Ulysses and *Finnegans Wake:* A Q-Methodological Look at Profundity (Part II: *Finnegans Wake*)

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ABSTRACT: In contrast to the mainly substantive content of Ulysses, *James Joyce's* Finnegans Wake *is wholly transitive, a distinction introduced by William James and fundamental to the principle of complementarity in quantum theory. The free-floating "inner" thought of Molly Bloom (in* Ulysses*) and that which permeates* Finnegans Wake *is the same that provides the basis for creativity and truths which are outside the substantive conventions of literary and scientific discourse.* Finnegans Wake *is therefore methodological, Joyce's equation of void, incertitude, and unlikelihood corresponding to the quantum principles of Q methodology.*

The Two Epics

I hold in my hands my copies of *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake.* The *Ulysses* belonged to my daughter, Mariel, when she took a course on *Ulysses* at Bennington College, where she was a stu-

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dent during 1957-61. My original copy was lost by the USA mail on its way here in 1948. The copy of *Finnegans Wake* was bought in Chicago, probably in 1950.

But why was I interested in James Joyce?

I have fond associations with Joyce's Ireland. Ireland was only a hundred miles from my birthplace and family home in the north of England. My wife and I spent our honeymoon in Ireland in 1930 with cycles and tent. My grandmother Stephenson was Irish from Dublin, and her surname was Cooper -- which was also that of Molly Bloom's grandmother on her father's side (Molly, the heroine of *Ulysses*). Molly's father was Major Brian Cooper Tweedy of the British Army, stationed at Gibralter where Molly was born and raised -- her mother a handsome Spanish Jewess. This is sentiment. But there are close and not inconsequential associations, rooted in my early education. Ireland, from the earliest days of Christianity, had been a refuge for scholars, beginning with St. Patrick's mission (ca. 385-461 A.D.), and including the many centuries when scholars flocked to Ireland from every part of Europe to consult its Doctors of Law, Medicine, Philosophy, Literature, etc.; presaging also the return of Christianity into Europe via the north of England, with St. Cuthbert (ca. 635-687), who was buried in Durham Cathedral, where I stood in 1926 to receive my doctorate in physics, in the Chapel House. The association also is with the Scottish Enlightenment of Francis Hutcheson (in the 18th century) from the same Celtic source, in Glasgow -- again less than a hundred miles away -- the font of my education as a psychologist with Charles Spearman, whose psychological principles were influenced by that source.

There were plenty of reasons for my interest in James Joyce, all of them *historically* related. When I returned to the two epics a few months ago (in January, 1988) after a lapse of many years, I readily put my hands on the copy of *Ulysses*, but at first couldn't find my copy of *Finnegans Wake*. My wife was about to buy me another copy when I found mine amongst my books -- it is hard to believe that I knew *where* it was but couldn't find it! Inside its cover there were two clippings

from *The New York Times Book Review* of May 26, 1957, one by Stephen Spender, the other by Brooks Atkinson. *Letters of James Joyce* (Gilbert, 1957) had just appeared. The reviews had clearly fascinated me in 1957.

The two reviewers marvelled at Joyce, describing him, from the letters, as a lonely man, an exile from his native land, thinking only of his writings and their publication. Joyce, they added, was surely arrogant, single-minded, concerned about little except his own work, which, he was sure, would have effects for the next 1,000 years. And yet, the reviewers agreed, Joyce was a kindly man, wishing no harm to anyone. Joyce separated himself from church, state, family, even friends: he was able to stand alone, with a few who believed in his work. He was a super do-gooder, looking for ultimate principles. Yeats and Synge were creating a new Irish drama on familiar lines; Joyce, instead, went to Ibsen (learning Norwegian the better to understand his plays), and thus to intellectual drama. One of his earliest publications is "When the Dead Awaken." His play, *Exiles* (1914), is all reason, minus passion. But he was already distinguishing between *substantive* thought, which he put into Leopold Bloom's remarkably receptive mind in *Ulysses,* and *transitive,* which he left intact in Molly Bloom's "silent monologue." And he was to continue for 17 years to develop transitory thought in *Finnegans Wake,* which he achieved with respect to the history of mankind.

Joyce's separation of substantive and transitive was, in my view, an astonishing achievement. I had found myself mired in unending argument amongst philosophers and psychologists of the 19th and early 20th centuries, as, for example, represented in *The Thought and Character of William James* (Perry, 1935), and could find in James Joyce a confirmation of my own conclusions and an end to the turmoil.

