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

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ARTICLES

PROFILES AND STEREOTYPES OF LOBBYISTS IN OKLAHOMA

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The authors surveyed registered Oklahoma lobbyists by mail during the winter, spring, and summer of 2006. The results were used to develop a preliminary picture of lobbyists and lobbying in Oklahoma. The responding lobbyists evinced political attitudes typical of the Oklahoma political culture of several years ago. Their incomes are lower than lobbyists in other states although their education levels are at least as high. The proportions of minority and female lobbyists are lower than in the population and electorate. They do compare favorably with lobbyists in other states. Lobbyists are often stereotyped as too numerous, too moneyed, too powerful, and too little concerned with the public interest. Oklahoma lobbyists are not as numerous relative to legislators as lobbyists are in most other states. By several attitudinal indicators, they do not see lobbyists generally as too powerful. However, Oklahoma lobbyists are increasingly concerned about the power of money in lobbying and about professional ethics.

Introduction: The authors mailed four waves of questionnaires to 369 lobbyists registered with the Oklahoma Ethics Commission during the winter, spring, and summer of 2006. The number of questionnaires completed and returned was 163 (i.e., 44%). The results should add some definition about lobbying in Oklahoma – a topic too little addressed. For instance, in what ways do Oklahoma lobbyists reflect the political culture of Oklahoma? How do Oklahoma lobbyists compare demographically with lobbyists in other states? Do Oklahoma lobbyists fit public stereotypes of lobbyists – i.e., too many, too moneyed, too powerful and too negligent of the public interest?

OKLAHOMA LOBBYISTS AND THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF OKLAHOMA

Partisanship: The percentages of lobbyists placing themselves in one of seven partisan categories in our survey are as follows: *Strong Democrat* – 28 percent, *Not-So-Strong Democrat* – 17 percent, *Independent, but leaning Democratic* – 6 percent, *pure Independent (no party leanings) – 7 percent, Independent, but leaning Republican* – 10 percent, *Not-So-Strong Republican* – 10 percent, *Strong Republican* – 21 percent. If "strong" and "not-so-strong" self-descriptions are added together for Democratic as well as for Republican lobbyists and if "leaners" are included with the Independents, there are three sorts of identifiers rather than seven. In that case, a little less than half (i.e., 45%) of the respondent/lobbyists consider themselves Democrats, a little less than one-fourth (23%) Independent and a little less than one-third (31%) would be Republican.

Similarly, in the mid-1980s, almost half of a survey of 915 Oklahomans identified themselves as Democratic. A little less than one-quarter were Independents and a little more than one-quarter Republican (Wright 1985). These are fairly close to the percentages given above for present day Oklahoma lobbyists (D = 45%, I = 23%, R = 31%) except that present day lobbyists are slightly less Democratic and a little more Republican than the Oklahoma voters of 1985.

Exit polls of 1,577 Oklahoma voters in the 2004 presidential elections revealed significantly fewer self-identified Democrats (i.e., 40%) than in the past. There were also proportionally fewer Independents (16%)

but significantly more Republicans (i.e., 43%) (CNN.com. 2004). Thus, today's Oklahoma lobbyists seem to be somewhere between the state electorate of the mid-eighties and the electorate of today in their partisanship. Lobbyists have been lobbying in Oklahoma for an average of over eleven years. Perhaps their years of experience in lobbying - often a second career - help explain their resemblance to the electorate's partisanship patterns of a decade or so ago.

Many observers believe there is a lasting shift away from Democratic allegiance toward independency and the Republicans in the Oklahoma electorate. OSU undergraduate Tim O'Neil found evidence of that in a survey of 202 Oklahoma presidential voters (O'Neal 2006). These observers explain the Oklahoma House going Republican in 2004 as symptomatic of this shift. As noted, about 45 percent of the sample considered themselves to be Democrats as compared with 31 percent who identified with the Republican Party. So Democrats allegiants are more numerous among lobbyists than are Republican allegiants.

Strong partisanship among the Democratic lobbyists may indicate retrenchment within a political culture marked otherwise by a shift toward the Republican Party. It may be that some weak Democrats and Democratic leaners are becoming Republican as power in the legislature shifts toward the latter. It is likely that Republican House leaders would like to see some of the Democratic lobbyists replaced by Republican lobbyists. In any case, Democratic partisanship is still prevalent among Oklahoma lobbyists although, as with the electorate, this is probably changing toward the Republicans.

Ideology: In the mid-80s about 45 percent of 888 Oklahomans willing to characterize their ideology saw themselves as conservative. Nearly 40 percent saw themselves as moderate and only about 15 percent as liberals (Wright 1985). By 2004, 43 percent of a sample of 1,577 Oklahoma presidential voters described themselves as conservative, 44 percent as moderates, and 13 percent as liberals. (CNN.com.2004). The O'Neil poll of 202 Oklahoma presidential voters in 2004 employed two measures of ideology. One was based on views of social issues and the other economic issues. The results of O'Neal's measures of economic and social ideologies were very similar. About 44 to 45 percent saw themselves as either "very conservative" or

"somewhat conservative." Some 46 to 48 percent saw themselves as in the middle (i.e., "slightly conservative," "middle-of-the-road" or "slightly liberal"). But only 6 to 9 percent of the Oklahoma electorate in the O'Neil sample saw themselves as "somewhat liberal" or "very liberal" (O'Neal 2006). If these three surveys suggest any change over time, it is that there is a shift in the Oklahoma electorate toward the ideological middle and away from liberalism to accompany the shift away from the Democrats toward the Republicans.

How in keeping with the electorate are Oklahoma lobbyists ideologically? About 38 percent of the lobbyists identified themselves as either "very conservative" or "somewhat conservative." Another 46 percent saw themselves in the ideological middle (i.e., slightly conservative, middle of the road or slightly liberal). About 16 percent of the lobbyists saw themselves as either somewhat or very liberal. So both Oklahoma lobbyists (CNN.com.2004) and Oklahoma voters (O'Neal 2006) are predominantly moderate to conservative although lobbyists are somewhat less conservative and slightly more liberal than the electorate. Perhaps these qualifications reflect the greater frequency of Democratic partisanship among lobbyists.

OKLAHOMA LOBBYISTS AND LOBBYISTS IN OTHER STATES

Socio-Economic and Educational Profiles: How well off are Oklahoma lobbyists compared with lobbyists in other states? The typical annual income from lobbying in Oklahoma is $86,525 (Coleman 2006). Whereas that sounds high to most Oklahomans, it is low when compared with lobbyists in other states. In fact, Oklahoma ranks 44th among the fifty states in the average yearly income for lobbyists (Coleman 2006). Thus, Oklahoma's lobbyists are affluent but not as well off as lobbyists in most other states.

Most lobbyists across the country are college graduates (American League of Lobbyists 2003, The Catholic University of America 2005). Similarly, less than 2 percent of the lobbyists responding to our questionnaire had no more than a high school education. Another 5 percent had completed no more than two years of college or had an Associate degree from a community college. The highest degree for

46.5 percent was a Bachelors degree. The same percentage (46.5%) had either a Masters degree (31.4%) or a Doctorate (5.0%) or a law degree (10.1%) We can conclude from this pattern that the level of education for Oklahoma lobbyists is at least that of their peers across the states.

Age, Gender and Racial/Ethnic Profiles: It is difficult to establish an average age for lobbyists at either the state or federal levels because it is difficult to find "typical" lobbyists. (Mahood 1990:53) Lobbying is usually a second career (Berry, 1997:103) although lobbyists may continue to lobby for ten to twenty years (Rosenthal 2001:33).

Registered lobbyists in our study of Oklahoma averaged a little more than fifty-one years of age. They averaged a little over eleven years in lobbying. So they, like lobbyists elsewhere (Mahood 1990:5), tend to be in the latter half of their careers. State lobbyists here, as elsewhere, are often at the age at which most people hit their full stride or peak professionally – i.e., early fifties.

Fifty-five percent of a sample of 23,949 Oklahoma voters from the 2004 presidential election were female, and forty-five percent were male. (Oklahoma Voter File: OKSW.Dbf 2005) About 72 percent of the lobbyist/respondents in the current study were male. Lobbying has traditionally been a "man's world" across the United States (Berry 1997: 108-109). In the early 1980s only 22 percent of Washington lobbyists were found to be women (Schlozman 1990:339-382). Similarly, in the early 1990s, between 20 and 25 percent of the lobbyists in Northeastern or Western states were female although the average was estimated to be somewhat lower in Southern states (i.e., 12 – 15%) (Thomas and Hrebenar 1992:162). By 2001, the proportion of state lobbyists who were female was estimated to be up to about 20 percent (Rosenthal 2001:26). Thus, the fact that 28 percent of the lobbyists in this study were female indicates that Oklahoma compares fairly well with other states. Moreover, in keeping with observations elsewhere (Berry 1997:10), 80 percent of the Oklahoma lobbyists felt the trend toward more female (and minority) lobbyists was clearly and increasingly evident these days.

It is true that minorities are still underrepresented in lobbying across the states. (Rosenthal 2001:26) and Oklahoma is no exception. In the current study, there were three Native-American respondent/lobbyists

(i.e. 2%) whereas Native-Americans comprise about 5 percent of the Oklahoma electorate (O'Neil 2006:17) and about 8 percent of the state's population (Statemaster.com 2006).

Likewise, there was only one Afro-American lobbyist (i.e., .6%) in this sample. The Afro-American percentage of the 2004 presidential electorate was 2 percent according to one source (O'Neil 2006:17) although the percentage in the population is higher (i.e., 7.6%) (Statemaster.com 2006). So the percentages of Native and African-American lobbyists are somewhat lower than their percentages in the state's electorate and lower still when compared with the general Oklahoma population. However, the small numbers of minority lobbyists in a sample of only 163 respondents reduce the reliability of these percentages.

PUBLIC STEREOTYPES AND OKLAHOMA LOBBYISTS

Special interests lobbyists are often seen as too numerous, too moneyed, and too powerful (Evote.com 2006). Moreover, the public sometimes questions the ethics of lobbyists (www.thehill.com 2006). What does the evidence from Oklahoma and other states say about these stereotypes?

Are There Too Many Lobbyists Per Legislator in Oklahoma?: The number of lobbyists relative to legislators in Oklahoma is modest when compared with other states. In 2004, there were 440 lobbyists (whether registered or not) in Oklahoma (Rawls, "Hired Guns" 2005). There were 149 Oklahoma legislators, yielding a ratio of about 3 to 1. In our sample of registered lobbyists, there are 369 lobbyists to 149 legislators. That is a ratio of 2.6 lobbyists to each legislator. Only seven states had fewer lobbyists per legislators. These include New Hampshire, Mississippi, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Vermont and Maine (Rawls, Hired Guns" 2005). Of these, only Pennsylvania would be considered a large state. The rest are no larger than Oklahoma.

As might be expected, more populous states generally have more lobbyists per legislator given the greater number and variety of interests in larger and more heterogeneous states. The three states with the most lobbyists per legislator were large - i.e., New York (18:1), Florida (13:1) and Illinois (12:1) (Rawls, "Hired Guns" 2005). However, there are

exceptions to this generalization of more lobbyists per legislator in populous states. For instance, California, the nation's largest state, has only 1,032 lobbyists to 120 state legislators – a ratio of 9:1. Pennsylvania, a large state with a large legislature (i.e., 253), has a ratio of only 2 lobbyists per legislator (Rawls, "Hired Guns" 2005).

The average size of state legislatures across the United States is 148 (Rawls, "Hired Guns" 2005). Oklahoma is right at the norm with 149 legislators (48 in the Senate and 101 in the House). In Washington, D.C., the current ratio of lobbyists to members of the U.S. Congress is about 9:1 (Office of the Clerk of the U.S. House 2006). In 2004, there was an average of a little more than five lobbyists per state legislator across the fifty states. Although the size of the Oklahoma legislature is at the norm, there are fewer Oklahoma lobbyists per legislator – i.e., 3:1 (Rawls, "Hired Guns" 2005). While the Oklahoma average of three lobbyists per legislator does not seem to be a lot less than the national norm of 5 to 1, Oklahoma had 440 lobbyists in 2004 as compared with the norm of 785 across the states. Moreover, Oklahoma's lobbyist-to-legislator ratio is about 39th in the nation (Rawls, "Hired Guns" 2005).

If Oklahoma lobbyists are not as numerous relative to legislators as lobbyists in other states, do they feel too crowded relative to one another? Do they think the field is so crowded that the efficacy of individual lobbyists is compromised? The answer from Oklahoma lobbyists is "no." Slightly more than one in four lobbyists (i.e., 26%) agreed with the statement "lobbying in Oklahoma is so crowded and competitive that one lobbyist can't make much difference anymore." On the other hand, about three in four (74%) agreed "the competition has not changed much – neither has the individual lobbyist's effectiveness." So lobbyists in Oklahoma do not appear to overwhelm legislators with their numbers as compared to other states. Moreover, they do not feel so crowded that individual effectiveness is reduced.

Is There Too Much Money in Oklahoma Lobbying?: As noted earlier, Oklahoma lobbyists make a good living when compared to Oklahomans generally but are on the lower end of the scale when compared to lobbyists in other states (i.e., 44th) (Coleman 2006). But how much do they spend lobbying as compared with lobbyists in other states? Oklahoma lobbyists reported spending a total of only $125,000 on lobbying in 2004. Of the 42 states for which figures were reported,

only North Dakota lobbyists spent less (Rawls, "State Lobby Totals" 2005). However, Oklahoma lobbyists are not required to report such major expenditures as campaign contributions or many sorts of catered events (Ethics Commission State of Oklahoma 2006). Campaign contributions from interest groups are reported by the candidates that receive them in Oklahoma. As a result, Oklahoma lobbyists appear not to be big spenders when compared to lobbyists in other states. However, that conclusion has to be seriously qualified by the exclusion of major lobbying expenditures such as campaign donations in Oklahoma.

Given such disparities and the resulting reservations about comparability, can any guidance be gained from attitudinal data supplied by the Oklahoma lobbyists themselves? It might be borne in mind that lobbyist/respondents in this study were not asked about their own expenditures but about expenditures for Oklahoma lobbyists generally. The reason for that was to encourage detachment and reduce subjectivity in their observations.

So, how big a part does money play in lobbying according to Oklahoma lobbyists? Only one in five agreed with the statement "Lobbying is becoming so high-dollar in Oklahoma that some interests can't afford to play anymore" whereas four in five felt "Lobbying takes money but old or even new interests can still play if they've got other political resources." **Table 1** shows how money compares to other resources such as information, communication, constituency resources and leadership.

As may be seen, nearly sixty percent of the lobbyist/respondents said they "very often" saw reliance on "money - political fund-raising and contributions to campaigns and other political activities" these days. "Communication - formal and informal communications with decision-makers and opinion leaders as well as the public and constituents" is a distant second. "Communication" is followed closely by "leadership and access - number of contacts, political credibility, and skills in persuasion, organizing, motivating, framing issues, public relations, timing, strategizing, etc." and "information - use of legal research or analysis, technical expertise, public policy research and strategic/tactical insights, etc."

According to lobbyists, the political resource least relied upon was "constituency resources – their votes, unity, reputation inside and outside government, affluence, available time and education levels."

TABLE 1

Reliance by Lobbyists on Various Political Ressources

Reliance on such political resources as. . .	Rarely If Ever	Less Often	More Often	Very Often
. . .information – i.e., use of legal research or analysis, technical expertise, public policy research and strategic/tactical insights, etc.	3.8% N=6	12.0% N=19	50.6% N=80	33.5% N=53
. . .money – i.e., political fund-raising and contributions to campaigns and other political activities, etc.	1.2% N=2	8.9% N=14	30.4% N=48	59.4% N=94
. . .communication - formal and informal communications with decision-makers and opinion leaders as well as the public and constituents.	0.0% N=0	4.4% N=7	52.5% N=83	43.0% N=68
. . .constituency resources – i.e., their votes, unity, reputation inside and outside government, affluence, available time and education levels.	4.6% N=7	26.1% N=40	47.1% N=72	22.2% N=34
. . .leadership and access - i.e., number of contacts, political credibility, and skills in persuasion, organizing, motivating, framing issues, public relations, timing, strategizing, etc.	0.0% N=0	9.0% N=14	54.0% N=84	37.0% N=58

SOURCE: Author's calculations using response data from questionnaire.

Are Oklahoma Lobbyists Too Powerful?: By several indicators, Oklahoma lobbyists would give a qualified "no" to that question although their assessments are somewhat mixed. Again, to lessen the problem of subjectivity, lobbyists were asked about lobbying techniques evident across the field of lobbying - not about their own use of particular tactics. Still, these judgments are attitudinal and, consequently, less objective than factual information would be.

Several of the lobbying techniques listed in **Table 2** would probably be considered pressure tactics by most observers because they involve pressure or, at least, the potential for it. These are bold faced among the lobbying techniques given in Table 2. They include "(c) sharing information with people in the media," "(d) political fund-raising and contributions to campaigns and other political activities, etc.," "(e) publishing voting records of candidates or elected officials," "(h) directly trying to persuade officials of interest's needs and views," "(j) getting influential constituents to contact officials directly," "(k) mounting grassroots lobbying efforts (e.g., letter writing, etc) and/or developing grassroots lobbing organizations," and "(n) filing suit or otherwise engaging in litigation."

As noted earlier, Oklahoma lobbyists see "fund-raising and contributions to campaigns and other political activities"as the most relied upon lobbying resource. Fund-raising and campaign contributions are also among the most important lobbying techniques. "Directly trying to persuade officials of interest's needs and views" (h) is as likely to be employed as fundraising and contributions. "Getting influential constituents to contact officials directly" (j) and "mounting grassroots lobbying efforts" (k) are generally considered pressure tactics. Both are seen increasingly often by lobbyists in Oklahoma.

At the same time, other pressure tactics are not particularly evident. For instance, "sharing information with people in the media" (c) could be seen as an attempt to pressure public officials as could "publishing voting records of candidates or elected officials" (e). Neither of these appears to lobbyists to be on the increase to any great extent in Oklahoma. Similarly, the preponderance of respondent opinion holds that "filing suit or otherwise engaging in litigation" (n) is actually "less often," or "rarely, if ever, seen these days."

TABLE 2

Reliance by Lobbyists on Varioius Tactics

How often do you see each of the following LOBBYING TECHNIQUES *used by Oklahoma interest representatives today?* (1) Rarely If Ever These Days, (2) Less Often These Days, (3) More Often These Days, (4) Very Often These Days

Reliance on techniques such as. . .	(1) Rarely If Ever	(2) Less Often	(3) More Often	(4) Very Often
a. engaging in informal contacts with officials (i.e., socializing)	3% N=4	18% N=29	31% N=49	49% N=78
b. promoting interest's public image through media campaigns	14% N=23	24% N=38	48% N=77	14% N=23
c. **sharing information with people in the media**	13% N=21	26% N=41	41% N=66	20% N=28
d. **political fund-raising and contributions to campaigns and other political activities, etc.**	1% N=2	9% N=14	30% N=48	60% N=94
e. **publishing voting records of candidates or elected officials**	18% N=29	21% N=34	46% N=74	15% N=24
f. testifying at official hearings (either legislative or executive)	5% N=8	23% N=37	48% N=76	24% N=39
g. use of legal research or analysis and technical expertise	2% N=3	17% N=27	54% N=86	28% N=44
h. **directly trying to persuade officials of interest's needs and views**	0% N=0	4% N=6	37% N=55	59% N=91
i. helping government officials plan legislative strategy	6% N=9	20% N=31	48% N=76	26% N=41

TABLE 2 (cont'd)

Reliance by Lobbyists on Varioius Tactics

How often do you see each of the following LOBBYING TECHNIQUES *used by Oklahoma interest representatives today?* (1) Rarely If Ever These Days, (2) Less Often These Days, (3) More Often These Days, (4) Very Often These Days

Reliance on techniques such as. . .	(1) Rarely If Ever	(2) Less Often	(3) More Often	(4) Very Often
j. **getting influential constituents to contact officials directly**	2 % N = 3	6 % N = 9	40 % N = 65	52 % N = 84
k. **mounting grassroots lobbying efforts (e.g., letter-writing, etc) and/or developing grassroots lobbying organizations**	4 % N = 6	8 % N = 13	41 % N = 65	48 % N = 76
l. attempting to influence appointments to public office	11 % N = 18	23 % N = 37	47 % N = 75	18 % N=28
m. affecting the policy application process – i.e., the interpretation and implementation of new decisions or policies	4 % N = 7	25 % N = 39	51 % N = 80	19 % N = 30
n. **filing suit or otherwise engaging in litigation**	30 % N = 47	39 % N = 61	34 % N = 34	9 % N = 14

NOTE: Lobbying techniques shown in bold are considered pressure tactics by most observers because they involve pressure or, at least, the potential for it.

