

Probing the Subjective Communicability of an Unfolding Presidential Scandal: A Q Study of the Clinton/Lewinsky Affair

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Abstract: This paper reports the results from a pair of Q studies designed to probe the subjective communicability accompanying the so-called "Lewinsky scandal." The first phase of the research was undertaken approximately one month after the initial reports aired alleging a sexual relationship between President Bill Clinton and the twenty-four-year-old White House intern. This "First Wave," based on a sample of Iowa college students, discovered six separate versions of the developments and their significance. The "Second Wave," utilizing the same Q sample, was conducted two months later, finding four factors from the Q sorts of the Indiana respondents. Comparisons of the two data sets reveal similarities and differences between popular constructions of the scandal during its initial phases and four months into the story's coverage. Factors from both studies are interpreted in light of their distinguishing subjectivity, and in terms of the light they shed on the unusual and unanticipated trajectory of strong public support for the Clinton presidency coupled with highly unfavorable news coverage over the course of the scandal. Furthermore, the four factors from the second study bear a striking resemblance to factors discovered by other Q studies conducted in different locales near the end of the impeachment spectacle. We conclude by considering and speculating on the significance among the factors of sharply antagonistic sentiment toward prominent principals (other than the President) who were involved the spectacle.

In the Spring of 1997, when the United States Supreme Court ruled in *Clinton vs. Jones* that a sitting president was not immune to civil legal action based on events alleged to have taken place prior to his/her election to the presidency, few if any could have foreseen how far the fallout from this decision would extend and on whom it would ultimately descend. For Bill Clinton, a powerful message signaling the severe potential of this fallout for himself, and indeed

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his entire presidency, was delivered on Friday, January 17, 1998. The occasion was Mr. Clinton's oral deposition in the Paula Jones case, the civil suit authorized to go forward by the Court's unanimous verdict from the previous year. During more than two hours of questioning at the hands of Jones's lawyers, the President received repeated queries regarding his knowledge of, and relationship with, a then-twenty-four year-old White House intern by the name of Monica Lewinsky. For the American public, the first indication of things to come occurred on January 21, 1998 when mainstream news organizations issued reports detailing the questions put to the President by Jones's attorneys, in the process citing rumors of an illicit relationship between Clinton and Lewinsky. Further reports indicated that these allegations were now the focus of an expanded investigation by Whitewater Special Prosecutor Kenneth Starr. Having secured Justice Department authorization to look into such matters, Starr launched an inquiry aimed at determining whether Mr. Clinton may have committed perjury or obstructed justice in the Jones case in an effort to conceal the nature of his relationship with Lewinsky.

Thus began an American odyssey of intriguing and often bizarre dimensions — one that would not see closure for another thirteen months. Before it was over, Bill Clinton would become the first elected president in American history to suffer the abomination of impeachment. And before Mr. Clinton would eventually win acquittal in the Senate trial of the case, Americans would bear witness to a political/human interest spectacle of immense (and often unimaginable) proportions. Along the way, the saturation news coverage of the scandal regularly outstripped the ability of reporters to provide any new factual information. And when factual information was featured, it was often so sordid — as in the details, for example, of the Clinton/Lewinsky sexual encounters chronicled in the *Starr Report* — that one routinely wondered whether the “news” was really news in this case and, if it was, whether it was truly fit to print.

In the end, it was public opinion that saved Bill Clinton's presidency. And, in retrospect, it is the public's response to the Lewinsky spectacle that poses the most fascinating and daunting challenges to analysts seeking to make sense of what happened and why. By now, the trajectory of mass response on the matter is as well known as it is perplexing. Over a prolonged period during which scandal coverage dominated the news and media assessments were unrelentingly harsh, poll after poll found vast majorities of Americans registering their approval of the Clinton presidency. In fact, job approval ratings for Mr. Clinton in the week after the scandal broke were the highest of his entire presidency (Newport and Gallup 1998). And thereafter Americans' support for their president hardly wavered, “remaining steadfast and loyal throughout the twists and turns of the scandal and news reports of cigars, stained dresses, and exchanged gifts” (Andolina and Wilcox 2000, 173).

Explaining the Clinton Paradox: Survey Evidence and its Limitations

How are we to understand the persistence of such strong approval rates in the face of a media-news climate featuring virtually uninterrupted and implacable hostility toward the President? Political scientists, drawing upon survey data, have put forward a variety of possible explanations for this phenomenon, some in the form of testable propositions, others more akin to educated guesses, regarding the micropolitical mechanisms that might be at play in the persistence of Mr. Clinton's robust approval ratings. In the earliest and arguably most theoretically ambitious effort along these lines, Zaller (1998) asserts that public opinion on the Lewinsky matter reveals a triumph of the politics of substance over and against what he variously refers to as "media politics" or the "politics of spectacle." "Monica Lewinsky's contribution to political science," says Zaller, lay in the demonstration the case provides that public assessments of presidential performance are ultimately grounded on actual achievements, particularly the bottom-line considerations of peace, prosperity, and policy moderation. Zaller concedes that data limitations make it impossible to abandon completely the alternative understandings. As a provisional matter, however, evidence from the Lewinsky imbroglio paints an entirely plausible, if not compelling, portrait of American citizens as unabashed "bottom-liners."

In diametric opposition to Zaller, Owen (2000) marshals evidence to support a "media politics" explanation for the paradoxical bounce in Clinton's approval over the course of the Lewinsky scandal. Specifically, Owen attributes that bounce to the impact of so-called "new media" actors (talk show hosts, tabloid reporters, and Internet gossip columnists) whose rise to prominence in American politics roughly coincides with — and dramatically augments — the incessant coverage devoted to the spectacle. According to Owen, these "new media" outlets are prone to the use of *entertainment formats* in their framing of stories involving political leaders. And, unwittingly or not, the effect of these formats was to frame the Clinton/Lewinsky matter almost exclusively "as a sex scandal, rather than an event with important political consequences" (Owen 2000, 162). This, in turn, facilitated the public's tendency to compartmentalize their evaluations of Clinton, making it possible — indeed, natural — to discount the seriousness of the allegations against the President. In sum, the "new media" manner of framing the events served in the end to trivialize their significance in political respects.

Based on the other scholarly appraisals to have appeared thus far, it would seem that the verdict on who will prevail in the Zaller vs. Owen dispute — "bottom-line substance" or "new-media spectacle" — is a long way off, if indeed it is forthcoming at all. In the meantime, however, it bears noting that credible, though circumstantial, survey evidence is available to support either side of the spectacle vs. substance divide. A case in point is provided in the

form of evidence suggesting that images of Bill Clinton throughout 1998 — along with assessments of his performance during the same period — were not negatively affected by revelations of marital infidelity and suspicions of deceit in the Lewinsky matter. As Just and Crigler (2000) point out, “public expectations about Clinton’s personal morality were not high to begin with” (p. 184). Before the Lewinsky allegations had even surfaced, a Gallup poll showed that fully 62% of the American people believed that President Clinton “did not share their values” (cited in Just and Crigler 2000, 185). Americans thus had presumably been inoculated against the effects of unflattering disclosures testifying to the President’s character flaws. “Once having taken account of Clinton’s moral failings, the public did not appear to further penalize him for those same failings” (Just and Crigler 2000, 185).

This by itself is not inconsistent with Zaller’s “politics of substance” account: if indeed focused on bottom-line considerations, Americans would naturally be disinclined to alter their views of the President on the basis of information denoting moral shortcomings so long as that information bore no material relationship to Clinton’s capacity to deliver in substantive respects. But as Fischle (2000) has shown from the only research based on panel survey data of the crisis, the most powerful predictor of support for Clinton during the initial stages of the scandal was *prior affect* toward the President — not policy satisfaction. For Fischle, *prior affect* toward Clinton exercises a powerful effect on the processing of information to surface *after* the scandal became public knowledge. Whereas Zaller’s bottom-liners are supposed to function, essentially, as practitioners of rational choice and therefore relegate newer (yet immaterial) personal information to an inconsequential status, Fischle’s data suggest, to the contrary, the strong presence of “motivated reasoning” whereby cognitive activity seems largely to occur in the service of *prior affect* rather than to accommodate a more rational “Bayesian updating” process.

Finally, as Andolina and Wilcox’s (2000) inventory makes clear, “available data do not permit a definitive explanation [for the Clinton paradox]” (p. 180). Still, these authors go on to suggest that a solution to the riddle is likely to be found from among the ranks of five conceptually distinct possibilities. The first two — that Clinton benefited from a prosperous *economy* and from fostering *popular policies* more generally — are of course the stuff of Zaller’s politics-of-substance model. The three remaining options are perhaps more in accord with Owen’s politics-of-spectacle: that Clinton persevered as a result of his *intangible ability to connect* with the American people; that the President was the fortuitous target (and formidable beneficiary) of *incredibly unpopular enemies*; and, finally, that Americans regarded the case as a *matte of private moral conduct* and, therefore, impertinent as grounds for a huge public inquisition, let alone impeachment. That bits and pieces of polling data can be amassed providing (partial) support

for *all of the above* arguably says less about the public's actual understanding of the Clinton/Lewinsky story than about the inherent limitations of surveys in probing that understanding. What is dramatically conspicuous by its absence from all of these accounts is some idea of what the *respondents in these polls believed that they were witnessing* when they were called upon to translate their personal assessments into survey responses.

Addressing the Missing Link in Survey Studies: Applying Q Methodology to Probe the Schematics of a Scandal

Missing from surveys on the Lewinsky matter is any clear indication of how Americans understood the case during the crucial early stages of the scandal. In defiance of conventional wisdom, previous precedent on presidential scandals such as Watergate, and perhaps even logic, Clinton's job-approval ratings, for whatever reasons, were taking the trajectory they maintained throughout the entire ordeal. Whatever else it might have been, the set of events bearing the name of Monica Lewinsky was unquestionably a *spectacle*. At least initially, the Lewinsky case had all the properties of the *human-interest* variant of the *political spectacle*. "It is public in the sense that it deals with the private life of a celebrity or with a kind of pathetic, heroic, or scandalous action that carries instant and wide appeal..." (Edelman 1988, 99). This and other forms of spectacle hold enormous importance, according to Edelman, because they "help to politicize the public and so keep it both apprehensive and hopeful. They evoke a dramatic setting that impinges upon private lives; a scene comprised of effective and ineffective leaders managing the effort to cope with distressing problems" (p. 120). Frequently neglected or forgotten, however, is the most elemental feature of any spectacle: that it "carries no meaning in itself. It is always a gloss on the phenomenal worlds of individuals and groups" (Edelman 1988, 93). To acknowledge that political spectacles are *constructed* affairs, while seemingly mundane, is actually to issue both an indictment and a challenge insofar as matters of meaning are customarily examined within the social sciences. Again, as Edelman (1988) warns, the context "from which people construct political spectacles deals in uncertainties, interpretations, and contradictions, not in conclusive generalizations. Political understanding lies in awareness of the range of meanings political phenomena present.... It does not spring from designating some one interpretation as fact, truth, or scientific finding" (p. 123).

