

The Structure of Attitudes Toward America's World Role

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ABSTRACT: The analysis presented in this article concerns how citizens organize their beliefs about America's role in world affairs. An intensive analysis using Q methodology is offered as an alternative means for uncovering the structure of foreign policy attitudes. The analysis revealed four distinct viewpoints. In discussing the viewpoints we offer a critique of the methodological presuppositions underlying earlier empirical research and the implications of those presuppositions for our theoretical understanding of the subject.

Introduction

Scholars have long been concerned about the public's ability to structure its attitudes concerning foreign policy. The concern dates back to Almond's (1950) early research from which he concluded that there are inherent limitations in modern society on the capacity of the public to understand the issues and grasp the significance of the most important problems of public policy. This is particularly the case with foreign policy where the issues are especially remote.

Philip Converse confirmed Almond's concerns, showing that the mass public's opinions lacked "constraint" in domestic and foreign affairs compared to elite opinion (Converse, 1964). Converse's

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important study sparked debate concerning the ideological sophistication of the public. Largely forgotten in the ensuing years was Converse's (1964) finding that even among elites there was much less constraint on foreign policy issues than on domestic issues. Recent studies have indicated increased stability of foreign policy attitudes (Page & Shapiro, 1992).

Prior to the Vietnam War most analysts agreed that there was a post-World War II elite consensus about the goals of American foreign policy. The goals were related to an international perspective that focused on containment of communism. Holsti (1979), among others, argued that the Vietnam War destroyed the consensus and created cleavages among both elites and the mass public concerning America's role in the world. It seems likely that the collapse of communism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, like the Vietnam War, will contribute to changes in perspectives and the structuring of belief systems.

In the post-Cold War era the "old ways" in which elites and the public thought about world affairs and "simplified the world" no longer work. Political scientists familiar with the literature on ideological constraint are not surprised by this phenomenon. At the time of Converse's study the political world was relatively tranquil; people were not motivated to become informed and did not feel passionately about politics. During the 1960s the civil rights movement, the Vietnam War, and social disorder dominated the news and not surprisingly surveys indicated increased attitudinal constraint in the mass public. Krosnick and Weisberg (1988) have pointed out that levels of constraint in individual belief systems can be affected by the clarity with which issues are presented in the mass media and salience of issues at particular points in time. Occasionally, events overtake the ability of both elites and the public to make sense of politics. It takes some time for individuals to sort out "what goes with what" with regard to new issues and situations. Eventually, new ideological dimensions develop that aid in the simplification of the political world.

Many studies have investigated how elites and the mass public structure their views concerning world affairs. These have generated a number of controversies. Among the concerns have been the number and substance of ideological dimensions used to organize beliefs about world affairs. More recently, studies have shown that a single internationalist-isolationist dimension is inadequate for describing a large number of issues. It seems likely that recent changes in the international scene would lead to a restructuring of thinking about

foreign affairs. Related to the question of dimensionality is whether belief systems concerning world affairs are simple or complex and whether they should be described in terms of dimensions or types.

The research reported in this article differs from previous studies in that it involves an *intensive* analysis of foreign affairs opinions. Most earlier studies examined survey data using factor analytic methods to determine attitude constraint and the dimensionality of belief systems. We suggest that Q method provides a useful alternative for uncovering differing perspectives and dealing with some of the methodological and substantive issues that have arisen over the years. We believe that Q method is especially useful for intensively examining attitude structure (see McKeown and Thomas, 1988). Use of the method also provides another perspective on issues concerning the hierarchical organization of belief systems and whether those systems should be characterized in terms of dimensions or types. After a discussion of some of the controversies concerning the structure of foreign policy beliefs and an overview of Q method, the results of an analysis of the views of a small sample of informed citizens is reported.

