

The Scientific Study of Subjectivity and the Achievement of Human Rights¹

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ABSTRACT: In this address, the possibility and potentiality of enlisting the scientific study of subjectivity in the cause of achieving human rights are explored. Reasons for why such study has been rarely undertaken are described and analyzed. Specific studies are proposed, including examinations of "self-determination" and the question of the universality and relativism of human rights. In conclusion, when the scientific study of subjectivity has been applied systematically to the problem of achieving human rights, new ground will have been broken in a most promising and challenging field.

Introduction

A good place to begin an exploration of how the scientific study of subjectivity might become an element in a strategy designed to achieve human rights is for me to describe in some detail my conception of human rights and its relationship to law. The purpose of this exercise is twofold: first, by clarifying my terminology, I hope that a shared

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frame of reference, however fleeting, can be generated. In my experience, a shared frame of reference facilitates communication, and the process of its establishment, in particular, is integral to the growth of knowledge. The second reason for what may seem at first like preliminary discussion relates directly to the issue of enlisting the scientific study of subjectivity in the cause of achieving human rights. This is the case because the way in which human rights and their achievement are conceived has an impact on the relevance of the scientific study of subjectivity to strategies designed to assist in the achievement of human rights. For example, if one believes that human rights do not exist or that their realization is predetermined by the flow of history, focusing attention on the subjectivities of human beings might be interesting, but it would have no relation to strategies for achieving human rights. Therefore, thinking about human rights in a way that makes the scientific study of subjectivity pertinent to their achievement is a crucial first step in designing an appropriate strategy.

I am confident that if Q Methodology were applied to the flow of communication among those who talk and write about law and human rights, a number of distinct outlooks or perspectives would emerge. The point in noting this is not to begin an indepth examination of each, but to remind you that what I have to say about law and human rights is representative of one distinctive jurisprudence or legal philosophy.

"Human rights" refer to those human desires or wants that the politically relevant members of a community have decided to authoritatively protect and promote. Based on vast historical and anthropological research, the founders of the jurisprudential school of which I am a member developed an inventory of eight human desires or wants or, as we prefer to put it, values. All people value power, enlightenment, wealth, well-being, skill, affection, respect and rectitude. We hypothesize that this is the case in all cultures and communities. It is important to emphasize that these eight value categories are logically exhaustive, but empirically empty. For example, the definition of each value, the relative importance of particular values, and how values are and should be shaped and shared will vary depending on the context and the community. The ways in which the world community addresses these issues and the outcomes of its deliberations comprise in large measure the international human rights program.

"Law" is the process through which the politically relevant members of a community seek to clarify and secure their common

interest. Human rights are established, maintained and changed through the action of this process and refer to the way in which law in any community authoritatively protects and empowers individual human beings in their ongoing efforts to shape and share each of the eight values. When the community in question is the world community, the process through which such protection and empowerment is established, maintained and changed is the empirical phenomenon to which the term the "international law of human rights" refers.

Among the many distinctive aspects of this jurisprudence or legal philosophy, a few require elaboration in this context. First, law refers to the same type of process regardless of the geographic parameters of the community in question. Whether the community is Columbia, Missouri, the United States, the European Community, or the world community, law refers to the process through which the politically relevant in the community of concern seek to clarify and secure their common interest. Those who are politically relevant will vary from context to context as will those who are politically irrelevant. Some academics who equate law with equity and fairness find this description problematic. After all, why shouldn't law serve the interests of all community members? The answer to this question is clearly affirmative. As a matter of preference, there should be no one who is politically irrelevant. But as a scientist, it is dishonest not to point out that some people's interests are not served (or are poorly served) by the various legal systems which have impact on their lives. Whether or not academics understand this, the disenfranchised and the dispossessed do. This is why they fight, when they can, to become politically relevant. Among the many implications of this line of thought is that while a great deal of contemporary law, whether local, national or international, is beneficial, a great deal is also detrimental in terms of its impact on human beings.

Another distinctive dimension of our conception of law is that it is a human artifact, established, maintained and changed by the decisions of the politically relevant. But it is critical to understand that decision and law are not synonyms. If they were, power and law would be identical. It is only those decisions that are taken from community-wide perspectives of authority that we characterize as law. Accordingly, "authoritative decision" is the most precise empirical referent of the term "law"; and, if one is unhappy with how authoritative decision is operating and has the resources to attempt to change it, the way to do so is to influence the processes of human activity that shape the

prevailing structure of authoritative decision.