To probe the range of meanings of the Clinton/Lewinsky affair, we turn to Q methodology (Stephenson 1953; Brown 1980; McKeown and Thomas 1988) — the foremost "intensive, intentional alternative" to large-sample survey techniques (Brunner 1977). From the vast quantity of commentary contained in the public record (including print, broadcast media, and the Internet) on the case during the first month, we compiled some 200 statements of opinion. These were then sampled in such a way as to ensure a balance of

sentiment (e.g., pro- or anti-Clinton) and adequate coverage of all issues and parties being addressed in the broader concourse of communication (Stephenson 1978) on the case. The result was a 48 item Q sample on the Lewinsky affair that was administered to two different samples of convenience at different junctures during the unfolding scandal: (1) approximately 1 month after the story broke; and (2) some two months later (after the Paula Jones case against Clinton was dismissed by a federal judge, yet well before the President's televised "confession" and the release of the *Starr Report*, let alone the commencement of impeachment proceedings). While the respondent sample in the first study was comprised mostly of college students (and is therefore skewed in the direction of youthfulness), participants in the second installment of the research display a fair measure of diversity in demographic respects. However, given our interest in discovering the "range of meanings" implicit in the vast universe of subjective communicability on the spectacle during its initial stages, both sets of respondent samples are more than adequate to this task.

Findings

First-Wave Factors and Their Interpretation

In the initial phase of the research, the 48 statements were sorted by the 54 respondents under the condition of instruction *most agree* (+5) to *most disagree* (-5) in accordance with the customary quasi-normally distributed opinion continuum. The 54 Q sorts were correlated and factor analyzed using the QMethod statistical program (Atkinson 1992). As indicated in Appendix B, this analysis produced six rotated centroids (based on varimax criteria), each of which had a minimum of four defining variates, i.e., Q sorts with loadings of ± 0.39 ($p < 0.001$) on one and only one of the six factors. One indication of the adequacy of the six-factor solution is the fact that only 5 of the 54 sorts load did not load on *any* of these factors. Of the 41 Q sorts with significant loadings on at least one of the factors, 38 are defining variates.

Factor 1: "Let's All Just Take a Deep Breath" (Following the First Lady)

Factor 1 is defined by six purely loaded Q sorts, all supplied by female respondents who approved of Bill Clinton's job performance one month into the Lewinsky scandal. Five of the six are Democrats; the other is an Independent. Four label themselves as liberal; two as conservative. Finally, four claimed to be closely following events related to the Lewinsky story, while two say they did not pay much attention to the matter.

With one notable exception, the sentiments of Factor 1 bore a striking resemblance to the reactions of First Lady Hillary Clinton as expressed in her initial public interview after the Lewinsky story broke on January 21, 1998. On the morning of Tuesday, January 27th, Mrs. Clinton appeared on NBC's

The Today Show and asserted her husband's innocence, admonishing Americans to calm down ("take a deep breath") and wait for the full facts to emerge. In the same interview, the First Lady alleged the existence of a vast rightwing conspiracy against her husband, insinuating that such sinister forces would ultimately be found at the roots of the most recent set of rumors involving the President. Statement 9 gives a straightforward rendition of this facet of Mrs. Clinton's remarks, which Factor 1 ranked -5, indicating that these sorters took strong exception to such conspiratorial constructions of the President's predicament in the early stages of the Lewinsky scandal.

In other respects, however, the story from the standpoint of Factor 1 reads as if scripted by Hillary Clinton's speechwriters. First, there is the generalized invitation for onlookers to "hold their fire," and to patiently wait for all of the facts to emerge (47 +5, 17 +4). While from one angle such overtures took on an obligatory (almost empty) cast, they were actually critical in political respects. In particular, they helped stave off suggestions that the President's capacity to govern had been so fatally compromised that a credible scenario could conceivably gain momentum wherein Mr. Clinton could be asked to resign by respected members of his own party. Probing beneath this veneer, it is possible to see the pro-Clinton affinities of Factor 1 more clearly. These sentiments show up across a host of specific issues and questions. To begin with, it was suggested that Congress take a close look at the law creating the independent counsel, given that the occupant of that office seemed to enjoy such immense powers with scarcely any checks and balances (22 +4). These misgivings were given added weight by the fact that this particular scandal appears to involve matters of consensual sex. That being the case, if Mrs. Clinton had no apparent problem with her husband's behavior, why should Mr. Starr want to prosecute in such an arena (15 +5)? Complementing these concerns was Factor 1's belief that modern mass communications media were at fault for fostering an invasive and obsessive kind of public-affairs journalism, with a pattern of practices virtually unknown prior to Watergate, but which threatened to extinguish completely the boundary between the mainstream and tabloid press (16 +5).

Two other themes are evident in this first impression of the Lewinsky imbroglio. One has been hinted at already, and that has to do with its aversion to "grand theories or theorizing," including Mrs. Clinton's insinuation that a vast rightwing conspiracy was out to get her husband. Not only was the First Lady's grand theorizing soundly rejected, so too were suggestions that Clinton's conduct in seeking to conceal his relationship with Monica Lewinsky may well have been no different in principle than Nixon's behavior with respect to Watergate (48 +2). In the same vein — and perhaps less surprising, given the female composition of Factor 1 — the frequently heard indictment of feminist leaders for failing to pursue "sexual-predator"

allegations when a Democrat (as opposed to conservatives such as John Tower or Clarence Thomas) becomes the target was also strongly rejected (12 -5). A prominent sub-class of such sentiments of reservation with respect to grand (or grandiose) generalizing pertains to President Clinton himself. Whether the particular reservation attaches to claims regarding Clinton's history of marital infidelity (26 0), the seductive character of his charismatic appeal (20 -4), the alleged absence of moral authority from his repertoire of political resources (4 0), his ability to control his own sexual impulses (21 0), or to suggestions that his capacities to provide effective leadership had been diminished (3 -4), Factor 1 was so consistently "protective" of Mr. Clinton that, at times, its orientation toward the President's persona bordered on denial.

Last but not least, the sense of protectionism shown by Factor 1 toward Mr. Clinton was most certainly denied Miss Lewinsky. Notwithstanding her own prolonged silence, and sympathetic news treatment of her interrogation at the hands of Starr's lieutenants (not to mention Linda Tripp), Monica Lewinsky was portrayed by Factor 1 as anything but a sympathetic figure. On the contrary, to the suggestion that Miss Lewinsky is indeed a victim in all this, Factor 1 (along with every other factor, for that matter) issued a strong objection (42 -3). In fact, Monica was chastised for her role in the affair. Even at that stage of the scandal, it was clear that she made choices, including the decision to share details of her "affair" with others, (Linda Tripp included) and that despite the age gap between her and the President, she was old enough to bear responsibility for her behavior (14 +4, 32 +3).

Factor 2: Casting Aspersions of Conscience: Anti-Clinton Conservative Spin

The Q sorts of eleven individuals, eight of whom are females, define Factor 2. Seven are Republican respondents; three are Democrats, and one is an Independent. Only two of these eleven voiced approval of Clinton's performance as president at the time of the study, six disapproved, and two were uncertain on this score. Despite stark contrasts in the overall meaning ascribed to the unfolding events by Factors 1 and 2, there were two issues on which they shared sentiments. In the first place, both took strong exception to Hillary Clinton's suggestion that the whole episode was concocted by a rightwing conspiracy, in cahoots with the press, which was out to get the President. Statement 9 received a -5 in the factor arrays of both 1 and 2. On the second issue, Factor 2 echoed Factor 1's warning about the need to exercise patience and restraint while resisting the urge to jump to premature conclusions until all the facts were in. Both factors give item 47 a +5 ranking.

In other respects, the story from Factor 2's point of view is sharply at odds from that of Factor 1. On the one hand, Factor 2 was disturbed by the "strange silence of feminists" (12 +4) in the face of evidence that Clinton may have been guilty of sexual harassment and, on the other, by suggestions that concern over the President's personal, marital and moral shortcomings — whether

involving consensual sex or not — was nothing more than a misplaced and childish outburst of puritanical outrage (10 -5). For Factor 2, the matter at hand was not simply a personal or private question that pertained to consensual, albeit extramarital, sexual relations. Hence it rejected suggestions to the effect that if what Bill Clinton does sexually is okay by Mrs. Clinton, then such conduct should be of no concern to a special prosecutor (15 -4). Where Factor 1 was in favor of Congress revisiting the independent counsel statute, this proposal was rejected (22 -3) by Factor 2. Furthermore, along with the appeal for evenhandedness and open-mindedness cited above, Factor 2 was unwilling at this juncture to rule out anything — including even the possibility of the president's impeachment (19 -4). In this light, it should come as no surprise that Factor 2, unlike Factor 1, was in no way reluctant to draw parallels between Clinton's conduct in the Lewinsky scandal and Nixon's conduct in Watergate (48 -5).

For persons on Factor 2, the President himself was the central character — and, in turn, it was Mr. Clinton's character (or the lack thereof) that became the central issue — in the Lewinsky story. While Factor 2 believed that “moral authority had never been the key to Clinton's political strength” (4 +4), it nonetheless viewed the allegations about Mr. Clinton's sexual relationship with Lewinsky as both accurate and disturbing. On the one hand, such conduct speaks volumes about Mr. Clinton's seeming incapacity to control himself: “Questions of morals aside,” as statement 21 reads, “you really have to wonder about Bill Clinton's judgment. For the most powerful person in the world, he seems such a slave to his libido” (+5). As problematic as such recklessness may be, Factor 2 found the more ominous threat to the integrity of the political order in Mr. Clinton's deceitfulness. “We survived Watergate, and we can survive yet another Clinton probe. But what we can't survive is a president who turns lying into a way of life” (41 +5). At its core, then, the Lewinsky scandal from the standpoint of Factor 2 was indeed the story of the presidency in crisis: as such, it is a personal story of failed leadership, to be sure. More importantly, it is as much the story of a crisis in conscience as it is of a crisis in confidence.

Factor 3: It's Just About Sex (and a Cast of Unsavory Characters); Leave Clinton Alone

Despite the fact that Factor 3 has only a scant correlation ($r = 0.23$) with Factor 1, there are some striking affinities in the two perspectives on the scandal. For starters, the demographic composition of the two sets of subscribers was remarkably similar. Factor 3 was defined by the Q sorts of six individuals, five of whom were females and five of whom were self-identified liberals (the other called herself a moderate). Furthermore, all residents of Factor 3 approved of the way Clinton was handling his job as president (as

was the case for proponents of Factor 1). Finally, like Factor 1, Factor 3 was principally composed of Democratic partisans (one defining variate was Independent, one was Republican).