Controversies Concerning the Structure of Foreign Policy Beliefs

Analyses of public opinion on foreign affairs conducted during the Vietnam War demonstrated that the utility of internationalism-isolationism as a single axis used by elites and the mass public for organizing belief systems had diminished. It was clear that new dimensions or modes of organization were emerging, but it was unclear whether they would replace the isolationist-internationalist continuum or simply add to the complexity of belief systems. While in the past twenty-five years numerous studies have revealed a wide variety of dimensions that organize views on world affairs, a recent study by Holsti and Rosenau (1990) confirmed the persistence of a two-dimensional, four-type configuration outlined by Wittkopf and Maggiotto (1983). The two dimensions describe views concerning militant and cooperative internationalism. Those who support both militant and cooperative internationalism are termed "internationalist" while those who oppose both types are termed "isolationist." Those who support cooperative internationalism, but oppose militant internationalism, are called "accommodationists," while the remaining group who support militant internationalism and oppose cooperative internationalism are "hardliners." Holsti and Rosenau hoped to put the question of

dimensionality to rest, arguing that much of the debate about the matter results from inconsistent labelling. However, they noted that two dimensions probably do not account for all of the cleavages in foreign policy attitudes. Indeed, in the original analysis of 234 attitudinal items performed by Wittkopf and Maggiotto (1983), 35 were eliminated because they failed to fit on any dimension and six factors were necessary to describe the remaining items. Other studies have revealed more than two dimensions (Bardes & Oldendick, 1978; Chittick & Billingsley, 1989) with several finding a dimension dealing with attitudes concerning foreign aid that seems distinct from issues of internationalism and militancy. Thus, the number and substance of dimensions used to organize beliefs concerning world affairs are still open to question. Indeed, research reported by Holsti and Rosenau (1984) suggests a dimension dealing with unilateralism-multilateralism that seems especially relevant today with the demise of the bipolar, cold war international system. The number and substance of dimensions are probably determined by context. As the international system changes, thinking about world affairs changes. In this regard, an intensive, exploratory analysis is better suited for revealing new dimensions that organize beliefs in light of new issues that come to the forefront.

John Hurwitz and Mark Peffley (Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987; Peffley & Hurwitz, 1993) made an important contribution to the literature arguing that specific policy positions on foreign affairs are related to broad general beliefs about America's role in the world. They posit a hierarchical model of attitude constraint whereby citizens "deduce" specific issue positions from a small set of stable "postures" and "core values." In their earliest article testing the model, Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) hypothesized a three-tier hierarchy where the core values (belief in the morality of warfare and ethnocentrism) constrained three postures (militarism, anti-communism, and isolationism), which in turn constrained specific issue positions on defense spending, nuclear arms policy, military involvement, Soviet policy and international trade. Analyzing cross-sectional survey data they found the expected relationships between the three levels. In a later analysis Peffley and Hurwitz (1993) dealt with the issue of causality, demonstrating through the use of panel data that respondents reason from the top down—from general postures to specific issue positions.

The conceptualization of a hierarchical model and the analysis of panel data to examine constraint over time is an important contribution to the general literature on attitude organization. We agree that citizens likely reason from more general postures to specific issues. However,

we believe that while citizens likely reason deductively from top to bottom, analysis of attitude structures should flow from bottom to top. Hurwitz and Peffley *assume* that the three relevant general postures are militarism, anti-communism, and isolationism. Based on that *assumption*, they construct scales to measure postures and then relate them to specific issues. A more appropriate approach would allow respondents to determine "what goes with what" with regard to general postures. In other words, analysis should proceed inductively whereby a determination of general perspectives is derived from consideration of specific issues. In our research we begin by determining how people are grouped based on how they "put together" specific issue positions; we then make inductive inferences regarding the nature of postures that "constrain" those positions. We make no *a priori* assumptions about the nature of postures. To do so would involve an imposition of *our* definition of attitude structure upon our respondents.

William Chittick and Keith Billingsley (1989) raised the important question of whether foreign policy viewpoints should be described in terms of dimensions or types. Most research on attitude structure has involved a factor analysis of survey items to determine substantive similarities among issues. The resulting factors are used to characterize viewpoints concerning various issue areas. Each respondent can be placed independently along each of the dimensions. Do the dimensions describe belief systems? They likely do not because respondents at opposite ends of dimensions have opposing points of view constrained by the factor. It makes little sense to talk about individuals having as many as five belief systems. The focus on dimensions has created some conceptual confusion. For example, Maggiotto and Wittkopf (1981) used their two dimensions to classify respondents into four "types." The classification depends on arbitrary "cutpoints" of scale scores based on two dimensions that describe views on a limited number of policy issues. It is unclear whether the types are artificially constructed or accurately describe respondents' viewpoints.