The association of Ireland with *knowledge* went back much farther in history, to its legendary association with ancient Phoenicians from the 13th century B.C. The Achean oarsmen of the Homeric ship that sailed the Mediterranean claimed to be of kingly descent (event if their mission was plunder and

piracy); and of course they landed in Ireland, as "knights of the oar," and very very Irish!

It was such history, whether fact or legend, that Joyce fastened upon for his 19th Episode -- *Finnegans Wake.*

Finnegans Wake

It took 17 years to write (from 1922-1939) and scholars are still busy fathoming its meanings. Like its predecessor, *Ulysses,* it is an event of one day, but it is a day-long dream, told as a story of a publican living with his wife and their three children in a village near Dublin: it is Mr. Humphrey Chimpden Earwicker, his wife Anna Livia, twins Shem and Shaun, and Isobel, the daughter. They represent an archetypal family. During the dream, Mr. Earwicker plays many parts -- as a goat, as Mr. Gladstone, as Christ, Oscar Wilde, as James Joyce, and much more. Finnegan the master builder had been killed, falling from a house he had built -- the *Wake* was his, but by the mysteries of "met-him-pike-hoses," Molly Bloom's version of *metempsychosis,* Earwicker is Finnegans' reincarnation *pro tem.*

As subsumed by Vincent John Cheng in his *Shakespeare and Joyce* (1984), *Finnegans Wake* is universal history, dreamed one night by one man, H.C.E. and his legendary predecessors, in dreams within dreams, as indicative of universal man.

But Cheng adds that the present age has given us relativity and quantum mechanics. Historians and novelists have always assumed, for centuries, that no event ever happens in a definite or exclusively certain way. What "happens" is ultimately determined by the beholder (in the form of gossip, criticism, history books, etc.). Every generation reinterprets its own history.

It was a pleasure to find these references to relativity and uncertainty principle commonly discussed by modern historians and of influence upon modern novelists.

But this comes far short of a *theory* of literature or of history. Joyce went ahead much further than Browning's *The*

Ring and the Book, which, as everyone knows, provides many different versions of a murder witnessed by several by-standers, with very different interpretations. Quantum theory isn't merely the vicissitudes of observers.

The Q-Methodological Approach

I was taught to look at history for solutions to problems by Charles Spearman's *Psychology Down the Ages* (1937), in which he describes the course of psychology as cyclical, where discoveries are made -- forgotten -- and -- remembered in endless convolutions of facts. Only *one* principle had come down the ages as of universal acceptance, that of *pleasure-unpleasure.*

It was this I represented by Q-technique in 1935. It seems so simple now, but at the time there was my primary involvement in experimental aesthetics as a budding experimental psychologist, beginning with G.T. Fechner's psychophysics, and with William James's "feelings." Articles on "pleasure and pain" had appeared in *Mind,* and in *Pain, Pleasure and Aesthetics* (1894) by Henry Rutgers Marshall (cited in Perry, 1935), and later by many others to the same effect, about which James could write:

> The feelings of pleasure and displeasure form a truly immense portion of the life of man, but man's attempts to give to himself some intimate account of their conditions, whether inside or outside of his organism, form a very shabby episode of his achievements in the theoretic line -- so shabby, indeed, that one's first impulse is to shy away from any book with the word "aesthetics" in its title, with the confident expectation that, if read, it could only emphasize once more the gaping contrast between the richness of life and the poverty of all possible formulas.... (in Perry, 1935, p. 127)

I made myself master of aesthetics by distinguishing between *pain* as sensory, and *unpleasure* as subjective. To "tickle" a person can be experienced as pleasure or pain; and to "prick" or "pinch" may be likewise pain or pleasure -- indeed there are people who enjoy a whipping. But *pleasure* and *unpleasure* seemed of primary significance. And even in *aesthetics* I had

to find out, for myself, that while a feeling that something is *beautiful* is pleasurable, the opposite, that something is *ugly,* is unpleasurable. The philosophers and psychologists were agog about *beauty,* oblivious of its opposite, *ugliness* -- which is the subject of my first attempt at a book manuscript, *Psychology of Aesthetics* (ca. 1936). Show unsophisticated people round an art museum and they dislike about as many works of art as they like.

