The Structure and Form of Subjectivity in Political Theory and Behavior[1]

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ABSTRACT: Approaches to the study of human behavior epitomized by objectivism and subjectivism are judged inadequate due to the a priori categories which they presume, and an alternative is demonstrated with two case studies. The first explores the structure of subjectivity underlying Downs's (1957) theory of voting, and the second reveals the same operant forms implicit in Zetterbaum's (1982) philosophy of the political self. Discussion follows on the ramifications for a science of subjectivity.

Let us keep to what we can learn from observation, if we do not wish to substitute the fancies of our imagination for the majestic silence of Nature concerning the first principles.

-- Romé de l'Isle, *Cristallographie* (1783).

Ironic as it may seem, two of the most formidable obstacles to the objective study of subjectivity in political science are objectivism and subjectivism. By objectivism is meant adoption of a vantage point external to the person under observation from which to make inferences concerning the person's thoughts, feelings, and meanings; whereas by

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subjectivism is meant those strategies which take the standpoint of the self as the only viable observational framework. Behaviorism epitomizes the former, but the methodological advantages claimed for it are often purchased at the expense of the subjectivity at issue. By way of contrast, some forms of phenomenology and existentialism remain true to their human subject matter but often take a stance antagonistic to scientific method since, it is sometimes claimed, "the human order is radically or qualitatively different from the natural order" (Jung, 1979, p. 98; cf. Rosaldo, 1994). We are therefore presented with the classic dilemma -- that those who can measure well too often restrict themselves to inconsequential epiphenomena, while those who complain remain steadfastly aloof.

In concert, objectivism and subjectivism in the human sciences collude in freezing the intellectual dialectic, thereby postponing the achievement of a higher order synthesis, and they do so in unexpected ways -- the objectivists by shying away from extending rigor at the level of the individual; and the subjectivists, lacking method, by failing to tie their concepts to the subjectivities which their categories were intended to denote. Taken to their extremes, therefore, objectivism ends in subjectivity (as when the scientist is forced to guess about the integration of behavior at the level of the single case), while subjectivism yields to a kind of objectivity of reified categories (such as life project, being-in-the-world, etc.) unconstrained by the particulars of concrete existence.

Lurking behind both stances is the assumption that knowledge begins with logical categories which are then used as a base from which to explore the world. The strategies of exploration of course differ: The objectivist proceeds to observation and the collection of facts, whereas the subjectivist relies more on the application of reason and the development of conceptual clarity. But the categorical presumption remains inviolate -- that concepts are of *a priori* importance.

A beginning is made in lending precision to these contentions by examining two single cases -- one within the context of a behavioral theory, and the other from the standpoint of political philosophy. As the following illustrations make clear, there is much wisdom in Romé de l'Isle's epigram, quoted at the outset, that at the beginning of any science there is more to learn from straightforward observation than from the postulation of first principles embedded in categories.

Voting: Rationality vs. Rationale

Paradigmatic of objective studies is the theory of voting advanced by Anthony Downs (1957), which begins with the axiom that "citizens act rationally in politics" (p. 14), i.e., that rational political man "approaches every situation with one eye on the gains to be had, the other eye on costs, a delicate ability to balance them, and a strong desire to follow wherever rationality leads him" (pp. 7-8). In determining which party to vote for, rational political man compares the utilities (benefits) he expects from parties A and B, the difference being his expected party differential: $E[Ua(t+1)] - E[Ub(t+1)]$, where $E(Ua)$ and $E(Ub)$ are the expected utilities of the incumbent and opposition parties, respectively, and $t+1$ specifies the period following the next election (Downs, 1957, pp. 38-39). Crucial to the voter's calculations is the current party differential: $Ua(t) - E[Ub(t)]$, i.e., the difference between the gains actually received in period t (up to election day) from the party in power compared to the gains expected had party B been in power during the same period (p. 40). Among other ways, party A's performance is judged against the voter's conception of an ideal government: $Ui(t) / Ua(t)$ (p. 43). Downs expresses these and other of his ideas as ratios, but acknowledges that "any other mathematical measure which allows relative comparisons can be substituted without changing the argument" (p. 43n).