Chittick and Billingsley (1989) used cluster analysis to describe types of viewpoints, but many of their respondents could not be classified. Holsti and Rosenau (1990) argued that emphasis should be given to dimensions over types because distinguishing types is cumbersome and exaggerates differences in viewpoints. We believe that the classification of respondents into types based on scale scores derived from factor analysis is problematic because in the final analysis it is the researcher who decides who will be classified into which type. The concept of distinguishable types is useful, as long as it allows key

conceptual distinctions to be drawn, and as long as it allows empirical determination of "distance" between types.

The methodology used for this research involves factor analyzing a data matrix whereby people with similar perspectives on foreign policy issues are grouped. This remedies some of the problems that have plagued earlier studies. In our analysis the factor loading of an individual on a particular factor indicates the extent to which he or she shares the perspective of others significantly loaded on the factor. Everyone has a loading on each factor. Therefore it is possible to determine the "extent" to which a respondent is a particular type. Q method also allows the opinions of respondents to indicate the substantive nature of types, as opposed to researchers defining, in addition to interpreting, viewpoints. Thus, Q is a suitable means for the objective analysis of subjectivity, avoiding at the basic level of data acquisition the prior imposition of the researcher's notions of political reality. Q method permits our respondents to speak for themselves by modeling their own views regarding America's world role.

Q Methodology and the Study of Foreign Policy Attitudes

Q methodology is especially useful for describing the structure of attitudes when issue domains are in a process of change. Because it involves an intensive analysis, Q is useful for closely examining the substantive nature of different types of perspectives. In as much as it is an inductive technique, it is especially appropriate for determining the nature of "postures" that constrain opinions on specific issues. Q also avoids the problem, noted by Bennett (1974), of researchers imposing their own criteria of "logic" upon people who may order their thinking about foreign policy issues along unanticipated dimensions.

Q is becoming a major analytical tool in the social sciences (see Brown, 1980). As an intensive approach it focuses on a few persons' attitudes using a great many questions or stimuli. The purpose is not to "count noses"—i.e., to determine how many people believe such and such—but to discover what people believe. The execution of Q technique is called a Q sort, where subjects in the P-set are given a Q sample of statements taken from the universe of stimuli on the matter in question. Each statement is typed on a separate card and respondents are instructed to sort the cards along a continuum. The range of the continuum varies, but the result is usually a quasi-normal distribution.

Completed Q sorts are factor analyzed. However, instead of

correlating statements, person-to-person correlations are calculated and factored. Subjects are grouped who have a common point of view. The analysis results in groupings which are viewpoints underlying similar Q sorts. Factors are interpreted by examination of the characteristics of the persons who loaded significantly on them and by a comparison of factor scores of each of the statements (see McKeown & Thomas, 1988).

Research Design

A balanced factorial design was used to construct the Q sample. Although theoretical considerations can be built into the design and guide statement selection, respondents provide meaning to the statements through their sorting operations. Foreign policy issues were chosen from a pool generated from contemporary news reports and discussions in publications concerned with foreign policy. Thirty-six statements were chosen from the original pool. The Q sort was designed to cover a wide variety of issues. The sampling frame used for selection is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1
Design of Foreign Policy Issues Q Sort

Main Effects	Levels	N
A. Ideological Perspective	(a) Idealism (b) Realism	2
B. Strategic Perspective	(c) Isolationism (d) Internationalism	2
C. Issues	(e) Trade Protectionism (f) Defense Spending (g) Reliance on UN (h) Aid to Russia (i) Human Rights (j) Immigration (k) Third World (l) NATO (m) Arms Sales Conflicts	9

In constructing the sample, statements concerning nine issues were first divided in terms of whether they reflected the ideological perspectives of realism or idealism. *Realism* sees conflict between nations as a natural state of affairs, while *idealism* denies that conflict is an unchangeable factor in international relations (Holsti & Rosenau,

1990). Next, the same statements were divided in terms of whether they reflected the strategic position of isolationism or internationalism. *Internationalists* indicate a willingness to project force or other resources in order to solve problems or promote interests beyond United States borders, while *isolationists* would limit American involvement abroad. For each of the four combinations (idealist-internationalist, idealist-isolationist, realist-internationalist, and realist-isolationist) a statement concerning each of nine issues was chosen for the Q sample. The following are examples of statements chosen:

Military spending should be reduced, and a larger share of investment should go towards building up our social and economic infrastructure. [Idealism/Isolationism/Trade]

When Third World conflicts impact vital American interests we may need to provide military assistance, or even intervene directly, in order to resolve destabilizing conflicts. [Realism/Internationalism/Third World]

In the aftermath of the Cold War, Europe ought to take on the burden of its own defense. [Realism/Isolationism/NATO]

We should not countenance human rights abuses, and should boycott trade with offending parties while simultaneously clarifying international norms against human rights violations. [Idealism/Internationalism/-Human Rights]

Each of the thirty-six statements was typed on a small card. The deck of cards was shuffled before each respondent began the sorting operation.

