Old Age Research

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(1902–1989)

Introduction

The Myers Lecture for 1987 is reported in *The Psychologist* of December 1988, by Patrick Rabbitt, in which the conclusion is drawn that a "gerontology which has nothing to say about what being old feels like, how elderly people see themselves in relation to the world, and how they attempt to understand their lives and to manage their interactions without embarrassment and pain will be a paltry, pseudo-academic exercise" (p. 506).

It will, Rabbitt continues, miss entirely how elderly people's social interactions maintain the everyday efficiency of their cognitive processes. Research in social psychology, the neurosciences, and cognitive psychology had failed to provide such essential knowledge, and gerontology was in sore need of all three disciplines.

I am to propose that it needs none of the three, and that already, in 1950, an opportunity was missed to develop gerontology on lines so egregiously lacking in these and other disciplines since then. It was a proposal originally published in mimeographed form in Harold E. Jones (Ed.), *Research on Aging: Proceedings of a Conference held on August 7–10, 1950, at the University of California, Berkeley* (Pacific Coast Committee on Old Age Research, Social Science Research Council). It involved Q-methodology, and I was its author (Stephenson 1950).

Background

I had originally studied old age at Littlemore Hospital, Oxford, in a paper published in the *British Medical Journal* (Stephenson, Penton, & Korenchevsky, 1941), and followed this with another study in 1943, under the auspices of a London County Council Home for the Aged, at Tooting Beck Hospital. The Council, through its chairman, Lord Latham, and Lord Nuffield, were deciding what to do for the study of aging, and a demonstration was arranged at Tooting Beck at which many notables of the Council and medical profession attended. Nuffield had to decide whether to give financial aid to such work, and he indeed gave £25,000 for four years of work, which went to Cambridge under Professor F. C. Bartlett's supervision, not to Oxford under mine. The result, if I may

deign to say so, is now plain to see, to judge by Rabbitt's article.

About the same time, in the early 1940s, a "Club for the Study of Aging" was formed, by Sir Robert Robinson, Dr. Korenchevsky, a Professor Barker, and myself. The idea was to have a few members, one each from different scientific, financial, political, etc. fields, to foster interest in the study of aging. I recall our first meeting at Lord Nuffield's invitation at the Ritz in London, where, in the sumptuous dining room at the hotel I was faced with the task of eating oysters, utterly repulsive to a budding vegetarian!

All of this I reported in my paper to the conference at Berkeley in 1950; and it is interesting to read after nearly 40 years lapse, the discussion that occurred after my talk. Clearly, no one could believe that work on a "single case" could be valid. My forthcoming book (it is so reported) had the title *Q-technique: The Correlation of Persons* which Wiley had apparently promised to publish. Actually, the book became *The Study of Behavior: Q-technique and its Methodology* (1953), published by the Chicago University Press. At the close of the discussion, a questioner asked: Suppose I am interested in measuring the attitude of a professor toward his work; he could perform a Q sort at 60, at the retirement age of 65, and again at 70, and from these sortings certain hypotheses or trends could be stated, how they vary, etc. But what about all the other professors? What is the use of a "single case"?

My reply could only be brief, that no matter what other professors may do this in no way could alter what the *one* had performed. The problem in science was to make what was done for the *one* serve for all others.

Self in Everyday Life

Almost any psychologist should know by now that Q methodology is a scientific, objective approach to the investigation of *self.* The purpose is not to determine general *facts,* but to use *laws* that find expression in subjectivity.

This can best be introduced by making brief reference to Irving Goffman's *Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (1959) and his *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience* (1975). He maintained that in social life people are acting parts, as on a stage, and that this is the case for most of our behavior. He was one of the Chicago sociologists of the 1950s who specialized in colorful social behavior, as titles of their many studies indicate—"The merchant seaman," "The junk business and the junk peddler," "The police," "Osteopathy," "The American funeral director," "House detective," "Pharmacy as a business in Wisconsin," "The fate of idealism in medical school," etc. Each merited a PhD dissertation. In all of them, 'play' is obvious: everyone

seems bent on fooling everyone else! Everyone is "putting on an act," like characters on a stage.

