

Oklahoma Politics



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INITIATIVE, COURTS, AND DEMOCRACY

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In 1992 Oklahoma's Supreme Court prevented the submission of an initiative petition to the voters on the grounds that it unconstitutionally limited elective abortions. Such pre-submission review is examined in light of constitutional, theoretical, and practical arguments. Several reasons are given for why the Court should adhere to an earlier precedent denying pre-submission review.

When William Jennings Bryan called Oklahoma's Constitution the "best constitution in the United States," one thing he was admiring was the initiative and referendum. In 1907 only four other states had constitutional provisions for these devices. Today, twenty-three other states provide for some form of direct democracy, but Oklahoma is still most liberal in this regard (Eule 1990).

The initiative and referendum were manifestations of a distrust in politicians in general and the state legislature in particular. The authors of the Constitution would probably have viewed the courts as the department least likely to encroach on the will of the people. Yet, in the summer of 1992 the Oklahoma Supreme Court refused to let the people vote on an initiative petition that was, in all respects, procedurally sound.

In 1990 a group called Oklahoma Coalition to Restrict Abortion, Inc., and a clergyman, Fred W. Sellars, Jr. led a circulation drive of an initiative petition concerning abortion. The Petition (No. 349) sought to limit the availability of elective abortions. In fact, except for four specific circumstances, it outlawed them entirely.¹ The petition was challenged in court on procedural grounds, and on constitutional grounds. Then, on June 29 the U. S. Supreme Court delivered its eagerly awaited opinion on abortion (*Planned Parenthood v. Casey*). On July 14, 1992 the state Supreme Court ordered those involved in lawsuits involving Petition No. 349 and the Attorney General to submit briefs addressing the constitutionality of the initiative in light of the *Casey* decision. The next month the Court, in a 5-4 decision, ruled that Initiative Petition No. 349 was unconstitutional, and therefore an election on it would be "useless" (Majority Opinion 1992, 3). The Court's decision raises several questions. First, one could ques-

tion the correctness of the state Supreme Court's view. That is, were the provisions of Initiative Petition No.349 in line with the *Casey* decision? This is traditionally the approach taken when examining court opinions, and not surprisingly, the parties in the case devoted most of their discussion to this question. Yet, there is another question that should precede any discussion of the constitutionality of the Petition. Is it constitutional or appropriate for the courts to rule on initiative petitions prior to their adoption in an election? That is the question on which this paper focuses. The legal issues raised by this question will be discussed first followed by some thoughts on the appropriateness of the Court's actions.

PRE-SUBMISSION JUDICIAL REVIEW

What are the arguments for and against pre-submission review of initiative petitions? First, it should be made clear that we are referring to a particular kind of review. All states permitting initiatives have procedural requirements that must be met before holding an election.² Few, if any, question the legitimate power of the courts to review, prior to the election, the correctness in following these procedures. There is no unanimity, however, when it comes to the question of reviewing the constitutionality of a petition *before* submitting it to the people in an election.

One argument favoring such pre-submission review is that to hold an election on an initiative petition that is unconstitutional would be a "fruitless endeavor" (Attorney General 1992, 1), or as the Court described it, an "exercise in futility" (Majority Opinion 1992, 4). It is futile since the people, if they passed such an initiative, would most likely have their efforts rather quickly nullified by the courts.

Another argument made for pre-submission review is that it can save taxpayer dollars.³ Elections cost money (officials have to be paid, ballots have to be printed, etc.). Why, so the argument goes, use taxpayer money for an election on an initiative that is unconstitutional? Why, as the Court put it, spend taxpayer money on an "elaborate charade?" (Majority Opinion 1992, 21).

It could also be argued that the Constitution specifically allows pre-submission review. It might, in other words, not be wise to conduct such reviews, but the Constitution permits it (Majority Opinion 1992, 13-22).

It was also argued in the present case, in what on its face seems somewhat Orwellian, that preventing the election on the initiative was best not only for those opposing the petition but also those supporting it. This was explained in the Attorney General's Brief:

“...for what good will it do supporters to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars on an election campaign, only to have the law struck down, the first time it is challenged – after passage. It is in the best interest of the petition’s supporters to know now, that the law they proposed is unconstitutional, so they can channel their efforts where they can be effective” (Attorney General 1992, 14-15).

The Court also rejected arguments emphasizing the right of the people to “speak” through the initiative.

"The proponents appear to assert that this absolute right to vote is derived from the First Amendment to the United States Constitution....assuming *arguendo*, the relevance of proponents’ ‘core speech’ argument in this context, it is obvious that these rights are not absolute" (Majority Opinion 1992, 16-17).

Finally, it was argued that pre-submission review can prevent an unnecessary divisive election. The Court agreed with *amici* that it thought pre-submission review could prevent the holding of an election that might not only divide public opinion, but unnecessarily so (Majority Opinion 1992, 14).

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS

The appropriate place to begin an examination of the correctness of pre-submission review is the state constitution. Proponents (those favoring a vote on the initiative) pointed out that the constitution gave the people the power to “propose laws...and to enact or reject the same at the polls independent of the Legislature...” (Article V, Section 1). Viewed in this manner, the people are acting as lawmakers and as such were “legislators.” Therefore, they argued, pre-submission review of an initiative would unconstitutionally deny this power because the separation of powers provision states that “neither [the legislative, executive, nor judicial departments] shall exercise the powers properly belonging to either of the others" (Article IV, Section 1).

Proponents also relied on Article VI, Section 2 of the Oklahoma Constitution, which states:

The first power reserved by the people is the initiative, and... voters shall have the right to propose any legislative measure....

For proponents, the key word in this section is “any” (Proponents' Brief 1992, 7). Although not explicitly stating it as such, proponents argument seems

to be that this would include the power of the people to propose laws which are *prima facie* unconstitutional.

Surprisingly, protestants (those against a vote on the initiative) did not cite any constitutional provisions in support of their view (Brief of Protestants 1992). The Attorney General's office did cite the U. S. Constitution arguing that *Casey* was the supreme law of the land and the U. S. Constitution (Article VI, Clause 2) mandates that "Judges in every State shall be bound thereby" (Attorney General 1992, 4). This, of course, begs the question concerning the constitutionality of pre-submission review. The question is not whether state judges are bound by the U. S. Constitution, but, being bound by it, when are they to exercise their review?⁴

In its written opinion the Court *did* rely on the state constitution for justification of its pre-submission review (Majority Opinion 1992, 13-22). Yet, like the arguments made in the brief from the Attorney General's office, the Court relied heavily on federalism for its rationale. First the Court quoted the U. S. Constitution: "the U. S. Constitution, treaties, and laws made in pursuance of the Constitution are the supreme law of the land" (U. S. Constitution, Article VI, Clause 2). Next, the Court quoted the Oklahoma Constitution: "The State of Oklahoma is an inseparable part of the Federal Union, and the Constitution of the U. S. is the supreme law of the land" (Article I, Section 1). This does not, however, answer the question as to *when* state courts and state judges are to exercise deference to the supreme law of the land. Therefore, as with the Attorney General's opinion, these references would seem to beg the fundamental question of pre-submission review.

The same could be said of another constitutional provision cited by a majority of the Court:

All political power is inherent in the people; and government is instituted for their protection, security, and benefit, and to promote their general welfare; and they have the right to alter or reform the same whenever the public good may require it; Provided, such change be not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States (Oklahoma Constitution, Article II, Section 1).

Again, both sides of the issue would have to concede that provisions in both the U. S. and Oklahoma's Constitution recognize that when there is a conflict between the two, the U. S. Constitution preempts the state's constitution. That this cannot be used to support pre-submission review is evident in the fact that this does not prevent Oklahoma courts from routinely ruling on the constitutionality of state laws. If Initiative 349 conflicts with the U. S. Constitution, then it will not stand. About that there is no uncertainty. The real question pre-

sented in this case is one of timing: *when* the court ought to decide the question of the constitutionality of Initiative 349.

The question of when a case should be decided by a court is called ripeness. The courts will generally only decide a case when the case has developed to its fullest, and an individual has exhausted all possible remedies. Only then is the case deemed "ripe" for review. Related to this judicially enforced restraint is another called "standing" which requires that a plaintiff has suffered, or is about to suffer, direct injury. Clearly, these restraints could have been used by the Oklahoma Supreme Court as legal justification for refusing to grant pre-submission review. (These restraints were important in the precedent established by the *Threadgill* case, were frequently mentioned by proponents in this case, and were cited in the dissenting opinions.) Interestingly, the dissenters in the case relied on the same constitutional provisions to support their position. Reliance on the same constitutional language by both sides of the pre-submission issue is probably due to a couple of factors. First, the two sides agree that the court has the authority to act, but differ on the question of when. Second, the state's constitution does not provide explicit language to support either side; hence, the question becomes theoretical in nature. Under these conditions the importance of the Constitution is minimized, with the emphasis becoming once more of what approach is most appropriate.

In his dissent Justice Wilson took a different approach. He reasoned that since the Constitution placed fewer restrictions on the initiative process than the legislative process, this was an indication that the authors of the Constitution did not want to impede the exercise of the initiative.⁵ Pre-submission judicial review is an impediment, Wilson argued, and therefore the authors of the constitution would denounce its use.

PRECEDENT

Related to constitutional arguments on pre-submission review is the argument based on available precedent. Again, as with the constitutional arguments, both sides can cite precedents.

The first case dealing with the question of pre-submission judicial review of an initiative occurred in the 1910 *Threadgill v. Cross* decision (26 Okla. 403). There the Court unanimously refused to review a proposed constitutional amendment prior to a vote of the people. The proposed amendment was challenged on grounds that it violated the provisions of the Enabling Act which members of the constitutional convention had accepted and written into the Constitution (Article I, Section 7; repealed in 1959). The Court reasoned that the acts of the legisla

ture, or voters at the polls, ought to be presumed to be valid until *properly* brought before the Court, meaning the parties must have "standing." Since legislative acts cannot be brought to the Court until the requirements of standing are met, neither, the Court reasoned, may the legislative acts of the people be heard by the Court until the requirements of standing are met. This is mandated, the Court argued, by the Constitution's recognition of the people as legislators when they exercise the initiative, and its guarantee of separation of powers.⁶

The *Threadgill* precedent, denying pre-submission review of initiatives, was followed for 65 years. Then, in a 1975 case dealing with the city of Norman, the Court did uphold pre-submission review of two proposed initiative petitions (Norman 1975). Subsequently the Court has, on several occasions, adhered to this recent precedent.

In the *Norman* case the Court held that the initiative petition was unconstitutional because the state's constitution (Article XVIII, Section 4, a) allowed *only* legislative power to be exercised through a municipal initiative. The initiative in this case was deemed to be an exercise in administrative (it established a rate structure for the city's utility service) rather than legislative power, and thus it was unconstitutional. The Court's sole justification for reversing the *Threadgill* precedent was not based on any constitutional language or even constitutional theory, but rather to prevent a "costly and unnecessary election" (Norman 1975, 8). It is to the question of appropriateness, or arguing from a policy or theoretical perspective that we now turn.

MEANINGLESS ACT

Doesn't it just make sense that if an initiative petition is clearly unconstitutional the Court should go ahead and prevent the people from going through the "elaborate charade" of voting on a petition and, if approved, having it subsequently declared void? The majority in this case said yes. Those supporting the initiative argued that *Casey* was not dispositive, and that *Casey* could, and most probably would, be overruled. The Court's response was that they would not base their decision on a guess as to what the future held for abortion cases. " 'Guesses' about the future development of any rule of law have never been an acceptable rule of decision in Anglo-American jurisprudence," wrote the Court's majority (Majority Opinion 1992, 12).

In other portions of its opinion, however, the Court did seem to be willing to engage in a guessing game of sorts. The Court was "guessing" that the U. S.

Supreme Court would follow the precedent of *Casey* and strike down Initiative Petition 349 (Majority Opinion 1992, 21). The Court was also “guessing” in each of the following descriptions of what might happen were the election on Initiative Petition 349 to be held: (1) it would be a divisive election (Majority Opinion 1992, 14), (2) if it passed it would be struck down within months (Majority Opinion 1992, 21), (3) a meaningful vote on the initiative was impossible (Majority Opinion 1992, 21), and (4) the election would be expensive (Majority Opinion 1992, 14, 21).

In none of the briefs, nor in the opinions of the Justices, was there mention of a way in which an election on an initiative, even one viewed as clearly unconstitutional, could be more than a meaningless charade. Yet, constitutional arguments aside, there is at least one possible benefit from holding such an election: education of the voters. Justice Opala touched on this in his dissenting opinion when he argued that pre-submission review in this case infringed on political speech. Proponents made the same point, and there would seem to be a great deal to this argument given the rationale behind the initiative.

But, voters can learn about the issues surrounding abortion without an initiative election. What they probably will not learn without going through the exercise is the importance of understanding a petition before they sign it. Particularly one for which they, with their tax dollars, will have to pay. If the Court is always there to stop what it considers to be an “exercise in futility,” then why should voters take the time to study any initiative before signing it? Why even have signature requirements? Why not have those wanting to propose an initiative submit it to the court before going to all the trouble of obtaining thousands of signatures?

Let the voters see what happens when they sign and are allowed to vote on a clearly unconstitutional petition and perhaps, in the process, they might learn something. What might they learn? They might learn that voters in Oklahoma did not desire a strict abortion law. They might learn that voters wanted to send a message that they wanted a strict abortion law, even if they knew the courts would subsequently declare it unconstitutional. Or, they might think they could pass a strict abortion law without interference by the courts, only to learn afterwards that any student of constitutional law, not to mention judge, could clearly predict that the proposed law was unconstitutional, and, some might thus argue, a waste of taxpayers money.

The first two seem entirely appropriate under the rationale for having the initiative in the first place. The third lesson, the one the court in this case would not allow, might be the medicine voters need to take initiative proposals seriously.

REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT

The dissenting Justices in this case (Opala and Wilson) emphasize the commitment the authors of the Oklahoma Constitution had to direct democracy. Opala writes, "Today's opinion impermissibly imposes the rigidity of the current constitutional orthodoxy on the use of initiative process and prevents the people from having access to that genre of lawmaking as a legitimate means of testing the continued popularity of current political values to effect their legitimate change" (Opala Dissent 1992, 13). Wilson scolded the majority writing, "I refuse to join in this flagrant encroachment upon the people's legislative powers" (Wilson Dissent 1992, 1).

The majority, while repeatedly referring to the initiative as a constitutional right and expressly stating their "reverence for initiative rights," argue that constitutional rights are not absolute (Majority Opinion 1992, 17). This is a *non sequitur* concerning the issue of pre-submission review. As already pointed out, the Oklahoma Constitution explicitly restricts the lawmaking process, but the courts do not allow review of laws passed by the legislature prior to their going into effect. Just as laws passed by the legislature can be declared void in violation of the U. S. Constitution, so too can laws passed by the voters. The idea of constitutionalism is ingrained in our American governmental experience. Granting this, it does not necessarily follow that the Courts may or must exercise judicial review *before* the legislature or the voters have acted.

The majority asserts, "The Oklahoma drafters were careful to frame a constitution which was in harmony with the Constitution written by the founding fathers" (Majority Opinion 1992, 17). If the majority means that Oklahoma's drafters were looking over their shoulder to make sure they did nothing to contravene the U. S. Constitution which might jeopardize approval of their work, they are correct. If, however, they mean that Oklahoma's Constitution not only does not contravene the "democratic" elements of the U. S. Constitution, but it does not go beyond it, they are very mistaken. Both the founding fathers and Oklahoma's drafters feared tyranny. Separation of powers and checks and balances, found in the documents they wrote, are clear evidence of this. The founding fathers, however, also feared "*demos* getting what *demos* wanted" in every instance. Oklahoma's drafters had this fear also (why else have a Bill of Rights?), but to a much lesser degree. There was, in short, less of a fear of majority tyranny. Some would go so far as to say that the founding fathers' fear of majority tyranny was so strong that they forbade direct democracy in the states by guaranteeing a republican form of government in every state.⁷ The fact is that the founding fathers used the word "republic" differently on various occasions. Madison, himself, used the word on one occasion as equivalent to majority rule,

while on another occasion he used it synonymously with indirect or representative democracy.⁸ It is noteworthy that the founding fathers *did* reject pre-submission review of state laws by the Congress (Madison 1987, 88-89, 92, 304-305, 518).

