The Military Mind and American Public Philosophies: A Q-Methodology Approach

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Abstract: *This article examines the veracity of longstanding claims that military leaders develop a coherent public ideology that is, first, distinct from the mainstream of their parent society and, second, that this military belief system is predictably conservative in character. In the American case, these claims depict self-selected and socialized military leaders as sharing in a conservative "military mind" that remains isolated from the mainstream of the American liberal tradition. Using a combination of Q-methodology public values sorting exercises followed by semi-structured, in-depth interviews, these arguments are tested through an intensive examination of the public philosophies of forty-five mid-level and senior U.S. Army officers and forty-five civilian community and business leaders. The result was the organic construction of four primary public belief systems, labeled here as Triumphant Individualism, Communitarian Democracy, Traditionalism, and Neo-Traditionalism. When these belief systems are matched to the conventional military mind wisdom, however, the basic claims of distinction, coherence, and conservatism are not supported. In place of ideological solidarity, one finds a diversity of value orderings and descriptions that do not easily fit the typical military-civilian categories and often belie the military respondents' own self-identified political labels. These findings challenge existing shibboleths regarding the prospect of a "military mind," while questioning attendant claims regarding the capacity of military service to shape individuals' public values.*

> *The civilian liberal and the soldier, unfortunately, are eyeing different things: the civilian sociologists are concerned with men living together in peace and amiability and justice; the soldier's task is to teach them to suffer and fight, kill and die. Ironically, even in the twentieth century American society demands both of its citizenry.*
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> -T. R. Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War* (1963, xi)

> *West Point is a gray island in a many colored sea, a bit of Sparta in the midst of Babylon.*
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> -Samuel Huntington, *Soldier and the State* (1957, 465)

Sparta in Babylon: few historical pairings could seem more dissimilar. If the Greek city-state of Sparta is the quintessential symbol of order, martial values, tradition, and the power of homogenous collective will, the Biblical Babylon is its profligate, permissive, and discordant antithesis. For generations of observers of American civil-military relations, these conflicting images have also epitomized a supposed deep disparity between America's Spartan-like military leaders and the egalitarian, individualistic, and commercial tendencies of America's liberal political tradition (De Tocqueville, 1945, Vol. II; Huntington, 1957b; Vagts, 1959). This metaphor has resonated in an American imagination that has viewed the social and political views of American military officers as distinct from—or even alien to—those of the citizenry from which they originate. Some have applauded such a distinction. To sympathizers, American liberal ideals are the barbarians at the gate of a necessarily distinct military ideology of traditionalism, hierarchy, and order (Fehrenbach, 1963; Huntington, 1957b). Others have condemned this disconnection. To critics, it has become emblematic of a harmful separation—"a civil-military gap"—between the beliefs and values of a democratic citizenry and the professional soldiers in its employ (Burgos, 2004; Janowitz, 1960; Ricks, 1997). But are these inveterate arguments and their supporting images of a separate, distinct, and conservative military ideology valid? It is on this basic descriptive question that this article is focused. In particular, is there evidence of a shared public philosophical coherence among US Army officers strong enough to warrant the use of the oft used label, "military mind?"

Answering this question requires an appropriate set of methodological tools. Toward this task, available survey data has failed to address the complex, holistic, and interdependent nature of the ideological cleavages said to lie at the heart of this public philosophical phenomenon. As survey researchers have continued to try and piece together a host of dissociated questionnaire responses in order to posit something about the broader worldviews of the actors involved, the use of Q methodology as an approach for assessing the possibility of civil-military ideological division has gone unexplored. Unlike traditional R method approaches, which rely on a disparate set of survey responses, Q methodology offers the ability to directly assess and compare the actual units of analysis at issue: individuals' comprehensive perspectives. Call it a public philosophy, worldview, or ideology; at issue is the way in which the relevant individuals organize their values and beliefs in order to make sense of the world.

Accordingly, the public views of a stratified sample of 45 mid and senior level US Army officers and a comparable sample of 45 business and community leaders are modeled using Q methodology. To better understand the explanations and motivations behind the value priorities highlighted by Q methodology, 27 of the original 90 Q sort respondents were selected for follow-on interviews. Thus, one may recognize the procedural implications of such an approach. If, in the respondents' freedom to construct their own worldview through Q sorting and subsequent explanation, military members demonstrate a unique, coherent, and, to be sure, politically conservative perspective, we may say that there does, in fact, exist something like a common, conservative military mind perspective. Conversely, if the Q-methodology approach finds a plurality of military political perspectives, more-or-less indistinguishable from those of the civilian comparison group, then we may conclude that claims of conservative military ideological homogeneity are overstated.

As it will be demonstrated below, Q methodology reveals no distinct, homogeneous military worldview, conservative or otherwise. Despite an overwhelming proclivity among the military respondents to identify themselves as conservative, the military leaders examined here were not unlike their civilian counterparts in their underlying ideological disunity and discord. Belying an apparent broad conservative consensus among US Army officers is a much more complex underlying ideological diversity.

Methods and Sampling

Q-methodology's sorting technique asks a respondent to examine a set of statements and then arrange those statements in accordance with a forced normal distribution from those with which they agree the most to those with which they disagree most. This approach has the advantage of allowing the respondent to consider and then order each statement relative to the other statements in the set, rather than judging them independently, as is the case with traditional survey or R-method approaches (Brown, 1980; Stephenson, 1953). Obliging the respondent to make decisions between competing statements and values offers a self-referential rendering of the respondent's larger value priorities. This accomplishes two purposes. First, the researcher is not burdened with having to arrange separate answers into a holistic perspective that maintains fidelity to the respondent's original priorities. Thus, the researcher's ex-post imposition of structure on a list of unrelated survey answers is avoided (Brown, 1980, p. 3). Second, considering each statement relative to the other statements in the list requires the respondent to approach the field comprehensively. This comprehensive interaction with the research instrument allows the more holistic nature

of the respondent's world view to be revealed. In this way, Q sorting provides an organically constructed holistic account of the respondent's world view.

The statements the individuals were asked to sort were drawn from the relevant literature in the empirical study of political beliefs and ideas.††† This initial search yielded more than one hundred possible statements that captured the depth and breadth of political attitudes revealed in these studies. To make this list manageable, it was evaluated for its relevance to the beliefs and attitudes said to lie at the heart of the "military mind" and its divergence from the broad liberal tenets of American political culture.‡‡‡ This narrower field of concern marks the communication concourse or, what Steven Brown (1986, p. 58) termed, the "volume of discussion on any topic." This "topic" of military public philosophical isolation was, then, divided along the five dimensions or discourse elements (Brown, 1980; Dryzek & Berejikian, 1993; Seidel, 1985) indicated in the literature as facets of military conservatism: pessimistic regarding human nature, anti-individualistic, nationalistic and focused on physical power as the path to security, thoroughly embracing of tradition, and authoritarian by nature (Abrahamsson, 1972; Busch, 1975; Huntington, 1957a, 1957b; Vagts, 1959). These Discourse elements provided a heuristically useful framework for narrowing the more extensive list of statements to a final list of fifty. A second dimension of the cell structure was employed in order to capture political, economic, and social opinions.§§§ The statements derived from the conventional military mind dimensions were, thus, vetted and adjusted for their ability to address relevant beliefs in each of these

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††† The literature used to derive the initial set of statements included the work of Lane (1955; 1962; 1972); McClosky (1958); Rosenberg (1956); Srole (1956); Ray (1972); Adorno (1950); Hochschild (1981); Reeher (1996); and Reinarman (1987). The inclusion of narrative or interview-based research offered the advantage of deriving the statement list from investigations of political beliefs and ideas that were themselves unassuming in their empirical study of political values and beliefs.

‡‡‡The civil-military relations literature used to narrow this field included a broad history of scholarship on the prospect of military ideational divergence (Abrahamsson, 1972; Bachman, Blair, & Segal, 1977; Burgos, 2004; Burk, 2002; Feaver & Kohn, 2001; Hadley, 1986; Huntington, 1957a and 1957b; Janowitz, 1960; Janowitz & Doorn, 1971; Morgan, 2003; Russett & Stepan, 1973; D. Snider, Nagl, & Pfaff, 1999; D. M. Snider, Watkins, & Matthews, 2002; Vagts, 1959).

