


Oklahoma Politics



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OKLAHOMA POLITICS

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THE MODERNIZATION AND REFORM OF THE OKLAHOMA JUDICIARY

PHILLIP SIMPSON
Cameron University

Between 1964 and 1970 trauma and fundamental change swept through the Oklahoma judicial system. In a state not known for its modernizing and reforming impulses, Oklahoma developed the outlines of a modern and effective judiciary. The state court system that prevailed when the scandals of 1964 broke into the open is not at all the state court system we have today. A political and historical analysis of that tumultuous period in Oklahoma judicial history will tell why court reform succeeded then when reform so often fails in Oklahoma. This paper examines the early judiciary and its critique, the push for judicial reform, the Supreme Court scandal of the 1960s, and the eventual reform of the Oklahoma judiciary.

THE ORIGINAL OKLAHOMA JUDICIAL SYSTEM

The judicial system for the new state of Oklahoma, established in the constitution of 1907 and by statute in 1908, retained many of the features of the court system of the Territory of Oklahoma (Gray 1910). This system remained essentially in effect until the new judicial articles were put in place in 1969 (Casey 1989). The first Oklahoma court system was decentralized, democratic, and prone to proliferation.

Though the state Supreme Court was given the power to superintend the state's judiciary, it was the legislature in the beginning and throughout the pre-reform period which played a central if not dominant role in judicial management. Given the politics of the state and the press of the democratic-populist political culture, this resulted in the evolution of a scattered and decentralized judicial system based upon the principle of local control. The democratic impulse was hard to resist in 1907 and it infused Oklahoma's government, including its judiciary. The Oklahoma Constitution "included most of the instruments of direct democracy that spoke to the delegates' faith in popular government" (Scales and Goble 1980). As figure 1 indicates, direct popular election on a partisan ballot was the central feature of judicial election in the state, a form not

to be changed until the 1960s. Even the clerk of the state Supreme Court at first was directly elected.

Democratization and decentralization led to proliferation and the unplanned and uncontrolled growth of various courts with multiple and often conflicting jurisdictions. The legislature was the driving force behind this proliferation, and it appears that log-rolling created local courts as individual legislators or delegations responded to local needs and pressures. The beginning of this proliferation could be seen in 1909 with the creation of superior courts. Established in counties of thirty thousand or more, these courts were limited to a county but had the same civil and criminal jurisdiction as the district and county court except for probate (*Revised Laws* 1910; Ch. 20:471). The need for judges could easily have been handled by increasing the number of county or district judges and by controlling workload and dockets. The legislature also followed its constitutional mandate and created a bifurcated court of last resort. It established a State Supreme Court with final power in civil matters and a Criminal Court of Appeals with final powers in criminal matters (*Revised Laws* 1910; Ch. 18:459).

THE OKLAHOMA JUDICIARY: AN EVALUATION


LAW REVIEW ANALYSIS

In 1951 the editorial staff of the *Oklahoma Law Review* (*Oklahoma Law Review* 1951) gave an excellent overview of Oklahoma's pre-reformed judiciary. This presaged the law school's leadership in developing the political and intellectual push for change in the system. The analysis compared Oklahoma's judiciary to the 1937 American Bar Association (ABA), minimum standards (Vanderbilt 1949). The 1951 evaluation of Oklahoma's judicial systems by ABA standards had several points of interest here.

Judicial Personnel: Judicial Selection, Conduct, and Tenure

The ABA strongly endorsed the Missouri plan of selection "which provides essentially for executive appointment of judges from a panel of three submitted by a non-partisan commission"; judges must then face voters in periodical non-partisan judicial retention in elections (*Oklahoma Law Review* 1951:252-3). The *Oklahoma Law Review* staff was highly critical of the partisan and political nature of state judicial selection. Given first and second primary requirements, Oklahoma judges could face three partisan elections. The ability to

FIGURE 1



raise funds and wage a winning campaign probably had “little relationship to judicial competency.” The law review staff cited the ABA Canon of Judicial Ethics prohibiting judges from engaging in partisan politics and pointed out that Oklahoma judges “often make political speeches and hold membership in partisan political committees. . . and have campaigned for non-judicial office without resigning from the bench” (*Oklahoma Law Review* 1951:253).

Managing the Business of the Courts

The ABA model plan called for three major policies: (a) “a unified judicial system with power and responsibility in one of the judges to assign judges to judicial service so as to relieve congestion of dockets,” (b) “judicial councils should be strengthened with representation accorded the bar and judiciary committees of the legislature,” and (c) “quarterly judicial statistics should be required” (*Oklahoma Law Review* 1951: 255-7). In a broadside on state judicial structure that went far beyond the issues raised by the ABA, the staff described the uncoordinated “jungle” which had been developed in the state:

The Court of Common Pleas and the Superior Court are the result of the haphazard growth of the judicial system in Oklahoma... there is duplication of jurisdiction, delay, excessive cost and waste of judicial manpower... these courts work with a great deal of independence without regard to the system as a whole... the Superior Court of Common Pleas should be abolished... (*Oklahoma Law Review* 1951: 256).

Rule-making: The Judicial Regulation of Procedure

The ABA recommended that “practice and procedure in the courts should be regulated by rules of court; and that, to this end, the courts should be given full rule-making power” (*Oklahoma Law Review* 1951:259). The law school staff wrote that “in the field of judicial administration the Supreme Court of Oklahoma has been most delinquent and the Legislature most active” (*Oklahoma Law Review* 1951:260). The Supreme Court had full rule-making power but had failed to assert it.

The Selection and Service of Juries

The ABA recommended “selection of jurors by commissioners appointed by the court” (*Oklahoma Law Review* 1951: 262). This system was designed to

minimize political influence and to raise the quality of juries. On this point, the law school staff disagreed with the ABA and asserted the commissioner system was inadequate. Oklahoma moved from the commissioner system to the jury wheel system in 1949. The wheel system randomly selects jurors and yields a representative sample, while the commissioner system selects a higher quality but less representative jury. The wheel system is still in use.

Trial Courts of Limited Jurisdiction

The ABA called for the abolition of the justice of the peace (JP) system and the upgrading of judicial professionalism for the lowest level courts. The law school staff agreed that the JP system should be abolished in Oklahoma. This step was taken in the 1960s reform (*Oklahoma Law Review* 1951:267-271).

Trial Practice

The ABA proposed that more power be given to the trial judge to control the conduct of the trial and thereby reduce the tendency to use the trial as a “sporting contest” (*Oklahoma Law Review* 1951: 369-71).

Appellate Practice

Finally, appellate practice was compared and Oklahoma’s judicial system was given mixed reviews regarding procedure. For example, dollar limits should be placed on appeals, according to staff, so that the appeal would not cost more than the case involved. The time, labor, and costs of appeals should be reduced and their efficiency should be enhanced (*Oklahoma Law Review* 1951:381- 409).

Oklahoma made halting progress in some of these areas after 1951. However, the 1960s saw wholesale reform, as state policy makers responded to both scandal and a general push for change.

DEAN SNEED’S EVALUATION

A second critique of the pre-reformed Oklahoma Judiciary came from Dean Earl Sneed of the University of Oklahoma Law School. He stated: “Why in the world is Oklahoma continuing with such an ancient, creaky, inefficient, out-moded, complicated, costly, and antiquated judicial system — a system that was

not good in 1907, and has grown progressively worse in the fifty-eight years since statehood" (Sneed 1965:7).

The first problem, as he saw it, was the justice of the peace system. This system was a good example of the "denial of due process on the criminal side that is inherent in the fee system court." Sneed stated that JP means "judgment for the plaintiff." (Sneed 1965:8).

Sneed also had harsh criticism for the "jumble" of courts that had become the middle layer of the crazy-quilt Oklahoma system:

In 1954, I asked my research assistant, a young man from Walters named Fred R. Harris, to prepare a "short" synopsis of the Oklahoma court system. Now Fred Harris is an exceptionally smart young man. He even began to part his hair in the middle, like his Dean and then boss. Fred produced seven pages of legal size, single spaced material with just the most basic facts about our court system. It would have been longer, but I told Fred that because of the virtual impossibility of the task, he should omit any detail about police and municipal courts and courts of specialized jurisdiction such as the juvenile court in Tulsa County, and that he should just mention the superior courts in Oklahoma. And of course, since Fred did that work in 1954, we have created small claims courts, the children's court in Oklahoma County, the aforementioned special session courts, and city courts. I have added three more pages to Fred's work (Sneed 1965:10).

At the appellate level, Sneed focused on the method of selection, judicial salaries, the lack of a court administrator and the need to centralize rule-making power in the Supreme Court. Sneed proposed to amend the Oklahoma constitution and replace the existing system with one modeled on an ABA plan (*Oklahoma Law Review* 1965:11-18). This model, with revisions, became the "Sneed Plan" for court revision which was placed before the voters in the late 1960s and which prodded the legislature to act on reform.

THE SCANDAL

In the mid 1960s, a Supreme Court scandal rocked Oklahoma politics and the state's judicial community. From the mid-1930s to the mid-1950s, one Oklahoma supreme court justice, N.S. Corn, and possibly four others (Earl Welch, N.B. Johnson, Wayne Bayless, and W.A. Carlile) took bribes to deliver Supreme Court votes, culminating in one huge bribe of \$150,000 in 1956 in the Selected Investments case.

Justice Corn confessed that he shared bribes with fellow justices, the most notable being \$7500 to Justices Earl Welch and N.B. Johnson. Corn testified that he had received \$150,000 in one case. One attorney, a friend of Justice

Corn's for 50 years, had established a pattern of bribery since the 1930s (Hall 1967:417-418).

Justice Corn was sentenced to 18 months in prison in July, 1964. The income tax evasion trial of Justice Earl Welch was tried in mid-1964, and the impeachment trial of N.B. Johnson by the state legislature took place in mid-1965. Nap Johnson was impeached in March, 1965, by the House and convicted in a close vote by the State Senate. Welch was convicted and given a prison sentence (*The Daily and Sunday Oklahoman* April, 1964 - May, 1965; *Lawton Constitution* 28 April 1985:12A).

The scandal hit the Oklahoma Bar Association very hard. Many in state government blamed the bar for the scandal, citing the cozy relationship between it and the courts. As a result, the OBA appointed a special three person committee and supplied staff to investigate the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court gave this committee complete subpoena power. Governor Henry Bellmon appointed a "watchdog" citizen's committee to review the bar findings. The bar committee issued two short reports and one longer and more detailed report of its findings. The Bar committee heard 51 witnesses from November to January, 1965. The final report of Governor Bellmon's Citizen's Committee endorsed the OBA Committee work, and the American Bar Association gave the OBA an Award of Merit. The bar felt it had faced up to the challenge and "cleaned its own house." This included disbarment of several justices and attorneys and additional forced resignations from the bench. Further, the bar announced the creation of a "Standing Committee on Judicial Performance" to hear complaints. The OBA also renewed its support for the five-point legislative program adopted by its delegates in 1964: a court on the judiciary, a modified Missouri plan of selection, a general sessions court to replace the JP, a district attorney system, and a court administrator (*Oklahoma Bar Association Journal* 1965:215- 217; 601-615; 703-704; 1507-1514). Indeed, the OBA had been moving toward reform in the early 1960s before the scandal. The bar had joined forces with the law schools (Dean Sneed, for example) to hold conferences on reform and to build the Oklahoma Institute of Justice, a communication net to analyze reform issues.

OKLAHOMA GETS JUDICIAL REFORM

Calls for reform were heard all over the state as the scandal ran its course (Hays 1970). This was especially true in the metropolitan press. For people in the bar and law schools, this was "I told you so time", as they pressed forward with long advocated reforms. Many expected quick action in the 1965 legisla-

ture, but the only progress made was with the court on the judiciary. The Court on the Judiciary was voted down in 1964 but adopted in 1966 (*Oklahoma Elections: Statehood to Present*, Vol. II, July, 1988: D458-D471). A bill allowing the Supreme Court to create administrative districts and the district attorney system did pass, but reform of judicial selection and tenure failed. An office of court administrator failed to pass the House in the committee of the whole, and a general sessions court and reform of the justice of the peace courts were indefinitely postponed (*Oklahoma Bar Association Journal* 1965:1229).

The legislature failed to act for two basic reasons. Many legislators simply did not support reform, especially the Missouri plan of merit selection and non-partisan judicial retention elections. Secondly, House Judiciary Committee chair John McCune decided to do a study of the issue of court reform. He wanted nothing less than a two-year study by the legislature, and warned against instant court reform. With a reputation for interim investigations that the Tulsa press called legendary, McCune launched his study through the vehicle of the Legislative Council (*Tulsa Tribune* 17 May 1965:1-2).

On the opposition side, one had to look no further than the Speaker of the House, J.D. McCarty. The debate on judicial bills in the 1965 session outlined this opposition, and the focus was almost always the method of selecting judges. Saying that McCarty must bear the blame for the death of judicial reforms, especially the Missouri plan and the JP bill, *The Daily Oklahoman* called for McCarty to put the reforms to a vote of the people. McCarty stated that he would rather trust one million voters than a commission, and called the Missouri Plan "asinine and silly". The paper retorted: if the voters are so smart, why not let them choose their system (*The Daily Oklahoman* 20 June 1965:1).

There were Senators who opposed the Missouri plan. Senator Gene Stipe stated that the bar needed reforming, not put in control. The plan would, he said, create "Hitler-type elections, with only one name on the ballot". Senator Young called the plan "the most diabolic scheme ever devised by man in the name of reform." Those supporting the system felt that judges should have to run on their record and not have to raise money to campaign from lawyers who practice in their courts (*The Daily Oklahoman*, 25 June 1965:6, 26 June 1965: 8, 7 July 1965:1).