COST TO TAXPAYERS

It is difficult to read the majority's opinion in the present case without concluding that the primary reason for granting pre-submission review is to spare the taxpayer the cost of an election. Were we, however, to follow this logic, we would be transforming our courts from the Clark Kent image Hamilton had of them to "super budget cutters," able to stop democracy with a single opinion.⁹

"The decision of how much money to spend on direct legislation is a political question" (Gordon and Magleby 1989, 311). Should the Court be permitted to halt a legislative hearing on a bill because the bill, if passed, would be unconstitutional? The expense for an initiative election "is no more useless than the time and money expended on other legislative proceedings that may ultimately produce an infirm law" (Farrell 1985, 932). As stated in the *Threadgill* decision:

It may be that a government all of whose powers are administered by one department may be administered with less expense than a government of the kind existing in this state and in the other states of the Union, in which the powers are exercised by different departments; but, if so, it must be presumed that the people in adopting the present form did so with knowledge of that fact.... (p. 415).

CONCLUSION

There is no explicit provision in the Oklahoma Constitution allowing pre-submission judicial review of initiative petitions. In *Threadgill*, a case contemporaneous with the writing of the Constitution, the Supreme Court decided that pre-submission review was unauthorized by the Constitution and furthermore unwise. Sixty-five years later, the state Supreme Court overruled *Threadgill*. The Court's sole justification for doing so was to prevent costly and unnecessary elections.

A decision concerning whether or not the taxpayers want to forgo the expense of an election is a political decision. The Courts should follow the re-

straints of standing, ripeness, and not deciding constitutional questions unless the resolution of a case demands it.

Judges should show the same respect for direct democracy that they do for indirect democracy (Eule 1990). It may be, most likely will be, that an initiative will be defeated at the polls. The voters may know exactly what they are doing when they vote for a clearly unconstitutional petition. They may not. Such elections may be meaningful in spite of the courts failure to recognize them as such. They may not.

Clearly Oklahoma's drafters looked upon direct democracy favorably, as can be witnessed in the provisions regarding the initiative and referendum. In this capacity the people can serve as legislators. Just as the courts show deference to the lawmaking process of the legislature, so too, it would seem to follow, they should allow the people to vote on an initiative or referendum, and as stated in *Threadgill*, "then, and not until then, will the judicial and executive departments have the power and duty devolving upon them to determine its validity and enforce its provisions" (p. 415).

NOTES

1. The initiative stipulated:

“Abortion shall not be a crime under the following circumstances:

- (A) (1) The abortion was necessary to save the life of female or to avoid grave impairment of the female’s physical or mental health;
- (2) For the purpose of determining grave impairment of a female’s mental health in Section 5 (A) (1), impairments or stresses produced by an unwanted birth, social stigma or embarrassment, interruption of life plans, or lack of financial resources, which have not resulted in psychosis or major depressive illness, shall not constitute grave mental impairment;
- (B) The pregnancy resulted from rape as defined by Title 21, Section 1111 of the Oklahoma Statutes;
- (C) The pregnancy resulted from incest as defined by Title 21, Section 885 of the Oklahoma Statutes; or
- (D) The unborn child would be born with a grave physical or mental defect.”

2. Eight percent of the legal voters of the state can propose a legislative initiative; fifteen percent can propose a constitutional amendment. Five percent of the legal voters can require a referendum on a law passed by the legislature. See, the Constitution of Oklahoma, Article 5, Section 2.

3. See, for example, *in re Initiative Petition No. 349*, Majority Opinion, pp. 3, 14; *Attorney General’s Brief*, p. 14; and *Brief of Amici Curiae United States Senator David Boren, United States Representative Dave McCurdy, United States Representative Mike Synar, The Honorable Carl Albert, and Professors Bruce Ackerman, Paul Brest, Guido Calabresi, Walter Dellinger, Geoffrey Stone, and Laurence Tribe in Support of Protestants*, p. 7.

4. See, *Fletcher v. Peck*, 6 Cranch 87 (1810), Supreme Court invalidated a state law; *Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee*, 1 Wheat. 304 (1816), Supreme Court reviewed state court judgment in civil case, and *Cohens v. Virginia*, 19 U. S. 264 (1921), Supreme Court reviewed state court judgment in criminal case.

5. *In re Initiative Petition No. 349*, Wilson Dissent, p. 3. For example, the governor cannot veto an initiative, and the effective dates of laws enacted by the people are not subject to the constitutional limitations placed on those of the legislature.

6. The petition was entitled: “An act proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the state of Oklahoma, by amending section 7, article 1, of the Constitution, repealing the separate article of said Constitution relating to prohibition, submitted by the Constitution Convention to the people of the proposed state of Oklahoma at the election held on September 17, 1907, and adopted by the people.”

7. “Lousy Lawmaking: Questioning the Desirability and Constitutionality of Legislation by Initiative,” *Southern California Law Review* 61:733-76 (1988); See Article IV, Section 4 of the U. S. Constitution.

8. Madison uses republic synonymously with "majority rule" in his "Vices of the Political System of the United States," and in *Federalist* No. 10 where he writes, "If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote." In that same essay, he defines republic as indirect democracy: "A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place...."

9. James D. Gordon III and David B. Magleby, "Pre-Election Judicial Review of Initiatives and Referendums," *Notre Dame Law Review* 64:298-320. In *Federalist* No. 78 Hamilton describes the judicial branch as "the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them."

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ORGANIZING FOR STATE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF OKLAHOMA FUTURES

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Oklahoma Futures was created by the Oklahoma Legislature as a public-private partnership in 1987 in an effort to redirect state economic development programs and strategies. This article retraces the history of and political dynamics revolving around Oklahoma Futures and then uses three models to analyze the organization's development. The three models of structural development – top-down, diffusion, and structural choice – each provide necessary and useful explanatory insights, but none is totally sufficient.

The choice of institutional structures says much about the policy goals and political decisions of government. Decisions to organize, reorganize, and reform bureaucratic entities have come to be recognized by many politicians and political scientists as key political choices reflecting the interests of important actors and the environmental forces at play (Seidman and Gilmour 1986). Reorganization efforts also take on an orthodoxy, rhetoric, and symbolism that are as important as the results themselves (March and Olsen 1989). Moreover, organizing a policy function reflects the nature of policy problems and analysis as much as their political environment (Jenkins-Smith 1990).

In the intergovernmental arena, different models emphasize different dynamics of organizational politics. Anton (1989) suggests three. The **top-down** model may be seen in situations where a broad consensus emerges quickly as a result of a perceived crisis and opens an opportunity for executive leadership to propose a solution (Anton 1989). The **bottom-up** model describes situations in which a state of permanent instability pushes problem awareness up from the local level to higher levels for a response (Sundquist 1969). The **diffusion** model reflects the spread of policy ideas and choices from state to state (Walker 1969). A fourth model, **structural choice**, has explanatory power as well. This model posits that the choice of agency structure reflects the political goals and self-interests of those involved in the creation of the new agency (Moe 1989).

While these various models have been used to explain or understand some of the dynamics of change in programs at the federal level, less attention has been paid to the evolution of agencies and boards at the state level. This paper explores the case of Oklahoma Futures, a kind of public-private partnership

created in 1987 in an effort to redirect state economic development programs and strategies.

The paper will briefly review some of the elements of economic development policy which make the issues particularly useful for an exploration of the dynamics of structural politics. Second, the legislative history and implementation stages of Oklahoma Futures will be described. The Oklahoma case is analyzed in a third section in an effort to understand the events in terms of public policy dynamics and the politics of creating new state intergovernmental agencies. The models noted above provide some insight, but none is sufficient for explaining the Oklahoma case.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE 1980s

Economic development has been a prominent and preeminent cross-cutting policy concern of the states throughout the 1980s and 1990s (National Governors' Association 1988). Governors at mid-decade ranked economic development as the third most critical priority on their agendas after revenue concerns and education (Mauro and Yago 1989, 63). A host of public interest groups, consulting firms and academic-based research centers sprang up to investigate, propose and monitor strategies and solutions. The literature on the state role in an internationally changing and complex economic environment exploded in terms of sheer volume, if not always with agreement about the best remedies.

The emergence of economic development as a key issue reflects the intersection of several trends, three of which are key to this argument. First, the 1980s brought a recognition of a changed economy. Second, the federalism initiatives of the Reagan Administration contributed significantly to a changed intergovernmental environment. Third, public and private leaders together began to see their economic and political futures as integrally linked and thus hinged upon an effective response from state government. Indeed, economic development is a keystone in changing ways that state governments think about and structure their capacity and potential.

The landmarks of the new economic landscape include a recognition of (1) the emergence of a post-industrial economy requiring technological sophistication, (2) the concern over the lack of competitiveness of American businesses in the world economy, and (3) the vulnerability of American society to global forces. While seemingly abstract notions, these trends are all too tangible when inventoried in terms of a loss of American manufacturing jobs to overseas producers, stagnant wages and personal incomes, and attendant social problems.

Concurrent with the recognition of a new global economy, the dynamics of intergovernmental relations and federalism underwent significant changes. New Federalism under the Reagan Administration effectively meant a significantly reduced federal role in intergovernmental finance and a shift of administrative responsibility of many federal grant programs to the states (Anton 1989, Conlan

1988). Block grants increased state government involvement in local economic and community development, but in the eyes of some, strong partnerships with the localities were slower to crystallize (Southern Growth Policies Board 1987, 2).

Finally, the relationship between business and government is being viewed differently. Reich (1983) argues that the American economy has historically been dominated in cycles by either a management-centered culture reflecting unfettered free enterprise or a government-centered culture characterized by regulation, planning and often conflict with business. The 1980s saw conflict slowly give way to a recognition of interdependency and the notion of partnership. A significant number, though not necessarily all, business and government leaders began to see their needs and fates more broadly intertwined.

As a result of this confluence of changes, state approaches to economic development shifted. The mission of state commerce departments moved away from the original "first wave" emphasis on industrial recruitment using primarily tax and financial incentives and business assistance services to attract new businesses into the state (Pilcher 1991, 34-37). This traditional approach fostered extensive competition among states and among communities within a state, thus creating a variety of intergovernmental and overtly political tensions along the way.

During the 1980s, a "second wave" of economic development programs emerged with an emphasis on targeting public investment strategically to intrastate enterprises and focusing broadly on public programs that enhance a state's attractiveness; for example, education, quality of life assets, and infrastructure (Barker 1983; Borders and Johnson 1985). In large part, the new look of state economic development was a response to economic conditions, a growing awareness of the need for competitiveness on a global scale, and a recognition, spurred by David Birch's critical research, of the role played by small and young businesses (Birch 1979). While not abandoning entirely the older industrial recruitment strategies, much more diverse and innovative activities characterize the arena of state economic development today (Osborne 1988; Fosler 1988). States increasingly look beyond the U. S. borders to find new markets for homegrown products and to develop trading opportunities for locally-based businesses. A new vocabulary promotes strategic planning, sectoral targeting, economic diversification, access to and sources of new capital, and human resource development.

Finally, public-private partnerships have been spawned with a wide range of missions and powers. Taking a variety of forms – citizen or business groups, quasi-public organizations, foundations and university-based centers – these cooperative efforts share a common cause of focusing the attention and resources of government and private sector elites on the economic development needs of a community or the state as a whole (Bollier et al. 1991). Being neither exclusively public nor private by definition, these advisory or intergovernmental agencies operate in a kind of "twilight zone" (Seidman and Gilmour 1986).

Of particular note, because of its relevance to this paper, are the quasi-public organizations, which are statutorily-created instruments of public policy or capital investment. One typology of the quasi-public organizations identifies four dominant forms:

- 1) business finance corporations, organized to raise or leverage capital for private sector enterprises;
- 2) bond financing authorities, created to raise capital through both the exempt and taxable markets for public works and, more recently, private sector projects with some perceived public benefit;
- 3) research and development authorities, whose charge is to stimulate research and foster technology transfer to the private sector;
- 4) strategic development organizations, which are given general responsibility for policy planning and oversight of state programs (Strange et al., 1991).

Different rationales are advanced in support of quasi-public organizations. One type of quasi-public entity first developed to allow government to circumvent constitutional debt and lending restrictions for public works projects. While some of these financing authorities date to the Depression Era, more recently created entities sometimes operate in territory where the lines between public-purpose projects and private benefit are less clear. Other objectives are also advanced. Proponents of quasi-public entities see them as necessary to bring innovative and entrepreneurial management into state government and to bridge existing agency structures (Daniels 1987, 27).

Critics suggest that some objectives may be less admirable. Political actors may find quasi-public corporations an easier way to expedite fulfillment of campaign pledges than changing larger, more bureaucratic structures of state government. Since financing authorities are usually off-budget (i.e. their revenue sources and expenditures are not part of the normal accounting processes), they may be insulated from scrutiny by the public and political leaders (Strange et al. 1991, 4).

Whatever the claims of their detractors and advocates, quasi-public corporations are a fact on the economic development scene. Whether the best vehicle or not, they also reflect the new catechism of public-private partnership.

SHAPING THE ECONOMIC FUTURE: THE OKLAHOMA CASE

Oklahoma did not escape this confluence of public policy forces during the 1980s. But as is often the case in federalism, each state's circumstances and response reflect certain unique conditions. The Oklahoma case in point is no different. Morgan et al. (1991) describe Oklahoma as a state in transition from a traditionalistic political culture and an economy based on agriculture and en-

ergy, thus economic diversification and expansion have figured prominently in policy agendas (170-176).

Oklahoma politics have long been dominated by the Democratic Party and a political culture flavored by localism and factionalism. Morgan et al. (1991) write of the fundamental divisions – rural versus urban, Oklahoma City versus Tulsa, labor versus management, and public sector versus private – which have characterized many public issues and often blocked important compromise. The factionalism is played out on the stage of state government – a strong but often parochially-motivated legislature and a relatively weak governor presiding over a balkanized bureaucracy.

Against this backdrop, the following section describes the context in which Oklahoma Futures was created, reviews key decisions in the legislative process, describes the implementation and accomplishments of the organization in its formative years, and reports some of the assessments of key participants and observers of Oklahoma Futures' operations. A series of interviews was conducted with legislators, state agency personnel, private sector leaders, media representatives and university personnel to form the basis for this section.¹

THE CONTEXT IN 1986

Passage of the Oklahoma Economic Development Act of 1987 (74 O. S. 1987, Section 5002) grew out of a period of extreme economic distress for the state and widespread recognition among business and government leaders that “something had to be done.”

The essential conditions, which led to enactment of the legislation (known through the deliberations as House Bill 1444), are economic, intergovernmental, and political. On the economic side, the state was in the depths of recession after enjoying an extended economic boom in the 1970s and early 1980s fueled by rising energy prices. The state saw its fortunes crash in 1982 with the precipitous drop in oil and gas prices and concurrently with the farm crisis in the agricultural sector. Times were bad in the oil patch (Morgan et al. 1991, 59-60). State revenues, which grew from \$2.58 billion in fiscal year (FY) 1979 to \$4.13 billion in FY82, dropped to \$1.93 billion in FY83, forcing the Legislature to cut agency budgets significantly and impose the first of several new taxes (House of Representatives 1985, 21-26).

In addition to the loss of revenues from a tax system based in large part on severance taxes, the state had lost significant federal revenues (as did all states) when the Reagan administration was successful in securing passage of its proposals for consolidation, reduction and elimination of various grants. Reagan's block grant changes gave the Oklahoma Department of Economic and Community Development (DECA) responsibility for the administration of the Community Development Block Grant and the Community Services Block Grant, both involving grants to local governments.

DECA also figured into the organizational and political context at the time. In 1986, as part of legislation to reorganize parts of state government, DECA was consolidated with the Department of Economic Development (DED), a small, old-styled industrial recruitment agency of state government, creating the Oklahoma Department of Commerce (ODOC). To some, DECA was a focal point for the distributive, pork-barrel politics of Oklahoma traditionalism, and clearly DED embodied the philosophy and tools of the “first wave” economic development trade.²

Also in the early 1980s, an important private sector force for change was emerging. Urged on and chaired by then former Governor Henry Bellmon, certain key business leaders including G. Douglas Fox and H. E. “Gene” Rainbolt revived the dormant Oklahoma Academy for State Goals, a non-partisan, non-profit citizens group established in 1967. In 1985, the Academy commissioned a major report on the uses and sources of state revenue and convened a conference of many of the state’s top leaders. Around the same time, Oklahoma 2000, Inc., an affiliate of the Oklahoma State Chamber of Commerce, issued a series of reports highlighting aspects of or problems with the state’s economic development policies. The chamber economic development reports supplemented its role as the lead organization on the day-to-day legislative issues of concern to the business community. Both organizations drew on research from and were advised by a cadre of economists principally from Oklahoma State University and the University of Oklahoma. Consensus clearly was forming around the notion that the state’s economic future could not “depend on its natural resources alone to sustain its economic base in the future” (Oklahoma Academy 1987, v).

THE 1987 LEGISLATIVE SESSION

In a legislative session dominated by a 16 percent drop in state revenues and the formulation of the state’s largest-ever tax increase, the passage of HB 1444 sparked very little public controversy. Moreover, most of the state’s leadership (legislative, executive and business) were committed to doing something to try to turn around the state’s economic fortunes.