A final, pertinent element in the conception of law we use concerns one of the ways in which greater specificity is given to the process of lawmaking. In an article entitled, "International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication," my colleague, Michael Reisman, explained in some detail the value to researcher and decisionmaker of a conception of lawmaking as a process of communication. For present purposes, I would like to quote from his article:

All communications involve the mediation of subjectivities. . . . While much of general communications may . . . be relevant to law formation, what is distinctive about prescriptive or lawmaking communications is that rather than transmitting a single message, they carry simultaneously three coordinate communication flows in a fashion akin to the coaxial cables of modern telephonic communications. The three flows may be briefly referred to as the policy content, the authority signal and the control intention. Unless each of these flows is present and effectively mediated to the relevant audience, a prescription does not result. Equally important, even if the three components are initially communicated, *they must continue to be communicated* for the prescription, as such, to endure; if one or more of the components should cease to be communicated, the prescription undergoes a type of desuetude and is terminated.

Let us consider each of these communication flows in more detail. The content of a prescription, the norm -- the injunction that one ought to do or refrain from doing something, or, writ large, the policy about the production and distribution of some value -- is obviously an indispensable component.

. . .

The authority signal is much more complex than the communication of policy content. While the command of *what* to do is essentially unilinear, the communication of authority is more of a closed loop. It is the audience, whether or not its members realize it, that endows the prescriber with the authority that renders his communications prescription. Hence the search for authority must be empirical in the broadest sense, rather than merely documentary. In many circumstan-

ces, authority may be subtle and diffuse. But its indispensability in prescriptions is clear.

We now address the third communications flow. One of the sillier notions that surfaces in jurisprudence with an almost schizothymic regularity is that lawmaking is essentially a polite ethical conversation, a dialogue requiring only content and authority. . . . If that were the case, we would maintain cadres of philosophers and rhetoricians instead of police, armies and other specialists in violence. Plainly, lawmaking involves another component: power, the capacity and willingness to make a preferential expression effective. This third component, . . . we prefer to call the communication of control intention (Reisman, 1981, pp. 108-110).

To sum up Professor Reisman's thesis, for a communication to be law, it must have a policy content, authority signal and control intention. The ongoing flow of communication that has an adequate authority signal and control intention and which bears on the protection and empowerment of individual human beings in their continuing efforts to achieve all values is the empirical phenomenon which corresponds to human rights lawmaking in any community, from local to global.

Clarification of Standpoint: Additional Observations

Tracing the development of my interest in international law and human rights and their realization is a tedious task that, if properly performed, would require creating a natural history of my life. Although this is not the appropriate place for undertaking this project, it is important, especially in this forum, to provide some autobiographical information for purposes of self-referentiality.

Like many others, I suspect that my interest in human rights grew from a belief that they were somehow related to fairness, which suggests that fairness and its achievement has been important to me. The earliest written data I have indicating a concern with the phenomena I now understand to constitute international law is a three-page paper I wrote in ninth grade. In this Cold War essay, I tried to understand world politics by comparing it to the game of baseball. My metaphor worked fairly well until I realized that I was not going to be able to

identify in world politics an analogue to the umpire. In fact, the essay concluded with the question, "Who is the Umpire?"

In college, I took a diverse course of study, with an emphasis on the social sciences. I majored in anthropology, with a specialization in archaeology and the so-called ancient civilizations. I also studied international politics. Although it was not referred to as the scientific study of subjectivity and Q Methodology was absent, I learned some methods for probing and examining subjectivity in my studies, especially in anthropology and sociology. But in no case was the scientific study of subjectivity linked theoretically or conceptually to practical problem solving and decisionmaking. This was hardly surprising since this kind of linkage is rarely made in any discipline, with noteworthy exceptions in psychoanalysis, experiential psychology and policy science.

It was in graduate school where I finally learned that the fact that there is no distinct, designated umpire in world politics does not mean that all is anarchy. In fact, effective political actors are continuously engaged in an ongoing process through which they seek to clarify and secure their common interest. This process, which is established, maintained and changed through the cumulative impact of human decision, is, as indicated earlier, the empirical phenomenon to which the term "international law" refers. I also came to understand, as mentioned earlier, that human rights are established, maintained and changed through the action of this process and refer to the way in which international law authoritatively protects and empowers individual human beings.

