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USE-VALUE IN ARCHITECTURE: RECONCEPTUALIZING BUILDINGS' FUNCTIONS

CAROLYN FAHEY

The present issue owes its contributions to an international symposium held by the *International Society for the Philosophy of Architecture*, the society behind *Architecture Philosophy*. Hosted over the summer of 2015 at the Wittgenstein House in Vienna, symposium speakers were able to literally demonstrate claims by pointing to the structure around them. The setting stimulated difficult conversations about Wittgenstein, architecture, and architecture's Modernism. Entitled "Use-Value in Architecture: Reconceptualizing Buildings' Functions," the symposium raised a host of questions related to the notion of function in architecture's Modernist discourse and called upon Wittgenstein's notion of meaning as use to aid in its resolution:

> *Given the wealth of new ways of conceptualizing building, its practice, and its meanings, this call for papers prompts authors to reconceptualize the notion of buildings' functions in terms of use, particularly as is described in Wittgenstein's use theory.*
>
> *By engaging one of philosophy's richest and most formidable postmodern thinkers—Ludwig Wittgenstein—the discourse surrounding function can move away from architecture's Modernist paradigm that has largely defined how we think about and deal with questions relating to function. Wittgenstein—who remains largely undealt with by the architectural discourse, but whose work has nevertheless had ample development from*

"THE DISCOURSE SURROUNDING FUNCTION CAN MOVE AWAY FROM THE MODERNIST'S PARADIGM"

> *within the philosophical discourse—provides genuine contributions to the understanding of use and meaning. Specifically, the Wittgensteinian notion of meaning as use moves the discussion away from mechanical or systematic notions grounded in scientific inquiry, and instead focuses analysis on the particular context or language-game within which a building partakes. Thus, the hope is to utilize Ludwig Wittgenstein's theory of meaning to achieve radically alternative analyses of building's use, thereby allowing for productive re-engagement with one of architecture's most fundamentally philosophical questions.*[1]

The symposium's call simultaneously prompted thinkers to revisit questions relating to Wittgenstein's philosophical significance within the architecture discourse.

This special issue seeks to reinvigorate the discourse surrounding the Wittgenstein House, not so much with the interest of canonizing the house, but rather as a means of developing a working method for understanding the relationship between philosophy and architecture. The motivating factor—not coincidentally the primary purpose of this journal and its society also—is a foundational question to understanding what architecture is, what its history is, and what it could, or rather, should be.

Wittgenstein himself participated in the design of a mansion, known widely as the Wittgenstein House, making him one of the few famous philosophers to have directly engaged in architectural design. Heidegger is also well known for having written on architecture, in his essay "Building, Dwelling, Thinking" but is not known for having engaged the design or construction processes so foundational to understanding architecture. In Wittgenstein's case, it was not well-known that he had had any run-in with architecture until after Bernhard Leitner's 1973 publication of *The Wittgenstein House*. Previously, and to this day, Wittgenstein is best known as a philosopher who made substantive contributions to philosophy of language—ordinary language philosophy especially. When Leitner published his text, the architecture discipline momentarily turned its divided attention to the house at a time when the architecture was inundated with post-structuralist theories. Architects were intrigued by the possibility that a single person's work could bridge between the disciplines of architecture and of philosophy and set out to understand how one's person work could embody both. Yet, the methods these thinkers used to analyze the house were in keeping with post-structuralist methods, and the results were tantalizing acrobatic arguments at odds with Wittgenstein's own philosophical methods. Little traction was gained by the post-structuralist attempts and since then few, with the exception of Roger Paden's *Mysticism and Architecture* and Nana Last's *Wittgenstein's House*, have attempted to re-conceive this terrain.[2]

Starting off the issue, Jochen Schuff's paper clears the field, so to speak, of the existing literature. The matter-of-fact survey separates theoretical interpolation from what Wittgenstein said. To do so otherwise, I would argue, is to proceed in a decidedly un-Wittgensteinian manner. His strict reading looks to David Macarthur's recently published piece in *Architecture Theory Review*, as having repeated many of the past attempt's missteps.[3] As readers will see later in the issue, August Sarnitz's paper draws a similar conclusion to that of Schuff albeit using original source material and recently translated empirical information on the house and the Austrian cultural context.

> “THE MATTER OF FACT SURVEY SEPARATES THEORETICAL INTERPOLATION FROM WHAT WITTGENSTEIN SAID”

Taking a staunch position, Schuff seems to believe that everything written on the topic of Wittgenstein's philosophy of architecture falls into the terrain of un-Wittgensteinian extrapolation, and therefore should be discounted. It seems that much of what has been produced in philosophical discourse on Wittgenstein's philosophy would then also fall into this category, but it is unclear whether Schuff would agree to such a parallel criticism of philosophy. Schuff does appear to shift into a moderate position with regards to what can be said of Wittgenstein's and architecture in the second half of his paper, wherein he does indulge in a few analyses of the significance of Wittgenstein's remarks when considering architecture. The shift later in the paper suggests perhaps that his initial staunch position is more moderate. For me, although Wittgenstein is not himself a philosopher of architecture, that does not rule out the possibility that there is something of philosophical significance on architecture Wittgenstein has said.

Nevertheless, whether any kind extrapolation is permitted, how much and when such extrapolation maybe permitted, or whether Wittgenstein's remarks hold any meaningful application to architecture remains contested and will remain a heated point of debate in any discussion of Wittgenstein in architecture. Whatever one's position on the matter, Schuff's paper will be an invaluable starting point for those entering this field as he carefully surveys and delineates what Wittgenstein did say and what can arguably meaningfully be said, without transgressing into the terrain of liberal interpolation.

Perfectly juxtaposed with Schuff is August Sarnitz who argues that the Wittgenstein House demonstrates some of Wittgenstein's philosophical points using a standard approach to analyzing building. Sarnitz is unique in existing literature for not over-attributing meaning to the house, for grounding his attributions of meaning directly in building analysis, and for analyzing the Wittgenstein House in light of Wittgenstein's own thinking as opposed to that of Loos or other fin de siècle thinkers in Vienna at the time.

Sarnitz provides an analysis of the house, contextualizing it in Viennese Modernism and traditional Austrian building practice. He provides a foundation for understanding Wittgenstein's engagement with building practice, and in doing so corrects the established understanding, and provides the basis for an alternative reading of the house. Unique other accounts of the house is Sarnitz's ability to argue for both Wittgenstein's status as an architect and his originality in this position. While the standard reading of the house places it within Viennese Modernism, or amongst the likes of Loos and Wagner, the reading typically views Wittgenstein as an intellectual member of the Viennese Modernist movement. Yet, Sarnitz demonstrates Wittgenstein's intellectual opposition to many of the foundational positions of Viennese Modernism. He shows us that the Wittgenstein House demonstrates a different take on the aesthetics of utility then many of his Austrian contemporaries. As such, many existing historical attributions of the Wittgenstein House are at odds with Sarnitz's characterization.

The next paper explores what can be said of architecture in light of Wittgenstein, particularly as pertains to Wittgenstein's theory of meaning. Emre Demirel approaches the topic from within the discipline of architecture and reaches toward a philosophical statement. Demirel discusses Wittgenstein's theory of meaning as a means of questioning the notion of tradition in architecture. His theoretical position is demonstrated by examples taken from his native Turkey, which serves not only to evidence the theoretical position taken, but further develop the position by working through notions of representation and building analysis.

Reidar Due's paper runs counter to Demirel's in the sense that his paper approaches the topic from within philosophy and reaches toward architecture. Due discusses the conceptual foundations underpinning segments of architectural theory. He looks to the Wittgensteinian concept of meaning as use in order to demonstrate the limitations of Hegelian notions of architecture, the limitations of which are for him the basis of contemporary architecture theory. He then discusses the role of ideologies in collective thought about building, so as to show the limitations of essentialist notions of architecture as well as the limitations certain "categories", as the author calls them, have on the way we think about building. Due's categories run parallel to Adrian Forty's analysis of the role of words in conceptions of architecture, yet Due argues further effectively saying that these categories or words provide the basis of conceptual formations.[4] Due focuses on the role of the historian in constructing architectural ideologies, leaving the reader to ask whether ideologies are always so construed.

> “SARNITZ DEMONSTRATES WITTGENSTEIN'S INTELLECTUAL OPPOSITION TO ... VIENNESE MODERNISM”

Hilde Heynen's contribution takes a turn, looking to the disciplinary rift that has for decades, perhaps centuries, divided reflective thinkers. Heynen reviews the discourse defining text *Aesthetics of Architecture* by Roger Scruton, marking its recent new edition. The review serves as a short position piece describing why philosophers, albeit not all, so consistently fail to engage architecture. Their methodological errors in the approach to a subject they know little appears the cause, and the seemingly lack of engagement with building the symptom. Heynen provides a reasoned analysis as to why Scruton's thinking has not resonated, in either the original or recent revised edition, with those in the architecture discipline. She argues that while Scruton provides a competently argued account of architecture, the characterization is too limited to be recognizable, perhaps intelligible, to those intimately studied in architecture's discourse and practice.

ENDNOTES

1. Fahey, Carolyn, March 1, 2015, "Use-Value in Architecture: Reconceptualizing Buildings' Functions," *International Society for the Philosophy of Architecture*, http://isparchitecture.com/events/call-for-papers/

2. See my Ph.D. dissertation for a detailed survey of literature surrounding the house and the limitations of each contribution: Carolyn Fahey, *The Claim of Architecture: a new Wittgensteinian reading* (Newcastle upon Tyne: Newcastle University, 2010).

3. David Macarthur, 'Working on Oneself in Philosophy and Architecture: A Perfectionist Reading of the Wittgenstein House', *Architecture Theory Review* 19.2 (2015).

4. Adrian Forty, *Words and Buildings: a vocabulary of Modern Architecture* (London: Thames & Hudson, 2000).

CONTESTING WITTGENSTEIN'S REMARKS ON ARCHITECTURE

JOCHEN SCHUFF

As the general concern of this journal issue is the relevance of Wittgenstein's thinking for the philosophy of architecture, I will take the task quite literally. Accordingly, the aim of my paper is to explore whether there is evidence for systematic ideas about architecture in Wittgenstein. Reading *Culture and Value*, it may well seem as if architecture ranked among the subjects Wittgenstein did think about—at least from time to time. I will provide some context concerning the status of these remarks—as well as that of some others not included in *Culture and Value*—in Wittgenstein's work.

All things considered, there is not much to be found in Wittgenstein's writing concerning the arts or aesthetics in general. There are, to be sure, some editions of student's notes of lectures on the subject of aesthetics [1], and numerous opinions reported in correspondences and biographies, but only a few remarks devoted to art both in the single book Wittgenstein published in his lifetime, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, and among the 20,000 pages of text he left in his *Nachlass*. Most of these remarks contain reflections about music, especially musical meaning and understanding. In relation, there is even less Wittgenstein specifically wrote on the subject of architecture. The fact may be striking, since Wittgenstein, while having temporarily abandoned philosophy, famously took part in designing and building the city mansion for his sister Margarethe Stonborough-Wittgenstein in Kundmanngasse, Vienna, between 1926 and 1928. He even considered himself an architect by trade

> "ALL THINGS CONSIDERED, THERE IS NOT MUCH TO BE FOUND IN WITTGENSTEIN'S WRITING CONCERNING THE ARTS OR AESTHETICS IN GENERAL."

during this period.

There is much to be said, and in fact much has been said about Wittgenstein's architectural practice, but I do not intend to contribute to that discussion [2]. Nor will I make reference to the frequent metaphors from the realm of building that Wittgenstein makes use of, for instance in the *Philosophical Investigations* or in *On Certainty*. In my mind, the parallels between Wittgenstein's activity as an architect and his being a philosopher, or between his architecture and his philosophy, are often overstated. Compared to Nana Last's reading of the Kundmanngasse house as a bridging between different spatialities in Wittgenstein's thought or Roger Paden's interpretation of the house as a manifestation of mysticism, there are more modest proposals. In a recent reevaluation of the links between the house and Wittgenstein's philosophy, for instance, David Macarthur nonetheless refers to Wittgenstein's "ideas" or "reflections" on architecture, drawing on *Culture and Value* [3]. On closer inspection, though, most of the ideas are actually Adolf Loos', serving Macarthur as a matrix of interpretation for Wittgenstein's own remarks. My aim, instead, is to focus exclusively on what Wittgenstein actually wrote about the subject of architecture, and to determine the philosophical status of these remarks in their own right.

In the first section of my paper, I will present a survey of more or less everything Wittgenstein specifically (in the strict sense) wrote about architecture. Most of these remarks, it will turn out, are no more than sketches or rough ideas. Some of them belong to the context of art or aesthetics as Wittgenstein conceived of it. This connection will be discussed in the second section. In other cases, Wittgenstein uses architecture as an object of analogy, or comparison. In the third section, a commentary on one remark comparing architectural to philosophical practice is provided. Section IV will conclude that the value of Wittgenstein's remarks read as contributions to a philosophy of architecture is limited; while Wittgenstein's broader reflections on aesthetics are significant in terms of content and method, if often neglected, the same cannot be said of the scattered paragraphs on architecture [4].

I

In his early writings, Wittgenstein virtually does not mention architecture at all. As far as we can tell, it is only after having finished the house in Kundmanngasse that he starts to write down thoughts about architecture, but there are usually long stretches of time in between. In 1930, he notes: "Today the difference between a good & a poor architect consists in the fact that the poor architect succumbs to every temptation while the good one resists it" [5]. In this aphoristic remark, we are given no hint as to what kind of temptation Wittgenstein could have in mind, or what the difference between a good and a poor architect could have been before today. We can only guess whether Wittgenstein is thinking of someone or something particular here. Shortly after, there is some criticism of contemporary architecture (as an expression of a culture and civilization alien to the author) in the "Sketch for a Foreword" dating from the same year, probably written for the *Big Typescript* [6]. Both comments can be read as fragments of criticism, rather than theory. In contrast, a recurrent aesthetic concept is introduced in 1933; Wittgenstein notes: "Remember the impression made by good architecture, that it expresses a thought. One would like to respond to it too with a gesture" [7]. Consequently, in 1938, in a rather sketchy remark, Wittgenstein tentatively thinks about, "Phenomena akin to language in music or architecture" [8]. Then, in 1942, the motive of gesture becomes explicit again: "Architecture is a gesture. Not every purposive movement of the human body is a gesture. Just as little as every functional building is architecture" [9]. Here, the link between architecture and gestures seems even closer. Moreover, Wittgenstein seems to draw a distinction between mere building and architecture, the distinction being that architecture is a gesture, while mere building is not. In a remark existing in several variations, he writes in 1947: "Architecture glorifies something (because it endures). Hence there can be no architecture where there is nothing to glorify" [10]. One alternative version mentions gestures, too; it reads: "Architecture glorifies something because it is a gesture which endures. It glorifies its purpose" [11]. Taking up, perhaps, the thought that architecture is some kind of petrified gesture designed with the purpose of glorification, Wittgenstein writes in 1948: "A great architect in a

> "WE CAN ONLY GUESS WHETHER WITTGENSTEIN IS THINKING OF SOMEONE OR SOMETHING PARTICULAR"

bad period (van der Nüll) has a quite different task from that of a great architect in a good period. You must again not let yourself be deceived by the generic term. Don't take comparability, but rather incomparability, as a matter of course" [12]. The bottom line in this case, however, is not so much aesthetic as linguistic, since Wittgenstein claims that one and the same *allgemeine Begriffswort* ("generic term") can have two different meanings relative to context, so that the term great architect can attribute different qualities to a person depending on the cultural context she is working in. It is not easy to see, though, why Wittgenstein is talking about generic terms here; it seems rather trivial that being called a great architect can rest on different accomplishments, or tasks, for it evidently depends on aesthetic judgments. Without any context, the remark is rather mysterious; it would have been interesting to know what Wittgenstein takes the task of the great architect in a good or in a bad period to be, respectively. All we can assume is that Wittgenstein seems to have appreciated van der Nüll's architecture (the most prominent example of which is the Vienna State Opera) [13].

Almost all of these remarks can be found in the collection *Culture and Value*. In German, the volume has been published under the more appropriate title *Vermischte Bemerkungen*, calling its content what it is: miscellaneous or mixed remarks, mixed not by Wittgenstein, but by his editors, Georg Henrik von Wright in this case. This is what they (or he) found worthy of being published after almost everything remotely resembling a book, say, abandoned publication projects or typescripts and even more or less coherent manuscripts like those that have come to be known as *On Certainty*, had already been published. This is not to say that the remarks thus collected, including those on architecture, are not worthy of attention, but that we should keep in mind that they do not constitute something like a book or coherent body of text that Wittgenstein devoted to questions of "culture" and "value," let alone architecture.

Some of the remarks on aesthetics and music included, in contrast, can be traced back to comparatively rich sequences of reflections on art in Wittgenstein's later manuscripts. There are good reasons for taking these series of remarks to be serious, if condensed, contributions to philosophical aesthetics. Joachim Schulte and Graham McFee argue convincingly to this effect [14]. Additionally, the published lectures can provide an impression of Wittgenstein's position in aesthetics. This holds even if we leave aside the importance for aesthetics of Wittgenstein's remarks on aspect-perception in what has come to be known as the second part of the *Philosophical Investigations*. Nothing of this sort can be said about Wittgenstein's more or less isolated remarks on architecture.

Apart from quantity and context, another criterion for the importance of a thought is the further use Wittgenstein is providing for it within his characteristic working method of writing down remarks, clipping manuscripts, reassembling remarks, clipping again and so forth [15]. Now, only in a few cases did Wittgenstein copy pertinent remarks about architecture into typescripts. It is apparent that most of these deal with the subject rather indirectly. The following remark from a 1930 manuscript will reappear in the so-called *Big Typescript*: "Work on philosophy—like work in architecture in many respects—is really more work on oneself. On one's own conception. On how one sees things. (And what one expects of them)" [16]. I will come back to these lines in the third section. The aforementioned remark saying architecture expressed a thought to which one would like to respond with a gesture reappears in TS 219 (which is part of the process of reworking manuscripts and typescripts leading from the *Big Typescript* to *Philosophical Investigations*) [17]. In TS 229, published under the title *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology I*, Wittgenstein takes up the following manuscript note: "One employment of the concept 'looking in this direction' is, e.g., as follows: One says, perhaps to an architect: 'This distribution of the windows makes the façade look in that direction.' Similarly one uses the expression 'This arm interrupts the movement of the sculpture' or 'The movement should go like this' (here one makes a gesture)" [18]. And, in the same typescript:

> *His name seems to fit his works. —How does it seem to fit? Well, I express myself in some such way. —But is that all? —It is as if the name together with these works, formed a solid whole. If we see the name, the works come to mind, and if we think of the works, so does the name. We utter the name with reverence. The name turns into a*

"[THE REMARKS] DO NOT CONSTITUTE SOMETHING LIKE A BOOK OR A COHERENT BODY OF TEXT THAT WITTGENSTEIN DEVOTED TO QUESTIONS OF CULTURE AND VALUE, LET ALONE ARCHITECTURE" *gesture; into an architectonic form [19].*

While both of these remarks seem to be concerned with questions from the domain of aesthetics, if in a specifically conceptual way, architecture surely is not their main focus. Note that both remarks mention gestures (one way or the other) in the same breath as architecture.

With all of this source material in place, first, the idea (or ideas) that architecture is a gesture, or demands a gesture, is related to Wittgenstein's general, if only adumbrated, corresponding ideas about art and especially music. Second, Wittgenstein's comparison between the work of the architect and the work of the philosopher will be revisited when considering the context of this analogy in the *Big Typescript*.

II

The motive of gesture obviously is the one prominent thread in the remarks quoted, so there is reason to suppose Wittgenstein took it seriously—at least to a certain extent. In the remarks taken from the later typescripts, he almost seems to take the motive for granted—while being occupied with different subjects. The second of the quotes from TS 229 seems to equate gesture and architectonic form; both serve to illustrate the relation between name and works. This is the light we should see the notion of gesture in. Wittgenstein is mentioning architecture in passages where he is thinking about expressiveness in various contexts, not only in the context of architecture itself. If we consider the remarks taken together, we can discern two reoccurring claims that Wittgenstein is putting forth. First, that architecture is a gesture. As a gesture, its relationship to building simpliciter can be compared to the contrast between corporeal gestures and purposive bodily movements. Yet, second, architecture also provokes, or demands, gestures. Good architecture seems to express a thought, Wittgenstein feels—he does not claim that it actually does express thoughts—in a way that one feels compelled to respond to it—the thought? the architecture?—with a gesture.

