physical sciences, and it would have been pleasant to know how the schemata of a Teller and an Oppenheimer contrasted in the opening days of this thermonuclear age (Stephenson, 1972a).

In the case of the humanities, we all remember C.P. Snow's (1963) concern about the lack of "common communicability" in the West. Science and the humanities were not on speaking terms. Leavis (1962) argued that the West needs more humanism, and doubted whether we are more human today than primitive peoples (p. 303). Science cannot be made of a poem, Leavis maintained, since it is experienced "only in the recreative response of individual minds"; literature is "for the sake of humanity," for the "deepest verities" of the human future. Maxwell (1968), with a friendly humanistic eye, argues that the humanities are methodologically in a weak position: "There is no one or no single group of even nominally neutral research techniques by which a researcher arrives at an interpre-

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6. The terms *communication pleasure* and *communication pain* have not been introduced in the current paper so far, but refer to basic principles of "play" and "work," respectively, with respect to self-theoretical considerations. Communication pleasure, like understandings, brings about no change in the world. Communication pain, like objective explanations, is in relation to information and change. In each case the abduction concerns what happens to the self, subjectively regarded, and is quite operant, as will be seen in the sequel.

tation of 'Ode on a Grecian Urn'" (p. 82). Along the lines of "it is raining," however, it is a simple matter to find a concourse for the "Ode" and to determine schemata for it, as in our study for graduates in English literature (Stephenson, 1972b). It is no less straightforward to put the claims of virtue in the humanities to empirical proof by determining, for example, what four years of English literature does for a student's *understanding* as distinct from his knowledgeability in the discipline. What does four years do to his schemata?

As for intelligence, the conclusions are devastating: Intelligence has been conceived by mental test psychologists objectively in terms of problems to which there are right (logical) answers, when in fact most problems in human affairs are not in this framework at all. They are multivalued, as Vickers (1967) has observed. Precisely as for "it is raining," problems in life are likely to be set in a concourse of communication and are solved in relation to schemata in which interests, belief systems and values enter into the answers beside reasoning. Thus, if one proposes to give $2000 to a city to help it, how might the money best be spent? There are a thousand and one possible answers, a whole concourse of possibilities. Yet studies show that there are not a thousand and one schemata but only three or four, and that from these there is the possibility of a publicly agreed-upon solution to the problem if it *happens* that there is common saliency for one particular "statement" across the different schemata. Like the problem vis-a-vis "it is raining," we found, for example, that random individuals in a city to which this $2000 problem could apply provided three Q factors, indicating three schemata: One was in relation to "family" interests, for playgrounds and the like; another ranged into ecological and cultural pursuits; the third was strictly "economic." All three agreed, however, that giving the money for parks would be a good solution (Stephenson, 1973a). Each schemata involved its own values and interests: As psychologists from Leibnitz to Ward (1920) assumed, but today's psychologists have forgotten, all cognition is dispositional by nature.

Intelligence test theory faces formidable inroads as well from artificial intelligence machines (Turing, 1950) which reduce much of it to simple algorithms and pattern-recognition devices for computers. Newell and Simon (1963) remark that "creative" intelligence is no longer quite what it seemed to be to psychologists, and Minsky (1963) adds that intelligence is probably largely an aesthetic matter--a concern for one's dignity, for the dignity of Caucasians, for example, over Blacks, denoting "little more than the complex of performances which we happen to respect, but do not understand" (Minsky, 1963: 447). From our theoretical standpoint, however, all intelligence problems are *communication* problems, involving concourses upon which the individual imposes his value systems, and until this is introduced into psychological theory of cognition, the nature of intelligence, a problem for Spearman (1923) as for Guilford (1967), will never find a satisfactory answer.