Researchers who have sought to pursue the implications of Downs's formulations have generally done so by recourse to large numbers of cases (e.g., Frohlich, Oppenheimer, Smith, & Young, 1978), but Simon (1985, 1995) has questioned the viability of Downs's neoclassical economic conceptualization and has advanced his own concept of "bounded rationality" as more compatible with contemporary cognitive psychology and with the way in which the mind actually works. Simon (1985) doubts the wisdom of examining social aggregates and instead invites the study of "individual actors at the microscopic and face-to-face level of the interview and the poll" (p. 300) and encourages consideration of those aspects of irrationality examined by Harold Lasswell: "The methodological lesson I would draw is that we need to understand passion and to provide for it in our political models, but we need particularly to provide in those models for the limited span of attention that governs what considerations, out of a whole host of possible ones, will actually influence the deliberations that precede action" (Simon, 1985, pp. 301-302). Finally, Simon concludes, "we need to understand where the frame of reference for the actors'

thinking comes from -- how it is evoked" (p. 302); i.e., to understand political behavior "we must characterize the political situation, not as it appears 'objectively' to the analyst, but as it appears subjectively to the actors" (p. 298).

It would be misleading to leave the impression that Downs omits subjectivity entirely. It is true that he is concerned with means rather than goals, but from the very outset he defines his key term, utility, as "a measure of benefits *in a citizen's mind* which he uses to decide among alternative courses of action" (p. 36, emphasis added). Moreover, features of Downs's conceptualization are reminiscent of Q technique: "A rational man . . . ranks all the alternatives facing him in order of his preference in such a way that each is either preferred to, indifferent to, or inferior to each other; . . . [and] his preference ranking is transitive" (p. 6). What is missing in Downs, therefore, as in Simon, is not subjectivity: That is their starting point. Rather, it is a method compatible with that subjectivity which permits demonstration in single cases, thereby relieving the observer of having to guess about those inner mechanisms, cognitive or otherwise, through examination of their external manifestations, such as voting.

Theoretical matters at issue are exemplified below in terms of a single case, Mrs. X, age 47, a middle-class mother of four, a teacher who regularly votes Democratic. A general characterization of the social process asserts that participants pursue values through institutions in a resource environment (Lasswell, 1971, p. 18), and a suitably comprehensive set of pursuable values would include the following:

Power: Increasing pressure on South Africa to abandon its apartheid policies.

Enlightenment: Increasing funding for science.

Wealth: Protecting banks and businesses from failure.

Well-being: Increasing the availability of low-cost medical treatment.

Skill: Retraining of the jobless.

Affection: Removing restrictions on sexual preferences.

Respect: Equalizing opportunities for women and minorities.

Rectitude: Legalizing prayer in the public schools.

This concourse of policy possibilities, the above as well as many others, was drawn from ordinary news accounts in the pages of the evening newspaper during the course of two or three days (in early 1984). Eventually, a Q sample of four from each of the eight value categories was selected, for a sample of size 32.

During a period of a month and a half, X utilized this policy sample under a set of 18 experimental conditions designed to highlight various features of Downs's deductive system. Initially, of course, X was instructed to provide an overview of her own personal policy preferences by ranking the 32 policies in a Q sort from those she most preferred (+4) to those she most opposed (-4), with relative indifference somewhere in the middle -- i.e., by ranking the alternatives available to her "in such a way that each is either preferred to [+4], indifferent to [0], or inferior to [-4] each other" (Downs, 1957, p. 6), with degrees of preference/inferiority arrayed between these points in a forced, quasi-normal distribution. (This procedure is assumed to be among those "other mathematical measures" to which Downs has already assented.)