The purposive sample of 40 subjects was chosen based on interest in and knowledge of foreign affairs. Represented in the sample were professors of international relations, analysts who work in policy "think tanks," and members of groups concerned with international affairs such as the World Affairs Council. The goal of selection of the P-sample was to obtain a group of people who were informed about contemporary foreign policy issues and who represented diverse views. The size of the respondent pool is less relevant than its diversity.

The Q sort served as the measure of opinions concerning America's world role. The sorting process itself indicates both a preference on issues and the intensity of preference since a "forced choice" format is used. Respondents sorted the 36 statements along a continuum with the number of statements under each score:

Most Strongly Disagree					Most Strongly Agree			
-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4
2	3	4	6	6	6	4	3	2

The Q sorts were recorded and subjected to factor analysis. The principal components analysis revealed four factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.00. The four factors accounted for 67.2% of the total variance in the Q sorts. The factors were subjected to a varimax rotation. The rotated matrix is shown in Table 1. Modal scores for each statement for each point of view were determined. The modes (-4 through +4) are based on scores given by respondents who loaded significantly on each factor. The four factors are best interpreted by making reference to the statement factor array found in the Appendix. In the presentation that follows, the statements are numbered to correspond with the complete Q sort that is given in the Appendix.

Table 1
Opinions Concerning America's World Role: Factor Matrix

Q sort Number	Age	Occupation	Party	Factors			
				I	II	III	IV
1	35	Policy Analyst	D	87	30	-02	-07
2	33	Professor-Int. Rel.	D	85	04	-09	07
3	35	Professor-Int. Rel.	I	82	11	-31	11
4	34	Professor-Int. Rel.	D	77	16	01	23
5	35	Professor-Int. Rel.	D	76	18	04	30
6	46	Professor-Int. Rel.	D	68	53	-07	-05
7	53	Professor-Int. Rel.	I	65	05	-35	28
8	54	State Department	D	64	56	-01	01
9	69	Professor-Human Dev.	I	62	36	-15	26
10	67	Professor-Int. Rel.	I	61	48	-02	03
11	60	Catholic Priest	I	61	19	-07	14
12	45	US Senate Staff	D	60	58	00	09
13	76	Retired Journalist	D	60	53	18	-02
14	33	Professor-Int. Rel.	D	58	28	34	10
15	40	State Department	D	54	28	-09	29
16	38	Think Tank-Analyst	D	-82	-26	28	-17
17	47	Think Tank-Analyst	I	11	83	10	13
18	39	Professor-Int. Rel.	D	15	82	15	18
19	39	Defense Dept. Analyst	D	17	78	38	01
20	--	US Senate Staff	D	11	75	06	-34

21	72	Engineer	R	45	74	04	15
22	33	Professor-Int. Rel.	D	45	71	18	-19
23	29	Professor-Int. Rel.	D	50	71	09	31
24	31	Professor-Int. Rel.	I	14	69	46	-30
25	59	US Senate Staff	D	27	68	-07	18
26	33	Professor-Int. Rel.	D	38	68	05	13
27	35	Professor-Int. Rel.	I	18	66	39	19
28	41	Professor-Int. Rel.	I	-02	66	-03	33
29	69	Advisor-Int. Security	D	42	61	05	-09
30	31	US Senate Staff	D	47	61	01	02
31	57	Professor-Int. Rel.	D	28	56	30	32
32	43	Research Analyst	R	05	-04	92	-27
33	28	Think Tank-Analyst	R	13	-02	91	-16
34	34	Professor-Int. Rel.	R	-24	18	62	01
35	36	Professor-Int. Rel.	R	-37	44	61	03
36	58	Investment Manager	I	-34	27	56	-20
37	35	Professor-Int. Rel.	R	-30	37	55	18
38	35	Administrator	I	24	-06	03	74
39	79	Retired Surgeon	D	35	30	-28	68
40	52	Professor-Int. Rel.	D	20	14	-15	67

Percentage of total variance explained 24.6 24.8 10.8 6.8

Note: Rotated matrix (varimax rotation). The factor loadings indicate the extent to which each respondent shares the perspective defined by each factor (decimals have been omitted). Four factors accounted for 67.2% of the total variance. Loadings of .43 or greater are significant at the .01 level.