§§§ For instance, Huntington (1957b) and Vagts (1959) dismiss later variants of American conservatism that embrace laissez-faire, property rights, and the market economy as having little relevance to the military mind. Nevertheless, other works on the civil-military relationship include broader interpretations of American conservatism as implicit components of their claims (Feaver & Kohn, 2001). This is especially true of elite theoretical accounts of the American political system and literature highlighting the rise of a military industrial complex (Galbraith, 1969; Mills, 1956). Consequently, statements such as 'people are better off with free trade than with tariffs' and 'minimum wage laws cause unemployment; repeal them' were included as components of the existing dimensions.

broad categories. This second validation is less crucial, but provides a useful heuristic tool for statement consideration and yields an additional check for comprehensiveness to the initial military mind statement derivation.§§

With the Q data providing the ideational map, twenty-seven of the original ninety Q-sort respondents were selected for interviews. These interviews were semi-structured discursive sessions in which respondents were asked to further explain their demonstrated Q-sorting priorities. Additionally, each interview was approached with a common protocol of questions dealing with issues of citizenship, democracy, rights, personal liberty, the use of military force, and a variety of other questions that were meant to uncover perspectives relevant to issues of public philosophy more broadly and civil-military tensions particularly.

The Person Sample

Of the 90 Q-sort responses, 45 were from mid- and senior-level military leaders and 45 from civilian community and business leaders. The 45 military leaders were randomly selected from among the rotating military staff at the US Military Academy at West Point and from among the students at the Army War College in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, as well as the National War College in Washington DC.*** To infuse the sample with a comparable set of civilian respondents, the relevant literature was again important. As Samuel Huntington saw in West Point "the military ideal at its best," he found in the adjacent New York community of Highland Falls "the American spirit at its most commonplace" (1957b, p. 465). From the community leaders of what several recent press reports labeled "Hometown USA," twenty Q-sort responses were solicited. These included the proprietors and managers of the First National Bank, the real estate and insurance offices, hotels, restaurants, and many more of the stakeholders and participants in what Huntington described as "the tiresome monotony and the incredible variety and discordancy of small-town commercialism." Added to this group were a collection of 25 top business managers from corporate America. These men and women manage and lead large

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§§ Many statements may easily fit into more than one dimension. For instance, statements 33 and 34 could also be included under the authoritarian dimension, and the line between social, political, and economic issues is often ambiguous. Nevertheless, the framework does provide a useful heuristic tool for negotiating the statement selection process (Brown, 1980 and 1986; Dryzek & Berejikian, 1993).

*** Omitted from consideration were the officers permanently assigned to teach the various academic subjects at the Academy. Many of these officers had spent a substantial amount of time away from the operational army in various academic capacities and would be subject to the sampling criticisms that have plagued earlier survey approaches to this subject (Szayna et al., 2004). The group included seventeen colonels and senior lieutenant colonels, along with twenty-eight Majors and Captains.

organizations in various sectors of the economy, including manufacturing, health care, and the service industries. Their offices and homes range from metropolitan New York and Richmond, Virginia to Atlanta, Georgia, and Chicago, Illinois. They are the leaders of American capitalism, the supposed harbingers of the business ethic or commercial based individualism that Huntington and others found so antithetical to the military worldview (Huntington, 1957b, pp. 289 and 373; Ricks, 1996; Vagts, 1959, p. 27). In sum, dominant narratives in the civil-military gap story were explored and, from the usual suspects of the commercial, individualist civilian liberal and the corporate, disciplined military conservative, forty-five military and forty-five civilian respondents were selected.

The P sample was stratified according gender, ethnic, and racial composition in an effort to approximate these groups' numbers in the broader populations. In total, the army person sample included five women officers (11 percent) and 40 men, approximating a current Army active officer corps that is 15 percent women (Segal & Bong, 2005). The military sample also included nine self-identified ethnic and racial minorities (20 percent of the sample group), compared to an active officer corps self identifying as an ethnic or racial minority at 23 percent (Department of the Army, 2003). The corporate and Highland Falls comparison groups included 10 women (22 percent of sample group) and nine self-identifying ethnic minorities (20 percent of sample group). This approximates similar demographics in the broader corporate and Orange County, New York business communities. According to a 2004 report by Catalyst, women comprised 12.5 percent of corporate officers in Fortune 500 companies and 11 percent of Fortune 1,000 companies. Ethnic minority representation on corporate boards for the Fortune 100 companies was reported at 14.9 percent, according to a joint 2005 report by Catalyst, The Prout Group, The Executive Leadership Council, and the Hispanic Association on Corporate Responsibility (Diversity, 2005). In 2003, a more extensive survey of minority representation on Fortune 1,000 corporate boards indicated that ethnic minority representation was at 21 percent, up from 19 percent in 2001 (Daniels, 2004). Finally, the U.S. Census Bureau's 1997 Economic Census of Survey of Minority and Women Owned Business Enterprises places Orange County, NY minority business ownership at 9 percent and business ownership among women at 26 percent (U.S. Census Bureau, 1997).

The Perspectives

What follows are the public narratives emergent in this group of 90 Americans, as organized in the Q-sorting instrument and further explained through the interview process. (Appendix A provides the

factor arrays for the reported perspectives.) These distinct views were constructed by correlating the 90 respondent sorts into a 90 by 90 matrix. Principal components analysis was then employed, and the resulting factors were rotated using varimax criteria. Four factors with statistical, theoretical, and explanatory value were constructed by merging significant loadings. Appendix B indicates the loading of each individual respondent on each of the four factors. These factors or perspectives are, then, presented with a label and a brief interview informed description of the resulting worldviews, including Triumphant Individualism, Communitarian Democracy, Traditionalism, and Neo-Traditionalism. Interview responses are credited by indicating the respondent's P-sample assigned number after the quote. In this way, respondent comments can be cross-referenced to the factor loadings in Appendix B.

Triumphant Individualism

The respondents loading heavily on this factor relay a familiar American narrative. This is the story, as Reich puts it, of "the self-made man (or, more recently, woman) who bucks the odds, spurns the naysayers, and shows what can be done with enough drive and guts" (1988, p. 9). It is the ubiquitous American story of atomistic "democratic capitalism," forwarded in Horatio Alger tales and described by Hartz as "the peculiar instinct of a Lockean world" (1955, p. 23). Triumphant Individuals embrace this story, and, along the way, offer a person-centered vision of the good society that is at once humanistic, democratic, and, most of all, classically liberal. As one Army Captain explained, "this is the idea that individuals pursuing their own interest are the best, generally the best way of allocating resources, deciding what they want, maximizing happiness, and creating the good that makes life good" (10).‡‡

Triumphant Individuals begin with a deep faith in the power of the human character and individual choice, offering the strongest endorsement for the claim that *Most people can be trusted and are inclined to help others* (Statement 1). "I love this statement," declared one respondent; "I believe this. I desperately want to believe this" (30). In the Triumphant Individualist telling, it must be believed. Individual rationality working through atomistic social freedom creates the best possible aggregate outcome. In this way, even the concept of self-interest is transformed from Hobbesian instrumental egoism into enlightened recognition of the individual benefit to be gained by collective cooperation (De Tocqueville, 1945 Vol. II, pp. 121-123).

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‡‡ Of the seven respondents loading significantly on this model view, I was later able to speak in more depth to five of them. The discussants consisted of three mid-level military officers, respondents 19, 10, and 25; one senior military officer, respondent 30; and one small business leader from the town of Highland Falls, New York, respondent 82.