SOURCE: Author's calculations using response data from questionnaire.

Summary statements by lobbyists also indicate the balance is tipped towards less rather than more pressure tactics. Only about one-third of the lobbyist/respondents felt "lobbying techniques are increasingly high pressure these days." Two-thirds agreed that "lobbying these days involves no more high pressure tactics than it used to." When the party leadership in the House or Senate is used as a point of reference, 79 percent agreed that "party leadership within the legislative chamber has more influence on the legislative process than do lobbyists." Only about 21 percent felt "lobbyists have more influence on legislative behavior than does the chamber's party leadership."

In sum, Oklahoma lobbyists do not see their colleagues as overwhelming in either their numbers or their power. However, the importance of fundraising or contributing to campaigns, while perhaps not overwhelming, is increasingly evident among Oklahoma lobbyists when compared with other political resources and other lobbying techniques.

How Public-Minded Are Oklahoma Lobbyists?: There is a mixed evaluation of professional ethics among lobbyist/respondents in this study. Exactly half (i.e., 50%) saw "the minimization of personal conflicts of interests by lobbyists" "rarely, if ever" or "less often these days." The other half saw the minimization of personal conflict of interests "more often," or "very often these days." Similarly, lobbyist/respondents were about as likely to see more (53.5%) as less (46.5%) evidence of "responsiveness by lobbyists to the public good." Some 56 percent agreed that "as a rule, lobbyists in Oklahoma are becoming more trustworthy and ethical." However, a healthy 44 percent felt "there are as many shady deals and underhanded tactics in Oklahoma as there ever were."

Fully 72 percent of the lobbyist/respondents felt lobbying is "changing for the *better* in Oklahoma" while 28 percent felt "lobbying is changing for the *worse* in Oklahoma." If lobbyist give themselves a passing grade, however, they do not believe the public does. Nearly two-thirds (64%) felt "the public's attitude toward lobbyists is changing for the *worse* in Oklahoma." Only 36 percent felt "the public's attitude toward lobbyists is changing for the *better*. . . ."

FINDINGS

Three reference points were used to begin the process of characterizing Oklahoma lobbyists. These included political attitudinal patterns in the electorate of Oklahoma, lobbyists in other states, and public stereotypes of lobbyists. Oklahoma lobbyists are fairly representative of the political attitudes of Oklahomans except that today's lobbyist looks more like yesterday's voter than today's. Lobbyists are more likely to be Democrats and less likely to be Republican than today's electorate. This corresponds with the ideological pattern of lobbyists. They are a little less conservative and a bit more liberal than the Oklahoma electorate. Causes of this apparent lag in political attitudes of lobbyists may be that they have been lobbying an average of over eleven years and like their peers in other states are usually in their second careers and often in early fifties. As a result, their political attitudes may well be a better reflection of a political culture of a few years back. The recent shift to Republican control of the Oklahoma House may speed up a shift toward more conservative, Republican lobbyists even more representative of today's voters.

The demographics of Oklahoma's lobbyists resemble their peers in most respects though not all. While affluent compared with the electorate, Oklahoma's lobbyists are not as well off as lobbyists in most other states. In fact, they are 44th in the nation in their annual income. However, they are at least as well educated.

Females seem underrepresented among when compared with the state's population or electorate. However, nearly 30 percent of the present sample was female which compares well with norms for state lobbyists around the country. African-Americans and Native-Americans are underrepresented among Oklahoma lobbyists when compared with the Oklahomans generally. However, minority lobbyists are a very small part of a small sample (i.e., 163) so their percentages are unreliable.

Some public stereotypes of lobbyists did not apply to Oklahoma at all. For instance, Oklahoma lobbyists are not as numerous relative to legislators as lobbyists are in other states. Whereas lobbyists are often seen by the public as too powerful, Oklahoma lobbyists do not report widespread use by their peers of high powered tactics. Some pressure tactics are becoming more evident or, in fact, very evident. But others are not. In any case, most lobbyists draw the broad conclusion that

lobbying tactics do not create tremendous pressure in Oklahoma. Similarly, a common stereotype of lobbyists being more powerful than legislative party leaders is dismissed by nearly 80 percent of the lobbyist/respondents.

The increasing power of money in Oklahoma lobbying concerned some of the lobbyist/respondents although the summary assessments of too large a role for money were mixed. Money was seen as the most relied upon political resources when compared with communication, leadership and access, information, and constituency resources. Similarly, fundraising and campaign contributions were seen as some of the most effective lobbying techniques. However, nearly 80 percent of the lobbyists believed that while lobbying took money, interests could still participate if they had some of the other political resources. Only 20 percent believed that only moneyed interests could lobby effectively. Still, one must wonder if there is some subjectivity or even defensiveness on the part of lobbyists when they characterize the practices of their own profession in their own state. If so, and if the power of money now observed by lobbyists expands, will the stereotype of the high dollar lobbyist materialize in Oklahoma?

Perhaps the increasing concern by lobbyists about the power of money is related to their concern about professional ethics. In fact, their review of professional ethics is as mixed as their assessments about the role of money. Half of the lobbyists saw personal conflicts of interests being minimized often times whereas the other half saw such minimization as comparatively rare. A little more than half felt trustworthiness and ethics were on the increase among Oklahoma lobbyists. But just a little less than half felt "shady deals" and "underhanded tactics" were as common as ever. Nearly three-fourths of the lobbyists surveyed felt that lobbying is changing for the better in Oklahoma. At the same time, however, nearly two-thirds felt the public's attitude toward lobbyists was changing for the worse.

CONCLUSIONS

In sum, lobbyists reflect the political culture of Oklahoma today but not quite as faithfully as that of a few years ago. In many ways Oklahoma lobbyists resemble lobbyists in other states although they are

less numerous relative to legislators and less affluent. The respondent/lobbyists in this study seemed to try to assess the pros and cons of Oklahoma lobbying with some balance. However, as noted, there is probably as much subjectivity in the lobbying profession as there is in any other.

What sort of conclusion do Oklahoma lobbyists themselves draw about an overall "grade" for lobbying as a profession in Oklahoma? On a scale of 0 through 5, where 5 was excellent, the average ranking of all respondent/lobbyists was 3.78. That translates into a grade of 75.6 or a solid "C."

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A STATE OF COMPETITION: HOW OKLAHOMA'S CITIES TAKE THE EDGE OFF OF THE STATE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

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Oklahoma and its cities establish policies and practices to compete for businesses to grow the economy, but a survey of Oklahoma cities reveals a slight, systematic bias in city strategies that might undercut state initiatives to collaboratively focus on higher-paying jobs. Bound primarily by state law to sales-tax revenue, cities appear to target sales-tax generating businesses such as those in the retail and tourism industries – which historically produce lower-paying jobs and foster direct competition as opposed to collaboration with nearby locations. The following is an updated excerpt from graduate student research conducted in 2003.

States and cities work hard to devise strategies to encourage, attract, and sustain businesses. Oklahoma's Governor wants to compete against other states, but unfortunately, it appears Oklahoma's cities want to compete against each other and possibly for lower stakes.

This research effort examined the competitive strategies being used in Oklahoma – revealing the actions of cities in Oklahoma and comparing them with proposed state strategies. Are cities in Oklahoma competing? Are they using strategies similar to cities in other states?

For what types of businesses are they competing? How does this align with state initiatives?

The answer is in the findings of a 49-city survey conducted in the fall of 2003. The results of the survey revealed that cities in Oklahoma appeared to be using similar competitive strategies as cities in other states; however, Oklahoma cities targeted more retail- and tourism-related businesses, considered nearby cities their greatest competition, and relied more heavily on the amount of sales tax produced to define a successful development. Targeting sale-tax producing industries could inadvertently lead to supporting businesses that offer lower-paying jobs (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2004). The target appears logical given the legal limitations that effectively require cities in Oklahoma to rely mainly on sales-tax revenue for general operations – apparently an anomaly in the United States. But the target seems to contradict and possibly undercut the state's economic development goals. One respondent to the survey commented: "What's good for Oklahoma may not be good for our city."

In contrast, Governor Brad Henry released in January 2004 an economic development *Action Plan* designed to help improve the business climate – including measures that affect cities (Levit and Lopez 2004). The plan has been updated with achievements posted online, but the overall goal of the plan remains to be more competitive at encouraging, attracting, and sustaining businesses that provide higher-paying jobs (Immediately Reform and Improve Our Business Climate 2006).

The Governor's plan revealed the recommendations of a committee, a panel of experts, and public and online forums – about 15,000 state citizens and 2,400 businesses participated in the Economic Development Generating Excellence (EDGE) process that devised the plan (Levit 2004). The plan presented four broad categorical recommendations, including technological advances, educational improvement, public health issues, and provisions to address the incentives and activities affecting local government.

The city and state strategies will be explored later, but first a better understanding of interaction between cities and businesses is essential.

THE CITY-BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP

Local government is comprised of many societal actors vying for influence to guide city actions – this is often called pluralism. However, given the realities of a society ruled by a democracy and the free market system, certain actors have greater innate influence. Ultimately, "the people" have the definitive authority. However "the people" participate in a "constellation of social processes" that enact and implement public policies (Dahl 1953). This means people establish institutions and systems (processes) to carry out their collective authority, operating in the more accurate neo-pluralism model. In this theory, business maintains a special position to unduly influence public policy to its advantage. Government leaders, being the acting supreme authority that oversee society, must respond to the message resulting from the powerful but not totally dominant influence of business in the policy making process.

THE CITY'S GROWTH GOAL: AN ECONOMIC THEORY

In the functional process, "the people" buy things in the free market system. Accordingly, the places from which people buy things grow – which means cities that generate wealth can export more and import less and replace imports with local production; more efficiently produce its exports; and encourage consumers both local and foreign to buy within their borders (Blair 1995). In such a system, businesses serve the public interest by providing points of monetary transfer – both sales and salaries – that cause an area to grow.

The government's role of fostering a business climate that provides and sustains the growth of such a system is important. In a capitalistic system, business is essential as a source of revenue for government services; and as demands for services grow, the source of revenue also must grow. Therefore, if growth must go through the business sector and politicians know that economic downturns can end government regimes due to a decline in operating revenue, then a major role of government in a free market is to nurture demands and provide inducements for business leaders to perform their functions that serve the public and the market (Dahl 1953).

Democratic governments have always performed these necessary activities, but they come at a cost. The functional reliance upon businesses gives entrepreneurs a privileged position with more influence on the policymaking process. Businesses produce revenue through taxes for the city to operate, which means lower taxes and/or more services, and jobs for citizens. These results affect people and provide political leaders fodder for campaigns, which affects voting, another source of influence (International City/County Management Association 1999). Therefore, devising business-friendly policies to be competitive is the product of the normal process, and the federal government is playing a large role in increasing the functional influence of businesses as a shift in national policy has created more of a need for cities to compete (Eisinger 1998).

HOW DO CITIES COMPETE TO MEET THE NEEDS OF BUSINESSES?

One research effort concluded that cities have about 75 different methods of competing (Fleischmann 1992). However, there are two general approaches of competition, one direct and one indirect (Levy 1991).

The indirect approach of competition involves trying to make a city more attractive. This is done through strategic planning. One report concluded: "Smart cities require smart businesses, smart citizens, smart non-profits, smart government and smart collaboration throughout the community" (Caldow n/a). In essence, the key to economic development success might be in design: "Smart Growth" or "Community by Design." As Alexander Garvin explains in *The American City*, when a development proposal is arranged to fit the right combination of market, location, financing, entrepreneurship, and time, the result is successful development (Garvin 2002).

Hence in this strategy, business leaders and community leaders must have an interest in ensuring their development projects and plans align with the goals of citizens. The partnerships between business leaders and community leaders can have a significant impact on budgeting for competitive strategies in four key ways: 1. Stay informed; 2. Anticipate other development improvement projects; 3. Suggest changes and

alternatives as conditions and environments change; and 4. Keep other key players informed (Post 1999).

THE SALES PITCH: MARKETING THE CITY

The indirect strategy of comprehensive planning provides tools and support for a more direct approach, which is more akin to the stereotypical process produced in a capitalistic system: making the sale.

Almost 70 percent of economic development professionals indicate sales activities as being the most important aspect of their jobs (ICMA 1999). One author writes that "the amount of data on taxes, wages, utility costs, construction costs, land availability and cost, shipping costs, environmental and land-use regulations, cost of living, housing costs and availability, amenities, and quality of life considerations that would be needed for" municipalities would be "formidable. In a world of imperfect information, it is no wonder that public relations, promotion, advertising, sales, and related activities become extremely important" (Fleischmann 1992). Without a sales effort, cities are left to rely on the happenstance that businesses will find out about their attractive qualities. Cities naturally try to change their economic incentive packages and their quality of life components, but these attempts may be for nothing if city leaders are not performing fundamental marketing tasks to target their efforts (Ashworth 1990).

Many cities partner with local private organizations such as chambers of commerce, citizen boards and others to provide necessary planning and implementation of marketing strategies. Some cities, especially small to mid-size cities, have found that marketing is best consolidated at a regional level. For instance, Oklahoma's Department of Commerce serves as a centralized portal for providing competitive information about cities in Oklahoma. The department's web site offers general information about Oklahoma's low cost of living, housing and construction, as well as information about different state-run programs. However, research indicates that there is no correlation between consolidation of administration of competition and increased growth (Carr 1999). Rather, regional coordination's benefits are in the decreased cost of marketing and information dissemination.

DOES COMPETITION WORK?

Given that businesses' needs are often out of the control of governments and the effectiveness of tax incentives are mixed, it makes the effectiveness of competition questionable. Objective research shows mixed results in terms of effectiveness. Due to the multiple strategies possible, it is difficult to focus on any consistent practices among different states or the same state over time; and often, how a competitive strategy is carried out is just as meaningful as the strategy itself (Aschauer 2000). Most of the evidence for successful economic development is anecdotal. One report suggests two very important cautions for cities that are attempting to be competitive (Schartz 2000). Trying to replicate the success of a city might be impossible in the context of another city, and often, economic development efforts do not lead to sweeping change in all communities that try them.

Given the uncontrollable issues and the offsetting tax incentives, competitive strategies appear to center on marketing activities. Whether selling incentives, quality of life or some other aspect, it appears the guiding principle is for cities to outsell each other.

THE GOVERNOR'S PLAN

Recall that businesses produce revenue for cities to operate, which can mean lower taxes and/or more services for citizens and jobs for citizens. Seeing as cities are extensions of the state, the same is true for the state government – whereas the state competes with other states and tries to help its cities compete with other states' cities to create, attract, and sustain development. Accordingly, on this more comprehensive level, the Governor introduced in January 2004 the *EDGE Action Plan* to try to give the entire state a competitive edge to improve the business climate and grow the economy. The ongoing plan presents four broad categorical goals, including technological advances, educational improvement, public health issues, and provisions to address the incentives and activities affecting local government and economic development.

All of the measures in the plan fall into both types of competitive strategies presented above – however, the Governor's plan goes a step further and defines a target for the strategies: The ultimate goal is to not

only grow the economy with more businesses but to do so by attracting businesses that provide higher-paying jobs to citizens (Levit 2004). The following sections provide an overview of the *Action Plan*, and the rest of this research presentation reconciles the competitive strategies in the Governor's plan with the actual strategies and actions that cities in Oklahoma are using.

TRANSFORM OKLAHOMA INTO THE RESEARCH CAPITAL OF THE PLAINS

The first of the four main directives in the *Action Plan* is a proposal to invest $1 billion in an endowment for research. The plan states, "Research results supported by the [endowment] will be directed toward innovation that will strengthen current Oklahoma businesses and create businesses that are likely to remain in the state." These businesses will "ensure that jobs—especially higher-paying ones—are available to Oklahomans."

DRAMATICALLY UPDATE OKLAHOMA'S PUBLIC EDUCATION SYSTEM

The second proposal is also in line with a planning strategy as the Governor plans to improve the education system in Oklahoma. This is part of the goal phase of development planning because the results of the proposals are not intended to directly attract businesses, but the goal is to create an atmosphere that is attractive to businesses. The plan states, "A highly educated workforce will be much more attractive to businesses considering relocating to Oklahoma. . . ."

REVERSE OUR STATE'S HEALTH TRENDS—NOW

The third item in the plan is a bold attempt to improve the health of the state's citizens. The specific proposal includes tax incentives for businesses that establish or continue "wellness programs that reduce health costs and boosts employee productivity." This also is part of a

comprehensive planning approach in which the state is trying to recruit specific businesses – this time particularly ones with healthy employees, which are assumed to be more productive and less expensive to insure and care for. The overall effect also could add to a higher quality of life for the state that could in turn attract more business.

IMMEDIATELY REFORM AND IMPROVE OUR BUSINESS CLIMATE

The fourth action item includes comprehensive planning aspects and marketing strategies. The proposals in this economic development goal address cities specifically. The planning features involve tort reform, worker's compensation reform, and changes in tax policy. Again, these proposals do not directly attract businesses but only serve to create by design an atmosphere that is attractive to development. The tax proposals include: extending tax benefits for small businesses, creating a constitutional amendment to allow for tax increment financing districts, reducing capital gains taxes, and improving the mechanisms for bonding projects.

This section of the plan also offers some marketing suggestions – marketing, as a reminder, is cited by almost 70 percent of economic development professionals as being the most important aspect of their jobs (ICMA 1999). The plan recommends developing regional economic development partnerships with public and private organizations. With these partnerships, the plan suggests pooling resources for centralized data collection and communication to ensure that information about development opportunities are more readily available. Also in marketing, the plan calls for an effort to promote Oklahoma as a destination for tourism.

THE RIGHT BUSINESSES FOR OKLAHOMA

Throughout the *Action Plan*, the focus is on higher-paying jobs, and the Governor includes proposals to guide the measurement and success of the plan. Accordingly, two specific proposals are made. The first is to establish a system to identify the "costs and benefits of all

current and proposed business incentives and tax credits to determine whether they effectively encourage the type of behavior they seek to stimulate" (Levit 2004). The "type of behavior" sought after is alluded to throughout the plan as it seeks to "ensure that all future tax credits and incentives" are "tied to higher-paying jobs."

METHODOLOGY

Given the options available to cities and the proposed development strategies of the state, it is important to know what cities in Oklahoma are actually doing for their part in the overall development of the economy. In order to obtain information about city strategies, a survey had to be devised and conducted. The following sections describe the methodology used to create the survey. For the purpose of this research, it is assumed that cities and their official leaders are the best source of information to assess what strategies are being used to attract businesses and what type of businesses are targeted.

THE SAMPLE CITIES

According to the U.S. Census Bureau, there were 692 cities, towns or community defined places in Oklahoma. For the purpose of this research, all towns and community defined places were removed from the population sample. Of the cities remaining, only cities with populations more than 2,500 were included in the population to be sampled. It was assumed cities smaller than this would not be interested in the type of economic development discussed here simply because they do not have the resources. After removing those cities, 127 cities with a population of 2,500 or more remained. The average population of these cities was 18,618 and the median population was 5,415.

Of the 127 cities, a total of 49 were randomly selected and Oklahoma City and Tulsa were forced into the sample due to their status of being central cities that influence all of the other cities in the state. Overall, the results of surveying the sample of cities about their economic development practices have a 95 percent confidence level and an 11 percent confidence interval.

The sampling of 49 cities had an average population of 33,212 and a median population of 7,989. These numbers are higher than the population average and median due to forcing Oklahoma City and Tulsa into the sample. Therefore, the data might be skewed slightly toward the responses of the larger cities. It also is important to note that Oklahoma City, Tulsa, and Norman could not provide a single voice for their cities. Therefore, publications, records and personal contact with multiple officials for the cities were used to answer the objective survey questions and responses for subjective questions were omitted. This is expected to have little effect on the outcomes.