An example given by Goffman is of a surgeon and nurse whose patient, in their hands, falls off an operating table. Soon there is a hullabaloo—other doctors blame the surgeon for gallivanting; hospital authorities blame it on a shortage of nurses; the public blames everybody; and the patient of course blames surgeon and nurse alike and the hospital in general. Whatever the reality, everyone is bent upon moralizing. In a striking conclusion, Goffman says "we are merchants of moralities."

Is this characteristic? And is the "acting" always moralistic?

Goffman tries to answer these questions. First he asks what are the *impressions* of the individuals in such social encounters? What *claims* are made? What are the realities? The merchant sailor's vulgarity at sea is a necessity for manliness (whereas anger and inadequacy, rather than macho-manhood, is at issue). Finally, Goffman conceives of the person's *self* in this context, and concludes that it is a *product* of the social encounters, *not* a cause of the behavior. The social environment is the driving force. True, Goffman asks us to distinguish between the person as a *performer* and as an actor: the performer is cast into the various roles he or she has to play: the performer may have dreams, wishes, feelings, etc., but, for Goffman, these are "inside," and do not constitute the overt self presented in social life. He concludes:

> The self, then, as a performed character is not an organic thing that has a specific location, whose fundamental fate is to be born, to mature, and to die; it is a dramatic effect arising diffusely from the scene that is presented, and the characteristic issue, the crucial concern, is whether it will be credited or discredited (Goffman, 1959, p. 253).

Goffman, in 1959, had presented this fairly convincing account of our everyday behavior.

At about the same time I was developing 'play theory' based on Huizinga's *Homo Ludens: Man the Player* (1950), but also a theory of *self* that was operational, and not merely speculative. The latter is introduced, for present purposes, as Chapter XI in *The Study of Behavior: Q-technique and its methodology* (1953). The 'play theory' appeared as the "Ludenic Theory of Newsreading" (Stephenson, 1964), and *Play Theory of Mass Communication* (Stephenson, 1967). Since then, Q methodology has sharpened its definition, and it is to this, as well as to Chapter XI that one wishes to draw the attention of any who, like Patrick Rabbitt, wants to study the *feeling* of old age.

Self-Psychology

Chapter XI is still worth any psychologist's reading. It proposed to begin the study of self "from the mere standpoint of what a person says about himself, what he believes he is like." It was, in fact, an abstraction from a book I had written in 1950–52 with title *Intimation of Self,* which remains unpublished. It rejected the attempts of many American psychologists at the time (Angell, Lecky, Rogers, Snygg and Combs and others) who separated 'inner' from 'outer' by a phenomenal field that could never have existence independent of the person experiencing it, and which is therefore never open to direct observation by "outsiders," and yet which is the center and cause of behavior. The causes were reconstructed by inference: there was linear, one-to-one relationship between what was inferred, and outward behavior, the latter being *public.* All such speculation, I contended (1953, p. 243) is quite unnecessary. What needed attention was what we reflect about ourselves:

> . . . what we think about ourselves. We wonder about *our* unworthiness at church, *our* grip of things at business, *our* hopes and aspirations. These matters can be studied without phenomenological speculations (Stephenson, 1953, p. 244).

Traditional methodology had ignored everything that happens "outside," except what happens "on the average." James Ward (1933) had been crying out for many decades that such measurement of man's attributes, "on the average," was "psychology without a subject," or, "more exactly a psychology which ignores the *subject* it everywhere implies."

The speculators put the self into *mind,* usually as some kind of gestalt, or whole, a "oneness" and unity embracing the many different roles a person plays. I point out that these are roles assumed *by the psychologist,* not necessarily any in fact existing *in the subject.* Very interesting hypotheses can be derived in speculation by the psychologist—and I mentioned the case of Grummon (1950) who had deduced that a client in psychotherapy will utter more personal pronouns early in therapy than toward its completion. This can be tested, and probably supported "on the average."

We proposed a very different approach, to the effect that we would "plunge" immediately into the subject's subjectivity, to *discover* what it holds. We would assume nothing about classes of behavior nor about postulates of "inner" phenomenology.

Instead, we would study a person's *notions* about himself or herself, beginning with an operational definition by attending to the person's self-referent statements and self-notions (Stephenson, 1953, p. 247).