Triumphant Individuals, thus, see no conflict in endorsing both the idea that *Societies run best when individuals are committed to the common good* (Statement 4) and *Societies run best when individuals all try to maximize their own self-interest* (Statement 3). One respondent reconciled the apparent contradiction thusly:

> The way I understand this dynamic is that individuals working toward the common good is maximized when individuals work for their own self interest. . . I am thinking about self interest in the liberal sense rather than the Machiavellian sense. If you can conceptualize it as lying, cheating, and stealing and squeezing the last penny out of whoever their neighbor is, that is not my understanding of it. I'm saying that in a liberal sense people pursuing their own self-interest will maximize benefits for themselves and they are going to maximize what society gets out of it. (10)

As self-interest gets reinterpreted as an attendant part of group efforts, typical conflicts between individual choice and collective action are reconciled. At least in the American case, unrestrained opportunity and traditional "American Dream" renderings make it possible to offer individual solutions for most collective problems. In this way, free trade is important (Statements 37 and 38); a vibrant consumer society should be encouraged (Statements 15 and 16); and individual hard work is among the keys to solving pressing national problems (Statement 48).

Indeed, democracy and capitalism fuse in language that describes democracy itself as a "political market" (10), and a negative conception of liberty is forwarded to argue on behalf of unconstrained political, social, and economic action.†† Accordingly, libertarian inclinations influence a general distaste for collective regulations, including those regarding sex between consenting adults (Statements 35 and 36), as well as any suggestion of religion, rather than human reason, as a collective guide to public action (Statements 46, 45, and 22). In the same way, the concept of morality is not attributed ontological status. Being associated with tradition enforcing constraints on contemporary decision making, Triumphant Individuals are suspicious of arguments

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†† Negative liberty is simply the absence of external constraint, where as positive liberty indicates the available means by which to exercise free choice. In the latter sense, impoverished peoples may not be seen as having liberty, if their economic status imposes severe constraints on how they may choose to live. As Volkomer describes this positive view of liberty, "A man who was poor, uneducated, ill-housed, and subject to the fluctuations of the economic cy. . . .uld not be considered free though he lived in a nation whose government abided by the tenets of laissez-faire. True liberty. . . [means] the positive freedom to achieve and accomplish" (1969, p. 4). Conversely, the concept of negative liberty is an attendant part of a liberal morality that emphasizes the concept of just deserts, earning what one gets and getting what one earns (Berlin, 1969; Macpherson, 1973; Reeher, 1996).

that embrace moral code rather than social freedom as the foundation of social relations (Statements 11 and 12).

In the international arena, Triumphant Individuals extend their basic democratic capitalist convictions into an International Relations Theory best understood as sophisticated liberalism (Keohane, 1990). Rather than realist arguments relying on the Hobbesian imposition of order or, conversely, the naturalness of collective "harmonizing interests" criticized by those like E. H. Carr or Hans Morgenthau (Carr, 1940; Morgenthau, 1967), the anarchical world environment can be made stable through state-interest serving agreements for non-hierarchical cooperation. State-interests, then, play a role in making "the positive argument that an open international political economy, with rules and institutions based on state sovereignty, provides incentives for international cooperation" (Keohane, 1990). It is not that individuals naturally seek peace, as in the more cosmopolitan liberal depiction, but that individual, as well as state interests, are "likely" to lead to peace, given open markets and the necessity of rules of exchange and behavior that markets require. In turn, this view distrusts centralized direction from the United Nations and remains suspicious of unilateral state efforts to intervene in the internal workings of fellow states (Statements 25 and 27). There is little confidence that such centrally organized action can bring about desired results: "I'm not so sure I'm always comfortable with the United Nations as the organization, as a centralized structure" (82). For Triumphant Individuals, the international community should focus on establishing a workable system of international law and agreement, with enlightened state-interest as the modus-vivendi behind these reciprocal arrangements. Similarly, liberal democracy is not something that can be brought to people, but something that is likely—over the long-term—to emerge through organic processes: "You got to get it from within" (30) and similarly "you can't force toleration" (19). In short, Triumphant Individuals offer a basically liberal vision of the international environment tempered with realist assumptions regarding state-interests.

Communitarian Democracy

If Triumphant Individualism finds its most useful analogy in typically American patterns of classical liberalism, Communitarian Democracy may be said to hold the most in common with post-New Deal variations of thought and praxis on the American political left. As the name implies, Communitarian Democrats find the greatest differences with Triumphant Individuals in the former's more collective interpretation of social, political and economic matters. Where Triumphant Individuals see the aggregate power of decentralized individual choice, Communitarian Democrats recognize an abiding human impetus toward

community and civic obligation. Where Triumphant Individuals find support for policies promoting individual competition and solidly meritocratic social and economic arrangements, Communitarian Democrats see lessons for mutual assistance and cooperation. Collective efforts toward social betterment are prized over negative forms of liberty. As one respondent insisted, "if people are doing things that affect your world you need to be a part of the solution. If that's military service, Peace Corps, public office, you figure it out; you need to help the community" (35).**

Morality itself gets interpreted through this communal lens, as it is identified with service to collective goals. While remaining ambivalent to dismissive on whether morality might be said to hold ontological (religious or otherwise) status (Statements 11 and 12), Communitarian Democrats were quick to use moral grammar as a call to communal service. In this way, moral pronouncements take on phenomenological justifications rooted in the life of the community rather than individual improvement or religious teleology. Self-interest, then, becomes the villain in a narrative that recognizes the social and, therefore, contextual nature of moral action. As one respondent explained, self interest "is greed, as far as morals, as far as anything can be greed. Ego is really greed of attention" (83).

The dual focus on community and democracy prescribes a more expansive understanding of the political. Accordingly, democratic politics receive a broader mandate to address a perceived wider array of "market failures," which they understand as more or less endemic to capitalist industrial society. Whereas the Lockean Triumphant Individualists accept interference in the free market only begrudgingly (Greenstone, 1993, p. 54), Communitarian Democrats expect it as a means to ensure a sufficient level of social justice, as well as citizen enhancing participatory experiences. For this view, minimum wage laws are important restraints on labor contracting (Statement 40); the criminal justice system may hold some rehabilitative potential (Statement 44); social and political change should focus on establishing justice and equity (Statement 14); and pure free market choice is a unattainable, as *Many individuals face a host of social and economic impediments to success in life that are not their fault* (Statement 18).

In this telling, human nature is viewed as generally positive (Statement 1), but it is also malleable. This combination places the locus of human shortcomings more in external conditions and human

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** Twenty-nine respondents loaded significantly on the Communitarian Democratic model. I was able to speak in more depth to eight, including two senior military officers (respondents 35 and 36), three junior military officers (respondents 14, 20, and 26), and three civilian community and business leaders (respondents 83, 85, and 88).

institutions rather than human nature itself. One respondent explained the dynamic thusly:

> Most people are trustworthy and are inclined to help others. I think that's human nature, that most people are good and willing to help others. But, I think that some of the social values are impeding that. That has an effect on our inclination to trust others. I think by nature we do trust others, but, some of the things that are coming out [causes us] to be cautious of others. (20)

In this way, context is important; institutions, including political, social, and economic arrangements, are critical influences on human behavior. Believing that most people can be trusted (Statement 1) or, conversely, that people are inclined to look out for themselves (Statement 2) is in large part contingent on the social circumstances of the relevant individuals. Consequently, the more comprehensive endorsement of human nature offered by Triumphant Individuals would be imprudent from the point of view of this perspective. For the same reasons, however, the pliability of the human character opens the way for collective action to fundamentally improve the human condition, particularly with regard to the causes of conflict and war:

> I think that everybody, including the Muslims in places like Saudi Arabia and Iraq, they just want to hang out, make a living, and care for their families. That's what everybody wants. . . But, it's fear of the other and what they could possibly do and particularly the riling up of that fear by some that causes both sides to act. (26)

These views carry over into the Communitarian Democratic conception of the international environment. Offering their strongest endorsements of statements like *The United States should avoid using military force against other countries, if they do not pose an imminent threat* (Statement 24) and *The best hope for peace in the world is strong cooperation between nation-states* (Statement 30), Communitarian Democrats are sure that technology, ecology, and a growing global interdependence are creating a world with an ever greater sense of shared membership. These trends serve to create a stronger impetus toward global community, requiring the establishment of ever more robust international institutions. Though Triumphant Individuals observe similar trends, Communitarian Democrats differ markedly in their understanding of the implications. The distrust of centralized purposeful global direction so evident in the Triumphant Individual perspective is set aside, as questions of state sovereignty take a back seat to this perceived new interconnected international reality. *The United Nations, for one, should play a much more proactive and*

purposeful role in solving common international problems (Statement 25). Though interdependence—economic, ecological, and otherwise— provides an important impetus for international cooperation, ultimately the global community will require greater collective governance rather than simply the conditions for decentralized, self-interest inspired cooperation. "War itself. . . [being no longer] a solution" (85), "there needs to be a lot more cooperation around the world, of other countries for the common good" (88). In this more cosmopolitan rendering of Liberal International Relations' Theory, a persistent emphasis on the idea of a "common good" eclipses the more attenuated notion of a mutually beneficial self-interest, making the social locus of decision making ever more important.