It was also in graduate school where I was introduced to the comprehensive and unified framework of analysis called policy science. Policy science is a term coined by the late Harold Dwight Lasswell to refer to a host of coherent intellectual tasks. These tasks, according to Lasswell and his many associates, are to be used to improve the quality of decisionmaking in any context, including the world community. Unlike many other recommended procedures for decisionmaking, policy science accords a central place to subjectivity.

For policy scientists, "subjectivity" refers to the demands, expectations and identifications of human beings. The term "perspective" is often used as a functional equivalent of subjectivity. "Subjectivity" is also used to designate a phase in human activity. All of our completed acts begin with an impulse, move through a subjective phase

and conclude with an expressive behavior. The subjective phase of a completed act and the expression usually occur together in time. For example, a handshake engages, at the moment of its enactment, our demands for respect and affection, our expectations about past and future relations with the person with whom we are shaking hands and our identifications with the person as well as with the groups with which we identify him or her. Expressions are always non-verbal and may include a verbal or written component. In any case, expressions are the phenomena we observe in order to make inferences about attending subjectivities or perspectives.

Having set out some of my terms of reference and a bit of personal history, I would now like to discuss why there is little research to date on how the scientific study of subjectivity can be used to shape decisions that have an impact on human rights.

The Scientific Study of Subjectivity and the Achievement of Human Rights: Trends and Conditions

A few weeks ago, in a discussion unrelated to my preparation for this talk, Professor Michael Reisman, who is, among other things, active in human rights, remarked that what is called "research" in human rights usually amounts to persistent efforts to try to get at and publish certain facts about current violations. There is little accumulation of more basic research, only an ever-expanding list of documented atrocities. This sobering appraisal did not surprise me, but it was significant to hear it from a person who is committed to the scientific study of subjectivity and to the achievement of human rights.

There are many reasons for the lack of empirical research on questions concerning human rights. Prominent among them is the fact that empirically-oriented scholars have not focused their attention and expertise on the issues. The reasons for this are varied and perhaps some of you could reflect on this matter. In any case, and for whatever reasons, academic international lawyers are the primary group of scholars who have set the agenda and performed what study there is on human rights. I might add that there is a voluminous quantity of such study, but rarely is it empirical or related to a method of decision-making.

For the most part, academic international lawyers are not trained

to conduct what you or I would consider empirical research. They are experts at syntactical derivation and logic chopping, not at the careful specification and calibration of human behavior and subjectivity. They excel in justifying propositions, but are far less interested in examining their empirical reference and social consequence. On the other hand, they are always ready to critique existing doctrine and prevailing practice and to offer recommendations for the improvement of each. I believe that these proposals or recommendations are more likely to be feasible and desirable when they are informed by the results of concentrated scientific study of the particular contexts of concern.

While the temperament and training of academic international lawyers are relevant, there are other more important factors that shape the character of human rights research. The subject, like much of law, is politically charged to an unusual degree, and political elites throughout the world have understandable reasons, some of which we might find we are in agreement with, for not supporting intensive and systematic empirical study of the status of human rights in their community. It may not be too obvious to add that political elites themselves are unlikely to participate in depth interviews or even Q sorts; and even if they did, interpretation of the data would be quite difficult given the fact that elites, even more so than members of the rank-and-file, will try to put themselves in what they believe is the "politically correct" position. Fortunately, there are other methods available to the researcher who is attempting to understand the subjectivities of political elites.²

The vehemence that accompanies human rights activity and discussion is not limited to the politically active. Academics and other intellectuals who work on and think about human rights are often passionate as well. As a result, the response to propositions put forward concerning, for example, the empirical reference of the term "human rights" is generally not to consider the propositions as hypotheses awaiting exploration and examination, but rather as political claims; and, of course, these claims require immediate denunciation and are characterized, at best, as propaganda, and not uncommonly, as cultural

²For discussion of a comprehensive, integrated and extensive method, with many detailed examples, see Reisman and Willard (1988), in particular, Chapter 1, *International Incidents: Introduction to a New Genre in the Study of International Law* and Chapter 2, *Incidents: An Essay in Method.*"

characterized, at best, as propaganda, and not uncommonly, as cultural imperialism. I might add that this is not a one-way street. Epithets are hurled from all corners of the planet.