Laying the groundwork, the Oklahoma Legislature in 1986 authorized a major study of the state’s economic development efforts. To conduct the study, Belden Daniels, president of the Council for Community Development, Inc., was retained. Daniels, one of a handful of nationally recognized experts advising states, espoused the formation of quasi-public organizations to lead policy development, to leverage capital, and to spur investment. His mix of proposals was first adopted in Massachusetts and then transplanted to other states.

Daniels’ final report to the Legislature’s Joint Fiscal Operations Committee emphasized three recommendations: 1) the creation of a “new, powerful state-wide public-private economic development partnership to guide Oklahoma’s future;” 2) the creation of a variety of financing entities to provide high risk

capital for innovative enterprises; and 3) major public investments in education at all levels (Daniels 1987).

At the same time, the Oklahoma Academy commissioned a study by Midwest Research Institute on the role of private sector involvement in economic development (Midwest Research Institute 1986). Both Daniels and Jack Wimer of Midwest Research Institute addressed the 1986 Oklahoma Academy conference and offered advice on developing a new Oklahoma strategy for economic expansion (Oklahoma Academy 1987).

Working closely with Daniels in the Legislature was Representative Don McCorkell who was the prime sponsor for HB 1444. Senator Roy Sadler sponsored the measure in the Senate. The bill drafted by Daniels and McCorkell borrowed heavily from the design of Kansas, Inc. and the Indiana Economic Development Council. The original bill proposed a new bureaucratic structure with Oklahoma Futures operating as an independent board of directors over the Department of Commerce and with interlocking directorates over new and reorganized financing agencies. The proposal allowed the Governor and legislative leaders to serve on and make appointments to Oklahoma Futures. In Indiana and Kansas, legislative leaders serve on the policy boards but the governor is the appointing authority and exercises direct executive control (Fosler 1988, 281; Strange et al. 1991, 53).

The Oklahoma provision for legislative appointments and other legislative-executive conflicts became significant sticking points between the Legislature and Governor Henry Bellmon and his Director of Finance, Alexander Holmes. In spite of their early involvement with the Oklahoma Academy and other private sector efforts, Bellmon and Holmes, an Oklahoma University professor of economics, argued that HB 1444 was a legislative incursion on executive branch power. The Governor objected to other provisions: Oklahoma Futures' approval power over the Department of Commerce's business plan and five-year economic development plan and annual business plans of the new financing agencies created in the bill; the requirement that the Governor appoint the ODOC director from a list recommended by Futures; and legislative membership on the proposed new Private Sales Bond Oversight Committee. As the session drew to a close, Governor Bellmon wrote to Senate President Rodger Randle requesting that the bill be held over for further study so that the legislative-executive disagreements could be resolved.

Ultimately the bill was passed (31-16 in the Senate and 72-16 in the House) after the conference committee worked out several key compromises with the Governor. The compromises included: making Oklahoma Futures advisory only with the power to review but not approve ODOC's business plans, creating separate legislative and executive bond oversight boards, retaining legislative members and appointments, and giving Futures the responsibility for writing the state's five-year economic development plan (Chavez 1987). A related compro-

mise created the Oklahoma Center for the Advancement of Science and Technology (OCAST) as a separate agency with a gubernatorially-appointed board.

The bill, now 161 pages in length, was criticized by some legislators who complained about its complexity and the lack of time to study it. But, importantly, the bill had something for just about everyone to support (Chavez 1987). Key provisions of the bill included:

- creation of Oklahoma Futures as a 22-member public-private partnership to develop strategic economic policies, coordinate development activities across state institutions and programs, and generally oversee ODOC and the new financing agencies;
- designation of seats on Oklahoma Futures as reserved for representatives of business, the state chamber, the state AFL-CIO, and the presidents of Oklahoma University and Oklahoma State University;
- mandate the development of a five-year economic development plan by Oklahoma Futures to provide overall policy development guidance to the state's efforts;
- creation of the Oklahoma Center for the Advancement of Science and Technology (OCAST) to expand seed capital for the state's research programs and foster technology transfer to emerging enterprises;
- designation of funds for centers of excellence and endowed chairs which would provide research support for the state's various universities;
- creation of the Oklahoma Development Finance Authority (replacing the Oklahoma Development Authority) and expand the bonding capacity of the Oklahoma Industrial Finance Authority (OIFA) to serve public works needs of towns and cities;
- creation of executive and legislative bond oversight committees;
- assignment of various strategic development functions to ODOC or the new financing agencies.

Most public-private partnerships reflect a kind of corporatist model of extra-governmental policymaking by resource-holding groups, but there are some variations to the theme which are distinctly more pluralistic (Goldstein and Bergman 1986). Oklahoma's traditionalist political culture reflects a long-standing tension and ambivalence between the public and private sectors (Morgan et al. 1991, 207-208), and might predict considerable resistance to such a partnership. But Elazar's (1966) original traditionalistic formulation also emphasizes the participation of elites and constraints on public bureaucracy. Thus it is surprising that the legislative debate did not focus more on the issue of elevating private-sector power over major functions of state government as was proposed in the draft bill for Oklahoma Futures. Given its focus on legislative-executive

relations, the debate sheds little light on whether this tension was on the minds of legislators, the governor, or the chief private sector advocates.

THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF FUTURES

In its first year, Oklahoma Futures devoted most of its energies to the development of the state's first five-year plan on economic development. Tom Bennett of the Stillwater National Bank was hired to coordinate the process and 18 task forces were put to work developing goals and aspirations for the state. More than 650 people from around the state got involved in the task force meetings. Culling through the mixed bag of task force reports, Oklahoma Futures identified its major goals and strategies and then directed the staff from ODOC to prepare the final document.

In the end, the five-year plan ran 172 pages in length and reflected the thinking of "second wave" economic development strategy. The plan was divided into 13 broad goals each accompanied by a variety of strategies for implementation. The top priority in the plan was the goal of improving the state's public education system, a topic that was to occupy much of the Futures members' time both as members of the board and as activists in other arenas. The plan also called for increasing per capita income, employment, new business formations, exports of manufactured goods and agricultural products, and international investment. Other "second wave" goals dealt with the reduction of adult functional illiteracy, improvement of government performance, creation of a viable banking and savings and loan sector, and enhancement of "the quality of life in Oklahoma" (Oklahoma Futures 1988, 29). Futures established measures and standards by which to monitor the plan, and in yearly updates reported progress.

Throughout the Bellmon Administration years, Oklahoma Futures suffered under the tensions that were evident during the legislative deliberations. At best, Governor Bellmon's posture toward the group was tolerant but protective of his executive authority over the Department of Commerce. At points, however, relations became downright acrimonious. One confrontation occurred when a Futures subcommittee criticized the management of the ODOC foreign trade program, citing the lack of coordination of various international initiatives in other departments, and recommended a freeze on opening new foreign trade offices until changes were made. The subcommittee recommendations provoked an angry reply from Governor Bellmon who accused the group of meddling and meeting too often. In a related incident, ODOC Director Donald Paulsen refused to provide Oklahoma Futures a copy of the department's proposed business plan and budget in a showdown over budget approval powers (Wolfe 1989).

Other factors contributed to Futures' struggle for effectiveness. Without its own independent staff, the group had to rely upon ODOC staff for assistance, thus hampering the board's ability to act as an independent reviewer of the agency.

(An ODOC staffer is currently loaned full-time to Futures after the Legislature turned down a request for an independent staff and budget in 1991.) While the Senate and House economic development committee chairs are regular Futures participants, legislative leaders rarely attended the meetings, thus further eroding its political support (Chavez 1989).

Not until the election of David Walters in November 1990 did conditions change. The new governor accepted Futures' unanimous recommendation, based on a national search process, of Greg Main to be the new ODOC executive director. Also, according to current co-chair Douglas Fox, Governor Walters invited Futures to give input on the ODOC budget and business plans in September to coincide with the normal cycle of budget development. Under Governor Bellmon, Oklahoma Futures was provided the ODOC business plan and budget to review in the spring too late to provide meaningful comment since the Legislature was simultaneously concluding its deliberations on the budget. Futures also is spearheading a rural development initiative that coincides with Governor Walters' proclaimed intention to make rural economic concerns a priority issue.

JUDGING FUTURES' EFFECTIVENESS

It is difficult to assess Oklahoma Futures' effectiveness empirically since few if any of the board's initiatives depend on its independent actions alone. If judged purely on its economic development goals, the organization's five-year plan is the logical yardstick with which to begin.

In 1990, the most recent year for which progress is reported, the measures of economic improvement were clearly mixed. On 20 of 34 economic indicators compiled by the Oklahoma Department of Commerce, there were signs, if modest, of a strengthening economy. But in most other areas, the objective measures – e.g. student graduation and dropout rates, educational expenditures and teacher salaries, bank equity capital growth, foreign investment, and per capita personal income – showed little movement toward achieving Futures' original goals (Oklahoma Futures 1990).³

Futures' seeming lack of progress was highlighted in a series of articles in 1989 by *The Daily Oklahoman*. But defending the group, James Tolbert, then chairman of the group, said "The state didn't get in a hole in a week and won't get out in that time either . . ." (Chavez 1989).

Another measure of impact would be the extent to which state funds have been redirected to the economic development function of state government. While reorganization of functions and agencies and changing budget formats between the Bellmon and Walters administrations make comparisons difficult, it is clear that substantial new money has been directed toward economic development. In the first three years (fiscal years 1988 through 1990) after its inception, OCAST was appropriated \$36.6 million (mostly new money) to build up its revolving

funds of venture capital and seed monies (Oklahoma 1992; Oklahoma 1991). Similarly, for fiscal year 1990 through fiscal year 1993, legislative appropriations for ODOC grew by 22.1 percent, a rate of growth outstripped only by education at 38.4 percent (Oklahoma 1993). At the same time, total executive branch appropriations (excluding education) grew by 15.1 percent.

While Futures has had only limited input on the ODOC budget, the members might arguably claim some credit for affecting the public discourse which in turn frames legislative appropriation decisions. Like the economic indicators, however, the direct link between the advisory body and appropriation decisions is tenuous.

In the eyes of many of its members, Futures' most significant contributions are not necessarily reflected in its plan. Primarily, Futures members point to their role as a "bully pulpit" on the education reform issue that dominated legislative and public attention from 1990 when the landmark reform bill, HB 1017, was passed through 1991 when a repeal effort was defeated. Futures members figured prominently in the leadership of campaigns to pass and then protect the reform legislation. Futures members hope that their efforts in rural development and a current project to develop a strategic "vision" for the state might likewise benefit from the board's high profile status to focus attention on state needs.

Members also point to their efforts to monitor the loan decisions of the Oklahoma Development Finance Authority. With a membership that overlaps with that of the Bond Oversight Commission, a Futures subcommittee has been "naggingly effective" in preventing ill-advised loans that would total nearly \$30 million, according to H. E. "Gene" Rainbolt. The subcommittee's composition of bankers and investment business people makes up for any lack of independent staff resources. At one point, Oklahoma Futures held up approval of the ODFA business plan, a statutory power which the board does not have over ODOC. In addition, the Legislature authorized an independent audit (recommended by Oklahoma Futures) of lending practices of the ODFA and the Oklahoma Industrial Finance Authority. In short, Oklahoma Futures has used its statutory, advisory, and symbolic powers to oversee the ODFA.

In spite of its accomplishments, the overwhelming consensus among the participants is that the board has not achieved the impact originally hoped for, and the gap between expectations and achievements is largely attributed to the lack of a consensus about Oklahoma Futures' central role. The political compromise in the legislative process relegated the board's powers to strictly advisory and visionary. The uneasy relationship with Governor Bellmon and the legislative leadership's disinterest further compound the board's weakness. Whether Oklahoma Futures thrives will clearly depend in large part on the posture which Governor Walters takes toward it. At present, the "new, powerful state-wide institution... for continuing short and long term strategic analysis, planning, action, and performance audit" remains a consultant's promise (Daniels 1987, 29).

ANALYZING THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURES

The creation of Oklahoma Futures demonstrates the elements of top-down, diffusion, and structural choice models, but illustrates little of the dynamics of the bottom-up model. The applicable models might easily have predicted some of the difficulties the board has encountered. While each model has some explanatory power as this section attempts to show, a fourth model – what March and Olsen (1989) term the “garbage can” – perhaps offers the most insight. But a “garbage can” theory of organizational politics may be less a model than it is an acknowledgment of the inability of theoretical constructs to fully explicate “real world” politics and practice.

THE MODELS OF STRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENT

In the top-down model, Anton (1989) describes the emergence of top-level leadership to propose and spur a policy change in a time of crisis. The mobilization of private leaders through the Oklahoma Academy for State Goals and Oklahoma 2000, Inc., and the personal networking of political leaders from both parties in response to the oil collapse characterize the early stages of a top-down process. The almost “instant” policymaking which results from a crisis environment often reflects primarily a consensus limited to the need for action rather than the specific solutions. As Anton notes, a top-down process is often characterized by “quick acceptance of the first proposal that seems reasonable.” Further he warns, “Actions taken under such pressure are likely to require renegotiation once the original source of pressure has abated” (106).

Elements of the diffusion model are also evident. The spread of economic development policies among the states is well-documented (Anton 1989; Barker 1983; Fosler 1988; Osborne 1988). The Oklahoma public-private partnership model borrowed heavily from the experiences of other states, particularly Indiana and Kansas. Belden Daniels, one of a handful of highly influential national advocates for state strategic development through quasi-public entities, had a hand in the creation of Kansas, Inc. and similar efforts in the Central Plains region (Strange et al. 1991, 6). The phenomenon of policy diffusion also reflects a diffusion of political leadership, according to Anton (1989). Thus with New Federalism under President Reagan, the locus for policy leadership came to rest upon Oklahoma state government, as it did in other states. If a solution to Oklahoma’s economic woes was to be found, the circumstances pointed to state government.

Clearly, Oklahoma’s dismal economic situation between 1983 and 1987 opened a window for a significant change in state economic development policy.

Nonetheless, there were still fundamental policy disagreements among key actors on what kind of public-private partnership structure was appropriate for Oklahoma's political environment. When consensus does not emerge from the policy community, Kingdon (1984) warns that the bargaining dynamics of the political stream take over, and solutions may assume an unexpected or different character (169-172). Arguably, Oklahoma Futures was built by coalitions which were far more unstable than might otherwise be concluded from its seemingly broad-based support.

In its administrative frustrations and struggles, Oklahoma Futures can also be seen as an example of the politics of structural choice (Moe 1989). Moe argues that new bureaucratic structures reflect the interests, strategies, and compromises of those who exercise political power and pursue distinct self-interests in the agencies creation. In this light, the policy disagreement between the Legislature and Governor Bellmon over the makeup of Oklahoma Futures is more than just a debate about separation of powers but a wider struggle about legislative and gubernatorial goals for achieving control of government, political rewards, and future objectives.

Moe argues that chief executives want to be judged successful and effective in the eyes of history through the achievement of policy objectives and management of the bureaucracy, thus maintaining hierarchical authority through one's key political appointees is critical (280). In the context of Oklahoma where constitutionally the governor is relatively weak, ceding further policy power to Oklahoma Futures would not be a particularly rational structural choice.

By contrast, legislatures in Moe's analysis value a "particularized" control over the bureaucracy; in other words, legislators desire to retain the ability to intervene quickly, inexpensively and in ad hoc ways for a constituent-client (278). When viewed in the light of the history of the predecessor organizations (DECA in particular), a board including top business leaders, legislative members and their appointees represents an attractive structural choice.

According to Moe, the dominant interest groups also pursue distinct goals usually involving matters of control, for example through the imposition of rules to constrain bureaucratic behavior, the choice of key personnel, and the specification of technical requirements for decision making (274-275). In the Oklahoma case, these control issues comprise a continuing theme articulated by private sector business members who were involved in the creation of the board and have served on it.

Once established, a new organization is also shaped by the rational pursuit of self-interest and self-preservation by bureaucratic actors. As Moe argues, "the game of structural politics never ends" (284). In spite of Bellmon's resistance, the Department of Commerce has moved to assimilate (some might say co-opt) the new board into its planning processes and to earn Futures' endorsement of new initiatives and budget requests.

THE UTILITY OF THE "GARBAGE CAN"

March and Olsen (1989) argue that institutional reorganization and reform are ad hoc activities – in effect, garbage cans full of “highly contextual combinations of people, choice opportunities, problems and solutions” (80). Given the complexities and changing emphases about what states can and should do to promote economic development, it is not surprising that consensus about the requisite institutions is illusive. Here, March and Olsen’s might have had Oklahoma Futures in mind:

Since there are few established rules of relevance and access, reorganizations tend to become collections of solutions looking for problems, ideologies looking for soapboxes, pet projects looking for supporters, and people looking for jobs, reputations, or entertainment (82).