In March, 1965, Governor Bellmon appointed a commission to study court reform. This was apparently an attempt to bridge the gap on reform as the panel had both Earl Sneed and John McCune as members. Sneed knew what he wanted but McCune did not, and these two later came to political blows over the Sneed plan. Sneed and McCune pretty well tell the tale of court reform from 1965-1968. Sneed, as stated in his 1965 law review article, was ready to go all the way with a petition drive if necessary. McCune wanted more study in the legis-

lature. A race for time developed as it became clear that whoever got his proposal to the voters first would win the court reform fight. Sneed had to go to the voters first for an initiative petition since the legislature itself was not willing to refer his plan to the electorate. That would take time. McCune had to study and study again, then get a legislative majority, and then submit proposals to the voters. That would take time.

The elections of 1966 occurred during all this activity, and the results sent a chilling signal to the anti-reformers. J.D.McCarty was beaten for re-election by a funeral director, and Dewey Bartlett defeated reform opponent Preston Moore for the governorship.

THE SNEED PLAN REFERENDUM

Earl Sneed, Leroy Blackstock, and Clark Thomas formed Judicial Reform Inc. in June, 1966 to organize a public effort behind an initiative petition that would embody the Sneed plan of court reform. The Sneed plan would have four levels of courts: one civil-criminal Supreme Court (the Court of Criminal Appeals would be abolished); intermediate appellate courts; a district court; and magistrate courts to replace JP courts. The Missouri plan would apply to the first three levels although county voters were given the option later of going to a non-partisan plan if they so chose on the district courts. District courts would appoint the magistrates and city courts would be exempt from the Missouri Plan. The Supreme Court would have almost complete superintending power over the judicial system (save for legislative appropriations) much like regents control Oklahoma's higher education (*The Daily Oklahoman* 14 June 1966:13; 19 July 1966:11; 31 August 1966:6).

The Sneed plan, with the help of the Oklahoma City press and the League of Women Voters, was ultimately placed on the ballot in the 1968 primary. The drive was marked by JP inspired legal challenges and spirited community efforts to get names on the petition. Marvin Cavnar, a JP, filed a legal challenge to the effect that the Sneed plan violated the U.S. Constitution by removing the public's right to vote for judges. The state Supreme Court dismissed the suit. Signs by petitioners read: "take judges out of politics, modernize Oklahoma court system, remove stain of court scandals." As the petition deadline neared, pro-Sneed people worked harder, driven by the press, especially *The Daily Oklahoman*. In Oklahoma City and Tulsa, the Parent Teacher Association (PTA) carried petitions in the evening on a "porchlight" drive. The opposition was given time through the spring of 1967 to check the validity of signatures. In late April, 1967, Judicial Reform Inc. won another ballot battle as Secretary of State John

Rogers ruled in their favor. The Supreme Court cleared away the last legal challenges in November, 1967, and Governor Bartlett set the vote on the Sneed reform for September 17, 1968 (*The Daily Oklahoman* 15 June 1966 - 15 November 1967).

THE LEGISLATURE ACTS

The politics of developing the legislative plan was much more complicated than the petition process. One can say a number of things about the legislative process that produced court reform in Oklahoma. The scandal was instrumental in moving the legislature as far as it did; the Sneed plan was forever in the mind of the legislature; and the more liberal Senate forced the issue on a modified Missouri plan for the appellate courts with the strong backing of Governor Bartlett.

Led by John McCune of Tulsa, the Judiciary Committee of the Legislative Council studied and hammered out a court reform proposal by the first half of 1967. The committee held hearings and traveled to Illinois to explore the new court system of that state. By August, 1966, the committee had settled on the Illinois plan of court organization for the trial courts and a court administrator. McCune also felt that the people in Illinois did not want to give too much power over the courts to the Supreme Court. The trial court plan finally became law in Oklahoma: an umbrella district court, one associate judge per county, and special judges chosen by district judges for minor matters (in place of the old JP system). The legislature later decided to keep the bifurcated system of final appeals for Oklahoma after hearing strong arguments from the Court of Criminal Appeals. But it inserted the possibility that intermediate appeals courts could be added by statute, which has been done in the area of civil appeals (*Tulsa World*, 9 July 1966:1; *The Daily Oklahoman* 21 August 1966 - 17 September 1966).

The real issue was selection, with proposals ranging from partisan election to a full Missouri plan. Illinois had a system which combined both — initial selection on a partisan ballot with a retention vote at the end of the term. Oklahoma never really considered this system, and McCune evidently favored non-partisan election of all judges save the special judges. He was forced to compromise with the Senate over the Missouri plan for appellate justices, leaving district and associate justices elective on a non-partisan ballot.

By the end of March, the McCune plan had been sent on to the Senate, where judiciary chairman Robert Gee and President Pro Tempore Clem McSpadden favored some form of the Missouri plan, as did Governor Bartlett. The combined senate-house judiciary committees, working under the Judicial

Council, had actually started a compromise on the issue in the fall of 1966. The conclusion then was to divide the issues for the public into separate referendum on organization and selection — in other words, put both issues up to the public for a vote. This is essentially what happened (*The Daily Oklahoman* 24 September 1966:1-2; 3 December 1966:17).

By April, 1967, Senator Gee and other pro-reform senators were locking horns with Senator John Young and his allies, who had endorsed non-partisan election of all judges. Young won the first round as the Senate backed away from the Missouri Plan. The governor applied pressure on the Senate to restore the Missouri plan for appellate judges, leaving trial judges elective on a non-partisan ballot. Fears were expressed that if the legislature failed to let the voters choose on the Missouri plan, the luster would be lost and the voters would turn to the Sneed plan. With leadership and gubernatorial pressure on the final conferees, a compromise was reached which stuck: let the people vote on organization with a built-in non-partisan election system on one ballot (a white ballot), but then let the voters also vote on a yellow ballot which contained appointment for the appellate court. In other words, the yellow ballot would amend the white ballot if passed, but the yellow ballot would not go into effect if the white ballot failed (*The Daily Oklahoman* 11 April 1967 - 9 May 1967).

What ensued was a McCune-led campaign to sell the legislative package to the voters before they got a chance to vote on the Sneed plan in 1968. The legislature's plan drew support from a wide range of sources, including organized labor and Governor Bartlett. Even the Sneed group endorsed the plan as a first step toward reform. The voter turnout was anticipated to be light as heavy opposition failed to materialize. The strongest opposition came from the JP's, but they had lost most of the battles up to this point. Shortly before the vote, the OBA endorsed the plan, as Jack Hays declared that a bar consensus was behind the legislative referendum. The press felt that the vote would turn on the voters' perception of the scandal — if they saw the scandal as being rooted in how judges run for office, the measures would pass. Both the white and the yellow ballot plans passed in part because of lopsided margins in Tulsa and Oklahoma City (*The Daily Oklahoman* 11 May 1967 - 12 July 1967).

The remainder of 1967 and most of 1968 was spent on debating the Sneed plan and passing enabling legislation under the new constitutional provisions. It was quite clear that Gee and McCune were not going to wait on the Sneed vote in order to put the new judicial system in place; in fact, McCune argued that the Sneed plan should be turned down because the handiwork of the legislature would have to be done all over again if the Sneed plan passed.

In speeches and debates across the state, McCune, Sneed, Gee, and Blackstock laid out the pros and cons of the Sneed plan. In Purcell, McCune

asserted that the plan would create chaos in the court system. In addition, the public would lose its right to elect local judges to an "army" of the governor's commissioners. Young judge's widows could, he said, draw big money under the Sneed plan, the Sneed plan would give the Supreme Court far too much power and take the legislature out of the balance of power picture; the Sneed plan would destroy the needed Industrial Court; and finally the Sneed plan would destroy the Court of Criminal Appeals and thereby put 450 new cases to the Supreme Court (*Purcell Register* 29 August 1968:1). In a Tulsa debate with McCune, Blackstock called voting for judges a myth. Most either get appointed or never draw an opponent; at least under the Sneed plan the voter would always get to vote on the judges's record. He also asserted that the legislature cannot get used to the idea that the courts should run their own business. McCune retorted that the Sneed plan would put so much power in the hands of the court that it could not handle issues like the recent scandal — the legislative check was needed. With the metropolitan press badly divided (Tulsa against, Oklahoma City for) and the public highly confused, the Sneed plan was defeated by a vote of 115,650 to 171,620 (*Tulsa Tribune* 6 September 1968:1; *The Daily Oklahoman* 18 September 1968:1-2).

CONCLUSIONS

One early force for court reform was the flow of judicial modernization theory from national and international sources into the Oklahoma judicial elite (Winters, 1965:115-126). As the legal elite modernized after statehood the older frontier legal order began to change. In the post World War II period the Oklahoma Bar Association made a definite commitment to reform, and by 1964 it had endorsed many ABA judicial administration guidelines, including the Missouri Plan for appellate courts. This period reflects an increasing immersion of the Oklahoma Bar in national bar activities and ideas. As the reform movement of the 1960s developed, several sub-bar groups formed to communicate reform impulses to the public and government, the Oklahoma Institute for Justice and Judicial Reform, Inc. being the two most visible.

The reform process eventually involved the formal structure of state government, public opinion, the mass media, and the political parties. A highly visible scandal on the state Supreme Court served as a strong catalyst for reform and deeply impacted the policy process and communication flow dealing with the issues of judicial reform. A sleeping public was suddenly awakened by the thud of the scandal, and the old frontier paradigm of judicial politics was fundamentally challenged. The bar became the locus for investigating the judiciary,

and legislators became conduits for bar reform proposals. State Representative John McCune of Tulsa was probably the most important of these. Judicial reform became an important issue in the 1966 race for governor, and interest groups such as the League of Women Voters became involved.

Extensive court reform, especially in package form, would have been a real uphill battle in the 1960s without the impetus of scandal. Yet the political process which produced court reform in Oklahoma was a healthy and predictable mix which demonstrates that the state is in the mainstream of state policy development in the country. The new court system comes closer to ABA models and approaches unified court theory, especially at the district court level.

The reform fight in Oklahoma was indeed a clash between democratic and legal subcultures, and these issues were joined in the fight over the Missouri plan in the legislature and in the public debate (both cultures won something). The democratic and traditionalistic subcultures also cross in the judicial system, producing demands on government for public control of the courts without corresponding ability to properly monitor that system. The legal culture has some strong selling points with the public, the strongest one being that almost everyone believes in objective justice in the courtroom.

Finally, the whole process of systemic reform at any level in this country is fraught with danger and difficulty, and success is unpredictable. The process of reform in Oklahoma was fed by the judicial reform movement in the rest of the country during this period, as a stream of ideas, people, and events flowed into the Oklahoma political process, but the scandal congealed the state's commitment to widespread reform.

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RELIGION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN OKLAHOMA CITY¹

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This study investigates the rate of political participation among Protestant evangelicals and fundamentalists in Oklahoma City. Using data collected by the 1991 Oklahoma City Survey (N=394), two competing hypotheses are tested. One hypothesis proposes that Evangelical and Fundamentalist Protestants (EFPs) strongly favor otherworldly preparations over personal involvement in political activities. This is found not to be the case. The competing hypothesis that the New Christian Right perceives a danger in the moral decay of American society and, therefore, participates more actively in politics also is found wanting. Participation in religious activities was found to be the significant indicator of political activity.

Religious commitment and affiliation only recently have become variables for investigation. Interest in the importance of religion and its effect on political affairs was spurred by the increased political activism of a "loose coalition of groups grounded in religious fundamentalism," often referred to as the New Christian Right [NCR] (Bruce 1988). This coalition, disturbed by their perception of a growing national trend toward immorality and led by outspoken preachers like Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson, was a significant political factor in the presidential elections of 1980, 1984, and 1988 (see Hertzke 1993, Chapter 4).

Political science has not clearly demonstrated whether the coalition of Evangelical and Fundamentalist Protestant denominations is a viable political actor. Two alternative hypotheses emerge from the literature. First, some contend that Evangelical and Fundamentalist Protestants (EFPs) focus on otherworldly concerns, such as assuring a place in "God's Kingdom," believing that all social and political problems will be solved at the "Second Coming." Thus, one would expect members of evangelical and fundamentalist denominations are less likely to participate in the political sphere than members of other denominations.

The second hypothesis proposes that evangelical and fundamentalist Prot-

estants are more active in politics than the members of other denominations. The argument for this is based on research suggesting that churches promote the fulfillment of civic obligations (Macaluso and Wanat 1979) and provide organizational skills and social contacts necessary to understand politics (Hougland and Christenson 1983). Churches provide a social context allowing for the transmission of implicit and explicit political messages (Wald, Owen, and Hill 1988). Participation in church decision making and other activities also has been found to “spill over” into political activity (Peterson 1992).

Using data collected from a random sample of Oklahoma City residents, the present research attempts to assess both arguments, while testing a potential third alternative — that participation in political activities is not determined by evangelical or fundamentalist beliefs.

RELIGION AS AN INDEPENDENT VARIABLE

Only recently has the impact of religion entered into political analyses. This fact is understandable when considering that most social scientists follow a “secularization” paradigm which suggests that as nations industrialize and become more socially developed, religion becomes less important in the public sphere of society. Following this paradigm, one concludes that because the United States is highly developed economically, Americans should live in a secular society. In fact, this is not true, as current public opinion evidence illustrates (Wald 1992, chapter 1; Niemi, Mueller, and Smith 1989; Benson 1981).