There follows, on page 247, a synopsis of what this meant—statements a person utters about oneself, as in a diary, journal or autobiography, or in the course of talks, interviews, etc.

On page 248 I gave examples of such statements, gathered by two of "my" Chicago students, Edelson and Jones (1951). Here are a few:

> I am usually a composed person.
>
> Sometimes I feel lost and abandoned.
>
> I care about influencing others, so that they'll do what I want them to do.
>
> Some of the things I do aren't exactly ethical.

Thus, the young psychologists, like botanists, could pick statements, all self-referential, in the wide-world "outside." But then follows the crucial step: "Our purpose is not to study these self-notions as such, but to use them as raw material for the development of a self-psychology" (Stephenson, 1953 p. 248). They would be gathered in *natural settings* (p. 247), and on this basis Q-technique made its beginnings. We could now experiment with *subjectivity* of the self-referential kind, in general (p. 249).

I then provided an example for psychoanalysis, for the case of Freud's patient Dora long before the current interest in the case (Stephenson, 1953, pp. 249–254): a critic at the time called it irresponsible! The chapter continues with an example for a clinical case Rogerg (pp. 255–268), and then gives a summary—that in addition to the *overt self-descriptions* of people like Dora, there are now Q factors, which are self-descriptions they *could* have given but were apparently unable to do so, because of a lack of technique to assist them. I conclude (p. 271), with a quotation from George Eliot, that "The beginning of an acquaintance with persons or things is to get an outline for our ignorance."

Chapter XI, I added, may be said to be such an outline. What was advocated was a way to put subjectivity on a scientific footing, with the advantage that factor-method:

> permits the investigator to transcend his postulations and to make inductive explorations and higher-order, more abstract explanations of effects. It is along such lines, we suspect, that a true *theoretical* psychology might be reached. (Stephenson, 1953, p. 271)

This chapter, in my view, marks the water-shed between speculation, and the true *theoretical* psychology now being developed. It marked, in 1953, the beginning of quantum-theoretical subjective science.

The Position Now

First there was Q technique, which proposed that for subjectivity we had to dispense with all normative scales and procedures, replacing them by *one* scale, the forced-choice distribution of integer scores that gave the same score to *everyone,* for *every Q sort,* for *every problem* in any culture, a score of *zero* for state-of-feeling.

The same step, taken by Max Born in 1928 in physics, led him to a Noble Prize in nuclear physics: it led in my case to total unacceptance and obloquy for now nearly 50 years! Even "my" most able students, e.g. Jim Nunnally, couldn't accept the idea that they could perform a hundred experiments on diverse topics, without using a standardized test of any kind (with norms, reliability and validity coefficients, etc.)—while in fact, they gained their doctorate degrees by this Q-technique process, and had conducted a hundred experiments with the technique. It was apparently *completely* unbelievable! Not a single psychometrist allowed the idea to "sink in," and to see what it meant.

Next, there was "consciousness" and the separation of behavior into "inner" and "outer." This was rejected, too, and replaced by *communicability,* mainly verbal report, but essentially any means whatever by which people communicated with one another or within themselves. My 1952 book on *Intimations of Self* began, indeed, with reference to the way society women *communicated* with their *fans*—the ones they waved to cool their faces. In this manner one dealt with the real world, whether in physics or in psychology—with what one *uttered.*

But this had two profound forms, evident in William James's *The Principles of Psychology* (1891): *transitive,* and *substantive.* James believed in consciousness, but distinguished between what was "inner" as *transitive,* and "outer" as *substantive.* What we utter, write down, print, or photograph, etc. is by that action made *substantive*—it is in the world "outside," and by that mode, was necessarily "objective." Also, a matter we *believed* in as in some sense real, true, existing.

This was to forget its beginnings "inside" as transitive thought, a condition that James saw as the birthplace of all creative thought. The *blunder,* as James called it, was to forget this, throughout all the centuries of substantive thought—since Plato, and certainly since the time of Descartes and Newton and "natural science" up to the time of Einstein. What everyone forgot, even Einstein, was that *self-reference* was a key abrogatory construct in substantive thought. Science has succeeded in the past several centuries precisely by eliminating all reference to *self* in its operations, as described, for example, in Karl Popper's *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (1959).

