The Interpersonal Sources of the Development of Political Images: An Intensive, Longitudinal Perspective[1]

Larry Baas
Valparaiso University

ABSTRACT: Harold Lasswell, among others, has noted that the vague, diffuse, and distant symbols of the secondary political world are elaborated and take on personal meaning to the individual as a result of a process of displacement or projection of some image from the primary world. To examine whether such a process mediates between primary and secondary worlds, a single subject was given two separate Q samples and asked to describe her images of 25 objects as well as how these objects made her feel. The correlation and factor analysis of these data, plus lengthy interviews with her, demonstrated how the varied aspects of her political world take on personal meaning to her with respect to specific primary images. The current study is an update of the study after almost 14 years. The same subject was asked to describe many of the objects from the original study as well as other "new" primary and political objects in her life. Once again the data support the Lasswellian proposition that primary and secondary worlds are bridged by a process of displacement of primary affect. Additionally, the data allow us to see how new objects are incorporated into her world and how changes in her

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Author's address: The Department of Political Science, Valparaiso University, Valparaiso, Indiana 46383; Lbaas@Exodus.Valpo.Edu.

[1]Portions of this paper were presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology, July 3, 1988 in Seacaucus, New Jersey. The author acknowledges, with appreciation, the assistance of Steve Brown and Dan Thomas on an earlier version of this paper as well as with the development of the Q samples used in this study.

primary world affect her images of the secondary political world, as well as how earlier images impact ones developed later.

Introduction

A central question in the study of political behavior is how do individuals develop their understanding of the political world? Not surprisingly, there have been a wide variety of theories put forth to explain this. (Downs, 1957; Fiorina, 1981; Lau & Sears, 1986; Conover & Feldman, 1984; Greenstein, 1965; Easton & Hess, 1962). In a previous, intensive analysis of a single subject (Baas, 1979), Lasswell's "law of primary affect" was suggested as an explanation of how such meaning develops. The results of that inquiry supported the Lasswellian proposition that secondary political objects develop meaning to individuals as a result of displacement of some image from their primary, interpersonal world. The current study seeks to update these findings by returning to this subject after almost 14 years to see what has happened to her and her images of the secondary political world. Specifically, three broad questions will be explored in the present study. First, have the subject's images of the political world changed and if so why? Secondly, does the "law of primary affect" still explain the development of her images of the political world? Thirdly, how do individuals incorporate new political objects into their existing cognitive and affective structures and how do earlier experiences and images impact later ones.

Lasswell and the Development of Political Images

The perspective which guides this study comes most directly from Harold Lasswell (1960; 1962; 1965) who argued decades ago that people develop images of secondary political objects and symbols based on the displacement of well developed images derived from the individual's primary world. The assumption is that most persons are confronted by a vague, diffuse and distant political world of which they have little personal knowledge and they form their images of this world based upon something about which they have intimate knowledge—images of persons they have dealt with in their personal life. As Lasswell (1962, pp. 156-157) noted:

> During any given period, a culture (and a given position in a culture) provides a characteristic sequence of primary circles to which infant children and young people are exposed. In addition, the culture supplies

> a characteristic sequence of exposure to symbols of reference to the secondary circles of society (the environment beyond the primary circle). Both the primary circle and the secondary symbols, therefore, are brought to the focus of attention in a discoverable pattern. Obviously, the secondary symbols (as well as symbols of reference to the primary circle) acquire meanings to the child in accord with the contexts in why they occur. Hence they are at hand for the displacement of affects from the immediate circle.

Lasswell's perspective, which can be labeled the "law of primary affect," is part of his larger conception of political man. According to Lasswell, political man (P) = p } d} r, where private motives (p) are displaced (d) onto the secondary world and rationalized (r) in terms of the public interest (Lasswell, 1960, pp. 75-76).

The Original Study

For reasons outlined elsewhere (Lasswell, 1938a; 1938b; Davidson & Costello, 1969; Stephenson, 1974), it was determined that an intensive approach would best facilitate an examination of the displacement or projection hypothesis. While most research in political science has been of an extensive nature, numerous efforts have demonstrated the utility and scientific credibility of intensive analysis in political research (Brown, 1972; 1974). The key in employing an intensive approach, especially in this type of study, is to use a methodology and a set of techniques which allow for the operationalization of relevant events (images of primary and secondary objects) and which can be replicated on other subjects. Q technique and its methodology (Stephenson, 1953; Brown, 1980; McKeown & Thomas, 1988) have been shown to be appropriate facilitating operations for this (Stephenson, 1977; Baas & Brown, 1973).

While for the purposes of this study almost any person would do, the one selected—Ms. Smith—was chosen because she was a representative of a group of persons who shared a very idealized image of various aspects of the political world (Baas, 1977; 1987). At the time of the original study Smith was a 21-year-old college senior at a small, religiously affiliated, liberal arts college in the Midwest; she was a permanent resident of a small town in Missouri. Smith was brought up in a middle-class family which was politically and theologically conservative. Her father was a strict Republican who believed Richard Nixon had been thrown out of office by a hostile press. While Smith held similar but less extreme views, political matters were of almost no

concern to her. Initial interviews with Smith yielded a list of 25 primary and secondary objects with which she was familiar and which could be examined to see if there were any connections between her primary and secondary worlds.