With the growing influence of the New Christian Right in the late 1970s and 1980s and the media attention given to American religions and religious leaders, political scientists began to include religious characteristics as independent variables in a variety of studies, including some on political participation (Guth, et al. 1988). Between 1976 and 1981, “ten studies, seven national and three local, compared the political activities and attitudes of evangelicals with those of persons with other religious views.” These studies found evangelicals to be the most active (Wuthnow 1983, 168). The increased political activity of EFPs created a “new” area of study for political scientists.

Prior to the 1970s, researchers found that while mainline Protestant denominations were active in political and social affairs, more conservative Protestants were not (Winter 1973). Members of conservative churches were following the direction of their leaders. Evangelical publications such as *Christianity Today* avoided discussing political issues except when admonishing readers to eschew politics (Wuthnow 1983, 172). Members of conservative Protestant denominations often were directed to the example of Christ:

He refused to enmesh himself or his followers in the economic, social and political problems of his day — problems certainly as serious as those we face today. . . . He made it crystal clear that we are to seek 'first the kingdom of God and his righteousness' — carefully pointing out that 'the kingdom is within you' (Pew 1966, 53).

The withdrawal from a secular and immoral society is illustrated well in Ammerman's (1987) case study of a fundamentalist denomination. Ammerman's study also provides another explanation for low political activity among EFPs: because most members of such denominations are active in church work, they are too busy to participate in other political activities. However, this conclusion is contradicted by evidence showing that church activity is positively related to political activity (Peterson 1992; Martinson and Wilkening 1987; Hougland and Christenson 1983; Macaluso and Wanat 1979).

The 1960s and early 1970s comprised a turbulent period in American history. Mainline Protestant churches joined protests for civil rights and against American involvement in Vietnam. Among the more conservative denominations, there was confusion. Although most were in favor of civil rights, Southern congregations did not accept the methods used to bring the segregation problem to the public's attention. Empirical studies conducted before the mid-1970s showed that evangelicals were politically inactive. These studies found that "orthodox religious belief correlated negatively with support for clergy being involved in political activities" (Gibbs, et al. 1973); direct communication between public officials and churchgoers was less common for evangelicals than nonevangelicals (Davidson 1972); and religious commitment was inversely correlated with political activity (Wimberley 1978).

Since the late 1970s, research (and conventional wisdom) has provided evidence that the New Christian Right is taking a more active role in politics. Born-again churchgoers were as likely to be registered to vote as other churchgoers according to a 1976 Gallup Poll, and would have been more likely to vote if other demographic characteristics had been controlled (Wuthnow 1983, 168). Another survey "found that persons scoring high on a scale of conservative religious commitment were more likely to have voted in local elections than were persons scoring low on the scale" (Wuthnow 1983, 169; also Macaluso and Wanat 1979; Martinson and Wilkening 1987).

There are three possible reasons for the discrepancy between early and more recent examinations of the political participation of EFPs. First, and most obvious, is that Evangelical and Fundamentalist Protestants are actually participating more actively in politics today than before.

The second reason could lie in methodological difficulties. Wuthnow contends that studies conducted in the 1960s and 1970s may have been "biased

against evangelicals” because of the subjects under examination (1983, 171). Many researchers in the 1960s and 1970s were trying to understand the political activism of the liberal churches and how activism was transferred from clergy to parishioners. The surveys may have carried connotations about issues, particularly civil rights, which members of conservative denominations may have found difficult to answer (Wuthnow 1983, 171-172).

Researchers have also been unclear about the distinctions between fundamentalists and evangelicals. Usually social scientists group the many Protestant denominations into a small number of categories which vary along some dimension of religious conservatism to religious liberalism (e.g. Wilcox 1986). Other more empirically based schemes, like Glock and Stark (1965), failed to take into account the proliferation of new Protestant denominations.

The discrepancy between the two threads of argument could depend upon a third reason, that of issue salience. EFPs are mobilized politically only on issues they see as important for maintaining the moral fiber of the United States. The social issues important to the New Christian Right are articulated well in documents like the “Christian Bill of Rights” advocated by the Moral Majority (Wald 1992, 233-234). The “amendments” include opposition to abortion, support for prayer in public schools, government maintenance of the traditional family unit, and “noninterference” by the government in the activities of Christian schools. Ammerman (1987) also suggests that fundamentalist Protestants yearn for the evolution of the United States into a “Christian nation” and follow the direction of their church leaders in working toward that goal.

HYPOTHESES

In sum, previous research suggests two hypotheses. First, EFPs forsake political activity for other worldly preparations. This political abstinence hypothesis is supported if these EFPs score lower on participation scales than the other religious groups tested. Second, because of the perceived moral decay of this country, EFPs participate more fully in politics than do other religious groups. High scores of political participation would support this contention. Research also points to the importance of participation in church activities as a precursor to political activity (Peterson 1992; Wald, Owen and Hill 1988; Hougl and Christenson 1983). A third alternative is possible — that religious beliefs have no impact on political participation — and would be supported if the relationship between religious denomination and political participation do not withstand the effects of socioeconomic control variables.

SAMPLE

Data to compare political activity across categories of religious affiliation were collected as part of the annual Oklahoma City Survey conducted by the Department of Sociology, University of Oklahoma, in spring 1991. A simple random sample of 394 adults (18 and older) was drawn from the *R.L. Polk Directory* for the city. The respondents completed the survey instrument in face-to-face interviews with trained research assistants. Members of the original sample who refused to participate or who could not be located were replaced by random selection.² Non-Christian respondents were deleted leaving 375 cases for the analysis.

MEASURES

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Political participation is measured by a series of 12 items coded 1 if the respondent has engaged in the activity and 0 if not. The items were adapted in whole from Verba and Nie's seminal work (1972, Appendix B). The items, their means, standard deviations, and factor loadings are presented in Table 1. Principle components analysis of the 12 items yielded three factors. The items loading best on each of the three components are combined as scales. The first three items (Component 1), combine to form "Voting." The next four items (Component 2) are combined as "Campaign Activity." The last three items (Component 3) combine to form "Collective Activity." These orthogonal factors represent three of the four modes of political participation described by Verba and Nie (1972).

The fourth mode of political participation identified by Verba and Nie (1972) is "citizen-initiated contacts," partially measured by two items. Since these items did not load cleanly on a factor they are removed from further analysis.

The present study is primarily concerned with understanding the role religion plays in political *behavior*. Thus, the survey items were designed to measure respondents' level of political activity by asking general questions about participation (Wuthnow 1983).

RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION

This research uses the General Social Survey by Smith (1990) to classify

TABLE 1

Means, Standard Deviations and Factor Loadings for Political Participation Items

Item	Mean	Standard Deviation	Factor Loadings		
			Voting	Campaign Activity	Collective Activity
Voted in General Election in Nov. 1990	.64	.48	.930	.112	.038
Almost Always Vote in Local Elections	.56	.50	.816	.184	.079
Registered to Vote	.73	.44	.875	.120	.051
Tried to Show People Why They Should Vote for One of the Parties or Candidates in Past 3 or 4 Years	.46	.50	.130	.617	.195
Attended Political Meetings or Rallies in Past 3 or 4 Years	.19	.39	.023	.693	.213
Contributed Money to Political Party, Candidate, or Cause in Past 3 or 4 Years	.24	.43	.115	.518	.100
Have Worn a Campaign Button, Put a Sticker on Car or Sign in Yard or Window in Past 3 or 4 Years	.42	.49	.090	.724	-.040
Worked with Others to Solve Community Problems in Past 3 or 4 Years	.35	.48	.081	.103	.731
Took Part in Forming Group to Solve Community Problem in Past 3 or 4 Years	.14	.35	-.022	.008	.759
Demonstrated in Protest or Support of Some Action, etc., in Past 3 or 4 Years	.16	.36	-.006	.226	.528
Written to Official on County, State, or National Level in Past 3 or 4 Years	.35	.48	.167	.536	.340
Personally Contacted Member of Local Community about a Problem in Past 3 or 4 Years	.27	.45	.172	.330	.559

*Codes are as follows: 1=yes, 0=no, n=375

SOURCE: Author's calculations from 1991 Oklahoma City Survey.

respondents into affiliation categories. The scheme divides members of Protestant denominations into fundamentalists, moderates, and liberals. Because the sample does not contain enough liberals to include as a separate category, the liberal and moderate categories are combined to create a single category. The present study also adjusts the scheme to compensate for the lack of agreement in social science about the doctrinal and historical differences between fundamentalists and evangelicals (Kellstedt and Smidt 1991). The denominations Smith called "fundamentalist" are placed in the EFP category.

Self-reported affiliation is the measure of evangelicalism and fundamentalism. This measure is more parsimonious than using a scale of doctrinal beliefs (Burton, Johnson, and Tamney 1989; Hood and Morris 1985; Rothenberg and Newport 1984; Ethridge and Feagin 1979) and accurately follows from previous research on the relationship between religion and political activity (Peterson 1992; Wald, Owen, and Hill 1988; Hougland and Christenson 1983; Macaluso and Wanat 1979).

Considering that Oklahoma City is in what is known as the "Bible Belt," it is not surprising that most respondents (53%) reported an affiliation with an Evangelical or Fundamentalist denomination. Methodists ($n = 45$) are the largest denomination in the liberal and moderate category which includes 26% of the respondents. While Smith's scheme probably contains some classification errors, it is still more empirically grounded than the schemes used in previous research (e.g., Hougland and Christenson 1983).

Persons identifying themselves as Catholics and those claiming no religious affiliation are included as separate categories comprising 11% and 8% of the respondents, respectively.

BIBLICAL LITERALNESS

In light of the controversy about identifying EFPs (e.g. Kellstedt and Smidt 1991), the questionnaire included four items measuring belief in a literal interpretation of the Bible. Each was answered on a four-point Likert scale with response options ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. The items were:

- (1) I believe the miracles described in the Bible really happened; they are not just stories;
- (2) I believe in a literal interpretation of the Bible;
- (3) I believe that Jesus truly rose from the dead;
- (4) I believe that those who do not accept God will go to hell after their death.

Factor analysis indicates one factor which is labeled Biblical Literalness. The linear composite of z-scores has a reliability of .83. The mean scores on this scale are +1.31 for EFPS, -.88 for Liberal and Moderate Protestants (LMPs), -1.08 for Catholics, and -3.95 for respondents claiming no religious affiliation. Pairwise comparisons show EFP means are significantly different from the means for each of the other categories ($p < .001$).

PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC RELIGIOUS ACTIVITY

Evidence suggests that high levels of public religious activity are positively related to political activity, or what is known as the "spillover effect" (Peterson 1992). The present research measures public religious participation using respondents' reports of (1) the number of times in the past month they had attended worship services, (2) the number of times in the past month they had participated in church-related activities other than worship services, and (3) the number of church-related groups (e.g., Bible discussion group, choir, sports team) to which they belonged.³ Participation in public religious activity is measured by the linear composite of the z-scores of these items. The scale has a Cronbach's alpha of .850, which indicates that each item is reliably measuring the same underlying phenomenon.

CONTROL VARIABLES

Standard socioeconomic and demographic variables found by others (Conway 1991; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Verba and Nie 1972) to correlate with political participation are included as controls. Gender is a dummy variable coded 1 for males (45%), and race is a dummy variable coded 1 for whites (83%). Age (mean = 46.7, standard deviation = 17.8) and education (mean = 13.5, standard deviation = 2.7) are interval variables measured in years. Post-high school training such as trade school is treated as equivalent to a year of college. Although other measures of socioeconomic status were considered as controls, Conway (1991) indicates that education is the primary socioeconomic variable which influences political participation.

ANALYSIS

Bivariate correlations (Table 2) show clearly that self-identified religious affiliation is not associated with Voting, Campaign Activity, or Collective Acti-

TABLE 2

Correlation of Religious Affiliation (Dummy Variables) Religious Attitudes, Sex, Race, Age and Education with Political Activity Measures.

	Voting	Campaign Activity	Collective Activity
No Religious Affiliation	-.059	-.032	-.046
Catholic	.018	-.035	-.003
LMP	.057	.118	-.019
EFP	-.030	-.064	.044
Biblical Literalness	-.060	-.033	.005
Religious Participation	.261*	.130*	.177*
Male	-.028	.102*	.054
White	.096*	.057	-.077
Age	.245*	-.030	-.109*
Education	.221*	.231*	.201*
N=375			

*Significant at the .05 level.

SOURCE: See Table 1.

vity. None of the bivariate correlations approaches significance at the .05 level.

The Biblical Literalness scale also exhibits no correlation to the political activity measures. As predicted by the spillover effect, religious participation is positively and significantly correlated with the three modes of political participation (Peterson 1992).

Table 3 reports multivariate analyses in the form of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. Since direction is predicted, one-tailed tests of significance are appropriate. The standardized regression coefficients (betas) are reported

to facilitate comparisons of the relative magnitudes of the effects of the independent variables. In the twelve equations of Table 3, the four religious affiliation categories are captured by dummy variables for No Religious Affiliation, Catholic, and LMP. EFP is the suppressed category coded 0 on all three of the other denominational categories. Thus, the coefficient for any one of the dummy variables compares that denomination category to EFP, with all other variables controlled. These coefficients are expected to be negative because it was contended in one of the hypotheses that EFPs participate in political activities more than members of other religious groups with other variables controlled.