Next, in line with my openings into *induction,* I solved a problem abandoned by Newton, as *Newton's Fifth Rule* (Stephenson, 1979). All

science, up to Einstein's time, was conducted in the deterministic framework of the *four rules* of Newton's *Regulae Philosophandi*, a deductive system with which present-day psychology is still hopelessly saddled.

Next, there is the principle of complementarity of William James, which enters Q methodology in a series of articles beginning in 1978 and continuing into 1988 (especially, the five "William James, Niels Bohr, and Complementarity" parts: Concepts, Pragmatics of a thought, Schrödinger's cat, The significance of time, and Phenomenology of subjectivity; Stephenson, 1986a, 1986b, 1987, 1988a, 1988b). Then comes the *coup d'etat*, an article "Intentionality: How to buy a loaf of bread" (Stephenson, 1987) in which the basic construct of quantum theory takes its truly horrendous conclusion, that *all* our Western thinking, expressed in the thousands of libraries and millions of books on their shelves, is flawed because it is *all* merely substantive, oblivious of its origins in its still unexplored transitory thought. In short, even today, about so simple a matter as buying a loaf of bread, psychology concerns itself with substantive thought only—and that covers all systematic psychology from Wundt to Freud, from Brentano to Watson, from MacDougall to Pavlov. It is *all* mainly categorical. *All* basically unsound!

Instead, there is the *profundity* (not merely the profound) of quantum-theoretical factors based on Q technique. Quantum theory is always described as "queer," "unbelievable." It took several decades before even physicists were prepared to accept it. Q-technique is the same "queer," "unbelievable" approach to subjectivity, in *rerum naturâ*.

Myself as Old

We can now suggest to Patrick Rabbitt what was in store for the study of old age in 1943 at Tooting Beck, of the London County Council, and cast aside, and never looked at by those who profited, at Cambridge and elsewhere, by Lord Nuffield's munificence and deep interest.

In 1972, upon my "retirement" at age 70 years from my university professorship, it was natural for me to submit Goffman's thesis to Q methodology. The University of Missouri has a practice of inviting all retirees to a luncheon, once a year, to keep in touch with them, and to allow the retirees opportunity to come together in a mildly festive event. I never attend. It is not because I think badly of the University: to the contrary. It is because it seems belittling, as if retirees needed "looking after." I resent such a parentalizing as officious. I doubt whether many, besides me, feel the same way.

Clearly, there is going to be much to say about *me.* To begin with, for my study, I assumed that there is a cultural (societal) position about retirement, like folklore, understood by every retiree. It was evident in

Goffman's *Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*: browsing through its pages there were hundreds of statements, all intrinsically capable of self-reference, having direct reference to the academic scene, for example, such as the following:

> Only a fool will expect common honesty in academic matters.
>
> Much of what we do is "make-work," to make an impression.
>
> My academic life has been orderly, routine, and I like it that way.
>
> Familiarity breeds contempt: it is a good thing to keep social distances.
>
> I expect people to give me my due respect.
>
> We are all "old boys" when we meet socially: horseplay and dropping of customary poses is customary.

. . . and so on, for a hundred more. Here, then, was a ready-collection of statements required for a *concourse* on my retirement, the folklore of academe about the matter.

A Q sample of 45 statements was chosen, with which I performed ten Q sorts, for the following conditions C_1 to C_{10}:

- C_1 My feelings at my official retirement.
- C_2 What I felt was the prevailing feeling amongst other retirees.
- C_3 My feelings about the Administration's well-wishing.
- C_4 What I felt an ideal feeling should be upon retirement.
- C_5 What had "social control" done to influence my feelings?
- C_6 What is Goffman's "dramaturgical" standpoint with respect to me?
- C_7 My feelings about Goffman's efficiency of the retirement system.
- C_8 My feelings about my future.
- C_9 The feelings that others attribute to me.
- C_{10} My *self*, as I feel I am.

This, then, is the situation. I am reflecting upon my retirement in terms of the prevailing folklore, known to me and to all retirees. The only person who could do this is *me*, and *all* the knowledge possible about it in this context is covered by the Q sorts, each a self-reference, of which the above ten is a sample of an unlimited number possible for the situation. The *ten represent the total information available to science in the subjective context.* This applies to Q, as much as to quantum mechanics in physics.