In order to operationalize Smith's images of her primary and secondary worlds, she was provided with a 50 item Q sample. The entire Q sample is in the Appendix. The Q "statements" were adjectives sampled from a list of 555 personality trait words which had been ranked from 1-555 for their likability (Anderson, 1968). She was asked to describe the 25 objects from her primary and secondary worlds (listed in Table 1) by ranking the adjectives on a scale from +5 (most characteristic of the object) to -5 (most uncharacteristic) following usual Q technique procedures. Thus on 25 separate occasions she described one of the 25 objects, such as her self, her father, her mother, her sister, President Ford, Chris Bond, the Constitution, and the Supreme Court using the Q sample. These 25 separate descriptions were then correlated and factor analyzed and examined for possible associations between primary and secondary objects as suggested by Lasswell's theory. If Lasswell is correct, we would expect Smith to describe particular primary and secondary figures in the same manner and that these same objects would load together on the same factor.

To probe primary and secondary connections even further, Smith was asked what types of feelings were brought forth when she contemplated each of these 25 objects. The assumption was that not only images of primary and secondary objects would be connected, but similarly, so would feelings. Again, to facilitate and standardize this descriptive process she was provided with a different set of 42 adjectives (see the Appendix) which would allow her to operationalize her feelings about each of these objects. This Q sample was structured around feelings and moods and represents a larger domain of possible emotions likely to be aroused. She was asked to rank these adjectives from +4 (most characteristic of how the object makes you feel) to -4 (most uncharacteristic). These 25 descriptions also were correlated and factor analyzed. The interviews and Q sorts were done during 1975.

Results

The Image Data

The correlation and factor analysis of her image Q sorts produced two factors. After numerous attempts at judgmental rotation, it was

determined that the varimax solution best represented her object world. Factor scores were computed for each factor and one composite Q sort that best represented each factor computed. (See the Appendix for a listing of these scores.) Table 1 lists the objects she described and their respective factor loadings.

Smith's first factor, A, represents a highly benevolent, protective, enlightened, and indulgent image which she obviously admires, respects, and idealizes. She describes it as sincere (+5), intellectual (+5), trusting (+4), and warm (+4). Included on this factor are people from her primary world whom she likes and respects, including her entire immediate family, her closest friend, her boy friend, and her pastor. Much of her secondary political world is described in factor A terms as well. Political objects on this factor include President Ford, Chris Bond, the Presidency, the Supreme Court, the Constitution, and God.

Smith's second factor, B, represents a quite distinct perspective. The image represented here is that of a stern, authoritarian and depriving figure in her life. She describes it as proud (+5), strict (+3), tough (+3), domineering (+5), possessive (+4), uncompromising (+4), and not tolerant (-5). Included on this factor are three objects from her personal world including how she describes her mother, father, and sister when she is mad at them, and one from her secondary world, the law. Obviously, the notion of law conjures up in her mind an image reminiscent of family members when she is mad at them. Interviews with her indicated that she often got mad at family members when they were enforcing "the family law."

The remainder of the primary and secondary objects in Smith's life are split in varying degrees on factor A and factor B. She appears to regard Nixon and the Declaration of Independence highly in that they are loaded primarily on factor A. Their significant loadings on B, however, indicate that they also possess qualities she does not admire and therefore her image of them reflects a degree of ambivalence. A little more negative and equally ambivalent view is taken of Congress which loads primarily on A, but nearly equally as high on B. George Wallace and Hubert Humphrey, two persons she "can't stand," are also mixed on A and B, but in a quite different manner. These two figures are essentially the antithesis (bipolar) of the good, benevolent image represented by A, and at the same time possess significant attributes of the bad factor, B. These latter two figures are clearly depriving, repressive, and despicable characters. Jones, one person Smith recalls out of her past as not liking, is the only primary figure split on A and

Table 1
Smith's Factor Matrices: The Original Data

Object Described	Perception Q Sort Factor Loadings* A	B	Feelings Q Sort Factor Loadings C	D
1. Pres. Gerald Ford	97	01	93	-01
2. Gov. Chris Bond	96	03	92	-03
3. Presidency	93	30	80	30
4. Pastor	92	-17	91	-05
5. Sister	92	04	92	-20
6. Boyfriend	91	12	81	-26
7. God	89	14	91	13
8. Ideal Self	89	-13	87	-19
9. Supreme Court	88	12	23	85
10. Moral Self	88	-26	-27	82
11. Constitution	87	29	-02	83
12. Best Friend	88	19	91	-24
13. Father	86	-05	91	-07
14. Mother	79	-22	80	10
15. Self	74	-23	86	-05
16. Mad-Sister**	-20	87	-45	71
17. Mad-Father	-04	80	-44	78
18. Mad-Mother	-02	71	-44	79
19. Law	-19	73	-35	79
20. Declaration	67	37	19	57
21. Nixon	60	40	13	74
22. Congress	50	54	-31	88
23. Wallace	-78	44	-53	72
24. Humphrey	-76	47	-51	75
25. Jones ("Bad" Person)	-46	38	-41	78

*Two place decimals omitted. Factor loadings > +/- 30 are significant, $p < .01$.

The objects were originally given randomly.

**All the "Mad" figures relate to how she perceives them when she is mad at them or how they make her feel when she is mad at them.

B. Thus from her perspective and in varying degrees, these figures represent ambivalent images. Some, like Nixon, the Declaration, and Congress possess both good and bad qualities, while Wallace,

Humphrey, and Jones represent aspects of two bad perceptual categories.

