Quantum Theory Media Research: II. Intentionality and Acculturation

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ABSTRACT: The unified theory for subjectivity elaborated in Part I (Stephenson, 1995-1996) is substantiated with illustrations in this paper, in reference to Danish media reserach. Quantumized operant factors in Q methodology incorporate intentionality in relation to culture formation, thereby revealing how action implicates culture, as evidenced in Eisenhower's unwillingness to use the atomic bomb (conscience), Freeman Dyson's principle of "live and let live" (hope), and the idealism of Rodó's Ariel as expressed in the policies of Costa Rica's Oscar Arias. A summary is provided of a theory of intentionalities (which presage, but do not predict subsequent events), which is rendered credible in terms of additional illustrations concerning public libraries, public health, and science journalism. Conclusions are reached regarding affinities between Q methodology and reception analysis in Danish media research.

Introduction

Part I of this paper (Stephenson, 1995-1996) provided a unified theory for subjectivity, including, therefore, the subjectivity of *reception analysis*, the theme of Danish media research in *Nordicom Review* (1988, issue no. 1).

Scholarly literature is replete with theories of acculturation, as reviewed (for example) in *Communication and Culture* (Smith, 1966).

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There we find mathematical, cybernetic, social, linguistic, syntactic, semantic, and other theories, with a selected bibliography of some 400 authors for further study. Because quantum theory requires a start from the beginning, we have to dispense altogether with this traditional scholarship, theory, and research. A beginning is made, instead, with individually experienced phenomena, and for this we chose Kim Schroder's TV-viewer in *Nordicom Review* (Schroder, 1988), who admitted involving herself in the *Dynasty* fantasy world:

> When I sit down in front of the TV it's as if I ... during that hour one could say that I immerse myself in that world, in those fine dinners and fine drinks and fine clothes. And when it's over, well then I'm just myself again. (p. 11).

Sitting in front of the TV is a statement of fact. The rest of her remarks are self-referential. She may utter a hundred of the latter, and all are common knowledge, understood by everyone in her culture (as everyone else's would be understood by her).

Quantum theory applies to *facts* in physics, and to *self-referential statements* in subjective psychology.

Sitting in front of a TV for an hour constitutes, in Q methodology (Stephenson, 1953), a *psychological event* (PE). In "William James, Niels Bohr, and Complementarity: IV. The Significance of Time" (Stephenson, 1988a), an explanation of operant factors proceeds as follows:

> The initial description of any PE is in language form and is necessarily determined by the culture in which one lives, and in which the PE occurs. The culture is overlaid by every manner of social controlling influences, such as I have described in *The Play Theory of Mass Communication* (Stephenson, 1967) and as Harold A. Innis had done in *The Bias of Communication* (1951). All that the Q sorting and its quantum-factor probes have achieved is, apparently, to clear aside some of this bias and control, leaving bare the basic causative influences. New ideas arise by clearing away dross. All that concourse has provided is the initial language, in self-referential form, so randomized that everything about it is indeterminate and probabilistic, ready for quantum theory to do its job. (Stephenson, 1988a, pp. 24-25).

It was indicated, in Part I, that Schroder's TV-viewer's psychological event (PE) could be "reduced" to three operant factors, A, B, and C. This is a reduction of considerable significance, holding within it the viewer's own *creative nexus*, corresponding, fundamentally, to what is

at issue in the new physics of Ilya Prigogine in his *From Being to Becoming: Time and Complexity in the Physical Sciences* (1980). Factors A, B, and C hold within them not only something of the viewer's *past* experiences, and of the *present* (when she was interviewed by Schroder), but also is a pointer to her *future*, creatively considered. For example, we explained Schroder's TV-viewer's psychological event (PE) as her fantasy (A), her reality (B), and her "hidden" fantasy (C), each in its own "world" (as she herself described the experiences). These factors are unpredictable, and subject to complementarity—she cannot experience more than one at a time, and the experiences contradict one another (they are paradoxical). But, most profoundly, they are also subject to *intentionality*, that is, to a creative nexus, that is itself not predictable, yet quite possible.

If this sounds confused, the same has been said a thousand times about quantum theory in physics. But let us look briefly at Schroder's TV-viewer's PE.