Traditionalism

As we have found general analogies for Triumphant Individualism in classic Lockean strains of liberalism and Communitarian Democracy in participatory variants of New Left liberalism, we may say of Traditionalists that their markedly different preference structures are most aligned with classical renderings of conservative thought. Here, the ideas of Edmund Burke and latter day advocates like Russell Kirk and William F. Buckley resonate in a perspective that embraces tradition, individual responsibility, and moral virtue as the touchstones of an effectively ordered society.§

Traditionalists begin with by equivocating on a generally positive endorsement of human nature (Statement 1). It is not that they are prepared to offer a Hobbesian rendering of human egocentricity but that caution bids them to prepare for this possibility. Prudence becomes the watchword for a position that finds the unbounded faith in human reason, offered by Triumphant Individualists, and the malleable nature of human nature, preferred by Communitarian Democrats, untenable. Traditionalists, instead, hold a chaste version of what Thomas Sowell labeled the "constrained vision" of human nature. Moral limitations, according to Sowell's description, are not to be lamented "nor regarded as things to be changed." Instead, they are to be "treated as inherent facts of life. . . .The fundamental moral challenge was to make the best of possibilities that existed within that constraint, rather than dissipate energies in an attempt to change human nature" (2002, p. 12). Following Adam Smith, Sowell goes on to describe the constrained vision's solution: "a system of moral incentives, a set of tradeoffs rather than a real solution by changing man" (2002, p. 14). Traditionalists would

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§ Fourteen respondents contributed sorts that are significant on the Traditionalist statement ordering model. Of these fourteen sig;nifi::nt contributors, I was able to speak at greater length to six: three mid-level Army officers (respondents 1, 23, and 27), one senior Army leader (respondent 41), and two civilian leaders (respondents 59 and 72).

agree, concluding on such matters as criminality that *Crimes of violence should be punished severely; this is the only way to stop most criminals* (statement 44). Change is impossible and—what is more—dangerously naïve:

> There's a bit of a. . .like we are going into the mode of blaming other people: it's not my fault, not taking responsibility, no character, things like that. I think we let people off too easy. I think that if we just had a truly harsher punishment, I think it would (a) motivate people not to do certain things and (b) it would rightfully punish those who do wrong things. And, people do some very, very bad things, and they need some pretty significant punishment for that. I just don't have a whole lot of sympathy for people who do really dumb things, not just dumb things, but evil things, with evil intent. I don't think we can cure these people. I think that is a utopian thought. (23)

Moral incentives, then, serve to bolster moral virtue and individual responsibility. In this way, collective problems become primarily an issue of individual moral failure, and the role of collective governance is to redress these shortcomings. Unlike the Triumphant Individualists' concession that equal opportunity may need some minimal, collectively provided foundations, Traditionalists see only a world where the absence of external restraint is evidence enough of opportunity (Statement 18). Both education and even citizenship are in turn viewed as accomplishments to be earned, rather than minimal conditions for fair competition. As one respondent described:

> I think the founding fathers meant to say you are not born with rights, you are born with the right to gain those rights. You don't just sit back and expect those like handouts, like things are coming to you that are due to you simply because you are born here. You need to work to make sure that you earn those rights. You can't demand respect, you have to earn respect. You are not born with anything. You should always be brought up and always live your life to continue to earn these things; I'm not entitled to anything simply because I'm an American. (59)

As individual responsibility becomes paramount, individual moral virtue is part and parcel of this emphasis. *Morality is enduring and unchangeable* (Statement 12). What is more, this morality is revealed for both Burke and Traditionalists in the inherited wisdom of tradition. Consequently, as the role of collective state action is found in the need to foster individual moral responsibility, the revelation of what that moral responsibility entails is made clear by the divine providence of tradition (Stanlis, 1958).

On the international front, prudence again emerges as a central feature of the perspective. For Traditionalists, such a beginning is only realistic, accepting the world as it is rather than as they would like it to be. Traditionalist worry about "the evil in the world" (1), and, unlike the weight of moral force and social norms that constrain human action within established states and cultures, they see no international equivalent to effectively limit threats between states. The world in this variant of Realist International Relations Theory is an anarchical collection of autonomous states, where the only real protection lies in power and dominance. Traditionalists require no attenuation of Hobbesian assumptions here. The threat from rival state and non-state actors obliges the United States to rely on, first, military and, second, economic power for security. Traditionalist do not view this as a gross quest for empire but a necessary precaution, one made morally acceptable—even desirable—by the rightness of American institutions and culture.

Realist logic and exceptionalist justifications are woven into a narrative where maintaining military and economic superiority (Statement 28) is a reasonable and necessary precaution because the best hope for peace in the world is a strong America to keep the peace (Statement 29). In this description, the necessary relationship between power and security is made acceptable in the American case because, as one respondent put it:

I see America as a society and as a culture as having progressed further than most other nations. I'm not saying that we're perfect or we are great or that that is where we need to be and we can stop progressing but I think that we have progressed farther than most other countries out there. And I think that we have it right. (72)

Moreover, collective security arrangements are not only impracticable but also not preferable given the qualities of the United States (Statement 25):

I am a little distrustful of the United Nations. I don't really think that other countries are as advanced in their thinking maybe as we are. I'm not trying to be egotistical or narcissistic, but I just think that we have a better societal perspective. I don't really trust the United Nations; I think that the way it is set up there is too much of those that are out for their own self-interest as a country. . . No, I don't think American policy should focus first on international cooperation through the United Nations. I think that what we are doing is right, and I think that we should do what is right rather than trying to compromise that away just in the name of international cooperation. (1)

In the end, Hobbesian-inspired realist logic and nationalist commitments merge in The Traditionalists' international perspective. This is not a belief that purposeful action can reorder or substantially improve the international situation; it is simply a recognition that properly aligned incentives and disincentives can be a prudent restraint on external threats. For Traditionalists, this is the most that can be done.

Neo-Traditionalists

Neo-Traditionalism and Traditionalism have much in common in terms of goals, yet arrive at these goals and conclusions through different justificatory routes. In fact, like Triumphant Individuals and Communitarian Democrats, Traditionalists and Neo-Traditionalists indicate a significant degree of aggregate commonality in their model sorts. The two factors correlate at 20 percent. In many ways, Neo Traditionalism is Traditionalism without the metaphysics. Put another way, Neo-Traditionalists—like Traditionalists—place a high value on traditional values, but justify those values more by pragmatic emphasis on what works rather than divine inheritance. Pragmatism, experimentation, scientific guidance, and expert solutions become touchstones for policy and politics that generally align with traditions of the 'right' in American political thought and praxis. Neo-Traditionalists, then, might be understood as offering a more secular and more purposeful Traditionalist persuasion.‡

Of all of the perspectives, Neo-Traditionalists are the most distrustful of human nature (Statement 2). Although stopping short again of a fully developed Hobbesian description, it is nevertheless, agreed that neither the shaping of participatory citizens or individual enlightened self-interest can provide a solid foundation for public life. The basic human drive toward the instrumental calculation of self-interest requires incentive structures to regulate individual behavior. Unlike in the Traditionalists' rendering, this is the regulation of behavior alone, based on individual cost benefit calculations, not the regulation of necessary moral virtue. Neo-Traditionalists do not carry any sense of an enduring moral order (Statement 12), and, on the topic of religion, remain ambivalent on the role of Christianity in public life (Statements 45 and 46). Instead, Neo-Traditionalists pride themselves on this instrumental pragmatism, describing criminal law as a simple "fabric of society" issue (62) and encouraging severe punishment of criminals to maintain effective disincentives for crime (Statements 43 and 44). In the Neo-Traditionalists rendering, then, the state is not the enforcer of order

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‡ Of the nineteen respondents who offered defining sorts for this perspective, I spoke with seven in greater detail. These included one Army senior leader (respondent 45), three mid-grade Army leaders (respondents 9, 11, and 22), one corporate leader (respondent 62), and two community leaders (respondents 76 and 77).

through the maintenance of moral rectitude, but the enforcer of order through incentive and disincentive based social discipline.