At the same time, Factor 3 differed from Factor 1 in certain critical regards as well. For one thing, Factor 3 seemed pretty much to have made up its mind on the nature of the whole episode, and exhibited the least curiosity of any of the factors on the many questions still awaiting resolution (47 -4). In essence, the entire affair could be considered a sex scandal and, from the standpoint of Factor 3, the Clinton/Lewinsky case was simply the most recent incident from a long history of such escapades involving American presidents (1 +3). Accordingly, if Mrs. Clinton can live with her husband's indiscretions, then surely the Republic can survive intact without hyping the matter into a specious threat to the constitutional order based on the antics of an overzealous, largely unchecked special prosecutor (15 +5, 11 +3). What was curious to Factor 3 was the extent to which the whole affair instigated such acrimony and contention (27 +5). At one level, Factor 3's rather mundane view of events led it to reject comparisons with Watergate (48 -5), dismiss proposals that Hillary should leave Bill at the end of his term (35 -5), and treat even the mere mention of impeachment (19 +4) as just so much hyperbole.

At another level, however, Factor 3 may well have been guilty of the same kind of hyperbole. Below the surface of its humdrum rendition of this story as merely another in a long list of presidential sex scandals, we find an almost obsessive fixation on the personalities of key characters in the spectacle. And it is here that we see what is perhaps the most critical divergence between the stories told of this spectacle by Factors 1 and 3 respectively. To the latter, the Lewinsky case was not simply just another (unremarkable) story of a sexual indiscretion by an American president, though that was what the story *should have been*. What it *had become*, though, was a sordid tale — *not* of a president's recklessness and/or deceit, but of a trio of villains so given to vice and viciousness that Clinton ended up as a victim of their self-serving yet thoughtless scheming. First in the trio was Monica Lewinsky herself, who was seen as anything but sympathetic (42 -5) and definitely old (and experienced) enough to bear a huge share of the responsibility for the entire mess (14 +5). Close behind Miss Lewinsky as a blameworthy accomplice in this affair was Linda Tripp, whose actions in bringing the Lewinsky/Clinton connection to light were equally inexcusable (24 +4), and who was therefore deserving of the pervasive public contempt for her conduct that followed revelations of her role in the scandal (30 -4). And then there was Ken Starr, "a special prosecutor run amok!" (11 +4) — yet another villain with hardly a redeeming quality. Starr was seen as a man so consumed with finding something, anything, with which to bring down the Clinton presidency, that all sense of proportion and

judgment were traded for Linda Tripp's tapes of Monica's distraught confessions (23 +3).

Finally, there was a hint in Factor 3 of the same kind of "protective" reaction vis-à-vis Clinton that was evident in Factor 1. Clinton's reputation as a man with a past (as a womanizer, at least in his younger years) was simply denied (46 -4, 26 0), as was the claim that the President may well suffer from an inability to control his sexual appetites (21 -2). Unlike Factor 1, however, Factor 3 at least acknowledged the possibility that Mr. Clinton's brand of charisma exudes a certain seductive, even sexualized, undercurrent (20 +1). Still, the most prominent feature of Factor 3 was its juxtaposition of two — in some ways antithetical — story lines at the heart of its account. One saw the Lewinsky scandal as a rather mundane "sex-behind-closed-doors" story. The other, dismayed at the dimensions the story has taken on as a feeding frenzy, was a story of unsavory characters whose villainy and broad arc of destructiveness in this case extended less from calculated treachery, or even malice, than from simple (albeit severe) defects of character.

Factor 4: "This is a Fine Mess, Mr. President."

The fourth factor was defined by the Q sorts of four liberal Democrats, two males and two females. Despite their partisan and ideological affinities, individuals comprising this factor displayed notable ambivalence toward their Democratic president. Only one of the four approved of the manner in which Mr. Clinton was handling his job as president; the other three indicated that they were unsure on this score. This sense of ambivalence toward Bill Clinton loomed very large in Factor 4's broader construction of the Lewinsky scandal.

Like Factor 1, Factor 4 worried about the possible effects of anti-Clinton political momentum generated by the scandal. Hence it warned against jumping to premature conclusions for fear that political pressures — particularly in the form of calls for Clinton's resignation — would build and possibly outrun events before a full accounting of the actual facts in the case could take place (17 +5, 47 +4). Unlike Factor 1, however, Factor 4 was visibly disturbed by the allegations regarding the President's apparent recklessness vis-à-vis Miss Lewinsky. While upset about Clinton's complete lack of judgment and incapacity to control his libidinal impulses (21 +5), the disturbance felt by Factor 4 was not borne of the wounded rectitude evident in Factor 2. Rather it was based on a sense that in the contemporary context of American politics, the personal is indeed political and, that being the case, Clinton will surely pay for his sins politically (quite apart from the personal-moral dimensions of whatever transgressions he was guilty of). "The real tragedy here," as item 33 reads, "is that Bill Clinton was sitting in the best political position of his presidency. Now, instead of building a legacy, the very future of his presidency is in doubt" (+5).

With an eye on the political costs of the unfolding spectacle, individuals loaded on Factor 4 were angry with Clinton. The nature of these sentiments can be gleaned from the comments made by Respondent 5, a fifty-year-old college professor, in the post-sorting interviews. "What a dope Clinton is! Yes, the entire affair is a fascinating spectacle; but it's laced with irony and tragedy. For a man who'd invested his whole being and virtually his entire adult life in becoming president, to risk it all for an ill advised fling with an intern young enough to be his daughter — I'm sorry, but this is the epitome of self-destructiveness. Of course I'm disappointed; of course, I'm angry. How could anyone feel otherwise?" Again, these are the words not of a conservative Republican, but a liberal Democrat; and while the scores of public-opinion surveys completed over the course of this episode gave scarce indication that Democrats might in fact have harbored such sentiments, this may well say less about the nature of reactions to the events than about the blunt nature of polls as instruments for calibrating complex subjectivity.

That complexity — and the ambivalence that in part gave rise to it — was well captured, however, in the story found in the remainder of Factor 4's factor array. While, on the one hand, the factor conceded that moral authority had never been among Clinton's political assets (4 +3), it nonetheless observed that Americans sincerely wanted to believe (and be able to trust) their president (37 +1). A similar duality was displayed in the juxtaposition, first, of an awareness that Mr. Clinton had a checkered past and therefore ought not be judged for having failed to measure up as a moral paragon (46 +3, 26 +2) with, second, the lamentation found in statement 39: "We are struggling to figure out how to deal with a president who disappoints us on a personal level, but generally takes care of us on a public one" (+3). The same tension is evident yet again in Factor 4's simultaneous rejection of two propositions which on the surface might seem contradictory: (1) that our puritanical culture forces politicians to lie about their personal shortcomings because the standards they are expected to meet are unrealistically perfectionist (29 -3); and (2) that it will prove difficult to survive Clinton's penchant for distorting the truth (41 -4). Ambivalence is not inconsistency, though some analysts (e.g., Cohen and Hamman 2000) seem to have confused the two in referring to survey respondents approving of Mr. Clinton's performance while registering disfavor with his character as "inconsistent" in their appraisals. For Factor 4, ambivalence was hardly inconsistent; rather it was the only sensible attitude available given the President's role in contributing to his own perilous political predicament. And the gravity of that predicament was such that, one month into the Lewinsky spectacle, it was impossible to rule out a "Watergate scenario" (48 -3), including impeachment (19 -2), from among the ranks of potential endings to the story.

Two other features of Factor 4 deserve comment. First, inasmuch as this account found Clinton himself more culpable for the state of affairs in late February 1998 — that is, in relation to Factors 1 and 3, which were also anchored by Democratic partisans — the “guilt” assigned to Monica Lewinsky in the scandal is correspondingly lessened. Across a host of statements either indicting or expressing sympathy for Miss Lewinsky, Factor 4 was found at the bottom with respect to the former and at the high end in terms of the latter (18 -2, 32 0, 14 0, 8 +1, 42 -3). Finally, Factor 4 exceeded its counterparts in its concern over the scandal’s human toll on Mrs. Clinton and Chelsea (44 +3). In fact, Factor 4 stood as the only account among the first-wave factors *not* to reject the suggestion that Hillary should leave her husband at the conclusion of his second term (35 0).

Factor 5: Tuned Out and Turned Off: The Deliberately Disengaged

The purely loaded Q sorts of six individuals defined the fifth factor (three men and three women). While their ideological self-identifications ranged from liberal to conservative, strong partisan affiliations were conspicuous only by their absence. All six located themselves near the center of the partisan continuum (there were two each of weak Republicans, weak Democrats and pure Independents). All six report not having paid much attention to the news coverage of the Lewinsky story. While two of the six approved of Clinton’s job performance, the remaining four expressed uncertainty on that question.

Factor 5 concurred with Factor 4 in one respect: It is both ironic and tragic that Clinton’s presidency should find itself in such peril when events otherwise were lining up so favorably for the White House (33 +5). While it might truly be none of our business what Clinton did with whom within the privacy of his own sex life, it was unfortunately the case that public (and press) preoccupation with the private life of the President was “wrecking his ability to do his job” (3 +4). Interestingly, Factor 5 showed scant inclination to place the blame for this state of affairs squarely on either the President or the press (16 -1). This did not let Clinton completely off the hook, for his actions most certainly constituted a lapse in judgment (21 +3), yet it was not as if people could claim innocence with respect to Clinton’s prior indiscretions (26 +2). And given our knowledge of earlier presidents’ problems with marital fidelity, Clinton’s actions ought not be magnified beyond all sense of proportion. Even if worst-case allegations eventually gain credible corroboration, Factor 5 felt that they would hardly qualify as impeachable offenses (19 +2) or, for that matter, even as symptoms of some deeper-lying personality disorder on the President’s part (40 -5).

Of all the accounts brought to light by this phase of our research, Factor 5 was clearly the most “put off” by the scandal. It was the only one of all six first wave factors that expressed no curiosity about how the whole episode would eventually end (47 0); and the only one willing to confess having

absolutely no interest in arming itself with as-yet-unknown facts before arriving at an opinion on the matter (17 0). While from this point of view others seemed compelled to reach and share opinions on the scandal without bothering to anchor them in facts (27 +3), Factor 5 found little of interest in the entire spectacle. In one major respect, the cranky feelings at issue here were well captured by Factor 5's strong agreement with statement 13: "If they interrupt any of the NCAA basketball tournament for news reports on Monica, Bill, and Starr, all hell will break loose" (+5). Notwithstanding Factor 5's best efforts to remain "deliberately disengaged" from the Lewinsky affair, it nonetheless coalesced around a distinctive construction of the story — one that was short on heroes and long on villains. As noted earlier, members of the press and the media more generally were pretty much given a pass in this account. In their place, Factor 5 assigned principal guilt for the entire spectacle to two sources: (1) Monica Lewinsky and (2) American culture, specifically that portion of it based on a vestige of our puritanical heritage. With respect to the former, Factor 5 was far more merciless in its view of Miss Lewinsky's role and responsibility in unleashing the chain of events that grew to bear her name than any of the other accounts (14 +4, 32 +5, 42 -4). The persistence of Puritanism, which Factor 5 saw as "dictating" Clinton's denials and deceit regarding his relationship with the young White House intern, was believed to be at the root of the public obsession with the story (25 +4, 29 +3). Unfortunately, unless and until such childish and archaic pretenses are purged from the larger culture, the demand for such stories will be there in the form of large audiences ready, willing, and able to consume "news" of naughty goings-on in the private lives of public figures (10 +1).