THE SURVEY

Anecdotal evidence abounds regarding the success and failures of economic development strategies. However, little data seems to exist concerning the frequency of the use of such strategies. The definitive source appeared to be a survey conducted by the International City/ County Management Association. The association conducts an economic development survey of cities and counties in the United States every 10 years – most recently in 1999 (ICMA 1999). The questions and structure of the ICMA survey were used as a model for the survey in this research effort. Most of the questions were closed-ended questions with multiple response categories that allow the respondent to select yes or no when the category accurately describes its city's situation. The questions included assessments of demographics, incentives offered, tools used, activities participated in, businesses targeted, and measurement criteria. The ICMA model helped ensure validity and consistency, and the results of the ICMA survey serve as a benchmark for comparison in the analysis presented here – all references to national averages are from this survey. It is important to note that the ICMA survey includes the responses of 912 cities and 130 counties with populations exceeding 10,000 people, and there is no way to extract responses that might have come from Oklahoma. This means samples in the survey for this research did not match up exactly to that in the ICMA survey. This and the age of the ICMA survey limited the conclusions to general indications when comparing results of the two surveys.

DATA COLLECTION

To ensure the exact number of responses needed and to better control reliability, the survey was conducted via phone calls to city managers, mayors or the official who oversees economic development for each of the sampled cities, and each respondent was promised confidentiality. The intent was to capture the official strategy and opinion of the city. All of the cities were called between September to November 2003. The responses were recorded at the time of the call and later entered into a database for tabulation. A total of 26 city managers, four mayors, 12 community or economic development directors, two city planners, and two economic development directors (with chambers of commerce or official development groups on contract) responded to the survey.

FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

The findings answer the question as to how the cities' strategies line up with the Governor's proposal. Overall, Oklahoma's cities are using comprehensive planning and marketing strategies to compete, and the cities seem to be as competitive as cities in other states. In terms of the state, cities are already using many of the applicable strategies proposed by the Governor. As a reminder, the proposals include:

- Invest $1 billion in an endowment for research efforts to increase the state's research industry and make information available to businesses.
- Dramatically update Oklahoma's public education system to make citizens more valuable employees.
- Offer tax incentives for businesses that have wellness programs – to make employees healthier and more productive.
- Improve the state's business climate by developing regional partnerships for marketing and disseminating information.

However, cities appear to be contradicting the Governor's primary focus of targeting higher-paying jobs. Below is a further description of the findings. Unless otherwise noted, all numbers are expressed as percentages of respondents. Totals not equaling 100% are due to rounding.

OKLAHOMA'S CITIES ARE COMPETING

A total of 80 percent of the cities responding said they believed their city to be competitive at attracting businesses. And from the findings, Oklahoma cities appear to be competitive at creating a good business climate. About 60 percent of the cities have a written economic development plan compared with only 55 percent nationally. Almost 90 percent of Oklahoma's cities have ongoing economic development programs – with 70 percent offering business incentives. Nationally as calculated by ICMA data, about 70 percent of cities also offer incentives, but Oklahoma cities appear to outpace the national average in most categories as indicated in **Table 1.**

TABLE 1

Cities Offering Incentives to Businesses (Percent)

	Oklahoma	National Average (ICMA)
Zoning/permit assistance	97	71.8
Infrastructure improvements	91	74.1
One-stop permit issuance	78	39.1
Free land	63	38.8
Federal/state enterprise zones	59	26.9
Subsidized buildings	59	10.6
Utility rate reduction	56	18.8
Training support	53	36.0
Low-cost loans	53	39.8
Tax abatements	47	53.5
Relocation assistance	44	17.7
Grants	41	45.3
Regulatory flexibility	41	23.1
Local enterprise zones	28	27.2
Tax credits	28	24.5
Employee screening	28	15.7

n=33 (number of respondents included; this response only included those cities offering incentives)

SOURCE: Primary research/ICMA 1999.

While cities in Oklahoma are offering similar and apparently more incentives, it also appears the cities are making a concerted effort to sell their cities. Among the selling activities used by the responding cities, 83 percent use regional approaches, have a web site, and have promotional materials, while 75 percent make use of community resource databases. All of these frequencies are either as good as or better than the national average as shown in **Table 2** – especially in the regional development effort where only 43 percent of cities nationally engaged in this strategy.

Cities use of regional approaches appears to be in harmony with the Governor's proposal. Furthermore, more than 70 percent of cities report working with private organizations in this effort (**see Table 6**). Of course, this research does not indicate the quality of cities' regional effort, and the Governor's plan might be an attempt to make the approach better by pooling resources to hire better-trained professionals.

TABLE 2

Cities Using Selected Sales Approaches

	Oklahoma	National Average
Regional approaches	83	42.5
Promotional material	83	81.6
Website	83	70.3
Community resource database	75	54.1
Gov. rep calls on prospects	75	52.0
Attendance at conferences	71	61.3
Host special events	66	29.5
Direct mail	63	40.1
Participation in trade shows	60	49.8
Media advertising	50	43.8
Ambassador program	29	12.4

n=48

SOURCE: Primary research/ICMA 1999.

In addition to the regional approach to marketing, cities are also in agreement with the Governor's proposal to promote Oklahoma as a destination for tourism, as indicated in **Table 3**. A total of 63 percent of the cities surveyed consider tourism more important than other industries – besting the national average by more than 20 percent. Accordingly, nearly 60 percent of the Oklahoma cities surveyed have developed slogans for their communities to attract people and businesses.

QUALITY COMPETITION

The findings compare well with the national average in terms of quantity, but they do lag some in quality, as in how aggressively cities pursue such development activities. On average, only 39 percent of cities in Oklahoma have at least one staff person who spends the majority of his or her time on economic development. About 75 percent of those staff members are trained, but the national average is a little more than two trained staff members per city. Furthermore, about 71 percent of cities in Oklahoma annually budget less than $100,000 for economic development, while the national average is more than $700,000. The breakdown for Oklahoma is shown in **Table 4**. Of course, remember the respondents in the ICMA survey are slightly larger cities on average and are from 1999 – this means the numbers are not exactly comparable but are worth noting. It also should be noted that almost 60 percent of

TABLE 3

Importance of Tourism in Comparison With Other Industries

	Oklahoma	National Average
Very important	63	38.9
About the same	24	23
Not important	12	38.1
n=49		

SOURCE: Primary research/ICMA 1999.

TABLE 4

Cities Budgeting Selected Amounts for Economic Development

	Oklahoma
$0 to $1,000	8.1
$1,001 to $10,000	22.4
$10,001 to $100,000	40.8
$100,001 or more	28.5
n=49	

SOURCE: Primary research/ICMA 1999.

cities in Oklahoma expected their economic development budget to increase over the next five years.

BARRIERS TO COMPETITION

The number one barrier to local development is a limited number of major employers – with 75 percent of the cities citing it. The next two problems with 58.3 percent reporting them as problems are a stagnant market and lack of funding (**Table 5**). Moreover these problems are indicated much more frequently in Oklahoma cities. Nationally, only 27 percent of cities cite a lack of major employers, 46 percent cite a lack of skilled labor, and 5.2 percent cite a declining or stagnant market. The Governor's proposal appears to indirectly address this barrier with his desire to make Oklahoma a center of research – assuming such a focus would provide funding of programs at larger institutions such as colleges and research institutions – as well as trying to improve the education system and make Oklahomans healthier.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR COMPETITION

The initial assumption in the methodology that city leaders are the best source of information for competitive strategies was validated by

TABLE 5

Cities Encountering Barriers to Economic Development

	Oklahoma	National Average
Limited number of major employers	75.0	27.2
Declining or stagnant market	58.3	5.2
Lack of funding	58.3	38.5
Lack of skilled labor	52.1	46.6
Cost of land	41.6	41.1
Citizen opposition	37.5	31.5
Availability of land	33.3	56.8
Restrictive rules and laws	29.2	NA
Lack of political support	20.8	12.4
Traffic congestion	10.4	27.0
n=48		

SOURCE: Primary research/ICMA 1999.

the findings. Of those responding, almost 92 percent indicated city government as a participant in economic development – this assures that the cities' responses can be deemed valid in assessing what is actually taking place in cities. The full list of participants is in **Table 6**.

The second-place participant in local development was the chamber of commerce at almost 86 percent, which reflects and upholds the notion that businesses generally, but not always, maintain a dominant position in local policy making. The chambers of commerce are one type of local private organization that assist in economic development. In contrast, the federal government was indicated to participate least often in local economic development at 38 percent. This might seem low, but the national average is only 8.3 percent. The survey aligns almost identically with the top two nationally – city participation at 93 percent and chambers of commerce at 77 percent. The similarity also is true for funding from the government, which is shown in **Table 7**.

About 90 percent of Oklahoma's cities and national cities use local general funds – 39 percent of Oklahoma cities use federal funds for

TABLE 6

Reported Participants in Economic Development

	Oklahoma	National Average
City government	91.8	92.6
Chamber of Commerce	85.7	76.5
Private businesses	71.4	54.9
Citizen board or group	67.3	49.9
State government	59.1	30.3
County	38.7	48.3
Federal government	38.7	8.3

n=49

SOURCE: Primary research/ICMA 1999.

TABLE 7

Cities Using Sources for Funding of Economic Development

	Oklahoma	National Average
General revenues	67.3	88.8
Special earmarked taxes	48.9	34.7
State grants	44.8	36.0
Federal grants	38.7	29.7
Bonds	24.4	23.7
Special assessment districts	18.3	12.3

n=49

SOURCE: Primary research/ICMA 1999.

development and the national average is 29 percent. These similarities help to provide further validity to the results of the survey in this research. The findings from this survey also appear to support the historical trend and theories presented in this research – see **Table 8** below. A total of 80 percent of the cities responding included local government as having responsibility for the economic well-being of its respective community – 40 percent responded local government had the sole responsibility.

Additionally, both nationally and in Oklahoma, the majority of cities count nearby local governments as the greatest competition for development (**Table 9**). In fact, cities in Oklahoma appear to give much more weight to nearby local governments as competitors when compared with other possible competition. However, this appears to contradict the regional marketing efforts described above – unless the regional efforts include only partnerships with private and other organizations. In any case, as the Governor proposed regional partnerships, the state and cities will need to be aware that 60 percent of cities include nearby local governments as the greatest competition – nearly double any other cited competitor.

TABLE 8

Ultimate Responsibility for Economic Well-Being

	Oklahoma Only
Local government	80
Private organizations	43
Citizens	34
State government	26
Federal government	17
n=46	

SOURCE: Primary research/ICMA 1999.

TABLE 9

Considered Greatest Competition for City Economic Development

	Oklahoma	National Average
Nearby local governments	61.1	79.2
Other local governments in state	28.5	66.9
Local governments in surrounding states	24.4	44.7
Foreign countries	18.3	12.4
Other states	16.2	46.5

n=49

SOURCE: Primary research/ICMA 1999.

COMPETING WITH A PURPOSE

Nationally, 81.3 percent of cities claim they primarily measure the success of their development efforts by the amount of jobs created. The second measure is the number of new businesses relocating in the jurisdiction, and third is the amount of money invested in the land – in terms of land purchased or construction upon. In contrast, 59 percent of the cities in Oklahoma define success primarily by the amount of jobs created *and* by the amount of sales tax produced, while only 4.1 percent of Oklahoma cities measure success by the number of new businesses relocating to the jurisdiction. The full list of measurements is shown in **Table 10**.

This difference in how cities measure success might seem strange.

However, Oklahoma state law prohibits cities from collecting property taxes to fund operating budgets (Oklahoma Statutes Title 69, Section 2701). This means cities must rely on sales tax for operating revenue unless they are willing to implement an income tax, which is authorized by the statute. The law dates back to the state's beginning and its efficacy is debatable (n/a 2003). Sales taxes are regressive,

TABLE 10

Cities Using Selected Gauges to Measure Success of Development

	Oklahoma	National Average
Amount of jobs created	59.8	81.3
Number of new businesses relocating or expanding in your jurisdiction	14.1	48.8
Increase in sales tax produced	59.8	0.0
Cost/benefit analysis	16.2	37.1

n=48

SOURCE: Primary research/ICMA 1999.

make consumer goods more expensive, and cause instability for budget projections. However, in the context of the theories presented here, this tax system appears to help reduce the cost of doing business in Oklahoma – as the Department of Commerce reports: the state has one of the lowest costs for businesses due to the third-lowest property taxes in the country. However, most cities in Oklahoma are near a 10 percent sales tax rate (n/a 2003).

One researcher pointed out:

> While job creation figures do have some analytical importance, raw numbers of jobs produced in a state do not show whether or not any new jobs that are created improve the standard of living in the state. The more important consideration is the types of jobs that are created, the wage and benefit levels that they offer, and the long-term stability that they provide for workers and their families (Gulibon 1999).

Perhaps those sentiments explain why the Governor also has placed much emphasis on higher-paying jobs in the *Action Plan*. The plan appears to rely on the proposal to ensure future tax incentives are tied to higher-paying jobs and the proposed research-sector focus to provide higher-paying jobs – whereas worker's compensation, tort reform and other comprehensive planning strategies are not directly linked to higher-

paying jobs. This might be where the cities' reliance upon sales tax and how they measure success influences their competitive strategies contrary to the Governor's goal. As one respondent in the survey remarked, "What's good for Oklahoma may not be good for our city." If cities rely on sales tax and measure success by sales tax generated, then it is logical that they also target businesses that offer retail jobs, which are generally lower paying when compared with other industries (Bureau of labor Statistics 2004). However, the findings indicate that cities in Oklahoma are not far off the national trends in the types of industry they focus on – with the exception of technology (**Table 11**). But Oklahoma cities do appear to focus slightly more of their efforts on the retail/service sector than others.

A total of 57 percent of cities in Oklahoma spend a great deal of effort attracting retail/service businesses, and the second most effort is spent on tourism in which 49 percent of cities spend a great deal of effort. Nationally, 52.5 percent of cities focus on technology development, whereas only 20 percent of Oklahoma cities spend a great deal of effort on technology. The most effort nationally is on manufacturing with 70 percent claiming this sector as its focus, but the retail/service industry is a close second.

This is not to say that the retail or service industry is bad, but only that a reliance upon these industries might create unintended consequences, such as inadvertently targeting lower-paying jobs while the Governor desires higher-paying jobs. In any case, the effects of the sales tax system are outside the scope of this research, but these findings might serve to inspire further evaluation and review of the effects of the overall tax system on economic development attitudes and practices.

CONCLUSION

Overall, the research presented here reveals that Oklahoma's cities are engaging in competitive strategies, and the findings show how and to what end. However, when reconciling the findings of this research with the Governor's recommendations in the *Action Plan* that are discussed here, some discrepancies emerge.

First, to propose providing leadership and funding for regional partnerships appears to be redundant to current activities, as 83 percent

TABLE 11

Cities' Focus on Attracting Specific Industry

	Oklahoma	National Average
Retail/service	57	67.7
Tourism/hospitality	49	41.7
Manufacturing	37	69.7
Technology/telecommunication	20	52.5
Warehousing/distribution	22	38.3
Residential community	22	19.2
Other (industrial)	22	7.8
Institutional (military, non profit)	12	9.7
Agriculture	1	9.9
n=45		

SOURCE: Primary research/ICMA 1999.

of the cities surveyed indicated they participate in these types of partnerships. Thus, the proposal appears to assert that there is a lack of leadership and funding in these partnerships. The research presented here does not address the quality of these partnerships, but it seems presumptuous to consider so many cities incompetent.

Second, the proposal to emphasize tourism in Oklahoma also appears redundant. Cities in Oklahoma currently promote themselves as tourist destinations more than the national average. Perhaps this proposal is more of a continuation of current efforts as opposed to a new development strategy.

Third, the types of businesses that cities are targeting appear to undercut the goal of trying to attain higher-paying jobs as expressed in the *Action Plan*. This poses a serious inconsistency that appears counterproductive.

In conclusion, cities should be commended for actively pursuing economic development. City leaders also seem to be filling their role in the model of neo-pluralism, whereas the cities are trying to nurture the

free market by helping businesses perform their functions that serve the public. In contrast, it appears cities might not be listening to the citizens who want and need higher-paying jobs. Of course, it is probably only reasonable to hope that city leaders' awareness of this slight built-in bias will be enough to counter any misguided strategies – because there is most certainly scant political interest in cities' establishing an income tax or ad valorem tax.

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MARRIAGE DEFINITION VOTES IN 13 STATES AND VOTING OUTCOMES

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In 2004, voters in thirteen states approved amendments to their state constitutions defining marriage as involving one man and one woman. Oklahoma was one of these states. This paper examines the political context of the voting outcomes in these states. It analyzes the influence of religion on the county-level votes for the marriage definition amendments, controlling for various political, demographic, and socioeconomic variables. The analysis reveals that while religious affiliation was an important fact in the political environment, the relationship between support for marriage definition and the 2004 Republican presidential vote was more important. The analysis also exhibits evidence that counties with large African-American populations strongly supported marriage definition amendments.

Same-sex marriage became legal in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts on May 17, 2004, the result of a judicial decision and the most dramatic step in a decades-long movement. This movement seeks to allow same-sex marriage in state law. Reacting to the apparent success of the movement, voters in thirteen states, including Oklahoma, approved marriage definition amendments to their state constitutions in 2004. Missouri voters approved a legislative referendum at the August

3 primary election. A legislative referendum was approved in Louisiana at the September 18 primary. Voters in Oklahoma and eight other states approved ballot questions at the November 2 general election. In Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Utah, the question was referred by the legislature. Voters in Arkansas, Michigan, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, and Oregon approved citizen initiatives.

HISTORY AND POLITICS OF MARRIAGE DEFINITION

The state campaigns to define marriage in their constitutions in 2004 were one dramatic point in a decades-long conflict over the ability of same-sex couples to obtain marriage licenses (Barclay and Fisher 2003; Cadge, Olson, and Harrison 2005, 5-8). In 1970, the first gay male couple applied for a marriage license from Hennepin County, Minnesota. After the county clerk denied their application, they sued in state court. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the men had no federal due process or equal protection right to marry (*Baker v. Nelson*, 291 Minn. 310, 314-15, 191 N.W.2d 185, 187 [1971]). A number of same-sex couples tried to obtain marriage licenses during the 1970s and 1980s and failed in court (Dupuis 2002).

Gay marriage entered the national political agenda in the early 1990s when the Hawaii Supreme Court ruled that the state's ban on granting same-sex couples marriage licenses violated the equal protection clause found in the Hawaii Constitution (*Baehr v. Lewin*, 852 P.2d 44 [Haw. 1993]). This decision was upheld by a Hawaii appeals court in 1996. During the period between the two decisions, same-sex marriage opponents organized. The opponents were able to persuade the Hawaii Legislature to propose a state constitutional amendment that was ratified by 69 percent of the state's voters in November 1998. In 1996, while several states were debating same-sex marriage, Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) defining marriage as an institution between a man and woman. The legislation prohibited federal recognition of same-sex marriages and permitted each state to ignore same-sex marriages performed in other states. President Bill Clinton signed the bill that was followed by similar legislation in a number of states.

The next legal action occurred in Vermont in 1999. The Vermont Supreme Court ruled that limiting marriage opposite-sex couples violated

the Vermont Constitution's "Common Benefits Clause" (*Baker v. State*, 744 A.2d 864 [Vt. 1999]). The decision forced the Vermont Legislature to develop a way for benefits and protections to same-sex couples. In 2000, the Legislature passed a "civil unions" law, granting to same-sex couples "all the same benefits, protections and responsibilities under law, whether they derive from statute, administrative or court rule, policy, common law or any other source of civil law, as are granted to spouses in marriage." This was the first legislative measure to provide the benefits and protections of marriage without the label of "marriage" (Cadge, Olson, and Harrison 2005).

Same-sex couples received additional support for their ability to obtain marriage licenses with the 2003 Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruling *Goodridge v. Department of Public Health* (798 N.E.2d 941 [Mass. 2003]). The court ruled "the marriage ban does not meet the rational basis test for either due process or equal protection." The first same-sex marriage licenses were granted in Massachusetts on May 14, 2004, over the objection of Governor Mitt Romney, a Republican.