It was in this context, as well as that of psychophysics upon which it was based, that Q-technique took form. There was no thought that a conscious "mind" was at work, painting a coat of consciousness upon the phenomena of pleasure-unpleasure. Instead, there was a *person,* interacting with objects, with music, art, and indeed with everything of life. It is a long road of knowledge from these early days of aesthetics to the present "Intentionality: How to Buy a Loaf of Bread" (Stephenson, 1987a), in which it appears that the psychological knowledge that has been recycled "down the ages" is needless -- we can now do without it in fundamental respects. And so it is for mountains of discussion about consciousness, knowledge, the self, the mind-body problem, etc., about which William James, and everyone else down to Spearman, were engrossed. Spearman rejected it. But so did James Joyce. We saw in Part I that he rejected *all* (not merely psychological) knowledge of the 19th century (Stephenson, 1991). In *Ulysses* the hero, Mr. Leopold Bloom, represented the materialistic positivism of that century, based upon the deterministic view of causality that still prevails today in the social and psychological sciences. In *Finnegans Wake* the situation is very different; it represents a view that modern science is with us, with its concepts of relativity and indeterminism. It was a perspective implicit in the profound psychology of William James (1891), and the suggestion is that James Joyce was of William James's mind, and that his *intention* was to make us see for ourselves, by arduous work, what the sheer complexity of everything human has in store for us.

Theoretical

It can be appreciated, then, why I turned to Joyce for support. If anything is true it is that his *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake* are revelations of inner, subjective life, untarnished by academic considerations. This intrigued me.

Chamber's Biographical Dictionary (1962) described *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake* as follows:

> These novels flout the accepted conventions of the novel form prior to Joyce. The time-factor becomes elastic and consciousness takes over and dictates the sequence of events. (p. 719)

In Q-methodological language, the "time-factor" is indeed elastic, being inconsequential, as in "William James, Niels Bohr and Complementarity: IV--The Significance of Time" (Stephenson, 1988a). We replace consciousness by communicability, but what "takes over" in *Ulysses* (with Molly's monologue) and throughout *Finnegans Wake* is *transitory thought.* All *substantive thought* of the Victorian-Newtonian era is declared null, as flawed and even chimerical.

The *Dictionary* continues as follows:

> Plot and character emerge in a stream of association that carries on its ripples all the mental flotsam and jetsam that the ordinary novel never rises to the surface.... In addition Joyce, particularly in [*Finnegans Wake*] employs language like a musical notation, that is, the sound superficially supersedes the sense (to the average mind), but in reality communicates (like music) profundities which conventionalized words cannot express. (*Chamber's Biographical Dictionary,* 1962, p. 719)

The "flotsam and jetsam" is the substance of "popular" culture, as represented by relatively untutored individuals like Molly Bloom. It is cultures, not individuals such as poets and novelists, that provide the basis of "profundities," the "essences," the "factors" of Q-methodology and quantum theory.

True, Joyce employs language like music -- indeed he is master of every use of language:

> And low stole o'er the stillness
> the heartbeats of sleep.

Or again,

> So this was the dope that woolied the cad
> that kinked the ruck and noised the rape
> that tried the sap that hugged the mort.

There are a thousand such, none a repeat of any other. It breaks the somnolence of narrative. But it solves no problems as such.

What Joyce had proposed, instead, was intended to solve profound problems. He had created a literary methodology, comparable to ours in Q-methodology, that apparently would communicate "profundities which conventionalized words cannot express."

Chamber's Biographical Dictionary had no doubt about the value of Joyce's effort, but considered it self evident that the analogy with *Odyssey* would turn back upon itself "in convolutions." There could be no development, therefore, after a certain point is reached in *Finnegans Wake.* The real achievement Joyce had made was to invent a musical form of writing.

Which is not at all acceptable.

Comparison With Quantum Physics

I shall consider what is "conventionalized" in a moment: meanwhile it is important to remember that "profundities which conventionalized words cannot express" confronted nuclear physics while Joyce was writing *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake.* For a number of years (1921-27) Werner Heisenberg and his peers were in a state of excited discussion, always getting nowhere because of contradictions and difficulties. These couldn't be resolved by rational means -- one simply had to accept either *waves* or *particles* as indicated by measurements. Einstein argued for particles as light quanta; Bohr retorted that, with the recent discovery of radio waves, Einstein hadn't a leg to stand on. So despair. Then, Heisenberg remarks...