There is wide belief that philosophers, scientists, and statesmen (for example) *think* differently. Plato described his thinking as a silent dialogue in the confines of his own mind. Zachary Young (1951) characterized the thinking of scientists as a "muddling through" process, not at all orderly or logical. The statesman is supposed to form dispassionate opinions by pondering over all aspects of complex situations (Arendt, 1967: 54). All such are set in their appropriate concourses, and schemata can readily be found for each, for anyone of the kind, philosopher, scientist, or statesman. The exemplar is that for student No. 4 [Table 2, *supra*], in which various aspects of self, of communication pleasure, for example, and communication pain become of direct theoretical interest as *understandings* (Stephenson, 1973a).

Perhaps the most interesting application of concourse theory is to the foundations of political science. A.F. Bentley's (1908) *The Process of Government*, in particular, has a modern look, and has engaged the attention of Truman (1951), Moneypenny (1954), Hagan (1958) and others in political science in language paralleling our own, except that Bentley and his successors see everything in the objective

framework. Bentley was searching for a "tool" to
bring order into political science. He introduced
the concept of "groups," conceived as "so many men
striking out" for this-or-that political or economic
objective—trades unions, business associations, ter-
ritories, political parties, and the like. Such
"groups," he observed, are subserved by interests,
indeed by vested interests. The problem was to define
them, as we would now say, operantly, and Bentley went
to newspapers, speeches, reports, books and the like
to find there what journalists, reporters, and poli-
ticians were saying, passing themselves off as spokes-
men for public opinion. His raw data on public opin-
ion, therefore, was second-hand; and his "tool" was
merely his own analysis of the data, his own *thought*
about it, "thought informed by public opinion," as
Weinstein (1962: 188) has convincingly argued, in full
agreement with the position taken here. The "tool"
Bentley searched for is Q sorting; his "groups" are
our schemata; his conclusions are *understandings* in
our sense of the term.

Nowadays pollsters gather opinions directly from
the public, and although the polls are thought of
mainly as a means for predicting election results, in
the hands of public opinion analysts they are in fact
attempts to understand the pulse of public opinion.
Masses of data gathered by polls during the 1971-72
Presidential election, for example, were used by
Harris (1972) of the Harris polling organization to
give a truly masterly account of what happened in the
Nixon-McGovern contest. According to Harris, Nixon
realized in 1971, when his public acceptance was at a
low ebb as shown by the polls, that the better-edu-
cated in America wanted a change in foreign affairs
and domestic fiscal authority. He went to China and
Russia, turning 180° from the communist world-domina-
tion position he had previously sponsored, and as many
degrees also with regard to "controls" on the economy.
He realized, too, apparently, that the less-well-edu-
cated (Wallace voters) were in no mood for revolution-
ary domestic changes vis-a-vis welfare, racial equal-
ity, and the like. Nixon put the two together to form
his massive electoral victory. This is Dr. Harris'

understanding, grasped by reasoning and cogitation over the whole concourse of opinions represented by the polls, to reach an "explanation" of what happened. It is a mistake to suppose, however, that the analysis is purely a rational process on Dr. Harris' part: What is at issue is his own schemata, which, like all others in the domain of opinion, is inevitably value laden.

The problem is, how can we make the analysis of a Harris or a Gallup more viable?

The logic is abductive. One sees fossils on the ground and can argue back to the fact that the sea in primordial times must have covered the rocks on which one stands. The concern is with *causes*, as to why things happened the way they did. So Dr. Harris, too, cogitates on the masses of data on public opinion and comes up with an interpretation, even with simple slogans--"Don't rock the boat for the poor," "Give the better-educated indications of change," and "Keep quiet meanwhile."

We have shown elsewhere how all of this can be approached by way of Q methodology and concourse theory of communication. The *evaluation* of public opinion, which is far more than counting opinions for predicting election results, is a complicated matter, as George Carslake Thompson (1966) indicated as long ago as 1886. Thompson's schema for its evaluation was never made operational, however, until recently (Stephenson, 1964b). It was applied to a study of *Canon 35* by Berk (1963), and to the Cuban crisis by Stephenson (1964c). Recently the present author has followed the course of public opinion in America about the Vietnam War during 1971-72, on the same evaluative, concourse theory basis. Early in 1971 there were three main schemata, "hawk," "dove," and "confused"; by 1972 there were four, "hawk" and "dove" as before, but now the "confused" had differentiated into one schemata favorable to *North* Vietnam and the other to a belief that what is at issue is a civil war in which America has no business to be embroiled.

