itz Schlick, and reliance was placed on a snippet translated from the Germa and found in Richard Braithwaite's Scientific Explanation (Cambridge University Press, 1953, p. 86). It has now been discovered that all of Schlick's papers have been translated and published, and persons interested in this issue are now diected to this new and official version (translated by Peter Huth):

The laws of nture are not (in the logician's terminology) "general implications," because they cannot be verified for all cases: they are prescriptions, rather, rules of procedure that direct the scienist to orient himself in reality, to discover true propositions, to expect certain events. (p. 197)

This quotation agears in chapter 10 (pp. 176-209), "Causality in Contemporar: Physics," in Schlick, Philosophical Papers: Vol. 2, 1925-1936(Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 1979).

Forthcoming Q lanel

J. David Gillspie (Political Science, Presbyterian College) is chairing a special panel at the 1991 Southern Political Science Association neeting, Tampa, November 7-9 -- "Q Methodology in Political Science Research: The Post-Stephenson Era." Three papers will comprise the panel: The Utility and Application of Q n Political Science, Bruce McKeown (Westmont College) and James Carlson (Providence College); Current Directions in 2-Methodological Research: Whither Intensive Analysis? Charle Cottle (U Wisconsin, Whitewater); and Generalization in Q Methodology: A Continuing Problem, Dan Thomas (Wartburg College) and Larry Baas (Valparaiso U). The discussant will be Steven Brown (Kent State U).

Burrhus Frederic Skinner

March 20, 1904 - August 18, 1990

Operant Subjectivity must take note of B.F. Skinner's passing by virtue of the term operant, which was his. William Stephenson was instrumental in bringing Skinner to the University of Missouri for an honorary degree in 1968, and although Skinner was not cited in Stephenson's "Factors as Operant Subjectivity." from which this newsletter's title was drawn, his work was clearly on Stephenson's mind.

Unlike many "behaviorists," Skinner never denied the existence of an inner life, which merely required the development of instrumentation to provide amplification, much as a O sort reyeals a person's point of view. However, he remained critical until the end of mind and self -- "There is no place in a scientific analysis of behavior for a mind or self" - his attack was aimed at the substantive mind of cognitive science. (Even Stephenson referred to "so-called mind," including quotations, to indicate he meant to imply nothing substantive.) Elsewhere, there were many similarities between Skinner and Stephenson, e.g., in the former's observation that "the word conscious ... means co-knowledge (Latin: con-science) or 'knowing with others' - an allusion to the verbal contingencies needed for being conscious." Stephenson was not interested in locating verbal contingencies of reinforcement, but the above quote could otherwise have been drawn from his "Consciring" paper in Communication Yearhook 4 (1980). The idea of measurement free of the constraints of the measuring device is of course central to both operant analysis and Q methodology.

The above quotations are contained in B.F. Skinner's final paper, completed the night before he died: "Can Psychology Be a Science of Mind?" American Psychologist, November 1990, 45,1206-1210. Its reading is commended.