The entire pattern of Smith's object world can be explained by some variant of Lasswell's theory. In every instance, secondary objects are associated with some primary object or image. Naturally, this does not prove conclusively that displacement or some other process is operative, but the results are consistent with what one would expect if such processes were mediating between primary and secondary worlds. When this data is combined with the results of the second set of Q sorts performed by Smith and the intensive interviews with her, a much more conclusive picture can be drawn of how specific political figures and symbols take on meaning for her.

The Feelings Data

The correlation and factor analysis of the 25 feelings Q sorts resulted in two factors. Again after numerous efforts at judgmental rotation, the varimax solution proved the most acceptable. These data are presented in Table 1. While the structure of the feelings data are quite similar to the image data, there are some slight differences here which aid considerably in understanding how the meaning of the political world is developed for Smith. The first factor, C, includes almost all of the same good objects found on factor A, but with some interesting exceptions. Most notably absent from this group are the Constitution, the Supreme Court, and her moral self. These objects have shifted to the second factor generated from this data, factor D, and are now associated with objects previously described as ambivalent or negative (the *Declaration of Independence*, Nixon, the law, and Congress). The remainder of Smith's object world is split on both C and D as indicated in Table 1.

A closer examination of how these objects make her feel provides evidence on how they have taken on meaning for her. (See Appendix for a complete list of the factor scores associated with each statement for each factor.) Objects on factor C make her feel good, warm, happy, and comfortable; objects on factor D make her feel uncomfortable, vulnerable, and very anxious. For example, factor C makes her feel kindly (+3), light-hearted (+2), warm-hearted (+3), and relaxed (+3); factor D makes her feel nervous (+3), anxious (+3), worried (+4), regretful (+2), doubtful (+2), sorry (+2), and suspicious (+2).

Focusing on factor A, it appears that President Ford and Governor Bond take on meaning as direct extensions of her immediate family and

close personal friends. She not only describes them in the same manner as her family and close personal friends (they are loaded on factor A), but they also bring out the same feelings in her (they are loaded on factor C). Interviews with her about these persons support this conclusion.

The Constitution and Supreme Court are also idealized and load significantly on factor A, but appear to obtain this admired position as a result of a different process. Despite their idealized descriptions, these two objects load on factor D, indicating they make her feel anxious, uncomfortable, and quite vulnerable. Interviews with her indicate that the unchecked, impersonal, faceless authority of these political objects make Smith feel quite threatened and vulnerable. It is interesting that the presidency, unlike other political institutions, does not bring out exactly the same feelings. Smith distinguishes these objects in her mind because the presidency easily comes alive in her eyes in the person of the president. According to Smith,

> [t]he president is one man and you can get to know him. The others are faceless people ... I would be much more willing to accept a decision from the president than from other people or political institutions.

Therefore, because the presidency is not as impersonal as the Constitution and Supreme Court, it does not leave her with the same feelings of vulnerability. The presidency has human characteristics in her eyes and, to some degree, this allows her to identify with it.

Thus while much of Smith's political world appears to take on meaning as direct extensions of primary objects and images, the Constitution and its counterpart, the Supreme Court, appear to obtain their idealized positions as the result of a compensatory process. The threatening potential of these objects is alleviated and compensated for by depicting them in highly protective and benevolent terms. Obviously a benevolent, kind figure would not utilize its depriving potential to one's detriment. This appears to be precisely what Smith does. She describes the Constitution in idealistic terms and yet it makes her feel threatened and vulnerable. The idealization becomes compensation for her feelings of vulnerability. What better way to reduce her anxiety than to picture the Constitution as the same as her father (and other close personal friends) who would do nothing to harm her. Therefore, for Smith, the Constitution and Supreme Court achieve their exalted position in her political object world as a result of compensation for feelings of vulnerability in the face of the vast, impersonal, and faceless

authority they possess (Greenstein, 1965; Easton and Hess, 1962).

Looking at Smith's case study, evidence is provided to support the conclusion that the political world as vague, diffuse, and distant from her life, is given specific meaning in terms of concrete, primary figures and/or images. In this sense, she conforms to Lasswell's developmental formula for political man: private motives are displaced onto public objects and rationalized in terms of the public interest. Ford, Bond, and the Presidency appear to become extensions of herself, family, and close personal friends, while other less respected political objects become extensions of more negative primary images. The Constitution and Supreme Court, however, obtain their idealized position by a more compensatory process. Thus while the specifics of the relationships change, the fact that there are primary and secondary connections, as Lasswell suggests, remains constant.

The Current Study

At a personal level, Smith changed a great deal in the 13 years since the first study. At the time of the second study, she was 34, married and the mother of 4 children. She married her college boyfriend (described in the original study), who is now a business professional and they live on the West coast. She describes herself as somewhat conservative but is still not very interested in political matters. Religiously, she has converted to Catholicism and describes the Pope as one of her most admired persons. Thus we see that Smith's primary, interpersonal world has changed substantially. These interviews took place with her in 1988.

Based on preliminary discussions with her a list of the primary and secondary political objects which were currently salient in her life was developed. These are indicated in Table 2 and include objects such as Howard Baker, George Bush, Ronald Reagan, Oliver North, Ayatollah Khomeini, two of her children, the Pope, and Michael Dukakis. Using the same Q samples and procedures, she was then asked to describe her images and feelings of these objects along with a selected list of objects from the first study. The data were analyzed by combining her descriptions of the first study with her current descriptions. This process was done separately for both the feelings and image data. Once again after judgmental rotation, the varimax solutions proved to be the best fit for both the image and feelings data. It should be noted that the data from the first and second studies were also analyzed separately with no significant differences from the results reported here.