All of this is merely a beginning, for political science and other disciplines. The communication nexus is clear, for example, in the author's application

of Q methodology to public relations programs (Stephenson, 1969b), and to mass communication most generally in his *The Play Theory of Mass Communication* (Stephenson, 1967). There are studies available on "imagery" for public libraries (Stephenson, 1962), for public health (Stephenson, 1964a), and on medical communication (Stephenson, 1972c). In due course, applications are to be reported on concourse studies for movies (*Bonnie and Clyde*), and doctoral and master's contributions are already available in this fascinating area (Hunt, 1971; Rawlins, 1964). Papers will appear on Reich's *The Greening of America* (for which our schemata provide sometimes complementary, but also very different understandings); on Kennan's *Democracy and the Student Left* (1968); on Lipset's (1963) study of four democracies; on Almond and Verba's (1963) *The Civic Culture*; and, most thoroughly researched of all, *Rationale for a Subjective Approach to Advertising* (Stephenson, 1973c) in which doctoral and master's candidates contributed (Branham, 1972; Goodall, 1971; Levy, 1971; Schreiber, 1973).

By now others are bringing understandings and abductory explanations to bear on political problems, including Brown and Ellithorp (1970), Khare (1972), and Brenner (1972) amongst others. As recently as a few years ago the author couldn't find a publisher for either his original paper on Thompson's evaluation of public opinion or for a book manuscript entitled *Amelioration of Political Conflict* which, reviewed by political scientists, were rejected by them as either above the heads of their peers, or because of the subjective (i.e., non-normative) character of the studies.

Finally, a study of the play *Orghast* (Croyden, 1971), meant to be an expression of "pure communication," has afforded an opportunity to measure people's schemata *before* they view a play or go to a theatre, to show first that there can be no "pure" communication (all is value laden whatever the creative artist tries to do), and second, that one can show quite easily how far the theatrical experience influenced one's (pre-existing) schemata. There is nothing static about schemata, which, on the contrary, have dif-

ferentiated ebbs and flows of their own.

THE PROBLEM WITH PROBLEMS

These applications are but a beginning, and one concludes with a broad surveyance of the concourse theory's range and methodological implications.

First as to methodology: Enough has been said to advance the new look position, that abductory methodology is respectable. It is true that in the final analysis it is the *inquirer's* understandings which are fundamentally at issue, but it need no longer be a case of authorities speaking their arguments, however brilliantly reasoned, unsupported by constraints and checks that can be introduced in terms of concourse theory. The pages of *The Center Magazine* (the publication of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions), for example, proud effort of Robert M. Hutchins, are massive exercises in opinion in our sense of the word with not a single check on the rampant subjectivity everywhere involved. All are set in concourses of communication, and all can be as subject to our theory as was Keats' "Ode on a Grecian Urn." The compendious source book on *Theories of Cognitive Consistency* (Abelson et al., 1968) includes papers by 63 authors, making reference to 1,000 papers, in which there are many references to *self* as a basic concept in Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance (Bramel, in Abelson, p. 365), in role theory (Lecky, p. 206), but with the conclusion by Brewster Smith (p. 372) that "to be useful in the development of consistency theory, more precise and better specified conceptions in the sphere of self are obviously called for." Our theory provides an empirical basis for self, as schemata in relation to concourses of communication, *and there can be no other way to reach the self*, since subjectivity is all that is at issue, and this is a matter of utterances only. Moreover, it is inconceivable that, with a Wheatstone Bridge available, anyone in physics would merely theorize about a measurement of resistance; so in our domain, one finds it hard to believe that so simple and cogent a matter as the representation of self along Q factor lines is

being widely ignored.