March and Olsen also argue institutions are often more important in terms of the symbolism they embody than the instrumental goals they pursue. From the depths of an economic downturn, Oklahoma political leaders were eager to do something (or anything) that might help the state’s economy. But while there was a consensus for action, little agreement about the best strategy existed. Oklahoma Futures thus became an important symbol of the state’s commitment to competitiveness in the zero-sum arena of economic development policy. Whether new strategies would work or not, the state had to ante up to be in the game.

ORGANIZING FOR THE THIRD WAVE

There is evidence that economic development is changing, and thus Oklahoma Futures will likely evolve. A critical assumption of the “second wave” strategy is the existence of adequate financial resources to make substantial and virtually simultaneous investments to improve public education, infrastructure needs, and quality of life (e.g. cut crime rates). Given the realities of intergovernmental finance in the era of Reagan’s New Federalism and continuing economic sluggishness, Oklahoma, like most states, has not had the resources to accomplish an ambitious “second wave” agenda such as reflected in Futures’ five-year plan.

Alternatively, limited resources can be targeted to benefit those communities or industries that are strategically situated to provide the greatest economic return on investment. Most sectoral and geographic targeting of economic development by states has met with mixed success because of traditional political pulls to disperse benefits as widely as possible (Hansen 1989, 47). As Mauro and Yago note, “...our political process might lead a rational governor or legislative leader to conclude that he or she could avoid plausible criticism from the

media, interest groups, or opposing politicians by having something of everything (82).” There is no evidence to suggest that Oklahoma has conquered the difficulties encountered by other state targeting efforts – i.e. insufficient definition of targets, shifting political pressures and administrative changes, and proliferation of organizational units particularly at the sub-state level (Mauro and Yago 1989, 82). Because communities possess unequal resources whether human, physical or capital, aid often follows economic growth rather than fostering it.

Fiscal realities of the 1980s and the state experience with targeting have led many economic development theorists to signal the advent of a “third wave” which “is a rethinking of what government can do and cannot do, and how it can do it more effectively” (Fosler quoted in Pilcher 1991, 34). This new phase relies on relationships between service providers, communities, and businesses at the local level. Should this new wrinkle in economic development find favor here, Oklahoma Futures may have to reshape its distinctly state-level policy focus toward more modest, community-specific programs. To be sure, Oklahoma communities are already heavily reliant upon state government for both power and revenue (Holmes et al. 1983, 21). But a “third wave” strategy would necessarily imply some shifting of state, sub-state, and local intergovernmental relations.

Oklahoma Futures in 1993 reflects a very different set of bureaucratic and political relationships than at any time in its short life. Whether Oklahoma can ride the “third wave”, however, may rest on the extent to which these evolving relations can also link up with local and regional groups in ways that bridge the state’s parochial traditions.

CONCLUSION

The Oklahoma Futures experience reveals much about economic development policymaking in the intergovernmental sphere. While public-private corporatist structures have been the popular alternative to “government business as usual,” they have not escaped the realities of operating within the dynamics of politics and federalism. Their impact is muted when, as has been the case with Oklahoma Futures, their institutional powers are relatively limited. To its credit, Oklahoma Futures has utilized with some success the symbolic tools available to it, but building and sustaining economic vitality will ultimately require more than persuasion.

In 1987, Oklahoma public and private sector leaders reached a consensus that a new direction was needed; as this case has illustrated, many of the details of how and which way to move were less clear. In 1993, the path to economic health seems no more obvious. State fiscal conditions and public resistance to tax increases limits options for significant new public investment or initiatives. The concept of strategic targeting implies hard-headed choices, nurturing some enterprises or communities while neglecting others. Business persons are trained

to make dispassionate choices driven by the tough realities of the bottom line, but similar choices are often untenable in the political world, particularly an environment like Oklahoma's rooted in a traditionalistic political culture. Which ethic will shape Oklahoma's economic development policy in the future?

NOTES

1. Interviews were conducted with State Representative Don McCorkell, Futures member and prime sponsor of HB 1444; former State Senator Roy Sadler, Senate sponsor of HB 1444 and former Futures member; G. Douglas Fox, co-chair of Oklahoma Futures and president of Tribune/Swab-Fox Corporation, Tulsa; H.E. "Gene" Rainbolt, Futures member and president/CEO of BancFirst Corporation, Oklahoma City; Alexander Holmes, professor of economics at the University of Oklahoma and former Secretary of Finance and Revenue; Drew Mason, chief of state for Governor Henry Bellmon; Gayla Machell and Mary Frantz, strategic planners with the Oklahoma Department of Commerce; George Humphreys, director of research for the Oklahoma House of Representatives; and Lou Ann Wolfe, reporter for the *Journal Record*.

2. The merger might date the beginning of the modern era for Oklahoma's economic development programs were it not for the fact that economic development was a relatively minor part of the legislative coalition that developed around the bill, House Bill 1946. House leadership supported HB 1946 in large measure to remove the DECA director. DECA's administration of the block grant programs had not endeared it to key House leaders who felt that the agency director had not shown sensitivity to their political concerns and wishes in the approval of certain block grant awards to local communities. Senate President Pro Tem Rodger Randle's interest in the measure focused on provisions for a cabinet form of government, and Governor George Nigh's interest in the bill was largely because it included a new ethics commission which he wanted. With the only clear economic development agenda, Representative Cleta Deatherage Mitchell saw the bill as an opportunity to remake the DED's smokestack-chasing operation into a strategic economic development agency, but her agenda was a secondary consideration to House leaders.

Representative Mitchell chaired a special committee on economic development, an assignment she received from Speaker Jim Barker who was elected speaker in part on the promise that Mitchell would not remain as Appropriations Committee chair.

3. Futures' impact might also be judged in terms of the personal goals of its advocates. Such an evaluation, however, must await another paper since this case study is limited in its ability to fully explain the motivations of the various actors.

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SENDIN' 'EM HOME EARLY: OKLAHOMA AND LEGISLATIVE TERM LIMITATIONS

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The drive to enact legislative term limitations has emerged as an enduring political movement in the early 1990s. However, the phenomenon has changed much since Oklahoma voters approved State Question 632 on September 18, 1990. Term limit supporters suffered one setback with a defeat in Washington state in 1991, but were overwhelmingly successful in 1992 with approval of term limit initiatives in 14 states. Now the focus of term limit supporters is on working to enact a constitutional amendment which would limit the tenure of members of Congress from all fifty states. In being the first state to enact term limits, the Oklahoma experience tells us much about how the term limit phenomenon began and provides a benchmark to judge how much the movement has been transformed.

Wielding their power of direct democracy, voters in 1990 amended their state constitutions to limit legislative tenure in three states, Oklahoma, Colorado, and California. Although a term limit proposal failed in the state of Washington in 1991, voters in 14 states in 1992 approved term limit initiatives. In the process of campaigning for term limits in those 14 states, term limit campaign organizers have become centralized with headquarters in Denver, Colorado, and Washington, D.C. Currently, term limit supporters have begun lobbying Congress to propose an amendment to the U. S. Constitution stipulating limits on congressional tenure while working to protect their 1992 successes from court challenges.

The term limit phenomenon has changed dramatically since September 18, 1990, when Oklahoma voters approved a 12-year limit on the tenure of their representatives in the state legislature. This paper examines the Oklahoma experience in an effort to identify a benchmark for assessing later term limit campaigns. To provide our perspective, we first investigate in detail the process and politics of the Oklahoma experience with term limits. This detailed examination experience is followed by an analysis of the impact of term limits on Oklahoma politics and on the nearly-mature term limit movement.

PROCESS AND POLITICS IN THE OKLAHOMA TERM LIMIT EXPERIENCE

The year 1990 was an important one in the history of legislative term limitations as voters in three states, Oklahoma, Colorado, and California, decided that their state legislators (and in the case of Colorado, their congressional delegation) needed to have their tenure in office (state) constitutionally limited. In 1991, a term limit initiative was defeated in Washington state. By the end of 1992, term limits on state legislatures and on Congress had been enacted by 16 states. The following section examines the process through which the first, Oklahoma's, term limitation initiative was enacted.

To many casual observers, term limitation was a new idea when Oklahoma voters approved State Question (SQ) 632 in 1990. However, term limitation is an idea older than the nation (Petracca 1992; also Beyle 1992; Richardson 1991; Benjamin 1985). As Richardson (1991) documents, there have been many proposals to limit the terms of legislators (particularly members of Congress), but none have ever reached fruition. The novelty of legislative term limitations in Oklahoma stems from the fact that term limits were enacted, not as a result of the legislative process, but through direct democracy. By approving SQ 632, Oklahoma voters were indicating that they believed the legislature had become too powerful, a judgment usually reserved for the executive branch.

Tulsa businessman Lloyd Noble II had "often thought . . . that we [Oklahomans] could limit our state legislators via the initiative-petition process" (Noble 1992, 24). In 1989, when a blue-ribbon commission appointed by the governor to recommend changes in the state constitution failed to consider term limits, Noble decided to take a deeper look into the concept. He commissioned Cole, Hargrave, Snodgrass & Associates, a political consulting firm in Oklahoma City, to conduct a poll of Oklahomans. The goal of the survey was to determine the level of popular support for term limits. Since there was overwhelming support, Noble decided to begin an initiative effort (Noble 1992, 24).

The formal initiative process in Oklahoma is prescribed in Article V of the state constitution, interestingly juxtaposed with the description of the structure and function of the legislative department. An initiative requires that 8 percent of the voters petition to have any legislative matter or constitutional amendment placed on the ballot (Morgan et al. 1991, 74).

The process that resulted in the first state legislative term limits began in the fall of 1989 when Noble (on September 14) filed a petition with the Oklahoma Secretary of State to limit the length of service of Oklahoma legislators to twelve years. The petition also stipulated that these twelve years could be served in either chamber or both. For example, a member of the state house could serve

four years in that body and seek election to the state senate where he or she would be able to serve only eight more years (McGuigan 1991; Copeland and Rausch 1991).

The question was carefully drafted by “a former legislator, a current legislator – both attorneys – and a personal friend who was also the personal attorney for the late Senator Bartlett” (Noble 1992, 24). Tom Cole, the president of Cole, Hargrave, Snodgrass & Associates, a former state senator, and a recent Executive Director of the Republican National Congressional Committee, relates that in drafting the question, the lawyers took several factors into account. First, the question had to conform to the “single-subject rule.” The results of the survey were taken into account; although there was support for term limits of eight or even six years almost everyone favored at least 12 years. The question “could not include federal offices because it might anger popular politicians” like U. S. Senator David Boren, who was serving his third term, and U. S. Senator Don Nickles, who was going to announce that he was running for a third term. So, even if the drafters of the question had been able to include federal offices in such a way as not to violate the single-subject rule, they remained very concerned about having Senators Boren and Nickles oppose the measure (Cole 1993).

With the question drafted, Noble’s organization was able to collect signatures. Paid collectors were able to gather the second highest number of signatures on an initiative petition in the prescribed ninety-day period. The signatures were certified by the Secretary of State and the certification was validated by the state Supreme Court (Noble 1992, 24-25).

After the signatures on the petitions were validated, Noble persuaded Republican Governor Henry Bellmon, a supporter of the proposal, to place the question on the primary run-off ballot in September 1990. Both men wanted to avoid the general election clutter and distractions, but of more importance was the desire to have Oklahoma be the first state to enact term limits. Noble recalls telling Governor Bellmon, “Governor, [term limits in] Colorado and California are going to be on the ballot in November [1990]. We want to beat them” (Noble 1992, 26; Martindale 1990). While this may seem to be pure boosterism (or “Soonerism”) on the part of the two men, there is a “tendency . . . for contentious policy questions to get settled at the ballot box on primary or runoff ballots” (McGuigan 1991, 3). Placing term limits on the general election ballot might have required some candidates to take public positions on the issue. With the question to be decided on the run-off ballot, candidates felt less need to take a position.

On September 18, 1990, Oklahoma became the first state to enact term limits. Voters approved the measure by a margin of almost two-to-one (Greiner 1990c). Most of the credit for the initiative’s success can be credited to Noble

and, perhaps, a disgruntled electorate upset over the heavyhanded way their legislature flaunted constitutional directives. Copeland (1992) and Rausch (1992) argue that support for term limits in 1990 was linked to support for an initiative approved in 1990 mandating the beginning and ending dates of each legislative session.

Noble, whose family is known throughout the state for their philanthropic efforts, is a Republican who once ran unsuccessfully for a seat in the state house. The pro term limit effort was spearheaded by an informal organization, Oklahomans for Legislative Reform, that was bankrolled primarily by Noble and other members of his family. The total budget for the campaign including advertising was \$220,000, most of which was collected from individuals (Noble 1992, 32). Financial records on file at the Oklahoma Ethics Commission show that most of the money was raised in state. Cleta Deatherage Mitchell, a former Oklahoma legislator and current director of the Term Limits Legal Institute, relates that Noble went into debt financing the measure, debt which he had not expected given the overwhelming popular support for the measure (Mitchell 1993). It was this debt, as well as concerns about the constitutionality of congressional term limits enacted by statewide initiative, which caused him to remove himself from a leading role in a forthcoming effort to place congressional term limits on the ballot (Associated Press 1993).

Noble's organization had a bi-partisan cast as most of the Republican minority in the state legislature and a number of key Democrats, including former Governor Raymond Gary, enthusiastically supported the idea (Copeland 1992; McGuigan 1991, 10-11). Simultaneously, Democratic gubernatorial candidate David Walters, while not specifically endorsing Noble's proposal, implied support and ran his own successful campaign against "professional politicians" (Lackmeyer 1990). During his campaign, Walters ran a commercial attacking professional politicians. Had it not been for the free advertising term limits received from Walters, Mitchell (1993) believes the campaign would have had to spend more.

Cole (1993) relates a more interesting account of Walters' support for the initiative. Early in the gubernatorial campaign, Walters contacted Noble with a proposal for a *quid pro quo*: would Noble publicly endorse the Walters campaign in exchange for Walters' endorsement of term limits? Noble, not wishing the term limit initiative to be associated with any party or particular candidate, rejected the proposal. According to Cole (1993), term limits was an effort "by the people of the state of Oklahoma to reclaim their legislature" and Noble was not going to have partisan politics endanger the effort.

Noble encountered less enthusiasm for his proposal from an interesting segment of the Oklahoma population. Many corporate leaders gave lip-service

to his initiative but failed to provide any substantial resources. He indicated that while many chief executive officers liked the idea, their government affairs staffs cautioned against active support or financial contributions (Noble 1991). According to Noble, the government affairs “people” did not want “to offend the legislature” (Martindale 1990).

Noble did find an enthusiastic supporter in one businessman, media tycoon Edward L. Gaylord. Among other holdings, Gaylord owns the Oklahoma Publishing Company (OPUBCO), the parent company of the state’s largest newspaper, the *Daily Oklahoman*. Gaylord, a billionaire, has been labeled “the richest and arguably the most powerful person in the state.” He also is recognized for his often controversial “ultraconservative views and his eagerness to skewer his political foes with blistering front-page editorials (in the *Daily Oklahoman*)” (Morgan et al. 1991, 4-6). The government affairs staff at OPUBCO did not have to worry about angering the legislature because the body is frequently the subject of the “blistering editorials.” OPUBCO and Gaylord gave large financial contributions to Noble’s efforts and the *Daily Oklahoman* displayed its support editorially (Rausch 1992, 6).

Public opinion data presents a measure of mass support for term limitations. McGuigan (1991, 7) notes that “the concept [of term limits] was never weaker in public opinion polls than the two-to-one margin it garnered [on election day].” Survey data support that contention. Noble’s original survey showed a better than four-to-one advantage¹ and a survey of Oklahoma residents taken in advance of the election found similarly strong support coupled with limited variation across demographic categories. The data from the latter survey are presented in Table 1 showing overall support for term limits to be about 75 percent.

Some minor differences in responses are found when the data are broken down in various ways, but in all cases support remains overwhelming. We do find that those least likely to vote are least supportive and that men are more likely than women to support this initiative (by 8 %). The Oklahoma poll also confirms the expectation that support for term limitations is greatest among those with low socioeconomic status (SES) – those most likely to feel unattached to politics – and is much more modest among those with high SES. Among the more political indicators we find that Republicans are slightly more supportive than are Democrats and that conservatives are more supportive than moderates or liberals. What is most clear is that Oklahomans, regardless of their political ilk, supported term limits.