A gesture, understood minimally, is a kind of expressive behavior. It is, characteristically, not only an intentional bodily movement, but a movement that will at least accompany and emphasize, sometimes contradict, a particular utterance, sometimes even replace it [20]. In the latter case, a gesture may appear as the appropriate mode of communication, the right expression for what we want to convey. In this sense, a gesture can be an alternative to verbal language. It may be tempting to think that architecture, or art in general, is to be understood as a gesture in exactly this sense.

Initially, Wittgenstein's intuition seems to be something like that—that works of art express something ineffable in spoken language, beyond its limits—thus the aesthetic quietism in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and continuing in the transitional *Lectures on Ethics* [21]. In the *Philosophical Investigations*, and even more extensively in his *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*, he acknowledges different forms of expressiveness in language, in expressive behavior, and still even more in art. He begins to conceive of the relationship between art and language in a more nuanced way: it is the differences as well as the similarities we have to take into account. His later thought about aesthetics tackles the question of the expressiveness of art not in competition with language, but in comparison. The notion of gesture is of importance in this respect [22]. The following provides a closer look at the two directions of Wittgenstein's claims:

> "ARCHITECTURE IS A GESTURE [...] ARCHITECTURE ALSO PROVOKES, OR DEMANDS, GESTURES."

(1) If architecture is a gesture, while a mere functional building is not, we can suppose that they can be told apart by their expressive potential. Both are functional or serve a purpose. But Wittgenstein seems to use the concept of architecture as a term of praise. Obviously, he is drawing a line between mere building and building as an art, restricting the concept of architecture to the second form. This, by the way, stands in stark contrast to Loos' view that architecture is not an art [23]. In its expressiveness, architecture, as Wittgenstein indicates, can be compared to music, and both can be compared to language.

In a certain sense, people can and certainly do speak of languages of architecture [24]. But in what sense? There seems to be an obvious difference between their respective communicative potentials. A linguistic utterance can express a proposition, definite content, one might think, while it is far from clear whether music or architecture can do so. Yet, we should look at it exactly the other way around, in Wittgenstein's view. One kind of remark Wittgenstein keeps reiterating points to a change of direction necessary to understand the analogy between music and language in the right way. Take this passage from the *Brown Book*:

> *What we call 'understanding a sentence' has, in many cases, a much greater similarity to understanding a musical theme than we might be inclined to think. But I don't mean that understanding a musical theme is more like the picture which one tends to make oneself of understanding a sentence; but rather that this picture is wrong, and that understanding a sentence is much more like what really happens when we understand a tune than at first sight appears. For understanding a sentence, we say, points to a reality outside the sentence. Whereas one might say 'Understanding a sentence means getting hold of its content; and the content of the sentence is in the sentence' [25].*

The problem lies in the model of transfer. It is this model that is misleading—and it is misleading in language as well as in the arts. From the *Philosophical Investigations* on, and more specifically in his *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*, Wittgenstein discards the idea that expressiveness can be explained by reference to an inner something, connecting thought and external world, and existing before and independently of its actual expression. This is why Wittgenstein, as regards the arts, prefers referring to the non-verbal, bodily mode of communication of gestures. Instead of overestimating the role of contents, he thus highlights the understanding of expressiveness in a specific context or situation, as Stephen Mulhall emphasizes: "In such contexts [of aesthetic judgment] he emphasizes two features of the concept's grammar: the inseparability of a gesture's meaning from the gesture itself, and the importance of the context of the gesture in accounting for its impact on us" [26].

(2) This is why understanding a work of art, in Wittgenstein's view, starts with our own immediate reactions or responses to it [27]. The way we understand art as expressive is precisely by reacting to it, with one or the other verbal utterance, emotional response, movement, or, for that matter, gesture. Interestingly, the notion of an aesthetic reaction, in Wittgenstein's *Lectures on Aesthetics*, is introduced by an example from the domain of architecture (or rather building in general). Here, Wittgenstein imagines an architect at work, in the process of meticulously judging and altering the dimensions of doors and windows. We can imagine that it is exactly the expressed "thought" or "gesture" of a building, its artistic expression, that is thus altered and improved [28]. The dimensions and placement of doors and windows of a house will, again, evoke particular reactions. These can be put or circumscribed or refined in words if we

are competent critics, but in many cases they will remain what they are: immediate, bodily responses.

Music, in the *Brown Book* and beyond, is the paradigm case for this kind of connection [29]. We are often inclined to think that a musical phrase says something, that it is meaningful [30]. But, although there are certain rules governing composition, meaning is not determined by them. Nor is it fixed by the transfer of an emotion or other content from the artist to the listener. Instead, musical meaning lies in the structures of the phrase or piece themselves [31]. Drawing on a distinction Wittgenstein introduces in the *Brown Book*, it has been argued that he conceives of aesthetic expression as well as understanding in an "intransitive" sense [32]. This is to say that expression in these cases, although meaningful, cannot be unraveled by some kind of translation, but only pointed to by calling attention to details or by interpretative comments. Grasping the meaning of a work, along these lines, will often find its basic outward expression in appropriate gestures. But these are reactions informed by our understanding of music (as well as other arts) in general; their context is the whole culture we share. Understanding music means both appreciating its structure and perceiving it according to the cultural context it is part of, the history and practice of music as well as the other arts [33].

> "UNDERSTANDING A WORK OF ART BUILDS ON WAYS OF RETRACING OR FOLLOWING ITS RESPECTIVE DESIGN."

Gestures figure on both sides of the equation, so to speak. Understanding a work of art builds on ways of retracing or following its respective design. If a work of art is a gesture, its meaning is determined by the context of its being made, while simultaneously the expression is present in the work. This is why the appropriate guide to artistic meaning is our own responses to it, in our being immediately involved with an object (or event).

But this, to be sure, is nothing specific to architecture. Or, to put it another way, when it comes to architecture, Wittgenstein generally seems to model its meaning and its understanding on the case of music. The understanding of architecture he is thinking about is an understanding of architecture as art. The basic understanding of artworks, to him, is an understanding of meaningful configurations in their respective contexts, and it starts as a kind of (somatic) resonance with the features of their design and organization [34].

III

This section returns to the remark quoted in the first section, comparing the work of the philosopher to the work of the architect. In the *Big Typescript*, the remark reappears. It is given pride of place there, right at the beginning of the chapter called "Philosophy" (which is an obvious precursor of the famous remarks on philosophy in *Philosophical Investigations*, § 89-133). The remark is singled out as more than a casual or preliminary thought, but is put to service as an opening of reflections on what philosophy is, or should be. (Note that this remark was not included in the "Philosophy" chapter of the *Philosophical Investigations*, while there are a number of other remarks from the *Big Typescript* that were.) The title of this first subsection of the *Big Typescript's* chapter on philosophy is: "Difficulty of Philosophy not the Intellectual Difficulty of the Sciences, but the Difficulty of a Change of Attitude. Resistance of the *Will* Must Be Overcome." Philosophy, for Wittgenstein, is serious work, but not solely because of the intellectual challenges it may provide, but because of obstacles concerning one's attitude. The heading thus opens up two topics: a contrast between philosophy and "the sciences" and the topic of a necessary change of attitude. In a Tolstoyan tone, it is this change that is presented as meeting resistance of the will. Following this heading, there is the remark about architecture again, in its new context:

> *As is frequently the case with work in architecture, work on philosophy is actually closer to working on oneself. On one's own understanding. On the way one sees things. (And on what one demands of them.) Roughly speaking, according to the old conception – for instance that of the (great) western philosophers – there have been two kinds of intellectual problems: the essential, great, universal ones, and the non-essential, quasi-accidental problems. We, on the other hand, hold that there is no such thing as a great, essential problem in the intellectual sense [35].*

For one thing, the second part of the remarks distances philosophy from the (presumably natural) sciences, which is a common thread running all the way through Wittgenstein's thinking [36]. Rather than solving, or even conceiving of, problems the way the sciences do, Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy aims—as he puts it here—at a change of perspective, at a different attitude towards the puzzles we are confronted with. This different attitude clearly involves the rejection of essentialist intuitions. All philosophical problems, Wittgenstein seems to imply, are equally important. Now the problems of aesthetics, Wittgenstein keeps on stressing (see *Lectures on Aesthetics*), are not like scientific problems either. They are not to be solved empirically, by research on causes of reactions, for instance [37]. When we deal with art, in Wittgenstein's words: when we are faced with aesthetic puzzles or conduct aesthetic investigations, we are looking for a different perspective, that is for alternative reasons a work is designed as it is we did not think of before. In this respect, as recently explicated by Simo Säätelä, aesthetics, in Wittgenstein, can be seen as a kind of paradigm of philosophy: "[A]n aesthetic investigation, in Wittgenstein's sense, bears a close similarity to a philosophical investigation (also in Wittgenstein's sense): both aim at putting things 'side by side' and change one's *way of perceiving*" [38].

This, to be sure, is rather what an art critic will do, not necessarily the work of the artist. Yet Wittgenstein does not sharply distinguish between performance and reception, nor between artistic creation and criticism. What a competent art critic can do is to persuade us of such a different perspective, to give us reasons for seeing something in a new way. She can help us change our attitude, so to speak. Being involved in the creation of a work of art includes such critical processes—in this sense, the artist is her own critic. The architect in Wittgenstein's analogy has to train her perception, her way of seeing things—especially in relation to detail: there is nothing inessential, accidental. This is the sense in which her work is a work on herself, on enhancing her capacities of judging and responding to the features of her work. We can see this as a model of how, for Wittgenstein, work on philosophy also contains both aspects, procedures of (self)criticism as a part of finding the right

> “PHILOSOPHY, FOR WITTGENSTEIN, IS SERIOUS WORK, BUT NOT SOLELY BECAUSE OF THE INTELLECTUAL CHALLENGES IT MAY PROVIDE, BUT BECAUSE OF THE OBSTACLES CONCERNING ONE'S ATTITUDE.”

expression.

Why is Wittgenstein comparing the practice of philosophy explicitly to the work of an architect, and not, say, to that of a composer or a painter? Perhaps because the attention to detail here not only concerns artistic expressiveness as an end in itself, but can simultaneously be a matter of the functional value of a building. In this sense, the comparison could be meant to bring out an existential dimension of philosophizing. If so, this could resonate in Wittgenstein's approval of the stanza from Henry Wadsworth Longfellow's poem "The Builders," which he considered using "as a motto" (whether for one of his books or for himself as philosopher we are not told): "In the elder days of art, / Builders wrought with greatest care / Each minute and unseen part; / For the gods see everywhere" [39].

IV

Having started with a list of Wittgenstein's scattered manuscript remarks about architecture, this analysis ends with a particular analogy between art and philosophy. It is not a coincidence, given the argument of the paper. In his typescripts and book projects, Wittgenstein mentions architecture directly only in the context of other subjects he is investigating. In the case of the remark quoted from the *Big Typescript*, for instance, he is concerned with the methods of philosophy. The allusion to the work of the architect put to use there has to build on an understanding of the subject either working on general intuitions or developed in detail elsewhere. So, the question remains whether the remarks on architecture noted in manuscripts over the years, as presented here, can be viewed as a serious contribution to a philosophy of architecture. Frankly, it does not appear so. In itself, the fact that the remarks are too sparse to constitute a coherent body of thought need not compromise their philosophical potential. Yet additionally, they remain far too vague to illuminate the practice of architecture. There is, to be sure, the recurrent motive of architecture being a gesture. Although this motive only makes sense in the context of Wittgenstein's general ideas about art and aesthetics, and especially about music, in which the notion of gestures is elaborated much further. These ideas, in turn, should be read in the light of the discussions about rules and linguistic meaning in *Philosophical Investigations* and about talk of inner states in *Philosophy of Psychology*. In a sense, then, granting Wittgenstein's own, rather idiosyncratic understanding of aesthetics, the practice of philosophy can be better understood by comparing it to the practice of art, especially art criticism [40]. It would be exaggerating to claim any special role for architecture in this regard—music is, for

Wittgenstein, the much more interesting case. His remarks on architecture hardly scratch the surface of whatever one could think of as subject matters of a philosophy of architecture, say, problems of the ontology, function, experience, or appreciation of architectural objects, or questions not only of the aesthetic, but also of the ethical, social, or political character of architecture. This is not to say that aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophy in general and his perspective on aesthetics in particular cannot fruitfully be used for elucidating the practice and understanding of architecture—but Wittgenstein himself, as read here, is not a philosopher of architecture [41].

> “WITTGENSTEIN HIMSELF, AS READ HERE, IS NOT A PHILOSOPHER OF ARCHITECTURE.”

ENDNOTES

[1] See Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief*, ed. Cyril Barrett (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1966). See also G. E. Moore, “Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-33,” Mind 64, no. 253 (1955) and *Ludwig Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein's Lectures: Cambridge, 1932-1935,* ed. Alice Ambrose (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 2001).

[2] Monographs on the architecture (and, sometimes, “philosophy”) of the Stonborough-Wittgenstein house include: *Bernhard Leitner, The Architecture of Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Documentation* (London: Studio International Publications, 1973); Jan Turnovský, *The Poetics of a Wall Projection* (London: Architectural Association Publications, 2009); Paul Wijdeveld, *Ludwig Wittgenstein, Architect* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1994); Bernhard Leitner, *The Wittgenstein House* (Princeton: Princeton Architectural Press, 2000); Roger Paden, *Mysticism and Architecture: The Meanings of the Palais Stonborough* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2007); Nana Last, *Wittgenstein's House: Language, Space and Architecture* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008); Daniele Pisani, *L'architettura è un gesto: Ludwig Wittgenstein architetto* (Macerata: Quodlibet Studio,

2011); August Sarnitz, *Die Architektur Wittgensteins: Rekonstruktion einer gebauten Idee* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2011).

[3] See David Macarthur, "Working on Oneself in Philosophy and Architecture: A Perfectionist Reading of the Wittgenstein House," *Architectural Theory Review* 19, no. 2 (2014).

[4] For the contrast between Wittgenstein's own aesthetic perspective and what became known as "Wittgensteinianism" in aesthetics see, for instance, Noël Carroll, "Art in an Expanded Field: Wittgenstein and Aesthetics," *The Nordic Journal of Aesthetics* 23, no. 42 (2012); Paul Guyer, *A History of Modern Aesthetics, Volume 3: The Twentieth Century* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 432-450.

[5] Ludwig Wittgenstein, Ms 107 230, *Culture and Value*, ed. G. H. von Wright, trans. Peter Winch (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 5. My quotations from Wittgenstein's manuscripts and typescripts are taken from *The Bergen Electronic Edition of Wittgenstein's Nachlass* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). Translations are Peter Winch's from the 1998 revised edition of *Culture and Value*, unless otherwise indicated.

[6] Wittgenstein, Ms 109 205, *Culture and Value*, 8.

[7] Wittgenstein, Ms 156a 25r, *Culture and Value*, 26.

[8] Wittgenstein, Ms 121 26v, *Culture and Value*, 40.

[9] Wittgenstein, Ms 126 29, *Culture and Value*, 49.

[10] Wittgenstein, Ms 167 11r, *Culture and Value*, 74.

[11] Wittgenstein, Ms 167 10v, my translation.

[12] Wittgenstein, Ms 137 76a, *Culture and Value*, 84.

[13] For a more extensive interpretation of the remark, see Joseph Masheck, *Adolf Loos: The Art of Architecture* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2013), 213-215.

[14] See Joachim Schulte, *Experience and Expression: Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 37-45; Graham McFee, "Wittgenstein and the Arts: Understanding and Performing," in *Wittgenstein, Aesthetics and Philosophy*, ed. Peter B. Lewis (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004).

[15] On Wittgenstein's working process, see Joachim Schulte, "What is a Work by Wittgenstein?," in *Wittgenstein: The Philosopher and his Works*, ed. Alois Pichler and Simo Säätelä (Heusenstamm: Ontos, 2006), 400-401.

[16] Wittgenstein, Ms 112 24r; *Culture and Value*, 24.

[17] Ludwig Wittgenstein, TS 219 22.

[18] Ludwig Wittgenstein, TS 229 192, *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*

I, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), 5. Translations are Anscombe's.

[19] Wittgenstein, Ts 229 269; *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology I*, 68.

[20] For a substantial account of gestures and their meaning, see David McNeill, *Gesture and Thought* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), especially the second chapter.

[21] See Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961), sections 6.421, 6.522; TS 207.

[22] See Karlheinz Lüdeking, "Pictures and Gestures," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 30, no. 3 (1990); Fabian Goppelsröder, "Über die Gestensprache zur Sprachgeste. Wittgenstein und die Konsequenzen seines alternativen Kommunikationsmodells," *Paragrana* 19, no. 1 (2010).

[23] See Masheck, Adolf Loos, 230; David Macarthur, "Remarks on 'Architecture is a Gesture' (Wittgenstein)," *Paragrana* 23, no. 1 (2014).

[24] For a quick overview, see Edward Winters, "Architecture," in *The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics*, ed. Berys Gaut and Dominic McIver Lopes (London: Routledge, 2013).

[25] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *The Blue and Brown Books* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958), 167; compare Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and Rush Rhees (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963), § 527.

[26] Stephen Mulhall, *Inheritance and Originality: Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Kierkegaard* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), 169

[27] See Simo Säätelä, "'Perhaps the most important thing in connection with aesthetics' Wittgenstein on 'Aesthetic Reactions,'" *Revue internationale de philosophie*, no. 219 (2002).

[28] See Wittgenstein, *Lectures and Conversations*, 13-14.

[29] See Lüdeking, "Pictures and Gestures;" Roger Scruton, "Wittgenstein and the Understanding of Music," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 44, no. 1 (2004); Yves Bossart, *Ästhetik nach Wittgenstein. Eine systematische Rekonstruktion* (Heusenstamm: Ontos, 2013), 213-226.

[30] See Wittgenstein, *The Blue and Brown Books*, 166.

[31] See ibid.

[32] See Richard Wollheim, *Art and its Objects*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 73-76; David Bell, "The Art of Judgment," *Mind* 96, no. 382 (1987), 239-244; Kjell S. Johannessen, "Philosophy, Art and Intransitive Understanding," in *Wittgenstein and Norway*, ed. Kjell S. Johannessen (Oslo: Solum, 1994); Bossart, *Ästhetik nach Wittgenstein*, 195-204.

[33] For an excellent reading of the way Wittgenstein comments on two musical examples, see Katrin Eggers, "'Diese musikalische Phrase ist für mich eine Gebärde. Sie schleicht sich in mein Leben ein.' Musik als Geste und musikalische Gesten bei Wittgenstein," *Wittgenstein-Studien* 6, no. 1 (2015).

[34] For detailed analyses of the way Wittgenstein criticizes and preserves both formalist and expressivist intuitions, especially with respect to musical meaning, see Béla Szabados, *Wittgenstein as Philosophical Tone-Poet: Philosophy and Music in Dialogue* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2014), especially 87-97; Katrin Eggers, *Ludwig Wittgenstein als Musikphilosoph* (Freiburg: Karl Alber, 2011), 203-227.

[35] Wittgenstein, The Big Typescript: TS 213, ed. and trans. C. Grant Luckhardt and Maximilian A. E. Aue (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 300-301. While Winch's translation of the remark differs substantially from Luckhardt and Aue's, Wittgenstein did not change the wording from the manuscript to the typescript version. The German original reads (in both cases): "Die Arbeit an der Philosophie ist – wie vielfach die Arbeit in der Architektur – eigentlich mehr eine Arbeit an Einem selbst. An der eignen Auffassung. Daran, wie man die Dinge sieht. (Und was man von ihnen verlangt.)"

[36] See for prominent instances Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, section 4.111; Wittgenstein, *The Blue and Brown Books*, 18; Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 109.

[37] See Wittgenstein, *Lectures and Conversations*, 19-23. Repercussions of Wittgenstein's view are clearly visible in Alva Noë's recent *Strange Tools*, not only in the repudiation of scientific approaches in aesthetics, be they of an evolutionary or neuroscientific variety, but also in the proposed model of philosophy as providing "perspicuous representations." See Alva Noë, *Strange Tools: Art and Human Nature* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2015), especially 17, 49-71, 120-133.

[38] Simo Säätelä, "Aesthetics – Wittgenstein's Paradigm of Philosophy?," *Aisthesis* 6, no. 1 (2014), 40.