> ...we saw that mathematics could do things we couldn't do ourselves. That, of course, was a very strange experience. (Heisenberg, 1975, p. 568)

The mathematics was matrix algebra, and Heisenberg continued...

> ...but we did not know the kind of language to use, nor how to talk about it. Out of this state of despair finally came this change of mind. All of a sudden we said, well, we simply have to remember that our usual language does not work anymore, that we are in the realm of physics where our words don't mean much. (p. 568)

Niels Bohr doubted whether a mathematics could be found that would serve: he felt that nature "might be so irrational that we could never get any kind of mathematical description." He was agreeably surprised to find that there was a system, "even if we don't know how to talk about it."

The same quandary faced James Joyce, who was getting nowhere against the traditional literary mode of Western culture. He had moved to Paris and Europe to pursue his ends. D.H. Lawrence had rejected Joyce's work as "too terribly would-be and done-on-purpose." What Joyce had achieved, in fact, was to reduce all literary creation to profound principles. *Joyce had discovered that all substantive knowledge has to be suspect, and had fashioned for himself the alternative, that the "silent monologue" of Molly Bloom held the secret of all creative thought, namely, what we now call transitive thought.*

But he also dug deeper, providing, through the voice of Stephen Dedalus, a formula, which, like Einstein's $e = mc^2$, represented the source of the creative thought, namely, it is based...

> *...upon the void. Upon incertitude, upon unlikelihood.*

This statement is the high point in *Ulysses.* It corresponds, in Q-methodology, to *concourse* (void), to the *uncertainty principle* (incertitude), and to *intentionality* (unlikelihood). To concourse because it constitutes the quantumstuff of Q, where

Q-technique measures anyone for pleasure-unpleasure on the assumption of *zero* amount for every Q-sort: the beginnings are with a void for feeling. Q-factor theory brings in quantum theory and Heisenberg's uncertainty principle (incertitude); and Q factors are *intentional,* not predictive, more *unlikely* than likely. The correspondence could scarcely be better.

Joyce's Knowledge Down the Ages

The terms *substantive* and *transitive* are used with the definitions given to them by William James, as in "William James, Niels Bohr, and Complementarity: I--Concepts" (Stephenson, 1986).

My submission is that James Joyce not only made the distinction between the two terms basic to his work, even if he never used the terms, but that he represented positions about *knowledge* that correspond to those we maintain in Q-methodology. In *Ulysses,* the positivistic materialism of the 19th century was put into the phenomenal memory of Leopold Bloom: it was rejected systematically, episode after episode in *Ulysses* with the logic and precision of a Russell and Whitehead's *Principia Mathematica,* as flawed and chimerical. His wife, Molly Bloom, put in its place, in her "silent monologue," what belonged by *nature* to the everyday humanity of a person. It was left to Humphrey Chimpden Earwicker to serve this purpose for what belonged to *mankind* by nature, down the whole course of its history.

We have seen that historian Vincent John Cheng (1984) related *Finnegans Wake* to relativity and uncertainty, in the manner of modern science. Historians and novelists had always assumed that events do not happen in straightforward, determinate ways -- which, however, is not merely what quantum theory is about. The approach by another scholar, Bernard Benstock, in *Joyce-Again's Wake: An Analysis of Finnegans Wake* (1965), provides the kind of clues that direct attention to what exactly *Finnegans Wake* is all about, from a quantum-theoretical standpoint.

It requires only a few clues, as follows: if *Finnegans Wake* is identified as a novel, it is certainly the most complicated novel ever written, to an *nth* power of complexity. Now we pick up from Benstock:

> (a) Nothing in *Finnegans Wake* is simple, Benstock says, because of Joyce's sense of the real complexities of human affairs. It is attributed to Joyce's capriciousness, except that it was *intentional* and logically supported (p. 21).

Our own emphasis is upon the *intentionality*; it is continued throughout *Finnegan's Wake* if quantum theory is to apply.

> (b) "We are far from agreement on what happens, to whom it happens, and why it happens"... The various sub-characters remain enigmatical (for example, the Four Old Men, the Cad, Kate the charwoman, etc.) (p. 27).

This supports the *intention* of Joyce. To be true to the utter complexity of all things human, Joyce has to keep us guessing.