Table 3 reports four equations for each mode of political participation analyzed. Equation I includes only the denomination variables. Equation II introduces the religious participation scale and Equation III adds control variables. Equation IV includes the Biblical Literalness scale. Across the three modes of participation, Equation I indicates that affiliation fails to have a significant effect on level of political activity. The introduction of religious participation in Equation III shows that this variable has a significant effect on Voting and Collective Activity, but a less significant effect on Campaign Activity. The introduction of the control variables in Equation III suggests that EFPs closely resemble other denominations in levels of political activity. The strengths of the relationships in Equation III are not weakened by including Biblical Literalness into the model.

Age and years of education have the strongest direct effect on Voting while Religious Participation also has a significant effect. Education has a significant positive effect on Campaign Activity. Religious participation and gender (coded 1 for male) have significant positive effects ($p=.035$ and $p=.043$, respectively). Years of education and religious participation have similar direct effects on Collective Activity. These findings confirm the findings of earlier research on the correlates of political participation (Conway 1991; Cobb and Elder 1983; Milbrath and Goel 1977; Verba and Nie 1972; Pateman 1970).

DISCUSSION

The present research examines the relationship between religious affiliation and activity and political activity among Oklahoma City residents. The data failed to support either hypothesis: that EFPs participate in political activities less than persons in other religious groups or that EFPs participate more than persons in other religious groups. The political participation of EFPs appears to be affected by the same influences as other persons.

The findings confirm that political participation is best predicted by the

TABLE 3
OLS Regressions of Voting, Campaign Activity, and Collective Activity on Religious Affiliation and Control Variables.*

Equations:	Voting				Campaign Activity				Collective Activity			
	I Beta	II Beta	III Beta	IV Beta	I Beta	II Beta	III Beta	IV Beta	I Beta	II Beta	III Beta	IV Beta
No Religious Affiliation	-.046	.029	.937	-.024	-.013	.025	-.018	-.004	-.053	-.005	-.032	-.027
Catholic	.025	.065	.030	.015	-.011	.008	-.013	-.006	-.016	.010	-.003	-.001
LMP	.055	.078	-.005	-.024	.113**	.124**	.090	.099	-.032	-.017	-.025	.011
Religious Participation		.274**	.193**	.209**		.137**	.114**	.106		.177**	.162**	.159*
Biblical Literalness				-.079				.039				.011
Male			-.024	-.031			.103**	.106**			.051	.052
White			.063	.063			.057	.057			-.044	-.044
Age (years)			.289**	.288**			-.032	-.031			-.098	-.098
Education (years)			.244**	.221**			.193**	.203**			.164**	.168*
R ²	(.01)	(.08)**	(.19)**	(.20)**	(.01)	(.03)**	(.09)**	(.09)**	(.00)	(.03)**	(.08)**	(.08)**

*EFP is the suppressed category in the dummy variables for religious affiliation.

**Significant at .05 level, one-tail.

SOURCE: See Table 1.

standard socioeconomic variables examined in much previous research. However, there is also a spillover effect with those persons participating in public religious activities participating in partisan activities as well. These findings support the recent analysis of General Social Survey data by Peterson (1992), where he finds a spillover effect between religion and politics.

On the whole, this research contradicts most research on the effect of religion on politics. The findings here do not repudiate the theory that Evangelical and Fundamentalist Protestants eschew politics. But they also do not support the conventional wisdom that Evangelical and Fundamentalist Protestants participate more actively in political affairs. The answer to the contradiction presented here could lie in matters of time and space. Because political participation is less static than presented by this research, it is quite possible that EFPs would participate in political activity more when such activities are stimulated by a salient issue.

This research is a case study of one community and not a definitive study of the relationship between religion and political participation. Since EFPs are the major religious group in the city, members of this group may feel comfortable in a community where their beliefs and values are shared by many others. Many of the political leaders they choose hold the same religious and moral beliefs which are transformed into public policy. Of course, the minority denominational groups also exhibited little political activity. For example, the local daily newspaper, *The Daily Oklahoman*, discourages the religious from participating in politics by describing government as ineffective and corrupt.⁴

To better understand the findings from Oklahoma City, similar studies should be conducted in other regions of the country. The factor of time also needs to be considered. While Oklahoma City may seem comfortably moral for evangelical and fundamentalist Protestants today, the environment may change later in the decade.

Another possible explanation for the seemingly contradictory findings presented in the research could lie in the theological differences among EFPs. The denominational groups can be divided into two doctrinal "camps": premillennialists and postmillennialists. Pretribulation EFPs believe that Christ will come after the moral state of the world has decayed into crisis, and are less likely to participate in secular political activity. Posttribulation EFPs believe that Christ will return only after Christians have evangelized. Thus, political activity is necessary to return society to a high moral and ethical standard. Wilcox, Linzey, and Jelen (1991) contend that premillennialists can be mobilized by church leaders to participate in politics even if they view such secular activity as futile, by casting such activity as a fight against the Devil.

Unfortunately, Smith's classification scheme does not allow such distinc-

tions within the EFP category. One speculation is that premillennialists in the sample could be obscuring the political activity of the postmillennialists. The political and social environment in which churches exist has an effect on the political participation of parishioners. As a sizable majority of the population, EFPs in the Bible Belt, may not feel threatened. Since they do not perceive a threat, these Protestants may not find it necessary to take part in political activities to return their community to more Christian values (Ammerman 1987). Thus, the premillennialists are not mobilized to action and prefer to retreat into their "otherworldly" preparations.

NOTES

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²To assure that the sample is representative of the population, it was compared to the 1990 Census data from Oklahoma City. The sample does not differ significantly from the 1990 population in percent male (46% in the sample; 47% in the population) or percent white (82% in the sample; 84% in the population).

³The distributions of all three items are skewed in a positive direction. To correct for skewness, positive outliers were recoded to the 90th percentile. The truncated items were subjected to a principal components analysis revealing the presence of a single factor.

⁴In the course of presenting my findings to several groups of worshipers at EFP denominations, most agreed that the influence of *The Daily Oklahoman* could be dissuading religious persons from becoming active in politics.

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**DAVID AND GOLIATH:
MEDIA EFFECTS IN THE 1990 OKLAHOMA STATE
TREASURER'S RACE**

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This study adds to the debate on media effects in political campaigns by examining the 1990 Oklahoma State Treasurer's race. Extensive interviews with participants in the race supported the hypothesis that Oklahoma City TV news had a significant effect on the outcome of the race.

The power of the press is debated in political science. C. Wright Mills (1956) argued the media control public thinking. V.O. Key (1961) argued the media have little effect. Part of the reason for this debate is the difficulty in separating for study, media effects from other political effects on voting behavior. A variety of political effects are recognized as part of the voting decision. In the 1950s studies concentrated on party identification as the primary predictor of an individual's vote (see Campbell et al. 1960). More recent studies found campaign financing, candidate gender, incumbent advantage, media coverage, and other factors helped determine electoral outcomes (Niemi and Weisberg 1993). Isolating, quantifying, and demonstrating the effect of each of these factors individually is always a problem. The 1990 Oklahoma State Treasurer's race provided a rare opportunity to separate these effects.

The race pitted a poorly financed Republican challenger, Claudette Henry, against a well financed Democratic incumbent, Ellis Edwards. Even Henry compared the race to the battle between David and Goliath (Ford 1990). Everyone involved in the race agreed that media effects were responsible for Henry's victory. Edwards had all of the conventionally understood advantages. Only the relentless depictions of scandal in his office by *The Daily Oklahoman*, the *Tulsa World* and KOCO Channel 5 can explain the election outcome.

This paper documents the story of the 1990 Oklahoma State Treasurer's race and examines media effects on the election result. Content analysis measured differences in bias between Oklahoma's two major newspapers. Voting returns and circulation rates demonstrated which areas of the state were most affected. Interviews with participants were used for anecdotal evidence. The

paper argues that certain media biases against the incumbent were present. Without the effects of these biases on voters' preferences the challenger would not have won.

DISADVANTAGES FOR THE CHALLENGER

The challenger faced seemingly insurmountable obstacles in the 1990 Oklahoma State Treasurer's race. Henry was a Republican in a Democratic state. She was the challenger. Her campaign was poorly financed. She was seeking a post that previously was never held by a woman. The fact that these effects worked against Henry eliminate them as possible explanations for her victory.

Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes (1960) argued that party identification and other long-term psychological and sociological forces are the primary determinants of an individual's vote. The studies that have followed in the tradition of Campbell et al. (see Niemi and Weisberg 1993) continue to view party ID as the most important factor in the voting decision. In the case of the 1990 Oklahoma State Treasurer's race, party ID did not predict the result. In Oklahoma 65 percent of the 1990 voters were registered as Democrats and only 33 percent were registered Republicans. During the statewide primary election on August 28 registered Democrats made up 74 percent of the electorate and Republicans only 26 percent. Oklahoma Democrats won five of seven statewide general elections on November 6 including Governor and United States Senator. The overwhelming partisan advantage for the Democratic incumbent eliminated party ID as a predictor of Republican Henry's victory.

Despite anti-incumbency fever, incumbents seldom lose. Even in the election of 1992 when over 100 new members were elected to Congress only five incumbent Congressmen lost in general elections. There are many explanations for incumbent strength (Niemi and Weisberg 1984) but the advantage of currently holding office is not in dispute. Anthony Downs (1957) argued that voters prefer to keep an incumbent whose record as a public servant is well known rather than take a chance on a challenger with no record unless the incumbent's record is so abysmal that random choice would be better. Perhaps in this case random choice looked better to the voters. Since the challenger was the victor, incumbent advantage can be eliminated as an explanation of this electoral outcome.

Some have argued that financial support for a candidate is a key to electoral success (Fiorina 1989; Niemi and Weisberg 1993). In the case of the 1990 Oklahoma State Treasurer's race the Democratic incumbent spent \$338,697 and the eventual Republican winner only spent \$41,662. Due to the extreme financial advantage the losing Democratic incumbent had over the winning Re-

publican challenger financial support can be eliminated as an explanation of the outcome of this election.

Studies on gender effects in elections indicate that gender could have been a disadvantage to the challenger. Jeane Kirkpatrick (1974) and Debra Leff (1978) both noted disadvantages that women have when trying to win elections. Some recent work (Carroll 1985; Darcy et al. 1987) challenged much of the "wisdom" about voters' gender discrimination, but they also recognized many obstacles still remained for women. As a whole this literature still supports the idea that if a gender advantage exists, it favors men. Gender can be eliminated as an explanation of why she won.

With all of these factors against her, what can account for the fact that Claudette Henry, a female Republican challenger with \$40,000, was able to defeat Ellis Edwards a male Democratic incumbent with over \$300,000 in a statewide election?

MEDIA EFFECTS

Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw (1972) argue the media set the agenda in elections. According to this view, the issues the mass media focus on become the salient issues with the public.

Leonard Tipton, Roger D. Haney, and John R. Baseheart (1975) challenged the notion that agenda setting can be applied to the state level. Using a Kentucky governor's race and a local race they re-examined the agenda-setting hypothesis. While they found a correlation between the media's agenda and the public's agenda they asserted that causality could not be established. Tipton's study might suggest that media effects cannot account for the election results in the Oklahoma State Treasurer's race. However, Tipton noted that the media focused primarily on the horse race aspects of the gubernatorial race they used in their study. In the Oklahoma treasurer's race the media focused on scandal rather than on the horse race. Also, Tipton, et al., failed to include Kentucky's major TV station in their analysis. In Oklahoma City the Gannett TV station broke several of the major stories involving scandal in the state treasurer's office.

J. A. Krosnick and D. R. Kinder (1990) argued that the media had a greater effect on voting behavior than just agenda setting. They suggested the media primed public opinion. By priming they meant that the public tends to focus on the events most recently reported by the media, giving the media the ability to prime the public just before an election.

David Swanson and Dan Nimmo (1990) argued that the media intrude into politics. Because the press largely derives its day-to-day power from its role as

mediator, when information flows through the media they have the ability to prioritize, edit, interpret, and mediate that information. Sometimes, Swanson and Nimmo argue, the media go beyond their role as mediator, intruding into politics by constructing their own version of reality.

“Intrusion” is a harsh word, but it is certainly a word Ellis Edwards would have used to describe the media’s role in the 1990 Oklahoma State Treasurer’s race. Edwards felt the media were out to get him. Paul English, a reporter for *The Daily Oklahoman* interviewed for this research, said with an air of satisfaction, “We just did the best we could to let the people know what was going on.”

PRELIMINARY INTERVIEWS

Each of the major participants in the campaign were interviewed. These interviews included primary candidates, political consultants, and reporters. Some were conducted face to face and others by telephone. The discussions were somewhat unstructured, but generally they focused on what made the difference for Henry and the importance of the media coverage in determining the result. Unanimously the participants felt that television reports caused Edwards’ defeat.

According to Delmas Ford, the third place finisher in the Democratic primary, “Channel 5’s Terry Watkins totally destroyed Ellis for Claudette.” Watkins, an investigative reporter for KOCO-TV, tried for several days to get an interview with Edwards. When she concluded that Edwards was avoiding her she took a TV camera into his office and photographed a remodeling project which the general public viewed as an extravagant use of funds. The remodeling project included an etched glass window and an automatic office door opener. Henry said, people “were most offended about the remodeling expenditures. The average citizen does not have the means to remodel their home like that.” Clinton Key, chairman of the Oklahoma Republican party, called the Watkins piece “the most significant event in the campaign.” Doug Nesbitt, Edwards runoff opponent said, “Channel 5’s TV pictures in the office killed it for him.” According to Edwards, “TV won the race for Claudette in one week. It was Channel 5 and that story on the furniture.”