Results

Policy Consensus

There are several areas of consensus across the factors that figure prominently in the manner in which respondents perceive America's role in the world. The value in examining consensus statements (i.e., statements which obtain the same degree of support or rejection by most respondents) is that they point to policy areas eliciting strong agreement in spite of differences on other policy dimensions (see Butler, 1993).

There are several notable areas of consensus. All four factors support the contention that free trade is desirable, indicated by disagreement with a statement that we should repudiate free trade:

3. We should repudiate free trade except in those sectors where we have a competitive advantage. (-2 -4 -4 -2).

However, there is not a clear consensus with regard to U.S. protection against unfair competition (statement #4). It is clear that free trade will be a dominant consensus feature in the future of American foreign policy, but ratification of the Uruguay Round is not an issue that resonates for respondents:

1. Ratification of the Uruguay Round will benefit the international economy, but we must take certain measures to protect our jobs. (0 -1 0)

In addition to general support of free trade, respondents agree that it is in the interest of the U.S. to contribute to Russia's recovery:

15. It would be contrary to our interests to subsidize Russia's recovery, especially when we should be tending to our own. (-3 -1 -3 -1)

With a weak dissent from respondents on Factor II, there is also general agreement that the U.S. should play a peaceful role in preventing regional conflicts:

26. Without intervening militarily, we ought to invest our resources in preventing regional conflicts from arising, by promoting democracy, human rights, and economic modernization in developing countries. (+4 -1 +2 +4)

Of all the statements, this one may symbolize a hope for American foreign policy in the future. Nevertheless, its value may rest entirely in and be limited to the symbolic realm. The statement contains elements that are difficult or would be unpopular to reject. Furthermore, analysis of policy positions of each factor that follows points to significant differences of opinion as to how the noble goals of statement #26 should be put into effect.

Policy Differences

Factor meanings are best induced from factor scores for each statement for each factor. The labels given to each factor are simple summary statements for the content of the policy positions. As labels, they are not cast in concrete; an advantage of Q is the manner in which the data are indeed public: Each reader is invited to examine the factor arrays and arrive at his or her own conclusions.

Factor I: Idealist and Internationalist

Factor I is idealist with a strong internationalist orientation. A fundamental theme is the persistent rejection of the role of the military in American foreign policy. Factor I respondents consistently support reductions in defense spending, repudiate arms sales as a business and policy issue, and give only mild support for military intervention in cases of human rights abuses:

6. The United States should drastically reduce military spending; the world's problems simply cannot be resolved by force. (+1 -3 -4 -1)

35. America should declare a moratorium on military sales, which contribute to regional arms races and security dilemmas. (+2 -1 -1 0)

Internationalism is reflected in Factor I in a number of respects. Respondents who load significantly on the factor seem to favor subordinating American policy to a strengthened UN (statement #10), and deemphasize traditional self-interest. The deemphasis of self-interest is reflected in the rejection of trade protectionism and a permissive attitude on immigration.

Factor I respondents place the continuing role of NATO in the context of their non-militarist internationalism; they clearly see NATO as a continuation of Cold War bloc politics:

9. NATO's continued existence is unaffordably expensive and counter-productive, insofar as it perpetuates traditional "bloc" thinking as opposed to global security cooperation. (+1 -4 -2 -1)

Finally, it is important to point out that Factor I respondents display a complex perspective that contains some paradoxes. While they generally reject military force as unsuitable for addressing real American interests, they are not strictly pacifist, since they regard violations of human rights as legitimate grounds for coercion:

20. In cases where our interests are directly affected by human rights violations, we should react forcefully to address the source of the problem. (+3 0 +1 -4)

17. We should not countenance human rights abuses, and should boycott trade with offending parties while simultaneously clarifying international norms against human rights violations. (+2 -1 0 -2)

They reject traditional alliance politics, but are unsure about direct aid to Russia.