The Oklahoma data are complemented by data from a candidate poll conducted in the fall of 1990. The individual was a challenger to a one-term (four-year term) state senator. The challenger, though, had served in the state house

TABLE 1
Oklahoma's Response to Term Limits

		Support Term Limits %
All respondents		74.8
Likelihood to vote:	Very likely	74.6
	Somewhat likely	77.5
	Not at all likely	64.7
Sex:	Male	77.9
	Female	71.9
Age:	18-24	81.5
	25-34	69.2
	35-49	74.2
	50-64	73.1
	65+	80.4
Socioeconomic status:	High	63.9
	Middle	77.9
	Low	77.4
Party:	Democrat	72.8
	Republican	78.4
Ideological Identification:	Liberal	70.7
	Moderate	70.3
	Conservative	78.6

Source: This survey was conducted by Frank N. Magid Associates on behalf of KOCO-TV, Channel Five in Oklahoma City. It included a random sample of 412 individuals in the state of Oklahoma.

since 1979, i.e., had served exactly the twelve years that would be allowed under Oklahoma's new amendment. No question was directly asked regarding term limitations, but a question was asked whether the long-standing house member had been in office too long. Twenty-eight percent agreed; 37 percent disagreed, and about one-third had no opinion. Clearly the pattern is quite different when there is a name attached to the length of service for an individual. The overall pattern of responses and correlations with other variables suggests that even

those who agreed that the candidate had been in office too long did so out of political opposition. The correlation between that viewpoint and support for the incumbent, for example, is .37.

Almost no opposition emerged to challenge the initiative, a fact owing much to Oklahoma's history of populism and government "by the people." A group calling itself "The Committee to Protect the Rights of Oklahoma Voters in Elections" (PROVE) emerged less than a week before the election. Its leadership included Jim Frasier, a Tulsa attorney and the former state chair of the Democratic Party, and Glo Henley, former executive director of the state Democratic Party. The organization could muster little effective opposition (Greiner 1990b). Some minimal opposition to the initiative came from current members of the state legislature (Greiner 1990a). Former Speaker of the U. S. House of Representatives Carl Albert was the most visible politician who opposed the initiative, but Copeland (1992, 142) claims that Albert's efforts may have been "too little, too late."

With the initiative successfully approved by Oklahoma voters, Lloyd Noble had made his mark. Less than a year later, he directed a group called "Oklahomans for State Question 640" which raised money and campaigned for the passage of a proposal commonly called the "no taxation without a vote of the people" initiative. He was also successful with this initiative (see Rausch 1992).

Several factors worth noting become apparent with a close examination of the history of term limits in Oklahoma. First, almost every part of the process involved Oklahomans. Noble is an Oklahoman who previously had campaigned unsuccessfully for the state house. To conduct the survey which resulted in his decision to campaign for term limits, he chose an Oklahoma City political consultancy. He relied on two Oklahoma lawyers, State Senator Gary Gardenhire of Norman and attorney Wilson Wallace of Ardmore, to write the initiative (see McGuigan 1991, 11). Almost all of the money spent in the campaign was raised from Oklahoma sources with almost no assistance from outside and no help from national term limit groups. The second factor is that Noble wanted the initiative to succeed and attract attention from across the country. Conversely, a failure could have doomed the nascent movement nationwide. His initial survey showed that limits of eight or even six years could pass, but twelve-year limits were shown to be more easily approved. Noble relates that he "very much wanted it [the limit] to be retroactive," but was talked out of that strategy with good reason (Noble 1992, 24). The initiative was simple and clear with no loopholes other than the "grandfather" clause, and it met the legal requirement of dealing only with one subject. Noble wanted Oklahoma to be first and it was.

These factors coupled with the growth of the term limit movement after successes in Colorado and California in 1990 are evidence that Oklahoma's

experience provides a useful study in term limit politics and strategy. The following section examines the impact that term limits in Oklahoma have had on politics in the state and on the growing term limit movement in the rest of the nation.

THE IMPACT OF TERM LIMITS IN OKLAHOMA

The impact of term limits in Oklahoma, of course, will not be felt until we approach the end of the twelve-year period in 2002, but several scholars have speculated on the potential consequences to Oklahoma politics specifically (e.g. Copeland and Rausch 1991; Copeland 1992) and to state legislatures in general (e.g. Thompson and Moncrief 1993; Bositis 1992; Moncrief et al. 1992; Moncrief and Thompson 1991). This section examines the potential impact of term limits on Oklahoma politics and the real impact of Lloyd Noble's enterprise on the maturation of the term limit movement.

TERM LIMITS AND OKLAHOMA POLITICS

At one level, the implications of legislative term limits on Oklahoma politics are obvious. But to understand them fully it is important to recall that all legislation has unintended as well as intended consequences. The opportunity to explore the question of these consequences is a rare and fun opportunity for political scientists embedded in the empirical tradition because no data exist nor will it for some period of time. We can freely speculate then and, if wrong, so much time will have passed before being proven wrong that no one will remember; if right, we can remind our colleagues a decade from now. So what follows is simply our best estimate of what will ensue as a result of the current term limitation movement. We first look at how term limitation is likely to have an effect on the relationship between representatives and their constituents and examine questions related to representation. We then turn to how it might influence internal legislative affairs. Finally, we examine how it will affect the relationship between the legislature and other actors in our polity.

Representation

The goals of supporters for term limitations primarily involve increasing the quality of representation that constituents receive. The fundamental premise

behind term limitations as a method to improve the quality of representation is that current elections are unfair and invidiously biased in favor of incumbents. Re-election figures – certainly for the U. S. Congress, and to a lesser extent for the state legislature – indicate that incumbents are seriously advantaged or, alternatively, that we actually have the best representation conceivable. As we all know, election data also provide evidence that open seats are more competitive. Therefore, the goal of more competitive elections should be achieved – at least every twelve years in Oklahoma. But, we may instead see a pattern develop whereby many candidates get a free ride after a term or two as potential challengers simply wait for the assured open seat, thereby limiting competition in the interim. This is of particular concern in Oklahoma with the relatively generous twelve-year limitation placed on its legislators.

The goal of fairness in elections is more difficult to assess. The distinction between competitive and fair is subtle, but important. Competition simply means close. Fair implies that regardless of the status of the seat (open or not), candidates have a reasonable opportunity to pursue election to it. If no other changes are made in conjunction with or in addition to term limitations, then the inherent fairness of the election has not been affected. All the advantages of incumbency (and perhaps more) will remain except in the year that the seat is open.

Term limits, then, are designed to treat the symptoms of a more egregious problem – unfair elections. If that is the case, then one of the most problematic unintended consequences of limits is that their passage may forestall serious election reform. Many states and Congress appear to be on the verge of serious consideration of election reform, but now some of the pressure may be lifted.

A potential positive consequence of term limitations is that parties may be strengthened by them. Mitchell (1990) effectively argues that term limits will force Democrats constantly to renew, to reinvigorate its leadership, and to remain closer to the party's constituencies. To us, her arguments are persuasive, but the point can be carried even further. Neither party will be able to count on Representative X to hold a seat indefinitely and will have to develop the infrastructure to make a seat a Republican or Democratic seat rather than so-and-so's seat. Party organization will become more central to obtaining and to holding a district over any extended period of time.

Mitchell's position is interesting because many people feel that term limits will benefit minorities – by "minorities," we mean any group that is underrepresented, including Republicans in the state legislature, racial and ethnic groups such as African-Americans, Hispanics, and women (although research shows that minorities do not vote for term limits, Martin 1992). The logic behind this view is straightforward. Incumbents can rarely be defeated and incumbents, currently, are white males and Democrats in the state legislature. If

more seats are open, the chances increase for underrepresented groups to vie for election.

The data for Oklahoma in part support that line of argument, but the picture is not quite as neat as might be expected. At the start of the 44th Legislature there were three African-Americans in the House and two in the Senate. One, Representative Kevin Cox, would not have been on the ballot in 1992 if term limits had been fully in effect. Moreover, political realism suggests that there are very few additional districts in this state where African-Americans could effectively compete. Likely, term limits would not alter the success level for African-Americans. Women, though, might marginally benefit from term limits, but that is not at all certain either. There are eight women in the House, none of whom would be affected by term limits. But the success rate for women is not great. While three women gained initial election in 1990, only one garnered that first victory in 1992 – and she succeeded another woman and ran against a woman. The overall success rate for women is similar to that for men (a little less than .5 in the House and about .3 in the Senate), but the success rate for women challengers in 1992 was virtually zero. Further, of the six women in the Senate, two could not have taken the oath of office at the start of the session had term limits been in place. Clearly, in Oklahoma the evidence on this point is mixed primarily because of the incapacity of underrepresented groups to compete even under the best of circumstances.

The possibility also exists for the parties to stagnate under term limitations, a greater possibility in a one-party state like Oklahoma. A political party which has held a seat for a number of years because it was held by a long-time representative or senator would predictably be unwilling to open the seat to an “unusual” candidate who might lose to the other party’s candidate. The party in that district would be more likely to have groomed a candidate over the years to replace the “old-timer” and would work very hard to see that the anointed candidate has an easy primary. Thus, competition in party primaries would be replaced by a “farm system” in which the politically ambitious must serve an “apprenticeship” until the current occupant is forced to leave office because of term limits. In states like Oklahoma where the parties are stronger, term limits could serve to increase the party’s ability to choose candidates leaving any competition for the general election.

There are other drawbacks related to representation that are likely to develop under a system that includes term limitations. First, voters are even less likely to recognize the person who serves as their representative. The representative may not serve long enough to make himself or herself known to constituents. The converse also could occur with the representative feeling pressured to make himself or herself known to constituents through various forms of public rela-

tions to the detriment of any legislative agenda. Needless to say, the voters may have too little information about incumbents or too much information and no legislative record against which to judge a representative's performance.

The electoral connection also may frequently be decoupled because we will see a large number of lame ducks at any given time. We do not need to recant the literature on the topic, but without the impending check by the electorate, the compulsion to represent one's constituents will likely decrease. The same logic holds for the various service functions performed by legislators. For better or worse, our legislators have evolved into an American ombudsman source. If the motivation to perform that role decreases, then either citizens will suffer or some other device will have to be developed. While the decoupling of the electoral connection may be viewed as a negative, other commentators (e.g. Will 1992) see this as a reason to support term limits. Without the need to satisfy all constituents for the sake of reelection, Will argues that legislators will deliberate more and tackle the difficult questions facing government today.

To conclude this section, let us offer a positive consequence of term limitations. Competition for a variety of offices may increase on a regular basis as a result of term limitations. The state senator who is being arbitrarily booted out of office may decide to run for Congress, or Attorney General, or Lieutenant Governor, or some other office. One of the great indirect consequences of this reform may be greater competition for a wide range of offices. Although most of the term limit proponents nationwide and in Oklahoma indicate that their goal is a "citizen legislature," upon further questioning, many find appeal in a system that encourages the exercise of progressive ambition (Schlesinger 1966). After a period of service, elected officials should pursue election to higher office and either move up or out depending on the outcome of that election (Inglis 1993; Schabarum 1993).

Institutional Consequences

The consequences of term limitations for legislative institutions are staggering to imagine and, of course, are not predictable. Our view is that term limitations are likely to move our increasingly professional legislatures back to a more amateur status. A variety of authors note the coincidental pattern of relationships among longer terms, the institutionalization of the seniority norm, and the development of a professionalized Congress (e.g., Polsby, Gallaher, and Rundquist 1969). With term limitations, then, the length of service should decrease, seniority should become increasingly irrelevant, and professionalized legislatures should fall by the wayside.

With term limits, the leaders of the body will have very diminished experience. Speakers are likely to be elected early in their tenure and serve relatively short periods of time. Committee chairs in the Senate, for example, may well be selected in their initial term of service and almost certainly in their second term. Legislative bodies will be run by individuals who may lack the proficiency to lead effectively their bodies. Legislatures subject to term limitations will find themselves with inexperienced leaders, lacking specialized, substantive expertise, and – probably – without command of its own rules.

While arguing that experience will decline, it is important to consider the context. Oklahoma has only a relatively small number of legislators who have served for an extended period of time and Oklahoma's limit of twelve years is relatively generous. In the House, only nine current members would be excluded from service if the terms had not been grandfathered-in. The proportion, though, is much higher in the Senate where one-third of the members would have served at least their maximum allotment. Additionally, seniority while valuable, does not dictate who will fill leadership positions. If the limit on service was currently in place, the entire House leadership would remain eligible for service (but, it would be Speaker Glen Johnson's last term). The entire Senate Democratic leadership team, though, would be obliterated. Four chairmen in the House would be excluded from services, as would seven of the eighteen in the Senate. Conversely, only three chairmen in the House are in their second term and nearly half are in at least their fifth term. Still, overall it is clear from a careful examination of where key decisions are made (e.g., Democratic party leadership, appropriations committees, and the General Conference Committee on Appropriations) that senior members carry much of the decision-making responsibility for the legislature.

Under term limits the way new legislators approach their responsibilities may also be affected. Many will want to "hit the ground running" and introduce long lists of legislation, but will the quantity of legislation improve the quality of legislation which may be developed over years of coalition-building and bipartisanship? Copeland (1992, 151) speculates that legislators will be less likely to concentrate on complicated issues. This contention is supported by one of the author's participant-observations in the U. S. House of Representatives. New members, many of whom have voluntarily limited their tenure, seem to be introducing a large number of bills – generally simple ones and often without serious examination of the long-term ramifications of the legislation. In some cases, the introduction of legislation almost has become a game with members keeping score of "pieces of legislation introduced per month" and giving imaginary honors for "legislative leaders."

Inter-Institutional Consequences

The powers held by our state governments and by our national government are not likely to diminish in the foreseeable future. By limiting the professionalism of our legislators, then, we are not limiting power, but shifting it. If our legislators lack the experience to perform their duties, the question arises as to where the power will shift. The executive, legislative staff, and lobbyists are all likely to be beneficiaries of term limitations.

In terms of the executive, the expertise provided by permanent executive employees will become more important. If legislators lack the expertise either to develop or to understand complex proposals, those proposals are more likely to evolve from the executive branch. Legislative judgment of those proposals is likely to be political and uninformed. It hardly needs to be mentioned that such a flow of power from the body closest to the people to the executive stands in contradiction to the longstanding bias held by our polity.

Another group that will rush in to fill the power vacuum is legislative staff. Under term limitations, staff are likely to have longer tenure than legislators. Our elected officials will have to rely upon the “permanent” people to provide expertise in both substantive and procedural matters. Legislative staffs, then, will likely become even more professional. The downside to that trend is that they may also become the actual leaders of the body and key decision-makers (Malbin 1979). One other possibility is that we may see greater movement between staff personnel and elected positions in the legislature.

Term limit supporters scoff at the notion that staff will become more powerful. They present the point that if staff will take power under term limits, why do staff members mobilize against term limits? While there is no clear answer to this question, it is important to note that although turnover among staff is quite high in the state legislature and in Congress, high-level staff often have longer tenure than their legislative bosses.

The final beneficiary may be lobbyists. One lobbyist told us that they work hard to develop long-term and positive working relationships with elected officials and that term limits would hurt them. The idea, supposedly, is that access and education takes time. Lloyd Noble feels that in Oklahoma, lobbyists (at least, corporate) generally opposed his efforts.

Our perspective of the influence of lobbyists, however, is parallel to our views regarding legislative staff. If competence and experience among our elected officials is lacking, then lobbyists just might find it prudent to fill the lacuna. There also is the fact that term limits increase the number of former legislators who could become lobbyists. While many of their contacts may have left the

legislature, they still understand the processes and could work well with the remaining high-level staff to see the legislation they favor enacted.

THE OKLAHOMA EXPERIENCE AND THE GROWTH OF THE TERM LIMIT MOVEMENT

The primary impact of Lloyd Noble's success in the nascent term limit movement was in showing that term limits really were popular with voters. Since the 1950's, public opinion data exhibited high levels of public support for term limits on legislators, but term limits were never approved by the Congress, for obvious reasons. The passage of term limits in Oklahoma, followed two months later by Colorado and California, showed the press and potential term limit activists that Americans were certainly upset at their legislators and willing to limit their tenure in office. Jim Coyne, former president of Americans to Limit Congressional Terms and a former U. S. Representative from Pennsylvania, commented that Noble "probably did the right thing. We [term limit activists] needed a start and he [Noble] gave us one" (Coyne 1992).

However, Noble's success in jump starting the term limit movement did not come without a price. In being cautious, he set the standard limits at 12 years. This has been a hindrance to those who desire shorter limits, especially among term limit supporters in Congress. Before Congress can send a term limit constitutional amendment to the states, term limit supporters must agree on how long members of Congress may serve. Currently, the term limit old guard is stuck at 12-year limits (with or without some variation of a break between periods of service) while a group of younger members seems to desire shorter terms, a desire shared by almost all of the national groups involved in the movement.