When asked if her story made the difference Watkins replied, “You can draw your own conclusions.” Even Paul English the reporter for *The Daily Oklahoman* agreed that the TV coverage was a significant factor. It was his opinion that the “Love Ellis” newspaper story and Terry Watkins TV reports really hurt Edwards. According to English, “They were simple stories – people understood.”

Edwards’ political pollster Tom Kielhorn said, “Where the metropolitan press stopped, Ellis did better.” Edwards felt people in the rural area were skep-

tical of *The Daily Oklahoman* and metro television did not reach them.

These interviews suggest media bias and media effects. The interviewees seemed to conclude that the media intentionally set out to expose Edwards and that TV was most effective.

THE STORY

Included below is a summary of the campaign. This account should help the reader understand the type of pressure Edwards was facing during the 1990 election season.

Auditor and Inspector Clifton Scott released a critical audit of the State Treasurer's Office on Monday, July 9, 1990. According to Scott the audit had been completed in late February or early March at which time the treasurer was given the standard 30 days to write responses and correct problems. Edwards' office asked for and was granted several extensions. Eventually it became "obvious they wanted the extensions to get past filing. I could not let that happen. As an elected official I felt an obligation to the people," Scott said in an interview.

Finally Scott gave the treasurer an ultimatum. Edwards was to complete his responses in June or the audit would be released without the treasurer's comments. Scott felt the public had a right to know about the treasurer's audit before the candidate filing period for statewide offices ended. After arguing over many points, Scott and Edwards' offices worked all weekend July 6, 7, and 8, to complete the report.

The audit uncovered an apparent \$866,000 kickback scheme (English 1990). Edwards said he called for the audit after discovering the irregularities himself. According to Edwards "It was his (Scott's) comments that were bad, not the audit. We earned more money per dollars invested than any treasurer in the United States. No state money was lost or jeopardized."

In an editorial on July 11th *The Daily Oklahoman* called Edwards "a loose cannon at the Capitol" and urged candidates to come forward saying,

Last-minute attempts to enter a political race are seldom successful, but the uncertainties in the treasurer's race call for candidates of impeccable credentials to come forward and file for the treasurer's office.

Ten candidates joined the race.

Unfortunately for Edwards the story was just beginning. On July 26 the banner headline was "Treasurer's Probe Uncovers Letters Signed 'Love Ellis'" (English and Ellis 1990). Personal letters from him to his chief trader, Belle

Ambre, were subpoenaed. Edwards strongly denied ever having a romantic relationship with Ambre and said they were just "good friends." "They are not love letters. Nowhere in there can you find that it's a love letter. If you read the whole letter...and skip the salutations," he said. "I sign all my letters 'Love Ellis'," he insisted. Sara Pyle, Edwards' press secretary, agreed saying she had several notes signed "Love Ellis." She showed one letter to the press signed, "Your friend, Ellis."

Five days before the August 28 primary *The Daily Oklahoman* reported that Robert Jackson, one of Edwards' opponents, had accused Edwards of breaking the law by using private contributions to pay off a loan on his Mercedes Benz. Edwards acknowledged the use of the contributions for his office remodeling but denied receiving any personal gain from it (English 1990a).

"Edwards Punched While Campaigning" was the headline August 24. While in Lawton at a Cotton Rural Electric Cooperative banquet passing out campaign stickers, Edwards encountered a Republican man who refused to wear an Edwards sticker. Edwards passed by him and asked the man's wife about a sticker. She accepted and Edwards put the sticker on her purse. The man became upset. While passing along the next row Edwards bumped the man, who then got up and started shoving Edwards. Another Democratic treasurer candidate Allen Greeson and a man in the crowd constrained the two combatants. Greeson said Edwards pushed them several times trying to get to the man (English 1990b).

Edwards denied trying to retaliate and claimed Greeson stirred up the event. Edwards told the *Tulsa World* the next day, "Allen Greeson came over and helped like you help put out a fire by pouring gasoline on it" (Ford 1990a).

Delmas Ford seemed to have everything going for him on primary day. Several newspapers including both of the Tulsa papers had endorsed him. Former Governor George Nigh's wife, Donna, was helping him and many speculated that Governor Bellmon was supporting him. However, it was not enough. In the August 28 Democratic primary Edwards received 39 percent, Doug Nesbitt 26 percent, and Delmas Ford only 14 percent of the vote.

When asked how Nesbitt, a newcomer to politics, overcame Ford to make the runoff, Nesbitt said, "Logistics won it. I used my own money and was able to purchase TV time by Friday (the week of filing). Delmas did not have money; he had to raise it. By that time all of the best time slots were taken because of the numbers of candidates buying time."

Bill Maguire finished first in the Republican primary with 44 percent of the vote. Claudette Henry was second with 40 percent and Elmer Million received 15 percent. Million said he quit the race early, partly because the Republican candidates were not getting any press coverage. "The editors thought Ellis Edwards would not win (the Democratic primary)," he said.

According to a report in *The Daily Oklahoman* on September 16, just two days before the runoff, campaign finance reports for the primary showed that 60 percent of Edwards major contributors or their companies had benefited directly from his investment of state funds. They included brokers from New York and California. Edwards said “it doesn’t bother me” that some of his contributors had received commissions from trades with his office (English 1990c).

The Daily Oklahoman ran an editorial that day proclaiming Nesbitt the “clear choice ... committed to stop the shenanigans of the incumbent.” Two days later on election day they supported him again saying, “The incumbent fooled voters four years ago.”

Although Nesbitt had hoped the continuing controversy over Edwards’ conduct of his office would weaken him, the challenger knew the treasurer remained strong. A poll Nesbitt commissioned by George Shipley of Houston indicated 10 days prior to the runoff election that Edwards was ahead. Shipley found Edwards gaining 43 percent of the vote and Nesbitt 25 percent. There was 30 percent undecided, enough to win if they all broke for Nesbitt.

Nesbitt promised not to run a negative campaign even though that is what his advisors recommended. “I did not have the stomach for it. You have to look at yourself in the mirror, you know.” He said, “If I had attacked I probably would have won.” On election night, September 18, Edwards garnered 234,628 votes and Nesbitt 222,788.

Official campaign finance reports indicate that Edwards spent \$323,000 while Nesbitt only spent \$172,000. Even so, Edwards barely survived. Nesbitt believed his smaller advertising budget was enhanced by the negative news coverage the incumbent was receiving while at the same time Edwards had to spend a lot of money just to keep pace. Both campaigns ended with large debts, Edwards with \$223,000 and Nesbitt with \$154,000.

After an endorsement by Million and the Republican leadership, Henry won the Republican runoff with 85,554 votes over Maguire with 82,671. Up to this point she had spent \$18,000. Few gave her much hope as a Republican woman with no money running against an incumbent Democrat man who had already spent more than \$300,000.

A poll conducted by Cole, Hargrave, Snodgrass and Associates for the Oklahoma Republican Party on October 1 showed Edwards with 41 percent, Henry with 36 percent, and 23 percent undecided. Henry went on the offensive. In a press conference she accused Edwards of broken promises that amounted to “acts of vandalism against the people of Oklahoma,” and “an act of treason.” “For weeks, the headlines concerning Edwards read like something out of a cheap tabloid,” she said (Greiner 1990).

Just 7 days before the general election Attorney General Robert Henry

ruled some of Edwards' trading practices improper. Once again Edwards' office was on the front page (English 1990d).

Edwards said his Republican opponent spent more than he did in the general election because he "thought it was over after Nesbitt." She spent \$23,000 while he spent only \$15,000. These limited budgets prevented paid media from being a factor in the general election. In the end Henry received 459,995 votes to Edwards' 415,864.

Scandal dogged Edwards throughout the campaign. His own actions and statements often only added fuel to the fire. The media could argue that they were simply reporting what happened, but the depth, intensity and frequency of the scrutiny tend to support the notion that efforts were being made by reporters to keep voters reminded of Edwards' problems. Krosnick and Kinder (1990) called it priming.

HYPOTHESES

Conventional wisdom in Oklahoma has it that *The Daily Oklahoman* has a very conservative and Republican bias in its news coverage (see Morgan et al. 1991). Edwards felt that *The Daily Oklahoman's* coverage hurt him. One hypothesis examines media bias by comparing the state's two major newspapers. The interviews with those involved in the campaign gave rise to a second hypothesis which examines the role of television.

The first hypothesis is that there were more negative stories published in Oklahoma City's leading newspaper *The Daily Oklahoman* than in Tulsa's major newspaper the *Tulsa World*. Support for this hypothesis would lead to the conclusion that one newspaper was more biased than the other in reporting this story.

The second hypothesis is that when the 1986 and 1990 elections were compared, Ellis Edwards' loss of electoral support from 1986 to 1990 was significantly greater in the Oklahoma City media market than it was outside the Oklahoma City area. Support for this hypothesis would indicate that something in the Oklahoma City media affected the electoral result.

If something in the Oklahoma City media affected voters support for Edwards and there was no difference in newspaper coverage, then television would be the obvious suspect. Radio effects on the campaign were discounted by most of the participants. Together these findings would provide some evidence that, as the participants in the campaign claimed, Terry Watkins and Channel 5 truly made a difference. This would also support the overall contention of this work that the news media played an important role in electing Claudette Henry state treasurer.

METHODS

The first hypothesis was tested through a content analysis of news stories in *The Daily Oklahoman* and the *Tulsa World* during the official campaign period from July 1 to November 7, 1990. Stories were divided into two categories, "attacks" and "non-attacks."

Stories were considered to be attacks if they discussed problems found with the incumbent state treasurer or in his office. In *The Daily Oklahoman* several neutral stories were published about activity in the treasurer's office but they were almost always tagged with a paragraph about the scandal. These stories were classified as attacks. Some readers may be concerned that counting such neutral stories as attacks biased the research. However, it was just such attempts to keep the scandal before the public that this research sought to identify. The fact that even neutral stories were tagged with scandalous statements demonstrates effectively the degree of media bias that existed in this situation. For that reason it is appropriate to measure all attacks. Stories that mentioned Edwards without mentioning his problems were classified as non-attacks.

Other media biases could be measured: story placement, headlines, story length or editorials. Coverage of the other candidates could also have been measured. Admittedly other biases may have existed. But the method used here is often used in media effect studies and does examine the quantity of stories that mention the incumbent and the quantity that reminded voters of his internal office problems.

Stories from each newspaper were located using the DataTimes Information Network. This electronic data base indexes both newspapers. As a supplement to the DataTimes index the researcher searched through most of the individual newspapers personally looking for additional mentions of Edwards. After each of the stories were examined and classified, the total number of stories in each category for each newspaper was compared to determine if one paper demonstrated more bias than the other.

The second hypothesis was examined by measuring the degree to which aspects of the Oklahoma City media market could explain the change in vote for Edwards. Official election returns published by the Oklahoma State Election Board were used to determine the difference of percentages in general election vote for Edwards between 1986 and 1990 for each of Oklahoma's 77 counties. The 1990 results were subtracted from the 1986 results; a positive value reflected movement toward Edwards' opponent.

The first variable used to measure the Oklahoma City media market was the readership of *The Daily Oklahoman*. The percentage of households in each county who subscribed to *The Daily Oklahoman* was used to measure the newspaper's impact. Readership of the *Tulsa World* was measured in the same

manner. Miles from Oklahoma City was measured for each county. Presumably, the further Oklahoma residents live from Oklahoma City the less attention they pay to Oklahoma City television media. Competing news sources become increasingly important the farther residents are from the specified source and the closer they are to the competing source. Because TV travels via airwaves or ground cable, reception is reduced and competition from other TV markets is increased as counties fall geographically farther from the source. Oklahoma City television then was presumed to have decreasing viewership at farther distances from the city. The Republican percentage of the registered voters measured partisanship. In 1990 Republicans were 33 percent of the registered voters statewide. The mean, median and standard deviation for the several variables are reported in Table 1.

The first hypothesis posited that there would be substantial difference in the *Tulsa World* and *The Daily Oklahoman's* coverage of the treasurer's office scandal. The results of the content analysis are reported in Table 2. While the proportion of negative stories was larger in *The Daily Oklahoman*, there was no significant difference between the two newspapers.

TABLE 1

County Characteristics

County Characteristics	Mean	Standard Deviation	Median
Change in Edwards' 1986-1990 Vote*	9.130	6.131	10.0
Miles from Oklahoma City*	121.779	56.908	116.0
Percent of households subscribing to <i>The Daily Oklahoman</i> **	13.711	10.497	12.6
Percent of households subscribing to the <i>Tulsa World</i> **	5.503	10.936	0.0
Republican percent of registered voters*	24.195	16.162	21.0

SOURCES: * Author's calculations.** Consumer Data Service of Oklahoma City, 1991.

TABLE 2

The Daily Oklahoman and *Tulsa World* Coverage of Treasurer's Office

	<i>The Daily Oklahoman</i> Percent	<i>Tulsa World</i> Percent
Attacks	84.1	78.4
Non-Attacks	15.9	21.6
Total (n)	100.0 (44)	100.0 (51)
Chi-Sq. = .492		
df = 1		
p < .48		

SOURCE: Author's calculations.

Most mentions of Ellis Edwards included discussion of the scandal. The stories that did not were not really news stories but lists of candidates running for office. Virtually every news story that mentioned him included words like "embattled state treasurer" or "following the release of a critical audit."