Reacting to these court rulings and events like San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom's granting of marriage licenses in his city in February 2004, conservative groups increased their efforts to amend state constitutions to prohibit same-sex marriage.

In 2004, voters in Oklahoma joined voters in twelve other states in approving constitutional amendments defining marriage as being between one man and one woman. During the campaign in Oklahoma, public opinion polls indicated that the state question would be approved overwhelmingly by voters (Satterthwaite 2006, 210). Polls conducted in other states indicated similar levels of support. By the end of the year, voters in all thirteen states had approved the constitutional amendments. The present research assesses the political context of the voting outcomes on these referenda.

METHOD

Using a method similar to the method used by Morgan and Meier (1980) in their study of voting on moral issues in Oklahoma, this paper examines the voting patterns on the question of marriage definition in

the thirteen states that considered the issue in 2004. Morgan and Meier used multiple regression analysis to study the county-level vote on several ballot questions. Their dependent variable was the percentage of each county's voters supporting the question. They used a number of independent variables including rural isolation, socioeconomic status, liquor consumption, and three categories of religion. They found that support for referenda on liberalizing liquor and gambling laws was found in Oklahoma counties with high socioeconomic status, a larger percentage of Catholics, and smaller percentages of both fundamentalist and other Protestants (Morgan and Meier 1980; Satterthwaite 2005a). Despite the relative simplicity of the method and the level at which the data are aggregated, Morgan and Meier's findings have been cited numerous times, especially on questions related to issues of morality (see Gibson 2004; Haider-Markel and Meier 1996; LeDuc and Pammett 1995; Oldmixon 2002; Satterthwaite 2005a, 2005b; Wald, Button, Rienzo 1996; Wilcox and Jelen 1990). Rausch (1994) uses a similar methodology to examine the politics of legislative constraint in Oklahoma.

Several hypotheses emerge to explain support for marriage definition state questions. One hypothesis is that votes on marriage definition were determined by religious affiliation. Public opinion research demonstrates that religion has an influence on opinions about homosexuality (Cochran and Beeghley 1991; Cotten-Huston and Waite 2000; Finlay and Walther 2003; Glenn and Weaver 1979; Roof and McKinney 1987), although Cadge, Olson, and Harrison (2005) show that religious affiliation may not specifically affect opinion on allowing same-sex marriages.

A second hypothesis considers the urban and rural populations in a state. Voters in rural areas are more likely to vote in support of marriage definition amendments while those in urban areas would oppose the measures. There has been little research on locality as a factor in voter outcomes on marriage definition amendments, except that some research has included "rural and urban" as variables (see, for example, Smith, DeSantis, and Kassel 2005). Examining Ohio and Michigan, Smith, DeSantis, and Kassel (2005, 16) find that rural counties were significantly more likely to support the marriage definition measure in Ohio.

A third possible hypothesis considers the role of political party on the marriage definition voter. A growing body of research (Campbell and Monson 2005; Donovan, et al. 2005; Hillygus and Shields 2005;

Smith, DeSantis, and Kassel 2005) links the success of President George W. Bush's re-election campaign with the state-level votes on marriage definition. This line of research supports the public opinion data that emerged out of the 2004 presidential election indicating that voters chose President Bush largely because he reflected their positions on moral issues, including gay marriage. The challenge, recognized by Smith, DeSantis, and Kassel 2005, 12), lies in identifying the number of Democratic and Republican party identifiers at the county-level, especially in states that do not register voters by party. This is discussed further below.

Using data collected from a variety of sources, the present research assesses the alternative hypotheses while testing for other potential explanations of support for state constitutional amendments defining marriage. Data were collected on each of 1,037 counties in the thirteen states. The counties are in state located in different parts of the country, providing some control on political culture. In addition, the counties vary in their support for the 2004 Republican presidential candidate. The Democratic candidate for president carried several of the states included in this analysis. In addition, there is a high degree of variability between the counties in terms of their populations.

The present research employs aggregate data collected at the county level. While individual-level data collected by a survey would be preferable to county-level data, the level of aggregation chosen is more practical for a study that includes a number of states. County-level data are useful for examining the political, economic, and social environment in which voters made their decisions on referenda (Giles 1977; Hero 1998; Key 1950; Morgan and Meier 1980; Oliver and Mendelberg 2000; Rausch 1994; Satterthwaite 2005a, 2005b; Smith, DeSantis, and Kassel 2005; Tolbert and Hero 2001). Of course, national surveys include respondents from a number of the subject states, but very few from some of the smaller states examined in this research, such as Montana and North Dakota.

Election return data were collected from the secretaries of state or the state election boards of the states examined. The data on religion were compiled from the Glenmary Research Center's *Religious Congregations and Membership in the United States,* 2000 (Jones 2002). Demographic data are from the United States Census.

MEASURES

SUPPORT FOR MARRIAGE DEFINITION AMENDMENT

The dependent variable, support for marriage definition amendment, is measured by the percentage of voters in each of the 1,037 counties who cast a ballot in favor of the marriage definition amendment. While the statewide votes on the question appear to have little variation, the county-level data exhibit greater variation. The highest percentage of "Yes" votes was 94.06 percent in Itawamba County, Mississippi. The lowest support was 38.55 percent in Summit County, Utah. The mean county vote was 78.25 percent with a standard deviation of 9.45 percent. **Table 1** presents the counties where less than 50 percent of the voters supported the amendments. These counties primarily are either urban or have large university populations. Using Census data available at www.gaydemographics.org, no relationship was found between the number of same-sex couples in a county and its level of support for marriage definition, as suggested by Overby and Barth (2002).

RELIGION

Data were collected on the proportions of county residents affiliated with different religions. Although religion has been involved in American political life for a long time, social scientists have only seriously researched the role of religion in politics for about the past quarter century (Jelen 1998; Satterthwaite 2005a, 2005b; Wald, Silverman, and Fridy 2005). Jelen (1998) reviews much of literature that specifically examines the role of religion in political behavior. For example, the Catholic Church has worked in coalition with other groups to enact restrictions on abortion at the state level (Day 1992; O'Hara 1992). Religious conservatives became actively involved in the Republican Party in the late 1970s and early 1980s to advocate their positions on a number of social issues (Guth 1983; Oldfield 1996). Interestingly, it was during the period when religious conservatives began to strongly participate in politics that social science experienced a growth in interest in the role of religion in American politics. Recent research has found that religious affiliation played a role in the results of the marriage definition amendment votes

TABLE 1

Counties with Less than 50 Percent Support for the Marriage Definition Amendments in 2004

County (County Seat)	Percent
Summit County, Utah (Coalville)	38.55
Multnomah County, Oregon (Portland)	40.26
Washtenaw County, Michigan (Ann Arbor)	40.55
Athens County, Ohio (Athens)	44.22
Benton County, Oregon (Corvallis)	45.17
Grand County, Utah (Moab)	45.97
St. Louis City, Missouri	47.01
Ingham County, Michigan (Mason)	47.03

SOURCE: Author's calculations.

(Cadge, Olson, and Harrison 2005; Campbell and Monson 2005; Sattertwhaite 2005b; Smith, DeSantis, and Kassel 2005).

The present research incorporates four variables for religious affiliation: evangelical Protestants; mainline Protestants; Catholics; and Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons). The Mormon variable presented some difficulty as will be discussed below. Using data from the Glenmary Research Center (Jones 2002), the proportion of county residents who are Evangelical Protestants was calculated using the "List of Religious Bodies" found at the American Religion Data Archive website. The percentages ranged from a high of 97.9 to a low of zero. The mean was 29.19 with a standard deviation of 18.12. It is expected that counties with greater percentages of evangelical Protestants will exhibit greater support for the marriage definition amendments (see Satterthwaite 2005b). In fact, this could be considered the key independent variable.

A similar procedure was used to calculate the percentage of Mainline Protestants. The range among all counties was from zero to 88.40 percent with a mean of 11.38 and a standard deviation of 10.48. Because mainline Protestants tend to be more liberal on social issues (see Fowler, Hertzke, Olson, and Den Dulk 2004, 93), mainline

Protestant counties are expected to exhibit lower support for the amendments. In fact, the United Church of Christ voted in July 2005 to affirm equal marriage rights for couples regardless of gender. Interestingly, Satterthwaite (2005b) finds that mainline Protestant population is positively related to vote on marriage definition, at least in Oklahoma.

The percentage of Catholics in each county was determined using the Glenmary data. Only the category labeled "Catholic" was included in this classification. The percentage of Catholics ranged from zero to 88.90 percent. The mean was 9.55 percent with a standard deviation of 13.79. Counties with greater populations of Catholics are expected to show more support for marriage definition.

The fourth religious category Mormons is a little more difficult to include in this research. In fact, had the state of Utah not voted on a marriage definition amendment in 2004, Mormons likely would have been excluded from this analysis. Across the thirteen states, the percentage of Mormons ranges from zero to 88 percent with a mean of 2.55 percent. Removing the 29 Utah counties produces a range of zero to 11 percent with a mean of 0.66 percent. In Utah, the range is 29 percent to 88 percent with a mean of 68.33 percent. For this reason, Mormons are combined with evangelical Protestants in several models and analyzed separately in others. The Mormon counties are expected to support marriage definition.

VOTERS IN RURAL AREAS

The independent variable tapping the effect of residence in rural areas is the percentage of county residents who are rural according to the United States Bureau of the Census. For simplicity, this research uses "percent rural"; therefore, the remainder of the county population can be considered urban. It is expected that counties with a greater percentage of rural population will exhibit more support for the marriage definition amendments.

POLITICAL PARTY AFFILIATION

The third hypothesis holds that counties with differing proportions of party identifiers will exhibit different levels of voting on the marriage definition amendments. The challenge is defining party affiliation. Some states report the number of party registrants by county while other states do not. Smith, DeSantis, and Kassel (2005, 12) indicate that neither Ohio nor Michigan records the party affiliation of registered voters. North Dakota does not register voters at all. In their analysis, Smith, DeSantis, and Kassel use data on the 2002 gubernatorial elections in the two states. This also may be problematic because gubernatorial contests could be affected as much by candidate personalities as by party affiliation.

In the present research, the percentage of each county that could be considered Democratic was calculated as follows. In Kentucky, Louisiana, Oklahoma and Oregon, the actual party registration numbers were used. The election results from the 2002 Secretary of State races in Arkansas and Georgia, and in Montana in 2000, were used to determine county Democratic percentages in those states. The election results from Attorney General races in 2000, 2002, and 2003, were used to represent the Democratic vote in Utah, Michigan, and Mississippi, respectively. The 2002 Public Service Commissioner results were used in North Dakota and the 2002 State Auditor results were used in Missouri and Ohio.

In order to simplify the research and to be more certain in what I am measuring, I decided to use a different measure of county-level party attachment: 2004 Republican Presidential Vote. This measure also has shortcomings, primarily the fact that the data, election results, were primarily collected at the same time as the data on the dependent variable, Support for Marriage Definition Amendments. The protection against problems using 2004 presidential vote as a measure is the fact that two of the states included in the present research had marriage definition questions on their ballots in an election other than the November general election. Models will be tested by separating these states from the other eleven. It is hypothesized that the 2004 presidential vote will be related to the vote on the marriage definition amendments in a positive direction and that this relationship will hold in Missouri and Louisiana even though these states did not vote on marriage definition in November.

The mean county Republican vote for president in the 2004 election was 61.39 percent with a standard deviation of 11.41 percent. The county that provided the most support to President Bush was Garfield County, Montana, at 90.77 percent. The president received the least support from the voters in Claiborne County, Mississippi, with 17.80 percent. The population of Claiborne County is 83.61 percent African-American. The marriage definition amendment was popular in Claiborne County receiving the support of 76.37 percent of the voters.

CONTROL VARIABLES

Additional independent variables are entered into the analysis as controls. They are the percentage of each county's population with a high school diploma, each county's median age, and the median household income in each county. The percentage of each county's population who are African-American also is included in the analysis. Pastors of African-American churches supported efforts to define marriage as being between one man and one woman.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

The present research examines the political context in which voters in thirteen states in 2004 approved state constitutional amendments defining marriage by prohibiting same-sex marriage. In order to allay concerns about multicollinearity and to determine if there are any potential relationships, a correlation matrix was calculated for all of the variables. This matrix is presented as **Table 2**.

Table 2 presents several surprises. The percentage of a county's population affiliated with an evangelical Protestant denomination is strongly correlated with the percentage of the county's voters who supported a marriage definition amendment. Rural counties also showed greater support for the amendments. The marriage amendment vote is significantly correlated with the 2004 Republican presidential vote. Two surprises are the correlations between Catholic population and Mormon population. The Mormon population correlation is suspect because the county percentages are small outside of Utah. The negative correlation

TABLE 2

Correlations

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
(1) % Yes on marriage definition amendment	1										
(2) % Evangelical Protestant	.573 (p=.000)	1									
(3) % Catholic	-.315 (p=.000)	-.456 (p=.000)	1								
(4) % Mainline Protestant	-.032 (p=.300)	-.128 (p=.000)	.185 (p=.000)	1							
(5) % Mormon	-.106 (p=.001)	-.272 (p=.000)	-.079 (p=.011)	-.176 (p=.000)	1						
(6) % Rural	.436 (p=.000)	.173 (p=.000)	-.169 (p=.000)	.138 (p=.000)	-.060 (p=.055)	1					

TABLE 2 (cont'd)

Correlations

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
(7) % 2004 GOP Presidential Vote	.386 (p=.000)	.147 (p=.000)	-.096 (p=.002)	.047 (p=.132)	.283 (p=.000)	.226 (p=.000)	1				
(8) % HS Graduate	.142 (p=.000)	.130 (p=.000)	-.016 (p=.599)	.032 (p=.296)	-.185 (p=.000)	.351 (p=.000)	.114 (p=.000)	1			
(9) Median Age	.017 (p=.586)	.049 (p=.114)	.101 (p=.001)	.380 (p=.000)	-.282 (p=.000)	.437 (p=.000)	.106 (p=.001)	.325 (p=.000)	1		
(10) Median Income	-.506 (p=.000)	-.346 (p=.000)	.186 (p=.000)	.001 (p=.977)	.142 (p=.000)	-.446 (p=.000)	.146 (p=.000)	-.116 (p=.000)	-.194 (p=.000)	1	
(11) % African-American	.259 (p=.000)	.156 (p=.000)	-.163 (p=.000)	-.177 (p=.000)	-.131 (p=.000)	-.139 (p=.000)	-.455 (p=.000)	-.237 (p=.000)	-.357 (p=.000)	-.250 (p=.000)	1

SOURCE: Author's calculations.

on the Catholic population is more intriguing, suggesting that counties with larger Catholic populations show less support for the marriage definition amendments. Of course, since this research uses aggregate data, it is difficult to argue that Catholics voted against the amendments.

Multiple regression analyses were run to produce several models. The first two are presented in **Table 3**. These models include all 1,037 counties. The variables included in the first model were percent of evangelical Protestants in the county, the percent of mainline Protestants, percent Catholic, percent rural population, the percent of voters who supported the Republican presidential candidate in 2004, the percent of county residents who graduated from high school, the median age, the median income, and the percent African-American population. The first model explains a respectable amount of the variance in the dependent variable (R^2=.727) and the model is significant.

The second model presented in **Table 3** combines the evangelical Protestant population with the Mormon population. The level of predication, or explanation, is reduced slightly to .674. Both models indicate that there is a strong relationship between the 2004 Republican presidential vote and the vote on the marriage definition amendments. The other important variable is the size of the African-American population. Counties with larger African-American populations voted at higher rates for the marriage definition amendments. Counties with large rural populations supported the marriage amendments. The control variables (education, income, and age) are as expected with the exception of age. The data show that counties with higher median ages had less support for the marriage definition amendments.

While most of the states examined this research considered marriage definition amendments on general election day in November 2004, two states voted on the amendments earlier in the year. This fact is presented in the models in **Table 4**. The first model includes the eleven general election states. The second model only considers counties in Missouri and Louisiana.

There are few dramatic changes from the models in **Table 3**. The best predictor variable remains 2004 Republican presidential vote; in fact, its predictive abilities become even stronger in Missouri and Louisiana. The African-American population also is a strong predictor with less strength in the Missouri and Louisiana model.

TABLE 3

OLS Regression of County Vote on Marriage Definition Amendments (with the County Percent of Evangelicals and LDS Separated and Combined)

	Evangelical Protestants and LDS Separate		Evangelical Protestants and LDS Combined	
	Beta	p	Beta	p
Evangelical Protestant	.275	.0001	N/A	N/A
Evangelical Protestant plus LDS	N/A	N/A	.184	.0001
Catholic	.017	.372	-.012	.581
Mainline Protestant	.044	.016	.060	.003
LDS	-.101	.0001	N/A	N/A
Rural	.209	.0001	.180	.0001
2004 GOP Presidential Vote	.554	.0001	.526	.0001
High School Graduate	.048	.010	.097	.0001
Median Income	-.313	.0001	-.346	.0001
Median Age	-.134	.0001	-.059	.011
African-American	.380	.0001	.435	.0001
	R^2=.727 Adj. R^2=.724 p=.0001		R^2=.674 Adj. R^2=.672 p=.0001	

SOURCE: Author's calculations.

TABLE 4

OLS Regression of County Vote on Marriage Definition Amendments (with the Eleven General Election States and with Missouri and Louisiana Analyzed Separately)

	Eleven General Election States		Missouri and Louisiana	
	Beta	p	Beta	p
Evangelical Protestant plus LDS	.182	.0001	.167	.014
Catholic	-.067	.005	.331	.741
Mainline Protestant	.101	.0001	-.213	.0001
Rural	.183	.0001	.171	.007
2004 GOP Presidential Vote	.507	.0001	.601	.0001
High School Graduate	.066	.002	.201	.001
Median Income	-.340	.0001	-.256	.0001
Median Age	-.054	.030	-.055	.329
African-American	.430	.0001	.280	.0001
	R^2=.690 Adj. R^2=.686 p=.0001 N=857		R^2=.732 Adj. R^2=.717 p=.0001 N=178	

SOURCE: Author's calculations.

In order to compare the voting patterns in Oklahoma with the other states, a regression analysis was conducted on just the 77 Oklahoma counties. The results are presented in **Table 5**. The strongest predictor variable is the vote for President Bush in 2004, indicating that the pattern

found in all of the counties is duplicated in Oklahoma. The number of evangelical Protestants in a county also is an important variable. The two variables that contribute negatively to the vote are the variables measuring the number of mainline Protestants and the median income of a county. Following the model, counties with more mainline Protestants had weaker support for the marriage definition amendment. Of course, an examination of data collected at the aggregate level cannot take into account such variables as church attendance. The Glenmary data only record church membership, not how often those members attend church. It is possible that Mainline Protestants who rarely attend were more likely to vote against the amendment. Counties with higher median incomes also displayed weaker support for the amendment. The African-American population of each county does not appear to be as important among the Oklahoma counties as it does in other states.

TABLE 5

OLS Regression of County Vote on the Marriage Definition Amendment in Oklahoma

	Oklahoma	
	Beta	p
Evangelical Protestant plus LDS	.264	.001
Catholic	.151	.064
Mainline Protestant	-.227	.011
Rural	.153	.104
2004 GOP Presidential Vote	.662	.0001
High School Graduate	.205	.011
Median Income	-.234	.011
Median Age	.146	.105
Afican-American	-.031	.648
	R^2=.766	
	Adj. R^2=.735	
	P=.0001	
	N=77	

SOURCE: Author's calculations.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The present research seeks to understand the political context in which voters approved marriage definition amendments in thirteen states in 2004. Three hypotheses were tested. The first suggests that counties with large evangelical Protestant populations would strongly support marriage definition amendments. The second hypothesis posits that rural populations would be more supportive of such amendments. Finally, the third hypothesis indicates that counties that voted strongly in support of the Republican presidential candidate in 2004 also would exhibit higher levels of support for marriage definition.

The findings presented here suggest that there is a strong association between 2004 presidential vote and the vote on the constitutional amendments. This association is maintained even in those states that did not consider the amendments at the same time as the presidential general election. Evangelical Protestant population also contributed to the vote in each county as did the amount of rural population.