The conditions have their purposes, as follows: C_1 C_2 C_3 represent the immediate situation upon retirement. The feelings are well-fixed: I would provide much the same Q-sorts at any time—a matter than can easily be tested. C_4 is predicated upon Carl Rogers's premise, that *self*

and *ideal-self* are congruent in adjusted situations. C_5 is based on my principle of *social control* (as well as Goffman's). C_6 represents Goffman's thesis of drama. C_7 is for Goffman's concept of "efficiency." C_8 is for Goffman again, who saw a relation between what we do *now,* and what we are likely to do in the *future.* C_9 is also from Goffman, for his concept of *character.* C_{10} required *me* to describe myself as I feel I am.

Note, then, how I have introduced Goffman's thesis in the conditions. Again, they were familiar to *me,* but unlikely to be so for anyone else attending the Administration's yearly luncheons for retirees.

The ten is a sequence of probes into *my* subjectivity, such as Goffman has described for his elicitation of self in everyday life. Academe was largely *my* everyday life, and the steps so far taken are completely in line with Goffman's (and my own) thesis.

The Factor Analysis

In 1938 Cyril Burt had pointed out that Spearman's factor theory in psychology had the same mathematical foundations as quantum theory in nuclear physics. He failed to realize, however, that factor theory had two sides to it, as I had indicated in my paper to *Psychometrika* (Stephenson, 1936). One, R, was concerned to measure an individual person for his factors, as intelligence, personality, etc., the basis of *individual differences* psychology. The other, Q, eschewed all such, and concerned how *feeling states,* under different conditions (C) for a subjective event, gave rise to a totally new kind of factor, intrinsic to the individual. It became apparent that the concern in Q was with transitive-like thought (all self-referent), in which there were what William James had called *gaps* in consciousness, but which really were indications of the complementarity to which he had drawn attention with respect to transitory and substantive thought. We found that operant Q-factor structure was itself subject to Bohr's principle of complementarity (Stephenson, 1986b). If there were three operant factors A, B, C, then AB, AC, BC, were in complementarity relationships, i.e. they could contradict one another, certainly were distinctly different aspects of the event, and in general could present us with *paradoxes.*

For myself, educated in the classics, and aware that contradictions and paradoxes had been described throughout history, from the time of Homer down to that of Edmund Husserl in our century, this factor conclusion was not so much a surprise as something to be expected, if we were on the way to *truth,* or to any presumption or persuasion of it. The long history of paradox is described in a masterly volume I have had in my library since 1952, *The Subtle Knot: Creative Scepticism in Seventeenth-Century England,* by Margaret L. Wiley (1952), a work that I recommend to every lover of the search for truth, even though I disagree with her conclusions.

Factor analysis of the 10 Q sorts gave the following operant factor structure:

Table 1: Factor Data

		Operant factors		
	Conditions (C)	I	II	III
C_1	My retirement		x	
C_2	Others' retirement	x		
C_3	Impression as welfare			
C_4	Ideal		x	
C_5	Social control	x		
C_6	Goffman's thesis	x		
C_7	Efficiency			
C_8	My future		x	x
C_9	Character (as given)			x
C_{10}	Self			x

(x = significant factor loading; all other values are statistically insignificant)

Factors in Q are theoretical Q sorts, for which empirical estimates are available, merely by averaging the Q sorts "on" a factor. Thus the theoretical Q-sort for Factor I is composed of the Q sorts 2, 5, and 6.

The factors are uncorrelated, representing distinctly different states of feeling. They are implicit. The Q sorter doesn't know what the factor will be. Yet they are not "unconscious," "preconscious," or "subconscious" but *forms* emerging out of the complexity of subjectivity. By this I literally mean what chaos theory is predicating in modern science as "the butterfly effect," that the flapping of a butterfly's wings in one place can, in principle, cause a weather storm somewhere else. In Q, it is *the predominance of perhaps one statement in a Q sample that brings all of the others into line with it to form a Q sort.* Otherwise the same torrents of numbers are at issue, and factor theory, with Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle, is also at work.