Operant Factors

Operant factors are subject to complementarity. Thus, the TV-viewer not only cannot experience A, B, and C simultaneously, but the experiences contradict one another; they are paradoxes. Obviously, when the TV-viewer is immersed in fantasy (A), she cannot at the same time be in her real world (B), or in her "hidden" fantasy (C). But more is at issue than the impossibility of being in two places at the same time: the factors are indicative always, of paradox. It is the same in physics: nothing that Niels Bohr could do can change the paradox that light can be both particle and waves, as experimentally determined.

The operant factors such as A, B, and C we could have gotten from any TV-viewer, and are also indeterminate. It may be objected that, surely, A and B must be predictable in the example, because the viewer herself admitted to fantasy and to reality. True, factor C was unexpected. But she is quite unaware that her utterances can be "reduced" to such factors; and next week, when she again views *Dynasty*, what was fantasy may now be reality; and what was reality, now fantasy. Her "hidden" fantasy may emerge. There is much more in Schroder's TV-viewer than meets the eye. Factor C, for example, may lead her, a few weeks later, to create a story for herself about it, which she may write down for publication. She wouldn't, probably, connect the TV-viewing of weeks ago with her creation: *but the roots were in factor C.*

Such is *intentionality*. It is a concept foreign to current thought. The

problem is to trace the consequences from operant factor to creation. It is achieved, it is suggested, in relation to *culture* formation.

The Long Peace

Consider, in this connection, J.L. Gaddis's *The Long Peace* (1987). He notes that there had been no use of the atom bomb in warfare since the destruction of Nagasaki in 1945. This, he says, is paradoxical, and cannot be explained by the strategic need to maintain mutual deterrence through the balance of terror. For 10 years after 1945, when America had a monopoly of the atom bomb, both Presidents Truman and Eisenhower were advised to use the bomb in Korea, Indochina and in the Taiwan Strait. Neither did so. President Eisenhower exclaimed that to use the atom bomb a second time against Asians would have disastrous *moral* effects:

> "You boys must be crazed," he is purported to say, "You cannot use those awful things against Asians for the second time in less than ten years. My God!" ("Paranoia and Prudence, 1988").

It is well known that President Eisenhower, in his farewell speech to his nation, warned it against the military-industrial complex. How, then, could a Commander-in-Chief, who knew war in triumph, attest to such a *conscience*? Surely a cultural matter was involved, that distinguished Eisenhower from a General de Gaulle of France, the former scarcely a gentleman army officer, the latter its epitome. Eisenhower read Zane Grey novels. De Gaulle read Proust. If we could have *measured* Eisenhower's psychological experience (PE) regarding the atom bomb, it would have indicated, we may be absolutely sure, two or three totally distinct *intentionalities*—one would be moral beneficence, actualizing as conscience, and one other would represent the thrust of *power*, of a Pentagon at war.

What is at issue is not merely speculation: it depends upon the following premise of acculturation:

> Any culture, subculture, or counterculture is represented as quantumstuff by the oral public communicability (self-referential) it engenders.

The transition from the TV-viewer to her culture is in terms of this premise. We used *her* oral public communicability as quantumstuff to represent *her* culture, subcultures, or countercultures. We do so to discover what *really* is at issue, free from any psychological theory

other than that which quantum theory calls for—in general, only the postulates of Part I of this paper. We *discover* operant factors, which have the exciting properties of complementarity, and of intentionality. We are almost used to accepting Bohr's principle of complementarity: but the principle of intentionality is still incognizable. It is this we seek to remedy.

Strategies for Nuclear Disarmament

Consider a step in the direction of credibility for intentionality. Gaddis has made reference to President Eisenhower's conscience, considered to be paradoxical in the circumstances of war-like U.S. policymaking. One day we must "reduce" President Eisenhower's subjectivity to Q methodology. Meanwhile his viewpoint is represented in a study reported in "Methodology for Statements of Problems" (Stephenson, 1984).

In this paper, a book by Freeman Dyson, entitled *Weapons and Hope* (Dyson, 1984), provided the quantumstuff. Dyson served in the British Army in World War II, and is respected as a "Physicist's physicist." He is an expert on weapons, and currently a distinguished member of the Princeton Institute for Advanced Studies. He served as an expert adviser on disarmament negotiations and is privy to secret information on nuclear weapons. Now, 60 years old, he considers that the USA nuclear-arms policy is "immoral and suicidal." For the past 30 years, he admits, he has wanted to do something about nuclear threats, "to steer the world in a better way."