An intriguing finding, and one that suggests the need for future research at the level of individual voter, is the level of support for the marriage definition amendments in counties with large African-American populations. The data collected in this research do not allow for interpretation at the level of individual voter, but it would be informative to examine the intersection of race, religion, and vote on marriage definition amendments.

The findings presented in this paper come with caveats. The data collected for this study are aggregate in nature. This situation introduces concerns about the ecological fallacy. The data presented in the present research should not be used to attribute support for marriage definition amendments at the level of the individual voters.

A second caveat involves the nature of state politics in each of the thirteen states examined. It is possible that there were factors other than the ones included in the regression analyses acting on one or more states and not involved in the others. For example, all Democratic, Republican, and Libertarian candidates for attorney general in Utah issued a joint statement opposing that state's marriage definition amendment. They were not united in their opposition to the idea of marriage definition, but they each had significant concerns about the

second part of the amendment: "No other domestic union, however denominated, may be recognized as a marriage or given the same or substantially equivalent effect." The candidates were concerned about the clause's effect on heterosexual common law marriages. It is important to recognize that the voters in the thirteen states that approved marriage definition constitutional amendments in 2004 did not consider identical pieces of legislation. Voters in Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Utah also constitutionally proscribed civil unions; the voters in the remaining states did not ban civil unions.

Oklahoma counties are found to follow the same patterns as the counties in other states. There is a close connection between the vote for President Bush's reelection and the vote on the marriage definition amendment. There does appear to be some support for the idea that mainline Protestant voters oppose the amendment, but the overwhelming strength of the amendment's support makes it difficult to specify the importance of this finding.

Despite the caveats, this research presents several models of county-level voting outcomes that can be tested in other states, especially in states that vote on marriage definition constitutional amendments in non-presidential election years. Does the relationship between the 2004 Republican presidential vote and marriage definition hold in those elections? Analyses of the exit poll data collected during the 2004 elections also may provide some interesting findings of who supports and who opposes constitutionally-defining marriage. This line of research would be strengthened if there are more counties in which more voters choose to reject the amendment than support it. Bringing statistical analysis to bear on elections with such lopsided outcomes is difficult, but the present research suggests that more questions can be asked and answered with different data.

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ASSESSING DUAL LANGUAGE POLICY: A CASE STUDY

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The Oklahoma City Public School System has a unique opportunity to evaluate Bilingual Education. A large enclave of Hispanics has settled in south central Oklahoma City and appears on the way towards establishing a bicultural community. Some degree of community dialogue spurred the creation of a bilingual education program that could potentially serve both Anglo and Hispanic students. Despite the initiation of a federally funded program, sustainable organized public support for Bilingual Education failed to materialize and public school administrators quietly moved towards other educational strategies.

Over the decades since 1950, Bilingual Education (BE) has enjoyed various degrees of institutional and public support. This case study reveals that BE can successfully educate both English speakers and non-English speakers when immersed in a carefully constructed BE program. Unfortunately, it is extremely unlikely that BE programs can overcome institutional inertia in favor of other approaches to teaching English, especially when there is a lack of organized public support for BE programs.[1]

In the post-WWII movement to include ethnic and minority students in the mainstream educational process, Bilingual Education was conceived and promoted as a valid solution for students whose native language was not English. Public support for BE was never cohesive or steady and the general public never became enthralled with BE. Different ethnic groups only mildly agitated for and against BE. Currently, Bilingual Education has at best been perceived as a temporary solution until children could be mainstreamed — the quicker the better.

Over time, the American public divided itself over two main concerns: those who saw an ongoing need for adequate bilingual, biliterate and bicultural education and those who saw a greater need for adequate cultural and linguistic assimilation. The two camps increasingly battled over the question of BE effectiveness. What was the best way to proceed? One paradigm urges integration and the other paradigm urges assimilation (Cook 2001).

Given the sizable enclave of Hispanics in the Oklahoma City School District, a few community leaders and public school teachers envisioned an opportunity to enhance job skills and academic skills for both Hispanic and Anglo children. Hence, the 1997 birth of the "Empowering School Communities, Yes!" program. The program was a Title VII grant given to the Oklahoma City Public Schools for Shidler and Wheeler and belatedly, Rockwood elementary schools. The dual language program attempted to enrich the foreign language capabilities of native English speakers and improve the level of English proficiency of Limited English Proficient students (LEP). The program ran through the end of the 2003-2004 school year.

This case study analyzes the academic effectiveness of a small, locally organized, and federally funded bilingual education program. It concludes that whereas the OKC BE program did succeed in its stated academic goals, it could not overcome two basic road blocks: 1) Institutional inertia moving towards a different paradigm: a short term intensive English approach that favored assimilation, and 2) Achievement of its titular goal of empowering a fledgling bicultural community. Sustainable organized public support for BE never materialized. Hence, school administrators quietly allowed the program to expire.

A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW REVEALS SHIFTING LINGUISTIC PARADIGMS

John Jay (Rossiter 1961), in Federalist Paper Two, identified several key reasons why unity under the proposed Constitution was preferable over splitting into smaller confederacies. One such reason given was a common language. The proponents of the new Constitution may well have overstated the degree of linguistic unity in the colonies in order to win acceptance of the proposed Constitution. The realistic acknowledgement of a wide range of immigrants, hence a wide range of languages, in the thirteen colonies is without doubt. Jay had to be referring to the "emerging dominance" of English and not the many different languages already competing within the colonial population.

As the country expanded, it also added significant language groups: Native American tribes, the French of New Orleans, the Spanish of Florida and California, the Japanese of California and Hawaii, the Russians of the Northwest, and the Native Hawaiians. Additionally, waves of immigrants tended to congregate into language communities: Cubans, Haitians, Arabic speakers, Jews, Swedes, Chinese, Japanese, Polish, Dutch, French and most often the Germans. By 1900, 600,000 elementary students were taught in German. This represented approximately 4 percent of all elementary students. At the national level, policy makers promoted the notion that the students had to melt together, abandon their mother tongue in favor of learning English and live as new Americans with their new freedoms and rights. However, in local settings, local leaders fought to keep their ethnicity alive through language instruction.

Language diversity played a key role in both WWI and WWII. The fear of German-American disloyalty in WWI allowed for the reduction of foreign language instruction nationwide, until after WWII. The fear of Japanese-American loyalty produced well-known hostilities. However, Navajo code talkers saved the military considerable lives in WWII. The US owes a large part of its military success against the Japanese to its rich and diverse linguistic heritage. By the same token, in a post 9/11 environment, the US government cannot easily find enough Arabic speakers to supply its own intelligence community.

After WWII, the Civil Rights Movement generated support for ethnic rights and by extension linguistic rights. The political shift occurred

and the policy shift soon followed. By 1968, Congress passed the Bilingual Education Act (Title VII of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act). Monetary support soon followed in order to promote the new regime's linguistic goals. Presidents and the Supreme Court followed suit. In Lau v Nichols (1974), the Supreme Court ruled that limited English proficient students had a civil right to receive adequate instruction. The policy elites in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) promulgated the Lau Remedies, a series of guidelines designed to guide school districts into compliance with their conceptual framework or paradigm. Also in 1974, the Equal Education Opportunities Act created additional legal requirements for immigrant students. Schools were prohibited from barring an immigrant child from attending public schools (Lessow-Hurley 2005).

The liberal policy monopoly in control of education and language policies favored an internationalist, multi-lingual approach to education from the 1960's through the end of the 1990's. However, political sands began to slowly shift in the 1980s and culminated in a conservative regime shift in Congress as of 1995 and also in the White House as of 2001. The new policy monopoly responded to several stressors.

The large wave of immigrants from Cuba, Haiti and especially Mexico created a wave of cultural anxiety and frustration. The Arabic immigrants were seen as a possible support mechanism for terrorists. The terrorist attacks of September 11th created hostility towards immigrants that held militant intentions against their adopted or host country. Citizens wanted immigrants to once again fit in and not maintain cultural roots that might otherwise indicate hidden reservations about the goodness of America.

More recently, many political leaders have played on the images of secret tunnels and numerous border violations with Mexico to raise fears of subtle and dangerous invasions. Border security now feeds the new policy regime that in order to save America from potential terrorists everyone should learn English as soon as possible, even at the expense of the native language.

No Child Left Behind (NCLB) legislated many of these new policy concerns into law (2002). Federal funding for Bilingual Education all but disappeared. In 2004, Secretary Paige asserted that more than 13 billion dollars was allocated for Bilingual Education but almost all of it for English Language Development strategies and not dual language

strategies (USDE web site). Stringent regulations and high testing goals make any new BE program unlikely and may well force most established BE programs to shrink or disappear. The ELD policy regime can now guide and direct public schools to abandon BE programs. Local communities and a few select states that wish to maintain BE programs will have to do so without federal support.

UNDERSTANDING PARADIGM SHIFTS AND THE STRENGTH OF INSTITUTIONAL INERTIA

Bilingual Education policy illustrates how a dominant regime that supports bilingual education can shift, especially when a large portion of the public awakens to a perceived need to assimilate newly arrived immigrants who are not yet prepared to form coalitions, participate in political battles, and preserve their linguistic heritage.

Over the last two hundred years, the United States has seen at least three different policy shifts: one towards national unity based in part on everyone using the same language. A second shift began after WWII aiming to be more tolerant of linguistic diversity and to preserve and nurture native languages. A third shift has just recently concluded and its political advocates now have the right to implement those policy changes by virtue of their electoral victories.

Carter A. Wilson argues in *Public Policy: Continuity and Change* (2006) that policy regimes work hard to create a closed policy system in order to maintain policy stability. Historical evidence supports three such shifts in linguistic policy. Building on the previous work of Baumgartner and Jones (1993) who identified policy monopolies (policy stability) and explained shifting attention (policy changes), Wilson asserts three critical components of policy stability and change (Wilson 45):

- Power Arrangements: The decision making patterns that a group of influential decision makers establish in order to maintain control over a policy.
- Organizational Arrangements: The array of organizations that deal with government entities while implementing the policy.
- Policy Paradigm: The dominant policy paradigm is the conceptual framework that justifies the policy.

The three educational policy paradigms fit within the conceptual framework that the policy monopoly developed, thrived, and withered as the public waxed and waned in its support for bolstering English development or for the preservation of other languages. The power holders either encouraged or limited what kind of language policies could be implemented and how. The members of the policy monopoly shape the general public's perception of what should be done. However, the policy makers cannot long ignore public support or lack thereof for new policies. Once the policy is implemented, it strives to preserve the status quo thus creating policy stability. Yet, it must hope for continued public support and the formation of interest groups to focus attention and resources on that policy.

A dramatic or substantial change in policy indicates that the regime has changed. Enough stressors accumulated to warrant a sudden shift in policy direction and more than likely in those who control the policy as well. Stressors include among others: demographic changes, catastrophic events, and international events. Such was the case right after WWII, when the country was sensitive to the need of minorities and immigrants. The nation also saw certain diplomatic and cultural advantages to nurturing diverse language skills. This pro-linguistic diversity paradigm slowly emerged after the dramatic experiences of WWII and the general mood supporting international involvement.

A more dramatic policy shift occurred in 2001. An emerging conservative coalition won control of all three branches of the federal government. The members of the conservative coalition generally wanted immigrants to learn more English faster. President Bush complied with those desires in the form of No Child Left Behind (2002). With a unified power arrangement and ample organized public support, a decided shift occurred that largely ended funding for BE unless the programs adopted a transitional program towards English teaching. Educators complied, rather than funding BE programs solely from state monies.

A quick review of available information on the Oklahoma Department of Education web site reveals that at least most if not all BE programs in Oklahoma now use the same type of word choices found in the NCLB guidelines on federal government websites. Hence, school systems wishing to receive grants must prove that their proposals will rapidly assist Limited English Proficient (LEP) students to make

measurable progress towards English development. Little to no mention is made of preserving native languages.

Just as Baumgartner and Jones (1993) argued for "punctuated equilibrium," we argue for punctuated equilibrium in language policy. There is a long period of policy stability until a sudden shift occurs, pushed along by underlying cultural events and needs. Public support for English development was expressed in the 2001 legislative session and has rapidly gained support as immigration reforms loom large in the 2006 elections.

THE HYPOTHESIS

Our hypothesis is two-fold: Does Bilingual Education (BE) work? And if it does work, why was an academically successful BE program allowed to expire?

THE RESEARCH STRATEGY

The first hypothesis is measured by observing the linguistic success or failure of students enrolled at Wheeler elementary school over a six year period from 1998 to 2004. A number of students were tracked and tested but as the students moved in and out of the BE program, the number of students participating in the entire six year program continued to shrink. The second hypothesis is explored by questioning a number of teachers and administrators involved in the program. The interviews were off the record. No one wanted to respond to the questions within a public format. Many involved refused to participate. The questionnaire can be found in **Appendix C.**

A concern for career security and advancement was obviously a valid concern for all involved in the Dual Language program. No one claimed open hostility but quietly reserved the right to be anonymous. Therefore, the answers to the survey were revised into the plural voice whenever possible and names were removed in order to make some of their comments obscure enough to be used. Additionally, face-to-face interviews were conducted with proponents of English-Only in Washington, D.C. and with James Crawford, an accomplished opponent of English-Only.

THE SUCCESS STORY OF ONE INNER-CITY ELEMENTARY SCHOOL IN OKLAHOMA CITY

In an attempt by the Curriculum and Instruction Department of the Oklahoma City Public Schools to comply with Oklahoma law (H.B. 1017), which requires the teaching of foreign languages and cultures in elementary schools, while at the same time meeting the linguistic needs of limited English proficient (LEP) students, the idea emerged to implement a dual language program. In August 1997, a Title VII Bilingual Education Grant was awarded to the OKC district for the purpose of providing an enrichment program in Spanish foreign language instruction for native English speakers, and a sound English development and academic curriculum for Hispanic LEP students. The *Empowering School Communities, Yes!* Title VII project (a Dual Language Program) served two elementary schools, Shidler and Wheeler in the beginning, with Rockwood being added later. This paper focuses on the program at Wheeler (**Appendix A**).

Dual language programs are BE immersion models designed to address the needs of LEP students and native English speakers while developing bilingualism and biliteracy in English and another language. There are two common program models: the 50/50 model in which English and the other language are used 50 percent of the time during the entire program, and the 90/10 model, in which English is used for a minimum of ten percent of the time beginning in kindergarten with the percentage increasing annually until both English and the other language are used equally. Perhaps the most important study addressing dual language programs was reported by Thomas and Collier (1997). Their research examined bilingual education programs across the United States and identified factors that most strongly linked academic success to an instructional model, such as academic instruction in the students' first language through at least grade five and intentional separate use of the languages in different domains. Likewise, Cloud, Genesee, and Hamayan (2000) discussed several features that are essential in the effectiveness of these bilingual programs. The two that are most relevant to this study are an additive bilingual setting and parental involvement. In the case of additive bilingualism, a second language is added for both limited English proficient and English-speaking students. In addition, parents agree to participate in regular group meetings and to cooperate with the school

ensuring that the students attend school on a regular basis. They also commit to at least five years in the program.

In more recent research conducted by Lindholm-Leary (2000, 2003), there continues to be favorable evidence supporting these types of models. One set of cross-sectional and longitudinal studies by Lindholm-Leary represents 7,120 students in 20 schools, mostly in California (2000). While comparing scores of LEP students in Dual Language Programs with those of English monolinguals in English Only classrooms, she concluded that by fourth grade not only are most Spanish speakers (86 percent) proficient in English regardless of the program model (90/10 or 50/50), but by sixth grade, LEP students scored average and well above state norms in standardized testing.

The instructional design chosen for Wheeler was the 90/10 model in order to promote the minority language as much as possible on the assumption that this is the language needing the most support (Cloud et al 2000). The goals of the dual language program implemented at Wheeler Elementary School in the fall 1998 were for students to attain high levels of proficiency in their first and second languages, to perform academically above grade level in both languages, and to develop high levels of self-esteem and positive cross-cultural attitudes. The teachers and instructional assistants fostered high academic achievement by teaching the content areas using both English and Spanish; thus literacy skills were acquired in both languages. The structure of the class was such that English and Spanish dominant students were placed together so that students learned from each other as well as from their teachers. Sheltered instruction and cooperative/collaborative activities, in conjunction with hands-on learning techniques, were used to increase understanding of school subjects. The student population consisted of approximately 50 percent Hispanics with a 35 percent mobility rate and a 100 percent rate of participation in free or reduced price lunch program (Coy & Litherland 2000).

CURRICULUM COMPONENTS

The curriculum was to parallel, as much as possible, the academic core curriculum in the mainstream program. Content was taught through thematic units based on the E. D. Hirch's *Core Knowledge* curriculum,

and was introduced through literature. The curriculum was also aligned to the state's *Priority Academic Student Skills* (P.A.S.S.) Guidelines, the district's *Standards 2000* Curriculum, and the national standards of all the core subjects. The use of technology was another important component of the curriculum. Each classroom was equipped with three student computer stations where students worked on a variety of software. Internet access and viewing by the whole class were also available. For samples of lessons observed in first grade Language Arts for Spanish, second grade Math for Spanish, third and fourth grade Reading for Spanish, and fifth grade Math in English, please refer to **Appendix B**.

STUDENT LANGUAGE AND ACADEMIC ASSESSMENT

Upon entering the dual language program at Wheeler, the two native English-speakers had no knowledge of the Spanish language, and the native Spanish-speakers (initially eighteen) had little knowledge of the English language. It was critical to test all students in the beginning to establish baseline data from which gains in both languages could be measured. Both groups of students were administered several tests throughout the school year for the purpose of collecting multiple ongoing assessments. In the Fall and Spring, these students took one battery of language proficiency tests, the *Language Assessment Scales (*LAS*)* in English and Spanish, and another one of academic achievement, the *Supera*, which is the Spanish equivalent of the Terra Nova norm-referenced test. In addition, both dual and English language development teachers were expected to make use of journals, portfolios, district assessments, observations, and other instruments to measure progress.

The present research specifically addresses language proficiency as assessed by the *LAS*, which is designed to generate measures of oral and reading/writing ability for students in grades K-12. The results hereby presented belong only to the one group of native Spanish-speakers being tested by the *LAS* in English since it is the proficiency in English (or lack thereof) that is at stake in the district's accountability. A student must score a minimum of level 3 in the *LAS-Oral* before s/he can be tested for reading/writing. In both modalities (oral and written), a level 1 generally means non-English speaking or reading ability; a level 2 or 3

for Oral means limited English speaking whereas a level 2 for R/W would be limited literacy; and a level 4 or 5 for Oral indicates fluent English speaking while a level 3 for R/W demonstrates competent literacy.

STUDENT LANGUAGE PROGRESS

Henceforth, the data collected at Wheeler shows the language progress in English of the LEP native Spanish-speakers (by fifth grade, reduced to ten due to the high mobility rate) when tested with the *English LAS-Oral* and the *LAS-R/W*.

ENG. LAS-ORAL/RW

Student	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
A	2	2	2	5/3	5/3	4/3
B	1	1	1	3/2	3/2	3/2
C	1	1	1	3/1	4/1	5/2
D	4	4	4	4/3	5/3	5/3
E	1	1	1	3/2	3/2	3/3
F	-	1	1	5/3	4/3	5/3
G	-	1	1	4/2	4/2	4/3
H	2	2	3/2	5/2	5/2	5/3
I	2	3	3/1	4/2	5/2	5/3
J	1	1	1	4/1	4/2	4/2

1999 – Kindergarten 2000 – 1st Grade 2001 – 2nd Grade
2002 – 3rd Grade 2003 – 4th Grade 2004 – 5th Grade

ASSESSING THE ENGLISH PROFICIENCY OF LEP STUDENTS

After six years of Dual Language instruction, the results seem to indicate that this group of LEP students consistently made progress in their second language, English. Once they had tested at level 3 orally,

they were eligible for reading/writing assessment. It is worth noticing that two students in the group were already testing for reading/writing proficiency in 2nd grade, after having received only 20 percent of English Development instruction. Most of them had reached the highest possible level in reading/writing by the end of 5th grade. During 5th grade, the use of English and Spanish for instruction was 50/50. Even though this sample was small, it still corroborates the findings of many other studies involving larger ones; that is, when a BE immersion program is properly implemented and carefully monitored, the goals of bilingualism and biliteracy are met. However, without administrative support even the most successful program cannot survive, as became the case at Wheeler.