[39] Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, "The Builders," Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, Maine Historical Society, accessed November 18, 2015, http://www.hwlongfellow.org/poems_poem.php?pid=118. Wittgenstein misquotes the last line of the stanza as "For the gods are everywhere." I can see no indication of this alteration being intentional. (Of course, I cannot rule that out, either.) Compare Wittgenstein, Ms 120 144v; *Culture and Value*, 39.

[40] See Kjell S. Johannessen, "Wittgenstein and the Aesthetic Domain," in *Wittgenstein, Aesthetics and Philosophy*, ed. Peter B. Lewis (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004).

[41] I wish to thank Eva Backhaus, Stefan Koller, and Martin Seel, as well as two anonymous reviewers for *Architecture Philosophy*, for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

WITTGENSTEIN'S ARCHITECTURAL IDIOSYNCRASY

AUGUST SARNITZ

Ludwig Wittgenstein was deeply embedded in Viennese architectural Modernism, culturally as well as personally. His assimilation in recent historiography to existing trends within the local architectural movement—namely Loos—are based on aesthetic and intellectual simplifications. The simplifications eclipse the distinctive contribution Wittgenstein's Palais Stonborough makes to architecture, to Viennese Modernism, and perhaps to philosophy. The present paper seeks to rectify this constellation by re-situating Wittgenstein as an architect in his own right by re-sensitizing us to the idiosyncrasy of Wittgenstein's architecture [1].

The paper begins by looking at the wider biographical background setting the foundation Wittgenstein's involvement with architecture in Vienna. It scrutinizes his own as well as the family's wider personal connections to key figures in Viennese Modernism, with special focus on Josef Hoffmann and Adolf Loos. As will be shown, Wittgenstein's relation to these architects is, in Stanford Anderson's terms, one of critical conventionalism [2]. Wittgenstein builds on the conventions of pre-modern and Modern Viennese architecture, but re-interprets and re-appropriates each in a highly transformative and critical manner. The house's design draws from the local design tradition of Vienna and wider Austria, making it historical without being historicist. The historical qualities of his architectural engagement are highlighted throughout the paper, particularly in part two, where a critical discourse on the architectural and interior qualities embodied in the Wittgenstein house is proffered. The significance of doing so is to demonstrate that Wittgenstein rejects not only ornament and opulence, as comes to define the Modern movement, but that he stands apart both aesthetically and intellectually from other Modernist architects practising in Vienna at the time. This paper will explore the lineage of aesthetic meaning as evidenced by architectural details in the house, with the assumption that these details reveal something of Wittgenstein's underlying rationale.

WITTGENSTEIN'S RELATION TO LOOS

On Monday, July 27th, 1914, one day prior to the outbreak of World War I, Wittgenstein and Adolf Loos met in the elegant and ornately designed Café Hotel Imperial [3]. Loos was already well-known in Vienna as an avant-garde architect, had gained prominence through his writings (such as the 1908 essay "Ornament and Crime"), and for his controversial work, such as the 1909-1911 House on the Michaelerplatz. The house implemented many of the ideas published in "Ornament and Crime," and serves as amongst the first haute buildings rejecting opulence. Initially the building was poorly received, and among the critics was Wittgenstein's sister and future client, Margaret Stonbrough. The house was described as having naked façades and as having material opulence, with marble, mirrors and wood paneling interiors. Importantly, it still lacked ornamentation, in the sense defined and decried by Loos. The lack of such ornamentation dissociated Loos and other Modernists from questions of use. Thus, Loos stood out in Vienna for his radical thinking and his work, leading him to recognition across Europe and the modernizing world.

Loos' difference from others in the Viennese context must have made an impression on Wittgenstein, who until this meeting with Loos had engaged only mechanical engineering and logic as fields of inquiry. The impact of meeting Loos' distinction is apparent as after meeting Loos, Wittgenstein returned home—a five-minute walk—to his parent's house. His family's city palace had interiors much like those of the Hotel Imperial —and like that hotel, would have likely been rejected by Loos' ideals of simplicity and austerity. The juxtaposition between the contemporary and opulence of empire and monarchy—even for the business elite—was stark and evidently present in Wittgenstein's everyday reality.

The next day, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. Eleven days later Wittgenstein volunteered to serve. During the war, Wittgenstein met and befriended Paul Engelmann to whom he was introduced by Adolf Loos, and who he would later work with on the Wittgenstein House.

Also in the war period, Wittgenstein worked on his *Tractatus*, the only work published in his lifetime. He completed the text during the summer of 1918, between July and September during a break from the front. In November 1919, after the end of the war and his release from captivity in August, Wittgenstein returned to Vienna.

Within just two weeks, Wittgenstein left for a meeting with his friend Adolf Loos full of expectation, but he was appalled by Loos and his ideas about a *Kunstamt* (a state office or ministry for art). Wittgenstein writes:

> *a few days ago I looked up Loos. I was horrified and nauseated. He has become infected with the most virulent bogus intellectualism! He gave me a pamphlet about a proposed 'fine arts office', in which he speaks about a sin against the Holy Ghost. That surely is the limit! I was already a bit depressed when I went to Loos but that was the last straw […] [4].*

The episode suggests the end of Wittgenstein's friendship with Loos as a person. True to his word, Wittgenstein would never meet Loos again.

“[WITTGENSTEIN] WAS APPALLED BY LOOS AND HIS IDEAS ABOUT A **KUNSTAMT**”

His relationship to Loos' aesthetic and architectural ideas, however, is more complicated. While living in the remote reaches of Norway between 1912 and 1914, Wittgenstein went to great troubles to receive subscription copies of *Die Fackel*. The Viennese cultural newspaper edited by Karl Kraus regularly reported on Loos and other mainstays of Viennese intelligentsia. While rejecting the radical changes in Loos' thinking after World War I, Wittgenstein's attempts to develop a nuanced response to Loos' earlier work, both written and built, continued to interest him. The lingering interest in the development of Viennese architectural Modernism is manifest in the house as Wittgenstein's entrance hall in the Palais Stonborough resembles Loos' design decisions at the Michaelerplatz. The hall of the Wittgenstein

House has four prominently placed columns and overall meticulous regard for precise dimensions, which demonstrates both resemblance departure from Loos' surface detailing in other regards.

Looking to Kraus' 1930 summary of Loos appearing in *Die Fackel*, parallels between Wittgenstein's later writing and the contemporary thought of Viennese designers are found:

> *Adolf Loos and I […] have done nothing more than to show that there is a difference between a urn and a chamberpot. It is in this difference that culture is given a space to play itself out. The others, those with positive knowledge, however, divide themselves between those who would use the urn as a chamberpot and those who would use the chamberpot as an urn [5].*

Similar remarks are found in Wittgenstein's student recorded lectures on aesthetics a year or two later in Cambridge. He observed a deterioration (a *Verfall* in Loos' terms) in the culture and craft of architecture [6]. In doing so, Wittgenstein targets the increasing failure of architects and patrons to differentiate a room and its furnishings, which he believed should be differentiated according to their proper use and place [7]. We now, he said, live in an age where dining-room chairs are put up in drawing-rooms and vice versa, with no understanding of what is inappropriate or incorrect about that practice—correctness being, for Wittgenstein, a central term of aesthetic commendation, rather than a descriptor of appearance such as beautiful [8]. Wittgenstein states:

> *A picture of what happens in Architecture […] when thousands of people are interested in the minutest details [, as opposed to a] picture of what happens when a dining-room table is chosen more or less at random, when no one [any longer] knows where it came from. ([…] A period in which everything is fixed and extraordinary care is lavished on certain details […]. A great number of people are highly interested in a detail of a dining-room chair. And then there is a period when a dining-room chair is in the drawing-room and no one knows where this came from or that people had once given enormous thought in order to know how to design it.) [9].*

The parallels the above lines to Kraus' and Loos' reflections on urns and chamber pots are rather pronounced and the intellectual genealogy clear. Moreover, Wittgenstein's use of the term 'detail' may relate to its use in craftsmanship. In craftsmanship the term is used to denote precision and adequacy to resolve design problems, specifically of an architectural character.

In light of detail's meaning for Wittgenstein, the term certainly plays a role in Wittgenstein's own architecture. For at the built level, Wittgenstein's own architectural decisions at Palais Stonborough fully reflect the distinctions of spatial use, dictated by a refined understanding and appreciation of propriety, both social and aesthetic, his later lectures on aesthetics reflect upon. The alleged austerity of Wittgenstein's interiors, for instance, is the result of historians' interpretations of photos of the house pre- or post-use as Wittgenstein's architecture in its intended state [10]. When furbished by his sister Margaret, the house's furnished interior fully reflected the dictates of good taste and propriety Wittgenstein eminently desired and demanded for his architecture, as he expressly wrote to his sister later on:

> *Only yesterday I had to think of the house in the Kundmanngasse—I don't know why—and of how pleasingly and pleasantly you have furbished it. In these matters we're on the same wave length [11].*

In contrast to Loos, who regarded the wall and the finishes the prerogative of the architect, Wittgenstein left such matters at the discretion of the client. Margaret, the client in this case, furnishes the house in a manner that is both independent from Ludwig's design intentions and which is in contrast to the Loosian standard in Vienna at the time. She is particularly expressive with her furnishments on the upper floors where she has her private spaces, and which she adorns with tapestries and furniture that are textured and warm. Thus, the standard historical characterizations of the house's apparent austerity as an aesthetic preference—or preference for the naked wall—appears misconstrued.

“THE STANDARD HISTORICAL CHARACTERIZATIONS OF THE HOUSE'S APPARENT AUSTERITY AS AN AESTHETIC PREFERENCE [...] APPEARS MISCONSTRUED”

MARGARET BREAKS, LUDWIG FOLLOWS: FROM LOOS AND HOFFMANN TO WAGNER AND PERCO

Between 1914 and 1919, a great deal transpired in the Wittgenstein family. Shortly before the First World War, Ludwig's closest sister Margaret bought the Villa Toskana in Gmunden on Lake Traunsee in Austria's unofficial lake district, the Salzkammergut. Over nearly two decades, Margaret dedicated her energies to the renovation and modernization of the historic building. The process concludes in 1925 and is immediately followed by her next architectural project: the Palais Stonbrough (1926-1928) [12]. With the exception of his time during the war, Ludwig would spend every summer in the increasingly modernized Villa Toscana, and would follow the building's transformation closely down to the minutest of details. To get the renovation under way, Margaret contracted a relatively little known young architect, Rudolf Perco—and not, as is often suspected, Hoffmann [13]. Margaret's choice of Perco over the family architect Hoffmann (see below) indicates an emancipatory act on her part, and certainly foreshadows her analogous decision to contract Paul Engelmann over the established radicals like Loos. Perco's significance as an architect resides in part in his discipleship with Otto Wagner, and Wagner's ground-breaking efforts in modernizing Viennese architecture. As head of the architecture school at the Vienna Fine Arts Academy, Wagner in fact founded a school. Perco became a star pupil, and Perco's own architectural output at Gmunden and beyond demonstrates his Wagnerian tutelage [14]. In its orientation, Wagner's program pursued a new orientation in the training and practice of architectural design, one we could dub constructive Jugendstil. That is, while Wagner's aesthetics was partly informed by Art Noveau sensitivities, he sought to anchor his visual design choices in the rationale of construction and function. In his famous Postal Savings Bank (1905), for instance, Wagner aesthetically elevates the duct work responsible for the building's ventilation and heating to aesthetic details. The duct work is designed to look like stelaes, stylized columns and do not recall their function directly, as standard artifacts like radiators do (see Figures 1 & 2). Here, the building systems hold aesthetic significance and meaning. Whereas in Hoffmann's work, it is carefully hidden away under, or under what may be interpreted as surface ornamentation. Perco followed Wagner's example in the Villa Toscana and turned the radiators into aesthetic elements of the architectural interior. As would, in turn, Wittgenstein in the Palais Stonborough's use of radiators (see Figures 1 and 2). So there is a clear lineage, not simply of an aesthetic decision or a built detail as such but also its underlying rationalization.

If Ludwig's future engagement with architecture is prefigured by the Villa Toscana, so is Margaret's. In contrasting Perco, Margaret acted in favor of a decidedly Modernist architect. She takes a difficult step forward in that she contracts out the work to a relatively untried-and-tested architect. She invests her money, free time, and potentially her own reputation on their promises. Margaret sets the building agenda as the primary client





FIGURES 1 & 2: (TOP TO BOTTOM).

> “WHERE THERE IS A SET OF KNOWNS OR FACTS THERE IS A BASIS FOR CLARITY”

which determines the (re)programming and aesthetics of the informal spaces in both building projects. Just as importantly, she departs from Hoffmann's influence. The departure is significant as Hoffman was the architect of her fully furnished Berlin flat, a wedding gift from her father. Hoffmann never worked with, but only for, Margaret. Margaret in turn would later emancipate herself aesthetically after her father's death, by nearly entirely leaving behind the wedding gift of a house. Except for two pieces of furniture, one of them designed by Hoffmann, Margaret left everything behind in Berlin when re-locating to Vienna to the Palais Schönborn [15, 16].

The Viennese architects Hoffman and Wagner are as important to our understanding of Margaret's future choices (as a patron) as they are to our understanding of Wittgenstein's architectonic idiosyncrasy. Let us first discuss Wittgenstein's relation to Josef Hoffmann's work. Returning to the biographical narrative at Wittgenstein's 1914 horrific and nauseating break from Loos, Wittgenstein spends ten days at his parents' lavish country home. The building was partially remodeled by Hoffmann, founding member of the Wiener Werkstätte and member of the Secession. Hoffmann presented, in many senses, an antithesis to Loos both artistically and intellectually. Hoffmann realized numerous architectural projects for the Wittgenstein family in close cooperation with Ludwig's father and was responsible for his sister Margaret's first apartment in Berlin in 1905.

Hoffman was a major proponent of the *Gesamtkunstwerk* (total work of art) where the artist delivers the complete package deal for the client. A building, interior furnishes, cutlery, crockery, and even jewelry are tailor-made to perfectly cohere in the total ensemble. The pieces are assembled by the architect, having solicited nothing from the client's own aesthetic inclinations. The client willingly signed up for the total treatment, wherein the architect designs their entire domestic realm.

Wittgenstein would later reject the *Gesamtkunstwerk* position—leaving all furnishing and other household objects to the discretion of the house's patron and tenant. He was morally open to a collaged or unplanned mingling of objects in his house, provided they bespoke a certain quality and contextual propriety. In this rejection of *Gesamtkunstwerk*, he is in keeping with Loos' idea and remaining critical of Hoffman that architecture would be confined to what was necessary from a use perspective. The confinement of aesthetics and design to use was not just critical of Hoffman, but restricted aesthetic universalism and excess. So much so that aesthetic universalism and excess is banished from the architect's scope of work.

Wittgenstein viewed Loos' aesthetic confinement not simply as the boundaries of architectural aesthetics, but further as the limits of an architect's role in building. The limits of the architect's role is the design of the house, leaving the inhabitants to develop its interior aesthetic as they choose. The demarcating the architect's scope of work runs parallel to Wittgenstein's position in his earlier writings in the Tractatus. Wittgenstein views the factual or what is the case, that which one can speak about clearly. His valuing of the factual translates directly into the way he approaches building and the design questions associated with it, such that one might argue that the Wittgenstein House has a certain clarity of expression itself.

For him, where there is a set of knowns or facts there is the basis for clarity. Transitioning beyond the knowns, or the basis for clarity, is otherwise a transition into the mystical. Wittgenstein famously critiques attempts to express the mystical, arguing that one must remain silent, at least if one is to speak philosophically.

> “WITTGENSTEIN APPARENTLY SAW NO REASON TO COPY ANY OTHER OF THE RENOVATED VILLA'S DETAILING”

For Wagner, some facts manifest from a design brief that the architect cannot merely design around but rather has to expressively accommodate —he called this *Sachzwang*. Though Wagner had introduced the notion of *Sachzwang* to Viennese architecture at the close of the century, Wittgenstein's practice in architecture is complimentary to Wagner's position to a certain extent [17]. Indeed, there are architectural echoes to Wagner in Wittgenstein's house. Looking to Wagner's 1912-1913 Lupus Sanatorium, there is a precision in the placement of the main columns and cross-beams hitherto absent in Viennese architecture, and taken up only again later in Wittgenstein's.

Regarding both Wagner and Hoffmann, there is a nuanced taking over of pre-existing Viennese ideas that Wittgenstein adapted to meet his own situation and goals. At the same time and in contrast to Loos, Wittgenstein had no personal or biographical confrontation with Hoffmann or Wagner. While Wagner's early death in 1918 may explain this, regarding Hoffmann this is all the more extraordinary since Wittgenstein would spend many a summer in the visually opulent interior of a Hoffmann design during his summers, at the family's hunting lodge. Nor do we have records of written commentary on Hoffmann's design stance. Arguably, Wittgenstein was not compelled to articulate his reaction to Hoffman's work in that it did not provoke as Loos' later musings would [18].

At the built level, however, traces of commentary and reaction to both architects exist. Without sharing Hoffmann's predilection for Jugendstil ornamentalism, Wittgenstein carefully observed and copied architectural details of interest to him. Traveling to another family-owned building, the Villa Toscana in Gmunden Rudolf Perco had renovated, Wittgenstein recorded a couple of technical details. The details would then re-appear in his own house, especially regarding heating elements, including the famous radiators and window mechanisms. Perco's pioneering contribution was to introduce the so-called French or Parisian windows into Austria. Parisian windows are more generously dimensioned than typical parapet Viennese windows, in that they extend from the floor level upwards. Vienna's harsh winter climate and lack of proper interior heating technology had previously disinclined Vienna's architects to use Parisian windows. Wittgenstein, observing Perco's introduction of Parisian windows at Villa Toscana, would now bring them to his Vienna project, and employ Parisian windows on all levels (which not even Loos had done). Finally, Perco had deliberately used a fitting that connected each window's two metal panes, which was an odd choice of materials at the time (see Figures 3 and 4). Wittgenstein took over Perco's distinctive fitting design and his choice of materials, deviating from Loos' approach which included wooden window fixture. At the same time, Wittgenstein apparently saw no reason to copy any other of the renovated villa's detailing—confirming once more his eclecticism towards the reservoir of Viennese Modernism and traditionalism.

Or again, in the Palais Schönborn-Batthyány Wittgenstein's sister previously lived in, Wittgenstein observed a built detail then common in Viennese architecture of the period—that the first interior door would rest, not on the floor, but on the first step of the short set of stairs leading up to the second interior hall (see Figure 5 and 6). (The same was true of the family's Vienna palais at Alleegasse 16, now known as Palais Wittgenstein.) Again, this was not purely an aesthetic choice but served utilitarian



FIGURE 3: INTERIOR VIEW OF PERCO'S WINDOWS FROM A DISTANCE.



FIGURE 4: VIEW OF PERCO'S WINDOW STOP FITTING.

ends—here, to ensure that any residual muck or moisture accrued from rain or storm water would not tarnish the door or seep into the interior. Wittgenstein takes over that detail, stripped of all period ornamentation of the pre- or Jugendstil era, in his own house—in a manner, and like so much else of the house, an historical ostension without being historicist. For, as he says in his 1938 lectures on aesthetics, deterioration in architecture occurs "when you get imitations," that is, wholesale copying of details with no understanding of "where this came from" i.e. what original use or purpose was behind the design detail [19, 20]. In this sense, and with regard to other built details already discussed (and to be discussed below), Wittgenstein builds levels of meaning into his architecture, and operates on indirect ostension rather than explicit copying, in line with his later discussions of ostensive explanation in the *Philosophical Investigations* [21]. These 'levels of meaning' operate on, and their discernment accordingly relies on, an understated familiarity with local Viennese architecture, elements of which Wittgenstein used with great ease as they were part of the everyday life he was immersed in. To later art-historical interpreters, especially those visiting the house (and indeed town) for a brief period only, Wittgenstein's points of reference will seem elusive, as they must, for anybody not sharing his form of life and cultural frame of reference [22]. Finally, points of contact to his (later) philosophical reflections, such as ostensive explanation, need not indicate causal relations of influence—where an idea in architecture 'leads Wittgenstein to' having an idea in philosophy [23]. Rather, Wittgenstein exercised a similar stance or orientation in both domains, leading to similar though not necessarily overlapping (let alone, identical) outputs in architecture and philosophy. Before investigating the results of Wittgenstein's engagement with architecture, his path toward that engagement will be briefly examined.