As for Eisenhower, Dyson knows what he is talking about, and his *Weapons and Hope* contrasts power and conscience even at surface value. But the book also contains hundreds of *his* self-referent statements about nuclear weapons, e.g.:

> Human beings must come to understand what it is in human beings that makes war so damnably attractive. ...Not international order but a balance of power rules now: every nation is for itself. ...The concept of "Live and Let Live" regards nuclear weapons as bargaining chips rather than military assets. ...There is a chance that the world is at a historical turning point, away decisively against nuclear weapons.

A Q-factor study of this concourse is in "Methodology for Statements of Problems" (Stephenson, 1984). It provided three operant factors, A, B, and C.

Factor A is for a moral injunction against the use of the atom bomb,

precisely as in the conscience of President Eisenhower, and as supported in Gaddis's *The Long Peace*. It is described in pages 580-582 of my 1984 paper, four years before Gaddis's book appeared. It is not often that Q-methodological investigation has such independent validation!

Factor B was common to both USA and USSR acculturation, involving a state-of-feeling for "saving humanity"—it not infrequently emerges in USA and Marxian ideology. Factor C concerned the morality of power (for example, that national policies take precedence over international order): this has been dogma for centuries, from Hobbes to Marx, and the current disarmament discussions between the superpowers are carried on entirely in this power-structure framework.

The Culture Paradox

Freeman Dyson was in a paradoxical situation: because of his expertness in weaponry he relied upon logic of power to arrive at a new strategy, "Live and Let Live," as bargaining chips in the power struggle. But, as he also admits, he had worried for 30 years about the moral matters at issue: to include this in "Live and Let Live" was subterfuge. Factor A requires far more than resolution of a power struggle to bring it into actuality and reality.

But every statement of his concourse is common coinage to students of war and peace, and to everyone entering into discussions about nuclear disarmament, whether expert or novice. That his three factors exist is as certain as anything in science. Why then, does *logic* prevail, as by Dyson, while the morality remains moribund, expressed only as *conscience* by Eisenhower and as *hope* by Freeman Dyson?

The cultural premise is surely at issue. For this we can turn to another Q-methodological study, concerning U.S. policy in Latin America.

Costa Rica

This was a study in 1964, reported in my *Amelioration of Political Conflict* (1964) and *The Play Theory of Mass Communication* (1967).

Two Minnesota Professors, N. Maritano and A.H. Obaid, had spent a year in Latin America studying President John Kennedy's *Alliance for Progress*, instituted in 1961: they published their findings in *An Alliance for Progress* (1963). They reported that little had been achieved by a program intended to serve the Latin American masses,

to help their nations achieve greater economic stability and themselves better living standards, in systems of social justice and democracy. Instead, politicians, businessmen and wealthy landowners were siphoning funds into their accounts in European and U.S. banks.

Maritano and Obaid had observed that Rodó's *Ariel* (1922), a classic of Latin America (excluding Brazil, a different culture), had deep impact upon Latin Americans, whose youth were being educated in its terms. Rodó called for a new ethic, with roots in a "beneficent utilitarianism," retaining the Spanish "aristocratic spirit." He wrote of the USA as imperialistic, dollar-minded, and devoid of truly creative thinking: the U.S. American was described as unaesthetic, hating "noble superiority," and belittling intellect and genius, rewarding mass mediocrity instead. Rodó wished to steer Latin Americans away from such Caibanism, and to instill instead the idealism of *Ariel*, characterized by...

> a generous zeal, the lofty and unselfish motive in action, the spirituality of civilization, the vivacity and grace of intelligence, the ideal goal to which human selection aspires. (Rodó, translated by Maritano and Obaid).

Contrasted with this was the USA viewpoint presented by its mass media, which distorted the news. The view given to USA media was that the spirit of enterprise was missing in Latin America, and that the Spanish background had produced an "incurable hatred" against all law and order; little sense of civil responsibility had been fostered, no sense of cooperation between nations.

Nor, of course, did the U.S. government help matters: it was not identifying with any genuine democratic movements, fearing communism. The two professors concluded that "We, the U.S.A. and Latin America, are woefully ignorant of each other." According to Maritano and Obaid, the elitist Latin Americans "still look at us with Rodó's eyes." A few, throughout Latin America, believed in 1960 that their culture had already achieved something of lofty Ariel's ideal.