The second hypothesis was that Ellis Edwards lost significantly more support in the Oklahoma City media market than he lost outside the Oklahoma City area. The results are reported in Table 3. Miles from Oklahoma City had the strongest relationship and that relationship was negative as expected. The farther away the county, the fewer votes Ellis Edwards lost between 1986 and 1990. Readership of *The Daily Oklahoman* (but not the *Tulsa World*) was also associated with Edwards' vote loss. The greater the readership, the greater the loss. As expected, the more Republicans in the county, the greater Edwards' vote loss.

A multiple regression equation relating Edwards' vote loss to county characteristics is reported in Table 4. Miles from Oklahoma City accounted for 49.86 percent of the variance in vote change (Table 3). Adding the other three variables only raised the explained variance to 56.72 percent. *Tulsa World* circulation was not a significant factor in predicting the change in votes for Ellis Edwards. Also, Republican registration was not significant when other variables were controlled. *The Daily Oklahoman* readership did have a significant effect on change in vote even with controls. Miles, however, was the most important predictor of Edwards' vote change.

TABLE 3

Correlations of Change in Edwards' Vote 1986-1990 and County Characteristics (N=77).

County Characteristics	Change in Edwards' Vote 1986-1990	Two-tailed probability
Miles from Oklahoma City.	-.706	<.001
Percent of households subscribing to <i>The Daily Oklahoman</i>	.486	<.001
Percent of households subscribing to the <i>Tulsa World</i>	-.163	.078
Republican percent of registered voters	.228	.023

SOURCE: Author's calculations.

TABLE 4

**OLS Regressions of Change in Vote for Edwards,
1986-1990 and County Characteristics (N=77).**

County Characteristics	Standardized Slope (Beta)	Probability
Miles from Oklahoma City	-.594	<.001
Percent of households subscribing to <i>The Daily Oklahoman</i>	.263	.008
Percent of households subscribing to the <i>Tulsa World</i>	.050	.309
Republican percent of registered voters	.124	.069
Intercept	13.520	
R ²	.567	
p	<.001	

SOURCE: Author's calculations.

CONCLUSION

This study leaves little doubt that the media played an important role in determining the outcome of the 1990 Oklahoma State Treasurer's race. However it also raises several questions about the media coverage in the race. What explains the effect demonstrated by *The Daily Oklahoman*? What specifically was the difference in television coverage between Oklahoma City and Tulsa? These questions may be difficult to answer. Television recordings from the campaign may no longer exist.

The Daily Oklahoman and Oklahoma City TV news coverage explained the significant loss of support Ellis Edwards suffered between the 1986 and 1990 elections. This explains why a Republican woman challenger with little financial support could defeat an incumbent Democratic man with a large campaign war chest in a heavily Democratic state. It is perhaps unfair to imply that the media vindictively went after Edwards and single-handedly, purposefully, destroyed him. However, interviews revealed they believed he needed to be replaced, supported his opponents, and took credit for his defeat.

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STATE MANAGED EXPORT PROMOTION IN OKLAHOMA

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State Governments have always played a role in economic development management, but their entry into direct export promotion is fairly recent. Although state governments have increased their involvement in this area, little is known concerning the outcome of such efforts. This study reports and analyzes the findings of a survey of Oklahoma firms that have received state based export assistance.

Traditionally, international economic management has been the province of the federal government. A series of political and economic circumstances, however, has prompted state and local governments to become increasingly involved in international economic policy management. This development is of interest from a variety of perspectives.

At the macro-level, a substantial literature emphasizes the growing importance of new, international actors. This literature asserts that economic interdependence increases the level of international activity undertaken by previously domestic governmental structures. This in turn renders analysis and management of foreign policy by central bureaucracies more problematic (Manning 1977; Keohane and Nye 1989, Ch. 2; Czempiel 1989).

At the micro-level, the efforts of states to direct their economic development programs overseas have become well financed and are central to their overall economic vitality. The purpose here is to explore the pattern of interaction between Oklahoma's export promotion agency and the private sector firms it was created to assist. First, we examine the processes which have encouraged state-level export promotion efforts. Next, we discuss the existing research on state export promotion. We then present the results of our own survey research and discuss the implications of our findings for the state of Oklahoma and for

the operation of state managed export promotion in general.

STATE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND EXPORT MANAGEMENT

EXPORT PROMOTION AMONG THE STATES

In 1959 the Governor of North Carolina made a trip to Europe to solicit foreign firms to invest in his state. Since that time states have become increasingly active in their economic relations with foreign nations. Concerned about job creation and retention, tax revenue growth, and enhanced economic competitiveness, state governments have diversified their activities to include substantial export promotion capabilities.

The slow economic growth of the 1980s has intermixed with increased global competition to encourage higher levels of state government involvement in export promotion. The performance of the American economy has become increasingly tied to its ability to export. In 1970 the share of America's GNP derived from exporting was 8 percent, by 1986 it had risen to 15 percent. Despite this increase, the U.S. share of world manufacturing exports was in decline, and by 1987 the U.S. trade deficit had reached a record \$160 billion (Erickson 1993). Despite action taken by the federal government intended to stimulate the economy and improve American export competitiveness (including, eventually, the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988) state governments were also moved to assume greater responsibilities for export promotion (Kline 1982; Luke et al. 1988, ch. 1; Archer and Maser 1989).

State governments may indirectly promote their exports in a variety of ways, such as taxation or regulatory policy (Posner 1984), and have done so for many years. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, states began to create programs and agencies designed directly to promote international sales of goods and services. These programs have experienced a strong and steady increase in their allocation of public funds. For example, it has been estimated that in 1984 state governments allocated an average of approximately \$200,000 to export promotion. By 1990 that figure had increased to approximately \$665,000 per state (Erickson 1993).

This rate of increase exceeds both the rate of inflation and the growth of total state spending. By the late 1980s export promotion budgets accounted for more than 20 percent of the state's overall economic development budget in Hawaii, Washington, Oklahoma, and Missouri (Kudrle and Kite 1989). Thus, state based export promotion efforts are rapidly becoming an integral feature of state governments' overall economic development strategy.

Some states, Virginia and Connecticut, for instance, have created fully independent export promotion organizations within their state Departments of Commerce. Alabama, California, Maryland, Minnesota, New York, and North Carolina have all employed an alternative organizational model for their export promotion organizations, an alternative based on the Oklahoma International Trade and Investment Division (OITI) (Luke et al. 1988, ch.7). The OITI is a formal partnership between the federal Department of Commerce and the Oklahoma Department of Commerce, where export promotion services are provided directly to Oklahoma businesses by state and federal personnel organized under Oklahoma leadership.

Export promotion spending has been categorized into several distinct activities by most states. These include providing information and educational services to potential exporters, engaging in overseas marketing activities, and providing financial assistance to potential state exporters (Archer and Maser 1989; Kudrle and Kite 1989; Erickson 1993). Thus, while all 50 states provide some of these services, there is substantial variation in both the mixture of export promotion services provided and in the organizational format which provides the services.

EXISTING RESEARCH

Limitations of the quantitative data regarding state exports and the relatively recent creation of export promotion arrangements have restricted study of these important new programs (Archer and Maser 1989; Erickson 1993). Nevertheless, some empirical examination of state export promotion agencies has been undertaken. Most of this work focuses on those factors that account for variation in states' export promotion. Accordingly, it has been hypothesized that:

- coastal and border states are likely to have larger than average state export promotion budgets (Kline 1982);
- states with high levels of unemployment will have higher than average export promotion budgets (Kline 1982);
- states with high levels of port activity have higher than average export promotion efforts (Egan and Bendick 1985);
- states with highly concentrated economies (low industrial diversification) tend to stimulate export promotion efforts in their less developed sectors (Pilcher and Proffer 1985); and
- states heavily dependent upon agriculture tend to have higher than average export promotion budgets (Pilcher and Proffer 1985; Archer and Maser 1993).

What has not been well documented, however, are the means through which, and the degree to which, state export agencies actually facilitate the internationalization of their respective business communities (Archer and Maser 1989; Erickson 1993). Econometric studies generally conclude that the structure of a given state's capital and labor stocks (rather than its levels of export promotion assistance) is the principal determinant of its export level (Feilke 1986; Coughlin and Cartwright 1987; Erickson and Hayward 1991). Systematic examination of the actual operation of export promotion agencies, then, becomes a matter of some interest. Indeed, one recent examination of states' efforts to measure the effectiveness of export promotion programs found that the lack of systematic appraisal, and over reliance upon "anecdotal" evidence of results, was generating a "backlash" among governors, legislators, and taxpayers (Kudrle and Kite 1989).

The present study is an attempt to address this research lacuna. Survey data are analyzed to measure the fit between services provided by a particular state's export agency (i.e., Oklahoma) and the services desired by that state's business community. The state of Oklahoma is a particularly good choice because its program has been so widely emulated. We have chosen to emphasize survey research techniques because the personnel and budgetary data regarding Oklahoma's export promotion efforts are already widely disseminated through the many comparative state studies cited above. Thus, we turn to an examination of the organization of Oklahoma export promotion.

OKLAHOMA EXPORT AGENCY

In the state of Oklahoma the agency charged with promoting international business is the Oklahoma International Trade and Investment Division of the state Department of Commerce. As mentioned above, the agency is organized as a cooperative venture with the U.S. Department of Commerce. This translates into an institution featuring a Division Director employed by the state who works in parallel with a District Director of the U.S. Department of Commerce's International Trade Administration. The formal lines of authority for the bulk of the agency (including those of the state's four permanent overseas trade missions) are centered in the Office of the Division Director. Despite their semi-autonomous status, the federal District Director and his personnel are organized to provide support assistance for the line functions centered in the Division Director's Office (OITI Table of Organization 1993).

In 1989 Oklahoma exported products with a total value of \$1,638 million. By 1992 that figure had risen to \$2,256 million (MISER 1989-1992), a 72.6 percent increase. This increase greatly exceeded inflation for the period. Clearly,

international business is making an important, and growing, contribution to the state's economy.

States often defend their export promotion activities by indicating statistical correlations between their activities and increasing state export volumes without attempting to establish any causal links between cause and effect (Kudrle and Kite 1989; Erickson 1993). Even the academic literature often resorts to the use of raw budget data as an indicator of the efficacy of state export promotion efforts (see for example Archer and Maser 1993).

While interesting issues may be addressed through this approach, it is not self evident that higher budgets are tantamount to more effective promotion. Data presented here are intended partially to offset this difficulty by providing detailed descriptions of the intersection between export promotion services provided by the state and the pattern of their consumption by the business community of Oklahoma.

DATA

The data for this study are derived from two sources, both of which are surveys. The surveys target similar populations. The first survey is the Oklahoma Department of Commerce's *Customer Satisfaction Survey Report: International Trade and Development Division*. This survey was conducted by the Research and Planning Division of the Oklahoma Department of Commerce and consisted of 120 questionnaires mailed to recent clients of the OITI. Two separate mailings were conducted, with 60 surveys mailed in each of the first two quarters of FY 1994. The response rate was 32.5 percent. The survey included a number of performance indicators, including industrial classifications, levels of export activity, and the effect of OITI's services upon the firms' work force. Both raw data and statistical summaries of this survey were made available to us by OITI.

The second survey was independently conducted by the authors between August and November 1993, a period contemporaneous with the state's survey. Our survey also sampled the client list of the OITI, but rather than breaking that list into quarterly mailings (as did the Research Division) we surveyed the entire list in one mailing. The list consisted of names and corporate addresses of the individual who had been the primary point of contact between their firms and the OITI. The list included all clients served between August 1991 and August 1993. We mailed 428 surveys and received 130 replies for a response rate of 30.4 percent. This survey contained questions designed to assess the level of utilization of OITI services by Oklahoma businesses and their general levels of satisfaction with those services.

As in any survey which achieves less than 100 percent response, one might be concerned with the external validity of these instruments. Important differences may exist between the firms which responded to the survey and the total population of firms which were surveyed. Given the modest response rates for both of these surveys this is a legitimate consideration. However, there is no indication that respondent firms significantly differ from the population of all firms surveyed on the potentially perturbing variables of firm size, industrial classification, and geographic location.

FINDINGS

PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

In the most basic terms it is important to know whether or not private sector firms find state-based assistance valuable. Among respondent firms 35.8 percent characterized their overall contact with the OITI as very helpful, and 56.9 percent found it somewhat helpful. Only 7.3 percent of firms said that OITI's efforts were not helpful, and no firm portrayed OITI contact as "detrimental." Thus, a vast majority of firms (92.7 percent) considered OITI efforts as generally beneficial. Still, much greater specificity is needed to determine the character of state-based, export assistance.

The next consideration in exploring the function of the OITI is to delineate the character of the firms receiving their assistance. Data from the OITI survey indicate that 65.7 percent of the firms it assisted are already engaged in exporting activity. The proportion of export activity, however, is a comparatively small proportion (less than 10 percent) of overall sales volume in the majority (63.1 percent) of the firms assisted.

As reported in Table 1 the two largest business categories measured by Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) of firms assisted are industrial machinery (10.8 percent), and petroleum and refining (13.5 percent). This is hardly surprising in the energy intensive economy of Oklahoma. At 37.8 percent, the largest category of firms receiving OITI assistance was "other." This is an extremely diverse category which included such businesses as disparate as bathtubs and back-support belts.