WITTGENSTEIN'S PATH TO ARCHITECTURE

With the Villa Toscana completed in 1925, Margaret decided to build a city mansion in a Viennese suburb. She approached Paul Engelmann, a project architect who had frequently worked with Loos, but he had a limited oeuvre on his own. Around the same time, Wittgenstein returns to Vienna after an unsuccessful and badly concluded attempt at becoming an elementary school teacher [24]. He writes to a trusted friend and future colleague at Cambridge University—none other than John Maynard Keynes—in late 1925:

> *I have decided to remain [a] teacher, as long as I feel that the troubles into which I get*



FIGURES 5 & 6: VIEW OF THE PALAIS WITTGENSTEIN (ABOVE) IN CONTRAST TO THE WITTGENSTEIN HOUSE (BELOW).

> *that way, may do me any good. […] If I leave teaching off I will probably come to England and look for a job there, because I am convinced that I cannot find anything at all possible in this country. In this case I will want your help [sc. to secure a job in teaching] [25].*

Seven months later, a major incident with a student forces Wittgenstein to resign as a teacher and exposes him to federal court hearings, which solidifies his grim prediction as to his future employability in Austria—certainly where the public sector educational institutions were concerned.

In these circumstances, his sister's offer that same year to act, not just as architectural patron but, as *de facto* employer for her compromised brother must have appeared as the only reprieve short of exile. Margaret's offer of employment further coincided with the family's alleged attempts at the time to hush up Wittgenstein's humiliating court case [26]. These are the circumstances in which Wittgenstein finds himself architect of a house.

Wittgenstein's foray into architecture, in that light, cannot simply be attributed to a purely vocational decision on Wittgenstein's part, but was forced on him by external circumstances. The circumstances shed new light on Wittgenstein's remark that he regarded work on architecture as work on oneself [27]. He may have argued that working on architecture is working oneself, because in his own case, he worked on himself through his engagement with architecture [28].

In 1926 Ludwig becomes involved in Margaret's project to build a city mansion at the express invitation of both his sister and Engelmann. From this point on, Wittgenstein described himself as an architect, and no longer as a teacher, as documented by his paperwork re-establishing his residency in Vienna. Rather than merely supporting the project at a distance, Ludwig gradually takes over the entire design process his friend Paul Engelmann had already begun. By May 1926, Wittgenstein was living in Vienna again and had started his new two-year long stint as an architect.

Wittgenstein's involvement in the design process at this relatively late stage can be seen as a reaction of sorts to the project's earlier stages. The sister, having rejected Loos and Hoffmann alike (the first two ways to approach the project), and then having contracted Perco (the third way), now finds a fourth way to approach the building project. Ludwig helps to furnish an architectural mantle on which to pin her own ideas. Margaret Wittgenstein, well embedded in the highly cultured Viennese upper class, knew what she would have received from Loos and Hoffmann. It was chic at the time to contract one of the two architects. Collectors of Klimt paintings leaned toward Hoffmann, who frequently worked with Klimt, and collectors of Schiele leaned toward Loos. Though well-versed in the aesthetic trends championed by the liberal Viennese upper class, Margaret Wittgenstein deliberately side-stepped them as a patron—and made her brother to understand that she expected likewise of him as her architect. That is, Margaret was not just Wittgenstein's immediate reason for engaging architectural design, but served as an ally in a departure from the established norms of Viennese Modernism. The finished house was to overcome both the architectural and cultural conventions of its time while additionally reflecting the growing emancipation of its owner. The remaining paper inquires as to whether and how the building itself achieves the siblings' rogue ambitions.

> “[LUDWIG] SERVED AS AN ALLY IN A DEPARTURE FROM THE ESTABLISHED NORM OF VIENNESE MODERNISM.”

ARCHITECTURAL ANALYSIS, 1: FLOOR PLAN

The building's floor plan, particularly the ground floor, is complex and dense. Wittgenstein faced the problem of creating a flexible world to accommodate the public and private lives of his sister. It was necessary the plan allowed for ready re-interpretation and re-appropriation while also allowing for the following of strict social and cultural expectations. Above all, the spatial program reflects Margaret's family and social life. There is social gathering space for her absentee husband, two sons, two foster sons, as well as domestic staff. The plan's resulting modernity and unconventionality, particularly in the Viennese context, emerges as follows.

The main floor combines public and private areas. One of the doors in the large semi-public hall opens directly into Margaret's living and sleeping area labeled living room on Wittgenstein's floor plan. An alcove opposite the window contains a niche for her bed, which also served as a couch during the day. The adjacent dressing area, misleadingly labeled bedroom on Wittgenstein's plan, is hidden behind a screen.

The main floor served as a stage on which Margaret lived her life. It was the focal point of her activities, private and public, within the house. The other floors were reserved for her husband, children, and domestic staff.

The building is viewed as consisting of two houses: a spatially organized object and a use-object. Wittgenstein himself insisted that, for all the plan's strictness, the house would allow for multiple uses and furnishings, as long as overall strictures on quality and correctness were observed [29]. In terms of spatial organization, the building is understood as an elementary and structural envelope, as a sequence of spaces—of autonomous spaces with defined proportions. The use of concrete furnishes a strikingly abstract background, a basic spatial envelope which draws its characteristics from the precise use of proportion, light, rhythm and tactility. (The characteristics of material use receives special focus in details with an overt relation to mechanical engineering, Wittgenstein's original subject at university: metal doors, metal windows, radiators, sliding elements and elevators.) The distinguishing features between Wittgenstein and Loos' approach to building design is perhaps most apparent in the spatial sequence. There is neither a spatial plan nor a central living hall as favored by Loos, nor an open plan with free spatial transitions. Rather, there is a ceremonial progression of sorts created by a variety of doors and thresholds. Wittgenstein designed, with great precision, a sequence of door types that vary subtly at the level of transparency and opacity. There are doors with clear glass, opaque glass, and without glass altogether (see Figures 7-9).

Further, the ground floor living room of Wittgenstein's plan is visually separated from the staircase and thus differs markedly from the type of grand living hall that Loos placed prominently in his domestic architecture for Vienna's upper class. Finally, Wittgenstein's internal spaces are completely devoid of material padding where Loos' celebrated the sensual and haptic use of materials such as natural stone, colored marble and granite, timber-paneling, leather and other wall coverings (cut and faceted glass and, later, color as a consciously-used spatial finish).

ARCHITECTURAL ANALYSIS, 2: BUILDING VOLUME AND FAÇADE

Looking at the house, one is primarily struck by the strong plastic appearance of the building, which has a cubist-like form unusual for Vienna in 1928. The sculptural effect of the house is comparable only to the contemporary building by Adolf Loos, the Moller House, but which


PARTERRE
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SAAL
TERRASSE
GARDEROBE
VORRAUM
WOHNZIMMER
Waschraum
EINGANG
2200
1140
545
Stufenprofil 1:20
Eisenbeton
Stampfbeton
Ziegelmauerwerk im Portlandzementmörtel
Ziegelmauerwerk im verlängerten Mörtel
Ziegelmauerwerk im Weißkalkmört.
12cm Mauerwerk
4cm Thermalit-Isolierg.
25cm Außenmauer
8KB=2×3KB+Luft
1:100
CARL KORN
Baugesellschaft A.G.

FIGURE 7: GROUND FLOOR PLAN OF THE WITTGENSTEIN HOUSE.

is markedly more reserved. Viewed in perspective, the projections and recesses of the building volume result in an apparently random window arrangement. The orthogonal drawings of the façades, on the other hand, reveal axially arranged windows, which enjoy a particularly complex relationship with the interior spaces. The fenestration as a result offers no clues about the sort of room located behind each window. Unlike in the work of Adolf Loos, bathrooms and small ancillary spaces are not represented on the façade by small windows. Wittgenstein's façade is not a functional illustration of the various spaces but rather a composed whole which works with axes and rhythms.

On the main floor, there is an unwavering use of virtually identical glazed metal doors on the façade and throughout the internal spaces. The door's use clearly demonstrates a design decision that cannot be reduced to functionalism and that does not feature in the architecture of Adolf Loos. The metal and glass double doors are arranged like Viennese casement windows. In one instance, the fenestrations are arranged in the form of French doors to the terrace and another as French doors to the hall. The hall is transformed into the external element of the internal space, a sensitively interpretation of the spatial hierarchy and the public and private characters of the rooms. Internally, the large living room or library and Margaret Stonborough-Wittgenstein's living room are the only two spaces whose internal double doors have no glass and consist entirely of metal. By controlling the amount of light passing through the glass doors, Wittgenstein directs movement through the house. Upon entering the house, the visitor's attention is drawn to the light to the left of the entry (the glass wall to the terrace) and eventually toward the dining room and the small breakfast room. To the right, the large living room or library can also be entered via glass doors. The programmatic sequencing of the entrance doors and terrace doors continues in the same manner throughout the house. It generates highly deliberate diagonal lines of sight that would have, for instance, allowed Margaret to discretely view visitors in the hall from her sleeping area in the curious alcove. The particular line of sight is permitted only when the doors were left open, providing a vantage point from which Margaret could oversee the central activities of the house.

The sequence of spaces creates an almost cinematic spatial and temporal chronology of uses which is expressed in the diagonal nature of the visual axes: the glass doors establish visual axes from the dining-room, through the hall and into the large living room (library) and from the small living room (Margaret Stonborough's salon), through the music room and into



FIGURE 8: GROUND FLOOR PLAN OF THE WITTGENSTEIN HOUSE, DRAWN BY EMILA BRUCK AND DORIS SCHEICHER.

the hall. As a result we have many intersecting and parallel visual axes, axes that are both linear and diagonal, axes that are both real and (in a sense) virtual. When the doors are open in certain arrangements, the building prevents its viewers to take in the unfolding scene all in a single glance. Instead, one has to take in the happenings in discrete visual moments and perspectives, and arrange one's experience of the house sequentially—as one would, for instance, view a film, one scene at a time, without being able to take in everything at once.

ARCHITECTURAL ANALYSIS, 3: INTERIORS

The interpretation of Wittgenstein's interior design is separate from the building's volume and envelope. The interiors have a fundamental and elementary quality virtually untouched by the furniture. The simplicity of the interiors embodies the greatest difference between Wittgenstein and his architectural contemporaries who opposed the separation of architecture and internal finishes. Each of their positions were represented on the Vienna architecture scene.

For Josef Hoffmann, architecture—the dwelling in particular—should be determined by the artistic predilection of the architect. The predilection could go as far as determining everyday objects such as kitchen utensils, appliances, and textiles. In contrast, Loos argued that the walls belonged to the architect, but not such moveable elements as chairs, dining chairs and armchairs. His approach yielded the design of in-built furniture, wall cladding and chimney-nooks. By consciously choosing such objects, Loos developed his own closed aesthetic. He had no difficulty incorporating inherited items of furniture or oriental carpets into a new architectural design. His interiors were sometimes characterized by the use of ornamental oriental carpets because the objects were effective status symbols of the bourgeois.

Wittgenstein gave instructions and guidelines to his sister Margaret regarding the furnishing of her own house. The guidelines and restrictions were severe. She was to use neither carpets, curtains, nor chandeliers. His position stands in distinct contrast to Loos' pupil Paul Engelmann, who would have wanted a Loosian interior for Margaret but was complicit with Ludwig who preferred an autonomous one. Wittgenstein's absolute position regarding carpets and curtains is, however, easy to explain. His architecture had already addressed the functional issue of the curtain—the ground floor windows incorporated vertical black-out elements that were parked at basement level during the day. The anthracite-black artificial



FIGURE 9: AXOMETRIC OF THE GROUND FLOOR OF THE WITTGENSTEIN HOUSE. DRAWING HIGHTLIGHTS THE COLUMN PLACEMENT IN THE MAIN HALLWAY.

stone floor with the detailed joint pattern was part of the design in which the reflection of the black stone de-emphasizes the material qualities of the perfectly polished floor, in turn creating the sensation that the floor itself dematerializes. Laying a carpet on the floor would have interfered with the dematerialization effect. The laying of carpets on the floor in this example would have would have been inconsistent with the floor's design, which does something to explain why Wittgenstein was strict in his instructions and guidelines for the house.

Wittgenstein's approach to the issue of artificial light was similar. The qualities and characteristics of a space are heavily determined by how much and by which route light comes into a room. A room appears differently with light from just one window on one wall, and differently with a floor to ceiling window wall. Wittgenstein's austere decision to have a single unadorned 200 watt bulb at ceiling level allowed for an evenly distributed light in all directions at even intensity; unlike the uneven distribution of shaded lamp shades. Wittgenstein's lighting design, one could argue, is objective, given its neutrality and impartiality to an observer's relative position in the house. In contrast, all further lighting sources would be induced by candles or standing lamps, were thus highly situational and subjective, and could be adjusted by the owner and guests to suit specific occasions.

ARCHITECTURAL ANALYSIS, 4: LEVEL OF USE

Furniture itself was not a matter for Wittgenstein the architect. Here, he allowed his sister—the user of the house—complete freedom. Wittgenstein was familiar with his sister's furniture and art collection because he had often been her guest in her *belétage* in the Palais Schönborn-Batthyany. He knew how his sister's house operated at the social level. One cannot escape the feeling and suspicion that Wittgenstein saw furniture, users and visitors as merely temporary, and in relative terms, less significant events in an absolute space, which served as a stage. His sister and the furniture changed continuously and yet this elementary space remained unchanged. During a social event the house functioned differently from times when only the family was present. His architecture was to be equally appropriate for both situations: hence the dark, almost black floor, which levels out the objects placed upon it—enveloping them in a world of continuity.

Margaret Stonborough's visitors, furniture and works of art inhabit the Wittgensteinian space almost as if they are egalitarian guests of the building. The approach reveals the radicalism of a modernism, which simultaneously takes up elementary and autonomous qualities of the building itself. Here, Wittgenstein's artistic intention reveals itself as an abstract creative will triggered by the architectural debate about the Viennese *modus vivendi*.

CONCLUSION

Wittgenstein's late philosophy urged against understanding our interpersonal communication in language in too fragmented a manner. Only by contextualizing our verbal exchanges against a shared and highly specific forms of life can their full meaning or significance be brought to the fore. Urging a contextualist position of sorts may hold validity in our engagement with and communication across material culture as well as architecture. This contextualism can fruitfully inform our reception of Wittgenstein's own architecture. Informed by a deep affinity to the material culture surrounding him since his earliest childhood, as Wittgenstein's own engagement with architecture undoubtedly was, engaging Wittgenstein the architect is not primarily a lesson for us so much as a challenge—a challenge to contemporary historiography [30]. Our own understanding of the full genesis and denouement of Viennese modernism is still too fragmented for us to understand Wittgenstein's own place in it, and frequently deters us to allocate him such a place at all. Wittgenstein's being at home and ease with a specific culture and its manifold reference points concomitantly accounts for the work's inaccessibility to those not sharing in the form of life that informed the house's gestation. In a sense, Wittgenstein's own house may explain why the canonization of buildings in disregard to their highly specific forms of life frequently make for awkward histories and reluctant exclusions. The resilience toward canonizing the house may be rooted in the house's stubborn refusal to explain itself or render itself into a code easily deciphered

> “WITTGENSTEIN'S OWN HOUSE MAY EXPLAIN WHY THE CANONIZATION OF ARCHITECTURAL WORKS [...] FREQUENTLY MAKES FOR AWKARD HISTORIES AND RELUCTANT EXCLUSIONS.”

by those outside its immediate context. This refusal may account for the continued relevance of not only Wittgenstein's own architecture but of our ongoing attempts to come to terms with it as a site of cultural transfer and transformation.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I thank Carolyn Fahey for probing questions and edits that greatly improved this paper and led me to expand my existing research in new directions, and Stefan Koller for help with the philosophical content.

ENDNOTES

[1] The present work builds on my earlier publications: August Sarnitz, *Die Architektur Wittgensteins: Rekonstruktion einer gebauten Idee* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2011); August Sarnitz, "Reconstructing Wittgenstein as an Architect: Ludwig Wittgenstein and Margaret Stonborough-Wittgenstein—Defining and Designing a New Interior," in *Private Utopias*, ed. August Sarnitz (Berline and Boston: de Gruyter, 2015), 106-123.

[2] Stanford Anderson, "Architecture in a Cultural Field," *Princeton University*, 5 March 1988), Stanford Anderson archives, disk Princeton/ Zürich, rev. 20 April 1988. The intended meaning of critical conventionalism is well conveyed by a quote from Loos provided by Anderson: "Tradition is no more the enemy of development than the mother is an enemy of the child. Tradition is a reservoir of strength from countless generations, and the firm foundation for a healthy future" (22 n. 15). A comparable dialectic between tradition and transformation in Wittgenstein's philosophical work is discussed by Stephen Mulhall, *Inheritance and Originality: Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Kierkegaard* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 27 ff.

[3] The encounter is referenced in a letter of Wittgenstein's to Ludwig von Ficker, as discussed by Burkhardt Rukschcio and Roland Schachel, *Adolf Loos: Leben und Werk* (Wien: Residenz Verlag, 1982), 195. See further Brian McGuiness, *Young Ludwig: Wittgenstein's Life, 1889-1921* (London: Penguin, 1988), 209; and Sarnitz, *Die Architektur Wittgensteins*, 145-146.

[4] Ludwig Wittgenstein to Paul Engelmann, 2 September 1919. (Cf. Sarnitz, *Die Architektur Wittgensteins*, p. 148). The English translation provided here is owed to Marjorie Perloff, *Wittgenstein's Ladder: Poetic*

Language and the Strangeness of the Ordinary (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1996), 224.

[5] Karl Kraus, "Festschrift zum 60. Geburtstag," for Adolf Loos (Vienna: Loecker Verlag, 1930), 27.

[6] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious Belief*, ed. Cyril Barrett (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), 9-10. The lectures on aesthetics date to 1938. The similarities between Wittgenstein's writings and (some of) Loos's are well documented in John Hyman, "The Urn and the Chamber Pot," in *Wittgenstein, Theory, and the Arts*, eds. Richard Allen and Malcolm Turvey (London: Routledge, 2011), 137-153. Hyman's architectural assessment seems overstated, however: "the design of the house in the Kundmanngasse would have been inconceivable without the example of Loos's work, and the influence of his ideas" (137).

[7] Ibid., 7, n. 2.

[8] Ibid., 8. Cf. Hyman, "The Urn and the Chamber Pot," 137. Hyman states: "the emphasis Wittgenstein places on technical correctness in design and his readiness to talk about clothing, hairdressing and architecture in the same breath are surely due, at least in part, to Loos' influence." On Loos' own ideas on daily (fashion) objects of use, see in particular the essay collection on Loos, Adolf Loos, *Spoken Into the Void: Collected Essays, 1897-1900,* trans. J. O. Newman and J. H. Smith (Boston: MIT Press, 1987), with an introduction by Aldo Rossi.

[9] Ibid., 7, n. 2.

[10] Thus Hyman writes: "if we compare the Stonborough house with Loos' domestic architecture, its austerity and refinement appear a little overwrought." From Hyman, "The Urn and the Chamber Pot,"146. Similarly, David Macarthur, "Working on Oneself in Philosophy and Architecture: A Perfectionist Reading of the Wittgenstein House," *Architecture Theory Review* 19, no. 2 (2015): "With regard to the matter of ornament, Wittgenstein applies Loos' ideas more systematically and scrupulously than Loos himself. Wittgenstein's interiors are, in sharp contrast to those of Loos, characterised by an overwhelming impression of austerity, simplicity, and stillness."

[11] Ludwig Wittgenstein to Margaret Stonborough, letter dated to circa September 1949, in *Wittgenstein. Familienbriefe*, eds. Brian McGuiness, M. C. Ascher, and O. Pfersmann (Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1996), 200. Cf. Sarnitz, *Die Architektur Wittgensteins*, 82.

[12] For details and documentation (including floor plans and building permits) of the Villa Toscana, see Sarnitz, *Die Architektur Wittgensteins*,

43-44; for a photo of Wittgenstein in the building, see Sarnitz, *Die Architektur Wittgensteins*, 71.

[13] E. Prokopp, Magarethe Stonborough-Wittgenstein, Böhlau, Wien, Chapter on the villa Toscana: the drawings of Rudolf Perco are very similar to those of Josef Hoffmann of the same period. The author holds the same opinion. Perco's drawings look "Hoffmanesque."