Thus, in the one volume there is a record by expert investigators, as distinct from data for several hundred intensive-type interviews that might have been the subject of a study by others in the field of inquiry. It is almost journalistic, telling a "good story." *But it is full of the authors' self-referent statements about the matters in hand, and it is these that are the substance of quantumstuff, upon which we function in Q-methodology. It is these that hold the secrets, if any, of the quanta of intentionalities that are at the heart of inquiry.*

It was a simple matter to collect several hundred self-referential statements from *An Alliance for Progress*, to subject a Q-sample to factor analysis, and to bring to light the intrinsic quantum factors involved—anyone can do it, knowing Q-methodology. If anything is "magic" in quantum theory, in either physics or psychology, it is this, that an adequate *concourse* for any psychological event—in this example it is Maritano and Obaid reflecting upon the culture of Latin America—holds within it *all* possible operant factors. They are *objective*, each indicative of an intentionality; that is, *not* predictive of what is to happen, but what, if it happens, is congruent with a *possibility* that was knowable beforehand.

Note that it does not require Maritano and Obaid to perform the Q-sorts for the studies. The information locked up in the concourse is available for anyone's probe, provided the persons are of the same culture. In the Maritano-Obaid case, it is doubtful that many U.S. journalists were familiar with Rodó's *Ariel*; but the *text* was of a common culture, translated into English.

On a visit to Ecuador in 1964, representing the USA at a conference of journalists from all nations of the American hemisphere, I undertook a study of the situation, with conclusions reported in *The Play Theory of Mass Communication* (Stephenson, 1967, pp. 76-78). Latin American journalists do indeed see themselves through the eyes of Rodó's *Ariel*. U.S. journalists, of course, don't. My own conclusion was to that effect:

> But who shall say that something of the kind, a loftiness of spirit, is not precisely what motivates far more of Latin America than we are prepared to admit? (Stephenson, 1967, p. 78)

What has transpired since, in Costa Rica, is now everyone's knowledge: President Arias gained the Nobel Peace Prize in 1987 for a nation without armed forces, fashioned on something very like Rodó's *Ariel*, "spiritualistic" and "utilitarian," neither democratic nor capitalist nor socialist nor communistic, but modestly self-expressing.

The change in Costa Rica was already under way, though I did not know this in 1964. *The Q-methodological study provided evidence of an intentionality corresponding to what has happened in Costa Rica.*

It will be objected that there was also the greed of politicians, businessmen and wealthy landowners, no doubt in Costa Rica as elsewhere in Latin America: how does it happen that only in Costa Rica the "true conscience" is grasped?

But in any Q-methodological investigation about a psychological

event, there will be two or three different factors, representing paradoxical, contradictory aspects of the event. To know what these are is one thing: to know which will actualize "in reality" is another matter.

There can be little doubt that any Q-methodological study of the Costa Rican acculturation will provide evidence of contradictory, paradoxical factors; conditions lent themselves in Costa Rica to the actualization of Rodó's action-plan, at the roots of the Latin American culture.

Equally, however, there are indications of a comparable media effort from the USA. On Monday, January 4, 1988, the U.S. Public Broadcast System (PBS) aired an hour-long documentary on TV entitled *Costa Rica: Child in the Womb*. It offers striking evidence that Rodó's dream may yet find a place in USA journalism!

Theory of Intentionality

I can report at least 20 Q-methodology studies that support the principle of intentionality. Critics will object that it is only being "wise after the event." Sometimes, however, conventional wisdom has to give place to genuine objectivity.

The conventional way of considering an intention, in systematic psychology, is to suppose that as you *intend*, so you are likely to act. True, some people are said to be "full of good intentions" and who never act accordingly. Most of us, however, allow for variations in means to achieve intentions, if, by chance, obstacles arise. Thus, I may intend to buy a loaf of bread but forget it because it wasn't on my shopping list.

A paper by Margaret A. Boden, "The Structure of Intentions" (1973), reviews what general psychology has had to say about the concept of "intention." Heider (1958), for example, in line with Gestalt psychology, represented "intentions" as forces in a person's life-space, as vectors pushing the person in a linear direction. This, for Boden, was missing the *complexity* at issue. She studied in detail what was involved, precisely, when a person makes an intention to buy a loaf of bread, and concluded that there is not a theory in psychology, in social theory, in neurophysiology or biology, that isn't at issue in this intention. Her essay was written in 1970, based on the systematic general psychology that was common knowledge to all of us educated as psychologists in the 20th century—that of William James, William McDougall, Sigmund Freud, J.B. Watson, Charles Spearman, Max

Wertheimer, and every psychologist in between.