While he has assisted activists in other states to develop term limit initiatives, Noble has not led the way in the national movement. He seems to prefer working on legislative reform issues in Oklahoma. This makes him different than his colleague in Colorado, Terry Considine, who built a national term limit group, Americans Back in Charge, from a core of his state group, Coloradans Back in Charge. Noble has been content to appear at a few gatherings of term limit activists to tell his story and lend his moral support while working for other initiatives in Oklahoma.

The Oklahoman who has been involved in the term limit movement from the beginning and who remains a key actor is Cleta Deatherage Mitchell. Mitchell campaigned extensively for the failed Washington initiative in 1991 and in nearly every state that had term limits on the ballot in 1992. She is currently heading the Term Limit Legal Institute where she has helped to both draft initiative peti-

tions and defend them in court. She and former U. S. Attorney General Griffin Bell are currently defending the constitutionality of Florida's term limitation for members of the U. S. Congress. It would be difficult to overstate the central role that she has played in the development of the term limitation movement.

CONCLUSION: WHY OKLAHOMA?

Many of the scholarly examinations of recent term limit activity ignore the role played by Oklahoma in sparking the movement. This close analysis of the history of term limits in the Sooner State was written to document the politics and strategy which were required to ensure that Oklahoma was indeed first to pass the proposal. Term limits will affect the future of politics in the Sooner State and future analysts must have some awareness of how our state legislators came to have their tenure limited. Oklahoma's experience also has impacted the course of term limits in other states, either encouraging activists or hindering fast passage of term limits in Congress. While Oklahoma's political scientists, or even Oklahomans in general, may have mixed feelings about term limitations, there are some points on which all can agree. There is a degree of glory that comes from being first in the term limit movement. Second, even opponents can take solace in the fact that a new multifaceted research agenda has been drawn for them. For this, at least, all of Oklahoma's political scientists can thank Lloyd Noble II and the voters of the state.

NOTES

¹The authors would like to thank Mr. Noble for sharing the results of his survey that was conducted by Cole, Hargrave, Snodgrass and Associates in June 1989.

²The survey was conducted on behalf of the candidate with the help of the authors of this paper. We aided the development of the survey instrument and provided analysis of the data. The data was collected from 283 individuals in the state senatorial district. The actual data collection was done by campaign volunteers based on a random sample of registered voters.

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SOURCES OF SUPPORT FOR LEGISLATIVE TERM LIMITATIONS IN THE STATES

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In the elections of 1990 and 1992 the voters in 15 states approved initiatives imposing term limits on the state legislatures, by margins ranging from 77 to 52 percent. The purpose of this paper is to explain why the term limit initiatives passed and what factors may have caused variations among the states in the level of support. Among the factors considered are the characteristics of the legislatures and the strictness of the proposed limitations, as well as several aspects of the campaigns: the sources of support from within or outside the state, sources of opposition, the role of media, and differences in opinion and voting patterns of various groups in the state. The most important factor appears to have been how extensive an effort was made by opponents of term limitations.

In the elections of 1990 and 1992 the voters in 15 states approved initiatives imposing term limitations on the state legislatures. (In most of these states term limitations on members of Congress were also adopted.) The successful votes occurred in California, Colorado, and Oklahoma in 1990, and in 12 more states two years later. Term limitations were rejected by the voters only in Washington, in 1991; and a year later they approved a revised version. State legislative term limitations have now been adopted in 15 of the 21 states where there are provisions for direct constitutional or statutory initiatives. They have not been adopted in any state where legislative action is required before a popular vote.

In most of the states, these initiatives were adopted by a wide margin. Table 1 shows that support was as high as 74 to 77 percent in four states, 64 to 71 percent in seven states, and 52 to 60 percent in four others.

The purpose of this paper is to explain why these initiatives passed, usually by large margins, and if possible, explain the variations in margins from state to state. The paper is organized around six sets of questions:

1. Were term limitation initiatives more likely to pass in the more professional states, and those where there was least turnover of membership, or were less drastic term limitations more likely to be adopted than more drastic ones?

2. What was the primary source, or the catalyst, for the term limitation movement in each state? What groups and political organizations provided support in the campaigns, and how much did this vary from state to state? To what extent were office holders or candidates supporting term limitations in order to advance their political goals?
3. How much assistance and support (financial and otherwise) did the groups supporting term limitations receive from national term-limitation organizations, and what is known about these groups? To what extent are they responsible for the speed with which this movement has spread?
4. How much organized opposition was there to the term limitation movement, and what groups and individuals were active in it? If groups that did not like the proposal failed to oppose it, what were the reasons?
5. Was support for term limitations significantly affected by the news coverage or the editorial stand taken by the media?
6. What can be learned from public opinion surveys or from aggregate voting studies about voter attitudes and reasons for support or opposition to term limitations? Is there evidence to show how the campaign changed public attitudes – did voters become more or less likely to vote for term limitations?

It is easier to ask these questions than to answer them, a problem that often arises in comparative state research. In three states – California, Colorado, and Oklahoma – the analysis is based in part on interviews conducted with a few legislators and participants in term-limits campaigns. For several states, case studies are available in published or unpublished form. In most of the states I have relied in part on newspaper clippings and written comments provided by political scientists responding to my questions.

THE CHARACTER OF THE LEGISLATURE AND OF TERM-LIMITS PROPOSALS

Logically, we might expect that there would be stronger support for term limits in those states where the largest proportion of legislators had long-term tenure, and perhaps more generally in the most professional legislatures. In states with a “citizen legislature” that is made up of amateurs and not professionals there ought to be less public perception that limits on terms were necessary.

Table 1 fails to provide support for that thesis. In fact several of the states ranked as most professional (using an index created by Squire 1992), including

TABLE 1

Comparison of Vote in Favor of Term Limits
with Legislative Professionalism and Turnover

State	Year	Strictness of Term Limits	Percent in Favor	Profess- ionalism Rank Order	House Members 10 Year Turnover
Florida	1992	1	77	13	83
Arizona	1992	1	74	15	75
Colorado	1990	1	71	9	89
Nebraska	1992	1	68	25	78
Ohio	1992	1	66	6	65
S. Dakota	1992	1	64	46	81
Wyoming	1992	2	77	49	79
Montana	1992	2	67	42	87
Washington	1992	2	52	18	90
Missouri	1992	3	74	10	73
Oregon	1992	3	70	27	83
Oklahoma	1990	3	67	15	85
Arkansas	1992	3	60	43	49
Michigan	1992	3	59	2	65
California	1990	3	52	3	70
Washington	1991	4	46	18	90
Mean			65.25	21.5	76.8

Correlations:

% in favor and professionalism +.16 p > .05 (NS)
 % in favor and turnover -.29 p > .05 (NS)

Strictness of term limits:	Mean Percent in Favor	(n)
1. Only a limit on consecutive terms, over 6 to 8 years	70%	(6)
2. Limit to serving roughly half of number of years, ranging from 12 to 24	65%	(3)
3. Lifetime limit of 12 or 14 years	64%	(6)
4. Term limits retroactive	46%	(1)
r = .64 F = 2.71 DF = 3/12 p < .09 (NS)		

SOURCES: The legislative professionalism index was created by Squire (1992). The measure of ten year turnover is found in Benjamin and Malbin (1992), p. 297.

Michigan, California, and Ohio, had a smaller vote for term limitations than many of those with a less professional body (notably Wyoming). Overall, the relationship is weak and insignificant, although in the expected direction.

There is not a large variation in the ten-year rate of member turnover. It ranges from 49 to 90 percent, but the median is 79 and in ten of the fifteen states the proportion is between 75 and 90; in other words, in two-thirds of the states between one-tenth and one-fourth of the members remained for at least ten years.

There is clearly no pattern of greater support for term limits in states with the lowest turnover. The three states with the lowest turnover, Arkansas, Michigan, and Ohio, ranked in the lower half of voting margins for limits. It is true, however, that Washington, the state with the highest margin of turnover (90 percent) was where term limits were first defeated and then narrowly passed. But Colorado ranked second in turnover (89 percent), but was one of the first states to pass term limits and did so by a high margin (71 percent). Overall, the relationship is weak and insignificant, although in the expected direction.

We might expect that it would be most difficult to adopt term limitation initiatives in those states where the proposed limits on terms were most drastic. These might also be the states where legislators were most alarmed and worked hardest to defeat the initiatives.

There is modest support for this hypothesis. The term limit initiative failed only in Washington in 1991, the only state where the limit was retroactive. Other than the retroactive limit in Washington, the most drastic limitations are those (coded 3) that impose a lifetime ban on terms. In these six states the average vote for term limits was 64 percent. Ranking next in strictness are states (coded 2) where members are limited to number of years of service over an extended period (such as 6 years in a 12 year period or 8 years out of 16). Here the average voting support was 65 percent. The least restrictive are limitations on consecutive terms, where a member must sit out only a term or two or may even be able to alternate between the senate and house without a break. In these six states average voting support was 70 percent. The correlation between strictness of term limits and the vote in favor is moderate and in the right directions, but is not significant.

There is only weak evidence that support for term limits is influenced by the characteristics of the legislature, but it may be marginally affected by the strictness of the limitations on terms.

SOURCES OF SUPPORT IN THE STATES

There is clearly a populist theme to arguments made in behalf of term limitations for legislators, at either the state or national level. Return government to the people. Create citizen legislatures instead of professional legislatures. Force legislators to be accountable to the voters. Because so many legislators have become entrenched in office, fortified by large campaign chests provided by PACs, it is almost impossible to defeat them at the polls. In order to give the voters a meaningful choice, limits must be placed on the number of terms, or of consecutive terms, that legislators can serve.

This is an argument that obviously has a broad appeal to voters, both liberal and conservative, Democratic and Republican, who believe that the democratic process is not working well and the politicians are not responsive to their constituencies. Deadlocks and bickering between the legislative parties and between the legislature and the governor, pay increases for members, occasional scandals and indictments of members, and stories in the media about the ties between lobbyists and legislators all nourish public disillusionment with their elected officials.

But the originators and the organized supporters of the term limitation movement in most of the states are not motivated by disillusionment with the *legislative process*. They are concerned with the *legislative product*: the substantive character of laws passed by state legislatures. From their viewpoint, state legislatures spend too much money on unnecessary programs and raise too much tax revenue to support these programs. They argue that individual legislators have become dependent on financial and voting support from interest groups that demand excessive spending on the programs they endorse. They claim, in effect, that individual legislators have endorsed the principle of "spend and spend, and tax and tax, and elect and elect."

The supporters of the term limitation movement argue, and presumably believe, that legislators who could not serve more than a few terms would be less indebted and committed to these interest groups and thus would be better able to resist the demands for higher spending and higher taxes. These legislators might be more accountable to voters who would demand lower rather than higher taxes. If the incumbent legislators failed to heed this message, the voters would have the choice of voting for challengers who had a more realistic chance of being elected.

A substantial majority of state legislatures have been under Democratic control in recent years, and it seems plausible that the promoters of the term limitation movement have been concerned not just about the commitment of

individual legislators to interest groups, but about the commitment of a legislative majority to a growing number of better financed social, educational, health, housing, and environmental programs advocated by organized constituencies. They calculate that over a period of years the imposition of term limitations should make it possible to replace this legislative majority with a different one that is more likely to support conservative principles.

An examination of the groups that organized and supported the campaigns for term limitation shows that in a number of states they have been led by conservatives, often with connections to the Republican party or to business. More particularly, a number of these individuals have been heavily involved in initiatives designed to place caps, or rollbacks, on taxing or spending at the state or local level.

A good example of the role of anti-tax conservative groups in the term limitation movement comes from California. One of the leading figures in the campaign to pass Proposition 130 was Lewis Uhler, whose work on behalf of taxing and spending limitations dates back to an unsuccessful initiative proposal submitted to the California voters in 1973. He is the head of the National Tax Limitation Committee that has campaigned for an amendment to the U.S. Constitution to limit taxes and balance the budget. He is the author of a book on *Setting Limits: Constitutional Control of Government*. Uhler is also involved in the national campaign to limit congressional terms. Uhler believes there is a direct, logical link between the effort to limit taxes and the need for term limitations, at both the national and state levels. Both are part of what he calls a "citizen revolt" against the concentration of power in government.

Uhler and his organization worked with Pete Schabarum, a Republican and a former state legislator who was concluding five terms on the Los Angeles Board of Supervisors. In that capacity he had carried on a bitter battle with various minority groups over the redistricting of the Board to create better opportunities for minority representation. Using left-over campaign funds, Schabarum financed half of the \$1.3 million spent by supporters of term limitation to put Proposition 130 on the ballot and run advertisements for it. But this was only a small fraction of the funds raised by opponents of term limitations.

Oklahoma is another example of a state where the term limitation movement was led by anti-tax business interests. In this case the initiative was launched, and heavily funded, by Lloyd Noble II, an oilman from Tulsa, who also helped to lead a campaign to approve an initiative making it difficult to pass tax increases in Oklahoma without a public vote. The term limitation movement also had very strong editorial support from the *Daily Oklahoman* newspaper, a very conservative publication that has wide readership in the state (Rausch 1992).

In Oregon, the active support for the term limitation initiative came from conservative Republicans, many of whom had been active in a long-term effort to win voter approval of a property tax limit, an effort that finally succeeded in 1990. Having accomplished this objective, and with an experienced political organization available for further use, some of the activists in this group decided to focus their efforts on term limitations.

The new organization was called LIMITS, which stands for "Let Incumbents Mosey Into the Sunset." It was led by a small businessman and a recent convert to the Libertarian party. Their term limit proposal originally was designed to be retroactive, but after the defeat of the similar retroactive proposal in neighboring Washington in 1991, the proposal was refashioned to make the clock start running in 1993.

The original impetus for Washington's first term limit initiative in 1991 came from a group of left-wing Democrats who were disillusioned by their unsuccessful campaign effort to defeat an entrenched conservative Democratic congressman and were convinced that the only way to oust entrenched incumbents was through term limits. LIMIT, the organization that they established to promote the term limitation initiative, attracted liberal and populist volunteers, but initially very little financial support (Olson 1992).

Representatives from several national organizations (particularly Citizens for Congressional Reform) supporting term limitations came to their assistance, contributing substantial funding, commissioning a poll on term limits, and giving professional assistance to get the initiative on the ballot. Thus the 1991 campaign for term limitation was led by an uneasy coalition of liberal volunteers and conservative professionals funded by business interests (Olson 1992).

The leadership, organization, and funding of the Washington term-limits initiative campaign in 1992 was essentially the same as in 1991. The local leadership was populist, the national leadership was conservative, and much of the funding came from out-of-state groups and individuals who were known, or perceived, to have a conservative orientation.

In many of these states where the conservative activists and business people have taken the lead in the term limitation movement, they have been endorsed and sometimes assisted by Republican office holders.

In California, Republican Senator Pete Wilson, running for governor, endorsed term limits. Leaders of the limitation movement claim that Wilson was converted after they showed him polling data showing that such a stand would enhance his chances of winning the election. Relatively few Republican legislators endorsed the proposal, however, even though in the past the Republicans had supported other initiatives affecting the legislature, particularly efforts in the 1980s to overturn the legislative districting created by Democrats.

In Oklahoma, legislative term limits had the active support of outgoing Republican Governor Bellmon. But it also had the support of most candidates of both parties running for governor in 1990, including Democrat David Walters, the eventual winner, who campaigned against "professional politicians" (Rausch 1992).

In some states legislative term limitations have been promoted more directly by Republican office holders, candidates, or campaign advisers. They may have shared the belief of conservative groups that the enactment of limitations would eventually reduce or eliminate Democratic majorities in their legislatures. Or they may simply have believed that this strategy would appeal to the voters, and thus build voter support for the Republican party.

In Florida, Republicans in the legislature at first sought without success to pass a term limitation proposal. The leader of the 1992 initiative was a campaign adviser to former Republican Governor Bob Martinez. The campaign also generated big business support.

In Washington, though the political parties avoided taking any stand on the 1992 term limits proposal, it was endorsed by a modest number of Republican legislators and some legislative candidates of both parties.

In several states the term limit initiative was developed and promoted by a single Republican politician, and it was widely viewed as either a strategic move in a current political campaign or a method of laying the groundwork and getting favorable publicity for a campaign that was being planned for the future. Ironically, while most of these term limit initiatives passed, most of the politicians who promoted them were defeated.

In Michigan, the campaign for term limits was led by Richard Headlee, who is well known as the sponsor of the 1978 constitutional amendment on limiting state and local taxes and who has actively supported other tax limitations proposals since. In 1982, Headlee had won an upset victory in the Republican gubernatorial primary, capitalizing on his tax-cutter reputation, but was defeated in the general election.