> (c) The subject is (besides quantum mechanics) seduction, particularly the defloration of virgins (p. 27).

This relates to the treatment given to ladies' hat-boxes, and the big-leaf concealment for clothing: hiding what is real and basic, as in quantum theory, is the *intention.* There is of course the sexual connotation, but the deeper understanding remains as something else, the unfathomed intention.

> (d) *Finnegans Wake* serves to investigate contemporary man in terms of his *history.* Religious and political claims seem to have been most carefully scrutinized.... History, in this, is a world of its own (p. 43).

Which is our major conclusion, that whereas Joyce's insight into Molly Bloom, as represented by her "silent monologue," pointed to universality for the human person as such, the *intention* in *Finnegans Wake* was to point to universality in mankind's history. Religion and politics dominated Joyce's lifetime.

> (e) The entire history of the human race flows past with the waters of the Liffey.... The history of man's globe is mirrored in the history of Ireland (the microcosm reflecting the cosmos) (p. 43).

Again, as Benstock remarks, history is invasions, struggles, defenses, absorptions, and *metamorphoses* -- in this, Joyce saw universalities. At the lowest level of metamorphosis there are the Earwickers, "hovering in time" between the 19th and 20th centuries, representing the present man and his heritage. It was a time when there were thousands of novelists, during the 1920-1930 years when Joyce was writing *Finnegans Wake,* all dealing with the *here* and *now* of existence, that Joyce found totally unacceptable. None was grasping profundities, towards which Joyce was *intentional.*

> (f) Politically, Ireland represents the world at large, constantly rebelling against its conquerors, constantly unable to unite in a common cause (p. 46).

There remains in Ireland today a xerox copy of this very condition, of religious turmoil, economic poverty, slums, two languages (one indigenous and unused, the other foreign and dominant) -- as Benstock remarked 20 years ago -- all of it contrasting with the Georgian pomp and circumstance of its buildings and aspirations. For Joyce, at the turn of the century, he could look, like every Irishman, at 800 years of such turmoil: but it served only to garnish the main dish, of a search for significance in history, as intentionality.

I conclude with one additional abstraction, of hundreds one can make from Benstock's analysis of *Finnegans Wake*:

(g) Even for Joyce, for whom the past was fluid and not fixed, the chaos of the present (the core and continuum of his work) suggested hazards that required careful handling and complete control (p. 44).

Nothing could better describe Joyce's intentionality. Moreover, chaos is the "core and continuum" of a budding new approach of science, described by James Gleick in *Chaos: Making a New Science* (1987). It is the brainchild of Mitchell J. Feigenbaum: but it is redolent of a majestic gestalt psychology, and part of the thrust, in this century, of a genuine phenomenology.

What I have tried to represent in the above few abstracts from hundreds more available in Bernard Benstock's analysis of *Finnegans Wake* is an underlying theme, that Joyce was aware that he was on the brink of fundamental discoveries. To this end he fashioned literary prose of great inventiveness: but it is misleading to credit Joyce's greatness to this. He was chary of literary pretention, as he was of all else: he wrote as follows...

> One great part of every human existence is passed in a state which cannot be rendered sensible by the use of wideawake language, cut and dry grammar and goahead plot. (cited in Begnal & Senn, 1974, Introduction)

The Gist of It

Instead of "wideawake language," Joyce sent us on a vast wild-goose chase in *Finnegans Wake,* and the purpose, to our way of thinking, was to make sure that there would be time for profundities to emerge, free from the chaos of the false substantive knowledge that we had inherited. It is the same in Q-methodology, where we have to leave it to Q-sorts to come to grips with human existence -- nothing we can say beforehand in "wide-awake" language can portray what factor theory discloses as intentionalities.

In all of this I make no pretense at being a Joycean expert: it merely follows that Q-methodology and quantum theory have direct correspondences with almost everything I put my hands upon in the literature about Joyce and his epics. Intentionality is a key concept in Q: and it qualifies every page of *Finnegans Wake.*

It is granted that Joyce was influenced by Vico, and that *Finnegans Wake* is in a Vicoean circle. However, fundamentally, Vico was postulating beginnings in *culture,* in *people,* not in the genius of a Homer or other poets. In *Finnegans Wake,* Shaun and Shem represent human history in terms of village gossip, the everyday conversations, however garrulous, however circumstantial, pompous, or funny (to echo Begnal and Senn's *A Conceptual Guide to Finnegans Wake,* 1974).