Factor 6: Moralistic Ambivalence — Straddling the Private vs. Public Divide
 The Q sorts of five individuals defined the final first wave factor. The four males and one female who provided these sorts represented a mix of liberals and conservatives; two were Democrats, two identified themselves as Independents, and one was a Republican. As was the case with the previous factor, the proponents of Factor 6 showed scant interest in keeping abreast of developments in the month-old Lewinsky affair. With only one exception (a liberal Democratic male), these respondents reported having paid very little attention to the matter. The exception here was also the only member of the group to disapprove of Clinton's handling of his job; three of the others registered approval, while one was undecided.

At first blush, Factor 6 appears to have gone to great lengths to "inoculate" itself against unflattering revelations regarding the President's personal behavior. This was at least suggested by the factor's placement of three statements in particular. First, the highest score of any statement in the entire factor was given to item 4: "Moral authority has never been the key to Clinton's political strength" (+5). Second, the factor strongly agreed with the

proposition that people were not shocked at the initial revelations regarding Clinton and Lewinsky because the President was understood to have had "a weakness for women" as early as the 1992 campaign (26 +4). Third, and perhaps most to the point, five years of listening to Jay Leno lampoon Mr. Clinton for his reputed hormonal excesses ironically served to diminish (or should have) the impact of the initial reports involving the young intern (46 +2). Despite its appreciation that Clinton's past marked him as a man who "could not withstand a moral frisk," Factor 6 found it difficult to reconcile itself to the morally reprehensible nature of Clinton's alleged misconduct involving Miss Lewinsky.

Like Factor 4, these individuals admitted to "struggling to figure out how to deal with a president who disappoints us on a personal level..." (39 +3). In contrast to Factor 4, however, the sting of disappointment felt by Factor 6 turned less on pragmatic concerns growing out of the scandal's effects on Clinton's ability to govern than on matters of rectitude. As seen by Factor 6, the President's moral shortcomings in relation to Monica Lewinsky were as relevant to his public role as they were abhorrent and inexcusable. Thus the real tragedy in the story was not the fact that without Lewinsky, Clinton would have been sitting in the best political position of his entire presidency. To the contrary, this conclusion was sharply rebuked (33 -4). Factor 6 was keenly aware that many Americans, by this point in time, had already come to compartmentalize their personal misgivings with Clinton's character from their approval of his public performance (2 +5). For its part, however, the boundary between one's private conduct, on the one hand, and public leadership, on the other, is not so easily or clearly drawn. From the standpoint of Factor 6, the Lewinsky case demonstrated all too clearly the tragic outcome that results when considerations of private-personal morality are consigned to ethical categories completely removed from the public realm. At a minimum, this segregation results in a substantial (and unseemly) measure of public hypocrisy: While members of the public complain about the sordid news coverage, vast quantities of the very same people routinely tune into that coverage in record numbers (25 +5).

Yet the indictment here differed from that of other factors insofar as the charges of hypocrisy were concerned. Factor 6 was *not* blaming audiences for betraying their professed disgust with the inappropriately personal nature of the media focus. It was not the "tuning in" in record numbers that was hypocritical, it was the preliminary protestation that it's all about private matters that should remain private" which was so bothersome. It was primarily Factor 6's challenge to the false dichotomy of private vs. public realms of morality that illuminated the coherence of its particular construction of the Lewinsky case. It is in this light, for example, that sense can be made of the factor's resounding rejection (-5) of statement 15: "If whatever Bill Clinton

does sexually is okay with Hillary, why should it be a worry of Ken Starr or the American public?" Finally, it bears emphasis that Factor 6 was *not* thereby embracing a totalitarian erasure of any and all boundaries between the public and private realms of conduct and morality. It offered no grand apologia for Ken Starr acting as Big Brother in some sort of sexual inquisition. From its point of view, American society — or at least a prominent segment of that society — was as much to blame as Mr. Clinton or Miss Lewinsky individually. Its indictment here was, again, not that of previous factors, particularly those upset with the perseverance of Puritan values in our culture (29 -4). "Such is the trap of our sex-obsessed society," as Statement 38 reads, "where sexual charm is money in the bank for anyone seeking attention — be it Pamela Lee or Bill Clinton.¹ When we buy into it, we get what we deserve" (+4). For its part, Factor 6 finds Mr. Clinton paying the price for having fallen into that trap. Yet it is worth recalling that only one loader on Factor 6, at this point at least, had concluded that Clinton's fall had fatally compromised his performance as president. But these are essentially first impressions of an unfolding scandal, many aspects of which remained mysterious or, at the least, ambiguous. It is therefore of some considerable interest how, and to what extent, these initial accounts "evolve" in response to incessant media attention to the case over the next several months.

Second Wave Factors and their Interpretation

In late April and early May 1998, after the Clinton/Lewinsky story dominated national news for more than four months, and approximately two months following the first wave of data collection, a second group of respondents used the same Q sample to model views on the matter. While Miss Lewinsky was yet to testify and President Clinton was standing by his earlier denials of "sexual relations" with the young intern, the most prominent piece of news to be added in the interim was the dismissal by Judge Wright of the Paula Jones suit against President Clinton. Sixty-two persons were given the Q set by students in a seminar in political science at Valparaiso University. Data summarizing the relevant demographics and background characteristics are presented in Appendix C for these participants, along with the rotated factor matrix for the second wave analysis. A centroid factor analysis with judgmental rotations produced a four-factor solution, and factor scores were computed for each factor. (Factor scores for statements both the Wave I and II analyses can be found in the Appendices.) Before turning to the interpretations for each of these second-wave factors, a brief digression is in order to provide a preliminary comparison of our two sets of results.

To facilitate comparison of the results from the early and later installments of this research, composite Q sorts based on the six Wave I factors and four

¹ Pamela Lee is a particularly curvaceous character on a popular U.S. television program.

Wave II factors were subjected to a second-order factor analysis. After correlating the factor scores for all ten factors, the correlation matrix was factor analyzed using the centroid method and judgmental rotation. Rather than ten distinct accounts, the results demonstrate only five (or possibly six) underlying the 116 separate Q sorts in the two studies. Working backward in the following table, we see that both Factors 6 and 4 from Wave I manifest unique perspectives and load on factors all by themselves. In other words, there were no similar constructions of the Clinton/Lewinsky scandal to emerge in Wave II. By the same token, Factors C and D from the second wave embrace a perspective on the spectacle not found in the initial investigation; C because it is split on second-order Factors I and III, and D because it is the only perspective that is loaded exclusively on second-order Factor III.

Second-order Factor Analysis

Factor	Second-Order Factors				
	I	II	III	IV	V
1	47	23	10	16	07
2	-02	85	10	26	23
3	80	-17	16	11	07
4	11	11	-03	58	11
5	30	01	-05	15	01
6	13	27	-06	17	77
A	-03	83	08	14	22
B	70	04	-08	-14	14
C	39	01	38	-14	01
D	18	10	42	18	00

At the same time, it is clear that some of these perspectives are not unique. For example, Factor 2 from Wave I is virtually identical to Factor A from two months later as they load 85 and 83 respectively on the same second-order Factor II. Likewise, Factor 3 at t_1 and Factor B at t_2 are also quite similar as evidenced by their high loadings on second-order Factor I. It also is interesting to note that Factor 1, Factor 3, and at least part of Factor C are loaded significantly on second-order Factor I. From this perspective, it appears that these "three" takes on the Clinton/Lewinsky scandal are variations on a common theme, as are Factor 2 and Factor A, which both define Factor II.

Factor A: Factor 2 Revisited — Conservatives and Matters of Conscience

As indicated in Appendix C, the Q sorts of twenty-eight persons have statistically significant loadings on Factor A; twenty-two of these have pure loadings, while the other six load on other factors as well. Focusing only on

those with pure loadings, this group included sixteen Republicans, two Democrats, and four Independents. There were eighteen conservatives, two liberals, and two others. Sixteen did not approve of Clinton's performance in office, three approved, and three were not sure. Fourteen were males; eight were females.

Factor A is virtually identical to Factor 2 in the first wave study, as indicated by a correlation of 0.82 and by virtually identical factor loadings on second-order Factor II. Given such substantial similarity, there is scarcely any need to amplify on this account over and above what has been said already about Factor 2. To reiterate the major themes, the entire affair was viewed as a deadly serious matter (15 -5, 28 -4, 48 -4), so much so that we should be morally outraged by the circumstances implicating Mr. Clinton (10 -5). Moreover, the charges were serious enough to warrant possible impeachment, if borne out (19 -3). The sad state of affairs witnessed here had nothing to do with the machinations of some vast rightwing conspiracy (19 -5). It was rather a story about William Clinton's flawed character (4 + 5, 21 +4) and its effect on the presidency (14 +5). Factor A also makes it perfectly clear that Monica Lewinsky was not simply a victim in this matter, but shared some of the responsibility (32 +3). Furthermore, persons having this perspective were disturbed by others who did not share their moral outrage and who were too willing to excuse such indiscretions simply because other presidents are known to have done similar things (5 +4). In the end, said these onlookers, the President should make a public confession and seek counseling (40 +3). Thus for Factor A the Lewinsky story raised serious questions about morality and character. President Clinton was guilty of immoral behavior and, in all probability, criminal activity. Given the gravity of Clinton's actions, impeachment was by no means to be dismissed as inappropriate and unwarranted.

Factor B: Guilty but Persecuted

This factor bears a substantial resemblance to Factor 3 in the first wave study. As indicated in Appendix C, both Factor 3 and this factor have high loadings on second-order Factor I (80 and 70, respectively). The simple bivariate correlation (r) between the two is 0.56. They also were similar in terms of the background characteristics of the persons who made up the factors. As indicated in Appendix C, fifteen participants provided Q sorts which loaded significantly on this bipolar factor, twelve positively and three negatively. Five of the positive loaders were Democrats, three were Republicans, and four expressed no party affiliation or identify with some other party. Five of these individuals were self-identified liberals, six were conservatives, and one was a moderate. Eight of the twelve approved of Clinton's job performance, whereas two disapproved and two were unsure. Comprised of five males and seven females, this group represented a relatively diverse partisan and ideological

mix, which was nonetheless generally inclined to support the President. At the opposite end of the factor, we find three conservative, Republican males who disapproved of Clinton's performance.