INSTITUTIONAL INERTIA AND PUBLIC APATHY DOOM A POLICY SUCCESS STORY

Based on a series of phone calls and emails to participating teachers, program administrators, district and state officials, we offer the following anonymous statements; some of which are quotes and others are paraphrases in order to disguise the authors. Of those who consented to answer questions, all but one did so with various degrees of reluctance.

It is our observation that the educators who initiated the two-way Immersion program in Shidler, Wheeler and later Rockwood did so based on the older paradigm of BE immersion strategies. In 1995-96, those strategies were acceptable to policy makers and well funded. When asked "Why was the program initiated?" responses included:

> A combination of interested teachers and administrative initiative responded to the rapidly growing Hispanic population in the school district and after hearing about a number of successful dual language programs in other school districts.

In other words, those involved saw a local need, observed other similar programs, and applied for a federal funding. The existing paradigm responded to perceived public need and local leadership under the framework of integration of dual languages.

> The Hispanic population in OKC had grown from 6 percent to 14 percent in five years. A number of local employers had expressed the need for more employees who were bilingual, particularly in Spanish and English. We had very few teachers in our schools that were bilingual. We wanted to implement a program that was an added value for everyone, that promoted a feeling of unity instead of a feeling of one group needing to be "fixed."

A key component of the program's approval was local leadership. When asked "Was the program supported and by whom?" answers included:

> The program was initially supported by the principals and the staffs of the two schools. We met with five principals and told them about the opportunity to apply for the grant. We asked them to converse with their faculties and let us know if they were interested. The two principals of Shidler and Wheeler reported that there was 100 percent support for the project among their faculty. The program was also supported by the elementary school directors and the Assistant Superintendent.

What reasons do you have for claiming that the program was a success or failure?

> The test scores of the students in the dual language classes were at the same level as the students in the mainstream classes or better, but in two languages instead of only one. The research literature reported that dual language students would surpass their peers in the third-fifth years of the program.
>
> Another reason that the program was a success is the response of parents of the children. Both Hispanic and English-speaking parents of children in the classes were very positive. We even had the children of one of the teachers in the Wheeler class.
>
> Another reason that the program was a success is that we never had difficulty filling a dual language class with both Hispanic and English-speaking students. Our goal was a 60-40 ratio Hispanic to English-speaking and we were able to accomplish that every year.

Would you take the time to explain why the program ended?

> The program became a political football between the Curriculum Department and the Hispanic Student Services Department. As long as someone was there to run interference and to minimize their negativity, the program survived.
>
> A change in superintendents began to minimize our ability to do our jobs. The Superintendent was politically aligned with the English-Only group and the Hispanic Student Services used his natural animosity to the program for their own benefit to undermine the program. As a result, many supporters of the grant left. Essentially, all the administrative support for the program left the district at the same time.
>
> The decision to end the BE immersion program occurred at the district level.

Should the program be revived?

> Yes, the program should be revived. It was one of the most positive experiences for children with which we have ever been associated. It was a value-added program, providing rich language experiences for all children, not just remediation in English for some. It implemented language instruction at the time when the research tells us that children are most able to learn multiple languages. It can not be revived, though, without strong support from the administration and the school leadership.

In September 2000, 735 surveys were distributed to both Anglo and Latino parents. The survey was not a random scientific survey. More than 50 percent were returned (n=381). Of those who chose to respond, parents overwhelmingly favored the learning of a second language, and felt welcomed, involved, and respected. The surveys revealed that parents with children in the dual language program were 10 to 15 percentage points more likely to favor, support, and respect any aspect of their children's educational experiences.

The BE program had a positive impact on parental attitudes. For example, 47.3 percent of monolingual parents participated in helping their children with homework while 65.5 percent of dual language parents

did so. The report clearly cited that English proficiency improved as did cognitive skills.

The *Empowering School Communities, Yes*! program inspired several superintendents, parents outside the OKCPS district, and university faculty to take note of the program's successes and notoriety. Based in part on its interactions with the three OKCP schools, Hennessey Public Schools implemented a similar dual language program. The participants evaluated, however, clearly noted that there was sparse administrative support and predicted little hope for long-term success.

When asked, state level administrators tended to explain "how NCLB changed the BE strategies and approaches?" in the following manner:

> School districts have the right to select the teaching approach of their own choosing, but all schools have to meet the same objective, which is passing NCLB English standards.

When asked if funding priorities changed as a result of NCLB legislation? State level administrators answered like this:

> The NCLB funding is the best thing that has happened to our limited English proficient students in our state. It does not matter which strategy/program so long as it is based on scientific research. Districts across the state have hired more ESL teachers to teach these students. Under NCLB all student have to be assessed and show progress (in English). The State Department of Education and the school districts are accountable for the achievement of LEP students.

How many BE programs does Oklahoma have and do they favor any certain type of educational strategy?

> There are 109 school districts that receive Title III funds through the NCLB legislation. Many of these schools would not have received Title III funds, without NCLB.

Do they favor English language development or two-way immersion? "All of the schools in Oklahoma favor English language development." In part the total disappearance of BE immersion programs

is explained by this statement, "In Oklahoma we do not have bilingual programs due to the lack of 'highly qualified bilingual teachers."

When asked if there is any kind of public demand for or support for preserving native languages: Spanish, Vietnamese, Native American, or others? The administrator replied, "No, the scope of the Title III grant is to help LEP/ELL student meet the English/academic achievement, not to preserve their native language. However, if the school would like to teach the students their native language, they can." Another school administrator made it clear that the school does offer BE opportunities. However, these opportunities are conducted after hours and only for the parents of the children enrolled in that school. It appears that few if any programs are designed to improve the academic efficiency of the native speakers.

We conclude, based on the responses we received, that while some degree of ordinary turf battles made it difficult to keep the program alive, the end of the program is more likely due to the intervening paradigm shift at the national level which was nearly unanimously adopted by the state of Oklahoma. The impact that NCLB has had on schools as they choose their teaching strategies is clear. Schools in Oklahoma unanimously choose strategies favored by the policy paradigm and its agents. Whether this teaching approach will succeed in improving English proficiency must be determined by future research. Yet, English Language Development (ELD) will not improve any student's L1 because it does not purport to try.

CONCLUSIONS

"*Empowering School Communities, Yes*! was able to improve English language skills for language minority students at Wheeler, while at the same time, Anglo children added an academic knowledge of Spanish. Parents of native English students reported to Oklahoma University evaluators that they were pleased with their children's newly acquired Spanish literacy. The Dual Language Advisory Board met more than 18 times to evaluate the program. Advisory members included administrators, consultants and parents.

ACADEMIC OUTCOMES

Measured by many kinds of responses: children and parents were happy with the program. They also expressed that the children are "teaching each other" and using their second language regularly. Measured by academic testing: The children scored well enough to regard the program as a success.

POLICY OUTCOMES

The initial supporters of the BE program moved on to other career choices, leaving the program in the hands of less committed administrators. The program had not generated either a wave of public support; or an organized support group that might protect and promote the program. The teachers in the program had committed an immense amount of time and energy to make it work, but one by one, they moved on.

PARADIGM OUTCOMES

The timing of the program was further plagued by its untimely life. The decision whether or not to continue the program was made just as the new focus on ELD was being pushed by federal policy makers. With little support under it, no leadership around it, and no policy support above it, the experiment expired.

Primarily, the program fell victim to a national shift away from the older dominant paradigm that favored Bilingual Immersion strategies. The new dominant policy paradigm favored English Language Development (ELD) strategies. The timing of the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) legislation suffocated any new funding for BE programs and expanded the funding for ELD strategies. Any remaining institutional inertia for BE ended just as the OKCPS terminated the experiment with two-way BE immersion that hoped to help an emerging Hispanic community develop. Second, the program could not survive a change in leadership and administration, especially with an ELD agenda. Bureaucratic turf wars made support for the program dangerous for

one's professional career. Third, the program did not have a level of public support that could overcome bureaucratic opposition and neglect. The occasional parent, businessman, and citizen interested in the advantages of BE never organized nor agitated for the program. Fourth, the likelihood that any BE program can be revived is indeed small.

POST SCRIPT

The current political environment at the national level is that LIMITED ENGLISH PROFICIENCY students should be moved into mainstream programs as quickly as possible and receive remedial classes if they cannot make the rapid transition. In addition, there appears to be ever more hostile anti-immigrant attitudes developing nationwide. Growing concern about the border with Mexico will inevitably feed into less and less support for BE immersion programs. These attitudes seem acute in those states where large numbers of immigrants burden public services.

The public policy ramifications are at least three-fold. First, in a time of obvious USA globalization, the reversal in BE policies seems counterproductive for successful business, educational, and diplomatic activities within a global economy. Second, in the very states where multicultural needs are the highest, the public attitudes seem to be full-throttle-reverse back towards strong public support for English-Only policies. Third, in localities where high levels of immigration have occurred, parents need to vocalize their needs and organize for effective programs that will enable their children to be proficient in both their family's culture and the economic culture, dominated by English. Otherwise, they will face the grim combination of a linguistically dysfunctional family beset by poor economic performance.

Obviously, Oklahoma has an additional level of cultural diversity. Native American parents in Oklahoma do not have to clamor for educators to help them find ways for their children to learn English. These children are already immersed in an English-dominated culture and these children learn English naturally. Parents soon realize that their children opt to learn English and often at the expense of their native tongue. Children often maintain various degrees of linguistic skills based

on family conservations and playground experiences but fail to progress academically in their mother tongue.

The real problem arises when neither English-only nor Spanish-only instruction serves their needs. They need both languages to survive in their bilingual setting and yet the quality of instruction is insufficient in both languages. Children faced with this predicament soon drop out. The few, who persevere, do so in the face of great odds. Good dual language instruction leads to success in both worlds. Poor quality monolingual instruction leads to poor performance. Poorly instructed students are frustrated and are potential social problems.

It appears that there is a symbiotic relationship between the institutional policies chosen and sustained by the school system and the organic implementation of these policies by the parents, teachers, and community leaders. A combination of political leadership, creative funding, proper bilingual staffing, parental participation, and community support converge to create successful educational environs.

Immigrant children with various levels of English proficiency are a fact of life. They are imbedded in the school system, welcome or not. Their presence represents a specific educational challenge which is not going away anytime soon. The US has a porous border and also prides itself with a democratic public school system. Hence, it is incumbent for policy makers to select linguistic programs that work and fulfill our political and cultural goals, such as integration. Imposing institutional stiffness or accepting inferior policies is an "invitation to struggle for cultural survival."

Access to adequate bilingual classroom instruction, acquisition of multiple linguistic skills, and the pursuit of human dignity in any language are both desirable and inalienable. In the short term, administrators need to realize that they will endure criticism from both advocates and opponents of Bilingual Education. In the end, all children should be given the opportunity to learn English and/or to be bilingual. It works. Therefore, no child should be forced to leave their native tongue behind, merely because of lack of institutional and public support.

NOTES

[1]A Bilingual Education program for either language majority and/or language minority children emphasizes instruction in two languages for the purpose of cultural integration. An ELD or English Language Development program, specifically designed for language minority children, emphasizes instruction in English for the purpose of cultural assimilation. For a robust treatment of the many subtleties and categories for BE language strategies, see Brisk, 1998.

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APPENDIX A

Empowering School Communities, Yes!
Title VII Bilingual Education Grant Overview

Award No. T290U70357

Empowering School Communities, Yes! is a project designed to address more effectively the needs of LEP students and native English speakers by implementing a model dual language program in Shidler and Wheeler Elementary Schools, which can be replicated in other elementary schools in the district.

Length of Grant:	Five (5) years
Amount of Grant:	$1.45 million
Grant Personnel:	Project Director Project Coordinator Project Secretary Project Consultants
Project Partner:	University of Central Oklahoma
Project Goals:	Participating students will (1) develop high levels of proficiency in their first language, (2) achieve high levels of proficiency in their second language, (3) perform academically at or above above grade level in both languages, and (4) develop high levels of self-esteem and positive cross-cultural attitudes.

Project Curriculum:	Benchmarks to Progress, district curriculum, which contain the Priority Academic Student Skills (PASS), state curriculum, and core subject National Standards. Core Knowledge Curriculum, E.D. Hirsch
Project Activities:	Ongoing professional development activities College courses in ESL and Spanish certification Adult education program Parent/community involvement activities and training program
Teaching Strategies:	Sheltered instruction, cooperative learning, technology as instructional tool, TPR, role-playing, language experience approach, and language taught through content, and other dual language teaching strategies.
Technology:	A teaching computer with television monitors in every classroom, three student computers with Internet access, teleconferencing and distance learning capacities.
Assessment:	Language Assessment Scales-Oral, Reading and Writing in English and Spanish (CTB McGraw-Hill) TerraNova and Supera norm-referenced tests (CTB McGraw-Hill) State CRT tests Mobility rates Parent surveys Student interviews Student sociogram Classroom observation instrument

APPENDIX B

First Grade – Language Arts (Spanish)
February 2000

The first lesson observed in this class was entitled: **Isla (Island)**. The children sat on a carpet in rows and read in unison the lines to the story. They worked on vocabulary (approx. ten different words), and the teacher asked questions on the story. The purpose of the lesson was to emphasize the Vowel+Consonant syllable, as in the title "isla", and in other words from the story, such as "*estaba, estuve, espero, escalera.*" At one point, one of the students (English native speaker) asked in Spanish about volcanoes, and the teacher responded to him, also in Spanish without ever using any English at all.

The second lesson was entitled ***Bosque (Woods)***, and it was in the form of a dialogue. Here, the children read individually, and the teacher would take care of corrections by repeating after the students with proper intonation and pronunciation. The purpose of this lesson was still the V+C syllable pattern, as in the title *"Bosque,"* and in the line: *"¿Qué te gusta, Gustavo?*" (What do you like, Gustavo?). Afterwards, the teacher wrapped up the lesson with an oral review of the possible combinations (each of the five vowels+C) as were displayed in several posters around the room.

Second Grade – Math (Spanish)
March 2001

Each student had a worksheet with the drawing of a clown, and several phrases typed below. The clown had different numbers across

the body, and the students were supposed to find the parts of the body or items of clothing mentioned in the phrases and add their respective numbers. So, for example:

***la corbata y el ojo derecho* = ...**
26 + 19 = 45
the tie and the right eye = ...

la nariz y el sombrero = ...
33 + 37 = 70
the nose and the hat = ...

***los dos ojos* = ...**
19 + 16 = 35
the two eyes = ...

Third Grade - Spanish Reading
March 2001

Each student had a book in Spanish (***El Señor Viento***) and a notebook. One student had forgotten her book at home, and was reprimanded by the teacher in Spanish; i.e. "Ser más responsable" (To be more responsible). While the teacher was writing the reading goal for that day on the board, the students read quietly. The goal (written in Spanish) was to read the story to acquire fluency and to develop a sequence chart for comprehension. All commands were in Spanish. One student was asked to read aloud, while the others were to follow the reading silently. The teacher would have the student repeat words which were not pronounced clearly, or not loud enough. Then, she proceeded to ask questions on the theme of the story (***Mr. Wind***). The students all nicely raised hands to volunteer, and almost all volunteered. The teacher continued to ask different students to read out loud, while she walked around the room making sure that everyone was following along silently. Gradually, she moved on from factual questions on the story to inferential ones. The native English speakers in the classroom were more willing to volunteer answers on the factual ones than on the inferential ones. The teacher stopped the reading after a while and had the students provide an end to the story. They were to do it in writing;

and if not finished in class, it would be finished at home. Then, the teacher and the class together worked on the sequence chart. While she would write information on the board, the students would do it in their notebook. They filled in the first and the last squares; the students were to fill in the second and third ones as homework. The last portion of the class was devoted to vocabulary work. The teacher wrote several words on a big notepad, and asked students for definitions. One of the words to be defined was "arremolinado" (as in a whirlwind), and one student used the analogy of a tornado. The words not covered in class would have to be finished at home. The students were asked to use their dictionary (***Mundo Hispano***) or to ask their parents. The class lasted for 90 minutes, and there were no discipline problems at all. The teacher had them sit in groups of four, with their desks facing each other, and commented that the students knew the routine. Only from time to time, she would remind them of the advantages of staying on task, i.e. less homework to be finished at home and no breaks taken away. No bathroom or water breaks allowed. Impressive!

Fourth Grade – Spanish Reading
May 2003

The teacher distributed the story to each student. Each student played the role of a narrator and each one took turns reading it out loud. The story was about a princess, her prince and a dragon. It made use of many descriptive adjectives to describe their attributes, such as "atrevido, valiente, perspicaz, sagaz, arrogante, egoísta, elegante, etc". The teacher reviewed these adjectives in conjunction with one of the forms of the verb "to be"; that is, "ser" (contrasted with the use of "estar"). Then, she personalized this vocabulary by asking the class if anyone reflected any of those characteristics. . . . "¿Quién es atrevido/valiente/perspicaz, etc.?" If a student gave a seemingly incorrect answer, she would give him/her the opportunity to change it or defend it. Afterwards, a student from each table, passed around paper, color pencils or markers and the students were to draw the princess, the prince, and the dragon. Below each drawing, they were to write an adjective.

Fifth Grade – Math (English)
May 2004

The class would play bingo today, but with a few adjustments (not by vertical and horizontal rows). The teacher used a wheel (or a pie visual) to review numbers and their factors, between 1 and 90. On a transparency, he drew the visual with eight numbers: 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 (one per slice). The students then were to draw their own wheels and choose eight numbers that were factors of the ones chosen by the teacher, so that number 22 would not be possible, but 35, yes. The teacher then distributed the chips so that they could begin to play, but not without first reminding them of the rules. Then, he began to call out numbers: 10 times 8= 80, 5 times 9= 45, etc. until black-out or bingo was called. The students loved it!!!

APPENDIX C

March 2006

Dear Respondent,

Thank you for responding to the following questions about the Oklahoma City Public School Dual Language Program at Shidler and Wheeler, 1999 to 2004[2].

Why was the program initiated? (Check all that all that apply)

- Parental demands
- Teacher initiative
- Administrative initiative
- State level initiative
- National initiative
- Other reason _____

In brief, what need was there in OKC or the state for such a program?

Was the program supported and by whom? And Why?

Was the program opposed and by whom? And Why?

What reasons do you have for claiming that the program was a success or failure?

In your opinion, why was the program discontinued? _____

- Incompetence: Who was guilty?
- Financial reasons: Who cut off the funding? Was the budget decision well done? Was this a primarily budget decision at the OKCPS or state or federal level?
- It was a proper and well done public policy debate with ample inputs
- Political expediency: the decision had little no political support; in the competition between programs, this program had little to no parental support? Or administrative support?
- Ideological suffocation: the policy did not fit into decision maker's agenda. Which level and whose agenda?

Would you take the time to explain the decisions made above?

Should the program be revived? Why or why not?

Which level would more than likely attempt to resurrect the program?

Who else should I question regarding this program?

[2]These questions were sent by e-mail to those who agreed to receive them. Often though, the survey merely served as a structured guide to a telephone interview. The survey was not a random scientific sample. Of those who responded, there was a nearly universal reticence to criticize.

BOOK REVIEW SECTION

Loughlin, Patricia. *Hidden Treasures of the American West: Muriel H. Wright, Angie Debo, and Alice Marriott.* (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 2005), pp. 234. $25.95 ISBN 0-8263-3801-1

Like Alexis de Tocqueville writing about his travels in America, sometimes it takes an outside observer to provide the best analysis of a political culture. Patricia Loughlin traveled from the West Coast to Oklahoma a few years ago. Since then she has continued her education here becoming one of this state's foremost up-and-coming historians. Her latest product is *Hidden Treasures of the American West*, a wonderful history of. . .well. . .Oklahoma's history. In this very readable work, Loughlin offers a close-up view of those who first put pen to paper to record the earliest accounts of the territory now called Oklahoma and its birth as a state. She mainly tells her story from the vantage point of three noted female historians. Through the power of their respective narratives, Muriel H. Wright, Angie Debo, and Alice Marriott were very much responsible for how Oklahomans look at themselves and their place in time. The stories that these strong women tell reverberate throughout the development of this young state. Their writings, though often not fully recognized by their contemporaries in the academic community, reflect *and* challenge the values of prevailing society. Wright, Debo, and Marriott did not merely catalog sets of facts as then understood. Their interpretations served as social commentary. The manner in which they framed the subjects of their historical and ethnographic analyses had significant political implications. The political goals of these three

scholars often were at odds. But as part of a common community of scholars, the experiences of these three women also intersect and complement each other in interesting ways.