The Image Data

Looking at the new image data presented in Table 2, we see that Smith's image world has remained virtually the same. After correlating and factoring all of her original Q sorts and the new ones, we see that the resulting factor structure is identical to that generated in the early study. (See the Appendix. The factor scores here would be identical to those in the original study.) Thus despite many changes in both her personal life and the secondary political world, she uses the same two categories (factors) to describe the various objects in her world. Significant change and development over the years has not lead to a different or more complex view of the world. The description of the meanings of the factors then is identical to that described in the discussion of the original study.

This is not to say that her images of particular objects did not change. They did. For example, her description of her arch enemy from her childhood, Jones, has shifted from almost the opposite of the good objects in her life to a more orthogonal position; now being much more like factor B than the antithesis of factor A. Likewise, as we shall see shortly, some of her current descriptions of political objects have shifted as well. The point to be emphasized, however, is that the image structure she imposes on the world has not changed, even though some of the objects have shifted about within that structure.

Table 2
Original and Current Image Data*

	Factor Loadings			
	Original Study**		Current Study	
Objects Described	C	D	C	D
Chris Bond	94	-07	--	--
President Ford	94	-10	--	--
Presidency	94	18	80	49
Ideal President	--	--	93	14
George Bush	--	--	92	02
Baker	--	--	92	13
Sister	90	-11	86	-28
Constitution	90	22	63	38
God	89	03	89	10
Supreme Court	89	03	71	55

Table 2 (*continued*)

Pastor	88	-29	--	--
Friend	87	10	--	--
Father	86	-17	80	-27
Son	--	--	86	-05
Boyfriend/Husband	89	00	86	28
Self	73	-18	86	-09
Daughter	--	--	86	28
Ideal Self	84	-25	83	-19
Mad-Father	05	71	80	-11
Moral Self	89	-40	76	-18
Mother	77	-38	54	-59
Law	32	76	73	48
Mad-Husband	--	--	70	46
Declaration	69	34	--	--
Ronald Reagan	--	--	63	58
Michael Dukakis	--	--	61	57
Richard Nixon	59	26	--	--
Oliver North	--	--	56	64
Congress	55	50	--	--
George Wallace	-72	56	--	--
Hubert Humphrey	-69	56	--	--
Gary Hart	--	--	-70	34
Ayatollah Khomeini	--	--	-73	46
Mad-Sister	-13	83	--	--
Mad-Mother	08	61	--	--
Jones	30	55	-43	50

*The factor loadings here result from the correlation and factor analysis of both the original and current Q sorts considered together.

**Two point decimals have been omitted. Loadings +/- .30 $p < .01$.

As in the original study, the data support the Lasswellian notion that secondary political objects take on meaning to an individual with reference to some primary object and these two worlds are bridged by a process of displacement. Once again we find that all secondary political figures are related in some manner to some primary figure or figures. That is to say, images of the secondary political world for Smith are not unique and have some foundation in either an earlier or current primary image. Thus she describes persons like George Bush, Howard Baker, and the ideal president the same as she describes her husband and father; both the way she describes them now and the way

she described these two figures 13 years ago. Smith has this image of the good people in her life and she uses it to cover political figures whom she evaluates favorably. This was also the idealized image she used to describe President Ford, Chris Bond, the Constitution, and the Supreme Court. It is definitely a warm, benevolent and idealized image in her life which she uses to elaborate certain objects from her secondary, political world.

Not all political objects are described so favorably by Smith. Recall, she has another category which she uses to elaborate the negative objects from the secondary political world. In the original study both Hubert Humphrey and George Wallace were two politicians she disliked. They were elaborated in terms of a personal image she had of Jones, a person she did not like very much. These three objects were all described almost as the opposite of her father and the other good people in her life and ended up on the bipolar end of factor A. What is interesting about this image category in her life is that now that Humphrey and Wallace have become less salient political figures, it is still a category that she uses to describe the new negative images which come into her life. Thus when Gary Hart and Ayatollah Khomeini come into Smith's cognitive world she has a preexisting category into which she puts them. It is not a new image, but one that she has from a negative relationship in her early childhood and one she now uses to cover other negative objects from the more current, secondary world.

What is also interesting about this negative category is that her early description of Jones, as previously indicated, which serves as foundation of this image has now changed. Jones has currently left the negative image world and jumped squarely in the middle of factor B in a category with how she views her mother, sister, and father during the original study when she was mad at the them. The importance of this shift is that it demonstrates that particular images of persons may change, but the image (category) itself may not change and may at a future time be used as the foundation for later use to facilitate the incorporation of new objects into an image world.

Most political objects in Smith's world, however, do not fall into the two aforementioned categories, but rather are loaded both on factor A and B indicating a degree of ambivalence about them. In her eyes, they possess some of the good qualities of A, but also some of the stern, authoritarian qualities of B. Originally only Nixon, Congress and the *Declaration of Independence* were described in these terms. Now this ambivalent image appears to be her principal view of the political world. Interestingly, her views of the Constitution and the Supreme

Court are now described in these terms; her idealization of them has been replaced with a more ambivalent image similar to the way she views the rest of the political world. Why these latter political objects have shifted will be considered shortly.