Accordingly, Neo-Traditionalists also extend their less endorsing view of human-nature toward a greater reliance on the organizing and disciplining power of collective efforts. Individual solutions to collective problems are preferred, but might not always be possible in a world defined by self-interest and rational ignorance (Statement 34). Accordingly, Neo-Traditionalists remain more open than Traditionalists to political-economic solutions to public problems rather than simple individual responsibility, acknowledging a need to significantly depart from the status quo when issues of justice and equity are at stake (Statement 14); accepting, at least cautiously, that some people might face social and economic impediments to success that are not their fault (Statement 18); remaining suspicious of fully unregulated trade (Statement 38); and maintaining the need for labor-market wage controls (Statement 39). As this more ordered or hierarchical model for group organization begins to emerge (Statements 31 and 32), the capacity of tradition alone to guide collective action is diminished. While confirming with Traditionalists the importance of traditional values (Statement 9), Neo-Traditionalists root their justifications in the pragmatic focus on proven effectiveness. The capacity of rational inquiry through science (Statement 22) together with the experimentation inherent in political and social development reveals for Neo-Traditionalists the appropriate path for future public policy.

The greater acceptance of social science-based expert solutions and tradition as experimentation rather than divinely revealed guidance closely aligns Neo-Traditionalism with the *Neo* variants of conservatism that emerged in response to the perceived excesses of the Great Society state in the 1960s. In both these models, individual responsibility and political-economic solutions meet (the former remaining preeminent) in a new attention to policy design as the appropriate guide for domestic policy. James Q. Wilson described these *neo* variants of conservatism as emerging in the 1960s primarily from members of the political left who began to pay attention to the "unintended consequences" of evolving New Deal and later Great Society social programs (1996). As one respondent argued, "I really think that if you keep doing research and studies and so forth you'll figure out what's happening. With enough measurement techniques and science, you'll figure everything out that we encounter" (22). To be sure, on matters of government regulation and distributive justice, Neo-Traditionalists continue to emphasize the preeminent role of individual responsibility, but leave more room for limited political-economic, collective solutions, when supported with demonstrable results. In short, Neo-Traditionalists offer what they consider to be a very pragmatic or realistic account of the proper

relationship between collective problems and individual, as well as collective solutions. This relationship relies on an instrumental rendering of human motivations responded to with policies that capitalize on these motivations to find the most effective way to encourage desired behavior.

With respect to international questions, Neo-Traditionalists again parallel the Realist position of their Traditionalist cousins. Nevertheless, Neo-Traditionalism melds the Realist emphasis on conflict over cooperation and power over agreement in the international arena with a greater attention to how some forms of cooperation and agreement can be useful in an otherwise *Realist rendering. In this way, a strong America* (Statement 29) as well as cooperation between nation-states (Statement 30) are both important for international security. In fact, alliances and international collective security arrangements are all important components of the international diplomatic milieu, within which Realist politics take place. Accordingly, Neo-Traditionalists are generally supportive of the United Nations as a structure that should be used rather than dismissed as an advantageous venue for the pursuit of state interests (Statement 25). One respondent described this cautious endorsement thusly:

> Obviously the UN is talked about as an inefficient bureaucracy. The mainstream press is only giving it more reason to dislike the UN, but Bush did a great thing by working through the UN after 9-11, and, when it didn't work out for Iraq, we were able to create our own coalition. Without some major nations in this world behind something the UN has problems, but it can be worked out when the right countries agree. (62)

With regard to international politics, then, Neo-Traditionalists are Realists for their emphasis on the natural state of conflict in the international arena and their focus on state power as the means of security. They are suspicious of economic interdependence (Statement 26) and the expansion of democracy (Statement 27) as having little capacity to supplant the endemic nature of international conflict. Nevertheless, this realism is far less parsimonious than that of the streamlined Traditionalist emphasis on individual state power. Diplomatic wrangling, alliance making, and the use of international structures all receive more attention in the Neo-Traditionalists rendering of a world where power structures rather than individual state power alone are important.

Discussion

Summarized in Table 3, individuals in this P sample offer four perspectives on the issues and attitudes purported to define the American 'military mind.' These perspectives generally revealed an

Table 3: Summary of the Four Emergent Perspectives

	Triumphant Individuals
Human Nature	static, rational and trustworthy
Individualism and Collectivism	egalitarian individualistic, collective effort enlightened self-interest
The State and the International System	sophisticated liberalism; international inter-dependence
Tradition and Change	present day social freedom requires limited role for tradition
Democracy and Authoritarianism	social autonomy and individual choice results in aggregate benefit
	Communitarian Democrats
Human Nature	malleable, potential for great improvement
Individualism and Collectivism	egalitarian collectivist; community focused
The State and the International System	cosmopolitan liberalism; focus on shared meanings and greater cooperation
Tradition and Change	change and progress linked; improving the human condition requires change
Democracy and Authoritarianism	participatory; egalitarian; common enterprise and public engagement are critical
	Traditionalists
Human Nature	static but can be managed; generally trustworthy but prudence isr
Individualism and Collectivism	individualistic with collective role of moral maintenance
The State and the International System	state centric; strict realism; nationalism
Tradition and Change	tradition linked to enduring moral principles; change can upset these necessary commitments
Democracy and Authoritarianism	democracy rooted in adherence to enduring moral precepts; political/economic objectives strictly limited
	Neo-Traditionalists
Human Nature	static; generally untrustworthy; instrumental self-interest must be accounted for
Individualism and Collectivism	hierarchical; group focused; collective role to maintain order
The State and the International System	sophisticated realism; maintenance of power balance and use of existing international structures when possible
Tradition and Change	value tradition as revealing of proven approaches; willing to experiment with change based on measured approaches
Democracy and Authoritarianism	technocratic; experts valued; citizens seen as largely unengaged, selecting from more capable and informed leaders

initial bi-polar relationship between the two factors explaining the most variance (Communitarian Democracy and Traditionalism), with variations on Communitarian Democracy manifested in the more classically liberal tenets of Triumphant Individualism and variations on Traditionalism revealed in the more secular and purposeful right-leaning rendering of Neo-Traditionalists.

The Military Mind.

Returning to the question of the military mind, a basic goal of this effort was to offer an experimental test for two prevalent hypotheses in the literature on military thought and civil-military relations: first, that there exists a definable and coherent military public philosophy distinct from and often counter to dominant American perspectives and, second, that this division might generally be understood as a split between the classical conservatism of the "military mind" and the supposed liberalism of the American ethos.