There are two points I would like to emphasize in this regard. First, the flow of invective would make for an interesting discourse and Q study for any number of groups of people; and second, empirical research has suffered because there is relatively little agreement on the procedures for conceptualizing the phenomena of concern, especially at lower levels of abstraction. Given the fact that human rights and methods for assessing their achievement are important to people the world over, it is not surprising that people with differing identifications, demands and expectations about past and future have had difficulty in establishing and applying commonly shared categories of inquiry to particular cases.

The final reason that I plan to mention this evening for the paucity of empirical research on human rights relates to the curious notion, prevalent in the United States, that human rights are international phenomena, which take place "overseas." Without exploring the assumptions which support this notion or the interests that are served by it, it is clear to me that it is ridiculous. While it is accurate to note that the well-known authoritative prescriptions establishing the conventional law of human rights are codified in international documents (e.g., the Universal Declaration of Human Rights), the application and violation of the various covenants and articles occur for the most part in national or domestic contexts. For example, the civil rights legislation and its application in the United States is considered by myself and like-minded persons to be part of the international human rights program. Scientists in New York or Atlanta or wherever, who study empirically the factors that contribute to the spread and control of infectious disease, are playing a role in the effort to achieve human rights, whether they know it or not. Scientists who study the perspectives of decisionmakers, whether in Washington, D.C. or in Columbia, Missouri, may be engaged in the scientific study of subjectivity. If the results of their inquiry shape subsequent decisions and the consequences which issue, they, too, are engaged in the human rights process. This is the case because the international human rights program is concerned with enhancing the quality of life of everyone. Accordingly, many of the people in this room who study subjectivity scientifically are engaged in human rights work, especially when your work has impact on authoritative decision.

I hope that my remarks have indicated that the achievement of human rights is related to the scientific study of a variety of phenomena, not only of subjectivity. However, I think that it is appropriate to emphasize subjectivity, not only because it has been neglected often in the human rights field, but because of the central role it plays in any effort to achieve goals, whether they involve the activities of children or adults, of politicians or scholars. The reason that subjectivity is so important is that, as mentioned earlier, the empirical reference of the term includes not only our goals, but also our assumptions about what is possible, our expectations about the consequences of differing courses of action, our preferences for different types of strategy and our conscious and unconscious identifications on whose behalf we are seeking to achieve our goals.

Because many people are predisposed to believe that the scientific study of subjectivity is an unqualified asset for humankind, I want to point out that as far as its impact on enlightenment and the growth of knowledge is concerned, I am in agreement. But when it comes to its impact on other values, like power and wealth, the situation is more problematic. Some of the most sophisticated uses of our knowledge of subjectivity have been enlisted in causes of political indoctrination and bogus advertising, two activities none of us would be particularly happy to support, either directly or indirectly.

The Scientific Study of Subjectivity and the Achievement of Human Rights: Future Possibilities and Potential Studies

In a series of brilliant addresses (which were published subsequently), Harold Lasswell dealt with the relationship between science and politics. He concluded, among other things, that there is no reason to be sanguine about the potential of science to benefit humanity. With titles like "The Political Science of Science: An Inquiry into the Possible Reconciliation of Mastery and Freedom," "International Lawyers and Scientists as Agents and Counter-Agents of World Public Order," "The Interconnections of Political Power, Psychotherapy and World Community," and "Must Science Serve Political Power?", Professor Lasswell's conclusion was based on a fairly thorough canvassing of disciplines. But for those of you who knew Harold Lasswell or have

read his work, you know that this solemn appraisal is not the end of the matter. For Lasswell was dedicated to the achievement of a world public order of human dignity and was confident that decisions informed by a scientific understanding of humanity and its history and aspirations was the strategy most likely to contribute to the achievement of such a world order.

Lasswell's recommendation is varied and highly integrated, but the aspect of it that I wish to discuss now concerns his proposal for scientists (and, of course, for all decisionmakers) to broaden their range of intellectual skill so that they are competent to perform all of the tasks associated with problem solving and decisionmaking. These tasks include ongoing self-scrutiny and clarification of observational standpoint, the clarification of values and goals, the description of trends in terms of the degree and ways in which goals are being achieved, the analysis of factors that condition or shape the trends, the projection of likely future trends and the invention, evaluation and selection of alternatives for better securing the achievement of goals.