Factor B conceded that "moral authority has never been" one of Clinton's strengths (4 +1) and that he was not without guilt in this matter (32 +2). At the same time, the primary focus of attention and responsibility for the entire episode was shifted away from the President. Adopting a "realistic" frame, Factor B acknowledged that, even if he was guilty as charged, Clinton was not the first president in American history to have indulged in extra-marital sex while in office. Indeed, "affairs" such as these have been going on for generations (1+5). What had changed was not the behavior of politicians, but the media's willingness to report on these matters and the pervasive sense of public cynicism this had fostered (16 +4). Like Factor 3, Factor B's charitable view toward the President's role was not extended to the other principals in the case. Monica Lewinsky herself was anything but a victim: she was definitely old enough to know what she was doing, and she was certainly irresponsible to "blab" about it (14 +5). Further still, Factor B found in Monica's decision to keep the infamous, unwashed (semen-stained) blue dress a sufficient basis for raising serious questions about her mental health (18 +5). In the same vein, the special prosecutor had been given too much power (22 +4); and, indeed, "Starr is a special prosecutor run amok" (11 +3). As in the case of Monica, Starr's sanity was questioned; "who in his right mind would subpoena a mother to testify against her daughter in matters like this?" (11 +3). Equally pointed questions were raised about Linda Tripp's behavior: "What kind of person would tape record the private conversations of a so called 'friend' without their awareness? With friends like Tripp, who needs enemies?" (24 +3).

Worth noting here is the fact that Factor 1 from Wave I — "Let's All Just Take a Deep Breath" — was *not duplicated* in the Wave II factors. However, that factor loaded on the same second-order factor on which we find both Factor 3 and Factor B (albeit at a much lower level of magnitude), suggesting perhaps that those initially inclined to withhold judgment on the case, in the spirit of Factor 1, had by early May of 1998 more or less run out of patience in preserving an open mind. While the absence of t_2 Q sorts by t_1 participants makes it impossible to say for sure, it would appear that, four months into the scandal, Factor B was the likely destination of persons embracing Factor 1 when the Lewinsky story first broke. What is less conjectural in any case is the *muted and mitigated nature of Clinton's guilt* in the story line of Factors 3 and B. While Clinton himself must share in some of the blame, the full measure of his culpability was diminished on two accounts. In the first place this occurred by acknowledging that adulterous affairs are a common fact of (presidential) life. In the second instance, Clinton benefited by reference to the "crazy" cast of accomplices, whose own widely reported misdeeds and discernable defects

of character made the President look both victimized and virtuous by comparison. To be sure, the prominence of the unsavory trio of Starr, Tripp, and Lewinsky did not go unnoticed as onlookers were forming their first impressions of the scandal. By four months into the spectacle, however, these three had in some respects already made the journey from bit-part players to caricatured stars in a black-comedic parody of a presidential scandal. And if this was the essence of Mr. Clinton's predicament, impeachment should have been the last thing on anyone's mind (19 +3).

Factor C: Caution and a Public vs. Private Distinction

Nine persons provided Q sorts with statistically significant loadings on Factor C. Six of these had pure loadings *only* on C while three had significant loadings on Factor A as well. Looking at the background characteristics of the group as a whole, we see that six of the nine were females; six were Democrats and three were Republicans; five labeled themselves as liberal, one as moderate, and three as conservative. Seven approved of Clinton's performance, one did not, and the other was not sure. While the factor generally favored the President, it was not comprised exclusively of liberal Democrats, but included conservative Republicans among its ranks as well. On the second-order factor analysis, this perspective was split on the first and the third factors, indicating that it shared elements of the Factor 1 and 3 perspectives from Wave I while falling far short of being a carbon copy of either. At the same time, it bore some (albeit modest) resemblance to Factor D as well.

Central to the story from the standpoint of Factor C was its amazement at "how quick people are to take sides on this issue before we know what the facts are" (27 +4). This was disconcerting to C because "(t)here are just too many unanswered questions right now. We need to fight the impulse to form an opinion without the facts. In time, we will have the information necessary to know what to think (17 +4).

Notwithstanding its own precautions about rushing to judgment before all the facts are in, Factor C appeared to already have a basic framework in place by which the facts would be appraised as they arrived. For Factor C this framework was found in its conviction that "the personal" and "the political" occupy existentially and morally distinct domains. Accordingly, ethics drawn around experience in the former should be kept separate from the kind of moral judgments framed by the latter. Thus, the idea that the president's personal life should be of concern to us after he has taken office was rejected (31 -3), as was the proposition that Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr had every right to launch an investigation into Clinton's sexual conduct regardless of whether such activities were consensual and/or posed no threat to his marriage (15 +5). And since other American presidents are known to have

slept around, the mere mention of impeachment as a punishment fitting the crime was, in effect, to criminalize private (and consensual) sexual activity and therefore beyond comprehension (19 +4, 1 +3). Presidential performance, in Factor C's view, pertained to public and official responsibilities, not what goes on between consenting adults behind closed doors with no relevance to the presidential job description. Accordingly, presidents should be evaluated on performance indicators such as the GDP, not by an inappropriate Victorian sexual standard that feigns "puritanical outrage" at news of the President's personal indiscretions (10 +3). To Factor C, a president who lies as a way of life was a much greater calamity than one who cheats on his wife (41 +3).

The real problem was not what Bill did with Monica or what he did or didn't do thereafter to conceal the nature of their relationship. Rather the real problem was that such matters were blown so dramatically out of proportion to become a political "feeding frenzy" of the first order and an invitation for Clinton's political enemies to exploit the affair as a means of bringing down his presidency. The real culprits in this version of the story, as with Factor 3 from Study I, were twofold: In the first place, there were Clinton's Congressional-Republican enemies, who essentially deputized the Independent Counsel to use all means at his disposal to bring down the Clinton White House. Thus Congress should not have reauthorized the Independent Counsel statute without introducing restraints on the power of the office to conduct unlimited "fishing expeditions" into an individual's personal and financial life-history (22 +5). Starr himself warranted special blame for pursuing such matters, seemingly unaffected by considerations of cost or by sheer human decency, well beyond the bounds of reason (11 +3). Last but not least, Factor C located part of the blame for the spectacle's persistence as an intractable feature on the nightly news to the remnants of Puritanism in American culture and on the immature expectation it breeds that our political leaders must never tell a lie under oath, no matter what the circumstance (29 +5).

In sum, residents of Factor C cautioned against making judgments without all the facts; nevertheless, they employed a ready-made framework centering on the clear distinction between the ethics of private life, on the one hand, and public life on the other. This distinction allowed them to conclude that this was about sex and not matters of constitutional or criminal magnitude. As such, it really had no business attracting the level of attention it had. And, more important, it had no business being raised to the plane of impeachable offenses. What was truly offensive was the thought that Americans would tolerate, perhaps even welcome, a special prosecutor such as Starr rummaging around in the personal lives of American citizens, our president included.

Factor D: Disgusted in the Heartland

Factor 4 is comprised of the significantly loaded Q sorts of nine respondents.

Eight of these were positive and one was negative. Focusing only on those with positive loadings, this was a group consisting of a plurality of conservative Democrats who approved of Clinton's performance in office. Specifically, four were Democrats, two were Republicans, and two others professed no partisan identification. Ideologically, three were conservative, two were liberal, and three considered themselves moderates. Only one disapproved of Clinton's handling of his job as president; one was undecided; all others approved. Three of these persons were female, one refused to answer, and the other five were males. The sole individual loaded significantly on the negative end was a female Democrat who supported the President and had an ideology other than liberal or conservative. Factor D was thus another hybrid group in demographic and background respects, though it had a vague conservative-Democratic cast.

Factor D conceded, though not fervently, that more information must be forthcoming before firm conclusions could be reached on the Clinton/Lewinsky controversy (27 +1, 17 +1). In one respect, however, persons with this viewpoint believed they already had enough information to draw at least one conclusion, namely that they had long since become disgusted by the whole mess (47 -5). As they viewed the list of characters and events that had surfaced in the four months since the story broke, they found nothing but grief. Topping Factor D's list of disappointments was Bill Clinton. Even his soiled reputation and constant lampooning by late night TV personalities did not cushion the blow of this event (46 -5). To be sure, the country survived Watergate and it would likely survive yet another Clinton probe. However, what this country cannot survive is a president who makes lying a way of life (41 +5). Regrettably, Clinton, in the eyes of Factor D, was such a president. Not only did this show Clinton to be untrustworthy; it also exposed his reckless side and his apparent incapacity to control his sexual appetites (35 +4). For his own good and for the good of the country, Clinton should have simply come clean, apologized, and attempted to put the whole sordid thing behind us (43 +4). And quite unlike any of the previously examined Factors, the deeply personal disappointment in Clinton's behavior led Factor D to view with favor the prospect of Hillary leaving her wayward husband as soon as his term was completed (35 +4).

Factor D's disgust over this whole affair was not confined to the President alone. Not too far down on its list of disreputable characters was Monica Lewinsky. Her youth notwithstanding, she was by no means a victim in this matter, but a willing (and culpable) accomplice at the very least. Indeed, Monica was doubly reprehensible: not only did she "succeed" in seducing the Commander-in-Chief, she could not resist "blabbing" about the affair to her friends, her mother, and to the infamous Linda Tripp (14 +4). For Factor D,

Monica's decision to keep in an unwashed state the semen-stained dress also raised serious questions about her sanity (18 +3). As this is a factor comprised mainly of conservative Democrats, the disfavor expressed toward the President and Miss Lewinsky cannot be ascribed to political motives. Indeed, there was an equal opportunity quality to the wrath of Factor D: not far from Clinton and Lewinsky in its lineup of characterological casualties was Ken Starr. Mr. Starr was given far too much power to investigate these matters (22 +3). Only after he had squandered millions of taxpayers' dollars on a fruitless search of Clinton's finances and transactions from twenty years past, did Starr stumble across yet another dubious character in Linda Tripp, who (on the advice of book publisher Lucianne Goldberg) contacted the Office of the independent counsel with news of her knowledge (and tape recordings) regarding Clinton's relationship with Lewinsky (23 +5). Like Factor C, D found Tripp's conduct in the scandal to be no less reprehensible than that of the other principals. What kind of person asked D, tapes the private conversations of friends without their awareness, let alone their permission? (24 +2) Tripp's behavior placed her squarely in the company of the tale's other repugnant characters. Together they offered up a veritable parade of humanity's least commendable qualities, which accounted for Factor D's overall disgust. The disgust ran so deep and extended so wide that D was unable to muster any sympathy whatsoever for either Hillary or Chelsea Clinton as victims in this story (44 -4).