Note that this entailed a subculture, that of psychological science in the 20th century.

It was her purpose, however, by a process of *logical analysis*, to abstract the basic principles required for a theory of intention—and she concluded that there are only two, *action-plan* as subjective, and *basic-action* as physiological. But she called attention, as well, to the sheer complexity of all human intentions, even for so simple a matter as intending to buy a loaf of bread.

This was a decade before Nobel Prize winner Ilya Prigogine developed the new physics of complexity, in his *From Being to Becoming: Time and Complexity in the Physical Sciences* (1980). The theory is about complexity *as such*. Boden couldn't take this step.

It was achieved by Q-methodology and the theory of concourse outlined in Part I of this paper.

In Q-methodology, as in Prigogine's new physics, intentionality is *discovered*. It is a property of every quantum operant factor. Thus, in a study of Boden's 25-page essay on "The Structure of Intentions," we were able to "reduce" her self-referential statements (of which there are hundreds in her essay) to a table of operant factor structure (Stephenson, 1993). There were three factors F1, F2, and F3, representing *information theory*, *dynamic psychology*, and *complexity* respectively.[1]

It has to be remembered that Boden's was a logical analysis of the *psychological culture* of the 20th century, up to the 1970s, the knowledge common to psychologists. The factors F1, F2, and F3 therefore have reference to that culture, which was in a deterministic frame of reference. Even so, a case can be made for concluding that the factors were intentional *in that framework*. Thus, Miller's "Behaviorism and the New Science of Cognition" (1988) follows in the framework of Boden's F1. My own paper on "Falsification and Credulity for Psychoanalytic Doctrine" (Stephenson, 1988c) has links with Boden's F2. Her factor F3 has its reflection in "process" philosophy and psychology, as in *Physics and the Ultimate Significance of Time* (Griffin, 1986). The linkages are because Boden's logical analysis touched 20th century psychology profoundly. She argued brilliantly for two fundamental principles with respect to intention:

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[1] There is need for the caveat that not all Q studies produce only three factors. We "rotate" factor data to provide as *few* factors as possible, and three is a healthy number to consider.

action-plan for subjectivity, and *basic-action* for neurophysiology. The latter is outside our purview. It is interesting that *action-plan* finds correspondence in F3 with respect to complexity because she used extremely vivid self-referent statements in her essay, such as...

> much is inexpressible ... there are fiendish subtleties at issue ... much is hidden from introspection ... the analysis is ever more taxing ... the need is for greater complexity

...and the like.

Prigogine also specified two basic principles in his *From Being to Becoming: Time and Complexity in the Physical Sciences*: they were the concepts of an *irreversible time* and the *complexity of phenomena*, calling for a synthetic matrix, not a reductionist one—in addition, of course, to the use of thermodynamics and Boltzman's law. That is, a few (only two) major constructs were abstracted by both Boden and Prigogine. These are significant if the scientific or analytic work has been "on the right lines." For the same reason, the linking of Boden factors F1, F2, F3 to subsequent investigations is credible because she was apparently "on the right lines."

Credibility for Intentionality

Operant factors *presage*, but don't *predict*. One's problem, long ago, was to face indeterminism in the actualizing of factors which are only intentional. Operant factors are expressions of "possibilities," "promises," "tendencies," "nothing ever happening," to use the language of Heisenberg about the comparable phenomena in nuclear physics.

Our investigations took shape about foreign affairs, politics, democracy, disarmament, business, and *public* institutions—the *public* libraries, *public* health and medicine, and *public* science of U.S. governments. They began, with the same quest, even in clinical psychology, in Kleinian psychoanalysis, as long ago as 1935. In every instance there had to be the conclusion that quantum factors *presaged* future actions, yet could *predict* none. In every case, only a few highly significant possibilities were at issue, not of innumerable others, but of very few others, and of lesser significance. In every case the "bottom line" was the oral public communicability of a culture, subculture, or counterculture.