Factor II: Limited Internationalism and Traditional Self-Interest

The second factor shares a number of attributes with the first. There appears to be a concern with traditional self-interest, but it is coupled with a modicum of "global security" thinking and internationalism. Factor II respondents are more positive about spending on the military, but within the context of other budget (especially domestic) issues:

7. America must maintain a healthy defense budget, but this must not crowd out other pressing domestic concerns. (-1 +4 0 +2)

The concern with domestic issues is also reflected in views concerning immigration:

22. We do not have the capacity to absorb the world's indigent population. But we should support international efforts to address poverty, overpopulation and political repression. (0 +3 -2 +1)

Factor II respondents were the only group that was unsure about investing American resources to promote human rights and economic modernization in developing countries (statement #27).

Respondents loading significantly on Factor II reveal their "global security" concerns with respect their desire to leave NATO unchanged:

29. NATO's continued existence is unaffordably expensive and counter productive, insofar as its perpetuates traditional "bloc" thinking as opposed to global security cooperation. (+1 -4 -2 -1)

30. NATO should be transformed along the lines of an expanded CSCE framework, in which admission is open to all Central European and former Soviet states who can qualify. (+3 -3 +2 +1)

32. NATO should propose, simultaneously, a coalition with Hungary, Poland the Czech Republic, and Slovakia leading to their eventual membership, perhaps accompanied by a separate alliance treaty to reassure Russia. (+1 -2 +3 0)

Respondents who loaded on Factor II seem to exhibit an ideological perspective in flux. They, like many others, are in the process of

sorting out "what goes with what" in the post-Cold War era.

Factor III: Realist and Internationalist

Factor III expresses traditional values regarding the high utility of force in world politics, and strong emphasis on self-reliance and pursuit of narrow American self-interests. They express strong support for military spending:

8. If we want to help shape a stable world order, we can only do so on the basis of military strength, which requires a substantial defense budget. (-3 0 +4 -4)

5. Military spending should be reduced, and a larger share of investment should go towards building up our social and economic infrastructure. (+1 +4 -3 +3)

There is little support for the UN; Factor III respondents resist expanding its role (statements #9 and #10) and, in fact believe that the US should pursue independent interests:

11. We must identify our own interests and pursue our own objectives, instead of trying to augment the UN. (-2 -2 +4 0)

Bloc politics remain relevant and NATO should be retained at all costs (statement #29) and, in contrast to the views of Factor II respondents, expanded to the East:

32. NATO should propose, simultaneously, a coalition with Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, leading to their eventual membership, perhaps accompanied by a separate alliance treaty to reassure Russia. (+1 -2 +3 0)

While Third World conflicts may negatively impact American interests, such conflict is seen as an inherent aspect of world politics and arms sales are an inevitable accompaniment of this dynamic:

33. To the extent that American arms sales are beneficial for the job outlook in a leading technology sector, this is a sound business practice and domestic policy. (-3 -2 +2 -3)

The primary thrust of foreign policy is what is in the national interest and militarism is acknowledged as necessary, as are international and

regional alliances.

Factor IV: Modified Realist and Semi-Isolationist

The isolationist tradition in American foreign policy is most closely represented by Factor IV. For Factor IV respondents America's narrow self-interest and standard-of-living is the central focus for foreign policy. While force remains relevant there is little support for increases in the military budget and military engagements. For Factor IV respondents the Cold War framework seems irrelevant and NATO is not regarded as a significant concern for foreign policy. Since an overriding concern is to improve American competitiveness, expenditures that do not directly promote narrow American interests are highly suspect. Factor IV displays support for a multilateral approach in the abstract, but only insofar as it does not require any sizable political or economic commitment on America's part. There seems to be general support for the UN, but a lack of willingness to subsidize its functions (statement #12). Likewise, Russia's recovery would tentatively be in America's best interest, but this cannot justify extensive direct assistance (beyond free advice) since it would mean reducing investment at home:

14. We should do everything reasonably possible to help Russia: We should offer development aid, humanitarian assistance, and expertise in constructing stable domestic institutions. (+2 +3 +1 -3)

Human rights fail to register as a paramount policy concern:

19. We may deplore human rights abuses in other countries. But our foreign policy should be entirely independent of such concerns. (-4 -3 0 +3)

20. In cases where our interests are directly affected by human rights violations, we should react forcefully to address the source of the problem. (+3 0 +1 -4)

There appears to be little interest committing resources to the solution of Third World conflict or the defense of Europe:

27. America must avoid wasting scarce resources on Third World conflicts, especially while truly vital interests at home require our full attention. (-1 -2 -1 +1)

31. In the aftermath of the Cold War, Europe ought to take on the burden of its own defense. (0 -1 +2)

It is tempting to argue that Factor IV respondents take an isolationist perspective, but they do indicate some support for the principle of multilateralism and the goals of the UN. They also join the consensus supporting US policies designed to prevent Third World conflicts by promoting democratization and development—perhaps on the grounds that this would indirectly strengthen the international economy and preclude the emergence of threats to American assets abroad.

