

ARISTOTLE, AUTONOMY, AND DESIGN: ANCIENT WISDOM AND THE MODERN HOME ¹

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In the discipline of architecture, we can distinguish at least three different questions related to autonomy. First, we can ask about the autonomy of the concepts and judgments made by architects and philosophers of architecture. Does architecture possess conceptual frameworks and principles of judgment that are logically independent of other disciplines, such as ethics, aesthetics, engineering, and politics? Second, we can ask about the autonomy of the architect herself in her practice. Are her designs constrained by persons and factors outside of her control? Finally, we can ask about the autonomy of citizens who live in spaces designed by architects. What possibilities or constraints are actualized by the design of a space for those who dwell in it?

Hidden among these questions are two different conceptions of autonomy. The conception presupposed by the first question is concerned with the independence of architecture as an area of theoretical investigation. A discipline is autonomous when it can be carried out independently of other disciplines. A discipline that lacks autonomy is one that depends on other theoretical domains for its investigation. The conception presupposed by the second and third questions, however, is concerned with the autonomy or freedom of the people involved, both architects and those who occupy their dwellings.² Here, an architect is autonomous or free to the extent that her designs are within her control; an occupant is autonomous or free to the extent that she faces no external constraints

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in attempting to live according to her own rational plan.³ The problem for architects and occupants who lack autonomy is not dependence on something else but rather a restriction on their freedom to access their respective goods.

My aim in this paper is to explore this second conception. Is it possible that we as designers and occupants – are not realizing all of the goods that could be available to us? Do current practices in residential architecture restrict the freedom of designers and occupants? It is my view that we have good reasons to answer these questions in the affirmative. In order to vindicate my judgment, I will develop a critical approach grounded in the anthropological, social, political, and architectural analysis of Aristotle. Central themes in Aristotle's thought, especially his accounts of *eudaimonia* (happiness), *arête* (virtue), and *phronêsis* (practical wisdom), have been rehabilitated by contemporary moral philosophers and find support among contemporary moral psychologists.⁴ Insofar as Aristotle's thought in these areas retains theoretical and practical significance, it seems possible that other aspects of his thought, especially his accounts of the *oikos* (house) and the *polis* (city-state), are worthy of renewed attention as well.⁵ To be clear, my primary aim in this paper is not interpretive: while the reader will gain some insight into Aristotle's views on the topics in question, my aim instead is to develop a critical approach to architectural practice that draws upon some of the compelling aspects of Aristotle's thought.

Aristotle's recent rehabilitation among moral philosophers was motivated by worries about the reigning Enlightenment orthodoxy.⁶ Similarly, the best way to appreciate the appeal of an account of freedom in architectural practice based on Aristotle will be to begin by drawing a contrast with the Enlightenment. This discussion occupies Part 1 of the paper. In Part 2, I develop my critical standpoint. Finally, in Part 3, I point out ways in which our contemporary architectural and urban planning practices inhibit the realization of important goods and sketch some avenues for improving the current state of affairs in accord with my approach. I also return to the distinction between the two different conceptions of autonomy that I laid out at the very beginning, arguing that my exploration of the second question has implications for how we think about the first.

1. AUTONOMY AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT TRADITION

In the Western Enlightenment tradition, autonomy is self-governance. The autonomous person is ruled by her reason; she is not controlled by the internal influences of passion and appetite or the external influences

of custom and culture.⁷ Understood in this way, autonomy lies at the heart of the liberal tradition of Western individualism. It is the only legitimate basis for political authority.⁸ It is the proper achievement of mature people in mature societies.⁹ With their correlative respect for the autonomy of others, mature autonomous citizens are reasonable, democratic, tolerant, and just.¹⁰

Despite its many virtues, the Enlightenment account of autonomy strikes many of us as too thin. In the first place, there is little explanation for how it is that we as individuals and groups achieve autonomy. Apart from notable outliers such as Locke's discussion in *Some Thoughts Concerning Education*, Rousseau's meditations in *Emile*, and Mill's personal reflections in his *Autobiography*, little attention is paid to the specific task of cultivating autonomous people. In the philosophical tradition, mature, autonomous citizens are typically taken as given. The problem here is of course that real people are not like this. We were children once; we are adults now; and we will be senior citizens later. Human life is a succession of stages with different challenges, standards, and requirements for self-governance at each stage. An account of autonomy that leaves out this dimension is not adequate.