More than 20 years ago the author read a paper at the Psychological Center (National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Maryland) in which he took the then current issue of a well respected social psychological journal in which 20 or so studies were reported, and showed that all but one were premature. They had ap-proached their problems in an objective hypothetico-deductive framework, asserting hypotheses and usually confirming them. The hypotheses, however, were not necessarily those that should have been *discovered* in the given situations, for the given problems, by way of concourse operations.

Only concrete examples can indicate something of the depth of misdirection in this respect. Consider, for example, Lipset's (1963) study of four democra-cies, Great Britain, U.S.A., Canada, and Australia in terms of the system of values adumbrated by Parsons (1949) by way of *sociological value analysis*. He pulled together many sociological facts concerning the school systems, status patterns, respect for law, and so on in the realm of "institutionalized activities," to support a conclusion that the U.S.A. is character-ized by the Parsons values of achievement, universal-ism, equalitarianism, and specificity, whereas, con-versely, elitism, ascription, particularism, and dif-fuseness are at the base of Britain's democracy. Can-ada and Australia fell in between these extremes, Australia more like America and Canada more like its Mother Country.

It is not necessary for the present author to be critical of the Parsons categorical framework: Others (e.g., Gouldner, 1970) have made this unnecessary. But Lipset's article includes a rich concourse of *opinion* statements, which flow like shadows over his account of the objective data on institutions. Typi-cal are the following:

 ... All men are expected to try to improve their
   position vis-a-vis others.
 ... You can tell the social status of a person the
   moment he opens his mouth--his manner of
   speech gives him away.

    ... We are tolerant of popular opinion: We are es-
       sentially middle-of-the-roaders in politics.
    ... And so on, for a hundred more.

These are "statements" of a concourse suffusing
Lipset's paper, and are clearly part of a mass "popu-
lar sociological culture" to which Gouldner (1970,
chap. 1) calls attention. When subjected to a search
for the schemata at issue, our Q studies show that
achievement certainly characterizes the American cul-
ture but that a yearning for *sovereignty* is just as
operative: All white Americans, it seems, are born
equal, but also sovereign. (The U.S.A., we may re-
member, is the only nation in the world which won't
dip its flag before any other, at the Olympics or any-
where else.) Lipset could never have found this since
his postulatory system precluded discoveries.

Another example is the work of Almond and Verba
(1963) on *The Civic Culture*. Based on more than 5,000
interviews conducted in five nations with question-
naires listing several hundred questions (whole and
sectionally), the authors' aim was to come to an *un-
derstanding* of the relationship between the attitudes
of citizens and the functioning of democratic systems.
Their conclusion was that a sense of "national iden-
tity," "participant competence," "social trust,"
"civic cooperativeness," and an "imaginative approach
to education" are basic to democratic culture. How-
ever, after 13 chapters of categorical analysis of
statistical data the two authors felt (as is notori-
ously the case) that the analysis had tended to ob-
scure the "wholeness of individual countries and the
reality of the human beings who constitute them" (Al-
mond & Verba, 1963: 402); they therefore turned in
chapter 14 to a "clinical method of analysis," to pre-
sent a few "illustrative case histories," with the
admonition that "the cases of individual respondents
are, like all individual cases, unique; and they do
not lend themselves easily to generalizations (p.
402). The reasoning, of course, is normative, within
the objective framework. There is no "working theo-
ry," just a set of unrelated conclusions: How, for
example, do the five parameters (national identity,

social trust, etc.) enter into their illustrative
cases? Only, of course, as remote explanations on the
part of the two authors. But the actual interviews
with their "illustrative cases" are the very stuff of
communication concourses. Using the data for the
American cases (Almond & Verba, 1963: 440-454) one can
readily compose a Q concourse, draw a Q sample, and on
as few as any 50 Americans begin with a "working theo-
ry" that schemata are at issue, which were what the
two authors were looking for all the time but couldn't
find because of their normative preoccupations. More-
over, having found them, they retain the reality of
the human beings; each individual no doubt is indeed
unique; and the understandings make such good sense
that they are readily accepted as generalizations.
There is no question that one has to penetrate, for
matters of civic culture, into self identifications
much as for "it is raining" and the case of No. 4.