Interpretation

I have now to bring all of the above to bear upon old age research. With myself as subject, what is lawful about my old age? At the time of the study I was 70 years old (I am now 86): had the study anything to say about *now,* sixteen years later? Its concern was with my *feelings;* but the Q factors were *intentionalities,* pointers to *possible* courses of action, not predictive that such-or-such actions would necessarily follow. Of what use, then, is a science that cannot predict, but only indicate possibilities?

To get to this quickly I propose to take much of the detail for granted that the factor study involved. It is sufficient to say that I interpreted the three factors I, II, III, with explanations to the following effects:

I: was *pretense,* as in Goffman's thesis and my own play theory

II: was avowal of *truth* as such, as a feeling of honest endeavor.

III: was *ostracism,* a feeling of being hurt at neglect of my achievements.

To understand these factors requires knowledge of their context. Since the early 1930s, Q, and by association myself, had been held to be controversial. My switch from physics to psychology in 1926 hadn't helped me; it made me suspect. It happens that I was correct about Q, and Professor Burt wrong; but my logic was far ahead of the times. I knew what the new science meant, of indeterminism, quantum theory, relativity, and inductive inference, long before anyone else of my peers and mentors. The hypothetico-deductive method was everywhere *de rigueur,* and remains so in psychology, when I denied it substance as early as 1930. In all of this I had to begin without the resources to match those of the establishment. I had prospered in England, becoming Reader in Experimental Psychology, and Director of the Institute of Experimental Psychology at Oxford University. I had taken a leading part in the development of the Honours School of Psychology, Philosophy and Physiology at Oxford, which still runs its course. I had been consultant psychologist to the British Anny, serving in the forces, Air Force and Army, from 1939 to 1947, while managing psychology at Oxford. All of this had to be abandoned when I resigned (of my own will) the bounties of Oxford. I was not interested in lecturing about psychology—I needed to work at what I knew was important about it, its subjective basis. For this I was tempted to America, where for ten years (1948–58) I was without a fixed appointment, wandering from one University to another as Visiting Professor, or directing research in a commercial research organization. Up to 1972, and continuing up to now in 1989, I have had to face denial of a place in the profession I stand for. I have been unable to publish my papers in Britain or in the United States in leading journals. The article introducing Newton's Fifth Rule was rejected, and only saw daylight as an open letter, a *Comment* (Stephenson, 1979). Only a week ago, in January 1989, I received the first letter of appreciation about my work from a fully-fledged American professor of psychology. Two Kantor interbehaviorists have begun to give Q support; and a few political scientists in the United States, notably Professor S. R. Brown, have aided. The late Professor H. Duijker of Amsterdam, and his successor Professor Marten Brouwer, were early advocates of Q. In 1958 I was given haven in the famous School of Journalism at the University of Missouri, and provided it with a genuine theory of *communication,* as distinct from the current foundations in *information* theory. It was only in 1972, upon my official retirement at the School, that I could hope to be free at last to go ahead with my life-time's involvement in quantum theory.

Merchandizing Moralities

To continue the analysis: Factors I, II, III make good sense when viewed in the light of the above situation.

With respect to I: it asserted that it was the *other* retirees who rely upon appearances, stand out in their dignity, and 'play' their roles as professors. (The truth was that I must have seemed notoriously so, myself, emphasizing my Britishness at any opportunity.)

Factor II was saying that my work should speak for itself, as scholarly, honest endeavor. (The truth was that I was crying out for it to be widely acknowledged.)

Factor III was an effort to defend my self-identity: it represents *hurt,* because of ostracism. (The truth was that I was extraordinarily *certain* of myself.)

Note that the initial interpretation had provided explanations the very *reverse* of what, upon reflection, was also true! I was almost immediately aware of this, that the factors, though representing aspects of what my feelings were, were really also topsy-turvy. To get at the other aspects one could turn the factors upside-down and reach quite contrary conclusions! There were, in that case, *six* distinct aspects about my retirement. These were the three as first interpreted, and three more, their *opposites.*

Moreover, by now I was aware of what I should have expected, that factors point to contradictions, and to paradoxes, in our thought. I mentioned this earlier, with regard to Margaret Wiley's *The Subtle Knot: Creative Scepticism in the Seventeenth Century* (1952). This was in 1972–3. We have to expect paradox as surely as we employ self-reference to elicit it, in all transitory (i.e., self-referential) thought.