In the second place, the account of autonomy, especially in its Kantian and neo-Kantian versions, is tied to an account of self-governance that appears to be too abstract. For Kant, the autonomous person is the person who makes moral judgments on the basis of a universalization procedure.¹¹ It seems to me, however, that moral judgments cannot be made on the basis of a universalization procedure alone. Moral judgment also requires a pre-deliberative canon of norms including ideals, functional descriptions, principles, practices, and habits. To be sure: I'm not defending a particular account of the pre-deliberative canon. My point is merely that the contents of a good life marked

“ DO CURRENT PRACTICES IN RESIDENTIAL ARCHITECTURE RESTRICT THE FREEDOM OF DESIGNERS AND OCCUPANTS? ”

by excellent moral judgment cannot be determined on the basis of an impartial rational procedure alone.

The implication of these concerns, it seems to me, is that we need a more robust account of autonomy. This not to reject the Enlightenment tradition altogether: several aspects of the tradition seem to be correct. For example, autonomy of the sort that matters to us is a condition that human beings achieve when things are going right for us – it is a mark of human flourishing. It is something we achieve in varying degrees. In this way, autonomy is not a necessary or basic characteristic of the human condition; it is instead something that we must figure out how to get for others and ourselves.

2. AUTONOMY AND ARISTOTLE

Aristotle begins with a very different understanding of human flourishing and a correspondingly different account of self-governance. In developing my approach, I will focus on three specific aspects of his analysis: (i) his account of the fundamental unit of human life, (ii) his account of the good life in community, and (iii) the way he employs the “doctrine of the mean” in the context of architecture. These three elements will give us tools sufficient to sketch an account of freedom sufficient to sustain a critique of contemporary architecture – especially contemporary home design and construction.

2.1 THE FUNDAMENTAL UNIT OF HUMAN LIFE

The concept of the “fundamental unit of human life,” is the concept of the proper starting point for an investigation into the human species from the perspective of philosophical anthropology. Finding this fundamental unit requires some care: we can err too small by focusing on a component and err too big by focusing on an aggregate. Aristotle regards the household as the fundamental unit of human life and identifies its elements with a quote from Hesiod. The household includes: “a house, a wife, and an ox for the plow.”¹² Abstracting a bit, let’s call these elements (i) one’s residence, (ii) one’s intimate relationships, and (iii) one’s tools for one’s work.¹³

We should notice immediately the contrast between Aristotle’s starting point and that of the Enlightenment. Aristotle does not begin with the abstract rational individual. He begins instead with a person in context. From Aristotle’s perspective, the Enlightenment approach that begins with the bare individual is bound to fail in the same way that the biologist

is bound to fail who attempts to make sense of ants by starting the investigation with a single ant confined to a specimen jar. The component part is mistaken for the whole unit.

Aristotle's more inclusive starting point lays the groundwork for our account of human freedom. The extent of one's freedom will depend on the degree to which one achieves success appropriate to one's residence, relationships, and work. For example, as physical beings, we require shelter from the elements in the world that threaten our bodies. As developmental beings, we require relationships with more mature people to help us grow. And as dependent and aspirational beings, we need avenues through which we can work to meet our unmet needs. Together, it seems right to say that the degree to which we are free depends in part on the degree to which we have found success in building a dwelling, establishing a social network, and finding meaningful work.¹⁴ Contrapositively, to the extent that these three tasks are challenges for us, our freedom is constrained and our lives are characterized by a kind of servitude. In other words, the idea of self-governance for Aristotle is one that presupposes natural dependence on others and modifications to the environment.

This insight is not especially profound; we might regard it as a philosophical adaptation of Maslow's hierarchy of needs.¹⁵ However, it seems to me that the relationship between these three elements of basic human life and human freedom is more complex. It is also the case that freedom, at least to some degree, is necessary in order to achieve a degree of success in these three elements. In other words, these elements, together with freedom, are symbiotically related. For example, in order to secure a residence that will enable my family to flourish, I require successful work. And in order to secure successful work, I require a secure residence in which or from which to do it.