The same applies very widely, wherever, indeed, a
normative approach has seemed *de rigueur*.

MESSAGE SYSTEMS

Finally, about message systems as such there is a
great deal to say. The problem, however, is not their
values, valencies, grammar, stylisms, or the like, but
how they enter *subjectively* into communication.

We should ask why a novel or a play communicates
whereas a lecture or a training manual only informs.
The differences turn fundamentally on *communication
pleasure* and *communication pain*, respectively. What
has to be understood is the enjoyment of movies, nov-
els, newspapers, television, gossip, dancing, reli-
gion, bull-sessions, politics, and every sort of play-
ing for fun (but not playing to win at all costs).
The basis, at least as to part of the pleasure, is
described in Freud's (1908) famous essay, "Relation of
the Poet to Daydreaming." The poet arouses in us emo-
tions, Freud taught, of which we scarcely thought we
were capable--no song is sweeter than the song unsung.
As is well known, Freud attributed the enjoyment to
displacement of painful emotions (reality related) by
pleasurable ones (play related). So the child plays.

Adults, instead, resort to fantasy. One would think
that playing may also be enjoyable anyhow, if one is
pleasing oneself, and not bent on serious purposes at
someone else's behest (Stephenson, 1967). Whatever
its origins, whether of the child openly or of the
adult vicariously at the movies, in bed, behind a
novel, within the pages of a newspaper or whatever,
the playing is the same as a play on a stage: It is
a tale told, with a hero, villain, action, a begin-
ning and an end. *Communication occurs when the indi-
vidual enters into the play by identifying with the
hero (or the like--he may indeed identify with the
villain, as children do about film cartoons and com-
ics), having communication pleasure in the process.*

This applies to all subjectivity, to every con-
course, explicit or implicit in our theory. Communi-
cation pleasure enters the scene from the following
considerations. Factor f_1 for No. 4 in the example
for "it is raining" was interpreted as a "poetical"
regard, and his self was in relation to it: *Communi-
cation pleasure occurs when the self is so entailed,
indicating an enhancement or commitment of the self--*
as though one had grown an inch taller. Factors f_2
and f_3, interpreted as "nostalgia" and "fun-loving,"
were *his*, but not *him*. They were what he *knew*. *He*
has no commitment in either of these directions as far
as "it is raining" is concerned. The self is absent.
*Such is communication pain, indicating an absence,
loss, or denegation of self in some degree.* So we
hide our head in shame, a loss of self that we can
now demonstrate in Q factor terms.

Schreiber (1973), in a study of advertising mes-
sage systems from our subjective standpoint, had as
subject a man who made his own "chopper" motorcycles,
who was an expert motorcycle mechanic, and who per-
formed 17 Q sorts under different conditions of in-
struction, on a Q sample consisting of magazine ad-
vertisements for motorcycles. The "chopper" is the
most powerful of symbols in the motorcycling world.
Four schemata were found for the individual, E, F,
G, and H. His self was on E and F, not on G or H.
The interpretation for E was that the young man on
his chopper was essentially "showing off"; F indicat-

ed, instead, a preoccupation with safety. Factor G
reflected the young man's expert knowledge of the
mechanics of motorcycles--he actually constructed his
own "choppers." Factor H had reference to the fun
aspects of motorcycling, the girls, romances, country-
side bowers and the like of the advertiser's "dream
factory." The fact was that the young man no longer
used his "choppers" as power symbols for roaring and
ripping the guts out of the countryside--he was too
afraid for that--but he could still show off by stroll-
ing along the promenade, a veritable cockbird for
everyone to admire. Factor E took F under its wing,
and the result is communication pleasure. Expert me-
chanic as he was, this was *work* for him, with which
he couldn't identify in motorcycling as such--whence
G. He was fully aware of the "fun with girls" and the
"advertiser's dream world" but he took no part in
this, whence H.

What appeals to the young man, his Q factors and
testimony alike aver, and observation of his conduct
supports, is the substance of factors E and F, not G
and H. He would never buy or make a motorcycle except
in relation to E and F.