Table 4 reveals the significant loadings by sample group on each of the public philosophies described above. Based on the disparity of belief orderings observed in this group and the basic differences in the way the respondents described, justified, and gave narrative life to their deepest beliefs, no such coherent, dominant perspective—classically conservative or otherwise—is emergent. That is, in place of military

Table 4: Distribution of Significant Sorts by Sample and Public Philosophy

	Trium-phant Ind.	*Communi-tarian Democrat*	*Tradition-alist*	*Neo-Tradition-alist*	*Not-Sig. on Either*
Mid Grade Army	3	6	6	7	6
Senior Leader Army	2	5	5	1	4
Army Total	**5**	**11**	**11**	**8**	**10**
Corporate Leader	1	8	3	5	8
Highland Falls	1	10	1	6	2
Civilian Total	**2**	**18**	**4**	**11**	**10**
Total	7	29	15	19	20

philosophical agreement, one finds a plurality of diverse value orderings and beliefs. (The trend holds when the number of extracted factors is reduced from four to two. Doing this reduces explanatory power, while providing greater potential to uncover commonality. Nevertheless, the resulting two factor solution split military respondents evenly between two meta-perspectives that might generally be understood by merging Triumphant Individualism with Communitarian Democracy and Traditionalism with Neo-Traditionalism.) What this experiment suggests is that military service alone does not appear to be a sufficient shaper of individual public beliefs. That is, at the most basic level, there is nothing inherent in the military functional task that mandates a homogeneous public perspective in the way assumed by the "military-mind" hypothesis. The military appears a poor school or, in Huntington's terms (1957b, p. 465), "monastery" for a separate conservative public philosophy.

Nevertheless, we are still faced with a body of public opinion research which suggests that the nation's military leaders are increasingly identifying Republican and conservative in proportions unrepresentative of the general population (Holsti, 1998; Trowbridge, 2003). For instance, in the area of party identification, the TISS project found that 64 percent of the military officers in their survey identified themselves as Republicans, compared to only eight percent identifying as Democrats (Holsti, 1998). This penchant to self-identify with conservative labels was also prevalent in the present sample. When provided the opportunity to label their political attitudes in either way they felt appropriate, twenty-three out of the 45 Army officers in the present investigation identified their political label as either conservative or Republican (51 percent); four as independent or moderate (8 percent); four as left or liberal (8 percent); two as pragmatic or realist (4 percent); four preferred mixed or miscellaneous labels; and eight gave no response.† However, when this self-identification is unpacked to the level of underlying values and beliefs, a somewhat different and more nuanced picture begins to emerge. This is where the present findings and survey results reveal divergent answers.

Consider Table 5 below, which compares self-identification of military leaders with significant loadings on the present public philosophies. Of the twenty-three military respondents that identified with some variation of the conservative or Republican label, six loaded significantly on the Communitarian Democratic factor and two on the

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† Respondents 23, 41, and 45 indicated during interviews that they preferred not to identify with any single label, hence the reason for their non-response during the sorting exercise. The sorting instrument, however, identified respondents 23 and 41 with the Traditionalists view and respondent 45 with the Neo-Traditionalist perspective.

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Triumphant Individualist factor, revealing a much greater diversity of attitudinal types for self-described conservatives than for self-labeling liberals or even moderates. That is, labeling oneself conservative was not a good predictor of a respondent's loading on any particular public philosophical type.*

Table 5: Self-Identification Compared to Public Philosophical Correlations

	Trium-phant Individual	Commun-itarian Democrat	Tradi-tionalist	Neo-Trad.	Not Sig.
Conservative Republican (23 of 45)	2	6	6	5	4
Moderate Independent (4 of 45)	1	1	0	0	2
Left Progressive Liberal (4 of 45)	1	3	0	0	0
Pragmatic Realist (2 of 45)	1	0	0	1	0
Misc. (4 of 45)	0	1	2	0	1
No Response Prefers No Label (8 of 45)	0	0	3	2	3
Total (45)	**5**	**11**	**11**	**8**	**10**

But, why is this? If there is a greater heterogeneity of belief systems among military leaders than military mind claims and survey responses might suggest, what accounts for the discrepancy between belief heterogeneity, on the one hand, and the dominance of Republican or conservative self-identification on the other?

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* Linear probability models confirm both the lack of relationship between military affiliation and public philosophical type and the lack of a relationship between conservative self-identification and public philosophical type. In the case of the latter, however, a reverse relationship was revealed. That is, loading significantly on Traditionalism or Neo-Traditionalism did turn out to be a good predictor of one's self-identification with the conservative label, while self-identifying conservative or Republican was not a good predictor of one's factor position on the underlying value statements.

Respondent explanations themselves provide important insights into this phenomenon. Despite a majority acceptance of "conservative" or Republican labels, many military respondents were quick to describe themselves as "much less conservative" than many of the other officers they knew (some of whom were also included in the sample and also described themselves as much less conservative than their colleagues). Thus, military respondents tended to prefer the conservative moniker, even as they tried to dampen expectations as to what that should imply about their broader convictions. They were also careful to describe this as fairly unique, given a perception of colleagues who held much more chased conservative dispositions. What emerges from the explanations, then, is less of an avowed conservatism than an abiding expectation that such an endemic conservatism exists. As one senior Army leader put the point, "when you are a young officer, sitting around the lunch table with your peers, there is always an unstated assumption that everyone you're speaking with is on the same sheet of political music. It takes an awful lot of moral courage to upset this assumption, to be the skunk at the garden party" (35). This despite the fact that, as far as the military mind is concerned, there does not appear to be much of a garden party at all.

Similarly, these expectations of officer political identity mirror the claims of Benjamin Ginsberg, Walter Mebane, and Martin Shefter (1998) in their argument for the systemic entrenchment of partisan affiliation within the institutions of national government. As Ginsberg and his co-authors argue, Democratic allies control social service and regulatory agencies and Republicans control the national security apparatus. In this rendering, the capture of the military by the Republican party had more to do with the Reagan buildup of military armaments and liberal resistance in Congress, than to inherent philosophical agreement (1998, p. 365). Again, whether one accepts the argument for such a partisan capture or not, the perception that the military as an institution is in the Republican camp or, perhaps more importantly, that one needs to identify with conservative beliefs in order to progress in the institution, could explain the proclivity, at least on the margins, to adopt political labels and even issue positions (particularly ones with low levels of personal salience) that are perceived to be commensurable with the military profession and its political "team" identification.

Whatever the explanation, it does appear that something else, other than underlying foundational beliefs, is driving conservative or Republican self-identification. Despite heterogeneity in the underlying public beliefs and values, a strong "team" identification emerges in these respondents regards the expectations of military partisan identity. And this perception of one's military officer identity as somehow rooted in conservative politics can and does act as an intervening variable

between the level of deep public beliefs, normative frames, and empirical assumptions and one's chosen political identification.

The implications are two fold. On the one hand, there remains no reason to believe that in its deepest commitments and beliefs the Army officer corps is any different from the American citizenry from which it is derived. It echoes a broad classically liberal grammar of liberty, democracy, opportunity, and rights, while reflecting underlying incommensurability over how these terms are understood: what exists as an empirical matter, what ought to exist, and, accordingly, what is to be done. In this way, the citizen-soldier tradition of an army reflecting the broader mood of the American citizenry, is alive and well, recreating in microcosm the fundamental public divisions that define the public discourse. On the other hand, there are broad assumptions among military officers themselves that this representativeness does not exist. When Army officers look at the institution of which they are apart, they see homogeneity and, more problematically, an abiding expectation that a single partisan political identity is the only way to fully be a part of the institution. It is this perception that is at the heart of so-called "civil-military gap" and military mind claims. And it is this expectation that poses the greatest difficulty for healthy democratic civil-military relations.

Conclusion

Though no coherent and definable military public philosophy was derivable from the present experiment, there, nevertheless, remain broad assumptions among these respondents that military functional demands have created in America's Army a distinctly conservative philosophical disposition. The conservative military mind of American military lore lives on in perception if not in reality. The implications of such a perceived philosophical singularity are not easily dismissed. What sectors of society will not serve in a military perceived to be philosophically hostile to their deepest public beliefs? How does this affect recruiting and how might it shape future cohorts of military officers? How would such a perception influence public willingness to support such a military with adequate resources? Though the military remains one of the most trusted professions in America (King & Karabell, p. 2002), how might continued identification with one political outlook shape future public perceptions? What happens when the national leadership does not share these perceived public commitments? Will the military institution be viewed as a politically hostile organization (Ginsberg, Mebane, & Shefter, 1998)? These and other questions speak to the great difficulties facing a public institution and a public profession perceived in such narrow, politically partisan terms.