And both of these observations presuppose that I can make choices with respect to my residence and my work that are free from the constraints that would keep me from making reasoned choices that reflect my own moral, philosophical, or religious account of the good life in the context of my community.

We can conclude then that the Aristotelian account of freedom begins holistically and *in situ*. To be a human being is to be located in a place, intimately connected to others, and involved in work. Autonomy in the more robust sense that I am developing here both requires and enables success with respect to these basic elements of human life. One is free to the extent that one can pursue one's account of the good life.

2.2 THE GOOD IN COMMUNITY

While Aristotle regards the household as the fundamental unit of human life, he does not regard it as the complete focus of an investigation into human affairs. By itself, a household is not self-sufficient. On his view, households are naturally organized into villages and a group of villages together constitutes a city (*polis*).¹⁶ Only when we build a city do we achieve a self-sufficient human community, and, in turn, the proper focus for a comprehensive investigation.¹⁷ In other words, to understand and then evaluate human affairs we cannot but make reference to the city. Villages, households, and citizens are all constituents of a city in their own fashion; their activities cannot be understood without reference to the city as a whole.

Now to say that a city is constituted by its citizens is not to say that a city is simply composed of citizens. If that were so, the good of the city could be measured purely in terms of the individual success and failures of its citizens. Instead, the good for the city is a common good. It is achieved when each of the citizens in the city performs his or her specific function well. Consider Aristotle's claim about the chief good at the beginning of the *Nicomachean Ethics*:

And since it [political science] uses the other sciences concerned with action, and moreover legislates what must be done and what avoided, its end will include the ends of the other sciences, and so this will be the human good. For even if the good is the same for a city as for an individual, still the good of the city is apparently a greater and more complete good to acquire and preserve.¹⁸

As Aristotle will explain in more detail, the function of the citizen is given not only in terms of her function in the context of the fundamental unit. Citizens' also have functions attached to their roles in the village,

and in turn, their roles in the city.¹⁹ In Aristotle's ideal constitution, the government assigns these roles according to citizens' stages and capabilities. It seems to me that we need not follow him in assigning these roles involuntarily, but we must follow him in recognizing that the obligations associated with excellent citizenship extend beyond one's obligations in the household.

We must take care in describing the relationship between the household and the city in much the same way that we took care in describing the relationship between the constituent elements of the household and the freedom of the individual. The flourishing city is certainly one in which all of the households are flourishing as well. But it does not follow that a city of flourishing households is sufficient to realize a flourishing city. In other words, the success of individual households in achieving their private goods does not guarantee the achievement of all of the common and public goods associated with a flourishing city. Insofar as citizens identify with the good not only of their household but also of their city, citizens' pursuits will include a range of private, public, and common goods. As always, the starting point for these pursuits will be citizens' dwellings, relationships, and work. As a result, our final account of these elements must be further tailored to suit the further goods that these elements both require and enable. Importantly, free citizens are not defined in terms of the absence of government interference.²⁰ Instead, free citizens are those who are enabled by the city to accomplish their good and who, at the same time, enable the city to achieve its common and public goods.

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2.3 THE GOLDEN MEAN

The “golden mean” is a central theme in Aristotle's moral and political thought. In many activities and pursuits, we achieve excellence when we find the mean between extremes of excess and

deficiency. Courage, for example, is the moral virtue concerned with our feelings of confidence in the face of a threat.²¹ Courage is found in the mean between excessive feelings of confidence (the vice of foolhardiness) and a deficiency of feelings of confidence (the vice of cowardice).

Aristotle doesn't say much about architecture. But the few comments he does offer on the subject reflect a more generalized application of the doctrine of the mean. First, with respect to the organizational plan for houses in a city, Aristotle says:

Where private dwellings are concerned, the modern Hippodamean scheme of laying them out in straight rows is considered pleasanter and more useful for general purposes. But when it comes to security in wartime, the opposite plan, which prevailed in ancient times, is thought to be better. For it makes it difficult for foreign troops to enter and for attackers to find their way around. Hence the best city-state should share features of both plans. This is possible if the houses are laid out like vine "clumps," that is if certain parts and areas are laid out in straight rows, but not the city-state as a whole. In this way, both safety and beauty will be well served.²²

Notice here that Aristotle is concerned with both form and function. For the purposes of aesthetics, he regards straight rows as superior. For better defense, irregular arrangements make it difficult for invaders to succeed. While this discussion departs from Aristotle's usual way of employing the doctrine of the mean, he is clearly following a middle path here between an extreme concern with aesthetics and an extreme concern with specific function. This moderate path will best achieve excellence in city planning.