It is somewhat surprising that a state which prominently features wheat and beef production, businesses in the food and kindred products category (SIC 20) received no assistance from the OITI. This is a point to which we will return later. For the moment, however, it is sufficient to note that OITI efforts are being directed toward a wide range of economic sectors and that most of those efforts

TABLE 1

Business Classification of Client Firms

Classification	Percentage
Textile Mill (SIC 22)	2.7
Fabric Apparel (SIC 23)	5.4
Chemicals and Allied (SIC 28)	5.4
Petroleum, Refining, Related (SIC29)	13.5
Leather Products (SIC 31)	5.4
Fabricated Metal (SIC 34)	5.4
Industrial Machinery (SIC 34)	10.8
Electronic and Electrical Equipment (SIC 36)	5.4
Measuring, Analyzing, Controlling Instruments (SIC 38)	8.1
Other Manufactured Products	37.8
Total (N)	100

SOURCE: Authors' calculations based on data from OITI Customer Satisfaction Survey Report.

appear to be augmenting existing export activities rather than establishing new ones.

This latter point is not necessarily a discouraging finding. With assistance to firms which have an existing commitment to export, it is still possible to create new jobs and enhance the economy. In fact, 44.7 percent of respondents said that they undertook specific activities which increased the efficiency of their exporting activity after consultation with OITI. In addition, 13.1 percent of respondents expanded the range of products they exported, 21.0 percent enlarged the number of their export markets, and 15.8 percent increased sales levels in their current export markets.

In terms of the Oklahoma labor force, 15.4 percent of respondent firms report the creation of at least some new, permanent jobs within their firm as a direct result of OITI services. Retraining and retention of workers who would have otherwise been laid off was reported by 12.8 percent of participating firms and 20.5 percent reported fuller utilization of their work force.

On the basis of both sales and labor force performance indicators, it seems that notable economic returns are attributable to the activities of the OITI by its

clients. Any significant disjunction between the types of services desired by Oklahoma enterprises and the array of services maintained by the OITI, however, would have the potential to undermine the efficiency with which state revenues and resources are converted into economic benefits. Thus, in addition to estimating the types of firms receiving OITI assistance and estimating the effects of services upon client firms, it is important to explore the pattern of services provided by OITI and their use by Oklahoma's business community.

SERVICES OFFERED BY OITI

The OITI provides three basic sets of services: 1) informational and export education services, 2) direct export promotion, and 3) foreign investment and joint venture facilitation services (OITI Quality Map 1993). Though OITI places somewhat greater emphasis on joint venture facilitation than other states, its services are roughly consistent with those provided by other state-level export agencies (Kudrle and Kite 1989; Archer and Maser 1989; Erickson 1993).

The results of our survey indicate that all three primary service areas provided by OITI enjoy a fairly high usage rate (see Table 2). The service most often used by OITI client firms is general information support; direct export promotion is a close second. With both of these service activities we find a close fit between the proportion of firms exposed to the service by OITI and the number of firms utilizing the service. Only in the area of joint venture facilitation is there a large disjunction between services offered and usage. These findings indicate a reasonable degree of congruence between services provided and their pattern of use.

TABLE 2

Firms' Contact With Oklahoma International Export Service

Service Area	Percentage Services Used	Percentage Services Offered by OITI
General Information	73.5	83.8
Export Promotion	61.0	67.7
Joint Venture Facilitation	26.6	40.8

SOURCE: Authors' calculations from survey.

We measure the degree of “fit” between the needs of Oklahoma’s business community and the activities of the state in each separate area of activity through a comparison of two different categories — Services Used and Services Offered. The Services Used category is reported as a percentage of respondent firms who participated in each activity. Services Offered is the percentage of respondent firms who reported having been contacted by OITI concerning that particular service. The Service Utilization Ratio is the Services Used divided by the Services Offered, multiplied by 100. It is possible that by using respondent recollections of the range of services offered to them by OITI we may understate the true range of services offered. After all, the impression made by merely hearing of a service may be less than that made by actually using a service. Nevertheless, any major discrepancies between OITI services and the needs of Oklahoma exporters should be traceable through this methodology. An alternative measure such as budget allocations made by OITI to each service category might be more accurate. Unfortunately these data are not readily available.

Tables 3, 4, and 5 provide a breakdown of activities associated with each general service area. The most heavily used service category is general informa-

TABLE 3

General International Information Services

Service Activities	Percentage Services Used	Percentage Services Offered by OITI	Service Utilization Ratio
Contact With Foreign VIPs	11.5	17.7	64.9
Background Information on International Business	30.0	50.0	60.0
Country of Region			
Specific Information:			
General	37.7	54.6	69.0
Political Climate	23.1	35.4	65.2
Economic Climate	34.6	44.6	77.5
Currency Regulations	20.0	29.2	68.4
Taxes	10.0	16.9	59.1
Corporate Ownership Regulations	9.2	10.8	85.1

SOURCE: Author's calculations from surveys.

tional support. Table 3 presents the specific activities associated with this service category. The table reveals a pattern of reasonably high levels of acceptance of OITI's informational services by Oklahoma firms. This acceptance is reflected not only in the percentage of firms who report using specific categories but also in the high degree of conformity between services offered to firms by OITI and utilization. The highest ratio of use to services offered is for corporate ownership regulations at 85.1 percent. The close fit between services brought to the attention of Oklahoma firms and their subsequent use by those firms indicates an appropriate mixture of services being provided.

The next most heavily utilized service area is direct export promotion. The offering and utilization data for these services are presented in Table 4. The values of offering and utilization scores for activities in this service area are,

TABLE 4

Export Promotion Services

Service Activities	Percentage Services Used	Percentage Services Offered by OITI	Service Utilization Ratio
Export Workshops	28.5	53.8	52.9
Marketing Seminars	22.3	45.4	49.1
Individualized			
Export Counseling	15.4	23.8	64.7
Overseas Trade Missions	23.8	50.0	47.6
Export Promotion Events	19.2	40.8	47.0
Receptions For			
Foreign Trade Delegations	13.1	29.2	44.8
Producer Consumer			
Matching Services	14.6	35.4	41.2
Export Financing	6.2	20.8	29.8
Contact With			
Overseas Business Agents	15.4	36.2	42.5
Information Transfers:			
Trade Leads	25.4	34.6	73.4
Newsletters	8.5	20.0	42.5
Direct Mailings	5.4	11.5	46.9
Online Data Transfer	0.0	5.4	0.0

SOURCE: Author's calculations from surveys.

generally, somewhat lower than those recorded for informational services. This is consistent with our earlier finding that demand for these services is somewhat lower than it is for general information. Nevertheless, the ratio between firms offered export promotion services and firms which subsequently use the services is still robust.

The highest ratio of offering to actual use is 73.4 for trade leads. A “trade lead” includes such items as the names and product requirements of overseas purchasers. Clearly such information has value to firms positioned to sell the required products. This would account for its high proportion of use. The lowest ratio of service offered to use is in export financing, 29.8 percent. The specific export financing services provided by OITI are “financial expertise” and the administration of a federal export insurance program (Oklahoma Department of Commerce Assistance Guide, 1990). The comparatively low score generated in this service activity indicates that despite OITI’s aggressive efforts to expose Oklahoma firms to export financing assistance, little demand for this service exists.

The least heavily used service area is foreign investment and joint venture facilitation. Service activities in this area are designed, in part, to help Oklahoma firms increase their stock of overseas production assets rather than directly expand their local output. As the list of specific services presented in Table 5 illustrates, no service of this type is heavily promoted by OITI. Never-

TABLE 5

Foreign Investment and Overseas Joint Ventures

Activities	Percentage Service Used	Percentage Services Offered by OITI	Service Utilization Ratio
Joint Venture Partner Matching Services	5.4	10.8	50.0
Contact with Investment Prospects	1.5	4.6	32.6
Investment Information Services			
Laws and Administrative Rules	7.7	7.7	100.0
Business Ethics Milieu	5.4	6.2	87.0

SOURCE: Author's calculations from surveys.

theless, the solid ratio of client offering to utilization indicates that for some firms these services are meaningful. Thus, services that may foster business expansion but are not directly related to increased local production are provided by OITI but do not constitute a major component of effort.

DISCUSSION

In general, the data depicting client firm profiles, industrial and labor performance indicators, and pattern of service utilization are consistent. They all point to an export promotion effort designed for, and directed toward, an industrially diverse mixture of small- and medium-scale Oklahoma exporters. The OITI delivers a range of services that are readily consumed by client firms with a reasonable amount of efficiency. We also find that OITI efforts are mostly directed toward the assistance of existing exporters in efforts to expand their activities rather than introducing new firms to the international market.

Some may object to this latter point by pointing out that a firm which is already exporting has internal incentives to expand its overseas activity. It will derive the profits from such expansions and thus should absorb the associated administrative costs rather than passing them on to the state. It is important to note, however, that the majority of firms employing OITI services are not large firms. The information and expertise required to expand into new export activities is a scarce commodity and, as such, is expensive. Furthermore, overseas business is inherently more difficult and entails greater risk than business conducted under the auspices of one central government. Further empirical evidence is required to confirm whether small firms could match their current, assisted, export performance if they were required to absorb such considerations alone.

Another potential area of difficulty presented here, is the low level of OITI assistance flowing to the food industry of Oklahoma. Recall that no firms in the food business (SIC 20) were present in the array of businesses receiving OITI assistance. According to the Oklahoma Department of Commerce's *Directory of Manufacturers and Processors* the state has over 400 food processing, value-added, agricultural companies. These firms produce products that range from "consumer ready" products such as canned vegetables, bottled juices, jellies and salsas to intermediary products like processed beef and pork, flour, and dry food mixes. One study of the export market activity of Oklahoma's value-added agricultural firms found that a crucial determinant of success in exporting was access to information regarding international financing, taxation, law, shipping, and documentation requirements (Charlet and Hennebery 1991). These are precisely the types of services provided by OITI, yet 89 percent of the Oklahoma

firms included in that study received these services from private consultants. In addition, Charlet and Henneberry (1991) found that 47 percent of the Oklahoma processed food firms in their study received direct export assistance from the Oklahoma Department of Agriculture.

Thus, although OITI delivers an appropriate mixture of services to its clients and makes a significant contribution to the state's export expansion, more could be done to improve the delivery of its services. A limited sample of two quarters may underestimate the number of SIC 20 firms served, but the use by food processing firms of private consultants and the employment of similar services provided by an alternative state agency indicates that a need for export assistance exists in this area. While the expense of private, export-promotion consultants among small SIC 20 firms may inhibit some firms from entering the export market, it is the use of the Department of Agriculture as an alternative source of export assistance which is most troubling. First, the provision of similar services by redundant state agencies is inefficient. Second, the literature suggests that in states where multiple state agencies promote exports, the difficulties of interagency coordination may decrease the achievement levels of exporting firms (Pilcher and Proffer 1985).

SUMMARY

The recent increase in the level of export activity undertaken by states has generated interest at a number of levels. This study documents the pattern of service delivery and the character of the state's export promotion program within Oklahoma.

We have discovered that significant economic benefits are attributable to the export promotion effort within the state. Sales levels are increased, jobs are created and maintained, and new markets are penetrated by Oklahoma firms as a result of the state's efforts. We also find that the firms receiving assistance readily consume state services (particularly informational services) and that those services are efficiently delivered. The study also reveals certain limitations in the current export promotion effort. First, the state's export promotion efforts serve existing exporters more often than they are used to apprentice new export firms. Second, we find that important areas of the Oklahoma economy receive only marginal assistance from the state's principal export promotion agency.

Our data do not address the nature of other states' international activity, nor do they shed light upon the degree to which international activity by state governments will transform the international political economy or shape the U.S. foreign policy process. However, our findings indicate that Oklahoma is meet-

ing the challenges of the new global economy aggressively and effectively. While more can be done to develop the state's export potential, to the extent that the activity in other states is similar to that found in Oklahoma, it is probable that state governments can responsibly serve the interests of their economic constituencies, and therefore will likely continue to play a significant role in international economic management.

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Ronald M. Peters, Jr., *The American Speakership: The Office in Historical Perspective*. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990) pp. 352. \$45.00 ISBN 0-8018-3955-6

The American Speakership: The Office in Historical Perspective is the most thorough book to date on the office of the speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives. University of Oklahoma Political Scientist Ronald M. Peters' solidly empirical research develops the role of the House as an institutional mirror of national politics from Speaker Muhlenberg in 1789 to Speaker Foley in 1989.

Heavily documented with what must be every significant aspect of House activity, past and present, the core of this work is a detailed analysis of the emergent leadership role of the Speaker reflected in the dynamics of policy formation and institutional change in the House. Peters' goal is to place the American Speakership in a general political and specific institutional context over time. The book, however, goes beyond this achievement so intelligently and thoroughly that it serves also as a primer of American factional politics from the Constitutional period forward.

While this analysis does not dwell on abstraction it does accomplish a much needed categorization of epochs in the development of the Speakership. Peters traces the "external" and "internal" factors which have affected and defined the Speakership in four principal political epochs. Beginning with the "Parliamentary" Speakership of the early Constitutional period the book identifies the Partisan, Feudal, and Democratic speakership periods. Significant procedural and substantive developments are identified and analyzed in terms of their impact on the office of Speaker and the House as an institutional body within the separation of powers system.

Peters does not set out to create a streamlined intellectual edifice with all the bells and whistles of avant garde political science. He has conspicuously avoided the cutting edge of terminologically overladen models with straightforward, patient, thorough research. In so doing he has created a singular resource necessary for any scholar researching the Speakership and the House.

The book, as a result, identifies leadership style and impact, the process of policy formation, the political context of the House with respect to the Senate and Executive branch, and finally the role of the Speaker and House in the historic panorama of American political conflict.

Peters' scholarship is based first and foremost on empiricism. He covers the "Who, What, When, and How" for practically each of the 199 years included in the analysis.