Discussion and Conclusions

This paper has reviewed several key studies of the structure of opinions concerning America's world role; in addition, it has presented data pertaining to alternative means for examining the structure of foreign policy attitudes. Our effort has been to critique the methodological presuppositions underlying some of the empirical research on the topic and examine some implications about the theoretical understandings of the subject.

Our findings lead us to argue that the question of the number and substance of dimensions used to organize foreign policy attitudes is unresolved. Previous efforts have "produced" dimensional structures by omitting key issues and elements of conversations about foreign policy. The inclusion or exclusion of foreign aid issues, for example, likely contributes to the number and substance of dimensions "discovered." The number and structure of dimensions used to make sense of foreign policy issues are probably related to context. We found four interpretable dimensions that differed substantially from those found in earlier studies. It seems likely that changes in issue concerns in the future will produce modifications of the means by which foreign policy opinions are organized.

We stated earlier that we held to the opinion that belief systems serve an individual by providing context for interpreting specific issues and events. At the same time, analysis of a belief system is best done by inducing its organizing principle from the specifics. In other words, belief systems may operate deductively, but we, as analysts, should determine their substance and structure through an inductive process. Our approach, Q method, facilitates this process inasmuch as it provides "structure" (factors) as well as specifics (factor arrays).

The existence of a factor (in this case four in number) indicates a fundamental communality among those respondents loading significantly

on it (see Table 1). What draws them together and sets them apart from other respondents is the fact that they sorted the items in similar ways. At issue, then is the question: What do the respondents on Factor I (or Factor II and so forth) have in common? At the most general level, one response would be a shared "belief system" or "belief structure" that serves to give meaning to specific policy issues as those issues enter and leave the discourse on American foreign policy.

The factor structure found here manifests areas of agreement and disagreement. Factor I respondents share a perspective regarding American foreign policy. They agree among themselves and disagree with other respondents (Factors II-IV) on particular policy issues. The meanings of their factor are derived from the *pattern of responses* noted in the factor arrays; i.e., the pattern of agreements and disagreements with individual statement items that composed the Q sample: support for free trade, desire for reduced military spending, concern for human rights, and so forth. The use of the "ideological structure" of Factor I (and the remaining factors) is an *induction* made from the configuration of specific items that characterize (positively and negatively) that factor. This configuration ultimately results from the use by Factor I respondents of a common foreign policy language; there is a basic agreement among them in the discourse of foreign policy.

Holsti and Rosenau (1990) suggested that much of the confusion concerning dimensions and types may be the result of "inconsistent" labelling. This raises yet another interesting issue. Is the traditional language employed in foreign policy debate currently sufficient? Given the evidence in this study, and the discussion of our findings, old labels such as "internationalist" and "isolationist" may still be adequate in some respects. However, these terms are limited in that variations on each are apparent; application of any universal label most likely will obfuscate rather than clarify the contending perspectives on the proper course of American foreign policy.

Appendix

Statements	Factors			
	I	II	III	IV
1. Ratification of the Uruguay Round will benefit the international economy,	0	0	-1	0

	but we must take certain measures to protect our jobs.				
2.	The GATT regime should be strengthened even further, since it is still not strong enough to ensure truly free trade.	-1	+1	+3	+2
3.	We should repudiate free trade except in those sectors where we have a comparative advantage.	-2	-4	-4	-2
4.	America can compete well in a free trade setting, but we must protect ourselves against unfair competition and avoid dependence on other states for critical goods and technologies.	-2	+2	-2	+1
5.	Military spending should be reduced, and a larger share of investment should go towards building up our social and economic infrastructure.	+1	+4	-3	+3
6.	The United States should drastically reduce military spending; the world's problems simply cannot be resolved by force.	+1	-3	-4	-1
7.	America must maintain a healthy defense budget, but this must not crowd out other, pressing domestic concerns.	-1	+4	0	+2
8.	If we want to help shape a stable new world order, we can only do so on the basis of military strength, which requires a substantial defense budget.	-3	0	+4	-4
9.	The United States should support a heightened UN role, but we cannot foot the bill or provide the lion's share of service personnel.	-1	+1	-1	-1
10.	America should support a strengthened UN, and subsidize	+3	+2	-2	-2