Aristotle's predilection for moderation can also be found in his reflections on residential design, at least by implication. In describing the design of the city, he says, "...it should be large enough to enable the inhabitants to live a life of leisure in a way that is generous and at the same time temperate."²³ Aristotle's overall aim is to describe a happy city where the citizens live flourishing lives together. Flourishing citizens, in turn, are citizens who live excellently; living excellently, in turn, is a matter of performing activities virtuously. It would be consistent with Aristotle's argumentative approach, I think, to extend this remark to residential design. Residences should be big enough to enable citizens to be leisured (that is, free to pursue the liberal arts and the social virtues) but not so big as to encourage vices of excess such as ostentatiousness and wastefulness.

In other words, happiness will not be found in a life preoccupied with maintaining one's estate. Such a life would be similar to the hypochondriac or the germaphobe: people who've made an end out of something that should rightfully be regarded merely as a means to an end. Residences for

Aristotle are the tools of their occupants, not the purposes of life for the occupants. The homeowner who does nothing with his life but work on his home misses out on the complete human good and contributes little to the common good. Interestingly, just as residences are not the ultimate ends of their occupants, nor are residences the ultimate ends of their designers. Residences are designed and built in order to enable their occupants to pursue the good, including the individual, common, and public good. In this way, an architect is a good architect if she designs and builds residences that accomplish these aims. She contributes to the common good of the city. She is free *qua* architect insofar as she identifies with the common good of the city, this good informs her practice, and she is not encumbered by external constraints on her practice.

Finally, it's not just the size of the residence that has an effect on the extent of our freedom. The design of the residence can also have an effect. Aside from the studies that show that our environment can affect our mood and productivity, we know from our own experience that the nature and quality of our surroundings can profoundly affect the vitality of the talking, living, and working that we do in them. Together with an excellent architect and builder, we believe that we could construct for our household a space that could maximize the capabilities of our household and thereby greatly increase the degree of freedom with which we could achieve an excellent (and thereby happy) life in community with others.

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2.4 A MODEL OF AUTONOMY IN ARCHITECTURAL PRACTICE

Let us now synthesize the themes that we've developed above. First, consider the residence. At bottom, residences are tools: they are spaces designed to enable us to flourish in the context of our relationships, our work, and our leisure. The good residence is one in which our freedom

is enhanced. At the same time, the design of the residence must reflect the circumstances of our household and its responsibilities with respect to the city more broadly. A good residence increases the freedom of its occupants to pursue the good life in community. But like all of our tools, we prefer those that do more than answer to our functional needs – we prefer those that answer to our functional needs in a way that we find aesthetically pleasing.

Next, consider the architect. We do not assume that every citizen will be a master of design and construction. In the excellent city there will be division of labor. Some citizens will be excellent at design and construction; the flourishing life is one in which they are free in the city to design and construct residences (etc.) that enable households and the city to flourish. Given what we've said above, the design and construction process must be a rational partnership. The architect brings expertise and experience to bear while the occupants bring aesthetic preferences and an account of the particular goods and pursuits attached to their household. The ultimate aim of the partnership is to produce a dwelling that conforms to the description above.

Finally, we must qualify this account by noting that, as human beings, there is no one perfect designed space in which we will be enabled to flourish for our entire life. At different stages in our life, we will have different functional requirements, together (perhaps) with developing aesthetic judgments. So either our residences must be flexible or our city must offer a range of choices. Both of these options involve the risk of limitations to our freedom.