After a suitable pause of 24 hours or more, so as to diminish the effects of memory and boredom, X was then instructed to rank-order the same policy possibilities (from +4 to -4) according to the gains she expected they would bring her; and later according to the costs they would impose on her; and then in terms of the happiness they would bring her; and so forth, as listed in Table 1. Among the conditions are those suggested by Downs -- e.g., (9) What policies is the Republican Administration pursuing at this time (late in the first Reagan term)? (10) What policies would the Republicans advance in an effort to maximize their support, i.e., to get re-elected? (11) What policies would the Republicans likely pursue after the election? And the same for the Democrats at (12), (13), and (14). Also included was X's conception of the policies that would be pursued by an ideal government (15) and in a "good society" (16). Added to these was X's preferences behind the Rawlsian "veil of ignorance" (Rawls, 1971) -- i.e., the policies X would like to see in effect in a hypothetical society in which she would be ignorant *a priori* concerning her sexual, religious, economic, and political statuses (17). In keeping with Simon's admonition, conditions were introduced to focus on Lasswell's (1947, pp. 180-194) triple appeal principle -- passion (conditions 4 and 5), reason (6, 7), and morality (8). Finally, at the end, X was instructed to render her preferences again (18, personal preferences at time 2), as in (1), thereby providing a test of Downs's (1957) assump-

tion "that citizens' political tastes are fixed" (p. 47).

Table 1
Downsian Conditions For Mrs. X

Conditions of Instruction	Factor Loadings*		
	A	B	C
1. personal preference	X		
2. gains (utility income)		X	
3. costs			X
4. happiness	X		
5. anger	-X		
6. rationality	X		X
7. informed position	X		
8. morality	X		
9. Republicans now, Ua(t)	-X		X
10. " to get elected	X		
11. " future, E[Ua(t+1)]	-X		X
12. Democrats if in office now, E[Ub(t)]	X		X
13. " to get elected	X		
14. " future, E[Ub(t+1)]	X		X
15. ideal government, E[Ui(t)]	X		
16. the good society	X		
17. Rawlsian position	X		
18. personal preference (t2)	X		

* X=significant loadings (p < .01). Experimental conditions were administered randomly.

Once rendered, X's performances were intercorrelated and factor analyzed as shown in Table 1. Minimizing technicalities, the factors demonstrate the structure of X's subjectivity vis-a-vis her policy orientations, factors A, B, and C representing those "chunks" to which Simon (1985, p. 302) makes reference. Factor A is bipolar and indicates the policy orientation which angers her (5) and with which she associates the Republicans (9, 11) as being diametrically opposed to her own preferences (1, 18), happiness (4), sense of morality (8) and

rationality (6, 7), and ideals (15, 16, 17) as well as her perception of
the Democratic Party (12, 13, 14). Of particular importance from a
Downsian standpoint is that X's preferences (factor A) are separate
from her estimation of both gains (on B) and costs (on C).

Downs might be tempted to label Mrs. X nonrational (if not
downright irrational), but a subjective science demands that we examine
her *rationale* before passing judgment on *rationality*. What she herself
regards as rational (condition 6), after all, is firmly, if not solely,
correlated with her own policy preferences. We must, of course, be
mindful of Simon's (1995) warning that people can deceive themselves
and that "the real reasons may be different from what people suppose
they are" (p. 46); still, we shouldn't be too quick to assume irrationali-
ty of conduct that fails to conform to our precious theories.

Initial insight into the content of X's vectors is gained through
examination of the factor scores (from +4 to -4) associated with the
various policies in her respective factors. Examining the extremes of
factor A first:

> (Scores +4, +3): Reducing pollution. . . . Equalizing opportu-
> nities for women and minorities. . . . Removing restrictions on
> sexual preferences. . . . Increasing the availability of low-cost
> medical treatment. . . . Increasing social security payments.

> (Scores -4, -3): Legalizing prayer in the public schools. . . .
> Legalizing abortion. . . . Reducing taxes. . . . Utilizing school
> busing as a way to promote racial equality. . . . Continuing to
> apply pressure on the Sandanista government of Nicaragua.