This, then, is the core of message systems in the
domain of entertainment and play: They have to be
such that the participant can identify with, for ex-
pression of himself, so that he gains self stature in
the process. Such is communication and communication
pleasure with it.

The situation is different for instruction, data
processing, learning from manuals and the like: One
could teach the above motorcyclist more and more about
motor mechanics, and he could acquire more and more
knowledge about the "fun" aspects of motorcycling, yet
he still wouldn't switch "choppers" for display, for
any Harley-Davidson motorcycle in the world.

The principles under discussion are well enough
known, and what is new here are the operations defin-
ing schemata and self, though one holds, contrary to
the Freudian position, that at some points fantasy,
and subjectivity generally, is in no need of uncon-
scious alchemy to transmute painful emotions into com-
munication pleasure, a process that does no good to

anyone, and no harm either, except to self enhancement (Stephenson, 1967). In newspaper reading, for example, which is a great skill when properly developed (the newspapers are doing their best, it seems, to blunt it), the reader

> ...creates his own order, commanding his own grasp of things in the world. There is an air of mystery and ritual about it.... there are few opportunities left to us in which we can go into retreat, as we do within a newspaper, there to talk to ourselves and to practice the arts of self designing. Behind the pages there are moments when we seize upon things in an authentic making of self--we become committed to this or that.... (Stephenson, 1967: 158)

It is such that we can now provide evidence for as applications of concourse theory and the centrality of self in relating to subjectivity.

But consider, as a final example, the most popular television program of 1972, *All in the Family*. It is seen by 60% of the viewers on any occasion. Archie hates Jews, Blacks, Poles, Puerto Ricans, and hippies, atheists, liberals. He has a lingo of his own--dago, meat-head, gooks, and all. The volume of audience laughter is boisterous and enormous. Yet the themes deal with such unlikely matters as homosexuality, racial prejudice, "swinging partners," impotency, the menopause, FBI surveillance, and the like.

Some critics call it tasteless. It is certainly not enjoyed by Blacks or minorities, buy by whites. Nor is it satirical: The BBC progenitor of *All in the Family*, entitled *Till Death Do Us Part*, was bitterly satirical, really showing things as they are; but it raised Cain, and communication pain rather than communication pleasure. *Till Death Do Us Part* put reality on the spot, as a documentary rather than as fiction.

All in the Family fits the Freudian displacement standpoint perfectly: In each episode Archie's prejudices are *played*, but never faced up to. Each story brings homosexuality, race discrimination or whatever

on the stage, but then switches the real problem to
Archie and his problem. Archie is the butt of every
joke; but in the end we identify with him, and the
real problems are apparently ignored, transmuted into
laughter.

The pleasure, therefore, would seem to come by tak-
ing real problems and displacing them on a prejudiced
hero. But is he really an apologist for bigotry and
reaction? Is the public really not being allowed,
this way, to see itself as it is? Is the laughing
encouraging people to suppose these problems don't
exist? Or that the major problems of society are due
to meatheads, hippies or the like?

Is it not possible that the public *couldn't* face up
to these prejudices before, but now can *play* with them,
at least on the stage? And isn't this the way a child
matures, playing off its fears? Is it not also pos-
sible that the viewer who laughs gains in self, and
that this actually has in it the seeds of self design-
ing? That is, to be able to talk freely of homosexu-
ality afterwards? Of swinging partners? Of racial
discrimination? Of impotency? Note especially that
the talk is now out in the open, as public conversa-
tion, whereas before these same individuals could
never have broken the taboos, could never have been
so blasé. The prejudices of the Archie Bunkers were
there schematically long before Archie came on the
stage. The storytelling is reaching these, and there
has been nothing of the kind before on American tele-
vision. How, in the final analysis, does it fare in
comparison, say, with the simple communication plea-
sures of *Bonanza*?