Because human rights discussion and activity tends to be impassioned, special mention might be made of the importance of clarifying standpoint. Clarification of standpoint requires that we be sensitive to and aware of the role we are playing. We need to be clear about when we are primarily scholars or client-servers or citizen-participants. Some of the expectations associated with the performance of these roles are difficult to coordinate, let alone integrate. For example, the confidentiality and anonymity of victims and perpetrators of human rights violations are ongoing concerns for both human rights activists and researchers. Although there may be characteristic ways in which activists and researchers deal with anonymity and confidentiality, it should not be assumed that these issues will be treated consistently, even by those who perform the same role; rather, it seems plausible to hypothesize that their treatment will vary from context to context. For individuals who perform more than one distinct role in the human rights program, understanding and managing their own oftentimes conflicting patterns of expectation is a difficult, yet necessary task.

As scholars, we should ask how our expectations -- regardless of their degree of realism -- about who we believe will be the eventual consumers and users of our research influence our choice of particular projects to work on. Once a project is selected, how do our expectations about the people on whose behalf we are conducting our research shape our focus of attention, our procedures of inquiry, the content of

our conclusions and the modality of our presentations. Because of the ubiquitous use of the products of science, whether conceptual or technological, by people whose major interests are rarely related to enlightenment, it is now extremely important for all scientists to engage in what I would call role clarification.

Standpoint should also be clarified in reference to our contemplative orientation to the subject of inquiry. In an obscure but important article entitled "Intensive and Extensive Methods of Observing the Personality-Culture Manifold," Lasswell explained that there is a continuum of contemplative standpoints, ranging from the most intensive, which, for him, included the practices required to perform ongoing self-scrutiny as well as what he called the prolonged insight interview, to the most extensive, an example of which is the polling conducted by survey organizations and marketing firms. The distinguishing characteristic of the intensive standpoint is prolonged contact with a subject, using complex methods for revealing the structure of what is observed. The extensive standpoint is cursory rather than prolonged and simple instead of complex.

I want to emphasize that the purpose of both types of clarification -- that is, role clarification and clarification of contemplative orientation -- is primarily to bring into better focus the subjects of our study, including ourselves.

Regardless of whether or not standpoint is clarified, when the tasks of goal clarification, trend description, analysis of conditioning factors, projection of future trends and the invention, evaluation and selection of alternatives are trained on the goal of achieving human rights, the relevance of the scientific study of subjectivity to the achievement of the goal is quite evident. Questions such as the following are germane: How does a particular group of people, anywhere on the planet, including humankind as a whole, characterize different values? What is the empirical reference of power to group members? Of wealth? Of enlightenment? Of well-being? Of skill? Of respect? Of affection? Of rectitude? How do group members believe these values are shaped and shared? How do they believe values should be shaped and shared? On whose behalf are values shaped and shared? On whose behalf should values be shaped and shared? According to group members, what factors account for how, and on whose behalf, values are shaped and shared? How are values likely to be shaped and shared in the future? What suggestions for improving the distribution of values do group

members have? How do group members rank the alternatives suggested? This is only a brief, suggestive list of questions that could be used to guide research with a bearing on the achievement of human rights. I would also like to point out that each question can be studied scientifically from both intensive and extensive standpoints.

The flow of communication that makes up the process of lawmaking in reference to human rights can also be explored scientifically. Questions about what is and should be the policy content of specific human rights norms and instruments have not been addressed systematically, directly or indirectly, to either politically relevant or politically irrelevant groups of people. What constitutes an appropriate authority signal or indicates a clear control intention are other critical questions that have received scant attention.

The answers to these and other questions may seem utterly unrealistic from my point of view, as when some members of an indigenous population explain that their plight is due to the failure of ancestors to worship appropriately. But this explanation may be critical for maintaining group integrity, and exposing the group to new explanations may not contribute to the common interest. The point is that without an understanding of the experience of group members as they see it, proposals intended to improve the quality of life may be misguided. On the other hand, even when proposals threaten group solidarity, they may be appropriate because values other than group integrity may be more important. An example might involve a not altogether uncommon situation in which a young woman proposes to her parents that she attend a university, when local custom demands that she stay at home. However one decides this young woman's fate, I feel that it is important to honor and respect the minority subjectivities in any group.