[14] Perco's architectonic contributions were (and, to this day, remain largely) overlooked by architecture historians. Within Austria, Perco regained recognition with the publication of Otto Antonia Graf*, Die Vergessene Wagnerschule* (Vienna: Jugend und Volk, 1969). See also Ursula Prokop, *Rudolf Perco 1884–1942. Von der Architektur des Roten Wien zur NS-Megalomanie* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2001).

[15] The two items of furniture include a post-Art Deco table by Dagobert Peche. Peche, at the time relatively little known, later became a highly sought-after designer: testimony to Margaret's own impeccable taste Wittgenstein would later speak so highly of (see letter, quoted above). For photos of the furniture, and traces thereof in Margaret's own drawings, see Sarnitz, *Die Architektur Wittgensteins* 62, 130.

[16] For photos of Palais Schönborn, see Sarnitz, *Die Architektur Wittgensteins*. To confuse the building with Palace Schönbrunn, as Monk does, is tantamount to confusing Windsor with Buckingham Palace; had Margaret already lived in anything like the latter, transitioning into the later Palais Stonborough would have conveyed an immense loss in socio-economic status.

[17] See Stanford Anderson, "Sachlichkeit and Modernity, or Realist Architecture," in *Otto Wagner: Reflections on the Raiment of Modernity*, ed. Harry Francis Mallgrave (Los Angeles: The Getty Center, 1993), 323-361 as well as August Sarnitz, "Realism versus Verniedlichung: The Design of the Great City," in *Otto Wagner: Reflections on the Raiment of Modernity*, ed. Harry Francis Mallgrave (Los Angeles: The Getty Center, 1993), 85-113. On a related note, Loos critiqued imagination as a source of architectural ideas, since imagination (for Loos) is dissociated from cognition of the realities of fact and use. See Adolf Loos, "Der Sattlermeister," *Der Sturm* 1, no. 3 (1910).

[18] As an author, Wittgenstein was keen to record disagreements, especially when they were egregious (such as on the subject of Weininger's misogynism), and less keen to record agreements or mild disagreements. Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein, preface to *Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus* (London: Kegan Paul, 1922), 23. Wittgenstein states: "what I have here written makes no claim to novelty in points of detail; and

therefore I give no sources, because it is indifferent to me whether what I have thought has already been thought before me by another."

[19] Wittgenstein, *Lectures*, 7.

[20] Ibid., 7. n. 2.

[21] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, ed. and trans. Elizabeth Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), §7.

[22] What complicates the issue is that the historiography of Austrian modern architecture has been shaped by the necessarily selective nature of synoptic studies, frequently composed from an outsider's perspective, such as Carl E. Schorske, *Fin-De-Siecle Vienna: Politics and Culture* (New York: Alfred E. Knopf, 1981); or Allan Janik and Stephen Edelston Toulmin, *Wittgenstein's Vienna* (Chicago : Ivan R. Dee, 1973). These works arguably create too limited a frame of reference for us to understand the diversity and nuance in architectural modernism that Wittgenstein and others before him (cf. Otto Antonia Graf*, Die Vergessene Wagnerschule*) responded to. See further the conclusion below.

[23] The causal reading is critiqued by Christopher Long, "[Review of] Nana Last. *Wittgenstein's House*," review of *Wittgenstein's House: Language, Space, and Architecture*, by Nana Last in *Estetika: The Central European Journal of Aesthetics* XLVI, II (2009): 230-233.

[24] Cf. Alexander Waugh, *The House of Wittgenstein: A Family at War* (Toronto: Random House of Canada, 2010), 148-149.

[25] Ludwig Wittgenstein to J. M. Keynes, 18 October 1925, in *Wittgenstein in Cambridge: Letters and Documents 1911 – 1951*, ed. Brian McGuiness (Oxford: Blackwell, 2012), 157. Italics added.

[26] Waugh, *The House of Wittgenstein*, 162.

[27] Ludwig Wittgenstein, MS 112, dated to 14 October 1931, posthumously published in *Vermischte Bemerkungen*, eds. Georg Henrik van Wright, Heiki Nyman, and Alois Pichler (Stuttgart: Suhrkamp, 1994), 52.

[28] While many details surrounding Wittgenstein's transition into architecture are beyond historical verification, Wittgenstein's oldest sister, Hermine, later confirmed that, in her own assessment, Margaret seemed 'psychologically compelled' to help out her younger brother with the architecture commission, which seems to corroborate the impressions from Wittgenstein's own correspondence. These unpublished family memoirs are preserved in the Brenner archives in Innsbruck, Austria (cf. Sarnitz, *Die Architektur Wittgensteins*, 230). Hermine Wittgenstein's relation to the house is of further importance: we owe to her surviving pastel

drawings the only documentation of Margaret's original furbishing of the house in the 1920s and 1930s (Sarnitz, *Die Architektur Wittgensteins*, 129). During World War II, the house had been used as a military hospital and it would never be re-instated to its pre-war interior state.

[29] See the earlier discussion on the place of 'quality' and 'correctness' in Wittgenstein's aesthetics.

[30] See accounts on Wittgenstein's place in Viennese Modernism and the *fin de siecle* Vienna, such as that of Allan Janik, Roger Paden, and Paul Engelmann.

USE-VALUE VALUE AND THE QUESTION OF COMPLETION

EMRE DEMIREL

> *You say to me: 'You understand this expression, don't you? Well then – I am using it in the sense you are familiar with'. – As if the sense were an atmosphere accompanying the word, which is carried into every kind of application.*
>
> *Ludwig Wittgenstein [1]*

The post-modernist approach to architecture often presents tradition as a problem of image [2]. Postmodernism prioritizes the display of stylized images of historic buildings in order to prompt one to deal primarily with the visual appeal of the historic forms rather than the (bodily and emotional) experience of the buildings [3]. Tradition is polarized against modernity when it is treated as a reconstruction of past images or styles, which is to say that the appearance of traditional buildings or their object-like material presences are treated as always complete and fixed to a particular point in time when they were built. When tradition is understood in purely visual terms, it loses its relevance in our modern world, becoming instead a static image of the past. The rigidity of historical images creates a sense that tradition has nothing to do with future imaginations, and history's appeal operates by virtue of its fictive attributes [4].

" TRADITION IS POLARIZED AGAINST MODERNITY WHEN IT IS TREATED AS A RECONSTRUCTION "

Past images or styles cannot be re-created in the present time. When they are re-constructed today they permanently demarcate the moment to which they belong. On the other hand, the bodily and emotional experiences of such buildings are free of time. Such experiences could be re-embodied through new building materials and techniques which are specific to the present time. The possibility of the re-embodiment of our emotional experiences from a traditional environment opens a door to new architectural configurations and the invention of an alternative modernity which is connected to our past. Looking from a non-visual but tactile view point, tradition can be considered as incomplete and enduringly open to new completions by offering a negotiable dialogue between the past and future.

In order to explore how tradition can be understood in terms of the building's physical qualities so as to open tradition to future inventive possibilities, Wittgenstein's philosophical proposition of meaning as use is herein used as the basis of argument. Wittgenstein's proposition suggests meaning cannot be predetermined or contain absolute definitions limiting our understanding to fixed mental images or other forms of representation. Meaning is provisional, open-ended, and continuously re-configures itself as it is used [5]. The flexibility and fluidity of Wittgenstein's definition of meaning suggests that our understanding of things can be viewed in both complete and incomplete aspects. What is completed is associated with an object-like presence or, in Edmund Husserl's terms, with the object of thought, whereas what is not yet complete refers to use, the experience of things, or the act of thought, all of which require active bodily engagement in the environment [6].

Before going into further detail, it might be useful to explain briefly what is meant by the word completion. The word complete is defined as "lacking nothing, whole, entire, full, or having all the required or complementary parts included; something undivided, uncompromised or unmodified" [7]. Such a definition indicates any kind of situation or process that has already ended. Therefore, complete suggests any case that has been fully established in itself or reached an ideal form which has no flexibility or tolerance for further interference. On this basis, Paul Ricoeur distinguishes between two types of meaning: ideal (complete or absolute) and circumstantial (or situational). According to the first type, the grasp of language occurs in reference to the absolute presence of objects, materials or actions. The absolute is similar to the way a dictionary introduces a term's meaning within purely objectified and pictoral norms. The second type, on the other hand, suggests a grasp of language based on our experiences of the lived world. Accordingly, Ricoeur draws attention to the differences between names (words) and sentences. While any single name or word individually refers to the purified object-like presence of the thing as defined in the dictionary, a sentence refers to our lived experiences, our circumstantial engagements with the environment [8].

Regarding our lived experiences, Ricoeur underlines the second concept: the process of completion or fulfillment. He argues that whatever we have experienced in the past remains in our minds or memories and in turn all these experiences cause us to re-embody these through new actions, events, or structures. It is like referring to past experiences for our future actions. What is meant by the term completion is simply the re-embodiment of our lived (emotional) experiences, and this embodiment renews itself continuously [9]. As Hannah Arendt notes, our lived experiences are like an invisible energy which enduringly holds a potential to be converted into a new concrete entity [10]. Applying this approach to tradition, it can be said that stylistic engagements present tradition as a picture: like reality, they develop a kind of normative understanding of tradition. However, our sentimental engagements with traditional environments structure our emotional experiences of them. These experiences are always open to renewals or new completions as they could be re-embodied through new modes of building materials and building techniques.

> “MEANING IS PROVISIONAL, OPEN-ENDED, AND CONTINUOUSLY RE-CONFIGURES ITSELF AS IT IS USED.”

Taking Wittgenstein’s position as a framework for this analysis, tradition is generally completed as an image or picture reality when it is engaged with its object-like qualities. When tradition is introduced as a display commodity, our encounter with tradition is reduced to a visual understanding. Within the terms of visual understanding’s reduction, tradition can only be contemplated retroactively in picturesque re-productions but not in new beginnings. Wittgenstein’s approach draws attention to the experiential and participatory qualities of traditional environments [11]. Such qualities can never be concretized by specifically defined stylistic orders; they are formless but at the same time formative; our emotional experiences and participation within spaces act like an invisible power that continuously initiates a person into re-embodying it as new architectural reality.

The question of completion in tradition will be demonstrated with three examples. The first is a miniature painting by the Persian artist Kamal al-din Bihzad (1450-1535), the second is a series of Le Corbusier's sketches of Istanbul and the Green Mosque—which were done during his trip to Turkey in 1910—and the final example is the 1994 B2 House designed by the Turkish architect Han Tümertekin. At first glance these examples might appear completely different and irrelevant to one another. However, when the sketches are closely analyzed they reveal distinctly similar positions regarding the concept of tradition. The common point between Kamal al-din Bihzad, Le Corbusier, and Han Tümertekin is that they propose an alternative way of understanding tradition which suggests that one considers tradition not as a fixed object-like reality—or what is typically rendered as stylistic images or the outer appearance of building facades—but rather as an experiential reality, which is to say, a reality that is fluid, unfixed, and open to new configurations. From this perspective, Kamal al-din Bihzad, Le Corbusier, and Han Tümertekin share similar grounds in that each envisions architecture not as an object to be seen but rather as an articulation of an emotive terrain [12]. The emotive terrain does not prioritize the optical but rather a full bodily and sensuous contact with the physical built environment. Such an approach leads to a perception that traditional architecture is not primarily a physical but rather an existential entity.

VIEWING MINIATURES THROUGH THE EYES OF WITTGENSTEIN

The fifteenth century miniature painting by the Persian artist Kamal al-din Bihzad (1450-1535) depicts a famous religious event: the escape of the Prophet Joseph from his lover Zulaykha. Zulaykha, the wife of the respected Egyptian officer Potiphar, falls in love with Joseph and seduces him in her house. Joseph attempts to flee, but the house is structured in such a way as to make escape difficult (Figure 1).

Although Bihzad was a talented painter and well aware of perspective, he opts to depict the cosmos in a distorted manner [13]. The distortion goes beyond the compositional technique typical of miniature paintings. It also relates to his way of conceptualizing architecture.

The representation of architecture reveals something of Bihzad's idea about what architecture itself means to the human mind. On closer inspection, Bihzad avoids illustrating a literal or realistic representation of the building. He was apparently not interested in how the building could be seen from the outside. Rather, his interest lies in what could be



FIGURE 1: THE PALACE OF POTIPHAR AND THE ESCAPE OF JOSEPH. ILLUSTRATED BY KAMAL AL-DIN BIHZAD (1450 – 1535).

emotionally experienced moving from one space to another throughout the building [14].

As seen in the painting, the overall composition is established in the patterning of oblique lines. The movement—or the escape of Joseph from one space to another—is sensed through the change of door color, each located on the oblique lines. Each oblique wall draws attention to the movement from one closed door to another. The attention to each door creates a feeling as if someone is running from one corner to another in a labyrinth but cannot find a way out. There are many oblique walls and lines that suddenly change colors, creating a chaotic and confined atmosphere. As it is seen in the miniature, the building is not presented as an enclosed space; rather it looks like an unfolded box or an unwrapped three-dimensional shape. It seems that Bihzad did not envision the building in the sense of an object, which is apparent in Bihzad's treatment of shape and profile as a topoi or a cartographic map. In Paul Rodaway's terms, a topoi is the collection of emotional experiences and sentimental contacts that all draw an unfixed, re-imaginative, shapeless world [15]. According to Sufi philosophy, the case of shapelessness always presents the challenges of re-embodiment or finding new form, but perhaps such a challenge is unattainable for any sustained period [16]. The concept of shapelessness is similar to the idea that whatever meaning we attribute to the environment renews itself as we use it, or, in other words, as we sentimentally experience it each time.

Bihzad's approach runs parallel to Wittgenstein's idea of meaning as use. Looking at this miniature painting from Wittgenstein's point of view, Bihzad tries to create a perception of the cosmos which renders itself in an account of use rather than in picturing reality. As explained above, use refers to our bodily involvement with things and activities; it is highly connected to what we experience sentimentally through our environment [17]. As Wittgenstein asserted, any temptation to concretize meaning reduces our understanding of it to mental representations [18]. Presenting architectural reality as a fixed physical presence is avoided by Bihzad. His interest lies in the shapeless presence of the building, as if he wants us to think about the paradox which is, in Wittgenstein's terms, between the non-existence of the intended object and the fullness of the seen object [19].

The way Bizhad conceptualizes architecture constructs a kind of vision that recommends how to look at tradition and traditional architecture. In the miniature, what we see is an example of traditional architecture, but it is presented in a way that is dramatically different from the way



FIGURE 2: LE CORBUSIER, MAJESTICSILHOUETTES OF THEMOSQUES ON THE"HUGEHUMPEDBACK TOSTAMBOUL", 1911.

the postmodern has conditioned us to see tradition. The building is presented not in a completed shape; rather, it looks shapeless. The reason for presenting reality in such a way is closely linked to how Bihzad wants us to give meaning to (traditional) architecture. It seems Bihzad brought architecture into consideration not as a question of the object, which is how postmodernity intends to shape our perception of the traditional environment, but as a question of completion. The question of completion is not concerned with the reproduction of reality (representing as fully as possible the appearance of things and thus repeating past forms and styles) which is already completed; instead, it is primarily concerned with the re-activation of what is sensually experienced, which leads the way toward the configuration of new realities.

MINIATURES AND LE CORBUSIER'S DRAWINGS: RE-CONCEPTUALIZING TRADITION

The analysis of one of Bihzad's miniatures has shown that the building is not presented with a photorealistic impression. It was argued that lack of photorealistic impression is closely linked with how Bihzad conceptualizes architecture. He constructs a vision about the built premises that suggests the viewer consider traditional architecture not in the sense of its material reality but in the sense of what we emotionally experience through it. Thus, Bihzad's engagement with the traditionally built environment is in this regard parallel to how Le Corbusier considers tradition. Le Corbusier's approach is clearly demonstrated by his sketches of Istanbul and the Green Mosque in Bursa during his trip to Turkey in 1910 [20]. Although the sketches were made using different painting techniques and materials, like Bihzad, Le Corbusier did not picture the buildings in the way they realistically appear. Le Corbusier's concern was not the outer appearance of the buildings or their stylistic images, but what he emotionally experienced through his immersion in the historic environment.

Looking at Le Corbusier's sketches more closely, it can be seen that they lack any photorealistic depiction or clearly rendered detail; his record of the existing built environment was always intentionally left incomplete (Figure 2). As in Bihzad's miniature, the manner of incompleteness releases the architectural object from its physical existence and converts it into an experience of its emotional ambiance. In doing so, the sketches refresh our engagement with the architectural object in keeping the prospect of wonder alive and arousing different emotional states in each and every moment viewed. Thereby, our perception of the architectural figure is not confined to the aesthetic definition of its absolute object-like appearance, and is instead left open-ended to new emotional encounters.



FIGURES 3 & 4: FLOOR PLAN OF THE GREEN MOSQUE IN BURSA BY LEON PARVILLE (LEFT); PLAN SKETCH OF THE GREEN MOSQUE IN BURSA BY LE CORBUSIER (RIGHT).



FIGURE 5: THE SULTAN'S PRAYER ROOM IS NOTED IN LE CORBUSIER'S DRAWING AS THE DARKEST PLACE. EMOTIONAL EFFECT CREATED BY THE TRANSITION FROM DARKER TO LIGHTER SPACES THET PRIMARILY INDICATED IN LE CORBUSIER'S PLAN DRAWING.

The aforementioned attitude of Le Corbusier can also be attributed to his drawing of the Green Mosque. Le Corbusier's notation on the plan of the Green Mosque demonstrates that he is imprecise about the exact position of the walls, the location of the outer windows and the doors, and does not elaborate the ornamental details that emphasize the material-like presence of the building. Instead, he keenly illustrates the emotional reactions created in the transition from the darker to the brighter and from the brighter to the darker spaces. Le Corbusier does not intend the drawing to re-construct the object-like presence of this traditional building but rather reconfigure its emotional cartography [21]. For example, the darkest hatch is the sultan's prayer room, which was clad with dark blue tiles and was located opposite to the large prayer hall clad with white marble (Figures 3-5). Moving from the lower darker space to a higher and brighter space creates an emotional experience that affects how the building renders itself in our mind. Le Corbusier's concern is not what exists as a literal built reality but as a sensed reality. Again, the aim of analyzing Le Corbusier's drawing of the Green Mosque is not to show the material Le Corbusier engaged. Instead, it is to reveal his working methods insofar as tradition is concerned. His visual notations demonstrate that his approach to tradition is not architectural but topical [22]. This non-architectural but topical vision is in keeping with how Bihzad and the Turkish architect Han Tümertekin engage with tradition.

Overall the point of significance is not Le Corbusier's sketching or painting methods. Instead, his alternative method of engaging traditional architecture is the point of interest. As elaborated above, Le Corbusier offers a model for understanding tradition [23]. For Le Corbusier, tradition is not the fixation of things in representations inherited from the past, such consideration that inevitably causes the development of a standardized position toward tradition highly conditioned by pre-defined patterns. Instead, tradition suggests new beginnings for Le Corbusier. He exemplifies the alternative notion of tradition in his paintings as he does not limit reality to pre-defined norms and patterns or to picturesque definitions. Instead, he intended to evoke different emotional reactions each time his paintings were viewed. Therefore, his painting is alive and dynamic as it produces new feelings and thus new meanings at each viewing of it. Le Corbusier's attempt to re-approach tradition is similar to a Wittgensteinian philosophical approach in that both suggest discovery is what makes meaning renewable.

Putting things into rigid preconceived patterns of what they ought to mean makes our perception of meaning past-oriented because meaning refers to the moment when things first appeared to us. Like the outer appearance of the building, the patterns are already constructed and mark the moment of the time completed. However, what makes meanings persist through time is perhaps their shapelessness that puts actions in the first place as opposed to meanings. Within the context of this issue, how tradition could be future-oriented is the main question of this paper [24].



FIGURES 6-8: VIEW OF B2 HOUSE OVERLOOKING AEGEAN SEA AND LESVOS ISLAND; DISTANT VIEW OF B2 HOUSE SUBTLY EMERGING FROM LANDSCAPE; AND VIEW OF FRONT FACADE (LEFT TO RIGHT).