The leader of the term limitation initiative in Colorado was state Senator Terry Considine, a conservative Republican. Considine set up an organization called Coloradans Back in Charge, which promoted not only term limitation but spending limitations and other conservative proposals. Considine played a major role in financing the term limitation campaign. Political observers described it as a "one man show," and generally believed that Considine was developing these issues as part of a plan to run for governor or U.S. senator. In 1992, Considine did run for the U.S. Senate but was defeated by Congressman Ben Nighthorse Campbell, a moderate Democrat who, ironically, was a supporter of term limitations.

In South Dakota, a leading sponsor of the term limit initiative was John Timmer, a candidate for the U.S. House who built his campaign almost entirely around that issue. But Timmer was unsuccessful in his effort to defeat the entrenched Democratic representative, Tim Johnson. There was substantial correlation in aggregate voting returns between support for Timmer and support for term limits, but Timmer ran well behind the initiative. There was no other public, systematic campaign for term limitation in South Dakota.

There were actually two term limitation proposals on the California ballot in 1990. Proposition 140, which passed, also mandated severe cuts in the legislative budget. Pete Wilson's decision to endorse that proposal in mid-October during a televised debate with Dianne Feinstein was widely believed to have helped his gubernatorial general election campaign.

Proposition 131, which lost by a 62-38 percent margin, was launched by Attorney General John Van de Kamp, a Democratic candidate for governor. It imposed less drastic limits on legislative terms than Proposition 140, tightened up ethical standards for the legislature, established new restrictions on campaign funds, and provided limited tax-supported funding of political campaigns. A major reason for its defeat, as the polls demonstrated, was the inclusion of public fundraising in the proposal.

Van de Kamp believed that by sponsoring three initiatives, including Proposition 131, he could gain favorable attention from the media and the public. In the initial stages of his campaign this strategy succeeded and he surged ahead in the Republican primary polls. But in the long run, he was hurt by the initiatives. He had to raise large amounts of funds to get the three initiatives on the ballot, funds that might have been used for his campaign. Moreover, his sponsorship of the term limits amendment alienated many Democratic legislators, who threw their support and their fund-raising efforts behind his opponent, Dianne Feinstein (Lubenow 1991).

In all of the states where term limitations were proposed, most of the organized support came from conservative and anti-tax groups and from individual Republican political leaders, some of whom used this as a major theme in their electoral campaigns. Most state campaigns for term limits also received assistance, financial and advisory, from national term limitations organizations.

INFLUENCE OF NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

The organizations promoting legislative term limitations in each of the states were not acting in isolation. Those that led the state campaigns in 1992 were familiar with the strategy and the arguments used by term limit advocates in

California, Colorado, and Oklahoma in 1990, and they also understood some of the reasons for failure of the effort in Washington in 1991 – particularly the effort to make the restrictions retroactive.

The state organizations also had varying degrees and kinds of assistance from several national organizations that were promoting term limitations at both the congressional and state legislative level. Several of these groups were initially and primarily concerned with limiting congressional terms. Stuart Rothenberg (1992) has identified three national organizations that have played a significant role in promoting term limitations, and his findings can be briefly summarized here.

Americans to Limit Congressional Terms (ALCT), was the first such group to be organized (in 1989). It has served primarily as a Washington spokesman for the movement and a conduit for information. But it has not worked directly at the state level, and recently has been overshadowed by other national groups.

Citizens for Congressional Reform (CCR), established early in 1991, has provided much more direct help to state groups working for both congressional and legislative term limits. This has included legal advice on drafting initiatives, practical assistance in getting initiatives qualified for the ballot, and advice on running initiative campaigns. It has had access to greater financial resources than the other national organizations, and has made substantial contributions to the initiative efforts in several states. CCR receives substantial financial support from two oilmen who are brothers, one of whom ran for vice president on the Libertarian ticket in 1980.

Americans Back in Charge (ABIC) evolved from Coloradans Back in Charge, the organization that led the successful term limitation movement in that state in 1990. It has provided legal advice to state organizations facing judicial challenges to term limits initiatives. It has been particularly important in providing campaign advice and assistance on media relations to groups in various states.

A fourth national organization, U.S. Term Limits, was apparently established slightly later than the other two. Reports indicate that it played a major role in funding the term limitations movement in several states.

David Olson (1992) has described in considerable detail the role played by Citizens for Congressional Reform (CCR) in the unsuccessful 1991 campaign for term limitations in Washington state. By the end of March, the volunteer efforts of LIMIT, the local term-limits organization, had failed to raise more than a few thousand dollars and was lagging far behind in its efforts to collect enough signatures to put the initiative on the ballot.

Then CCR came to Washington and took charge of the campaign. It took a poll that showed term limitations already had broad support. In four months it

contributed \$177,000 and hired enough professionals to collect the necessary signatures. By the end of the campaign, CCR had contributed over \$490,000 to the term limitation effort, while \$50,000 came from Americans Back in Charge, almost \$35,000 from the National Committee to Limit Terms, and \$9,000 from Americans To Limit Congressional Terms. These four groups provided 82 percent of total funding for the campaign.

It seems unlikely that the term limitation effort in Washington would have come close to passage if there had been no outside help for the campaign, considering the strength of the opposition in that state (which will be described below). But it is also true that the campaign was hindered by friction between CCR and the local leaders of LIMIT and the big spending by CCR (and particularly its hiring of professional signature-collectors). This spending led to frequent criticism by the media and by critics of the movement.

National organizations played a similar role in the successful 1992 effort to pass a term limitation initiative in Washington state. The campaign once again was an unusual alliance between the populist volunteers running LIMIT and national organizations providing advice, campaign assistance, and funding. One national organization providing a significant amount of funding was U. S. Term Limits.

In Wyoming, 98 percent of the funding for the term limitations movement came from two out-of-state organizations. Citizens for Congressional Reform paid more than \$40,000 to an organization that conducted the petition drive to put the initiative on the ballot; U. S. Term Limits provided almost \$13,000 in direct and in-kind contributions for the general election campaign for term limits (King, 1992).

In Nebraska, the U. S. Term Limits organization played a crucial role in getting the state initiative plan under way and developing a fund-raising plan to support it and to make possible the hiring of persons to circulate petitions. The organization provided about one-third of the \$225,000 raised for the term limits initiative campaign.

The group sponsoring term limitation in Arkansas, Arkansans for Governmental Reform, received three-quarters of its funding from the national organization, U. S. Term Limits. The Florida term limits organization, Eight is Enough, raised over \$200,000 from out-of-state groups and individuals, including \$50,000 from Americans Back in Charge. In Michigan, the national group Citizens for Congressional Reform, donated more than \$200,000 to Michigan Citizens for Term Limits. Opponents of term limits in Michigan focused some of their criticisms on this group and emphasized its right-wing character.

While the supporters of term limits initiatives could count on various types of support, including funding, from several national organizations, the oppo-

nents were almost entirely on their own. The national Democratic party provided some advice or assistance in a few states. An organization called Let the People Decide was established in the spring of 1991 to monitor developments in the states, provide information and arguments against term limitations, and provide legal advice to those challenging term limitation propositions in the courts. But the group lacked the capability and resources to work directly in the states. Obviously hampered by a shortage of funds, the organization scaled back its efforts before the end of the year and soon faded from sight (Rothenberg 1992).

ORGANIZED OPPOSITION TO THE TERM LIMITATIONS MOVEMENT

What role was played by legislators, particularly Democratic legislators? Were they actively opposed because they would be directly affected, or did they remain quiet because they perceived term limits to be popular with the voters? Also, did liberal interest groups perceive (as conservative groups did) that their interests were at stake and, if so, which ones actively opposed term limitations?

STRONG OPPOSITION

In California, the opposition was led by Speaker of the House Willie Brown and Senate President Pro Tem David Roberti, and they played a major role in raising money for the campaign against term limits. The opponents of term limits outspent the supporters by about 5-1, raising some \$6 million. The campaign appeared to have considerable effect, because the term limitation initiative (Proposition 140), which had generated at least 2-1 support in polls conducted during the campaign, passed by only a 52-48 margin. But some observers believe that the initiative could have been defeated if the legislative leadership, which was preoccupied with the session, had moved more quickly to get funds raised and the campaign under way.

The leaders decided to oppose both Propositions 140 and 131 because both provided for term limitations, and because it would have confused the voters to support Proposition 131 with its less restrictive term limits.

The legislative leadership hired the Bernam-D'Agostino firm to prepare advertising for the media attacking both Propositions 140 and 131. The firm is a controversial one whose commercials are often hard-hitting. The advertising tactics were developed by the firm, rather than by the legislative leadership, and some legislators criticized the media campaign for its negative tone. The adver-

tisements were run for only the last three weeks of the campaign, and some observers thought that this delay was costly.

Although most legislators in both California parties were opposed to the term limitations initiatives, only a few were outspoken about the issue during the campaign.

Legislators of both parties made clear their opposition but failed to vigorously campaign. They were preoccupied with their own campaigns, and some of them may have believed that a strong stand on the issues would have alienated some voters.

A major effort was made to enlist allies of the Democratic party in the fight against term limits, including liberal, labor union, and minority groups. An intensive effort was made by leaders of minority groups to turn out a heavy vote against the term-limit initiatives in minority areas, an effort that was quite effective. Minority leaders were concerned that the implementation of term limits would drive out of office minority legislators who have held major leadership positions in the legislature.

The first term limitation initiative in Washington in 1991 was opposed by a large and diverse collection of groups, including environmental, business, labor, good-government, and partisan groups, which had some difficulty agreeing on strategy. The group, called No On 553, was able to raise half as much money, about \$350,000, as the supporters of the initiative. Labor unions and Democratic party committees and office holders were the largest contributors. But the opponents spent slightly more than the supporters on radio advertising during the closing weeks of the campaign. (Supporters had to spend one-third of their funds on the campaign to get enough signatures to put the initiative on the ballot.) (Olson 1992).

The Washington state Democratic party was united in strong opposition to the term limitation initiative, and a Democratic campaign expert ran the opposition campaign. The initiative would have forced many incumbents from office in 1994 or sooner. The Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee provided funding and staff assistance. Members of the Washington congressional delegation worked actively against the initiative. U. S. House Speaker Tim Foley, whose tenure would have ended in 1994, was initially reluctant to become actively involved in the campaign, but in the last few days before the election he campaigned vigorously and passionately against term limitations, and his efforts probably tipped the balance against the initiative (Olson 1992).

In Washington in 1992 a similar collection of interest groups opposed the new plan for term limitations as in the previous year. But the Washington congressional delegation was much less active in opposing term limitations in 1992. The new proposal, unlike that in 1991, was not retroactive, and the restrictions

on term limits were more flexible. Its effect on the Washington congressional delegation would be postponed and be less severe, and thus there was less intensive opposition to it.

MODERATE OPPOSITION

According to one legislative leader, in Oklahoma most legislators were unwilling to take the risk of opposing what they perceived to be an initiative that was very popular with voters. The only organized opposition came from a group organized by the former chair and the former executive director of the Democratic party. The group raised \$56,000, mostly from labor unions, most of them out of state; this was less than one-fourth of what the proponents spent on their campaign. The most visible opponent of term limitations was former U. S. House Speaker Carl Albert, but this effort was not effective (Copeland 1992).

In Arkansas, there was clear and strong opposition from Senator Dale Bumpers and Governor Bill Clinton, but Clinton obviously had more pressing demands on his time. The Arkansas Democratic party provided tangible assistance, \$40,000, to Arkansans for Representative Government, the anti-term limits group. There were also substantial contributions from the Farm Bureau and a number of major corporations, perhaps because the Clinton administration was opposing the initiative. Arkansans for Representative Government raised nearly as much (84 percent) as that raised by the proponents of limitations.

In Michigan several interest groups, including Common Cause, the League of Women Voters, the Michigan Education Association, and the Michigan Citizens Lobby worked against term limitations. But some of these groups, like the Michigan Education Association, devoted a larger effort to fighting a ballot proposal to cut property taxes, which was presumably viewed as presenting a more direct threat to their interests. There was little attention on television or in the press to this issue because most of the advertising, pro and con, was focused on the property tax and a proposal to reform the state's insurance system.

In Ohio, the Democratic political leadership was convinced that the legislative term limitation initiative would pass if it got on the ballot, and they could do nothing much to stop it. Supporters collected almost 600,000 signatures to qualify the initiative for the ballot. During the campaign most legislators simply kept a low profile on the issue. Democratic leaders were successful in attaining one goal, to include all state executive officials (and not just the governor and lieutenant governor) in a two-term limitation. The main opposition in Ohio came from Common Cause, the League of Women Voters, and a coalition of labor unions, but these groups did not provide much funding for the opposition causes.

Similarly, in Nebraska the opposition to the term limits initiative was broad based, including the AFL-CIO, teachers, Common Cause, the League of Women Voters, and the state Democratic party. But the opponents spent only about \$60,000 and were outspent four-to-one.

WEAK OPPOSITION

In Oregon, there was no effective opposition to the term limitation movement. Early in the summer a group of legislators met, examined the polls that showed a pro-limitation margin of at least three-to-one, and decided that there was no realistic chance to defeat the measure. They decided not to attempt a large-scale fund-raising campaign because they thought the money would be wasted. The state Democratic party took a stand against it but raised no money and conducted no campaign, while the state Republican party remained neutral. A few good government groups, such as the League of Women Voters and the Portland City Club, took a stand against term limits. One observer, noting some political similarities between Washington and Oregon, believes that a vigorous campaign against term limitations in Oregon might have reduced the majority from 70 percent to about 55 percent, but would not have led to its defeat.

In Wyoming, there was a minimum level of opposition from a few groups, such as the League of Women Voters and a few paid newspaper ads. In Colorado there was little organized opposition to the term-limits initiative. Legislators failed to make any effective effort to defeat it, apparently because they believed that both the legislative and congressional restrictions were popular. Similarly, in South Dakota there was no significant organized opposition to the term limitations amendment; those legislators most adversely affected by it were reluctant to take a strong stand against a proposal that appeared to have great popularity. There was also no organized opposition to the initiative evident in Arizona. Information on the strength of opposition is not available from Florida, Missouri, and Montana.

Although there was strong, well-organized and often well-financed support for term limits in most states where the initiative was adopted, there was wide variation in the extent and effectiveness of organized opposition. At one extreme are California and Washington, states where the initiatives passed by only a small margin or, in the first effort in Washington, where the opposition was successful. On the other hand are states where there was no significant organized opposition, in some cases because the groups that were most opposed to term limits believed that public support was too strong and there was no realistic chance to defeat the initiative campaign.

Table 2 shows that in states where the opposition was well organized and well financed, the margin of victory was smaller; in states where the organized opposition was weak or almost nonexistent, term limitations were adopted by a comfortable margin. This relationship was strong and significant.

ROLE OF MEDIA ENDORSEMENTS

There is scattered evidence about the role that the media played, primarily through editorials, in the campaign. The most detailed analysis, by John Rausch (1992), concerns the *Daily Oklahoman*. The paper is very conservative in its orientation and is generally viewed as having a large impact on state politics. Its editorials are often run on the front page. The *Daily Oklahoman* gave strong support to the term limitations initiative.

Table 2

Comparison of Vote in Favor of Term Limitations with Level of Organized Opposition

<i>Organized Opposition</i>	<i>State</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Percent in Favor</i>
Strong	California	1990	52
	Washington	1991	46
	Mean:		49
Moderate	Washington	1992	52
	Oklahoma	1990	67
	Arkansas	1992	60
	Michigan	1992	59
	Nebraska	1992	68
	Ohio	1992	66
Mean:			62
Weak	Oregon	1992	70
	Wyoming	1992	77
	Colorado	1990	71
	South Dakota	1992	64
	Arizona	1992	74
Mean:			71
$r = .84$	$F = 12.06$	$DF = 2/10$	$p < .01$

In county-level analysis of aggregate voting data, Rausch (1992) has found that there is a correlation of .563 between the vote for term limitations and the circulation of the *Daily Oklahoman*. In a multiple regression, the circulation of the newspaper has a greater impact than a measure of Republicanism on the vote for the term limits initiative.

In Oregon, most of the state's newspapers took an editorial stand against the term-limitation initiative, including the *Portland Oregonian*, regarded as the "statewide" newspaper. The fact that 70 percent of the voters voted for the initiative suggests what little effect these editorials had. Similarly, in Arizona the two newspapers with the largest circulation, in Phoenix and Tucson, opposed the initiative, but it got almost three-quarters of the vote.

Supporters of term limitations originally proposed an initiative that would have been retroactive. A number of newspaper stories reported on the drastic impact this would have on the state legislature and the state's congressional delegation. In part because of this (and partly because the retroactive Washington measure failed in 1991) the sponsors withdrew the proposal and offered one that was not retroactive. Ironically, by emphasizing the damage that a retroactive measure would cause, the media helped persuade the supporters of term limits to offer a less drastic measure that would be less vulnerable to attack – and it passed.