Additionally, when new political figures whom she is apparently unsure about enter her world, such as Reagan, Ollie North, and Michael Dukakis, she puts them in the group with these other "political" objects. While this entire grouping seems clearly explainable in terms of the law of primary affect—all of these images relate directly to other primary images on factor A and factor B because they have significant factor loadings on both—quite interestingly she has placed one of her more recently described primary figures in this category as well. Apparently, when she gets mad at her husband he takes on the characteristics of the political world; possessing some of the good qualities, but also being somewhat stern and authoritarian. The same ambivalence she sees in her husband in situations she gets mad at him is attributed to the political world.

Thus there have been some changes in her images of specific objects, yet she still describes the world using the exact same categories. Likewise, most of the objects described in both studies are described the same. Additionally, her images of the secondary political world are still explainable in terms of Lasswell's law of primary affect; political images do not take up unique space in Smith's world, but are associated in some manner with primary figures and or images.

The Feelings Data

Following the same procedures utilized with the image data, the original and new feelings Q sorts were correlated and factor analyzed together. Computing the factor scores for the two resulting factors indicates that like her image data there is not a lot of change in the structure of her feelings towards these various objects. The ordering of the individual items does change a little, but the correlation of respective factors C (the first factor in the feelings data) at time 1 and C at time 2 was .89. The same figure for respective factors' D (the second factor in the feelings data) was .88. Thus the feelings are virtually the same as before, but because, unlike the image data, there were some differences, the interpretation of this data which follows is based on the factor scores when all the data is considered together. The factors generated in the current study when all Q sorts are considered together will be referred to as C1 and D1 respectively to distinguish them from the factors in the original study. (See the Appendix for the

factor scores.) The factor loadings for each described object are presented in Table 3.

Table 3
Factor Loadings for All Feelings Data*

Factor Loadings**	Original		Current	
Object Described	C1	D1	C1	D1
Baker	--	--	93	-06
Presidency	73	-34	92	-07
Moral Self	-05	87	92	-03
Constitution	12	74	91	00
Sister	77	-48	90	13
Pope	--	--	89	-03
Self***	--	--	88	-05
Son	--	--	88	-11
God	86	21	87	-17
Daughter	--	--	86	-21
Law	-21	82	84	-03
Father	79	-26	83	24
George Bush	--	--	81	24
Mother	76	-14	81	24
Ideal President	--	--	80	-20
Chris Bond	--	--	77	-34
Ideal Self	67	-47	75	30
Boyfriend/Husband	69	-53	75	-41
Pastor	73	-34	--	--
President Ford	73	-39	--	--
Closest Friend	69	-54	--	--
Ronald Reagan	--	--	60	63
Declaration of Independence	42	54	--	--
Oliver North	--	--	01	92
Congress	07	92	--	--
Mad-Mother	17	88	--	--
Mad-Father	18	88	10	73
Michael Dukakis	--	--	10	86
Hubert Humphrey	34	86	--	--
Supreme Court	01	86	29	78
George Wallace	23	85	--	--
Jones	23	84	35	26

Table 3 (*continued*)

Ayatollah Khomeini	--	--	29	84
Gary Hart	--	--	29	84
Mad-Husband	--	--	22	79
Richard Nixon	32	70	--	--

*The table includes all the feelings Q sorts from both the original and current studies.

**Two point decimals have been omitted. Loadings +/- .30 $p < .01$.

***Her original description of feelings about herself was unusable in the current study.

When Smith thinks about persons on factor C1 she becomes thoughtful (+4), serious (+3), and introspective (+3) and at the same time it makes her feel pleased (+4), warm-hearted (+4), kindly (+3), affectionate (+3), and cheerful (+3). She also indicates that these objects do not make her feel angry (-4), rebellious (-4), worthless (-3), nor helpless (-3). Factor D1 also makes her feel more serious (+4), thoughtful (+4), and introspective (+2). The similarity ends here, however and D1 brings forth more negative feelings, including feelings of anxiety, alienation and even hostility. For example, Smith indicates that these objects make her feel worried (+3), anxious (+3), and nervous (+3). Additionally, they make her feel doubtful (+4), skeptical (+3), suspicious (+3), and regretful (+3), as well as angry (+3) and defiant (+2). Obviously objects on D1 bring forth a much darker set of emotions than those on C1.

As to the objects on these respective factors, C1 includes objects from her primary and secondary worlds and from both the current and previous studies. We find diverse objects such as Howard Baker, the Presidency, her moral self, the Constitution, her sister, the Pope, her self, both her son and daughter, as well as the law all bring out similar feelings. These feelings appear not to reflect any new dimensions of affective response in her life and are anchored securely in feelings she described as having in the original study. On D1 we find objects from the original study including the *Declaration of Independence*, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution. Also included are objects she described in the current study such as Dukakis, the Supreme Court, and her husband when she is mad at him. These objects bring out feelings similar to the ones she experienced when her parents did something that made her mad at them. Thus like the emotions evoked when she contemplated objects on C1, these are not new, but are feelings similar to those experienced much earlier in her life. This is consistent with the law of primary affect; the emotions evoked by numerous secondary

figures are similar to the emotions evoked by certain primary figures. That the primary emotions evolved first is certain in most instances because they were described 13 years earlier.

These data also allow us to understand how Smith incorporates new objects into her affective world. The new objects on factor C1 include Baker, her son, her daughter, George Bush, the Pope and the ideal president (she was not asked to describe this in the initial study). New objects on fact D1 include Dukakis. It is clear that when these objects enter her world, a whole new set of emotions do not emerge, but rather they bring forth a set of emotions similar to those brought out by persons from her primary world and emotions she had experienced before this time. Thus like the image data, she has a ready-made set of responses which are forthcoming when new objects enter into her world.