The negative scores, recall, are those associated with policies which
anger X, and in this regard the influence of her teaching profession
shows through, for she, more than most, is sensitive to the realities of
classroom conflict attendant upon external pressures wrought by busing
and enforced prayer. She believes in "live and let live," which perhaps
also accounts for her opposition to pressure on the Sandanistas. Only
the issue of abortion is ostensibly exempt from this principle: A
non-Catholic (in fact, an atheist), X nevertheless believes that the fetus
is a live person with rights -- so, "live and let live" prevails after all!
She is not traditional in a prudish sense, however: She favors removal
of all restrictions on sexual preferences, for example, as well as
equalization of opportunities for women and minorities. Her opposition
to the reduction of taxes and support for increases in social security
payments reflect her altruistic side since a reversal of sentiment in both

instances would be to her economic advantage. (X falls under a teacher retirement system rather than social security.) Downs (1957), of course, left room for altruism: " . . . self-denying charity is often a great source of benefits to oneself" (p. 37).

Unnecessary details can be avoided in the case of factor B (benefits) and C (costs) by examining just a few of the policies which distinguish these categories (scores to the left for factors A, B, and C, respectively):

+1	+4	-3	Supporting the Equal Rights Amendment.
-2	+3	-1	Providing tuition tax credits.
-3	+3	-3	Reducing taxes.
0	-1	+4	Funding more MX missiles.
+1	-1	+4	Making of alliances and treaties which enhance the U.S.'s power position.
+1	-3	+3	Retraining of the jobless.
-2	-2	+3	Increasing foreign aid to the poorer and less developed countries of the world.
+4	+3	+3	Reducing pollution.

X sees herself benefiting directly from the Equal Rights Amendment, tuition tax credits, and reduced taxes (factor B); however, in interviews following the Q sorting, she declared the first as potentially unnecessary, the second as unfair, and the third as unrealistic if needed social programs are to be maintained. By the same token, retraining the jobless, MX missiles, and international treaties are seen as costly (factor C) with few personal benefits to be derived. She favors assisting poor countries as a matter of principle, but opposes the foreign aid mechanism since strings are always attached (another manifestation of "live and let live") and since the wrong people get all the money. The last policy above (reduction of pollution) is both costly (factor C) and beneficial (B), a cost/benefit tradeoff which she enthusiastically embraces (A) as being in the common good.

Factor C is X's implicit recognition of political necessity. As

shown in Table 1, factor C is defined in part by what both political parties would pursue as a matter of policy (as X sees things) if either held the reigns of power (conditions 9, 11, 12, and 14), and this X accepts as to some degree rational (condition 6). This is the domain of MX missiles, foreign aid, and international treaties -- the stuff of *Realpolitik*: These are the things that *cost*, and this X realizes. She also realizes that what politicians must do as a matter of necessity (factor C) is different from what they say they will do as a matter of electioneering: In order to maximize electoral support, both Republicans and Democrats (conditions 10 and 13) are seen as making appeals congruent with factor A. X is therefore nobody's fool. That there is a greater congruence, from her perspective, between what the Democrats say they will do and what they will actually do if elected is an operational manifestation of X's greater trust in them, and a measure of her party identification.

These three factors, then, are the vectors of X's decisional calculus, and of the three, factor A of course takes precedence over B and C: The latter two are merely objective evaluations of which X is capable -- of beneficial or costly courses of action, of "value in exchange" relatively detached from feelings. Virtually everyone attentive to American politics has factors B and C in their make-up, as a matter of common cognition. They are "mine" for X in the sense that they are *her* perceptions of the cost/benefit ratio, but without the self (Q sort no. 1) being implicated.