This book is not intended for the casual reader. Peters' work is so filled with detail and information that close attention is required to master the material contained therein. Rewards, however, await the diligent reader. After digesting 199 years of Speakership politics, one emerges with a comprehensive understanding of House rules, the circumstances and significance of their development, the role of each Speaker, the significance of internal organizational changes and the dynamic relationship between American political issues and House politics.

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R. Darcy, Susan Welch, and Janet Clark, *Women, Elections, & Representation, Second Edition*. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994) pp. 276. \$35.00 (hardcover), \$12.95 (paperback) ISBN 0-8032-6597-2

'Talking 'Bout a Revolution.' Four new female senators and 24 new female House members were elected to the U.S. Congress in 1992. So noteworthy were these numbers that 1992 became known as the "Year of the Woman." But as a percentage of the total, these gains appear less than momentous. Women today make up to about 11 percent of the total membership in Congress. It is this "dramatic underrepresentation of women" that political scientists Robert Darcy, Susan Welch, and Janet Clark address in the second edition of their book, *Women, Elections & Representation*.

Since their enfranchisement, American women have made steady but snail-like progress in gaining political office. Women have been the most successful in penetrating the lowest-level (local) and mid-level (state) elected positions, while the highest and most prestigious posts have remained elusive. Previous studies have sought to explain the underrepresentation of women by looking for party leadership bias and voter prejudice against women candidates, as well as the impact of sexrole norms and political incumbency. In their reexamination of each factor, Darcy, Welch and Clark find that while the latter two factors remain important barriers to increasing female representation, prejudice against women, either at the elite or mass level, no longer can explain the low numbers of women serving as elected officials. The authors also rule out political culture as a barrier, finding that although Arizona has one of the highest percentages of women serving in its state legislature (38 percent), no state's political culture seemed less receptive to women political officeholding. The problem remains one of numbers: few American women run for public office. Thus, even if all of the women running for the U.S. Senate happened to be independently wealthy lawyers competing for open seats, the proportion of women senators would continue to remain extremely far from gender parity. The authors estimate that if the ratio of male-to-female candidates remained the same and if most incumbents continue to win their reelection bids, women should still be expected to represent only 10 percent of House representatives into the next century.

They then reexamine the impact of electoral arrangements and other structural features of American politics to ascertain any bias against women. Here, there was some evidence that the state's electoral system mattered. Multi-member legislative districts were more likely to elect women than single-member districts. In fact, states that changed from multi-member districts or some com-

bination of multi- and single-member districts invariably saw a decrease in the number of women elected or fell below the national rate. Ironically, this trend favoring single-member districts was engineered by the organized efforts of African Americans and their allies to advance Black representation. They also find that proportional representation electoral arrangements tend to elect more women than single-member district systems. Although women are only 11 percent of Congress, in Western European countries, with PR systems, such as Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, women represent one-third of their national legislatures. PR systems do not always elect more women, however. Greece and Portugal, for example, employ PR systems, and yet women represent less than 10 percent of their national legislatures. In addition to the paucity of candidates, by far the biggest obstacle to increasing the political representation of women appears to be the stability of the electoral order, characterized by the low rates of political turnover.

Overall, the book represents an impressive example of social science research, its strongest feature by far being its comparative focus. Indeed, it is through this approach that the authors are able to establish through empirical means that it is the electoral stability of the U.S. political system that accounts for the continued underrepresentation of women. Moreover, the clear presentation of both the issues and of their empirically-based findings makes the book still very appropriate for use in undergraduate courses.

The book falters in the limited, if not tepid, conclusions that the authors draw. Darcy, Welch, and Clark favor incremental reforms, such as limiting elected officials to two, consecutive terms, rejecting more radical changes that they suppose would involve a substantial change in the social and economic position of women. Neither of these changes might actually promote higher levels of female political officeholding, since the problem remains of getting more women to run. Raising the political consciousness of women may be the only sure means for increasing the rate of female officeholding over the next few decades. Until more women become conscious of themselves as a *political minority*, a consciousness that many gender scholars assume already exists among American women, they may not engage in the necessary political activities, such as pressuring the political parties, raising funds and fielding candidates, to increase their representation in government. More women were elected in 1992 precisely because more became conscious, as a result of the Clarence Thomas/Anita Hill hearings and general voter disgust with political incumbents, of the need for increasing representation of women and their interests in Congress. The broadening and deepening of a gender consciousness surely would entail a radical change, a change that the authors should have discussed.

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Jace Weaver and Robert H. Henry, *Then to the Rock Let Me Fly: Luther Bohanon and Judicial Activism*. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993) pp. 212. \$27.95 ISBN 0-8061-2554-3

Then to the Rock Let Me Fly is a valuable contribution to the political, legal and social history of Oklahoma. The role of the judiciary has received too little attention in most recent histories of the state. Jace Weaver, an attorney, and student at Union Theological Seminary, states that his purpose is: "...to sketch the life and career of one trial court judge, Luther Bohanon..." In a poetic metaphor Weaver observed: "The actions of federal trial courts form lasting threads in the invisible tapestry of social control that we call law". Weaver selects four major cases from Bohanon's 180 published opinions to demonstrate Bohanon's courage and persistence.

The book's title, "*Then to the Rock...*" is taken from an old Methodist hymn which, according to Weaver, is "an appropriate metaphor for the struggle of African-Americans for civil rights."

It also reflects the consistently strong religious beliefs evidenced in some of Judge Bohanon's judicial decisions by his use of Biblical quotations.

Luther L. Bohanon was appointed to the federal bench in 1961 by President John F. Kennedy, at the insistence of U.S. Senator Robert S. Kerr and over the objections of U.S. Attorney General Robert Kennedy and the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary. Robert Kennedy, years later, did write a letter to Bohanon commending him for his eminent career as a judge. Throughout his career Bohanon maintained a reputation for strict judicial procedural dignity.

Weaver emphasizes Bohanon's legal and jurist career. The biographical sections briefly but adequately paint a portrait of Bohanon surviving a rigorous childhood on the family farms in eastern Oklahoma and becoming self-supported at an early age. At the University of Oklahoma School of Law, his mentor, Dean Julien Monnet, instilled in Bohanon deep reverence for the United States Constitution.

Bohanon, because of his friendship with several political leaders could have easily become one of the "good ole boys" of Oklahoma politics, but his deep moral and religious foundations evidently directed him to a more noble path, and sustained him through the backlash which followed his controversial decisions.

All four cases selected by Weaver illustrate Bohanon's devotions to equality, justice and concern for human rights. Weaver presents succinct summaries and brief historical background information for each of the four cases. He does not resort to "legalese" but uses uncluttered prose throughout.

In the chapter, "The School Board Case," (*Dowell v. Board of Education*, 219 F.Supp 427), Weaver presents a review of the history of "Jim Crow" in Oklahoma and the civil rights struggles of African-Americans and describes the recalcitrance of the urban school boards to comply with federal desegregation mandates. This protracted legal battle continues today. Weaver does not, however, address the changes in housing patterns which resulted from the proposed integration of schools and subsequent "white flight."

In "The Prison Case" (*Battle v. Anderson*, 447 F.Supp 516), Weaver briefly describes the archaic, abusive and corrupt conditions which were prevalent in state correctional institutions at the time that Bobby Battle brought suit against Warden Park J. Anderson and the Oklahoma Department of Corrections. This case resulted in a complete reorganization of the Department and continued oversight to prevent continuation of the overcrowding and other conditions.

"The American Indian Land Case" (*The Choctaw Nation v. Cherokee*, 393 F Supp.224) and earlier related cases trace the sad history of the treatment of American Indians by white settlers and the violation of treaties by the government. Bohanon determined the title to the Arkansas River Navigation Project riverbed section by section and divided the land between the involved tribal entities.

In "The Laetrile Case" (*Rutherford v. United States*, 429 F Supp. 513), Judge Bohanon expressed his support of an individual's freedom to select medical care in face of the Federal Food and Drug Administration's restricting laetrile without previous standard testing procedures. Bohanon's decision was ultimately reversed.

This compact book (159 pages of text) will interest students of political science, social history, Oklahoma history and legal history. Because of its easy flowing style the book will appeal to a general audience as well. It is well researched, and includes copious notes, an extensive bibliography and an appendix which gives the complete citations for the published opinions of Judge Bohanon in chronological order from 1962 through 1992. If there is a shortcoming, it is the limited biographical section, which serves to whet one's appetite for the Bohanon autobiography to be published in the near future. This is not intended to be a critical judicial study and Weaver does not compare Bohanon's opinions with those of other federal jurists. Enough background material is provided for

additional study by legal scholars if desired.

Readers of *Then to the Rock Let Me Fly* from any background will gain an informed and more sympathetic understanding of the contributions of one federal judge to some of the forces of change which have molded Oklahoma culture over the past three decades.

Hannah Atkins O'Neal

Edwin G. Corr and Stephen Sloan, ed., *Low Intensity Conflict: Old Threats in a New World*. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992) pp. 317. \$63.50 (hardcover), \$19.85 (paperback) ISBN 0-8133-8593-8

Two international relations specialists have edited a timely work that should be most useful to academics and policy makers alike. As the leaders of industrial democracies seek the best ways to function internationally in a still dangerous and predominantly undemocratic world, they should consider the words of Senator David Boren (D-OK) in the book's preface: "We live in a time which our basic assumptions about geopolitics and military power have been rendered obsolete. Perhaps the greatest threat to...security is the danger we will not change our thinking to coincide with the changes in the world around us."

Ed Corr (Henry Bellmon Chair in Public Service at the University of Oklahoma) and Steve Sloan (Professor of Political Science at the University of Oklahoma) have long been concerned with low intensity conflict — Corr as U.S. Ambassador to Bolivia, El Salvador, and Peru, and Sloan through many years studying of international terrorism.

In his introduction Sloan asserts that nations now find themselves in a period when "uncertainty, unpredictability, and conflict have replaced the enforced outward stability of what was once a bipolar world." With the decline of Communism and the demise of the Soviet Union, nations (especially transitional ones) are no longer seen "as either pawns or surrogates of superpower machinations." These factors, coupled with often previously unrecognized regional and local ones, must be taken into account by policy makers who should also realize that the "line between peace and war will increasingly be blurred and ambiguous..."

The editors, noting that specialists in the field do not agree on a definition of low intensity conflict, accept the U.S. military's lengthy definition:

"Low-intensity conflict is a politico-military confrontation between competing states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low-intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means, employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low-intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications."

The book is separated into three sections: The Challenge, the Concepts,

and the Context; Selected Cases of Low Intensity Conflict; and Implications and Conclusions. Included among the authors are U.S. Ambassador to Sudan, James Cheek; former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William Crowe; Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, General John R. Galvin; and director of the Center for National Security Law at the University of Virginia Law School, John Norton Moore. These and the other contributors have been involved in the "bureaucratic, policy, legal and academic trenches of low intensity conflict" and share many "lessons they are still learning" while the world's "security situation undergoes reassessment in a new international order."

Among the case studies that should be of special interest to political scientists is one on Peru's Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) terrorists by David Scott Palmer, director of the Latin American Studies Program at Boston University.

Shining Path founder and leader, Abimael Guzman (captured by government forces after this book went to press), and key followers were trained in guerrilla strategy and tactics in China (1966 to 1976) and, of course, observed the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution first hand. Shining Path's ideology reflects Guzman's approach. Guzman, who holds a Ph.D., has always considered himself an ideological purist and the world's foremost interpreter of the thoughts of Mao. Indeed, Palmer characterizes the group's ideological commitment as "a secular religion, a guide for all aspects of life, and a vow in which advancing the revolution through deeds is far more important than life itself." Palmer further avers that this total submission to a higher cause by Sendero members has enabled them to "wreak havoc" in Peru despite their relatively small numbers. Such a commitment "redefines objective reality in ideological terms... then acts as if the ideological interpretation was reality itself." This observation doubtless applies to many (perhaps most) highly ideological groups that employ force or violence in pursuit of social control or social change.

Ambassador James Cheek's case study of Eritrean and Tigrayan insurgents in Ethiopia delineates reasons for their eventual success after decades of fighting against Emperor Haile Selassie's rightist government and then against the Soviet-backed Marxist-Leninist dictatorship of Mengistu Haile Mariam.

Because these insurgents had little contact with anyone outside Ethiopia, not much was written about them and their situation except in occasional news reports dealing mostly with their civil and military activities. Cheek relied on insights he acquired from "an active involvement with Ethiopia since 1985 and extensive discussions with insurgents since 1989." Although Eritrean and Tigrayan insurgencies were Marxist in orientation, ethnicity was the main factor motivating them. Eritreans and Tigrayans shared a strong antipathy toward the Amhara ruling group, but they interpreted the problem differently. Eritreans always have considered themselves an independent nation. They saw the Amhara not only as

a foreign power, but one with much less to offer than their former occupier, Italy. Tigrayans, who once were in charge of Ethiopia, saw the Amhara not as colonizers from outside, but as oppressors of their fellow citizens, especially the larger ethnic groups such as Oromos and, of course, Tigrayans themselves. Even though the two insurgencies gained legitimacy, it seems quite likely that they would not have succeeded had not the Mengistu government lost its principal supporter, the Soviet Union.

This is a versatile book most useful for those teaching courses as international relations, low intensity conflict, political violence and terrorism, revolutionary movements, and national security policy.

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AUTHOR'S NOTES

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The editors appreciate the careful reading and helpful comments of the following reviewers for this issue of OKLAHOMA POLITICS.

Gary Copeland

James A. Davis

Mike Dineen

Larry Eberhardt

John George


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