A different problem that will confront researchers who begin to map subjectivities in reference to human rights will occur when they encounter perspectives that, if acted on, are likely to generate violations of human rights. This can take place within a single community or when a particular group has subjectivities that are incompatible with the international human rights program. How to respond to this type of situation will be an extraordinarily complex matter. Among the many thoughts that come to mind, a most pressing one concerns the need to understand how our subjectivities develop in the first place and how we can become more likely to cultivate what Lasswell called "Democratic Character" (Lasswell, 1951).

There may be situations, especially those characterized by crisis, where the results of scientific study, if improperly presented, could prove to be counter-productive. For example, if such study reveals that opposing parties' subjectivities are in intractable conflict, the public presentation of this data might contribute to the crystallization of difference and the ossification of position. The point, of course, is to be aware that, like all procedures, the particular method selected for executing a specific scientific study of subjectivity and the modality chosen for presenting results should both be sensitive to the subjectivities of those engaged in the human rights context of concern.

Perhaps it would be useful to provide a couple of specific, contemporary examples, each involving perennial issues, in which the scientific study of subjectivity could be used to great advantage. The first concerns the intensifying claim for "self-determination." Whereas self-determination is associated most commonly with the formation and establishment of a new sovereign territorial group, it is essential to keep in mind that the principal demand that is being expressed in terms of self-determination is for the enhancement of the individual human being's capability to shape his or her own life. In addition, there is no necessary correlation between self-determination and the creation of a new sovereign territorial group. For example, the large-scale social movement of which we are a part that marches under the banner of "diversity" is a local manifestation of the global demand for self-determination.

Self-determination and its achievement raises many important research questions. While the most obvious concerns the question of who is indulged and who is deprived, and how, through the application of norms of self-determination in different contexts, other questions also suited to scientific study may be more fundamental. For example, the "self," as we all know, has many facets. Only certain facets, for example those associated with religion, gender, ethnicity or phenotype, have been engaged recently in the process of mobilizing people on behalf of efforts to achieve self-determination. What are the short-term and long-run costs and benefits to each of us of mobilizing and conceptualizing ourselves in such a fashion? How are our lives enhanced and impoverished? What is the impact of this type of mobilization and conceptualization on other people and on the local and world community? I am confident that the scientific study of subjectivity and Q Methodology, in particular, with its capacity to reveal the

structure of the self in the self's own terms, can be used in a way not previously done to address these and other questions. We may yet gain greater insight into how, and with what consequences, both good and bad, we determine ourselves.

A second issue, which generates some of the more acerbic debate in the human rights community and that is ripe for scientific study, concerns the question of the relativism of human rights. According to the advocates, human rights are either universal or relative. Clearly, as indicated earlier, they are universal in the sense that the international community has determined that all people are to be protected and, in effect, empowered in their efforts to secure power, enlightenment, wealth, well-being, skill, affection, respect and rectitude. On the other hand, human rights are relative in the sense that the international community has determined that each value can be shaped and shared in differing ways in different contexts so long as such practices are compatible with the common interest.

So, you may ask, what is the research question? It turns out that the advocates of relativism claim that culture determines what is a human right and they claim, furthermore, that the universalists are simply trying to impose Western culture on all of humanity. What I would like to see performed is a study designed to reveal the actual structure of subjectivities concerned with human rights. I am sure that culture is an important factor, but other factors like class, personality, age, gender, experience, occupation and so on will also contribute to the configuration of subjectivity. Of course, some individuals who can be expected to have divergent perspectives on human rights because they are members of different cultures will find that they have similar outlooks, whereas some members of the same culture will discover that they have different perspectives.

It is precisely because the scientific study of subjectivity has the capacity for this kind of enlightenment that resistance is likely to develop against its application. It is not too far-fetched to assume that political elites, whether their power is based on culture, class, personality, ethnicity, gender, phenotype or whatever, may sense that the insight provided by a more realistic map of subjective reality could lead to the liquidation of their power base and the erosion of their position of influence. Political action may be taken to block the potential for the scientific study of subjectivity to weaken or even undermine the hold of contemporary political identifications and their power for mobilization. Teachers and researchers, for their part, may

also resist as they sense the possibility that the scientific study of subjectivity may disturb or dissolve their own orientation and sense of self. Accordingly, it will be necessary, as usual, to proceed with caution.

In conclusion, I hope that eventually the scientific study of subjectivity will be applied systematically to the problem of achieving human rights. When this project has begun, ground will have been broken in a most promising and challenging field.

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