On the other hand, Mrs. X's factor A represents "value in use," as Adam Smith (1776/1937, p. 28) might say; i.e., a composite of X's ideals, rationality, and sentiment which serves as her yardstick for the appraisal of policies in *feeling space* as opposed to *utility-income space*. Factor A is therefore "me," as opposed to factors B and C, which are "mine" only (James's Law). Whether or not her voting behavior can be classed as "rational" in some global or abstract sense depends on *a priori* categorizations, such as Downs's, but that it is accompanied by a rationale, however bounded, cannot be doubted.

Downs (1957) concludes his volume with a chapter listing various testable propositions which flow deductively from his theory of voter rationality -- e.g., that "the incentive of most citizens to acquire information before voting is very small" (p. 298), that "when voting costs are reduced substantially, participation in elections increases greatly" (p. 299), and so forth. These are all tendency statements with general implications, and "provable," if at all, only in terms of agglomerations of response, but largely irrelevant at the quantumized

level of the individual. Not one of his actuarial propositions would have permitted accurate prediction of the number of factors that would have emerged from X's performances, nor of the surprising fact that, for her, costs and benefits are two quite separate matters unrelated to her policy preferences. Yet lawfulness there is in her case, but in probabilistic rather than absolute terms: Given a particular policy, it is highly *probable* that factor A will be pushed into service as a framework within which to reach a judgment -- as a matter of feeling rather than rationality in any abstract sense, or even in terms of information retrieval -- and this places the act of voting on a quite different footing.

Phenomenology of the Political Self

There will be occasion to return to these more general issues in the sequel, but first it is necessary to consider the approach of subjectivism, and in this regard there is no better illustration with which to begin than Zetterbaum's (1982) interesting paper on "Self and Subjectivity in Political Theory." Zetterbaum's intent is "to set forth the concept of the self as a dominant paradigm of our contemporary understanding of political things" (p. 59), and this he initially seeks to do by contrasting Rousseau's natural man with his conception of the citizen.

Natural man is wholly preoccupied with his own needs, according to Zetterbaum, whereas the citizen is said to be preoccupied with the regime. Illustrating the latter is Rousseau's example of the Spartan mother awaiting news of the battle: "A helot arrives; trembling, she asks him for news. 'Your five sons were killed.' 'Base slave, did I ask you that?' 'We won the victory.' The mother runs to the temple and gives thanks to the gods" (cited in Zetterbaum, 1982, p. 62). For the genuine citizen, there is no distinction between self and political role. Natural man, who is identical with his own being, is therefore a "reminder of what is ineluctably absent from social and political life" (p. 65), and serves as a "kind of standard against which to measure man in society" (p. 63).

Contemporary political theory is often haunted by "the ghost of Rousseau's solitary self," however. Zetterbaum first cites an example of Kantian existentialism -- that each self must be recognized as an end in itself and as at the center of its own self consciousness -- but he finds this ontology (of what it means to be human) to be an unsatisfactory basis for political discourse to the extent that it reintroduces

Rousseau's opposition between sen anu society, and he examines an alternative in ordinary language philosophy which inquires not into whether the self *exists* or what it *means*, but rather "how we *use* the word in our ordinary speech" (Zetterbaum, 1982, p. 71). Linguistic concepts are also ontological, of course, but not arbitrary, according to Zetterbaum, inasmuch as they are shaped by the "underlying natural regularities" of the human condition.

Still, Rousseau peeks through. In contemporary moral discourse, for example, concern is often not with the *promotion* of morality and one's moral self, which is the goal of traditional moral philosophy, but in making one's own position understood, i.e., in truthful *self disclosure*, often culminating in moral relativism. (The self is not entirely free in these matters, of course, for one must operate within standards of ethical argument as well as attend to the arguments of one's opponent, hence there are elements of both objectivity and subjectivity.) By the same token, political discourse often focuses less on the public good to be undertaken than upon the achievement of a common identity, upon how a collectivity defines itself as a people. This implies neither solipsism nor privatism, Zetterbaum contends, but what he terms *responsible subjectivity*, i.e., an attempt "to generate the good out of a recognition of individual subjectivity as the basic human condition" (p.78).