We need no longer wonder, question, and argue, or
marshall facts and figures supportive of one position
or another: We consider *All in the Family* as we do
"it is raining," and discover what is at issue with
the simple working theory of concourses, schemata, and
the centrality of the self. A Q factor study of *All
in the Family* is one of the papers in our series of
applications of concourse theory. It is especially
interesting, perhaps, that the earliest study in this
area of concern was a comparison of fictional and a
documentary film treatment of race prejudice: Rawlins

(1964) compared Edward Murrow's documentary *Who Speaks for the South* and the well known movie *Raisin in the Sun* showing that if any converts were made they came from the emotions at issue in fiction, not from the colder rationality of the documentary. The emotions of a song unsung may indeed shake up a little self designing.

CONCLUSION

It is said that women are wiser than men because they know less but understand more. The above pages, it is hoped, are on the side of wisdom.

By a "working theory" is meant asking questions in concrete situations--one town for a study of traffic in towns (Ministry of Transportation, 1963), one Ellen West for existentialism, one medical group for a study of diffusion (Coleman, Katz & Menzel, 1966), one small group on a George Carslake Thompson design for any inquiry into public opinion (Stephenson, 1964b), one television program (*All in the Family*), one book of chapters on a burning issue (Kennan's [1968] *Democracy and the Student Left*), and so on--asking the questions in such a way that *understandings* are grasped before *explanations* are sought, if necessary, to confirm them.

Such is the abductory logic upon which the approach to communication has been based in the above pages, and we believe it to be very much in line with the new-look logic of science.

The "working theory" itself asks for full recognition of subjectivity as concourses of communication; of a schematical concept as to how individuals relate to concourses, based on their past experience; and of the self as central to identifications (and much else) in all communication. It calls for separation of communication from information, of opinion from fact; and it is of special importance that concourse theory provides an empirical basis for the measurement of self, and that there can be no way to reach self other than through its own concourses.

Schemata, and not message systems, are the key matters in communication. Their operational defini-

tion by Q methodology is rough and ready, but suffi-
cient for most purposes. One offers two warnings in
this regard. First, schemata, though broadly consis-
tent and coherent, are by no means to be conceived as
hard nuggets of fact, unbending and fixed by one's
past experience. They are, instead, vital, the source
of apperception and the nexus of our values and be-
liefs. Second, a little *simple* factor analysis is
all that the operations demand: It will be the end
of work in this domain if anyone thinks that its be-
all and end-all is factor analysis. The less of it,
the better. Three or four factors are all that most
well planned studies require; there's something loose
in the works if anything like ten or so factors are
carved out for interpretation. The key to sound work,
i.e., to make discoveries, is what one puts into Q
method as abduction, not what factor analysis turns
out deductively.

With respect to message systems, which of course
mediate communication, the profound matter at issue
is *play*. Subjectivity is on a stage, *in esse*. Play-
ing, not to win at any cost but just for the fun of
it, characterizes everything that is intrinsically
subjective, and therefore all communication as herein
considered. For Freud, His Majesty the Ego reigned
supreme in all subjectivity, and a healthy individual,
Freud argued, should be purged of anything of the
kind. For us it is the self, and it requires no pur-
gatives. We can measure this elusive schemata like
any other, and this makes the difference between un-
derstandings with, and understandings without a mea-
sure of control. The way is open, therefore, to or-
derly understanding of all message systems, as indi-
cated by "it is raining" or our analyses of *All in the
Family*. The concern is with communication pleasure.
The concern of information is with communication pain
--but that is another matter for future elaboration.

One application of concourse theory to which no
reference appears above is in the field of college
education, and this, no doubt, suggests social engi-
neering. It is a study entitled *Quiddity College*[7] in

7. Quiddity: L. *quidditas*, 1. The real nature or

which the concourse of common communication vis-a-vis
college and university education is examined: One
discovers that the communication pleasure aspects of
college education are widely confused with the commu-
nication pain of *training schools* (for medicine, law,
journalism, business, education, and the rest), to
everyone's loss. *Quidditas*.

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essence of a thing; that which makes a thing what it
is. 2. A captious nicety in argument; a quick, a
quibble. 3. Subtlety (or wit).

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