As the present findings suggest, however, American military and civilian leaders are not unlike in their deepest beliefs, reflecting a public philosophical heterogeneity not captured by conventional wisdom, and even many public opinion polls. For better or worse, the military experience seems a poor teacher when it comes to shaping, molding, or, even, selecting particular public philosophical types (Krebs, 2004). Most importantly, there appears to be nothing inherent in military service that necessitates a strong single political identity, no necessary military mind and, indeed, no manifest evidence for just such an abiding phenomenon. What it does require is individual reconciliation of one's own public beliefs with the mandate to remain responsive to civilian leadership and the results and directives that result from the democratic process. As Dahl contends, the central necessity in a democracy is not that citizens share substantive (or perhaps even commensurable) public beliefs, but that citizens, especially those charged with public decision making capacity, share in their acceptance of democratic norms and processes (1961). It appears that this thin consensus is all that might be derived from and required of citizens and military leaders alike. It is a point that in a pluralistic heterogeneous liberal society may well deserve emphasizing, that, in the end, the military offers no new Sparta or Babylon either, but the fortunate truth that we are all Spartans, all Babylonians.

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Appendix A: Q-Sample Statements with Factor Arrays

	1 (Triump. Ind)	2 (Comm Dem)	3 (Trad)	4 (Non-Trad)
1 Most people can be trusted and are inclined to help others.	4	2	2	−1
2 You can't be too careful in your dealings with others, as they are inclined to look out for themselves.	0	−1	0	2

	1 (Triump. Ind)	2 (Comm Dem)	3 (Trad)	4 (Non-Trad)
3 Societies run best when individuals all try to maximize their own self interest.	3	–4	–1	–5
4 Societies run best when individuals are committed to the common good and service to common societal goals.	6	5	3	4
5. Citizenship cannot be given; it must be earned by service to one's community; duty begets rights.	–2	–1	1	5
6 Citizenship is an inherent right of being human, and you should not have to do something in order to get citizenship rights.	–2	0	–3	–6
7 Voting is a democratic obligation, regardless of the chances your party has to win.	3	3	2	2
8 If a person doesn't care how an election comes out, he should not vote in it.	–2	–3	–1	–2
9 The decline of traditional values has created significant problems for American society.	–2	1	6	6
10 It is necessary for each generation to define their own values and ways of life.	1	0	–3	–2
11 Morality is rooted in social norms and beliefs and is, consequently, ever changing.	2	0	–6	1

	1 (Triump. Ind)	2 (Comm Dem)	3 (Trad)	4 (Non- Trad)
12 Morality is constant and does not depend on what people think is or is not moral.	–3	–1	6	–4
13 Social and political change must come slowly and carefully, less we risk destroying the successes and accomplishments of past generations.	–2	0	1	–1
14 Social and political change must be focused on the fulfillment of important core values like justice and equity, even if that means a significant departure from the status quo.	1	3	–1	3
15 Pervasive selfishness and consumerism represent alarming threats to the future of American society.	–1	1	0	0
16 A vibrant consumer society should be encouraged because it sustains American economic prosperity.	2	1	3	3
17 No weakness or difficulty can hold us back if we have enough will power	3	1	1	3
18 Many individuals face a host of social and economic impediments to success in life that are not their fault.	–1	3	–2	1
19 A few strong leaders could make this country better than all the laws and talk.	–4	–6	–1	1

	1 (Triump. Ind)	2 (Comm Dem)	3 (Trad)	4 (Non-Trad)
20 Collective discussion and debate is the only way the country can move forward.	1	5	1	–2
21 The business professional and the manufacturer are much more important to society than the artist and the professor.	–5	–5	–2	–4
22 Science has its place, but there are many important things that can never be understood by the human mind.	–5	0	1	–2
23 The United States is justified to use force against a country suspected of developing weapons of mass destruction, even if these countries do not currently pose a threat to the United States.	0	–4	4	4
24 The United States should avoid using military force against other countries if they do not pose an imminent threat to the U.S.	1	6	0	–3
25 American foreign policy should focus first on fostering international cooperation through the United Nations.	–1	4	–5	2
26 American foreign policy should focus primarily on the expansion of capitalism and free markets.	0	–2	2	–1
27 American foreign policy should focus primarily on bringing a democratic form of government to other nations.	–1	–2	–1	–3

	1 (Triump. Ind)	2 (Comm Dem)	3 (Trad)	4 (Non- Trad)
28 American foreign policy should focus first on maintaining American economic and military superiority.	3	–3	4	0
29 The best hope for peace in the world is a strong America to keep the peace.	2	–2	3	2
30 The best hope for peace in the world is strong cooperation between nation-states.	5	6	0	4
31 In times of threat, democracies often have to forego consultation and deliberation and turn over decision making authority to one strong leader.	–3	–6	0	3
32 In times of threat, deliberation and democratic decision making are most important.	0	4	–3	–4
33 Most of the time the majority of Americans are unable to determine what is in their own best interest, much less the interest of the country.	–3	–3	–4	1
34 Average Americans are generally stable and rational guides for decisions regarding governance and public action.	1	2	0	–1
35 We should repeal regulations on sex for consenting adults.	5	2	–4	–1
36 Some regulations on sex—even between consenting adults—is necessary in a good society.	–6	–1	2	–1

	1 (Triump. Ind)	2 (Comm Dem)	3 (Trad)	4 (Non-Trad)
37 Tariffs are necessary to protect important sectors of the national economy and American jobs.	–4	–1	–2	0
38 People are better off with free trade than with tariffs.	6	1	2	–2
39 Minimum wage laws cause unemployment; repeal them.	–3	–5	–1	–5
40 Minimum wage laws prevent the exploitation of the least advantaged workers.	1	3	–2	1
41 Affirmative action is little more than reverse racism, because it disadvantages some individuals simply on the basis of skin color.	0	–2	3	0
42 Affirmative action is a necessary device to ensure healthy diversity, which inevitably benefits all Americans.	–1	2	–4	–3
43 Our treatment of criminals is too harsh; we should try to rehabilitate them, not punish them.	–4	–1	–5	–6
44 Crimes of violence should be punished severely; this is the only way to stop most criminals.	2	0	4	6
45 In the future the US would do well to avoid identification with any particular religion.	4	4	–2	0
46 In the future the US should be careful to remain a Christian nation.	–6	–4	1	0

	1 *(Triump. Ind)*	2 *(Comm Dem)*	3 *(Trad)*	4 *(Non- Trad)*
47 Government action is the key to solving the major problems facing America today.	0	–2	–6	–3
48 The improvement of moral character and individual hard work are the keys to solving the major problems facing America today.	4	1	5	5
49 Democracy is about citizen participation in government; it should not be made to mean other things like social justice and relative resource equality.	2	–3	5	1
50 Democracy must be judged by its product, such as the degree to which it equitably distributes justice and resources.	–1	2	–3	2

Appendix B: Factor Loadings*

Subject self descriptions	1 *(Triump. Ind)*	2 *(Comm Dem)*	3 *(Trad)*	4 *(Non- Trad)*
1 Mid Grade Army (conservative)	–0.25	–0.08	0.63X (I)	0.42
2 Mid Grade Army (conservative)	0.00	–0.06	0.67X	0.19
3 Mid Grade Army (conservative)	–0.07	0.33	0.43	0.39
4 Mid Grade Army (conservative)	–0.08	0.58X	0.28	0.38
5 Mid Grade Army (pragmatic)	0.03	0.35	0.22	0.54X
6 Mid Grade Army (no-response)	–0.02	0.38	0.30	0.28
7 Mid Grade Army (mercenary)	0.06	0.43X	0.10	0.29
8 Mid Grade Army (middle of the road conservative)	0.13	0.16	0.08	0.66X