This brief summary of Zetterbaum's paper does not do justice to the intricacies of his argument, but enough has perhaps been said to indicate his major concerns and intellectual strategy, which is every bit as *a prioristic* as Downs's and as abounding in theoretical categories -- of responsible subjectivity, morality, citizen role, natural man, self disclosure, the public good, and so on, all held in place by the strength of argument but devoid of method: It is as if reason were the sole procedure available to the philosopher. Zetterbaum does express some interest in methodology (at p. 75), but only in passing, yet method is precisely what is required, as Barchak (1984, p. 21) has suggested, if philosophers of science are ever to achieve the status of scientific philosophers as well.

A demonstration of the way in which method can assist in the orderly examination of the structure and form of political discourse could begin in principle with any topic, but was afforded in this instance by the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon (which, recall, was 10 years prior to the current rapprochement between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization). Political and moral discourse abounded -- in newscasts, editorial pages, and back fence gossip, all in

the form of ordinary language -- and was eventually modeled in a Q sample administered to a variety of participants. One from among them is selected here for illustrative purposes: Mr. Y, age 25, is a Protestant, a Republican, and a computer specialist whose spouse is a contract administrator with the U.S. Department of Defense. As in the previous study, Y was instructed to Q sort the 45 statements provided him from agree (+5) to disagree (-5), and his general viewpoint can be partially inferred by examining some of those statements with which he most strongly agreed:

> The PLO is not and never has been a representative of the Palestinian people. It is a terrorist organization -- nothing more, nothing less -- and should be treated as such. (score +5)

> Israel does not want to leave troops in Lebanon, and will probably do so only as long as it takes to find all the guerrillas and negotiate some formula to prevent the area from developing again into a base for terrorism. (score +5)

> Israel is doing everyone a favor in this war. The PLO should have been kicked out long ago. (score +4)

> Israel demands and deserves a 25 mile guerrilla-free buffer zone along the southern Lebanese border. (score +4)

Y is obviously pro-Israel in sentiment, and he clustered with others similarly predisposed when the data were factor analyzed. (For a brief summary of the larger study, see Brown, 1986, pp. 61-67.) But on what basis are we justified in saying that Y engaged in self disclosure? And in what ways, if any, do concepts such as responsible subjectivity, morality, citizenship, public good, etc., enter the picture?

During a period of several days, Y was instructed to operate with this same set of statements to provide Q-sort surrogates of conceptions which Zetterbaum deemed important: (1) *Moral position*: The most moral position that you could adopt, leaving aside your biases as best you can. (2) *American view*: What the American public, as opposed to the government, would say if it could speak with one voice. (This was an effort to represent the "sovereign" viewpoint.) (3) *U.S. Administration*: The official standpoint of the government, as might be rendered by President Reagan or then Secretary of State Alexander Haig. (4) *Responsible standpoint*: Looking at matters all around, the most responsible view that could be taken vis-a-vis the situation (a model of Zetterbaum's "responsible subjectivity"). (5) *Rationality*:

The most enlightened view of which you can conceive, as might be given by a scholar with access to all the facts at issue. (6) *Natural self*: The view you might have if you were free of all the usual constraints of national loyalty, religion, racial and ethnic biases, family traditions, etc. (an effort to approximate Rousseau's natural man). (7) *Citizen*: The viewpoint you would have if your main identification were with your country and your main role in life that of citizen (Rousseau's citizen). (8) *The public good*: The view you would espouse if you wished to conduct yourself in light of some transcendental conception of what was right and good for the general order of things.

In their entirety, the above conditions comprise a *propositional set* (Stephenson, 1953, pp. 42-46), i.e., a set of performance specifications paralleling Zetterbaum's main concepts. The intent, however, is not to test Zetterbaum (or Y) in any *general* sense; rather, it is to provide a network of *singular* conditions within which Y then operates, and which are designed to *induce* as operant factors those categories of Y's actual functioning which then become prime candidates for replacing (or at least for reconsidering) the logical categories of Zetterbaum's theorizing.