What this involves can be understood by making reference to *Explaining America* (1981) by Garry Wills. At the time of the 1776 Revolution in America, the Unionist leadership of the Northern states

had been educated in the moral science of the Scottish Enlightenment, of David Hume; Francis Hutcheson, Adam Smith, Thomas Reid, Lord Kames, and Adam Ferguson—in history, ethics, politics, economics, psychology, and jurisprudence (Wills, 1981, p. 17)—at the Universities of Princeton, Yale, Pennsylvania, Harvard. Amongst them were a President of the USA, a Vice-President, Senators, Congressmen, States' Governors, Judges (the Supreme Court included), Presbyterian ministers, presidents of colleges, and officers in the Army. The everyday conversational communication, the writings, the prayers, speeches, of all of these men was of this *moral* sensibility, as "oral public culture." It is something of the kind that we have to look for in a culture, to find origins for the operant factors and the quantumization of self-referent statements about significant events.

This has been our pursuit in Q-methodology. Study of *public* libraries in rural America found a subculture of women, the main users of libraries, with roots in a history of folklore art in the regions, supplemented in the 1960s by colorful mass magazines for women—such as *Better Homes and Gardens, House Beautiful*, etc. (Stephenson, 1968). Another study, of *public* health and medicine (Stephenson, 1963) found that what became the Federal systems of *Medicare* (for the aged) and *Medicaid* (for the indigent) was already evident as operant factors, 10 years earlier—a significant part of the *public* was already prepared for this legislation. The chronically ill were already calling for help in cases of catastrophic illness, where families were being ruined in order to pay for medical treatment. Only now, in 1988, has a federal law for *catastrophic illness* been put into effect. There was already a subculture ready for "socialized medicine" in the 1960s, but it was for reasons of poverty, disease, and ignorance, not because of a human right. It still exists in the USA, where the main public is not in favor of "socialized medicine"—for reasons, in the main, of cultural individualism.

In brief, the mass media play only an ancillary part in these public matters, and have always been preceded by existing cultural and subcultural influences.

One asks, however, what is the nature of these influences as such? Why is individualism so entrenched, holding sway over compassion? Why thrusts to *power*, not to *hope* and *beneficent utilitarianism*?

These questions, too, have had our investigative attention, in particular with respect to *science*, as briefly noted below.

Secularization of Science

The daily newspapers, news magazines, and TV provide the U.S. public with daily or weekly news within the ambit of science and technology, as *public*. It is easy to assume that the mass media have had much to do in the formation of the scientific-informational "climate" in America. Historian R.D. Tobey, however, in *The American Ideology of Natural Science, 1919-1930*, published in 1971, shows decisively that science was *secular* long before the mass media could be credited with its formation.

Our Q-methodological studies show that American scientists and professional science writers, in the 1970s, were apparently oblivious of this, and pressed for an increase of professional science in the news (Stephenson, 1976). Theirs is value-free. Secular science is valuebound.

That is, the mass acculturation of science, in the public, beginning in the 19th century, was linked to human values and self-referentiality. The professional subculture of science remains value-free, as necessary for truth.

In a phenomenological experiment (Stephenson, 1976) into this difference we were able to show that on both sides, that of secular science on the one hand and professional science on the other, *factualities* are at issue, and not scientific (provisional) truth. The concept of factuality is little recognized in mass media theory and research: it was developed in Hannah Arendt's "Truth in Politics" (1967). That the earth moves round the sun is a fact. That God and Heaven exist, for the religious person, is factual. Scientific facts and factualities are alike, Arendt and other philosophers contend, in *that no exchange of opinion, no argument, can change them*. Scientists and priests are alike, both obdurate for the truth of their avowels.

Where, then, is the real truth?

It is not a popular question to ask: we propose, however, that quantum theory in physics has part of the real truth, and that the same theory applied to subjectivity (self-reference) can grasp the other part. This means, in both cases, revolutionary changes in how we regard investigation. It means coming to grips with factualities.

In journalism, for example, the student is taught to be objective, as if only information is at issue, whereas skill as a journalist is likely to depend on how well the student can write "stories." "Stories" are about realities, no doubt, but 10 different journalists can tell 10 different stories about an event—as in Browning's *The Ring and the Book*, where the poet tells of different stories about a murder each story-teller had

witnessed.