3. CONTEMPORARY ARCHITECTURE

3.1 A CRITIQUE OF CURRENT PRACTICE

How does this ideal match up with our current realities? We should note first that this entire vision is available to the wealthiest members of contemporary society. Architects and builders exist who could, in partnership with homeowners, design and build dwellings that reflect and enable freedom in this sense. I frame this first claim counterfactually, however, because in most cases those homeowners who can afford to realize this model fail to achieve it. They build without regard to the common and public good of the community, seeking instead to isolate themselves in enclaves with other wealthy people. They also build large, wasteful, ostentatious homes that enable vice and inhibit virtue. At the same time, the socioeconomic realities of contemporary markets act as disincentives to architects and builders to partner with middle and lower

classes in pursuit of freedom in the sense I describe above.

Outside of the wealthy, most of us select from and live in residences that neither are the product of genuinely autonomous architecture nor enable freedom for occupants. In the first place, many of us cannot make significant alterations to our dwellings because we do not own them. Even in the United States, the ownership rate is below sixty-five percent.²⁴ In the second place, even when we have some choice among possible houses or apartments, our options are nearly all one form or another of mass housing. Mass housing is, by definition, designed without contact and therefore without input from those who will occupy it. To be sure: designers of mass housing are constrained by the market – the market requires that they produce units that people will select among a range of choices. But since the architects of mass housing must cater to a wide range of people, they must produce designs that are suited broadly.

This problem could be overcome if our building methods for mass housing permitted greater flexibility for configuration and reconfiguration. Unfortunately, our contemporary designs and building methods permit very little change on a macro level. Occupants can add furnishings, detailing, and color to a unit but they have little opportunity to create or adapt their main spaces to better match the distinctive aesthetic and functional characteristics of their particular household. Macro level aesthetic and functional characteristics – the ways in which the beauty of the unit as a whole might be tailored to match the household – are inaccessible without great cost. The autonomy of occupants is significantly constrained.

It is no better for the architects and builders of mass housing than it is for the occupants. In addition to having no direct connection to the eventual occupants of the dwellings they design and

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construct, they are rarely permitted to add furnishings, ornamentation, color, and other details to their products. In other words, they are not really permitted to finish designing and building a residence. Market forces require them to build residences that are incomplete from a design standpoint. Note that the problem here is not merely that of not seeing a design plan through to its full realization. It is instead the problem that the architect is not permitted to fully design a residence. Since she does not know the occupant, even a fully designed but not fully built structure would fail to satisfy the needs of a mass housing market that requires broad appeal. In this way, the architect too is constrained in her freedom with respect to the full use of her expertise in service of the good of the community and its citizens.

3.2 ELEMENTS OF A SOLUTION

It is possible that the problems I suggest above all reduce to problems of economic class. Even in a flourishing capitalist economy with redistributive policies that create a broad and flourishing middle class, it might be that the kind of freedom and flexibility that I defend is available only to the wealthiest members of society. A more optimistic attitude would hold that with creative thinking, sound government policy, and motivated entrepreneurship we could make progress.

Supposing that my model provides an attractive starting point for rethinking contemporary practice, it seems clear that at least the following three improvements would need to be made. First, we need to increase the *flexibility* of the residences that we design. Given that households and their needs are constantly evolving over time, we must design and build residences that can be more easily configured and reconfigured to fit the conditions necessary for a flourishing household. To be sure: some changes in the nature of a household will require changing residences. But changing residences is highly disruptive to the household and ought to be minimized for the sake of their pursuit of the good. Second, we need to find ways to enable households to make use of the full spectrum of talent that architects and builders have to offer. Achieving a complete design offers benefits for both the architect whose full talents are utilized and the occupants whose dwelling will be better suited to achieving their goods. Finally, we must find a way to reduce the costs associated with flexibility and complete design in order to expand the possibilities for a wider segment of the population. Insofar as greater numbers of architects and occupants can better achieve their goods, the common good for the community is better achieved.

At the outset, I noted that the autonomy of architecture as a theoretical discipline is different from the autonomy of the architect and the occupant. The latter two forms of autonomy concern the realization of specific goods while the former concerns disciplinary independence. The critical perspective that I develop here implies that architecture *qua* theoretical or academic discipline cannot be independent. Architecture serves the good of the city and thus stands subordinate to politics, broadly construed. Of course, this follows only in the context of the Aristotle-inspired ideal. If cities and other forms of community have no common good or *telos*, then architecture could be independent as a discipline. In a world of this sort, there is no such thing as a building out-of-place since there would be no organizing principle from which to render the judgment in question. But insofar as we still find ourselves making judgments of this sort, we still find the Aristotelian perspective or something like it attractive.