More concretely, the eight experimental performances above, plus Y's own personal point of view, were correlated and factor analyzed, and the two-factor solution (as shown in Table 2) revealed the "underlying natural regularities" of Y's human condition: These are Y's dimensions of existence, the "primitive forms" (Emerton, 1984) of his subjectivity, induced by the experimental instructions under which he performed and transformed into factor space through the operation of Q sorting.

As the results show, Y's self disclosure (no. 9, own view) defines factor I only and shares factor space with his conceptions of the most moral view, the American public's and Administration's views, the responsible view, and the view of the citizen: Hence, Y approximates a modern day version of Rousseau's citizen, whose own standpoint is indistinguishable from the regime's. Yet the most rational position of which Y can conceive, and the one most compatible with the public good, is orthogonal to his own viewpoint and, interestingly, shares

Table 2
Factor Structure (Zetterbaum)

Conditions of Instruction	Loadings I	II
1. moral position	X	
2. American view	X	
3. U.S. Administration	X	
4. responsible standpoint	X	
5. rationality		X
6. natural self		X
7. citizen	X	
8. the public good		X
9. own view	X	

X = significant loadings

factor space (on factor II) with Y's natural self. When providing his own view (factor I), therefore, Y does not disclose that aspect of his outlook measured by factor II.

Y's pro-Israeli stance was previewed above, and this is the essence of factor I. Salient differences between Y's citizen and natural-self roles can be seen in his responses to the following statements (scores to the left for factors I and II, respectively):

-4 +5   The PLO's political influence cannot be wiped out by military means.

-2 +4   In the longer term, Israel is simply storing up hate among her Arab neighbors and acting as recruiter-in-chief for the PLO.

 0 +4   The U.S. should take a step toward the Palestinians, and help end the bloodshed.

To Y's mind, therefore, the natural self on factor II, far from being the rough beast pictured by Zetterbaum, is instead a rational creature prone to seek the public good. It is also more sensitive than Y's factor I self in the sense of being better able to empathize with the Palestinian side

of the equation. Were we inclined to seek Y's support for peace in the Middle East, we would obviously have to appeal to his more humane factor II side and somehow sidestep the parochialisms of factor I -- i.e., we would have to appeal to his rationality and induce him to act congruent with his conception of the public good. Such is the task of political propaganda.

In this respect, the task of creative leadership is to locate bases of consensus, and there is evidence in the data of policy positions capable of gaining support from both the citizen and the natural self:

+5 +5   For there to be peace, Israel will have to with-
          draw its forces from Lebanon, and the Palestin-
          ians will have to stop using Lebanon as a
          launching pad for attacks on Israel.

+4 +4   Arafat and other leaders should lay down their
          arms and endorse the Camp David agreements
          which they have bitterly opposed thus far.

Implicit in both of these statements is self restraint, i.e., a willingness to subordinate the ego plus its symbols of identification to the authority of international agreement and similar constraints so long as others voluntarily limit their sovereignty to the same extent. As a counter-point to the pessimism of Rousseau's "legacy of the solitary self," therefore -- i.e., of the view that "our contemporary zeal for self-fulfill-ment and self-expression threatens to dissociate the private and the public altogether" (Zetterbaum, 1982, p. 81) -- the consensus above gives reason for optimism, and it would be to the advantage of theorists such as Zetterbaum, who are themselves in search of foundations for the public good, to have access to complimentarities such as these prior to their own theorizing.

Toward a Science of Subjectivity

The skeptic may wonder about the salience of the above two case studies for the larger American voting public -- What's one or two votes in a sea of those cast? -- but it is important to keep separate what is of practical as opposed to scientific significance.