Subject self descriptions	1 (Triump. Ind)	2 (Comm Dem)	3 (Trad)	4 (Non-Trad)
9 Mid Grade Army (fairly conservative)	0.23	−0.09	0.27	0.50X (I)
10 Mid Grade Army (moderate independent)	0.60X (I)	0.42	0.06	−0.16
11 Mid Grade Army (moderately conservative)	0.22	0.22	0.13	0.45X (I)
12 Mid Grade Army (moderate-conservative)	−0.14	−0.02	0.64X	0.26
13 Mid Grade Army (politically liberal, culturally conservative)	−0.43	0.32	0.44	0.19
14 Mid Grade Army (moderate)	0.04	0.49X (I)	0.41	−0.09
15 Mid Grade Army (moderate conservative)	0.20	−0.14	0.20	0.25
16 Mid Grade Army (conservative)	−0.05	0.00	0.34	0.68X
17 Mid Grade Army (no-response)	−0.12	0.25	0.24	0.73X
18 Mid Grade Army (liberal)	0.31	0.72X	−0.34	−0.18
19 Mid Grade Army (liberal)	0.62X (I)	0.00	0.02	0.13
20 Mid Grade Army (conservative)	−0.10	0.59X (I)	0.34	0.23
21 Mid Grade Army (Christian-libertine)	−0.08	−0.09	0.71X	0.23
22 Mid Grade Army (conservative)	0.15	−0.13	0.31	0.60X (I)
23 Mid Grade Army (no response)	0.07	−0.15	0.50X (I)	0.04
24 Mid Grade Army (no response)	0.02	0.04	−0.03	0.07
25 Mid Grade Army (conservative)	**0.31X (I)**	0.07	−0.12	0.10
26 Mid Grade Army (moderate-conservative)	−0.34	0.43X (I)	0.24	−0.08

Subject self descriptions	1 (Triump. Ind)	2 (Comm Dem)	3 (Trad)	4 (Non-Trad)
27 Mid Grade Army (conservative)	−0.04	−0.02	0.80X (I)	−0.15
28 Mid Grade Army (no response)	0.00	0.26	0.07	0.12
29 Senior Leader Army (republican)	−0.11	0.02	0.54X	−0.29
30 Senior Leader Army (pragmatic realist)	0.48X (I)	0.33	0.24	0.15
31 Senior Leader Army (left-leaning centrist)	0.39	0.56X	0.22	−0.13
32 Senior Leader Army (conservative)	0.46X	0.31	−0.05	−0.04
33 Senior Leader Army (independent)	0.38	0.45	0.24	−0.18
34 Senior Leader Army (neo-conservative)	−0.04	0.57X	0.32	−0.12
35 Senior Leader Army (moderate-conservative)	0.10	0.56X (I)	0.07	0.18
36 Senior Leader Army (liberal)	0.13	0.63X (I)	−0.10	0.21
37 Senior Leader Army (moderate)	0.42	0.36	0.22	0.02
38 Senior Leader Army (conservative)	0.43	0.34	0.43	0.07
39 Senior Leader Army (fiscal conservative-socially moderate)	0.14	0.10	0.41X	0.24
40 Senior Leader Army (conservative)	0.19	0.05	0.60X	−0.21
41 Senior Leader Army (no-response)	0.01	0.13	0.68X (I)	0.17
42 Senior Leader Army (republican)	0.33	0.62X (I)	0.20	−0.01

Subject self descriptions	1 (Triump. Ind)	2 (Comm Dem)	3 (Trad)	4 (Non-Trad)
43 Senior Leader Army (no response)	−0.14	−0.39	0.58X	0.30
44 Senior Leader Army (conservative communitarian)	−0.36	0.46	0.35	0.24
45 Senior Leader Army (no response)	0.16	0.07	−0.15	0.46X (I)
46 Corporate Leader (moderate right)	0.02	−0.15	−0.04	−0.09
47 Corporate Leader (moderate conservative)	0.34	0.14	0.45	0.33
48 Corporate Leader (conservative)	0.08	−0.18	0.51	0.48
49 Corporate Leader (independent)	0.36	0.40X	−0.08	0.04
50 Corporate Leader (conservative)	−0.04	0.41	0.43	0.23
51 Corporate Leader (no response)	0.02	0.53X	0.08	0.27
52 Corporate Leader (informed thinker)	0.02	0.72X	−0.14	0.12
53 Corporate Leader (no response)	−0.35	0.51	0.38	0.26
54 Corporate Leader (conservative-republican)	0.23	−0.28	0.48X	0.04
55 Corporate Leader (liberal)	0.01	0.80X	−0.25	−0.22
56 Corporate Leader (independent-thinker)	0.31	0.74X	−0.19	−0.13

Subject self descriptions	1 (Triump. Ind)	2 (Comm Dem)	3 (Trad)	4 (Non-Trad)
57 Corporate Leader (conservative)	–0.16	0.08	0.24	0.50X
58 Corporate Leader (liberal)	0.39	0.51X	0.04	0.18
59 Corporate Leader (conservative)	–0.05	0.09	0.65X (I)	0.11
60 Corporate Leader (liberal)	0.43	0.65X	–0.24	–0.02
61 Corporate Leader (conservative)	0.13	–0.18	0.69X	0.35
62 Corporate Leader (conservative)	–0.02	–0.06	0.51	0.53X (I)
63 Corporate Leader (apolitical-conservative)	–0.14	0.02	0.13	0.51X
64 Corporate Leader (no response)	0.24	0.62X	–0.04	–0.21
65 Corporate Leader (no response)	–0.02	0.09	0.21	0.48X
66 Corporate Leader (no response)	0.14	–0.12	–0.01	0.48X
67 Corporate Leader (economic-conservative social liberal)	0.42X	0.29	0.00	0.26
68 Corporate Leader (moderate republican)	0.12	0.39	0.26	0.40
69 Corporate Leader (born again Christian)	–0.49	0.24	0.43	0.14
70 Corporate Leader (no-response)	0.36	–0.36	0.09	0.42
71 Highland Falls Community (conservative)	0.09	0.21	–0.04	0.32X

Subject self descriptions	1 (Triump. Ind)	2 (Comm Dem)	3 (Trad)	4 (Non-Trad)
72 Highland Falls Community (conservative)	0.28	0.08	0.65X (I)	0.24
73 Highland Falls Community (no response)	−0.02	0.77X	−0.14	0.00
74 Highland Falls Community (no response)	0.09	0.76X	−0.14	0.00
75 Highland Falls Community (conservative)	0.20	0.73X	−0.11	0.12
76 Highland Falls Community (conservative)	−0.04	−0.05	−0.05	0.54X (I)
77 Highland Falls Community (conservative)	−0.17	0.01	0.43	0.50X (I)
78 Highland Falls Community (conservative)	0.02	0.20	0.19	0.49X
79 Highland Falls Community (moderate-democrat)	0.15	0.66X	−0.03	−0.03
80 Highland Falls Community (no response)	0.48	−0.01	0.30	0.43
81 Highland Falls Community (no response)	0.00	0.20	0.14	0.47X
82 Highland Falls Community (no response)	0.55X (I)	0.26	0.19	0.27
83 Highland Falls Community (conservative-liberal)	−0.13	0.71X (I)	0.06	0.10
84 Highland Falls Community (between conservative and liberal)	0.14	0.22	−0.09	0.48X

Subject self descriptions	1 (Triump. Ind)	2 (Comm Dem)	3 (Trad)	4 (Non-Trad)
85 Highland Falls Community (progressive conservative)	0.22	0.39X (I)	0.01	0.25
86 Highland Falls Community (no response)	0.04	0.23	–0.02	0.25
87 Highland Falls Community (moderate independent)	0.03	0.68X	0.00	0.21
88 Highland Falls Community (liberal)	–0.02	0.45X (I)	0.01	0.19
89 Highland Falls Community (no response)	0.15	0.50X	-0.10	0.05
90 Highland Falls Community (moderate to liberal)	0.03	0.68X	-0.17	0.19

*X indicates defining sort (statistical significance at the $p<.01$ level)
(I) Indicates individuals with whom a follow-on interview was conducted