B2 HOUSE

The B2 House was built in a small traditional Mediterranean enclave, Büyükhüsun, in north-western Anatolia. This small settlement is established on a mountain slope, which descends steeply southward towards the Aegean Sea below. It is a couple of miles away from the ancient Greek city of Assos located on the coast. Büyükhüsun is a traditional town and in keeping with the town's look and feel, the intention of Han Tümertekin was to create a traditional house [25]. When the award-winning house was built, the building's front facade (Figure 8) drew the attention of respected local and international journals. However, Tümertekin's approach to tradition was different. On the one hand, the architect controversially reveals the ways in which modernity has conditioned us to see traditional architecture. On the other hand, his



FIGURE 9: SKETCH OF B2 HOUSE DEPICTING TENSIONS BETWEEN DEFINED AND UNDEFINED BOUNDARIES.



FIGURE 10: VIEW OF RETAINING WALL AND BUILDING SUGGESTING A KIND SPATIAL DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE TWO.



FIGURE 11: VIEW OF HOUSE AND REAR RETAINING WALL.



FIGURE 12: VIEW OF HOUSE AND REAR RETAINING WALL.

approach strongly parallels the way both miniaturist Bihzad and Le Corbusier consider traditional Turkish architecture, particularly when looking to a Wittgensteinian inspired reading of tradition.

Approaching the enclave, the settlement's houses have a landscaped look, as they are camouflaged to blend into the slope's surface. Among them is the B2 House, which stands with a back-like front, aligning with its context. It is not visually insistent and therefore does not dominate over the other buildings. On the front facade, Tümertekin refrained from a picturesque definition. The large binding panels made by reed strips create a plain front surface unrelated to any picturesque display of existing traditional dwellings.

In the overall simplicity, only the bindings' colors permit the building to be seen from a distance. Before gaining a clear idea of the appearance of the building, the dark-brown color strikes the eye and evokes curiosity. The experience of the building piques interest before one even arrives at it (Figures 6 & 7).

The starting point for Tümertekin is the retaining wall at the back rather than the building itself. However, Tümertekin's intention is more than constructing a simple wall to hold the earth behind. His intention, rather, is to continue the angled pattern of the already existing traditional street. Following the street pattern, the building was not designed as an absolutely individual object. It emerges as a seemingly natural outcome of the continuing wall (Figure 8). The retaining wall begins before a person arrives at the boundary of the building and in doing so, it prolongs the path that one normally expects to complete at the building's main entrance. However, when a person arrives at the entrance door, the retaining wall immediately directs attentions to another distant point. The purpose of the retaining wall is not defining a physical boundary but rather topographically

> “THE CONFINMENT TO APPEARANCE PRACTICED IN AN ARCHITECTURAL CONTEXT CAN BE INTERPRETED AS THE IDEALIZATION OF MEANINGS.”

narrating the building as evoking a bodily and emotional experience. In fact Tümertekin does not want the visitor to face the building immediately. As Gill explained by referring to Wittgenstein, immediacy is limitation [26]. When we grasp things immediately, our understanding of the things are reduced to the visual level [27]. Such understanding is like the way a dictionary presents things as a momental event that allows no freedom to consider them habitually [28]. Here delaying the arrival enables bodily involvement with the building, which happens before the visual one. The delay in turn gives time to construct the architecture mentally in the mind before physically experiencing it.

The other intention of Tümertekin's retaining wall is to create a street-like settlement. He addresses the experience of the Turkish street. For Tümertekin, the street is not a collection of the building facades set side-by-side. Rather, he considers it a journey already-begun in order to enact it bodily. Neither the retaining wall on the left nor the blind wall of the building on the right is directly related to any appearance of the traditional Turkish houses specific to the region. His attempt is not to re-picture them but rather to allow traditional architecture to re-establish meaning as the re-embodiment of what we have bodily and sentimentally experienced through the setting.

Therefore, the building reveals its meaning not so much when someone looks at its front and other façades individually, as when one actively participates in the journey which starts from the enclave and continues throughout the building.

The irregular relationship between the retaining wall and the north face of the building is manipulated in such a way as to create a spatial dialogue that encourages bodily experience. Arriving at this point, one faces a lower retaining wall, which is positioned in such a way as to create a passageway to the other side of the building. On first viewing, the convergence of the retaining wall and the building itself gives the impression that the journey to the building site is complete. However, this is not actually so.

Surprisingly, on approach, the upper wooden deck immediately frames the view far beyond the building, and, together with the lower retaining wall (in the middle), takes the attention away from the building to the sea and to the infinite horizon in the rear (Figures 9-12).

Tümertekin's intention is not to create a destination that is completed by physical boundaries, but rather to create the sense of an incomplete journey. Here the temptation is always to draw attention toward the back of the building. In contrast to a building's front, David Leatherbarrow argues that "the back is hardly an identifiable figure, neither a picture-like



FIGURE 13: MAIN FLOOR PLAN OF THE B2 HOUSE.





FIGURES 14 & 15: FLOOR PLAN OF TRADITIONAL TURKISH HOUSE JUXTAPOSED WITH PHOTOGRAPH OF TRADITIONAL TURKISH HOUSE (LEFT TO RIGHT).

display of representational shapes" [29]. Yet, for Tümertekin, the building does not consist simply of its outer appearance. Its appearance constitutes an emotional experience engendered by bodily movement, responding through personal interaction with all aspects of the building [30]. In doing so, more emphasis is given to invisible presence, which is re-configurable ad infinitum over time.

For Tümertekin architecture does not start when we physically enter the building but rather occurs at the moment we sentimentally begin to experience things related to the building before and after arriving within its physical boundaries. Architecture begins when the building begins to alert one's feelings and evoke some anticipation. In this regard, Tümertekin addresses the traditional Turkish Mediterranean houses in Bodrum. The B2 House's design was based on the same traditional experience, as described by the architect here:

> *I am gradually thinking that architecture lies in the differences between the physical boundary and the perceived boundary. […] First I formulized this a little with the Bodrum House; here the boundary of the house physically exists, but these are the boundaries that are set up when only the doors are closed. Outdoor and Indoor are deliberately interlaced with each other. During day-time the sliding doors of the house around the courtyard remain open and the garden continues into the inside and the inside continues into the garden. This obscurity is so advanced that when all these sliding doors are closing at night-time, the small kid says that his grandmother is setting up a house […]. There are two boundaries; one is physically what you own and the other is what you can see beyond or what you can perceive a location which is yours and not yours [31].*

Accordingly, architecture has two boundaries. In the first case one can physically see it, and in the other, one can sense it, but cannot show or empirically demonstrate it. Mentally, architecture first occurs at the moment of tension between these defined and undefined albeit boundaries. The tension is the same that Wittgenstein described as the emptiness of the intended sign and the fullness of presence [32]. Accordingly, architecture may not be limited by its physical boundaries. Its sentimental boundaries are not stabilized as exactly as the physical ones, and therefore they are incomplete. The experience of boundary continues both before and after. The continuation is what Tümertekin sought to achieve using the uniquely placed retaining wall.

In fact, buildings are constructed on the definition of physical boundaries which separate inside from outside. However, when too much focus is given to boundaries, architecture reduces itself to a frontal articulation, or an outward appearance. Addressing Wittgenstein, the confinement to appearance practiced in an architectural context can be interpreted as the idealization of meanings. In other words, reducing circumstantial meanings to ideal ones occurs when things are decontextualized from the intended audience and environment [33].

The crucial point for Tümertekin is creating a journey before creating the object itself. Creating a journey means taking off any façade-like frontal barrier and by doing so initiating a person to move. In one sense, Tümertekin's manner addresses how the miniature artist Bihzad perceives architecture, which is façade-less and boundless so that it is presented in a picturesquely less defined and more ambiguous form. It comes into being as an unfolded box or a topoi, a sentimental narration of landscape that contains a collection of emotional moments.

In the B2 House, the utility spaces appear withdrawn and are located in the back. As a result, there is large empty living space generated for the daily use. The living space is not divided into smaller rooms, going so far as to have no interior wall or partition separating the terrace. The space is like a large room, except for a wardrobe compulsorily used to separate two bedrooms on the upper floor. In contrast, it is completely left open and tolerant of future arrangements and other incremental adaptations that occur as someone inhabits the space. In that sense, the way Tümertekin arranged the house's layout is attributed to the re-embodiment of the traditional Mediterranean Turkish house experience (Figures 13-15). In those dwellings, all functional places and storage units are placed to the sides allowing for the creation of a large open space in the middle perfect for a variety of social activities [34]. As Turkish scholar and architect Cengiz Bektaş has noted, traditional Turkish architecture is so often tempted to eliminate frontal barriers and characterizes itself as an open venue [35]. Even furniture is constructed as earth-bounded element; any object used for sitting is not much heightened or separated from wherever it is located. Such objects are introduced as part of their ground. Less heightened furniture does not sharply separate one space allocated for a specific activity from others arranged in a single living room. So the entire floor is a piece of furniture, not confined to a predetermined activity.

More openness increases the opportunities for possible bodily interactions with the space. Taking traditional Turkish architecture as reference, the intention of Tümertekin is not to create architecture in the sense of building, because building to him means to verticalize things or construct spatial elements in a vertical sense. Verticalization physically gives space a boundary or physical definition. Instead the tendency in experiencing the B2 House is to eliminate a definitive account or sense of total completion as much as possible. The B2 House interior comes into being in the sense of topology [36], an open venue that continually takes shape as someone interacts with it.

Perhaps there are other factors, beyond the way of interpreting tradition, contributing to the B2 House's success. However, when looking at the region where the B2 House was built—Büyüksun—many buildings imitate local traditional buildings by using local materials. Many originally concrete buildings are clad with traditional facades consisting of stylistic figures and ornaments. The superficial use of material strengthens the stylistic consciousness of tradition created by post-modernist tendencies. That the B2 House exemplifies a model of encountering tradition in building, not in an imitative manner but in an inventive one, remains worthy of exploration.

CONCLUSION

The philosophical approach of Wittgenstein's meaning as use is a model for an alternative way of considering tradition in architecture. A miniature painting by Bihzad, sketches of Istanbul and the Green Mosque by Le Corbusier, and the B2 House design by Han Tümertekin were the examples of how Wittgenstein's notion of tradition transpires in architecture. Although it seems that these examples appear quite different in material and method, or that they are seemingly irrelevant to one another, they share the same concern and propose a similar approach to tradition. How each handles tradition, as demonstrated here, serves as a model for contemporary practice, which maintains a propensity toward an incessant vacillation between the imitation of the past and the ultra-technocratic conception of the future. The alternative is consistent albeit constantly in flux. It is not limited to an encounter with the historic image of buildings, but is rather concerned with what is emotionally experienced or communicated through them. The emotional reading of buildings could explain why Bihzad avoided photorealistic, object-like depiction of the buildings in his miniatures and likewise why Le Corbusier's sketches lack any precise depiction. The main interest of these thinkers was not representing a picture of reality but rather the emotional contact between a sensuous body and the built environment. In a similar way, the B2 House comes into being not as a re-figuration of the traditional motifs but as a re-embodiment of the emotional experiences of traditional building. Their conceptualization of tradition addresses Wittgenstein's criticism that the fixation of a meaning is a kind of idealization that converts things into frozen mental images. Yet, as Husserl suggested, anything more ideal means more remote and independent from its audiences; idealization is subject to mere objectification. The concern then is not the object-like presence of the traditionally built environment, but the sentimental contact with it however so conceived. As Merleau-Ponty suggested, our direct bodily (and sentimental) involvement with things is always provisional, indeterminate, and open-ended [37]. Merleau-Ponty's idea could be interpreted to mean that the appearances of traditional forms are fixed to a particular time when they are constructed. However, the sentimental connections are renewable; they can be re-collected and re-embodied through new materials and forms specific to the present time. In doing so, they hold out the promise of new architectural configurations derived from traditional architecture. As such, the B2 House can be taken as an example of how tradition can play an inventive role in an alternative modernity.

ENDNOTES

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SEMIOTIC NATURALISM IN ARCHITECTURE THEORY

REIDAR DUE

This paper seeks to present a kind of skeptical, and, in an indirect way, Wittgensteinian perspective upon purpose and meaning in architecture. The argument presented here revolves around the two notions that, first, there are different categories, which we have available for making architecture seem intelligible to us, and, second, that there are distinct historical discourses in which architecture has been made intelligible in specific ways. The implication of this discourse argument will be a skepticism regarding the prospect of an encompassing theory of architecture, or a theory that would fully and adequately capture the purpose and significance of individual buildings. This skeptical argument will build around a distinction I will make between what a rational subject can perceive and what can be said about it—a distinction based on Gilles Deleuze's distinction between the visible and the sayable.

> “THE PROBLEM OF UNITY ... HAS BEEN OBSCURED BY THE TRADITION OF ARCHITECTURE INTERPRETATION ORIGINATING IN HEGEL”

It is argued that there are four categories of things that can be said about architecture: construction, style, use, and ideology, and that a difficulty of architecture theory is the possible unification of these categories. The problem of unity, it is argued, has been obscured by the tradition of architecture interpretation originating in Hegel, and which implies that there is an unproblematic semiotic relationship between construction, style, and meaning such that construction serves the purpose of style and style serves the purpose of embodying the collective aspirations of a community. Thinking through this problem in terms of Wittgenstein's philosophy of language will allow us to defamilarize ourselves from the notions that there could be a natural relation between style and meaning in architecture and that there could be an encompassing discourse on architecture such that all the categories of what can be said about buildings would be articulated within a unifying concept. The following paper thus presents the reasons one might have for being skeptical about a theoretical discourse concerning architecture that would do justice to its totality of significance. This discourse skepticism is, it must be said, at one remove from descriptive or prescriptive statements about particular buildings or building styles. Thus, unlike, Tafuri for instance, philosophy is not claimed (or a theoretical argument grounded in philosophy) is not claimed as assuming the normative power of grading the merits of individual buildings according to general criteria. The relevance of the skeptical program for architectural practice and architectural practitioners is thus indirect. That is not to say, this skepticism about meaning is without consequence for architectural practice. To say it more bluntly, it is believed that modernism and its avatars—functionalism, deconstruction, and the 'iconic' style of building—have overstated the power of theory within building practice. The modernist program of the early twentieth century and its continuation in architecture theory of our time can be defined as the effort to provide an aesthetic rationale for an industrial process of production and then to amplify this aesthetic program within a fitting social ideology: concrete is an industrial construction tool. Concrete produces an anti-ornamental aesthetic. The anti-ornamental aesthetic is egalitarian. This would be the basic pattern of argument. This theoretical assertiveness and this trajectory from construction—through style to ideology—relies on a conception of the unity between style and meaning, which is herein called semiotic naturalism and which, it is argued, is problematic.

MEANING SKEPTICISM IN WITTGENSTEIN

Wittgenstein exhorts us to be skeptical about the notion that there is, or that there must be, some such entity as meaning in order for language to be meaningful [1]. For language to make sense, does not in turn mean that there is a sense which language makes and which we, the linguists or philosophers, could subsequently isolate and study as if it were a self-contained mental object. It is not clear from Wittgenstein's texts, or from the scholarly interpretations of his texts, what the implication would be of holding this skepticism about meaning. The pragmatic and anti-theoretical stance pervading the *Philosophical Investigations* sits uncomfortably with the extraordinary ingenuity of Wittgenstein's thought experiments and search for candidates that purportedly should satisfy justificatory or foundational criteria, but which under his skeptical scrutiny always collapse [2]. This painstaking search reveals something other than mere opposition to particular theoretical positions, conceptions of meaning, or conceptions of consciousness. It reveals an attitude of puzzlement or bewilderment regarding that which seems natural. It is true, of course, that Wittgenstein's puritanical sensibility would lead him to search for a higher, simpler, or more essential naturalness in which our thoughts about language would contain nothing superfluous [3]. This sensibility is evident in different ways in both the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations*, but in the latter text, his own method of skeptical scrutiny runs counter to the ideal of simplicity.

The significance and purpose of a building is similar to meaning in Wittgenstein's sense in that within a natural, non-skeptical attitude we may think that there is a purpose or a significance that we can isolate intellectually and think about. It is argued that just as Wittgenstein encourages us to be skeptical about meaning as an isolated ideal entity, we should also problematize the notion of purpose as a unifying meta-category within the architecture discourse. This problem is addressed in terms of distinct categories and with reference to distinct discourses in which architecture has been made intelligible, or in which one has sought to make architecture intelligible. The semiotic principles at work in these efforts at making architecture intelligible are questioned and problematized.

> “MODERNISM AND ITS AVATARS ... HAVE OVERSTATED THE POWER OF THEORY WITHIN BUILDING PRACTICE”

HEGEL AND THE SEMIOTICS OF ARCHITECTURE

In studying modern architecture theory, one cannot fail to notice that particular assumptions are made again and again regarding the purpose of architecture. These assumptions are semiotic. The philosophical origin of the semiotic assumptions appears to be Hegel's theory of architecture in his lectures on aesthetics as embodying collective beliefs [4]. The legacy of Hegel is rooted in the thought that buildings are meaningful because they are bearers of shared, historically specific aspirations, which make up their purpose and their meaning. Within the Hegelian perspective, purpose and meaning appear identical, or at least convergent.

The Hegelian legacy is referred to as ‘semiotic naturalism’ because it consists in taking for granted that buildings convey meaning and that these meanings can be clearly and univocally determined. For instance, in historical research the following is a common thought formation: there is here a natural, that is, non-problematic relationship between a presupposed cultural signified and the concept of the building as signifier. This way of thinking leads us to a view in which style choices such as choices of ornamentation, referring to the three orders of antiquity, or choices concerning internal spatial disposition between rooms, or choices of materials, or even the relation of a building to its surroundings, can be reconstructed as having been made for reasons that are culturally transparent. The building may not be a sign in the sense of a message or a tool of communication, but it appears as a depository of cultural meanings. The cultural meanings can be of various kinds: religious, political, social, etc. The argument for a distrust in this semiotic principle will be given in the last section of this article, where the ideological positions taken in Alberti’s theory of architecture are discussed. If the assumption of cultural continuity between construction, style, and ideological meaning is broken, so is also the idea of a building’s cultural intelligibility and transparent readability. One may also say that this skeptical approach to ideology is directly opposed to the Marxist social and contextual reading proposed for instance by Tafuri.

When Hegel writes about religious medieval architecture he is inspired by Winckelmann’s idealization of Greek civilization on the one hand, and guided, on the other, by his own notion that the European Middle Ages was a spiritually saturated period [5]. His idea of churches summing up the spirit of a community subsequently became influential in architecture theory as a basic semiotic premise. The premise was taken to mean that buildings are constructs made within, for, and in some cases, by a community. That buildings are successful to the extent that they express the beliefs of that community.

One follower of this Hegelian perspective is the twentieth century architecture historian Christian Norberg-Shulz. In his synthesis, *Meaning in Western Architecture*, he presents architecture as a cultural response to a given environment. According to this model, the succession of civilizations presents different solutions to the question of how to create, and articulate a meaningful space. He describes how, in other words, to appropriate the natural environment and integrate it into forms of construction, that are not merely monumental and not entirely aloof from their surroundings.

A less idealistic, more empirically historicist, but also implicitly Marxist, account of meaning in architecture is Tafuri's analysis of post-war Italian architecture [6]. The analysis is committed to a normative idea of social progress, which is used as a benchmark and tool of distinction for evaluating and comparing social building projects. Some buildings are good because they have a style, which implies a commitment to modernity, while other buildings imply a more muted position. Tafuri also evaluates projects in the context of a wider historical narrative. In Tafuri's account of Italian architects' ideological responses to urbanization, he envisaged architectural and urban design as embodying rival propositions around the notion of progress.

In Hegel, Norberg-Shulz, and Tafuri we arrive at the position that buildings are made for ideological purposes and that, in this, they carry meaning. For Hegel, buildings are meaningful when they embody religious beliefs. For Norberg-Shulz, buildings are meaningful when they articulate and appropriate a space. For Tafuri, buildings, or design projects, are like actions according to Jean-Paul Sartre: buildings take sides in an ideological battle between progress and reaction [7].

The different approaches to architecture from a historicist, phenomenological, and Marxist perspective shares the assumption that the relationship between architectural style and architectural construction—as well as the relationship between these two and whatever can be said about the meaning or significance of a building—is obvious. It is obvious, according to Hegel, that aesthetic form expresses a moral ideal.

“WITHIN THE HEGELIAN PERSPECTIVE, PURPOSE AND MEANING APPEAR IDENTICAL, OR AT LEAST CONVERGENT”

It is obvious, for Tafuri, that design choice expresses a stance with regard to the opposition between modernity and reaction. It is this obviousness or naturalness of meaning that is problematic and which Wittgenstein helps us to think of as problematic. The assumption that buildings and building design must have a cultural meaning is not self-evident. At least, this is what this paper goes on to argue—but in doing so it will be helpful to return to Wittgenstein.