Intentionalities

What, then, had these results to say about me and my future?

From the Q-methodological standpoint there were glaring dynamisms in the above interpretations. Not only were the factors somehow topsy-turvy, but I placed my *self* on factor III, and my *ideal* on factor II. This meant maladjustment. According to Carl Rogers and the law we have taken from him, *self* and *self-ideal* are congruent in adjusted situations. My *self* should have been on factor II, but was where my *hurt* was, on factor III.

It may seem a small matter, like the flap of a butterfly's wings. But it had quite enormous effects. It meant that I remained the "kicking child" of London days, wholly dissatisfied with things as they were in the everyday life of an inquisitive psychologist. Upon my retirement in 1972 I could begin again, to try to complete what began in 1935.

Even so, factors are only *intentional,* pointing the way to possibilities, not to determinate actualities. Opportunity has to knock, as it has done in my life many times. One grasps what one can of them, such as fit intentionalities, which is what is at issue for everyone. I think with sadness of two brothers and their sons (my playmates) who set out from England in 1912 for new lives, one to Canada, the other to New Zealand. The former went down with the ill-fated *Titanic.* The other prospered in a new land. So it is. Intentionality, like everyday intentions, aspirations and wishes, is non-linear.

In my case opportunity knocked when I was invited to the School of Journalism, Iowa University, as John F. Murray Distinguished Professor in 1974. The Dean of the School, Malcolm MacLean Jr., had died unexpectedly, leaving behind a very active graduate student body primed in Q methodology. MacLean had fashioned this, initially, from my published work, unaware that I was his neighbor in Missouri. That was in 1965, and in the meantime we had got to know each other, sharing ideas. The professorship afforded the opportunity for research, by graduates, that I could never have accomplished by myself, and allowed me to develop the quantum-theoretical approach upon which I had set my mind fifty years earlier. My papers from 1974 to 1986 bear witness to this opportunity, chancelike, when my first disciple died too soon. No doubt I would have done something about quantum theory, but chance led me to accomplish it at Iowa.

What is left for the study of aging is now manifest. For Goffman self was not a *cause* of behavior, but a facade of acting. It is drama, like an actor's part on a stage. The same holds for Q in 'play theory.' But the self is far more complex than facade. There is self-reference in every Q sort, and this has opened the way, as with a microscope, to see what was hidden heretofore. Deep-seated *intentionalities* become manifest, of which we have all been unaware, subjects and psychologists alike. These are not internalizations as such, though their underlying *values* are. They are involvements in ongoing psychological events, whether minute and recent, or lasting a lifetime.

Internalization of values *is profoundly important in early childhood. Intentionalities arise in adolescence and into early manhood or womanhood.*

The outcries against abortion in the United States form as values in early childhood, but are intentionalities in adolescence and beyond.

Goffman would seek to explain *me,* in the above context, as subject to "barriers to perception." He would call attention to my Northern temper and speech (not the gloss of an Oxford accent), and argue that a "social class" influence had made me the reactive, aggressive, kicking person I seemed to be. I spoke a cultured Northern manner, neither Scottish nor

Oxfordish, but somewhat in between. Any barriers seem to have been of my own making. They were in relation to *values,* going back into my childhood—there was no alcohol, no gambling, no swearing, no religion in our family, only an enlightened and caring companionship. At age 16, at the end of World War I, I wrote a prize essay, published in the *London Times Literary Supplement,* in celebration of the war's end. It was in the literary style of Carlyle, Ruskin, and Edmund Burke's *Essay on the sublime and beautiful,* a romantic, youthful cry for peace in a troubled world. A neighbor had lost all four sons, all killed in France. The morality has continued with me throughout adulthood—*sans* religion, *sans* race, *sans* social-class-consciousness.

Conclusions

Enough has been introduced to make the point that studying the *feelings* of a person in the subjective context can be central to old age research. This does not mean that neurological, "brain science" theory and research is to be neglected—to the contrary. Neurology must go its own selfless way. Marshall McLuhan became entangled in speculation about the nervous system, conceived as a complex telephonic system. Twenty years later the focus is on the complexity as such, as in chaos theory—the science of turbulence. Psychology can only wait patiently for the neurosciences to make their discoveries. Meanwhile there is no "cognitive psychology" worthy of the name, nor a social psychology that isn't equally categorical.