More than 50 years ago, Lewin (1931/1935) described the stranglehold which Aristotelianism has had on theory in the human sciences (specifically psychology), with its reverence for frequencies

and its equating of lawfulness with events defined by their characteristics and which occur often enough to be judged nonfortuitous: Lawfulness is associated with regularity, and isolated individual cases only have the status of exceptions, i.e., so long as their frequency does not assume significant proportions. Such are Downs's (1957) propositions, e.g., that "citizens who are best informed on any specific issue are those whose income is directly affected by it" (p. 299), which is predicted to be true on the average (but not necessarily in any particular instance) and is closely bound to classifications comprised of common traits most often defined in dichotomous terms -- e.g., informed vs. uninformed citizens, those whose income is affected vs. those not, and so forth.

In the Aristotelian mode of thought, with which Downs's work shares many features, some events are believed to be subject to laws and others are not, but Galileo homogenized the universe so that the movements of planets, the free fall of stones, and the oscillation of pendulums, despite their apparent diversity, all came to be regarded as manifestations of the same law.[2] Consequently, frequency was discarded as a mark of lawfulness: $s = (1/2)gt^2$, for example, does not precisely describe most falling objects with which we typically come into contact, and it is certainly not an expression of the behavior of falling objects on the average; rather, it expresses the special, idealized, and infrequently observed events of the controlled experiment. All events, rare or not, and including "unique" cases, are therefore presumed to be lawful, subject to the conditions under which they occur. (This in no way implies uniformity, particularly with respect to human behavior, since we can never know ahead of time which of many possible laws will have actually operated.) Ultimately, the classifications and logical categories upon which Aristotelianism depends, and which are of such intrinsic importance to both Downs and Zetterbaum, yield in Galileian thinking to specification of the conditions surrounding concrete cases, i.e., to the *field* of action (Smith, 1993). It is therefore not in the averaging of responses taken *en masse* that the

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[2]Even religion was not left untouched by this mode of thought: The so-called "dysteleological surd" (or natural evil, such as killer tornados and floods) is merely an indication that "the Lord works in mysterious ways" (see MacGregor, 1959). This is, of course, a theistic principle, which brings all events under the suzerainty of a single deity in the same way that Galileo brought manifestly dissimilar occurrences together under a single law.

surrounding concrete cases, i.e., to the *field* of action (Smith, 1993).
It is therefore not in the averaging of responses taken *en masse* that the
laws of behavior are to be found, but in generalizations induced from
examination of single cases in all their specificity (Kantor, 1978).

A science of subjectivity requires one proviso -- namely, a
distinction between statements without self reference (structural
information) and those with self reference (functional information):
The former are testable facts (such as "water boils at 212° F"),
whereas the latter are unprovable and irrefutable opinions (Stephenson,
1980). Simon's (1985) concept of bounded rationality deals with the
former as matters of information retrieval, as does Downs (e.g., when
he refers to voters who are informed about the issues); Q methodology,
on the other hand, deals with subjective communicability, typically
shared (consciring), as when citizens debate the pros and cons of
Israel's incursion into Lebanon. Feelings, not facts, are at issue.
Q-sort performances are, of course, structured in individual cases, but
the operant factors which emerge from the experimental situation are
not categorical in the Aristotelian sense in which they are postulated by
Downs and Zetterbaum: Rather, they are natural categories which
reflect *states of mind* that are more often than not organized quite
differently from the observer's logical categories.

In his *Cristallographie*, published in 1783, the mineralogist Romé
de l'Isle recommended that "before seeking to penetrate the secret
world of Nature in the varied arrangement of the molecules of any
crystalline substance, one ought to begin by knowing and studying all
the variety of forms of which a single substance is capable" (cited in
Emerton, 1984, p. 274), and the same may be said for the study of
subjectivity, political or otherwise. The concern is with mind (not
minds on the average) and with the "variety of forms" of which it is
capable. For purposes of study, virtually any mind can be selected
with the confident expectation that it will prove to be lawful, that there
are many others quite like it, and that an understanding of it will
contribute to a deeper comprehension of the political and social fields
in which it is suspended.

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