WITTGENSTEINIAN DIALECTIC

To approach the assumptions and the semiotic naturalism of certain kinds of architecture theory, it is useful to return to Wittgenstein to draw from another more specific trait of his thinking in the *Investigations*. The trait of interest is a methodological trait. Rather than putting forward views directly and systematically, his thought moves dialectically in relation to a number of putative theories presented in rudimentary form—the most famous of which is the so-called private language argument. The movement through, or via, alternative and rival theoretical scenarios has the obvious advantage over a straightforwardly systematic discourse in that it avoids, or at least postpones, the petition of principle inherent in any dogmatic statement of a systematic set of propositions: as soon as there is a starting-point, something must have been assumed which is not quite explicit in the self-justification of the system. At the outset, the position will not be argued from the plane of a specific conception of architectural meaning. In itself, the argument from potential scenarios has the advantage of bringing into play, simultaneously, different theoretical possibilities and thus to highlighting the element of choice in the formulation of a theory. In this paper on semiotic naturalism, and an alternative to semiotic naturalism, a non-natural and less obvious, less straightforward understanding of the meaning relation in architecture is unfolded, one that is manifest in a certain kind of architecture history. Next, semiotic naturalism as consisting of a set of potential scenarios, or theoretical propositions, indirectly addressing a certain semiotic question of intelligibility is considered.

CATEGORIES OF ARCHITECTURE DISCOURSE

We can now think of the Hegelian tradition of semiotic naturalism as consisting of alternative theoretical propositions. These are all predicated on the assumption that the problem of how to articulate intellectual and visible space has already been solved, or that it need not emerge. In order to analyze these assumptions closely, we need to consider the categories within which we speak about architecture. For architecture is only, and can only become, intelligible in terms of the things which we can say about it. Anything we may predicate belongs to some kind of category. The question would be, therefore, what are the discourse categories relevant to architecture? Does architectural discourse, that is, the kind of language which seeks to make architecture intelligible, possess its own distinct categories or does it employ categories that are common to architecture and art, architecture and the city, architecture and society, and so on?

Before suggesting an answer to this question, one can take as an example of a category problem, the concept of modernity. Now, we may think of many different sorts of things as modern, for instance, in no apparent order: the modern state, modern lifestyle, modern painting, modern technology. It is clear that within a general historical narrative, all these different phenomena could somehow be related. It is further clear that by doing so the historian will have to make certain fundamental methodological choices regarding the relationship, for instance, between society and politics, between science and society, or between the social and the aesthetic. These are precisely category questions.

“THE ASSUMPTION THAT BUILDINGS AND BUILDING DESIGN MUST HAVE CULTURAL MEANING IS NOT SELF-EVIDENT”

All of the examples above further present a relevance to the question of architecture discourse in that architecture could be said to have something in common with all of them. One could write monographs on the relationship between the modern state and modern architecture or on the relationship between modern lifestyle and modern architecture. The issue of modernity and the category questions it immediately raises are thus apt at bringing out the precarious ontological status of the phenomenon of architecture as it exists somewhere between art and society. The ontological precariousness is another problem for the naturalist semiotician, for it gives rise to semiotic problems of classification. If architecture is like painting, if Le Corbusier is like Picasso, one set of questions concerning meaning will arise. If on the other hand architecture is technology, if Mies van der Rohe is the apogee of the historical development that produced high speed trains and motorways, another, entirely different set of meaning questions will ensue.

The precarious ontological status has to do with the relationship between the primary categories within which we can talk about buildings: construction, style, ideology, and use. It is difficult to conceive of anything that can be said about buildings that does not belong within any of these four categories. It is also difficult to think of a principle according to which we could identify their unity. If we think of the development of architecture theory since the Renaissance we find a gradual shift in the relationship between these categories and their relative importance. We also find different efforts at identifying a unity between them. Alberti's work is often considered as marking the beginning of modern architecture theory and his primary focus is construction—but he also introduces the notion of the importance of architecture for human life. The notion is referred to as ideology so in order to distance this analysis from Tafuri's more prescriptive notion of ideology, which is based on a normative battle between socially modern ideas and socially reactionary ideas.

At the end of the 16th century, Palladio writes about construction in terms of a prescriptive notion of style. In the course of the eighteenth century and in response to the need for domestic houses for a bourgeoisie oriented toward comfort rather than ostentation, architecture theory becomes concerned with pragmatic questions of what is pleasant and practical. Issues of style will thus be interpreted in terms of ideological questions concerning use. In twentieth century architectural modernism there is the effort to integrate construction, style, and an ideology of use. Le Corbusier is famously prescriptive in his ideas of use, and the functionalist school equally presents a formidable unity of construction principles, aesthetic norms, and norms of social life: functions are finite and simple and correspond to a clarity of design, and it is inconceivable that the purpose of a building could be to enhance a messy overlap between many kinds of activities in the manner, say, of a medieval city.

The latest modernists, the so-called deconstructionist Bernard Tschumi and post-modern Koolhaas, seek to explore the relationship between construction, style, and ideology while arguing—against functionalism—neither in terms of style nor in terms of use but in terms of a direct relationship between construction and ideology. The ideological principle is in both cases one of freedom of creation. Tschumi's notion that the basic grammar of buildings, such as walls and roof, is open to question or his embrace of the principle of the grid in his Parc de la Villette project implies that construction dictates style and use. Koolhaas' surreal conception of New York as a place designed by the settlers for a future invention and use challenges the functionalist principle that we already know what use is, or should be. This brief sketch of the history of architecture theory and the shifting relations between categories is meant to indicate the motivation behind semiotic naturalism.

NORBERG-SHULZ AND HEIDEGGER

The grand synthesis of Norberg-Shulz is based on the idea that the categories of construction and style are inseparable and that both find a common expression in the context of a natural environment, which architecture has the mission to order, manage, structure, in short, articulate. The environmental aesthetic synthesis does indeed make the architecture of different epochs appear purposeful, and in a sense meaningful, as each epoch with its characteristic and distinct style and construction method, appears to offer fresh solutions to the environmental, or one might say anthropological, problem of man's relation to, and management of, his physical surroundings. Norberg-Shulz's theoretical position is referred to here in some detail because it constitutes a particularly explicit and ambitious formulation of semiotic naturalism. With his aesthetic and spatial understanding of Heidegger's phenomenology, Norberg-Shulz presents a theoretical position that is much more sophisticated and detailed than the vague philosophical reflections on building and living put forward by Heidegger himself in his famous article "Bauen Wohnen Denken" from 1951 [8].

> "THE PRECARIOUS ONTOLOGICAL STATUS HAS TO DO WITH THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PRIMARY CATEGORIES WITHIN WHICH WE CAN TALK ABOUT BUILDINGS"

In the article, Heidegger develops a rhetorical context in which the phenomenon of architecture appears anonymous and traditional, as something objectively manifest—in the way of having already been made—rather than as something planned or invented on the basis of style and construction choices. Norberg-Shulz, on the other hand, keeps the door open to the perspective of the practicing architect and is attuned, with his flexible concept of articulation, to the element of choice in architectural creation. At the same time, choices appear in retrospect to be culturally coterminous with other contemporary choices: this does not imply that the individual choice is determined by collective beliefs, perhaps, but it at least means that we cannot make sense of the individual choice outside of the context of the culture with which it is contemporary. Formulated thus blandly, architecture historians might agree with this principle, but it implies the attribution of a degree of internal coherence to architecture, which is perhaps excessive and which does not do justice to the multiple contingencies of architectural creation.

The naturalist assumption Norberg-Shulz makes is that architecture is successful always or that architecture is identical with successful architecture. There is no reflection upon the relationship between vernacular or folk architecture and stand-alone, deliberately conceived constructions. There is scant reflection on the relation between public and domestic space, since his focus is religious and political architecture: building on a grand scale. In this identification between the general concept of architecture and the narrower, normatively charged notion of successful architecture, Norberg-Shulz turns out to be close to Heidegger. For in Heidegger we see that the position of normative discrimination between different buildings in terms of their aesthetic merit is problematic. For such a normative aesthetic authority implies that the power of viewing and thinking of an individual subject is somehow higher than the weight of tradition. Yet, Heidegger would exhort us to think of architecture as a kind of prolongation of the natural environment. Buildings and bridges are there in our midst. They impose themselves upon us and create a coherent space and landscape, but they do not offer themselves to judgment. In other words, judgment is not the most relevant attitude that we can have towards them.

Thus, the aesthetic perspective which privileges style and, on the other hand, the construction perspective, which evaluates craft and technique, are both rendered irrelevant to a large extent within the rhetorical space that Heidegger creates for architecture. What Heidegger and Norberg-Shulz share is thus a kind of transcendental perspective where the activity of making buildings, on the one hand, and the activity of perceiving and judging them, on the other, are set aside. The phenomenological method consists in part in the transcendental. By putting aside certain questions—such as empirical causality—other questions, concerning meaning or the essential properties of phenomena can come into view. In the field of architecture theory, this phenomenological essentialism has the authoritarian implication that aesthetic and ideological discussion will appear irrelevant. Architecture appears in its history as a kind of general anthropological phenomenon. It manifests itself outside of the distinctions and disagreements which individuals can make, and which would form the topic of theoretical discussions among architects.

CULTURAL INTENTIONALITY

Normative or evaluative discussions and reflections appear in the history of architecture in two distinct forms. On the one hand is the discipline of architecture history, which develops as a part of art history, largely in the course of the twentieth century. On the other hand is the kind of architecture theory that is produced by architects. The analysis herein will attend to the former first and come back to the latter at the end of this article. Architecture history has been practiced in different rhetorical and methodological modes in different countries, with Italian architecture history often being attentive to craft, whereas the German tradition has been predominantly style, and the Anglo-American tradition of recent years being positivist and contextualist.

> “A NORMATIVE AESTHETIC AUTHORITY IMPLIES THAT THE POWER OF VIEWING AND THINKING OF AN INDIVIDUAL SUBJECT IS SOMEHOW HIGHER THAN THE WEIGHT OF TRADITION”

The analysis is now primarily focused on the naturalist semiotic assumptions of contextual architecture history. A prominent example of the naturalist semiotic method is Ákos Moravánszky’s *Competing Visions* text devoted to the themes of eclecticism and modernism in large cities of Central Europe during the early twentieth century [9]. In this work, he reconstructs a complex cultural intentionality underlying the making of individual buildings by the preeminent architects of the time.

Moravánszky's account keeps alive both the notion of individual creation and the notion of collective belief, a balance which was not achieved in the synthesis of Norberg-Shulz. He is able to correlate specific choices of ornament or construction with general aesthetic and ideological currents prevalent at the time the building was conceived so as to demonstrate how general trends are taken up and inflected by the personality of individual architects. The architects, Moravánszky argues, impose their own personality and idiosyncrasies upon the ideas made available to them in the surrounding culture.

The subtle, multifactorial historical approach cannot properly be named simply contextual or positivist, since it is carried by a phenomenological idea, similar to that of Norberg-Shulz. The complexity of the notion is captured in the title of the book, *Competing Visions*. At the horizon of the study is principally the philosophical idea that architecture embodies a vision. The vision is both aesthetic and moral. It is embedded in style and construction. It involves an open question as to what constitutes modernity. It concerns the historical development of large cities and brings into view questions of how one should live in modern society. Moravánszky is some senses similar to Norberg-Shulz in thinking of architecture as a sort of synthesis, but differs from Norberg-Shulz in that the arena of such a synthesis is neither the appropriation of space nor the articulation of space through choices of construction and style. The arena of synthesis is instead the relationship, that the historian reconstructs, between style and ideology. The relationship, once it is painstakingly reconstructed, can be retrospectively attributed to the agents—the architects and theorists of architecture—so that it appears as the backbone or structure of a complex, cultural intentionality. This ideologically rich intentionality appears as the ground of architectural creation.

Thus, by placing the focus on ideology rather than construction, while retaining style as a central category, Moravánszky is both in continuity with Norberg-Shulz and decisively different. Both start from the assumption that architecture is predominantly a phenomenon of style. Yet, Norberg-Shulz interprets style in terms of anthropological needs and Moravánszky interprets style in terms of specific ideological commitments. We can elaborate on the divergences between to two thinkers in terms of the four primary categories and the relation between them. In Norberg-Shulz we find with his concept of articulation a claim that the satisfaction of spatial anthropological needs is simultaneously a feat of style, of construction, and of ideology. For articulation corresponds to anthropological needs and is expressed through style features and construction choices. With this anthropological focus on the task of creating spatial articulation, Norberg-Shulz interestingly downgrades the normative importance of those features of style that are purely ornamental. Style is so intimately related to construction through the articulation of space that any style choice would become significant within the context of molding that space. Moravánszky's method, on the other hand, is symbolic rather than anthropological. For him the specific ornamental choices on the façade of a building are ideological signifiers independently of the building's functionality. Thus, with architectural historians such as Moravánszky, we find the concrete elaboration of the ontological assumption that buildings are primarily visible, which is to say, buildings are something akin to three dimensional paintings amenable to aesthetic analysis.

In a less nuanced version of this type of intellectual history of architecture, such as Pelkonen's book on nationalism and internationalism in Alvar Aalto, the ideological strand in the argument becomes so dominant that other considerations are clearly subordinate [10]. In Moravánszky's study ideological commitments do not command the analysis [9]. Moravánszky's text deftly and incessantly moves between different types of consideration. It is, however, in the balance and subtlety that the method betrays its semiotic assumptions. For the seamless transition between different categories and apparently effortless integration of different sorts of material is only possible if it is assumed at the outset that style, construction, and ideology cohere and form a necessary unity. The assumption may of course turn out to be the case, but how do we justify such a general, idealistic, semiotic conception of architectural unity? It is this sort of unity that was referred to as a naturalist conception of purpose earlier, that is, an idea of what a building is for.

“IDEOLOGICALLY RICH INTENTIONALITY APPEARS AS THE GROUND OF ARCHITECTURAL CREATION”

The different kinds of theoretical synthesis discussed involve not questioning the possibility of coherence between different categories. These are the categories within which, or at the aid of which, architecture purportedly becomes intelligible in its purpose and significance within the discourse of architecture historians. It is suggested that the synthesis of different categories, which justifies claims for intelligibility within architecture history (and which are referred to as semiotic naturalism) rest upon a denial. Or as psychoanalysts might say, foreclosure, of a possible scenario in which the visible and the intelligible might drift apart. Such a drifting apart takes place in discourse and is perceivable as a skeptical scenario occurring within the discourse. If that which drifts apart are intelligibility and visibility, there must be also a scenario of something, which is presented to visual perception but which does not immediately fall within the realm of discourse. That being said, the relationship between the primal categories varies greatly both within the history of the discipline of architecture history and in the history of theories produced by architects—which is in some cases distinct from the discipline of architecture history (though not always, as Tafuri and Norberg-Shulz are both examples of).

This is the sort of theory now considered in order to argue that it highlights a specific problem of ideology. In its implications, this problem of ideology poses, I will argue, a challenge to semiotic naturalism. As I said, the term "ideology" is used here not in the Marxist sense, for instance by Tafuri in his discussion of competing stances taken towards urban or social modernity. Tafuri attributes definite ideological positions to individual architects and deftly correlates these positions with style and construction choices. My view of architecture is less concerned with positions and choices; it is Platonic, rather, in its focus on rival conceptions of the good life or the sort of life that architecture is for or that it should enhance and promote. There may well be many different conceptions of the good life, depending on geographical and historical circumstances. The concept of ideology thus does not come with a theoretical—in Tafuri's case, modernist and social historicist—script, which would provide the ground for identifying individual positions contrastively and contrasting them with others as on a structural grid. Ideology, in this context is a conception of life, of what life should consist of, and of how architecture can enhance this good or appropriate life. The ideological conception of life has to be both related to style and construction choices and separate from them.

ALBERTI'S IDEA OF THE GOOD LIFE

Alberti's *On the art Art of Building in Ten Books*, which appeared around 1450, pursues a painstaking and detailed reconstruction of everything that the craft of architecture entails as a material process of construction [11]. Yet, in doing so, in presenting the meticulous inventory of principles, problems, and prescriptions, Alberti also introduces his own presuppositions concerning what matters in life. In short, in the margins of the text we find his ideology. His ideology coheres with his construction principles, but significantly, is not correlated with style, a topic about which he has little to say—and what he says is theoretically bland.

Alberti's starting points are climatic and geographical. He shares with Machiavelli the notion that place is a category defined by geographical security questions. In Alberti's case, however, it is not only the advent of potential enemies that buildings and towns must be prepared for but also natural disasters, and, more generally, contingencies. In book 3, chapter 7 book 3/7 he thus says, programmatically, about weather conditions: "Moreover, it is self-evident, without looking for any less obvious reasons, that the assault of the weather will be responsible for loosening and breaking the bond of anything that has grown or been forced together" [12]. We could of course gloss this statement pragmatically, seeing it in continuity with Vitruvian norms of adapting to the environment, but the emphasis here is very different. Against the happy common sense of Vitruvius, we find here an anxious *memento mori*, an acute and poignant awareness of the fragility of all things made by humans. There is a kind of existential dimension to Alberti's architectural thinking in which contingency is not far from his mind. The adequate response to contingency

> “IN THE MARGINS OF THE TEXT WE FIND [ALBERTI'S] IDEOLOGY”

according to Alberti appears to be control—and control is according to him based on knowledge. The required knowledge is by no means limited narrowly to the architect's craft but includes detailed and specific geographical information. It is a kind of highly specific knowledge which ideally should inform choices of material and hence construction. In Book 3, Chapter 12 he thus talks about controlling natural conditions when it comes to choosing wood: "The beams should be related if at all possible: that is, they should be of the same type of timber, from the same forest, raised under the same climatic conditions, and felled on the same day, so that by having the same natural strength they will perform their function equally" [13]. There is an elegant slide in this passage from reflections upon conditions to a prescription concerning structure. In fact the arc of Alberti's argument is formed by this integration of control and structure. For construction is for Alberti essentially a control of structure. The purpose of this kind of control is a wider sense of control of contingency. Hence, in Book 3, Chapter 14 he develops an analogy between biological organisms and architectural construction with the aim of articulating a concept of structure: "In short, with every type of vault we should imitate Nature throughout, that is, bind together the bones and interweave flesh with nerves running along any possible section: in length, breath and depth, and also obliquely across" [14].

His reflections on use and usefulness are similarly climatological and informed by a sense of insecurity and need of protection. In book 5, chapter 2, for instance, he discusses the internal division of private houses: "Inside, the dining rooms, storerooms, and so on should be appropriately located where their contents will keep well. Where the air is right and they will receive the correct amount of sun and ventilation, and where they can serve their intended uses" [15]. We find a similar climatological idea of usefulness in a reflection on urban planning. In Book 5, Chapter 7 Alberti discusses the location of monasteries in towns: "But I would have any cloister within the city, be it for women or for men, sited in the healthiest possible place, lest emaciation of the body and sleeplessness prevent the inmates from attending fully to their minds, and lest illness make their lives harder than usual" [16].

The running thread of geography and contingency forms the ideological basis of Alberti's thinking. The purpose of architecture is safety. It aims to protect us against decay, illness, natural disaster, weather conditions, and enemies. The ideological conception that he projects and presupposes is that life is precarious, in need of support and security. The good life is essentially one in which one survives. This may be a bleak vision of the good life, but it is explicit, articulate, and clear. Through his reflections on structure, Alberti integrates his ideas of protection and solidity within his precepts on construction. Alberti's aim is to integrate construction and ideology. He thus indirectly problematizes the later programs of categorical synthesis in which style is central, either in relation to construction as in Norberg-Shulz or in relation to ideology as in Moravánszky.

Returning to Wittgenstein, the skeptical conclusion of this comparison between different styles of architectural reflection is that the relationship between the four suggested categories of architecture—construction, style, ideology, and use—is more contested and more controversial than one might think if one starts from the assumptions of semiotic naturalism and the presupposition of coherence.

ENDNOTES

[1] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophische Untersuchungen* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1982).

[2] Reidar A. Due, "At the Margins of Sense: The Function of Paradox in Deleuze and Wittgenstein," *Paragraph* 34, no. 3 (2011): 358-370.

[3] Norman Malcolm, *Wittgenstein: Nothing is Hidden* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988).

[4] G. W. F. Hegel, *Ästhetik* (Berlin: Aufbau Verlag, 1965).