This book first caught my attention because both my daughters have spent their elementary years at Angie Debo Elementary School in Edmond. When Loughlin held a signing session for her book at a local bookstore, I thought my girls would learn a lot by attending her presentation. Here was a female scholar speaking knowledgeably about other female scholars. My hook for getting my girls interested was of course the namesake of their school. I thought they would be provided with several wonderful role models, not to mention Loughlin herself. I was not disappointed. My youngest daughter was inspired to take the book to Angie Debo Elementary School as an unofficial "show-and-tell" item. It wasn't until a few months later that I picked up the book again. As I read it, the breadth and depth of Loughlin's political analysis soon became apparent.

As might be expected when writing about women scholars, *Hidden Treasures* devotes much of its discussion to feminist concerns. Like almost everything else in this book, my preconceptions about how these feminist themes would play out were greatly mistaken. The big surprise is that these three women did not devote much energy to publicly railing against the injustices and indignities they experienced navigating through the overt patriarchy of their day. Strangely, they seemed to have channeled such energies to righting inequities experienced by others, most notably the Indian tribes. Loughlin explains that these women studied "American Indian history as a means of offering a general social critique of the United States rather than commenting on gender discrimination based on personal experience"(p. xvi). According to Loughlin, Debo in particular "would not speak out on behalf of gender discrimination, but she would write quite passionately about injustices to American Indian people" (p. 70). As a result, this book runs the gamut from racial politics to bureaucratic politics; from interest group pluralism to a variety of policy concerns such as education, drug use, and economic development; and from elite power structures to mass political movements. Intergovernmental relations among the tribes, the state, and the federal government are examined. These women shine a critical eye on American policy toward the Indians and have little good to say about the bureaucracy designed to manage tribal relations. Loughlin follows

her introduction by writing two chapters each for Wright, Debo, and Marriott. She then closes with a general discussion of "The Tradition of Women Public Intellectuals in the American West." Loughlin writes about each of the women in the order as laid out in her title starting with Muriel Wright.

Wright tends to idealize the coming together of the disparate white and Indian cultures that ultimately would make up Oklahoma. Although she displays little empathy for African Americans, Wright proves to be a consistent defender of assimilation policies in regard to Native Americans. In many ways, Wright defends much of the status quo—at least in her published writings. In private correspondence, Wright could be sharply critical of federal policy and "expressed disdain for the Bureau of Indian Affairs and its meddling in Indian communities" (p. 46).

Angie Debo follows her own personal creed "to discover the truth and publish it" which in turn leads to her "commitment to social justice and her selection of controversial historical subject matter" and "her disbelief in acquiescence to politicians or administrators" (p. 91). Though apparently surprised by the results of her own research, Debo finally concludes that "all of eastern Oklahoma and Oklahoma in general was dominated by a criminal conspiracy to cheat these Indians out of their land after their own tribes were broken up into individual allotments" (p. 95). Ironically considering the venue of this review, Loughlin even examines the politics of writing book reviews for a state journal. The longstanding academic duel between Wright and Debo originated when the latter published her book, *The Rise and Fall of the Choctaw Republic*. Wright wrote a seething 13-page review for the *Chronicles of Oklahoma* in which she slammed Debo's book for factual errors, misguided interpretations, and incomplete truths. "At the center of Wright's fury was the notion that her grandfather, Allen Wright, accepted a kickback—or a treaty fee or a rebate—as tribal national treasurer and delegate of the Choctaw Nation negotiating the treaty of 1866 with the U.S. government following the Civil War" (p. 55). Muriel H. Wright contended that this so-called "kickback" was really payment for "services rendered" (p. 57). Later, when Debo published *And Still the Waters Run*, "once again Muriel Wright took a strong position against Debo's work—this time by refusing to acknowledge it. While national journals . . .reviewed Debo's book, the *Chronicles of Oklahoma*" under Wright's editorial direction did not" (p. 60). Wright and Debo would

have other high profile disagreements on such matters as the location of the Civil War Battle of Round Mountain. Debo submitted an article to *Chronicles of Oklahoma* supporting the location of Round Mountain near the modern town of Yale based on new evidence. Wright defended her original placement of the historical marker near Mannford in the Keystone Lake area. "Wright used her editorial authority to reject Debo's article, only to be overturned by the (Oklahoma Historical Society) Board of Directors" and "the location of Round Mountain remains unconfirmed to this day" (p. 54). Even now, commemorative markers remain in both sites. Loughlin describes Debo and Wright as a pair of contemporaneous scholars who were "very much polar opposites—one framing despair and the glimmer of hope through reformist rhetoric and the other highlighting the positive contributions Indian people, mostly progressive elites such as politicians and businesspeople have made to the state" (p. 61).

Alice Marriott provides a nice counterweight to the more dominant personalities of Wright and Debo. Loughlin's inclusion of Marriott in *Hidden Treasures* helps the reader to gain an overall sense of the experience of women scholars during the first century of Oklahoma statehood. This triangulation among the three women highlights similarities and differences. It encourages a better appreciation of the complexity of how their individual lives unfolded. "The Depression of the 1930s had dramatic consequences for Marriott, as it did for Angie Debo and Muriel Wright, guiding career choices, education, and relationships" (p. 113). Like Wright and Debo, Marriott experienced limited opportunities in academia and was thus channeled into alternative career choices. In the prelude to her latter career as a freelance writer, Marriott was employed by the federal Indian Arts and Crafts Board as a field agent. Her mission was to travel among various Native American communities "talking to Indians and non-Indians about the importance of reviving Native arts and crafts and the additional need for markets" (p. 119). The challenge for the IACB was that the public's awareness of Indian arts and crafts tended to be limited to the "Indians of the Southwest, particularly Pueblo pottery and Navajo weaving" (p. 117). Through her own informal program evaluation, Marriott estimated that because of the work of the IACB, "the Indians were doing a two million dollar a year business in fine arts—instead of twenty thousand a year in curios" (p. 125). On the research front, Marriott also found success by

uncovering information about the Indians that were unavailable or overlooked by previous male researchers. She also adopted ethnological research methods that were considered unconventional within anthropological circles. Instead of following the normal route of research that began with tribal governance and worked down to the family level, Marriott "started with the family, then friendship and hospitality, THEN the political structure; bands, chiefs, and the tribe as a whole" (p. 146). She was a master storyteller and her work reached well beyond the narrow interests of the scholarly community to reach the public at large. She also endeavored to use her research to affect public policy. For example, she would leverage her fieldwork research to testify in support of the Native American Church's incorporation of peyote use into its religious sacraments (p. 151).

One of my favorite features of this book are the pictures of these women throughout their lives. They may be black and white snapshots of a different age, but they provide a little extra insight into their character. My only real disappointment after reading this book is the title. One of the major themes of *Hidden Treasures* is the notion of female intellectuals as "hidden scholars." They have difficulties following their educational pursuits. Of the three, only Angie Debo makes it all the way through to a terminal degree. Even if these women intellectual do earn a doctorate, they are highly unlikely to find a tenure track position at a university. Many who are married must subsume their work under the name of their husband. Those who remain single often work under male supervision and therefore transfer credit for their hard work up a male-dominated chain of command. The title of "Hidden *Treasures*" is somewhat of a distraction. These women are true scholars and certainly did not receive their full measure of recognition during most of their careers. My preference would to have the book titled, "Hidden *Scholars*." They were able to rise above the station in life that was assigned to them. "These public intellectuals sought out challenging projects and took risks because they were not bound or limited by the confines of the academy" (p. xx). Along a similar line, "Oklahoma" should have been included in the title since this book is really about the state and its wonderful scholars.

Hidden Treasures of the American West is a marvelous chronicle of social commentary and its impact on a rapidly developing society. As the book makes clear, Oklahoma's development is "a microcosm of

the frontier experience" (p. 75). The rapid move from plains wilderness to forced resettlement of Indian tribes to implementation of assimilation policies is followed by rapid economic development. It is all played out within the territory that eventually becomes Oklahoma. But instead of crossing several generations, this process occurs, as Debo notes, "within the memory of one still living generation" (p. 75). These three women and their sisters in scholarship extended a valuable service in sharing their ongoing historical and anthropological analysis of the American West. In doing so, they helped influence not only the politics of their own time, but also the political understanding of succeeding generations.

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Pitney, John J., Jr. *The Art of Political Warfare*. (Red River Books 2001), pp. 246. $14.95 ISBN 0806133821 pb.

This book was one of a couple of books which escaped being reviewed in earlier editions of this publication. Though it is a little late, the book is significant enough to remind readers that it is still around and still has some relevance. The author, John J. Pitney, Jr. has been involved in both practical politics with the U.S. House Republicans and is currently in academe in the California university system. He brings a mix of the scholarly and practical approaches to his analysis which leavens the topic significantly while still retaining a readable style.

His approach is simply to examine how we use warfare analogies when we describe virtually all aspects of modern politics. Anyone who teaches about government and politics has done this, as have our political leaders and the press, so his starting point is certainly one which is common. It also will remind academics of their days as graduate students when we were asked to look at the obvious, but to think about the obvious in different terms or to question the premises differently. In fact, for me the absolute best part of the book is the end when the author states that we should take other common viewpoints, themes, or metaphors and examine them in a broader context. Some topics he suggests which would be interesting applications to our conceptions of politics include ecology, physics and mechanics, medicine, games, theater, and education.

Specifically, he develops chapters around the military analogy in the following areas: strategy, leadership, coordination, rallying the

troops, "demoralization, deception, and stealth", intelligence, geography and logistics and friction. In developing each of these areas, he uses both history and present politics to build his case. His encyclopedic level of quotations is impressive in itself, drawing from a wide range of actors and authors. However, this is also one of the problems with his examination. Quotes are so frequently utilized that the flow of the book can get choppy, and the individual chapters may work better by themselves rather than in a collection as in this book. On a personal note if I did not see another citation from Clausewitz, Sun Tzu (*The Art of War*), Newt Gingrich, or James Carville I would rest happy.

The book has been well-reviewed and still has utility. I would suggest that it is more of a reference text than a unitary volume. The author does succeed in getting the reader to view some of our old habits in new ways. How many books do that?

Richard Johnson
Oklahoma City University

Kirtz, Mary K., Editor; Mark J. Kasoff, Rick Farmer, and John C. Green. *The Elections of 2000: Politics, Culture, and Economics of North America.* (Akron, Ohio: University of Akron Press, 2006), pp. 292. $19.95. ISBN 1-931968-30-6 pb

The editors correctly identify the need for a more integrated political analysis of the emerging North American economy. Canada, Mexico and the United States are moving towards a more integrated relationship at the economic level, somewhat at the cultural and linguistic levels but not at the political level. In fact, political integration is not on the horizon. The electoral process is a first indicator of a maturing democratic process which in turn can lead to subsequent political cooperation. That cooperation is made possible by electoral shifts.

Implied in 2000 elections is that as Mexico moves toward a greater degree of democratization and modernization it can more fully partner with the US and Canada. In other words, since the PRI leadership could not bring itself to cooperate to any greater degree; it would take the newly elected President Fox and his more neo-conservative economic policies to trigger a deeper economic cooperation with the rest of North America. The authors correctly identify cultural trends, economic indicators, and electoral events that shape the fledging triumvirate.

The rest of the continent should have been included. The authors tended to ignore the Caribbean islands and the rest of North America, except in the very useful last chapter that takes a snapshot of elections in four Central American countries. The book does not synthesize its many analytical chapters very well and ends abruptly. I was left hungry

for more synthesis. How can elections lead to more cooperation? Can interest groups move towards being more transnational? Will we see the Mexican, North American and Canadian middle classes find common ground? The book would have been perfect with a final chapter exploring the next steps towards integration.

The book needed to be published given the obvious globalization and regional developments. However, history never ceases its march forward and possibly may have left the text behind. The analysis of the 2000 elections is good in and of itself, yet recent events involving the 2006 elections in Mexico, the growing importance of immigration, and border disputes may cast doubt on the long run usefulness of the text. The authors work hard to cover a wide range of topics such as media coverage, voter apathy, immigration issues and especially valuable material dealing with multi-cultural issues from all three perspectives. The text is especially useful for the Latin American scholar but most undergraduates would complain if assigned this to read. The book provides a wealth of data and may serve as a valuable reference in the scholar's library.

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Perkins, Edward J. with Connie Cronley. *Mr. Ambassador: Warrior for Peace.* (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 2006), pp 576. $39.95 ISBN 0-8061-3767-3 hc

This intriguing autobiography of Dr. Perkins, in retirement from the Foreign Service at the University of Oklahoma as William J. Crowe Professor of Geopolitics and Executive Director of the International Programs Center, begins by recounting an event at the apex of a distinguished career—the surprise and bold appearance by newly appointed Ambassador Perkins at the South African treason trial of two black anti-apartheid activists (December 1986). By appointing an African-American foreign service officer as ambassador, the Reagan Administration (under congressional and other pressures to change from a failed policy of constructive engagement) was sending an unmistakable message. The President made a commitment which is unusual in modern U.S. diplomacy—giving his ambassador "carte blanche authority to make policy from the embassy. . . ." (p. 259). And Perkins delivered in spades, earning the respect of grassroots groups of all races in the Republic and in the words of former Secretary of State George Shultz, helping to "lay the groundwork for the end of apartheid" (Foreword). Altogether, about forty percent of the narrative relives events and personalities in South Africa as well as the extraordinarily successful negotiations leading to the independence of Namibia.

Edward Perkins, born in 1928 in rural Louisiana, was a "late-bloomer," completing his formal education after two stints in the army and marine corps and two tours in East Asia as a government civilian

employee. He meets his wife, Lucy Cheng-mei Liu, in Taiwan and they elope against the wishes of her family. At age 44, he secures a difficult lateral entry appointment to the Foreign Service followed by a meteoric rise, securing his first ambassadorial appointment (1984, Liberia) twelve years later. (Only five per cent of officers become ambassadors, and then after averaging 20 to 28 years in the Service!)

Dr. Perkins is a meticulous and insightful observer as he recounts his career, progressing from a desk job in the Foreign Service's Office of Equal Employment Opportunity (where, with other black officers, he persuades Secretary of State Kissinger of the practical wisdom of making the Service a much more representative and inclusive institution), to a first overseas posting as political counselor in Ghana, a second as deputy chief of mission in Liberia, back to Washington as the Director of West African Affairs (in the State Department's Bureau of African Affairs), back to Liberia as Mr. Ambassador (for one year, before being dubbed ambassador to South Africa). (To his and my surprise, an interview with Mr. Reagan revealed a president fully focused and in charge!) (pp. 256-257). The highlight of both Liberian assignments was dealing with the chaotic transfer of power from the descendents of American slaves to the regime headed by Sergeant Samuel Doe. Ambassador Perkins is convinced that effective diplomacy requires both thorough knowledge of the local terrain and willingness to act as a revolutionary change agent.

Upon completion of the three year tour in South Africa, he was offered the prestigious director-generalship of the Foreign Service where an earned Ph.D. in public administraation assisted in a general reorganization (against bureaucratic resistance), and broadening of recruitment and training of officers. Subsequently, the ambassador received the highest ranking appointment a foreign service officer can aspire to—U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, 1992-1993, under George H.W. Bush. At the UN, he engages in an acrimonious turf battle over control of the U.S. mission with none other than John Bolton, who at the time headed the Bureau of International Organizations Affairs! Major substantive concerns included Iraq, Somalia, China, and Cambodia. With President-elect Clinton's appointment of Madeline Albright as his UN permanent representative—to his extreme annoyance, Dr. Perkins learns of his replacement via the TV news—he

lobbies for, and receives a Clinton appointment to be Ambassador to Australia, 1993-1996, after which he "retires" to OU.

Dr. Perkins ascribes his success to grandparents' high expectations (both grandparents were illiterate, but all their children attended college); support from a cohesive black community; moral discipline cultivated by evangelical Christianity (Most black families in rural 1930s Louisiana had two pictures on the wall—Huey Long and Jesus Christ!) and the marine corps; and a lifelong fascination with and study of Asian philosophy. Success was achieved despite obstacles, including often distant relations with mother and stepfather, and pervasive racism during early education and career. The latter was particularly obvious after moving from Pine Bluff, Arkansas to an integrated high school in Portland, and service in a yet to be integrated U.S. army—the train ride from Portland to basic training in Kentucky was punctuated by the segregation of coaches in Indianapolis! In the 1970s Foreign Service, young black officers at Washington social functions were sometimes mistaken for waiters!

In this very personal narrative, the reader will find neither a sustained justification nor criticism of U.S. foreign policy. At bottom, the author is an optimist, believing that America is a revolutionary society that is capable of continually reinventing itself. Its genius is a creative synthesis between unity and individualism. His career may be taken as vindication for this assertion. On the other hand, it took extraordinary personal dedication and skill to breach formidable barriers.

I find little to criticize in this book—arguably it could have been shorter and better edited; however, its detailed, almost encyclopedic, accounting of persons and situations is tremendously informative, and it holds the interest of the reader. I agree with the quote by columnist Georgie Anne Geyer—"Mr. Ambassador conveys what sophisticated and effective diplomacy is all about. A remarkable journey that should inspire, inform, and influence everyone it touches!" (publisher's release)

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Willman, Chris. *Rednecks & Bluenecks: The Politics of Country Music*. (New York: The New Press, 2005), pp. 302. $25.95
ISBN 978-1-59558-017-7

Oklahoma is known throughout the world for its contributions to the musical arts. Of course, country music is the most prominent of this state's entertainment exports. This musical tradition stretches from the singing cowboy days of Gene Autry to the American Idolization of Carrie Underwood. In between, numerous Oklahomans have made a habit of perfecting and then reinventing the country music genre. Bob Wills inaugurated the western swing era. Woody Guthrie popularized the Dust Bowl wisdom of the folk song. From the late 1960s to the early 1990s, Tulsa-based Roy Clark provided down-home humor and musical charm to American families. As co-host of the nationally syndicated *Hee Haw* variety show, his pickin' and grinnin' became a mainstay. Yukon native Garth Brooks injected his country stylings with powerful rock riffs and a dazzling stage presence. In 1999, the Recording Industry Association of America named him the top selling solo artist of the twentieth century edging out Elvis Presley for the coveted title. Prolific Oklahoma songwriters such as Hoyt Axton and Jimmy Webb have also made their mark. Even now, the country music universe is ruled by a cavalcade of Oklahoma superstars such as Reba McEntire, Vince Gill, Ronnie Dunn (of Brooks & Dunn), and Toby Keith.

In his book, *Rednecks & Bluenecks*, journalist Chris Willman takes the reader through a fascinating journey in contemporary politics. Country music serves as both metaphor for politics played on a larger

stage and as a significant venue of political power play in and of itself. Some of the best and most provocative books about American politics come from outside the typical channels of political punditry, electioneering, and scholarship. Although it may not be particularly palatable to the urban intelligentsia, especially on the east and west coasts, to truly understand American politics a sense of what's going on in the heartland of America is necessary. And there, country music is king.

Willman makes a strong case for country music as actually being the most popular form of American music. He points to the music industry's annual awards shows. The 2005 Grammy Awards drew 18.8 million viewers while the 2005 Country Music Association Awards drew just a little less with over 18.4 million viewers. Willman explains the significance: "In other words, if the Grammys had expanded the token country segment—into which they had shoehorned stars like Gretchen Wilson, Tim McGraw, and Keith Urban—to fill the program's entire three hours, the show might have been about as highly rated as it was with J. Lo and Usher thrown in, too" (p. 6). Country music continues to be the longstanding leader in radio penetration. Talk radio gets a little over half that coverage. Even though Top 40 and other urban formats seem to get most of the attention from the news media, they lag far behind in terms of radio outlets and broadcast coverage. Willman says, "After the 2004 election, pundits had to confront the possibility, welcome or otherwise, that the red states making up the nation's vast middle represented the mainstream of America. If you follow that line of thinking, you could theorize that country, long marginalized by gatekeepers on the coasts, is actually America's most mainstream music" (p. 5). The South has certainly played an outsized political role over the past four decades. Like the lights that brighten high school stadiums on Friday nights and the church choirs belting out hymns on Sunday morning, country music is an undeniably powerful cultural institution dominant in this region. That it has a major impact on American politics should not come as a big surprise.