Explaining Change: The Case of Legal Symbols

The tendency is towards stability in Smith's object world, yet two important political symbols, the law and the Constitution, did change. In the original study, "the law" was described in depriving terms and left her feeling anxious. She also described her parents when she was mad at them and how she felt when she was angry with them in the same way as she described these two political symbols. These associations led to the conclusion that the secondary symbol, "law," was associated in her mind with how members of her family had appeared when she was mad at them; a condition engendered when they enforced rules or "the family law." These situations made her feel very uncomfortable which is the same way "the law" made her feel. These primary associations, therefore, appear to be important in the development of her image of "the law."

Now, however, her description (image) of law is split on factor A and B, is described in somewhat kinder and benevolent terms, and brings forth more positive emotions. A portion of this change can be explained by her maturity. As June Tapp and Felice Levine (1974) note, given the right circumstances, the process of maturity leads to viewing the law less as a restrictive guideline and more as a guide for social life. This would seem to be what happens in Smith's case. For example, in the original interviews with Smith she talked about the law as a "... roadblock. It stops you from doing things. Stops you from trying things out. It hangs over your head and stops you. We actually have too much law. Its needed for some people, but not for people like

you and me."

Currently, she sees the law much differently. "I think I realize that it is necessary, it is not hurting me or limiting what I want to do—it is protecting me." She also speaks of how she has benefitted from the legal system and notes that "... I want to keep it that way to help protect my children's lives." Thus her changing conception of law appears at least partially a function of her increased maturity and development.

At the same time, it appears that her altered family status has an impact here as well. As an adult with four children she has now become dispenser rather than recipient of the force of the family law and it appears that this has affected her image and feelings about "the law." This seems particularly the case since she does not enforce the law in the same manner as her parents. This is supported by both the Q sort data and the interviews with her. Recall in the original study her image of the law was intricately tied up with her images and feelings of her parents when she was mad at them. When she talked about situations wherein she was mad at her parents it was where they enforced the "family law." They stopped her from doing things she wanted to do like, "... to stay out later with (boyfriend). Stay out later with the girls. Have the car more often." To enforce this her parents did not use physical discipline and not even much verbalization of any kind. "You just knew you had done something wrong. They made you feel guilty."

Now, however, things are quite different. She not only has the responsibility of enforcing the law, but she handles this task in a very different manner. In her hands the law has become applied much more benevolently and with a quite different purpose. As she indicates:

> (w)ith four young children there are plenty of squabbles around here. I do get frustrated at times dealing with it. I feel that I am just and fair, but in the children's eyes I'm not always. Children expect you to take sides, but ... I refuse to do this.

Additionally, and without a negative evaluation of her parents, she suggests the relationship she has established with her children and the way in which the law is enforced is quite different. For example, she notes that she has a

> ... loving, trusting, caring, and honest relationship (with the children). We try to show them that we are all each others best friends ... (That) we are always there to stand up for one another, encourage each other

> and be forgiving of each other. We try to use our home life to instill good values in our children at home, then we can feel confident that the children will carry these values into their every day lives at school and play. (In discipline I). ... try to be a good example. I. ... talk to them about right and wrong. And when they do something wrong, I make sure I talk to them. ... I want them to know exactly what I expect of them.

In Smith's hands, the family law has become quite different. It is dispensed much more benevolently with justice and fairness and it has a much different purpose. Family law is not designed to create "guilt" and feelings of anxiety, but to actually teach values and right from wrong—it is a benevolent guide to life, not a threatening inducer of guilt and anxiety. This, not too surprisingly given Smith's associations, is the view she currently holds of "the law" in her more distant, political world. Thus the change in Smith's image of the secondary symbol, law, appears to be tied into her entire life history. The change in meaning of this symbol can be attributed to both her maturing as an adult, her change in status in her family, and the way she enforces the family law. In more general terms, Smith's example demonstrates how changes in one's interpersonal world can lead to corresponding changes in one's perceptual and affective relationship to secondary political symbols.

Like "law," the meaning of the Constitution for her has changed and now brings out more positive affect. In the original study, the Constitution was idealized (viewed in factor A terms), but it made her feel anxious and insecure (brought out factor D feelings). It seemed reasonable to conclude that what she did was to idealize the Constitution to overcome her feelings of vulnerability when she thought about it. This was accomplished by attributing to the Constitution the same benevolent characteristics possessed by her father and other close friends—people she knew would do her no harm. Thus for Smith, anxiety was alleviated by idealizing the potential threat.

Now, however, the Constitution has fallen in her cognitive world; she still idealizes it somewhat, but it is split on both A and B and described much more like a typical political symbol. At the same time, however, the Constitution no longer brings out feelings of vulnerability in her, but now brings out more positive feelings associated with factor C1. Why this change has occurred seems once again to relate to her development and maturation; as Smith matures she no longer uses a compensatory process of idealizing secondary political objects to overcome the feelings of vulnerability they create in her. In addition to

an examination of her Q sorts, a comparison of the original and current interviews with her demonstrates her change and her more mature look at the document. Originally, she talked about the Constitution as vague and unclear and somewhat scary because you did not know exactly what it meant. Likewise it made her feel uneasy because

> ... it is something above you that just prohibits people from doing certain things. (It is) something out there that prohibits people from committing a crime. ... I never think about it much but it is just in the back of my mind, I guess. It puts restraints on people.