While Factor D showed some affinities with Factor C in its dim view of Lewinsky, Tripp, and Starr, it is notably more perturbed by the President's personal foibles. For D, in contrast to C, there was no clear boundary to be drawn between the realm of ethics and morality in someone's private life as opposed to moral-ethical questions pertaining to public life (39 -3). Such distinctions, according to Factor D, have no place in the evaluation of political candidates, nor office holders (31 -4, 3 -4). We are, and should continue to be, concerned about what goes on "behind closed doors" in the lives of public officials (25 +5). Furthermore, oral sex is sex, and oral sex outside of marriage is adultery (5 -5) despite what Clinton or others might contend to the contrary.

Overall, then, Factor D was utterly disgusted with the whole turn of events, viewed them as serious matters and, at the very least, potentially damaging to our political institutions. The distinction between personal and private life was rejected along with the corollary that these comprise separate realms of ethical reasoning. What was crucial was that this was an account of the Lewinsky scandal that was held by individuals who still approved of the way Clinton was handling his job. And this is perhaps ironic in that it demonstrated that deep disturbance with Clinton's personal shortcomings did not prevent the same individuals from issuing a passing grade on presidential performance.

Discussion

From the day the presidential scandal bearing the name of Monica Lewinsky broke in January 1998 until February of the next year when the US Senate acquitted Bill Clinton on two articles of impeachment adopted by the House, scores of opinion polls were conducted to monitor the public pulse toward these events. While there can be little doubt about two messages in particular of those polls — namely, that large majorities of Americans were pleased by Clinton's overall performance in office, and they did not want to see him removed from office — in some respects the results were as puzzling as they were clear. In the midst of such unrelenting and unfavorable news coverage, why did so many Americans rally to the defense of their embattled president? In one sense, this question begs another: How did Americans come to construe the mosaic of events, issue, and individuals that came to define the scandal? What did the Lewinsky scandal mean to Americans even as they were telling pollsters that it provided no reasonable grounds for removing Mr. Clinton?

From surveys alone, we simply have no way of knowing what it was that members of the public *believed they were witnessing* when their opinions on Clinton's performance, veracity, favorability, immorality, or impeachability were solicited, in the context of the scandal, in an *ad seriatim* fashion. In consequence, efforts by analysts to "reconstruct" holistic narrative accounts of the spectacle from a series of discrete, dubiously connected survey responses inevitably fall short of compelling, while at the same time seeming to lend at least partial credence to any number of theories, be they antithetical or not. The net result, as our initial review of polling data revealed, is an impasse on the viability of two perspectives in particular regarding the scandal's paradoxical impact on President Clinton's approval ratings. One view (Zaller 1998) ascribes this bounce to the public's ostensibly ultimate concern with *bottom-line policy substance* — Clinton benefited from unprecedented prosperity and the promotion of popular, centrist policies — while the alternative stance (Owen 2000) holds that attitudes toward the spectacle were dramatically yet inadvertently shaped by "new media" framing the story as a *politically inconsequential sex scandal* rather than as an important issue of public trust and Constitutional integrity. Perhaps more than anything else, this impasse is a reminder that surveys are ill-suited to penetrate, let alone model, the public's schematic understanding of a multifaceted spectacle such as this. But if the public opinion poll is inadequate to this task, Q is wholly within its element in the interrogation of such matters. When supplied with a sample of naturalistic commentary on the case, our respondents are perfectly able to construct their own accounts of the "real story" signified by (and operating behind the scenes of) the media's unrelenting sound and fury over Bill Clinton, Monica Lewinsky, Ken Starr, and others. And following correlation and factor analysis of these individual Q sorts — in a manner that preserves

the self-reference and holistic integrity of the original responses — we are privy at last to the critical missing ingredient in survey efforts to probe the public's reaction to an ongoing presidential scandal, namely *operant models of the public's schematic understanding of that scandal*.

Based on the pair of Q studies reported above, we can now say with confidence that, for purposes of public opinion, the Lewinsky scandal was not in fact a singular entity at all, but rather a classic political — and therefore polytextual — complex spectacle. At the time of the first wave of data collection, one month after the story broke, we found six versions of the scandal: The first is embraced by liberal-Democratic females who are reticent to believe the worst about the President and willing to follow the First Lady's recommendations to patiently wait for the facts to emerge. A second story is convinced that Clinton is guilty, and that his misdeeds pose such a grave threat to the rule of law and the dignity of the office he holds that his resignation or impeachment may well be warranted. The third construction considered Clinton's alleged sexual indiscretions (along with any efforts to conceal them afterward) to be matters of a private, personal nature blown out of context by his political enemies. A fourth perspective, found among liberal Democrats irritated at the President's apparent recklessness, who are uncertain concerning the ultimate significance of the events but willing to withhold judgment until additional evidence is forthcoming. The fifth point of view is shared by individuals generally fed up with the scandal and the attention devoted to it by media; hence the whole affair is a matter they did their best to ignore. Finally, the sixth version of the story found the charges against Clinton to be credible, serious, and also morally offensive; yet adherents worried about the costs to our society and political system of a protracted feeding frenzy on the matter.

By mid-May 1998, when our second wave of data are collected, the last three versions from the initial installment of our research either vanish altogether or "morph" into less provisional and/or less ambivalent constructions. Factor A from Wave II is essentially a reprise of Factor 2 from Wave I. Its strong condemnation of Clinton coupled with its wish to see the President pay for any criminal misdeeds is also virtually identical to the first factor turned up by Rhoads and Brown (1999) from their study at the end of the impeachment ordeal. Factor B from Wave II ("Guilty but Persecuted") closely resembles Factor 3 and less closely Factor 1 from the first wave. It is also a virtual replica of the second factor discovered by Rhoads and Brown. The common message is that while Clinton is certainly not innocent, neither do his actions warrant anything like a huge inquisition, either by Ken Starr or the news media. Given the nature of improprieties involved, impeachment is a thoroughly disproportionate remedy. Factor C from the second wave incorporates elements of the stories found in both Factors 1 and 3 in the first wave and, once again, looms as a fairly faithful facsimile of another of the

Rhoads/Brown factors, in this case their Factor D derived exclusively from their Ohio respondents. While Factor C's precautionary gloss is not really to be found among the Ohio-based respondents in the Rhoads/Brown study, the two factors otherwise both cast aspersions on Clinton's enemies for hyping the scandal, insisting instead that issues of sexual morality/immorality should be kept distinct from any considerations of public ethics. Finally, Factor D from our research, while it may bear some kinship with the initial Factor 5 version of things, is again (barring one exception) in apparent harmony with the remaining factor found in the Rhoads/Brown study several months later. Dubbed "Disgusted in the Heartland," Factor D eschews the dualistic private vs. public ethics displayed by the preceding pair of factors. And while it condemns Clinton's actions rather than consigning them to a realm of privacy off limits to independent counsels and the like, it bears noting that this is a perspective shared by nine individuals, only one of whom registers disapproval of Clinton's overall job performance.

What could these people be thinking? Why, if Clinton's actions are so despicable, would persons on this factor stop short of endorsing his removal? The answer in this case seems to be a rather cynical one, and herein lies the point of difference with Rhoads and Brown's comparable factor, which they term "indignation-cynicism" based on its bipolar resonance to themes along this dichotomy. What makes the Indiana version (Factor D Wave II) quite distinct is that it combines cynicism and indignation in one and the same viewpoint, rather than at opposite ends of a bipolar factor. Yes, Factor D types are indignant at Clinton's misconduct. But their cynicism shows up in their suspicions that virtually all politicians are at least equally flawed — if not in kind, then surely in degree. As one member of the factor put it in her post-sorting interview, "I wouldn't given you a plug-nickel for the whole lot of 'em." Furthermore, this "equal opportunity" disgust was felt with a special animus, not only toward Bill Clinton for his role in the affair, but with evidently equal fervor toward Linda Tripp, Kenneth Starr, and Miss Lewinsky.

The strong resemblance between our Wave II constructions and the subsequent retrospectives discovered from a different place and time thus testify to the power of Q in turning up "reliable schematics" (Thomas and Baas 1992/3) in independent studies undertaken under the rubric of the same concourse. Consequently, we echo Professors Rhoads and Brown in drawing conclusions regarding the ultimate failure of Republican efforts to remove Clinton from office. As both sets of studies show, despite the best efforts of GOP leaders to frame the episode as a story of "high crimes and misdemeanors" on the part of the President, this is a take on the spectacle which simply falls on deaf ears outside the confines of its own camp. Furthermore, our findings dovetail nicely with those of our colleagues in drawing attention to the inadequacy of familiar categorical designations such

as Democrat vs. Republican in efforts to decipher the opinion dynamics at play in the so-called "Clinton Paradox." While it is true that, generally speaking, Democratic partisans were more likely to approve of Clinton's performance throughout 1998 than were loyal Republicans, the pattern of association between partisan affiliation and presidential approval is far from exact: Just as there are numerous self-identified Democrats who sharply disapprove of Clinton's handling of his job, there are many Republicans who approve. As indicated in Appendix Tables B and C, uniformity in partisan and/or ideological preference among the respective clusters of defining variates for our factors is more the exception than the rule. And, as Rhoads and Brown have noted, this helps explain why analysts drawing exclusively upon survey data were so confounded by results that cast doubt on the predictive power in this case of conventional categorizations of political sentiment.

What, finally, do our own findings suggest on the relative merits of Zaller's substantive "bottom-line model" of mass politics over and against Owen's ostensibly less sanguine "media politics" model? Considering the ubiquitous coverage of this story by all manner of communications media, we believe it would be inaccurate to conclude, as does Owen, that Americans were led to trivialize this whole matter because that's how media played the story. (By our reckoning, ample opportunities were made available by various media forums for spokespersons convinced that important principles were at stake in these events, and such perspectives were hardly given short shrift in "new media" programming on the subject.) At the same time, *regardless of their ultimate informational sources*, the stories of the Lewinsky spectacle that emerge triumphant (with only one exception perhaps) are thoroughly imbued with a "soap-operatic" cast. Indeed, whether we are referring to Wave II Factors 2, 3, or 4, this story is a veritable bounty of banality, the narrative essence of which turns on the odious archetypes brought to life in the characters of Lewinsky, Tripp, and Starr. If these varying versions of the story agree on little else, they are unanimous in their disgust at the actions and motives of these three principals. Each seen as utterly unsympathetic and reprehensible; and their conduct across the board deserves the strongest possible condemnation.