Willman seamlessly switches among various perspectives of the political scene. He focuses on how business executives carefully maneuver their media products through an environment of polarized politics. At times, these music industry leaders swallow their own political preferences to cater to the oft validated perception that their

audience expectations now lean right. The actual degree of the drift toward conservatism among country music fans is a matter of some dispute. Some surveys suggest a relatively balanced partisanship among country fandom. But Willman persuasively illustrates that events like the Dixie Chicks fiasco would not occur unless country music fans were not skewed significantly toward the right.

Willman provides one of the best descriptions about how intelligent, informed people of conflicting political persuasions can and do communicate with each other. In one passage, he describes Nashville's famous "Music Row," the de facto center of the country music business as a hotbed of political diversity and debate: "It makes for many a tense moment as folks try to feel each other out—as well as some exciting ones as people who respect each other sometimes discover they're ideologically at odds and end up having substantive debates from across party lines, something you don't often find on the Upper West Side or in Birmingham" (p. 197). According to Willman, rampant bipartisanship characterizes the top executives at Music Row. "Sony has Democrat Grady on top and Republican Mark Wright right under him; the Universal Music Group has liberal Luke Lewis and conservative James Stroud in the top spots; Universal South has its own guys on either side of the aisle, Tim DuBois and Tony Brown as cochairs; and so on" (p. 196). These corporate types in Nashville appear to live within a political culture that places high value on tolerance and civility. Such demonstration of mutual respect coupled with a willingness to deliberate on the nation's policy issues is rare in the new world of red states v. blue states. The top executive at the Warner music label, Paul Worley says, "As you're sitting with somebody, maybe getting to know 'em for the first time, there's a little dance that people do to figure out whether to go there or not, probing ways of talking and looking that you can use to subtly let somebody know where you stand, that if they want to pull out, it's okay, and that if they go in, they may not like what they hear" (p. 197). Willman is quick to add that this uniquely balanced and deliberative mix of progressives and conservatives among the top managers of country music does not characterize the rest of the country music industry. As you travel down the food chain in the country music business, the professional employees lean more and more to the right. Likewise, the vast majority of the top musical talent seems to be very visibly bent toward conservatism. Willman's interviews with the board

of directors for the Country Music Association lead him to estimate that over three-fourths of the membership are conservative (p. 196).

Willman interviews countless music artists about how their political tastes relate to their craft. He recounts the political activism (and restraint) of various artists. Since the terrorist attacks of 9-11, the stakes have become high. The spark that ignited the most recent political controversy within country music is the famous remark by Natalie Maines of the Dixie Chicks. She told a London audience that she was ashamed to hail from the same home state as President George W. Bush. Willman even invents a new adjective to describe the process of a left-leaning country music star ostracized by his or her conservative fan base: "Dixie Chicked." In their case, record sales plummeted, concert venues were canceled, radio stations ignored their songs, and even their CDs were burned. Meanwhile, initial reports that the Dixie Chicks music sales were unaffected by the controversy proved wrong. They turned out to be based on data covering the time period before their London remarks received publicity on this side of the Atlantic. Sales dropped from 202,350 units per week down to 33,127 by the next month. As Willman notes, "Considering that every liberal worth his salt was swearing he or she was headed out to buy the album just to show support, the incredible shrinking numbers suggested a severe vote of no-confidence in more conservative climes" (p. 36). Such open hostility directed toward the Dixie Chicks is incongruous with the fact that other very public progressives in country music such as Willie Nelson are able to express their liberal sentiments with little public reaction. Willman explores whether there are double standards for male and female but he rejects this feminist explanation. He finally concludes that the Dixie Chicks basically pulled a bait and switch on their fans. "That's the very cornerstone of country music: that the entertainers are no different from their audience, a rule not found in any other genre, not even hip-hop, where a certain amount of ostentatious, super-elitist bling is customary along with the still-down-with-y'all, just-got-shot-at-yesterday street realism," explains Willman, "In the Chicks fracas, some country fans may have been wounded by the realization, subconscious or otherwise, that they aren't really so tight with the people who they believed gave a voice to what was in their hearts after all" (p. 33).

Willman chronicles the historical evolution of country music with its rural, agrarian roots and common-man sympathies. That is has come to be aligned with the Republican party is a relatively new development. Both what have come to be termed country music and folk music originated with traditional Appalachian songs. "Country partisans have always been suspicious of pop crossover, and Woody Guthrie was the original crossover star, making his name in the hillbilly ghetto he soon abandoned for the less woodsy climes of Carnegie Hall when it became evident that his burgeoning political sensibilities wouldn't require such careful parsing up north" (p. 11). Willman sees a reconvergence of folk and country and offers the inability of the Grammys to cleanly categorize its nominations as examples: "Nearly every album that's been nominated recently in their 'contemporary folk' category. . .can at least loosely be considered alt-country at the core" (p. 11). It is perhaps a byproduct of the divergence between country and folk in which the latter came to be identified with progressive politics during the decades in the mid-twentieth century. Now, country music for liberals must be known by any other name such as pop, alternative country, or contemporary folk. Linda Ronstadt who has long been forgotten as getting her start as a country-western singer on *The Johnny Cash Show* singing tunes from Waylon Jennings now refers to her own music with the painfully awkward phrasing, "Mexican American agrarian music" (p. 174).

Oklahoma's country stars have not fit as neatly as one might expect into the tight conservative boxes assigned to them by their publics. Vince Gill, for example, came out early in defense of the Dixie Chicks saying that there are political leaders who "have said a lot worse things about George Bush than Natalie did, and nobody rips them for it. . . . I kind of feel like she's been bashed enough" (p. 37). He later succumbs to pressure from his public to distance himself from the Chicks and lets it be known the he holds "the completely opposite view of Natalie Maines" (p. 37). Reba McEntire proved to fairly apolitical in Willman's treatment although George W. Bush particularly favors her songs because of their emphasis on traditional values of family and faith (p. 89). Garth Brooks raised a few eyebrows among Southern conservatives with his unabashed stance against gay bashing. In his song, "We Shall Be Free," Garth sings, "When we're free to love anyone we choose/ When this world's big enough for all different views. . . . Then we shall be free" (p. 166). In 2000, Brooks very pointedly joined gay icon George

Michael to sing Freedom 90 at Equality Rocks, the first major benefit concert in the United States for gay rights (Birch, 2000). Willman theorizes that once you rise to the status of Elvis, the public will let pass a stray heresy or two.

Much of *Rednecks & Bluenecks* covers Oklahoma's own Toby Keith. In fact, the second chapter is devoted to him. Throughout much of the rest of the book as well, the complexity of Keith's politics is further explored. Keith arrived most visibly on the political scene with the release of "Courtesy of the Red, White, and Blue (The Angry American)." The song was ostensibly written in reaction to the terrorist attacks of 9-11 and to show support for American soldiers sent to Afghanistan. But the song was widely interpreted to show support for the president during the build-up to the invasion of Iraq. Keith delivered a message to the terrorists in the blunt poetics of country music—America is going to "put a boot up your ass." His song became a #1 hit on the country music charts and even crossed over into Top 40. As military action progressed, Toby Keith and Natalie Maines would publicly trade barbs on their differing responses to America's new policy of preemption. He also made several appearances in support of the Bush campaign during the 2004 election. By all appearances, Keith became the poster boy for conservative causes and a very convenient campaign asset for the Republican Party. Willman comments, "If you polled Al Franken's audience, Toby would probably have a Q rating somewhere between Ron Silver and Don Rumsfeld" (p. 59). Then once more, Willman goes behind the scenes to reveal that reality is a little more complicated than what it seems at first blush.

With maybe just a little bit of a tongue-in-cheek overstatement, Willman declares, "Toby Keith is the face of the Democratic Party in the South"(p. 62). He grew up as a Democrat and is still committed to the Democratic party. "Back home he campaigned on behalf of conservative Oklahoma's Democratic governor, Brad Henry" (p. 64). He helped the Democratic party campaign for the state lottery to help pay for Oklahoma's public education. And, "Keith has famously buddied up to country music's most veteran liberal, Willie Nelson, without apparent discomfort" (p. 64).

And finally, what about that "Okie from Muskogee" who once famously derided those San Francisco hippies for growing their "long and shaggy" hair, taking drugs, and burning draft cards? In his modern

incarnation, Merle Haggard has done a 180 degree turnaround and has been filing a series of protest songs against the war in Iraq and the Patriot Act. As a result, Haggard has become a new darling of the left. Willman pairs up Haggard with Johnny Cash, terms them "the Omnipoliticians" and devotes an entire chapter to a discussion of these stalwarts of country music.

Of all the top country music stars with Oklahoma roots, only Ronnie Dunn of Brooks and Dunn fame, appears to be consistently conservative in the vein preferred by the fan base. What Willman's book reveals is that Dunn "is a boot-scootin' foreign policy wonk" who feasts his eyes on such tomes as *What Went Wrong* by Princeton historian Bernard Lewis and *Hatred's Kingdom* by the former ambassador to Saudi Arabia. Dunn loves a good talk about politics. "Unlike Alan Jackson, Dunn can tell you the difference between Iran and Iraq. At length" (p. 90-92).

Overall, *Rednecks & Bluenecks* confirms the widely held notion that country music is a strong bastion for conservative beliefs. In the entertainment world, country music is therefore a bit of an oddity. Although the surface appearance of a conservative bent is well founded, Willman successfully analyzes at a deeper level to reveal more complexity. In that respect, the author plays an important scholarly role in addition to mere journalistic treatment. Wilmann shows that country music's alliance with the right may just be a quirk of recent history. Very few producers or even artists strive to be overtly political. "A majority of artists and the bean counters who rely on them would prefer that the music remain altogether apolitical and not alienate even a single listener whose purchase might provide the next day's per diem" (p. 8). But the reality is that business necessity must pay its due to political reality. *Rednecks & Bluenecks* is an important primer for helping the uninitiated unlock many of the mysteries of American political culture. Admittedly, my expectations were not that high when I first picked up this book, but I found it filled with exceptional political analysis. It should not be dismissed.

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Lowi, Theodore J. *The End of the Republican Era.* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2006), pp. 352. $15.99 ISBN 0-806-1288-79

Part of the Julian J. Rothbaum Distinguished Lecture series first published in 1994, *The End of the Republican* book represents Lowi's attempt to extend his critical analysis of 20th century liberalism set forth in *The End of Liberalism* (1969). Lowi argues that the Republican era that has succeeded the long period of liberal dominance has not remedied the ills of interest group liberalism, and contains within its coalition serious cleavages that he believes will eventually undermine the GOP's electoral effectiveness. That a book by this title was first issued in 1994 — at the high-water mark of Republican electoral success at the congressional level — should in no way undermine Lowi's analysis of the troubles within the Republican Party or with the ideological precepts that have guided it. Lowi acknowledges the irony of the timing, while persisting in his conviction that the Republican period of ideological hegemony will crumble as surely as did the liberal hegemony. While perhaps not a masterpiece on the order of *The End of Liberalism*, *The End of the Republican Era* nevertheless deserves attention as a sophisticated and eclectic analysis of major political trends in 21st century American politics.

As a self-described liberal, Lowi's principal complaint in his previous work has been the decoupling of policy from the rule of law. Struggling to find a constitutional means of extending governmental authority into realms previously left untouched by previous generations

(e.g. and esp. economic regulation, social welfare, civil rights, and environmental regulation), the tendency of politicians operating in a relatively consensual environment was to "wing it," and in the process created interest group liberalism, with its concomitant sins of incrementalism, clientelism, and bureaucratic drift and bloat. In an acute analysis of the intersection of party politics and ideology, Lowi identifies Nixon as the last "liberal" president of the liberal era, and concludes that Clinton's presidency was "conservative" to the extent that Clinton was compelled to move within an ideological environment that offered no space for progressive policies or positive government. In extending Lowi's theory, the radicalism and lawlessness of the Bush administration may signal the fatal cracks appearing in Republican coalition.

Lowi's analysis of the forces that are in the process of decomposing the dominance of the conservative reflects his somewhat dim view of how American democracy functions. Lowi resists the temptation to identify conservatism outside the framework of philosophical liberalism – and hence as "un-American" – but contends that the political forces that have brought the disparate ideological groupings that currently comprise the conservative movement will, through the process of governing, create unbridgeable fissures that will diminish Republicans' electoral successes. Similar to his complaint regarding the later coalitions that comprised the Great Society, Lowi argues that the array of ideological interests guiding the current Republican Party are incapable of governing prudently or responsibly. In particular, Lowi predicts that as cultural conservatives grasp a greater share of attention from Republican administrations, "patrician" and economic conservatives may find such policies put into action too much to take in exchange for the tax-cuts and deregulatory policies that first brought them into the Republican "big tent."

Lowi's analysis of the flaws of the American political system is trenchantly critical, and betrays much of the same frustration and despair that marks his seminal work. At time his prose can be hard to follow for a scholar uninitiated in the arcane of political science, and many political scientists may voice concern at the number of times Lowi indulges in intuitively satisfying but empirically unsupported assertions. Lowi's eclectism may thrill and satisfy many, while frustrating less nimble minds with his theoretical leaps. In short, *The End of the Republican*

Era bears many of the hallmarks of course lectures converted into book form, but any serious student of American politics and history will find the book well worth their time.

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Sinclair, Barbara. *Party Wars: Polarization and the Politics of National Policy Making*. (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 2006), pp. 448. $34.95 ISBN: 0-8061-3756-8 hc; $19.95 ISBN:0-8061-3779-7 pb

In this book political scientist Barbara Sinclair examines how the ideological gulf now separating the two major parties developed and how today's intense partisan competition affects the political process, lawmaking and national policy.

She notes the atmosphere in contemporary Washington is intensely partisan and highly conflictual. Congressional Republicans are more uniformly conservative and Democrats more uniformly moderate and liberal than at any time during the past half century; the result is that most important policy and political fights pit most Democrats against more Republicans. Combine that with narrow margins of party control, and the result is highly polarized and often highly charged and even antagonistic, politics.

Sinclair provides the reader numerous historical as well as current examples to emphasize the material. For example, former Speaker Sam Rayburn used to instruct new members on his prescription for success: to get along, go along. Fast forward to the 1990s, the cocoon of good feeling had been replaced by overt partisan hostility. How did the congressional parties of the Rayburn-McCormack-Albert era – the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s – become over the course of one generation, less than three decades, the congressional parties of Newt Gingrich and Tom DeLay?

If the congressional parties of the 1990s and early twenty-first century are internally more homogeneous ideologically and also ideologically more distant from each other than they were thirty years ago, why did this happen?

Her explanation is a story in which voters, political activists, and politicians all play significant roles. In the first four chapters she traces the development of partisan polarization. She examines its roots in the electorate and in the activist core of the Republican Party. House members' responses to polarization have altered the way in which the House functions and have thereby amplified the effects of polarization, she concludes. Realignment in the South and increased partisan polarization at the voter level contribute to voters becoming more likely to see important differences between the parties. She describes how the Republican Party moved right, how evangelical Christians flooded into the Republican Party, as well as the role played by neoconservatives, the development of conservative infrastructures, and think tanks.

Is the extreme partisan polarization and the hostility between Democrats and Republicans that we see in Congress entirely a result of external factors, that is, of changes in voters and activists? These external factors, she argues, make possible and were a necessary condition for some of the internal changes discussed in the House and Senate. She also contends that internal changes have shaped and amplified the effect of external factors and have had consequences of their own for how Congress makes law.

Most of the book focuses on the changes in Congress and much of this is a story of the Democratic Party, which was after all the majority party in the House almost continuously from 1930 to 1994. She continues the story with the evolution of a confrontationist opposition, the Republican House, from collaboration to confrontation. What have been the consequences of partisan polarization for the policy process? And how and why have the consequences differed in the House and Senate? Her description, in great detail of the new lawmaking process, is the most interesting section(s) of the book.

Political parties in the House today - Members of the House, she argues, desire reelection, good public policy, and influence in the chamber. When members' reelection needs and personal policy preferences are similar within the party and differ substantially between parties, as is the case today, it makes sense for members to organize

their parties and endow their leaders with the resources necessary to facilitate the achievement of members' goals. The contemporary parties are elaborately organized in the House so as to facilitate joint action toward collective goals while also providing members with much-prized opportunities to participate in the legislative process; rank-and-file members' participation is thus channeled largely through their parties and takes forms that benefit rather than endanger their efforts.

Unorthodox lawmaking in the hyperpartisan House now is the norm. Special rules and new floor procedures have been institutionalized. The external political environment of the Senate is essentially the same as that of the House, but those external forces impinge on a body with very different basic rules. She shows, the individualist Senate, a body in which senators aggressively exploited the great prerogatives the rules gave them to further their own individual ends. Sinclair then examines how partisan polarization affects the politics and the process of lawmaking in a chamber with nonmajoritarian rules and with members accustomed to exploiting those rules fully. What has been the impact of partisan polarization on the relationship between the president and Congress in the policy-making process? Does the president do better or worse at getting bills in a form he likes from Congress when congressional partisanship is high or low? What has been the effect of increasing partisan polarization on whether the president and Congress agree?

The Congressional parties, she argues, have also reacted strategically to their transformed political environment; they have adjusted their behavior so as to try and take advantage of new opportunities the altered environment presents and so as to cope with problems it creates. Strategic responses include the following: 1) a concerted effort by the congressional opposition party to compete with the president in agenda setting; 2) more emphasis by the congressional parties on PR politics, that is on attempts to influence the opinions of attentive publics and sometimes the broader public so as to advantage one's electoral and policy goals; and 3) the use of Senate prerogatives by the minority party to try to seize floor agenda control from the majority, and their use by both the majority and minority, to make the Senate floor a forum for PR politics.

From fluid coalitions to armed camps, not only have elected politicians in Congress and the presidency, political activists, and to a

considerable extent ordinary voters polarized along partisan lines, but so have other key political actors. Interest groups and the media are increasingly firmly aligned with one or the other of the major parties and, in many cases, are functioning as full-fledged members of one of the two party "teams." Sinclair elaborates about how these developments have altered the politics of the policy-making process.

In the remaining chapters, she asks a series of still broader questions about how and why our politics have changed: what has been the impact of partisan polarization on the relationship between the president and Congress in the policy-making process? Have the president and the congressional parties responded strategically to the changed political environment, and if so, how and with what effect? How has the Washington political world of interest groups, policy experts, and the news media changed as a response to the hardening of partisanship, and with what consequences? To what extent and in what ways should we worry about the consequences of partisan polarization and is there anything we can do about them?

Sinclair concludes the book with an even broader overview of the political environment. A half century ago, a group of eminent political scientists decried the then current state of affairs. In a report titled "Towards a More Responsible Two-Party System," they called for parties that "are able to bring forth programs to which they commit themselves and. . .possess sufficient internal cohesion to carry out these programs." Responsible parties, they argued, are the essence of a well-functioning democracy. Political parties seem to meet the requirements of responsible parties as defined by these scholars to a greater extent today than at any time in the past half century. Yet, the contemporary assessment of the parties and of the partisan that characterized them is far from sanguine. Partisan polarization evokes near-apocalyptic hand-wringing from most commentators and many scholars she notes.

To what extent and in what ways should we worry about the consequences of partisan polarization, and is there anything we can do about them? The contemporary political parties do stand for something and do offer citizens a choice, as responsible-parties advocates argue parties in a well-functioning democracy should do. If you agree that politics in a democracy should be about something real and important, the parties that are ideologically polarized are not altogether a bad thing she concludes.

Extremely relevant in the current political climate, *Party Wars* puts all the parts together to provide the impact of polarization on national politics, pinpointing the good, the bad and the ugly. It is Volume 10 in The Julian J. Rothbaum Distinguished Lecture Series at The University of Oklahoma. This is a highly readable text which students of Public Policy, the Congress, American Institutions and American History would all benefit from greatly.

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The editors appreciate the careful reading and helpful comments of the following reviewers for this issue of *OKLAHOMA POLITICS*.

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