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ENDNOTES

1. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2nd International Conference of the International Society for Philosophy of Architecture: Autonomy Revisited, on July 11, 2014.
2. A discussion of the concepts of autonomy and freedom naturally invites the distinction between negative liberty and positive liberty. (For the

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canonical paper, see Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” in *Four Essays on Liberty*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969.) Insofar as my account has roots in Aristotle, it is best seen as part of the positive liberty tradition. However, it seems to me that the account I develop here can avoid the slippery slope to dogmatism and tyranny that was the chief concern of Berlin.

3. For a contemporary discussion of the idea of a rational plan, see John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, Revised Edition (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 358-365.

4. See for example Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 3rd Edition (Notre Dame: Indiana, University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), Rosalind Hursthouse, *On Virtue Ethics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), and Daniel Russell, *Practical Intelligence and the Virtues* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2009). For virtue theory and moral psychology, see Nancy Snow, *Virtue as Social Intelligence: An Empirically Grounded Theory* (New York: Routledge, 2010) and Christian Miller, *Character and Moral Psychology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).

5. Some work has already been done to re-appropriate Aristotle for politics. See Aristide Tessitore, ed., *Aristotle and Modern Politics: The Persistence of Political Philosophy* (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002).

6. See for example MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, pp. 51-61.

7. See Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, edited by Lara Denis (Orchard Park, NY: Broadview Press, 2005), pp. 98-102.

8. See John Locke, “Second Treatise of Government,” in *Two Treatises of Government*, Student Edition, edited by Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), §99 (p. 333).

9. See Immanuel Kant, “Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment [1784],” translated by Thomas K. Abbott, in *Basic Writings of Kant*, edited with an introduction by Allen W. Wood (New York: The Modern Library, 2001), pp. 133-141.

10. John Rawls paints a thorough picture here. See Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” in John Rawls, *Collected Papers*, edited by Samuel Freeman (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 573-615.

11. Kant, *Groundwork*, p. 81.

12. Aristotle, *Politics*, 1252b10.

13. Notice that I have framed my discussion of our dwellings, relationships, and work as abstract types, rather than specific tokens. In Aristotle’s *Politics*,

the specific tokens include a patriarchal marriage, and slaves (human tools) if you have the money for them. We can accept the view that our thinking about human anthropology begins with dwellings, relationships, and work without being required to accept his specific account of the household.

14. Recently, Andrew Ballantyne has argued that architecture must be concerned with the habits of the occupants in their everyday lives. (See Andrew Ballantyne, “Architecture, Life, and Habit,” *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 69(1) 2011: 43-49.) On this point, Ballantyne and Aristotle are in agreement. However, Aristotle and contemporary neo-Aristotelians might worry that Ballantyne’s appeal to pragmatism will not provide him with the normative justification that he needs for “an appreciation of the fitness of the match between place and the ethos...” (p. 48). They might suggest that a neo-Aristotelian approach would provide what he needs.

15. Abraham Maslow, “A Theory of Human Motivation,” *Psychological Review*, 50(4): 370–396.

16. There is an excellent monograph on this relationship. See D. Brendan Nagel, *The Household as the Foundation of Aristotle’s Polis* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

17. Aristotle, *Politics*, 1252b27.

18. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Second Edition (Kindle Edition), translated and annotated by Terence Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company), p. 2.

19. Aristotle, *Politics*, 1329a2ff.

20. Cf. Berlin, “Two Concepts...” As I noted above (note 2), I am defending a version of positive liberty.

21. Cf. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1115a7ff.

22. Aristotle, *Politics*, 1330b25.

23. Ibid, 1326b30.

24. Robert R. Callis and Melissa Kresin, “Residential Vacancies and Homeownership in the Second Quarter 2014,” *U.S. Census Bureau News*, <http://www.census.gov/housing/hvs/files/currenthvspress.pdf>. Accessed August 1, 2014.