Additionally, the whole notion of the Constitution was quite scary to her because she doubted the competence of the current generation to create and handle the document. "People today are not as perfect as them (the founders)." Currently, however, she talks about the Constitution quite differently. As she indicates:

> Now I see that I don't have to worry about the Constitution. It is there and it protects the average person. ... I always marveled at those men who wrote the Constitution, but now I realize that there are and are going to be people in my generation that will continue (its) work."

The change in the meaning of the Constitution for Smith, therefore, seems to be at least in part explainable in terms of a normal process of maturation. As an older adult, it looks less scary, and she has developed more confidence in her own generation's abilities to handle problems related to it.

At the same time, there is something else involved here. In Smith's mind there has always been a very close association between the Constitution and her moral self (how she was taught to be in a moral sense), and the shifting of her feelings and perception of the Constitution is associated with similar changes in perception and feelings about her concept of her moral self (See Tables 2 and 3). In the original study Smith described both the Constitution and her moral self in factor A terms—kind and benevolent—yet they both made her feel relatively anxious and uneasy (factor D). The description of her moral self in these terms and the emotions that resulted from this are understandable if we view her description of her moral self—how she was taught to be by her parents in a moral sense—as equivalent to her internalized superego or conscience (Baas, 1980; Lerner, 1937). Her description of this image in such idealistic terms—a very demanding conscience—obviously created an elevated set of expectations that induced

significant anxiety. With such high standards failure was almost inevitable and with it, the added anxiety resulting from the discrepancy between expectations and reality. (Alford, 1988).

Interviews with Smith provide additional support for this interpretation. Each time Smith indicated that she had done or contemplated doing something contrary to what she had been taught to do, she would lean over a little as if that image of how she was taught to be was etched on her shoulder and it was becoming weightier the further she deviated from its expectations. She had clearly internalized the messages from her parents of what was and what was not appropriate behavior and it weighed on her heavily. Even the thought of acting contrary to the dictates of this image created a deep sense of guilt and anxiety. Similarly, as indicated earlier, the Constitution was seen as a limit on her; it defined right and wrong, prohibited her from doing things she might otherwise do, and made her feel very uncomfortable and uneasy.

Currently Smith appears to have overcome both of these burdens. Her image and feelings about the Constitution have changed and she feels much better about her moral self. For example, Smith notes that:

> Now, at 35, I feel that I know what my moral self is, and I'm comfortable with it. ... I know what's right and wrong according to the values I want to live by. I'm usually happy with the choices I make. If I make a wrong choice, I accept it and hope that I will not make the same mistake twice.

Likewise, as indicated above, she feels much more comfortable with the Constitution. Thus there has been some significant, related shifts in both of these concepts in her mind. In more general terms, what appears to happen with Smith is that as she has matured, married, raised her own family, and distanced herself geographically, religiously, and other ways from her parents, she no longer bears the emotional burden of her moral self (after all, it amounted to how her parents had taught her to be in a moral sense). The Constitution appears affected by this change because it has been associated in her mind with her moral self and conceptualized in her life as the symbolic equivalent of conscience. Currently, as a result of changes in her inter and intra personal world—not feeling as threatened by the concept of her moral self—she also feels less threatened by its corollary in her secondary world, the Constitution. Likewise, this may lighten her need to idealize the Constitution. As it becomes less threatening, the need to idealize it becomes less and she can then view it like so many other political

symbols.

Smith's case demonstrates how the meaning attributed to the symbols of the political world, like the law and the Constitution, are often affected by the maturation process and by change at the inter or intra personal level. In the case of Smith's view of the law, a significant change in her position in the family appears to affect her conception of it. In the case of the Constitution, its continued association in her mind with her moral self has consequences for its personal meaning.

Summary and Conclusions

Looking at Smith after almost 14 years we see that her personal life has changed substantially. She has gone from being a student at a small college, to a married, mother of four living on the West coast. Yet despite these changes, the cognitive and affective structures by which she relates to the world have not changed much at all. When asked to describe how she views and feels about 25 objects from her primary and secondary worlds in the first study, she generates two factors for perceptions and two for feelings. When asked to describe many of the same objects and some new ones in her life years later, she generates essentially the same factors. At least for Smith, her images and feelings about her primary and secondary worlds seem remarkably stable.

This is not to say that her images and feelings about objects within this structure do not change. We find that several figures from both primary and secondary worlds have changed. Smith, however, does not create entirely new evaluative dimensions, rather she just shuffles objects around within her existing framework. Likewise, when new political objects enter her world she does not create new categories, but has ready made categories into which to place certain types of objects. Thus when George Bush and Howard Baker enter her cognitive world, she describes them in the same terms she describes her father, boyfriend/husband, and many other good objects from her primary world; images, it should be emphasized, that were similar to the way she had described these and other persons many years earlier. Additionally, she has ready made categories for other less well respected political figures like Gary Hart and Ayatollah Khomeini. Again, the images used to cover these objects are not original, they were the same categories used to describes Jones, an old enemy of hers, and also used to describe Hubert Humphrey and George Wallace in the original study. Thus we are not just assuming that primary

images came first, there is longitudinal data to demonstrate this.

Smith's case also demonstrates how change at the interpersonal level relates to changing images and feelings about the secondary, political world. In Smith's case it was suggested that her changing relationship with the "family law" may have resulted in corresponding changes in her image of and feelings about the more abstract notion of law in the secondary political world. When primary and secondary images become associated in one's mind, as appears to be the case with Smith, change in one may lead to change in the other. Similarly, her feelings about her moral self have changed and seem to be related to corresponding changes in her image and feelings about the Constitution, two objects that have long been associated in her mind.