In our view, this shared animosity is remarkable not only by virtue of its depth and breadth, but by its very existence. After all, Monica Lewinsky was essentially a silent unknown to most Americans throughout the first several months of the case (save for a few excerpts from phone conversations taped by her erstwhile friend, Linda Tripp, and occasional commentary by her father and/or other acquaintances). And Ms. Tripp only stooped to the tactics of secretly recording Lewinsky's telephone messages when she had reason to fear that Clinton's lawyers were bent on discrediting her for any testimony she might give to Paula Jones's lawyers in connection with her knowledge of

Kathleen Willey's links to the President. Others finding themselves in the same predicament might typically have done the same thing. Prior to his appointment as Independent Counsel, Ken Starr was widely if not universally respected as an accomplished jurist, litigator, and legal scholar. In much of the public mind, however, Monica Lewinsky is ascribed an identity that is about as far from victimhood as imaginable. Indeed, Miss Lewinsky emerges from our accounts as stereotypic hybrid of Lolita and the Glenn Close character in the movie, "Fatal Attraction," an oversexed and unstable basket case hell bent on bedding the President at all costs. As for Ms. Tripp, it is difficult to conjure up a more compelling rendition of Cruella DeVil, the scheming icon of duplicity who is also played by Ms. Close in the non-animated version of *101 Dalmations*. And last but not least, there is the Director of the Office of Independent Counsel himself, Clinton's nemesis, Ken Starr — an adult incarnation of the smug, "goody-two-shoes" teacher's pet that inspired our disdain back in our earliest school days. Individually, each in his/her own way is a textbook caricature of clinical narcissism. Together, they comprise the perfect ensemble cast for a scandalous farce too incredible to have been scripted. And while their mere presence invites invidious comparisons of an odious sort (*e.g.*, who, all considered, is the biggest cad?), the character played by Bill Clinton in this modern-democratic melodrama is — in the end and against all odds — saved from the clutches of this unholy alliance. And the final and fitting irony in the story is that its ending is scripted by the audience who, in turn, writes itself into the hero's role. Whether reflecting bottom-line rationality or not, it is a climax to the drama that is as aggrandizing to its authors as it is exculpatory toward Mr. Clinton.

In the final analysis as to the victor in the Zaller/Owen debate — as well as the usefulness of reaching such a decision — it is important to return to the perspective of Murray Edelman (1988) who reminds us that "political understanding" resides not in designating one interpretation as "fact, truth, or scientific finding," but understanding begins when we become aware of "the range of meanings political phenomena present" (p. 123). From this viewpoint, the data presented here take us a step closer to an understanding of these events by presenting the variety and the range of public meanings attributed to unfolding political spectacle. Furthermore, the results demonstrate once again the utility of Q methodology as a tool in probing and making operant the subjective constructions of political spectacles.

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Appendix A: Statements and Factor Scores

No.	Statement	Factors									
		1	2	3	4	5	6	A	B	C	D
1	With over two centuries of presidential history behind us, sex scandals are hardly new.	0	1	3	1	0	3	4	5	3	-1
2	The juxtaposition of bad news in the media with good news (for Clinton) in the polls shows that the public is processing this scandal very differently from the way the press is.	2	1	2	2	-3	5	0	3	1	3
3	What Clinton does with whom in his sex life might be none of our business, but it's wrecking his ability to do his job.	-4	2	-3	-1	4	-3	3	-2	2	-4
4	Moral authority has never been the key to Clinton's political strength.	0	4	2	3	-4	5	5	1	1	2
5	Does extramarital oral sex constitute adultery? Apparently, Clinton does not think so. And he seems to have lots of others who agree with him on that.	-1	1	-2	-5	-3	-1	4	0	-2	-5
6	That Clinton's approval rating has soared to record heights of late suggests that Clinton's actions make people feel better about their own weakness and lack of moral strength.	-3	-3	1	4	-2	-1	-3	-4	-4	-2
7	All sides have apparently come to the conclusion that shaping public opinion is crucial to strengthening their hand in court.	0	0	1	2	3	3	2	-1	-3	-2
8	In an effort to make a juicy story even juicier, the press has become an unwitting accomplice of the White House by turning Monica Lewinsky into the girl who asked for it.	-2	-2	1	1	-2	0	-2	1	2	-2
9	Hillary Clinton is right. There is a right-wing conspiracy out to get the president alright. But it's in cahoots with the press.	-5	-5	0	-2	1	-4	-5	-1	-5	-2
10	Grow up, America! It is immature to judge politicians by other than public, quantifiable consequences, such as growth of the GDP. The puritanical outrage is simply childish.	-2	-5	1	-5	1	-3	-5	0	3	1

Appendix A: Statements and Factor Scores - continued

No.	Statement	Factors									
		1	2	3	4	5	6	A	B	C	D
11	Kenneth Starr is a special prosecutor run amok! Who in his right mind would subpoena a mother to testify against her daughter on matters such as this?	-1	-2	3	1	1	0	-3	3	2	-1
12	The strange silence of feminists on this whole episode is suspect at best. Were these allegations to surface against a conservative political leader, they would be calling for his head.	-5	4	-4	-2	-2	2	3	-5	3	2
13	If they interrupt any of the NCAA basketball tournament for news reports on Monica, Bill and Starr, all hell will break loose.	-4	0	3	-5	5	3	2	3	-2	-3
14	Monica was old enough at the time to bear some responsibility for entering into a relationship with the President. If the allegations are true, she was irresponsible to blab about it.	4	-1	5	0	4	1	1	5	1	4
15	If whatever Bill Clinton does sexually is okay with Hillary, why should it be a worry of Ken Starr or the American public?	5	-4	5	-1	-1	-5	-5	1	5	0
16	Twenty years ago the media wouldn't even touch a story like this. And there was much less cynicism toward public life and distrust of political leaders. The change since is not progress.	5	0	0	0	-1	-2	-2	4	0	0
17	There are just too many unanswered questions right now. We need to fight the impulse to form an opinion without the facts. In time, we will have the information necessary to know what to think.	4	3	4	4	0	1	0	0	4	1
18	Only a sick person would keep and not wash an article of clothing with semen on it!	2	3	2	-2	2	-1	2	5	0	3
19	Impeachment should be the last thing on anyone's mind. My God, JFK, FDR and many other presidents slept around on their wives and it didn't ruin the country or hamper their ability to govern.	-1	-4	4	-2	2	-1	-3	4	4	1

Appendix A: Statements and Factor Scores - continued

No.	Statement	Factors									
		1	2	3	4	5	6	A	B	C	D
20	This case calls attention to the seductive quality in Bill Clinton's style. His ability to connect with audiences and his charismatic appeal have always had a sexualized undercurrent.	-4	0	1	0	-5	1	-2	-1	-2	-2
21	Questions of morals aside, you really have to wonder about Bill Clinton's judgment. For the most powerful person in the world, he seems such a slave to his libido.	0	5	-3	5	3	1	4	-3	-4	3
22	Congress should take a hard look at the law creating the Office of the Independent Counsel. Never again should a prosecutor be given such broad powers without any checks and balances.	4	-3	0	1	-1	2	1	4	5	3
23	After more than three years and 32 million dollars, with nothing to show for his Whitewater efforts, Ken Starr was desperate and found a lucky star in Linda Tripp.	1	-2	3	-1	-2	-1	-1	1	0	5
24	What kind of person would tape record the private phone conversations of a so-called "friend" without their awareness? With friends like Linda Tripp, who needs enemies?	1	2	4	2	1	0	0	3	-1	2
25	While we whine about the news coverage, we tune in to stories on the scandal in record numbers. If we're honest, we'd have to confess: we are interested in what actually happened behind closed doors.	2	4	1	5	4	5	2	-5	2	5
26	People aren't shocked because they knew Bill Clinton had a weakness for women back in 1992. Now, if the allegations were about Al Gore — then people would be shocked.	0	0	0	2	2	4	1	-1	-2	0
27	What amazes me is how quick people are to take sides on this issue before we know what the facts are.	-1	1	5	1	3	2	0	2	4	1
28	This is a lot more interesting than stories about chemical or germ weapons or Asian financial markets. What's wrong with having a few chuckles at the all-too-human frailties of the President?	-5	-3	0	0	0	-3	-3	-4	-2	-2

Appendix A: Statements and Factor Scores - continued

No.	Statement	Factors									
		1	2	3	4	5	6	A	B	C	D
29	We forced Clinton to lie under oath in the Paula Jones case by our puritanical pretensions and expectations of our leaders. It's unrealistic to expect Clinton to be a saint.	-2	-4	0	-3	3	-4	-4	-2	-5	-1
30	Linda Tripp is getting a bum rap in all of this. She only tape-recorded the phone conversations with Lewinsky to protect herself. Clinton's lawyer had called her a liar.	-3	-2	-3	-4	-1	-5	-1	-5	-3	-1
31	A president's personal life is part of the Presidency, but it should come into play when we decide whom to vote for, not after they are already in office.	1	-1	2	-3	-1	-1	-4	-2	-3	-3
32	Although Clinton is probably guilty, Monica should not be seen as a victim. She was a willing participant; nobody forced her to do anything she didn't want to.	3	3	2	0	5	0	3	2	1	1
33	The tragedy here is that Bill Clinton was sitting in the best political condition of his presidency. Now, instead of building a legacy, the very future of his presidency is in doubt.	3	-2	-1	5	5	-4	0	-3	-5	0
34	It is ironic how this incident came to light when the movie "Wag the Dog" was released. It's like life imitating art rather than the other way around.	3	2	-2	-4	-3	0	-1	0	-1	-1
35	Hillary should leave Bill after his term ends.	-2	-1	-5	0	-5	-2	1	-3	-1	4
36	This is trial by news leak.	-1	-1	-1	1	0	2	-1	2	0	2
37	We want to believe our president; we want to trust him. Not to believe him opens up the possibility of impeachment or resignation. No one should want such a crisis for our democracy.	1	3	-1	2	-1	0	1	2	-5	0
38	Such is the trap of our sex-obsessed society, where sexual charm is money in bank for anyone seeking attention — be it Pamela or Bill Clinton. When we buy into, we get what we deserve.	-1	1	-2	-1	0	4	1	2	-2	-4