So it is, too, in Q-methodology. Its beginnings are in *cultures,* not in the minds of scholars like myself or any other. There is, for example, the problem as to when does history begin? Leopold Bloom was completely up-to-date about his knowledge of the substantive thought of Europe's 19th century. Joyce, to the contrary, makes no mention of crucial social events of the 1920s and 1930s -- nothing of Franco, Mussolini, Hitler, Chamberlain, Roosevelt, Stalin, de Valera -- and no mention of Spain, Japan, Geneva. We have to agree with Benstock that Joyce must have been more than merely aware of what was happening in Europe at the time. His sympathies were with the Russian experiment, with due caution. Much of Joyce's writing had been, all his life, condemnation of the middle class...

> its hypocritical morality, mediocrity of taste and thought, book banning, insistence on compromise and conformity. (Benstock, 1965, p. 66)

Benstock's conclusion is that Joyce managed to develop a balanced attitude toward his own period in history, in relation to the development of man and his society. He knew what humanity is about. He is described as socialistic, but not by conviction, only by sympathy. Benstock concludes that Joyce

managed to develop a truly adjusted attitude about the culture forming around him.

Conclusions, Pro and Con

There is wide agreement that Joyce, with *Finnegans Wake,* aimed at writing an epic, to be remembered for a thousand years, like *Paradise Lost* or *Chanson de Roland* or *Beowulf.* He was abstracting from vast volumes of historical and literary material, to "fuse" it, as Benstock put it, into a universal work.

This, in my opinion, is not what Joyce was about. His *Ulysses* was a masterpiece of logic, as watertight as Russell and Whitehead's *Principia Mathematica. Finnegans Wake* was a continuation of a *conclusion,* that Molly Bloom's monologue held within it some truths that were escaping the network of literary (and scientific) discourse, and that to reach into these truths on a universal scale required an extension of Molly's free-floating "inner" thought, that we now recognize as transitive. Joyce's "fusing" was *not* to make a new *Beowulf,* but to seek, through the avenues of *history* (of which Molly Bloom was ignorant), what *conclusions* could be found. What was apparently a rambling mind in Molly, was a ranging mind in Joyce in the person of Earwicker. The ranging was dreams within dreams, events within events, the connections within which had to be *experienced* -- such as to make you cry at Molly's humanity -- and to be experienced in *Finnegans Wake* as profound *in esse.*

There is a difference, in my view, between a solution to a problem (as in algebra, a matter of deduction) and *conclusions* such as Joyce was confronting.

Professor E.R. Curtius (1929), a Joycean scholar, came to the *conclusion* that Joyce's work was nihilistic, springing from "a revolt of the spirit that leads to a destruction of the world" (cited in Gilbert, 1959, p. 226). For Curtius, the void of Stephen Dedalus was indeed a foundation for the macro- and microcosm, but, in Vico fashion, the process would lead inexorably to a destruction of the world, so that all philosophical

and theological knowledge, and all the knowledge in all the literatures of the world would ultimately self-destruct. What will be left, Curtius concluded, would merely be an odor of ashes, the horror of death, and pangs of remorse. I have to ask, What is the nature of such a conclusion? And the answer has to be that it can scarcely be logic, because other experts came to totally different conclusions.

Benstock's conclusion is that *Finnegans Wake* is intrinsically *synthetic*, not analytical: it is constructive, the very opposite of Curtius's nihilism -- which, as it happens, is also the viewpoint of physicist Ilya Prigogine, in *From Being to Becoming: Time and Complexity in the Physical Sciences* (1980). Joyce, according to Benstock, was of this turn of mind, optimistic about man's future, and accepting 20th century thought that had provided the technical advances and industrialism around him. Marx, Darwin, Fraser, Freud, Planck, Einstein, Bohr -- the splitting of the atom, satellites, and worldwide television to enhance a "world village" -- were integral to Joyce. There was nothing sentimental about Joyce in this: the conclusion is of benevolence. Joyce is reported as saying:

> the calm judgment of the world is that those men cannot be good who in any part of the world cut themselves off from the rest of the world. (Benstock, 1965, p. 263)

Again, I ask what is the nature of such a *conclusion*? Stuart Gilbert attributed it to differences in personality. "I cannot help thinking," he says in a footnote on p. 226 of his *James Joyce...*