In TV journalism, again, *format* now governs what is produced for the news. The TV cameras will pursue a Nancy Reagan and Raisa Gorbachev around in the expectancy of compromising gestures of unfriendliness. On a world scale it is noxious: Altheide, in *Media Power* (1985), records the reporting about President Carter's *Iran Crisis* of 1978-79. The real facts were about a deposed Shah (put into power by CIA machinations). What was "shot" for the 444 days of the crisis was quite different—there were 925 TV news reports, about 90% of which was film showing Iranian students outside the U.S. Embassy at Teheran, yelling insults at America. Khomeini was depicted as "weird, crazy, unpredictable, fanatical." The other reality was 50 million Iranians in the throes of a religious revolution. One may believe that officials of governments all over the world knew this: but none spoke out.

Format is now a critical element in any account of mass media process. Many of the journalists' factualities are also at this level of mere format.

Conclusion

The two parts of this paper were instigated by the theme "Reception Analysis in Danish Media Research" of *Nordicom Review* (1988, issue no. 1).

And here, in conclusion, I have to express a warm affinity with the theory and research represented in the papers of Klaus Jensen, Kim Schroder, Jorgen Bang, and Ib Bondebjerg. There is scarcely a paragraph in their articles that doesn't ring of my own interests over the years. Jensen's (1988) *audience-cum-content analysis*; his observation that reception analysis has not grasped a unified theory; the *interface* between medium and audience, for example in the home; the media rely upon genres, or conventional modes of expression; audiences are characterized in *cultural* terms, not merely demographic; his evaluation of *in-depth* interviews. All such is honey to the bee in my bonnet; and all of it is reflected in the above pages. But that there are many different approaches, each problem for its own, is to mistake methods for methodology. Nuclear physics, too, is full of methods, but there is one *methodology*—and that is governed by quantum theory.

Jensen's summary of results is also rewarding. That audiences reformulate, or even oppose the dominant meaning of media text, is at

issue in every "reduction" of a text to operant factors. Radway's (1984) declaration of independence for women was grasped as a subculture in the 1950-60s in the U.S./Midwest, for women using public libraries to express their own wishes. The concept that an important part of TV in contemporary culture "may not be its images of reality," but its "restructuring of daily life, patterns of conversation, bedtime, and so on," has to be tempered by the reverse possibility, that self-reference is far more potent than anyone could have guessed.

As for Kim Schroder (1988), his references to "ferment" in the field, on both sides of the Atlantic, has a welcome ring, and there is wisdom in his cautionary stand about false hopes. His argument that media research cannot "explain why the incredible amount of research done on the question of media violence and sex has had virtually no effect on either legislative policy or media content" (Ball-Rokeach & Cantor, 1986) has an answer in McLuhan's conclusion, and ours, that the "*medium is the message*," not media contexts. Technology is omnivorous. Note, however, Schroder's apt reference to Stubbs (1976), quoted as saying:

> Complexity must therefore be admitted as an essential feature of social interaction and studied in its own right with the help of appropriate concepts. (Schroder, 1988, p. 7)

This is Boden's, Prigogine's, and our own achievement.

Schroder's social semiotics is Q methodology's, too, as everyday use of public oral culture. But for scientific purposes the distinction between *facts* (and factualities) and *self-referentiality* is of universal significance. His analysis of qualitative audience research is ours, too, followed for 50 years: but the "meaning potential" in quantum theory far transcends anything that traditional paradigmatic and syntagmatic lines can provide. Otherwise everything written by Schroder as "tenets" of qualitative audience research "holds water" for us. Enough has been said above about Schroder's TV-viewer to indicate how, by quantum theory, his *Dynasty* project can be, and indeed has been, pursued in terms of a perfectly general, unifying theory.

Jorgen Bang (1988) begins with the statement that studies of reception are also studies of culture, and in this respect they offer to reconcile conflicts between "scientific and humanistic traditions." Bang notes, in particular, that Schroder puts reception at the core of theory for mass media research—"the interesting and important thing is how viewers perceive the content, for this is the key to the functions the traumimon serves in social reality" (p. 15). Again, it is not merely how

they consciously perceive content, but what their culture demands from them—and this is the real social reality. Niels-Aage Nielsen's (1982) warning of the pitfalls of qualitative approaches to reception is well taken, but the pitfalls are primarily in the decoding by researchers. In Q technique, though highly formalized, the Q sorter is untouchable—each Q sort is the Q sorter's own transitory thought, in the Q sorter's own language, from beginning to end. Bang ends with an observation that "what is assimilated by whom and under what conditions cannot be predicted", which is only true of *prediction*, not of *intentionality*.