What Q methodology proposes, contrary to much in current thought, is *that behavior is influenced by principles which are within the province of subjective science.* One such is *intentionality,* which leaves all to *possibilities.* The world "outside" will do most to change possibilities into concrete actions, that may *look* like predictions, but which are only fortuitously so. I would beg any "doubting Thomas" to read Bertrand Russell's "My Mental Development" (in *The World of Mathematics,* 1956, Vol I, (14), p. 381–394). There Russell found Shelley, long before he went to Cambridge. There we find him using the word *profundity* (p. 386), and deciding to devote his life to philosophy—if Ward and Whitehead had not been supportive, Russell would have devoted himself, instead, to economics (p. 387). His *Philosophy of Leibnitz* owed its origin to chance (p. 388). Then, on page 389 the deadening influence of Wittgenstein, that the theory of *description* depended upon normative attribution of meaning to every word in a sentence. Chance had dealt a fatal blow. Then a grasp that theory of knowledge (p. 391) has "a certain essential subjectivity . . . it asks 'how do I know what I know?' and starts inevitably from personal experience. Its data are egocentric, and so are the earlier stages of its argumentation." But then a mistake: whatever is not experienced, Russell argued, if known, must be known by inference.

In Q, what is *not* experienced is the operant factor structure of *any* thought. Is this merely inferential? It is clearly not solipsist, a belief that the self is the only knowable; nor idealistic, a belief that objects of perception count as ideas only. It is *realistic,* that when an operant factor structure is shown to the Q sorter who provided it unknowingly, it is accepted as his or hers without question—often with astonishment. Our position is that *technique* has allowed us to extract from communicability what was there already, as amoeba are in pond water, waiting for a microscope to bring them into view.

The point I am making is twofold: old age research could scarcely do better than *begin* with a Bertrand Russell, whose 1959 essay on "My mental development" is chockfull of self-reference, and to show to the scientific world what *he* represented as intentionality. And, second, old age research, from the subjective framework, can be testimony to the quotation from Harriet Beecher Stowe with which Russell opened his essay:

> I 'spect I grow'd. Don't think nobody ever made me. (From *Uncle Tom's Cabin*)

We now know that the self is mainly implicit. The self, that everyone believes but that the modem psychologist cannot find (Natsoulas, 1978) is in fact real enough, and can be *found.* In Goffman's system, the performer is a communicator of *claims,* and these are highly predictable. The Junk Peddler always puts on his front; the Surgeon always attests to professional standards. In Q, however, the self is unpredictable though not lawless; and it always involves moralities. We are indeed "merchants of moralities" as Goffman supposed. Thus, there is much in agreement between Goffman and our own thesis. But where Goffman speculates, Q provides operations. These, we have known for half a century, are quantum-theoretical. In addition, what I have indicated above is as "queer" as quantum theory itself, that in searching for roots of behavior in early childhood internalizations, and professing that these are the forces at work in adolescence and adulthood, we lose sight of a certain *autonomy* in these latter years. Some psychologists, for example Gordon Allport (1937), have already called attention to this. Again, whereas Allport speculated, we can operate by Q. The *discovery* is that Q factors about psychological events involve *profundities* (a concept for matters deeper than the merely profound), which are the *intentionalities* of Q-factor analysis for all of us. They deal directly with the sheer complexity of our subjectivity, in everyday experience. I have written about profundity elsewhere (Stephenson, 1988), and about the significance of conscious fantasy, as distinct from so-called unconscious fantasy, also elsewhere (Stephenson, 1952, 1987). I make reference to chaos theory, the concept of non-linear formations from chaos, legitimately, and not

merely as analogy. I make reference to paradox and contradiction, everywhere manifest in modern physics and modern subjective science alike. It is in this context, of Q methodology as such, that old age research can prosper in the manner required in the Myers Lecture of Patrick Rabbitt. Incidentally, I knew Myers well: he didn't really like statistics, except for averaging.

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