	its peacekeeping actions as well as other functions, including information-gathering and conflict avoidance.				
11.	We must identify our own interests and pursue our own objectives, instead of trying to augment the UN.	-2	-2	+4	0
12.	America should help strengthen the UN's capacity, while at the same time reserving maximum independence in seeking its own objectives.	-1	+1	0	+2
13.	Rather than providing direct aid, the US should facilitate Russia's entry into the leading international organizations, and encourage it to become a stable member of the community of states.	0	-1	+1	+1
14.	We should do everything reasonably possible to help Russia: we should offer development aid, humanitarian assistance, and expertise in constructing stable domestic institutions.	+2	+3	+1	-3
15.	It would be contrary to our interests to subsidize Russia's recovery, especially when we should be tending to our own.	-3	-1	-3	-1
16.	There is a limit to how much aid we can and should provide to Russia. Perhaps the most realistic step would be to offer advice in creating democratic and market institutions.	0	-1	+3	+4
17.	We should not countenance human rights abuses, and should boycott trade with offending parties while	+2	-1	0	-2

	simultaneously clarifying international norms against human rights violations.				
18.	In cases of gross human rights abuses, sanctions—including, if necessary, military force—may legitimately be employed.	+2	+1	+1	-3
19.	We may deplore human rights abuses in other countries. But our foreign policy should be entirely independent of such concerns.	-4	-3	0	+3
20.	In cases where our interests are directly affected by human rights violations, we should react forcefully to address the source of the problem.	+3	0	+1	-4
21.	Without shutting out the impoverished masses, we must try to resolve the underlying problems that cause demographic instability.	+1	+1	0	-1
22.	We do not have the capacity to absorb the world's indigent population. But we should support international efforts to address poverty, overpopulation, and political repression.	0	+3	-2	+1
23.	We cannot allow our borders to remain permeable; refugees are draining jobs and resources, and lowering our standard of living.	-4	+1	-3	+1
24.	We should accept as many immigrants as we can absorb. But beyond that, we must take measures to prevent a mass exodus to our shores, and induce other countries to take a more active role in preventing refugee flows.	0	0	+1	0

25. The United States ought to support international organizations in brokering negotiations over Third World conflicts, and imposing economic sanctions on aggressors.	+1	+2	0	-1
26. Without intervening militarily, we ought to invest our resources in preventing regional conflicts from arising, by promoting democracy, human rights, and economic modernization in the developing countries.	+4	-1	+2	+4
27. America must avoid wasting scarce resources on Third World conflicts, especially while truly vital interests at home require our full attention.	-1	-2	-1	+1
28. When Third World conflicts impact vital American interests we may need to provide military assistance, or even to intervene directly, in order to resolve destabilizing conflicts.	-1	+3	+2	0
29. NATO's continued existence is unaffordably expensive and counterproductive, insofar as it perpetuates traditional "bloc" thinking as opposed to global security cooperation.	+1	-4	-2	-1
30. NATO should be transformed along the lines of an expanded CSCE framework, in which admission is open to all Central European and former Soviet states who can qualify.	+3	-3	+2	+1
31. In the aftermath of the Cold War, Europe ought to take on the burden of its own defense.	0	0	-1	+2

32. NATO should propose, simultaneously, a coalition with Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, leading to their eventual membership, perhaps accompanied by a separate alliance treaty to reassure Russia.	+1	-2	+3	0
33. To the extent that American arms sales are beneficial for the job outlook in a leading technology sector, this is sound business practice and domestic policy.	-3	-2	+2	-3
34. America should sell arms selectively in order to enhance deterrence in specific regional contexts, and to increase the security of stable allies.	-2	+2	+1	-2
35. America should declare a moratorium on military sales, which contribute to regional arms races and security dilemmas.	+2	-1	-1	0
36. Arms sales result in hyper-militarization and conflict, and by exacerbating regional tensions they erode everyone's security, America's included. It is in our and everyone else's interests to establish an international regime to restrict arms sales.	+4	0	-1	+3

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