Finally, there is Ib Bondebjerg's paper (1988), with emphasis on *critical theory*. The definition of culture as equivalent to the "fine arts" no longer holds. The revival of phenomenology as a marked feature of modern thought is given weight and is supported in "William James, Niels Bohr and Complementarity: V Phenomenology of Subjectivity" (Stephenson, 1988b). We have experimented with the phenomenology of symposia (Stephenson, *Secularization of Science*, 1976) and found group discussion to be characterized by factualities and format, not rationality. The reference to Robert C. Allen rings truly Q methodological:

> Reality, in other words, has no meaning for us except as individually experienced phenomena ... (and) the world contructed as a result of the reading act has existence only in the mind of the reader. (Bondebjerg, 1988, p. 22)

Part I is the unifying theory for this conception.

Bondebjerg would have us call qualitative empirical reception research the paradigm of the 1980s—and remarks on the commercial aspects of the media. (Most of our own studies had origins in advertising and commercial studies; there is available *Quantum Theory of Advertising*, [Stephenson, 1994], giving due place to mass marketing in a *cultural* context.) But we find the clearest statement of our purpose in Bondebjerg's "oral popular culture," as adapting its earlier role to present-day life. This indeed reaches down to fundamentals, to *The Bias of Communication* (1951) by Harold A. Innis, a pillar of our own methodology.

What Q methodology has to offer, with quantum theory, is a new vision of psychological events. *Values* rather than physical facts are at issue, evident in every Q-methodological inquiry. Always, *measurement* is the *sine que non* of science. The "five tenets" with which Bondebjerg ends his critical theory are all part-and-parcel of Q with one exception

and one omission: *First, a life-style is evident*: it is that of a President Arias of Costa Rica, a President Eisenhower of the USA. *Second, meaning is determined by cultural and historical influences*: so it was for Rodó's *Ariel* and Eisenhower's *conscience. Third, conflicts and struggles are omnipresent: they seek social significance and cultural hegemony.* But might it not be the case that modern quantum *physics* is halfway to fundamental truths, about the physical world "outside"? *Fourth, cultures are ideological, but not dogmatical Marxism or any "false consciousness."* We replace consciousness by communicability. But what is the truth about cultures? Might it not be the case that modern *quantum* psychology (self-referential) is the other halfway to fundamental truths about the world "inside"? *Fifth, there is a conviction that the mass media play a central part in ideological formations.* This we do not accept: the media play only a *medium* message, for the main part.

There is needed a sixth tenet, which we add: *Sixth, every psychological event (PE) reflects its culture, subculture, or counterculture phenomenologically as subjectivity (i.e., as self-reference).* This opens the way to *new* knowledge, and the necessity for a new epistemology, in which quantum-theoretical indeterminism and *intentionality* can replace the causal-determinist paradigm of current Danish, and all other, mass media research.

We end, then, as Niels Bohr began, with a call for a new epistemology, that has its roots in psycho-physics rather than either science or the humanities, but encompasses both under one rubric, that of quantum theory and indeterminism. It is far from my purpose, however, to downplay the significance of the mass media for modern societies and developing nations. The documentary film, *Costa Rica: Child in the Womb*, alone is indicative of its place. But themes and purposes can be *discovered*, and this is Q's aims: it has no superiority in this matter over that of creative writers—our search into phenomenology was directed by this admission—but research aspects can reach truths more cogently.

Most of us in the West, one supposes, would like to see an alleviation of hunger, disease, poverty, ignorance, hopelessness, authoritarianism, and warfare in the world. Distinguished cultural anthropologists have indeed proposed changing the whole world, to provide a new culture in which everyone can share, "equally suitable for all peoples from whatever traditions their present ways of living." It was proposed seriously by famous Margaret Mead, in *The Future as a Basis for Establishing a Shared Culture* (1953), supported by the U.S. National

Institutes of Health and the American Museum of Natural History of New York. It is difficult to imagine anything more capricious and impossible of achievement! For our part, we ask only for the development of subjective science, that countenances diverse cultures, subcultures and countercultures as its substance.

Even so, it is a fact that the present author, who maintains ties with the North Sea at its Northumbrian end, and whose deepest affinities are with all things for the common good, knows that his own thinking owes more to the Scottish Enlightenment of Frances Hutcheson than meets the eye; and his bias is indeed toward beneficent humanitarianism.

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