> ...that the learned critic (Curtius) overestimates the pessimism of *Ulysses*, and, perhaps does not sufficiently bear in mind the fact that its author is an Irishman. Both Stephen and Bloom have their consolations -- Stephen in his art, Bloom in his keen interest in material details. And both (Bloom especially) have a sense of humour. (p. 226)

It is neither Stephen nor Bloom, however, but James Joyce who is at issue: and one has to come to terms with his 17-year

effort to complete *Finnegans Wake,* which involved extraordinary convolutions of "dreams within dreams," the constant reiteration of themes, all with intense involvement -- all to ensure that we would have time to grasp things as no longer in circles, but as "ageless" and "timeless."

In short, I attach methodology to *Finnegans Wake.* Joyce was experimenting with phenomenological methodology, such as I describe in "William James, Niels Bohr, and Complementarity: V--Phenomenology of Subjectivity" (Stephenson, 1988b). There is correspondence between Joyce's fundamental equation, of *void, incertitude,* and *unlikelihood,* and the principles of Q-methodology. The reiterated *intentionality* of *Finnegans Wake* is also the core of Q.

Conclusion

Enough has been indicated to place Joyce with Edmund Husserl, Charles Spearman, and Albert Einstein, as rejecting knowledge of the 19th century, with its pomposity, shallowness, greed, etc. My conclusion is that James Joyce, in *Finnegans Wake,* was employing phenomenology as a methodology, to reach "essences" by facing a profound problem -- the meaning of history -- precisely as in *Ulysses,* Molly Bloom was facing her own problem, of individual *being.* Molly Bloom's monologue is not merely a literary *quale,* but a technical way to grasp the phenomenology of individual thought, to come to grips with its "essences." After all, free association in psychoanalysis, and "talking it out" in daseinanalysis, is the same use of transitory thought. Earwicker's day-long dreaming, of "dreams within dreams," is not merely an historical *quale,* but an experiment, lasting 17 years, with the phenomenology of history. Both involve profound problems: both are qualified by "renewed self reflections" over and over; by "infinite interest"; and solutions emerge as "essences" -- as spontaneous evocations of truth-value -- all characteristic of the basic tenets of phenomenology. Molly's took half an hour. Joyce's own, as Earwicker, lasted 17 years. An example of the same patient

scrutiny of phenomenology, lasting six years, is provided in my *Secularization of Science* (Stephenson, 1987b).

It is easy to object that one is only being "wise after the event." Our response is that beginning with *transitory* and *substantive,* we not only relate these to quantum mechanics, but go much further, to show that present-day substantive knowledge in social-psychological-historical directions is irrelevant in fundamental respects. This was the message of *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake,* as it is of our *Intentionality: How to Buy a Loaf of Bread* (Stephenson, 1987a). It is a message that Husserl, Spearman, and Einstein would now, I believe, have accepted.

Moreover, what these scholars, and Joyce, rejected beggars description compared with the horrors of the 20th century, with its massive wars and genocide, and with the threat of total annihilation by *Big Bombs.* The significance of *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake* is that without quantum theory and Q-methodology, it was providing an approach to "essences," instead of an unending disembowelment of facts. What Joyce could not have foreseen -- and this is true of Husserl, Spearman, and Einstein -- is that every profound problem may have two or more "essences," each as possible as the others. The choice remains, it seems, of a fundamental nihilism, or a basic benevolence, a sort of fundamental socialism for mankind, and decent humility for its individuals.

I forgot, as these pages were written, that I was educated as a school teacher, and that Johann Friedrich Herbart's *Application of Psychology to the Science of Education* (1892) must have got into my thinking. It was still gospel in the 1920s, and deserved it. He defined ideas in such a way that they could be dealt with *mathematically,* but not experimentally. He denied the possibility of psychological experimentation such as fills laboratories today. Nevertheless he sought to develop the empirical and metaphysical aspects of psychology. This we have achieved! So far, it has proven impossible to experiment with the *intentionality* of operant factors. It has to be accepted, *sui generis.* The search for "essences" is a wonderful fulfillment of Herbart's approach to a science of education and to subjec-

tive knowledge in general. And James Joyce's *Finnegans Wake* was pointed in this same direction.

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One person with a belief is a social power equal to ninety-nine who have only interests. (John Stuart Mill)