Looking at the entirety of Smith's case study, evidence is provided to support the conclusion that the vague, diffuse, and distant symbols of the secondary political world are given specific meaning in terms of concrete, primary figures and/or images. In this sense, she conforms to Lasswell's law of primary affect: private motives are displaced onto public objects and rationalized in terms of the public interest. In all instances, we find that secondary political figures are associated in some manner with images from her primary world. Sometimes the association appears to be one of the direct extension of an image from primary to secondary. Other times it appears to be the result of a more complex, compensatory process. Whatever the specific dynamics of the relationship, the associations are there as suggested by Lasswell.

Appendix

The Perception Q Sort: Factor Scores for Smith*

Adjectives	Factor Scores A	B	Adjectives	Factors Scores A	B
1. Submissive	0	-5	26. Realistic	1	-4
2. Tolerant	2	-5	27. Domineering	0	5
3. Clever	0	-1	28. Consistent	1	-3
4. Materialistic	-2	-1	29. Self-Centered	-4	1
5. Shrewd	-2	-1	30. Proud	2	5
6. Idealistic	-1	2	31. Aggressive	1	2
7. Uncompromising	-3	4	32. Warm	4	-4
8. Decisive	3	5	33. Old-Fashioned	-1	3
9. Malicious	-5	-3	34. Conscientious	4	1
10. Frustrated	-2	2	35. Unhappy	-3	-2
11. Strict	0	3	36. Respectable	5	1

12. Trusting	4	-5	37. Cynical	-5	0
13. Timid	-2	-5	38. Refined	3	0
14. Intellectual	5	1	39. Irresponsible	-5	-2
15. Mediocre	-3	-2	40. Daring	-1	1
16. Rational	2	-3	41. Impulsive	-2	0
17. Suspicious	-4	4	42. Sincere	5	-3
18. Confident	2	2	43. Dependent	-1	-4
19. Thoughtless	-5	3	44. Ambitious	3	2
20. Cautious	0	-1	45. Demanding	1	5
21. Self-Righteous	-4	0	46. Active	4	4
22. Honorable	5	0	47. Possessive	0	4
23. Tough	-1	3	48. Humble	2	-2
24. Ethical	3	-2	49. Vain	-4	-1
25. Insecure	-3	-4	50. Obedient	1	0

*The factor scores from the original study were almost identical when both the original and current data were analyzed. For that reason, only one score is given for this data.

The Feelings Q Sort: Factor Scores*

		Factor Scores			
CL**	Adjectives	C	D	C1	D1
A	1. Angry	-4	-1	-4	3
B	2. Nervous	-2	3	-2	3
C	3. Carefree	1	-2	-1	-3
D	4. Elated	0	-4	1	-4
E	5. Serious	4	4	3	4
F	6. Drowsy	0	0	-2	0
G	7. Affectionate	2	-1	3	-3
H	8. Regretful	-2	2	0	2
I	9. Doubtful	-3	2	-2	4
J	10. Boastful	1	-1	2	-1
K	11. Active	1	1	1	1
L	12. Calm	2	-1	-3	-2
M	13. Excited	1	0	2	-1
N	14. Hopeless	-3	1	0	1
G	15. Kindly	3	1	3	-1
H	16. Sad	0	1	0	1
F	17. Sluggish	-4	3	-2	0
I	18. Skeptical	-4	3	-2	3
E	19. Thoughtful	4	4	4	4
J	20. Egotistical	-2	-2	-3	1
D	21. Overjoyed	0	-4	1	-4

K	22. Energetic	1	0	2	0
C	23. Playful	-1	-4	-1	-3
L	24. At Ease	3	-2	2	-3
B	25. Anxious	-1	3	-3	2
M	26. Light-Hearted	2	-1	1	-3
A	27. Defiant	-3	1	-3	2
N	28. Helpless	-1	2	-3	1
G	29. Warm-Hearted	3	-1	4	-2
H	30. Sorry	-1	2	0	2
I	31. Suspicious	-4	2	-3	3
J	32. Self-centered	-2	-3	-2	-1
K	33. Vigorous	1	0	1	0
L	34. Relaxed	3	-2	2	-2
M	35. Cheerful	2	-3	3	-4
N	36. Worthless	-2	-1	-3	0
A	37. Rebellious	-3	1	-4	1
B	38. Worried	-1	4	0	3
C	39. Witty	0	-4	-1	-2
D	40. Pleased	4	1	4	-2
E	41. Introspective	2	3	3	2
F	42. Tired	0	0	-1	0

*Factors scores listed under C and D are scores for the original study. Because the factors were a little bit different when all the data—both original and current—were factored together, the scores for these factors, C1 and D1, are also presented. Note that interpretations in the original study are based on C and D; interpretations for the current study (all the data) were based on factors C1 and D1.

**Refers to the classification of the items: A = aggression, B = anxiety, C = surgency, D = elation, E = concentration, F = fatigue, G = social affection, H = sadness, I = skepticism, J = egotism, K = vigor, L = relaxed-composed, M = cheerful, N = depressed. Items classified A, C, D, F, G, H, I, J, and K come from Nowlis (1965). Items classified B, E, L, M, and N come from Lorr, Daston, and Smith (1967). This Q sample was developed by Steve Brown and I thank him for allowing me to use it in this study.

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