Appendix A: Statements and Factor Scores - continued

No.	Statement	Factors									
		1	2	3	4	5	6	A	B	C	D
39	We are struggling to figure out how to deal with a president who disappoints us on a personal level, but generally takes care of us on a public one.	1	0	-1	3	2	3	0	-1	1	-3
40	If the allegations are true, Mr. Clinton should confess in public, ask for our forgiveness, and undergo counseling. If he did it, he's obviously got a problem and he needs help.	0	2	-1	-1	-5	-2	3	-2	1	1
41	We survived Watergate, and we can survive yet another Clinton probe. But we can't survive is a president who turns lying into a way of life.	3	5	-2	-4	2	1	5	0	3	5
42	Poor Monica! Since she cannot speak for herself, the press has pretty much savaged her as a spoiled rich kid who has a thing for sex with married men.	-3	-3	-5	-3	-4	-3	-2	-4	-3	-1
43	Clinton can put an end to the media feeding frenzy by simply coming clean and telling the American people what did and did not happen. There's nothing to prevent him from telling the truth.	-2	2	-2	-1	-4	-5	2	-3	-1	4
44	Most of all, I feel sorry for Mrs. Clinton and for Chelsea.	2	1	-3	-2	-2	4	-1	1	-4	-4
45	The media's slant on all this has changed of late. Whereas they began by taking aim at Clinton, they are now basically "following the polls," portraying Starr as a Prosecutor out of control.	2	1	-3	-2	-2	4	-2	0	0	-3
46	Clinton's own checkered past and his soiled reputation have, ironically, cushioned the impact of this scandal. Had we not listened to Jay Leno lampoon him for five years, we might be upset.	-3	-1	-4	3	-3	2	-1	-2	-1	-5
47	I cannot wait to see how this all turns out. At present, we simply have no basis to make any firm predictions.	5	5	-4	4	0	1	5	-1	0	-5
48	The facile comparisons with Watergate are absurd. Nixon sought to use illegal means to discredit his political opposition and then cover it up. This is about far less consequential stuff.	2	-5	-5	-3	1	-2	-4	1	-1	0

Appendix B: Wave I Backgrounds and Factor Loadings

No.	Gender	Backgrounds*		Follow	Approve	Factors					
		Party	Ideology			1	2	3	4	5	6
20	F	SD	L	Close	Yes	.72	15	11	01	-03	00
34	F	SD	L	Close	Yes	.71	05	-03	03	00	-01
36	F	Ind	C	NVC	Yes	.54	29	03	27	17	16
26	F	WD	L	Close	Yes	.54	-08	09	06	07	08
18	F	SD	C	NVC	Yes	.54	01	37	22	12	-13
8	F	WD	WL	Close	Yes	.52	.22	00	10	05	33
47	F	VSR	VSC	Close	No	-.07	.74	-26	-06	-05	-05
43	M	R	C	Close	No	-.10	.73	-31	09	-07	11
42	F	WR	Mod	NVC	No	-.13	.65	-01	08	-23	05
3	M	WD	WL	Close	No	-.10	.60	-11	24	06	32
16	F	SD	L	NVC	NS	.27	.60	08	20	21	30
49	F	R	Mod	Close	Yes	.24	.59	-09	20	-15	-03
48	F	SR	SC	NVC	No	07	.59	19	00	00	24
14	F	D	L	Close	NS	30	.58	-31	27	20	-11
44	F	R	Mod	Close	Yes	32	.52	16	29	25	-08
41	M	R	C	Close	NS	33	.50	28	-07	-09	24
39	M	Other	WL	Close	No	36	.42	-.04	11	10	15
12	F	D	L	Close	Yes	18	-.14	.87	10	13	10
22	F	D	L	Close	Yes	10	-.07	.87	04	12	01
40	F	WR	WL	NVC	Yes	32	15	.56	08	31	-16

* D = Democrat, R = Republican, Ind = Independent, S = Strong, W = Weak, V = Very, L = Liberal, C = Conservative, M = Moderate, N = Not

Appendix B: Wave I Backgrounds and Factor Loadings - continued

No.	Gender	Backgrounds*				Factors					
		Party	Ideology	Follow	Approve	1	2	3	4	5	6
2	F	D	L	Very	Yes	-21	-14	55	-04	19	17
17	M	D	L	Close	Yes	33	-03	44	30	35	02
40	F	WR	WL	NVC	Yes	32	15	56	08	31	-16
2	F	D	L	Very	Yes	-21	-14	55	-04	19	17
17	M	D	L	Close	Yes	33	-03	44	30	35	02
46	F	Ind	L	NVC	NS	26	18	40	23	00	-34
1	M	D	L	NVC	NS	-04	10	-02	57	08	08
5	M	SD	SL	Very	NS	19	15	22	70	00	02
4	F	WD	L	NVC	NS	13	15	-12	55	-04	27
6	F	SD	L	Close	Yes	32	12	06	39	11	10
27	M	Ind	C	NVC	Yes	-02	-25	05	00	68	-01
25	M	WD	C	NVC	Yes	12	-17	12	-07	59	15
51	F	WR	L	NVC	NS	06	19	12	31	56	-06
45	M	WR	WC	NVC	NS	03	04	15	-10	48	05
50	F	Ind	Mod	NVC	NS	27	09	22	-14	44	-03
38	F	WD	C	NVC	NS	29	25	-21	29	39	-08
30	F	D	L	NVC	Yes	30	23	22	34	10	39
54	M	Ind	WC	NVC	NS	18	33	22	20	-09	46
21	M	SD	SL	Very	No	-07	35	-22	13	08	40
29	M	Ind	WC	NVC	Yes	01	25	-03	17	00	40

Appendix B: Wave I Backgrounds and Factor Loadings - continued

No.	Gender	Backgrounds*				Factors					
		Party	Ideology	Follow	Approve	1	2	3	4	5	6
31	M	WR	WC	NVC	Yes	01	15	13	04	04	55
7	M	SD	SL	Very	Yes	49	07	43	-03	02	11
23	M	WD	Mod	Close	Yes	46	34	40	-16	15	32
15	M	Ind	SL	Close	NS	46	43	51	-11	03	16
52	F	WD	Mod	NVC	NS	46	-14	41	11	00	-16
28	F	D	L	NVC	Yes	50	-10	17	17	44	14
19	M	VSD	L	Very	Yes	50	02	01	08	08	50
32	F	D	L	Close	No	-08	49	-36	46	04	28
33	M	R	C	Very	Yes	-11	39	-04	42	-10	-10
53	F	WD	WL	NVC	NS	-05	47	19	09	47	16
11	M	D	L	Close	Yes	11	-18	54	17	39	26
37	M	WR	Mod	Close	Yes	-12	-28	59	04	23	40
9	M	D	Mod	Close	Yes	26	06	32	-09	14	06
10	F	SD	SL	Close	Yes	32	-05	20	16	28	08
13	M	D	Mod	Close	Yes	08	03	-22	-35	09	-13
24	F	WD	L	Close	Yes	18	-06	18	05	13	38
35	M	WD	WL	NVC	Yes	36	-9	-6	-15	18	21

Appendix C: Wave II Backgrounds and Factor Loadings

No.	Gender	Backgrounds*				Factors			
		Party	Ideology	Follow	Approve	A	B	C	D
19	F	SR	SC	Close	No	78	09	05	14
5	M	SR	WC	Close	No	75	-09	13	-14
47	M	SR	C	Very6	No	72	-38	-08	-01
38	M	Other	WC	NVC	Yes	69	14	04	-13
54	F	SR	VSC	Close	No	69	07	-31	-12
28	M	SR	SC	Close	No	66	-28	-09	18
20	F	None	WC	NVC	No	65	-13	20	06
58	F	WR	SC	Close	No	63	23	00	19
11	M	None	WC	NVC	NS	60	18	-13	-19
35	M	SR	SC	NVC	No	60	-01	-04	41
43	M	SR	SC	Close	No	60	11	-04	-23
15	M	SR	SC	NVC	No	57	18	-06	05
29	M	VSR	SC	Very	No	56	-41	-01	05
48	M	WR	WL	Close	NS	56	06	23	-32
59	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	51	06	-08	05
2	F	VSR	VSC	Close	No	50	-13	-33	19
12	M	VWD	WC	Very	Yes	50	29	49	05
40	M	SR	SC	Close	No	49	04	-09	-19
10	F	WD	Other	Close	NS	48	-26	44	29
13	F	VWD	WC	Close	Yes	48	26	36	-02

* D = Democrat, R = Republican, Ind = Independent, S = Strong, W = Weak, V = Very, L = Liberal, C = Conservative, M = Moderate, N = Not

Appendix C: Wave II Backgrounds and Factor Loadings - continued

No.	Gender	Backgrounds*				Factors			
		Party	Ideology	Follow	Approve	A	B	C	D
24	F	VSR	VSC	Close	No	47	22	09	20
14	F	WR	WC	NVC	Yes	44	08	43	36
7	F	SD	SC	NVC	Yes	42	16	-29	13
42	M	WD	SC	NVC	Yes	40	-17	15	23
21	M	SR	SC	Close	No	40	-25	22	23
56	M	WR	VWL	NVC	No	39	10	11	19
62	F	None	WL	NVC	NS	38	37	09	17
18	M	SR	SC	Close	NS	37	19	28	15
55	M	SR	Other	NVC	Yes	37	-02	-04	00
39	F	SD	VSL	Close	NS	23	10	13	21
4	F	WD	SL	NVC	Yes	-09	75	12	41
1	F	SD	WCC	Close	Yes	09	75	13	15
17	F	SR	SC	NVC	Yes	05	67	26	-14
37	F	VSD	SC	Very	Yes	-15	59	24	46
3	F	SD	WL	NVC	Yes	-09	58	16	18
9	M	SD	SL	Close	Yes	08	58	11	34
46	M	SR	WC	Close	NS	16	55	02	-27
41	M	None	SL	NVC	Yes	-15	46	11	-10
61	F	None	WL	Close	Yes	27	41	31	-09
44	M	None	SC	NVC	NS	23	41	31	-33
27	M	SR	SC	NVC	No	16	40	11	11

Appendix C: Wave II Backgrounds and Factor Loadings - continued

No.	Gender	Backgrounds*				Factors			
		Party	Ideology	Follow	Approve	A	B	C	D
57	M	SR	SC	Close	No	21	-55	22	17
50	M	None	DK	NVC	Yes	-22	27	-21	-07
45	M	WD	SL	NVC	Yes	21	26	-12	04
30	F	WD	SL	NVC	Yes	-04	28	85	-02
34	M	WD	SL	Cclose	Yes	-12	32	81	01
32	F	VSD	SL	Very	Yes	-13	10	74	-07
33	F	WD	WL	NVC	Yes	-17	28	73	28
31	F	VSR	SC	Very	Yes	-11	18	72	02
6	M	SR	WL	Close	No	29	-09	39	-07
16	F	WD	SL	Close	Yes	02	07	33	04
52	M	Other	SL	NVC	Yes	-04	03	24	-08
8	M	WR	DK	NVC	Yes	-01	22	34	58
60	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	28	-06	02	51
36	M	VSD	SC	VC	Yes	-21	27	-37	45
22	F	None	DK	NVC	Yes	-24	39	-02	40
51	M	SD	SL	Close	Yes	18	-08	11	38
26	F	SD	Other	NVC	Yes	23	30	-12	-43
53	M	WD	DK	NVC	Yes	-22	02	04	31
49	M	VSR	Other	Very	No	-18	04	-10	01
25	M	VSR	VSC	Very	No	05	05	10	09
23	F	Other	DK	NVC	Yes	04	14	02	04