[5] Johann Joachim Winckelmann, *Gedanken über die Nachahmung der griechischen Werke in der Malerei und Bildhauerkunst* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2007).

[6] Manfredo Tafuri, *Storia dell'architettura italiana* 1944-1985 (Torino: Einaudi, 1986).

[7] Michael Scriven, *Sartre and the Media* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993).

[8] Martin Heidegger, *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2000).

[9] Ákos Moravánszky, *Competing Visions: Aesthetic Invention and Social Imagination in Central European Architecture, 1867-1918* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1998).

[10] Eeva-Liisa Pelkonen, *Alvar Aalto: Architecture, Modernity, and Geopolitics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009).

[11] Leon Battista Alberti, *On the Art of Building in Ten Books*, trans. Joseph Rykwert, Neil Leach, and Robert Tavernor (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1991).

[12] Ibid., 71.

[13] Ibid., 80.

[14] Ibid., 86.

[15] Ibid., 119.

[16] Ibid., 127.

BOOK REVIEW

THE AESTHETICS OF ARCHITECTURE.

ROGER SCRUTON.

PRINCETON, NJ: PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2013 (1ST EDITION 1979).

REVIEWED BY HILDE HEYNEN


THE AESTHETICS OF ARCHITECTURE
ROGER SCRUTON
WITH A NEW INTRODUCTION BY THE AUTHOR

Roger Scruton is a well-known and well-respected philosopher whose work has been extensively studied and commented upon, especially in the field of aesthetics [1]. In this field, Scruton's recently reissued book on architecture is generally appreciated. It is even considered a "classic in architectural philosophy" [2]. Scruton's standing within the field of architectural history and theory, on the other hand, is a point of contention. In this regard, the book is far less extensively studied and certainly not seen as indispensable. In the recent *Sage Handbook of Architectural Theory*, the sixty page section on "Aesthetics/Pleasure/Excess," for example, only mentions the book in passing, as an example of normative discourse "pitched against the theoretical developments published in progressive architectural journals" [3]. How does one attempt to explain this discrepancy? How is it that a book that clearly impresses many philosophers fails to register broadly in architectural culture? There is of course the possibility that aesthetics as a field matters to architects or artists only like 'ornithology to birds' [4]. It seems, however, that the reasons for the discrepancy are more complicated than that. Architectural culture supports, after all, a flourishing critical and theoretical discourse with a multitude of journals, books, and series all devoted to discussing the merits and values of particular trends, architects, works, and ideas. This discourse engages quite intensively with a host of philosophical references, and many prominent architects are actively involved in the exchange. How is it then that the parameters of the discourse are so clearly different in philosophical aesthetics and in architectural theory? Would one not expect that these fields would be involved in an intensive transdisciplinary dialogue? Both try, after all, to make sense of what it is that drives architecture and what makes up its specific qualities. This review will try to delve into this problem after briefly discussing Scruton's position and summarizing the book's content and merits.

When *The Aesthetics of Architecture* was first published in 1979 the book was understood as part of a series of publications that all focused on questions regarding the meaning of architecture. Semiotics was, at that moment, a central concern in architectural culture, and many authors sought to develop an approach to architecture that could go beyond the functionalism and rationalism of the modern movement. Such publications provided the intellectual ground for what became known as postmodernism, and Scruton's book might be seen as part of that endeavor. Scruton, however, was different from the other authors in this field (such as Norberg-Schulz, Eco, Jencks, Bonta, and others) in that he considerably narrowed the type of architecture that he saw as 'right.' His book may be simplified as an argument in favor of some form of classicism in architecture, and there are thus only a few contemporary architects whom he would sympathize with. As such, his position is out of sync with the architectural culture of the last decades. Classical-minded architects and theorists, just like new urbanists and neo-historicists, belong to a subculture which sometimes manages to evoke popular appeal, but which has not penetrated the academic sphere or the higher echelons of the professional field.

The new introduction Scruton wrote for the 2013 edition confirms the impression of desynchronization with mainstream culture. Here the author is more outspoken in his criticism of modernism and in his alignment with particular architects and theorists than he was in the 1979 version of the book. He mentions such architectural figures as Christopher Alexander, Nikos Salingaros, and Leon Krier as people who share his convictions. These are authors who indeed do not figure among the most prominent individuals in current architectural culture. Alexander and Krier briefly occupied a position of influence in the 1980s and 1990s—the heydays of postmodernism—but their intellectual impact has largely withered away due to the renewed prominence of modernism and modernity, in all their complexities, as the main point of reference. Salingaros is a mathematician and younger collaborator of Alexander, who has written several works on architecture and urbanism. He calls for a built environment catering to human emotions and providing agreeable and pleasant places to live, and thus fights 'stararchitects' as well as all forms of deconstructivism and poststructuralism. Again, Salingaros's work seems to have some popular appeal, but it is not widely known or highly regarded within the architectural field as a whole, which rather engages with questions of technology, sustainability, infrastructure, urbanism, or justice [5]. Many architects are weary of easy argumentations like Saringaros's because they understand how the call for 'pleasant places' can hide utter conservatism as well as resistance against any form of innovation.

Let us now turn to Scruton's book itself and its arguments. The author helpfully provides a summary in the third part of the book, which rehearses its line of reasoning. I will draw upon that summary to give an overview of his argument. Scruton posits in the first chapter that architecture does not derive its nature from being a form of art but rather from an everyday occupation with getting things right—which is basically an aesthetic concern. He thus wishes to start from the aesthetics of everyday life as the basis for his discussions. In the next chapters, he deals with theories that, according to him, detach aesthetics from architecture or that erroneously perceive some concept as central or essential to architecture. He thus dismisses functionalism, rationalism, theories of space and proportion, as well as discourses based upon the art historical concepts of Riegl (*Kunstwollen*) and Wölflinn (*Zeitgeist*). All of these approaches are 'vacuous' because they all fail to adequately describe the experience of architecture. In order to give a positive account of the experience of architecture, Scruton reverts to the concept of imagination, which he deems absolutely crucial for his aesthetics. Moreover, he claims that it "is because the experience of architecture is imaginative that architecture can be judged right or wrong" [6]. For

> "[SCRUTON'S] POSITION IS OUT OF SYNC WITH THE ARCHITECTURAL CULTURE OF THE LAST DECADES."

aesthetic judgment is based upon imagination, informed by perception, and modified by reasoned reflection. It aims at an ideal of objectivity and at a continuity with moral life—hence its normative quality.

With all this, the basis is put together for further dismissals of other competing discourses. Freudian and Marxist analyses are seen as largely irrelevant to the understanding of architecture because they either generalize beyond aesthetics or devote themselves to a falsification of architectural experience, thus missing the point. The efforts of semiotics to understand architecture as a language likewise turn out to be 'vacuous' because they lack a theoretical basis or a critical application. Concepts such as 'representation' or 'expression' are faulted for not adequately connecting aesthetic judgment with the practice of the builder. Finally, the concluding chapters argue the importance of detail and the role of style as an indispensable adjunct to architectural knowledge. They culminate in a defense of classicism, which is seen as the only approach to architecture that allows it to connect with a true understanding of the self and with objectivity.

This quick summary of course does not properly acknowledge the depth of the author's knowledge or the fine-tuned details of his specific discussions. Scruton is well read in the history of architectural theory, and he is an expert in the tradition of aesthetic philosophy up to Kant and Hegel. He clearly makes an effort to familiarize himself with architectural discourses such as those of Giedion or Tafuri. Many of his architectural examples are also quite illuminative and help to clarify his arguments. These qualities, however, cannot detract from the book's weak point: its set-up as a take-it-or-leave-it argument, almost like a mathematical proof that sets out to validate the correctness of a formula by deriving it from previously proven formulas or from axioms. If, as a reader, one disagrees with only one step in the reasoning, that is enough to render the whole argument—and especially its conclusions—unconvincing (or 'vacuous,' to use Scruton's own term). This, of course, happened to this particular reader early on in the text. I disagreed with Scruton's analysis of functionalism and the theories of space in chapters 2 and 3. Whereas I was still following him in chapter 1—agreeing with his approach to architecture as being based on utility, location, public character, and continuity with decorative arts, which he later sums up as 'aesthetics of the everyday'—his analysis of functionalism struck the wrong chord. Scruton understands 'theory' as prescriptive: "architectural theory consists in the attempt to formulate the maxims, rules and precepts which govern, or ought to govern, the practice of the builder" [7]. That means that he is reading texts by architects as if they are fully explanatory of the architecture they produce, which is rarely the case. If Hannes Meyer wrote manifests of functionalism—which he did—this does not in turn mean that all his design projects can be explained as if he just applied his own rules—he did not. It also means, however, that a mere philosophical disputation of the correctness of the theory is not enough to deny the buildings associated with it any aesthetical significance. It is not because modernist theory does not hold that modernist buildings therefore lack any value. This however seems to be an important subtext in Scruton's book.

“ITS SET-UP AS A TAKE IT OR LEAVE ARGUMENT”

The author also takes issue with Giedion's and Zevi's theory of space, which considers space and spatial articulations as the essence of architecture. “Taken literally,” he states, “the theory that the experience of architecture is an experience of space is obviously indefensible” [8]. The reasons for this indefensibility however do not convince me. According to Scruton, as soon as one can point to an architectural feature that does not relate to space or spatial experience, the theory is invalidated. He thinks he found such features by referring to materials or by referring to the differences between carved and molded forms. However, for people thinking as architects (I count myself among them), both materials and carved versus molded forms are fine examples of how some details can articulate space in different ways, causing different experiences of space. Hence for me the theory of space continues to be a contender for adequately conceiving what the ‘essence’ of architecture might be. Because I thus repeatedly found unaddressed objections to parts of Scruton's argument, the whole book seemed to become one large fallacy, constructed to prove the inescapability of what Scruton calls ‘classical vernacular’ as the only valid form of architecture. The more I read, the more the text came across as a potentially interesting but largely irrelevant elaboration of an argument, many parts of which I found too poorly developed to sustain scrutiny.

There are other small mistakes and larger misunderstandings in this book that might irritate people familiar with architectural culture. (They are competently summed up by Juan Pablo Bonta in his review from 1981 [9].) Rather than further repeating the flaws, however, I would like to point out two major issues that are responsible for the wide gap that separates Scruton from much contemporary reflection in architectural theory. The first has to do with the import of modernity, the second with his claim to objectivity.

From the turn of the twentieth century onwards, architects and architectural theorists have been talking about modernity. Around 1900, Berlage, Muthesius, Loos, Van de Velde, and many others agreed that industrialization and urbanization gave rise to societies with a wholly different way of life, which hence necessitated a wholly different kind of architecture. There was a widespread consensus that modernity implied a rupture with tradition, and that this discontinuity somehow had to be reflected in architecture. The intensity of the conviction provoked an aesthetics that no longer took classicism to be the ultimate point of reference. The new aesthetic sensibility has since been elaborated in many different ways—avant-garde, modernism, art deco, regionalism, critical regionalism, high tech, postmodernism, deconstructivism, neo-modernism, etc.—but across the board the idea that architecture needs to relate—somehow—to modernity has remained paramount. This means that 'getting things right,' as Scruton says, is only part of the equation for contemporary architects. Since dissonance, struggle, and contradictions are so much a part of that modern condition, a new aesthetic register seems to be more adequate, one that can show, in a right way, that things are not all right. Such an aesthetic register is more consistent with the philosophical musings of Walter Benjamin, Theodor Adorno, Jean-François Lyotard, Jacques Derrida, or Gilles Deleuze—names indeed prominently present in contemporary architectural culture.

Secondly there is the issue of objectivity. Whereas I agree with Scruton that aesthetic judgment assumes in the act of judging a claim to universal validity, I would be much more reluctant than he is to translate the claim into something actually true and objective. As an architectural theorist who has taken to heart the criticisms of rational discourse coming from Marxism, feminism, and postcolonial theories, I have a hard time accepting Scruton's writing as possibly universally valid. It rather strikes me as an excellent example of how an intellectual of a specific (hegemonic) class, gender, and culture produces a discourse that serves the continuation of the dominance of that class, gender, and culture. I do not believe, in other words, that there really is a general consensus possible about how buildings would 'feel right.' I do not believe that the aesthetics of the everyday can be anything else than confusing, contradictory, and hybrid (which, by the way, I see more as an asset than as a problem).

All in all, I think Scruton's *The Aesthetics of Architecture* narrows architecture to something which most of its practitioners today would not recognize as such—as if architecture essentially deals with only questions of style and detail, regardless of everything else. Most architects and theorists would agree that architecture necessarily engages with the real world—that it is crucial therefore to consider political and social issues (such as, Who is the client? Who is excluded? Who is included?), technological and material questions, ecological constraints, contextual considerations, and so on, as part and parcel of what architecture is all about. An aesthetic theory valid for today needs to adequately address these issues, not putting them aside as 'marginal' to the 'essence' of architecture. I am afraid that Scruton's book does not live up to these expectations, not in 1979 and not now.

> “I WOULD BE MUCH MORE RELUCTANT THAN HE IS TO TRANSLATE A CLAIM INTO SOMETHING ACTUALLY TRUE AND OBJECTIVE.”

ENDNOTES

[1] Andy Hamilton and Nick Zangwill (eds.), *Scruton's Aesthetics* (New York: Pallgrave Macmillan, 2012).

[2] Rafael De Clercq, "Scruton on Rightness of Proportion in Architecture," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 49, no. 4 (2009): 405.

[3] John Macarthur and Naomi Stead, "Introduction: Architecture and Aesthetics," in *The SAGE Handbook of Architectural Theory*, eds. Greig Crysler, Stephen Cairns, and Hilde Heynen (London: Sage, 2012), 126.

[4] Barnett Newman, "Untitled" (presentation, 4th Annual Woodstock Art Conference, Woodstock,

NY, August 22-23, 1952).

[5] *The SAGE Handbook of Architectural Theory* doesn't even mention Salingaros.

[6] Roger Scruton, *The Aesthetics of Architecture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 240.

[7] Ibid., 3.

[8] Ibid., 39.

[9] Juan Pablo Bonta, review of *The Aesthetics of Architecture*, by Roger Scruton, *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 39, no. 3 (1981): 328-330.

CALL FOR PAPERS:
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
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The fact that buildings are so strongly associated with various power holding empires, nation-states and other forms of civilization is widely recognized in the study of both the history of people and their buildings. From Pericles's Acropolis to Niemeyer's Brasilia, architecture has long been associated with political figures and institutions. Buildings such as the British Parliament, the Russian Kremlin, and the U.S. Capitol stand out not just as iconic architecture, but also as representative of the politics, institutions, and culture of their nations. Architecture and politics are intimately connected, yet precisely how are political concepts captured in the form and function of buildings?

Certainly utility plays a strong role here. We know that buildings serve the establishment and maintenance of a governing body. But in serving that function, do they also necessarily contribute to maintaining a particular ideological belief system? If we acknowledge that buildings hold both deterministic effect and autonomous disassociation, how do architects and politicians act? To what extent should architects design public structures intended to capture the social and political ethos of the people? Do architects have an obligation to address the socio-political in their work, or is this kind of moral obligation misplaced? Is it rather that the work of architects is already tacitly, inextricably part of the political process? And to what end? Is the 'autonomous turn' in architecture of the 1980s well and truly dead?

Beyond considerations of functionality, how do rulers utilize building to achieve their political goals and ideals? Is building fundamental to realizing ideological goals or a mere part of the process? One might also worry that we read too much into the social and political power of architects and buildings. While power routinely uses architecture to further its agenda, how reliably can we read buildings as instances of specific intentions? Architecture can be a highly political art form, but what can be said about the relationship between political intentions and aesthetic merit? Are there styles or typologies particularly conducive to establishing and maintaining power? Is the association of contemporary democracy with classical Greek and Roman architecture appropriate or warranted? And is the style's reverence intrinsic or learned? Could the Romanesque not equally as well serve the same purpose?

Assuming that buildings are already intrinsically enmeshed within the governing body's authority, can a single building work against that same authority? Can a building undermine a regime more readily than it can legitimize it? Some may argue that the Berlin Wall marked the end of the Communist rule over Eastern Germany, but how much weight can we ascribe to a building's maintenance of a governing body? Does time sanitize architecture that came into existence in the service of repugnant regimes?

How effective, for instance, are efforts to rebuild Iraq? Do contractors design buildings that are consistent with the social and political climate of the people? Can the people interpret these buildings independently of their feelings about the builders? Could it be that the very act of building in Iraq may be taken as an offense by some in the Iraqi nation-state? Although not all instances of international exchange are as contentious as this one, can architecture be incompatible with particular political concepts or systems?

Finally, what of the relation between architecture, power and capital? Does the globalization of capital and in its wake, of architecture, render architecture's connection to any individual state obsolete? Or to put it another way, is everything becoming an expression of the values of global capital?

The intent of this interdisciplinary conference is to gather philosophers, architects, urban planners, and critics to consider these questions regarding building's service to political ideologies, governing authorities, and socio-political contexts.

The event will be held in one of the most iconic and representative projects of the International Style of 20th century modern public architecture: Walter Netsch Jr.'s United States Air Force Academy—a premier education facility—in Colorado Springs, Colorado. The conference itself will be held in the latest addition to the Academy: the new Polaris Hall—a 45 million dollar addition designed by SOM that remains true to Netsch's original vision. The stunning new addition breathes new life into a pristinely preserved Modernist campus, a detailed analysis of which is featured in the *Journal of the American Institute of Architects*.

In addition to the conference, presenters and participants will have the rare opportunity to tour the Academy, including the well-known Academy Chapel with its four distinct worship spaces.

Full consideration will be given to all proposals (500-700 words) received by 15 January 2018; acceptances announced no later than 12 February 2018. Send your proposal as an attachment prepared for blind review to isparchitecture[at]gmail.com.

A selection of papers will be published in a special issue of *Architecture Philosophy*, edited by Prof. Tom Spector, Dr. Mark Jensen, and Dr. Carolyn Fahey..

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IMAGE CREDITS

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From “Wittgenstein’s Architectural Idiosyncrasy”
Figures 1, 2, 4, 6, 8 & 9: August Sarnitz
Figure 7: City of Vienna, MA 37
Figures 3 & 5: Stonborough Family

From “Use-Value and the Question of Completion”
Figure 1: National Egyptian Library, Cairo
Figure 2 & 4: Société des Auteurs dans les Arts graphiques et plastiques
Figure 3: Ve A. Morel et Cie
Figure 5: Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism
Figures 6-12: Han Tümertekin
Figure 14: Kemal Aran
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Architecture Philosophy conducts double-blind reviews of all papers submitted. Each paper is reviewed by one philosophy expert and one architecture expert. Reviewers are members of the editorial board and are asked to evaluate submissions according to the following criteria:

APPROPRIATENESS TO THE FIELD OF ARCHITECTURE PHILOSOPHY

Does the paper acknowledge and/or build on existing scholarship in both architecture and philosophy?
Does the paper acknowledge existing scholarship in philosophy and architecture respectively?

PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS

Is philosophy engaged directly?
Is there an argument?
Is there analysis of the claims made?
Is the logic of the argument presented explicitly?
Are the paper's arguments valid and sound?

ARCHITECTURAL ANALYSIS

Is architecture engaged directly?
Is architecture's relevant history/contemporary situation acknowledged?
Is architecture's history/contemporary situation dealt with accurately?

ORIGINALITY

Is this paper a contribution to knowledge?
Does the paper present new ways of solving philosophical problems in architecture (philosophy) or does it engage architecture to illustrate philosophical problems?
Does the paper present new ways of engaging architecture and the built environment?

PRESENTATION

Is the paper written in English to general academic writing standards for the humanities?
Does the paper follow the journal's submission guidelines?

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Please direct all submissions and general inquiries to isparchitecture@gmail.com. There are no deadlines for submissions, unless otherwise announced (e.g. special issue, conference proceedings, etc.).

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Authors are invited to submit full papers, response pieces, and book reviews. Full papers should be between 4,000 and 5,000 words with a 200-300 word abstract, response pieces should be between 500 and 1,500 words, and book reviews between 1,000 to 2,000 words.

GENERAL FORMATTING

All submissions should be presented in accordance with the University of Chicago Style. Papers should be RTF documents, 12 point font, Times New Roman, double-spaced, and with no additional or otherwise unique formatting. References should be manually placed in brackets (e.g. [1], [2], and so on) with full citation information placed in the references section at the end of the document.

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