The press helped to defeat the first term limits proposal in 1991 in Washington. Editorials were very critical of the use of paid signature-collectors to put the initiative on the ballot. One influential newspaper, the *Tacoma Morning News*, ran an investigative story on the right-wing sources of support for CCR, the national organization that dominated the pro-term limits campaign in Washington. On their editorial pages, most of the state's newspapers (18 out of 20 surveyed) opposed the term limits initiative; they particularly emphasized how the initiative would weaken the influence of the state's congressional delegation and how it would drive Speaker Foley from office (Olson 1992).

One reason why the term-limitation initiative (without the retroactive feature) passed in 1992 in Washington was that several major newspapers that had opposed the initiative in 1991 endorsed it in 1992. There was also less analysis of term limits and its implications in the news pages of most newspapers the second time around.

PUBLIC ATTITUDES AND VOTING PATTERNS

Comparable polling data from each of the states is not available, nor is polling data available for several time points during the campaign on term limi-

tations. In only a few states are analyses of aggregate voting data, usually by county, available. But there are a few clues from several of the states that may help to explain the level of support for term limitations, variations of support within the state, and changes in public attitudes that occurred during – and presumably resulted from – the campaign.

In August, 1990, before the California campaign on term limitations was fully underway, supporters of term limitations commissioned a poll that showed term limitations being favored by a margin of 71-13 percent; in fact 46 percent said they strongly favored it. Registered Republicans favored it by 78-9 percent and Democrats by 66-17 percent. It was somewhat more popular among whites than among blacks and hispanics. At that point in the campaign there were no large regional variations in the level of support. When respondents were asked about specific substantive provisions of Proposition 140, 73 percent favored the term limitations, 77 percent favored ending legislative pensions, and 72 percent favored cutting the legislative budget. Surprisingly, support for Proposition 140 was at almost the same level for respondents who approved of the legislature's job performance and those who disapproved.

The California Poll indicated that by early October half of the voters had heard of Proposition 140, and these favored it by more than a 3-1 margin. By late October the margin was down to 2-1 among the two-thirds who had heard of it; when a summary was read to respondents they favored it by a 61-26 percent margin (Price 1992). This would suggest that the relatively late but intensive advertising campaign by opponents was largely responsible for the drop to 52 percent support recorded at the polls in November.

Voters in a majority of the California counties supported Proposition 140, including Sacramento, San Diego, and also Orange county – where the margin of victory was large enough to account for the outcome statewide. The initiative lost in Los Angeles and San Francisco, where the Democratic party is strong. Proposition 140 also did poorly in minority areas – black, hispanic, and Asian – where local political leaders worked hard for its defeat.

Those whom we interviewed suggested a number of reasons why voters were disillusioned with the California legislature. A prolonged budget deadlock in 1990 attracted a lot of attention in the media. The high levels of campaign spending by incumbents, and the huge disparity in spending between incumbents and challengers, are frequently criticized. The indictment of two legislators damaged the legislature's reputation. Willie Brown, the controversial and often flamboyant speaker of the House, was often a target by critics of the legislature who were supporting term limitations.

In March, 1991, before the debate over term limitations was underway, a poll in Washington state showed that 68 percent of the voters favored some form

of term limitation, but less than half of the respondents favored the initiative when they understood that it would force Speaker Foley out. By mid-October a poll showed that support had fallen to 57 percent, and a tracking poll just before the election showed that the initiative would lose. At the polls the initiative received only 46 percent. It appears that support dropped gradually during the campaign as voters understood more about the effects of term limitations, including the forced retirement of the speaker (Olson 1992).

In a survey taken just after the Washington election, supporters were most likely to mention the need for "new faces and new ideas," pay raises for members, the logjams in the legislative process, and the influence of special interest groups. Opponents emphasized that passage of the initiative would reduce the clout of the state's congressional delegation and the loss of the speaker; they doubted that Washington should be the only state to have such term limitations; and they thought that voters should be able to vote for whomever they pleased. It seems clear that opponents were primarily concerned with the impact of *congressional* rather than *state legislative* term limits. Thus it appears that a limit just on state legislative terms would have passed (Olson 1992).

The pattern of voting in 1992 in Washington followed approximately the pattern in 1991 except that there was obviously less opposition to the measure. This was presumably because the new initiative imposed less stringent limitations, particularly on congressional terms, and was not retroactive.

A survey of public opinion in Wyoming "suggests that a general dissatisfaction with government, rather than opposition to specific incumbents or a conservative ideology" produced the lopsided vote for term limitations (King 1992, 8). Support for term limits was only slightly higher among those who expressed distrust of the state government; there was a gap of only two percentage points between conservatives and liberals; and there was a gap of only one percent between those who said state legislators were doing an excellent or good job and those who labeled it as fair or poor. However, Republicans were more likely to favor term limits than Democrats, by eight percentage points (King 1992).

A poll taken in Florida in July showed that 76 percent supported term limitations. The initiative passed by 77 percent in November, suggesting that the campaign has little net effect on voter opinion. In July, Republicans were more likely to support the initiative than Democrats, by a margin of 12 points. There was almost as much support for the initiative from minority voters as from white voters.

A poll taken in Michigan in early October, 1992, showed the term limitation initiative leading by a 67-24 percent margin. It actually passed in November by 59-41 percent. This suggests that public support for the initiative declined

during the campaign, even though the opposition failed to undertake an aggressive effort against it.

In Ohio, a series of polls from February to late October showed that a rather consistent majority of 70 to 75 percent supported term limitations; the final margin at the polls was 66 percent in favor. This was a state where neither the supporters nor the opponents campaigned very intensively, which may explain the lack of major shifts in public opinion during the campaign.

A poll taken by the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* in June, 1992, before the initiative had qualified for the ballot, showed that 79 percent of Missouri respondents favored term limitations for state legislators. The initiative, which won 74 percent of the vote, carried by comfortable margins in every county in the state. The majority was 74 percent in St. Louis County and 65 percent in St. Louis City.

In Arkansas, the term-limits initiative passed with a vote of 60 percent. A comparison of the aggregate county-by-county vote on the initiative with the vote for Dale Bumpers, who also won 60 percent in running for reelection to the Senate, suggests that support for term limitations was associated with Republican voting. Most of the counties where Bumpers ran considerably ahead of the initiative are strongly Democratic; most of those where the initiative ran well ahead of Bumpers are Republican. The vote for term limits averaged 68 percent in the small number of counties that Bumpers did not carry; and Bumpers averaged 77 percent in the small number of counties where the initiative failed.

In Wyoming, where the term limits initiative gained 77 percent of the vote, the county-by-county variation was small, ranging from 70 to 86 percent support. A correlation analysis shows that term limits were particularly popular in counties where Perot did well and where Clinton did poorly. It did better in counties with smaller population and those with lower education levels.

In Nebraska, where polls showed a consistent majority of 70 to 75 percent support for the initiative, an aggregate analysis of county voting showed the strongest support in rural, sparsely populated counties, and the weakest support in and around the county containing the capital city.

In Oregon, where the initiative got 70 percent of the vote and carried all 30 counties, it garnered from 60 to 65 percent in several of the more Democratic and urban counties and about three-fourths in several of the most Republican counties.

In Oklahoma, Lloyd Noble II launched his campaign for term limitations after a poll that he commissioned demonstrated strong, widespread support for that proposal. Term limits were approved by a margin of 70-18 percent (the initiative finally passed by 67 percent) with no significant partisan or demographic differences. The poll also showed that 78 percent of the respondents

evaluated the legislature's job performance as only fair or poor (McGuigan, 1991). Late in the campaign a survey showed Republicans and conservatives more likely to favor term limits than Democrats and liberals, but by margins of only 6 to 8 points (Copeland and Rausch 1991).

A regression analysis of aggregate voting by county shows that both a measure of Republican party registration and voting and the circulation of the *Daily Oklahoman* (which campaigned strongly for term limitations) are important and significant in explaining the pro-initiative vote. The simple correlation between the county vote for the initiative and the measure of Republicanism is .453 (Rausch 1992).

In South Dakota, where term limits got 64 percent of the vote, there was a correlation of .65 (gamma) between the county vote for term limits and the vote for the Republican congressional candidate who had been a leading sponsor of term limitations but who was defeated.

Table 3 summarizes opinion survey data from those states voting on initiatives in 1992 on Republican and Democratic respondents' attitudes toward the term limitation initiatives. (The states are listed in order of the percentage who voted for term limitations.) The data come from exit polls taken at the November election, and therefore reflects public opinion at the end of the campaign in each state. In most states the two-party averages in the polls approximate the actual vote. (The California survey concerns the 1992 initiative on congressional term limits, which passed by a much larger margin than the 1990 initiative limiting state legislative terms.) Oklahoma 1990 data are also included.

Except in Wyoming, where the partisan difference was trivial, there was substantially stronger support among Republicans than among Democrats for term limitations. There were also larger state-to-state differences among Democrats than among Republicans. Except in Washington in 1991 (where the initiative lost), Republican support percentages ranged from the low 80s to the high 60s, about 14 points. Among Democrats, support ranged from 70 to 41 percent, a difference of 29 points.

The largest differences between Democrats and Republicans were in Arkansas, Michigan, Montana, Ohio, and South Dakota – most of the states where voter support in November for term limits was two-thirds or less. In two of these states we have reported evidence from county-level aggregate data of greater Republican support. In only one of these five states – Arkansas – was there active opposition from Democratic leaders to term limitations.

The strongest, most active Democratic opposition to term limits appears to have been in California, Washington, Oklahoma, and Arkansas. Aggregate voting analysis in California, Oklahoma, and Arkansas suggests Democratic voters were more likely to oppose the term limit amendments.

Table 3

**Partisan Differences in Support for Term Limitations,
Based on State Surveys on Limitation Proposals**

State	Proportion in Favor		Difference
	Republicans	Democrats	
Wyoming	69	70	-1
Florida	81	69	12
Missouri	79	67	12
Arizona	81	68	13
Oregon	67	60	7
Nebraska	70	59	11
Oklahoma	78	73	5
Montana	69	41	28
Ohio	75	56	19
S. Dakota	73	54	19
Arkansas	75	44	31
Michigan	73	44	29
California	78	66	12
Washington-92	57	46	11

SOURCE: "Public Opinion and Demographic Report." *The Public Perspective* January/February, 4 (1993): pp. 97; and Copeland and Rausch, 1991.

CONCLUSIONS

The organized support for term limitations came primarily from conservative groups and Republican political leaders. Both of them were trying to weaken liberal and Democratic influence, and frequently control, in state legislatures. Conservatives believed that the link between well entrenched legislators and interest groups led to policies of more spending and higher taxes.

While some voters who voted for term limitation initiatives shared these viewpoints and goals, many of them were concerned less with the output of legislatures than with the legislative process. They believed that legislators were

more interested in their political careers than in their constituents, too often obligated to special interests and sometimes corrupt; and they were frustrated with partisan feuding and political deadlock.

At a time when the polls show that public frustration and disillusionment with both Congress and state legislatures are unusually high, it is not surprising that the voters have approved term limitations in almost every state where they were on the ballot. Nevertheless, there has been some variation among the states in the proportion of votes cast for term limits, from a high of about three-fourths to a low of slightly more or less than one-half. The evidence suggests that these variations can be explained in part by the strength of the organized groups and leaders working for and against term limitations, and *particularly the strength of the opposition.*

The job of collecting enough signatures to place an initiative on the ballot requires organization and resources. Therefore, in any state where the term limitation initiative qualified for the ballot, there was an organization that had shown the ability to raise money, mobilize supporters, and provide enough publicity about the issue to encourage voters to sign petitions. Once this organization had been established, it could be used to run a campaign to win voter support for the initiative.

Those organizations and political leaders (such as legislators) who might be expected to organize a campaign against the initiative faced a difficult problem; the polls showed that there was very strong public support for the principle of term limitations. In many of the states this is confirmed by polls taken before the campaign for voter support was in full swing. In several of the states it appears that potential opponents looked at these polls and concluded that there was little or no prospect of defeating term limitations, and therefore decided not to undertake a large-scale, expensive campaign.

Only in California and Washington could the organization opposition to term limitations be described as strong, and it was in these two states that voter support for term limitations was held to 52 percent or less. But the strength of public support is indicated by the fact that in California Proposition 140 won 52 percent of the vote even though its proponents were outspent 5-1 by the opponents.

In the other states, once the organized supporters of term limitations had succeeded in placing the issue on the ballot, they were capable of carrying out a vigorous campaign for voter support of term limits. If this campaign was sometimes low keyed, it was because there was no effective organized opposition, and a more aggressive campaign was unnecessary – particularly if the polls showed

that public support remained strong. In South Dakota, for example, where there was little organized opposition or support (except for the Republican congressional candidate who led the fight for it), the initiative passed comfortably. Only in California and Washington were the political forces opposing term limits as strong or stronger than those supporting it – and only in these two states was the decision really close.

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TRIBAL ELECTIONS: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF THE CHICKASAW NATION

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This is a preliminary study of the Chickasaw Nation's tribal elections for the legislature and governor in 1990. An important historical issue has been the controversy between the legislative branch and the executive branch over power within the nation. The focus here is whether this controversy had a significant impact on modern tribal elections

Despite increased research into race and ethnicity since the 1960s, little is known of the electoral behavior of racial and ethnic minorities in the United States other than African-Americans and Hispanics. The unique legal and social status of Indian tribes makes most of the current political science literature regarding minority electoral patterns inapplicable to Oklahoma's largest minority groups, Native Americans. Nor can Native American tribal elections be treated as a homogeneous whole. Each of the over 250 recognized tribes in the United States has a unique historical form of tribal government. One type of Native American election unique to Oklahoma is that of non-reservation tribal elections. The Chickasaw Nation was chosen for study because it is a non-reservation tribe and because research findings for this tribe may be generalizable to the other Five Civilized Tribes (Choctaw, Cherokee, Creek, and Seminole).

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The original Chickasaw Nation encompassed the western one-third of what is now the State of Tennessee and a large portion of what is now the State of Mississippi (Bond 1937). The Chickasaw Nation population at first contact with Europeans (in 1540, when Hernando DeSoto attempted to move into the Nation's territory) was probably 3500 to 4500. This Chickasaw Nation had a strong warrior tradition and a propensity for war (Gibson 1971). The present governor of the Chickasaw, Bill Anoatubby, calls the Chickasaws the "unconquered and the unconquerable."

The original tribal government was an extension of the clan system. The Nation's clans and towns were self-governing. Tribal officials held their positions because of clan status. Each clan was governed by a council of elders and a clan Minko (chief) was selected by the council. At the head of tribal government was the High Minko, the principal chief, who was selected from the ranking clan of the Imosaktca (Gibson 1991). The next position was reserved for the war chief known as "first beloved warrior" (Martini 1986).

After the Chickasaw contact with DeSoto, in 1540, another 150 years passed before the tribe had contact with Europeans again. Beginning in the 1700s the Chickasaws formed an alliance with the British. Based originally on trade, the alliance only lasted until the American Revolution, but had a significant and lasting effect on both Chickasaw government and culture (Gibson 1971). As a result of this alliance with the British, the Chickasaw adopted Anglo social and political norms. By 1763, the Chickasaws began to pattern their government structure on that of the British, even changing the title of the leader from High Minko to the British title of "governor" (James 1992).

Having supported the British in the American Revolution, the Chickasaw Nation found they were in no position to bargain with the newly independent United States. In 1786, the tribe signed a treaty with the United States which began a 51-year pattern of relinquishment of most of the land of the Chickasaw Nation to the United States (20 million acres of tribal lands were ceded). The states of Mississippi and Alabama, in which the tribe lived in the early 1800s, were determined to grab the remaining tribal lands and to eliminate tribal government (O'Brien 1989). In 1830, the Indian Removal Act was passed by the U. S. Congress ordering the removal of the Five Civilized Tribes to lands located in the west. In 1837, a treaty was signed between the Chickasaw Nation and the United States relocating the Chickasaws with the Choctaws, the tribe's hereditary enemy (Kappler 1975). By 1853, the Chickasaws were removed to the Indian Territory (what is now southeastern Oklahoma).

Traditional Chickasaw government, already significantly weakened by the Chickasaw's century of contact with the British and the tribe's attempt to adapt to Anglo culture, was almost totally destroyed by removal to the Indian Territory. The blood clan form of tribal government could not adapt to these changing circumstances and disappeared. A pattern of mixed-blood families controlling Chickasaw politics emerged, which exists to this day. During this period, the mixed-bloods supported the owning of slaves and developed a plantation economy in the Indian Territory. They consequently dragged the Chickasaw into the Civil War on the side of the Confederacy. The defeat of the Confederacy once again imperiled the Chickasaw Nation. The Nation was forced to sign a new treaty

with the United States in 1866 and required to write a new constitution. The new constitution, ratified in 1868, modeled tribal government on the U. S. constitutional model, separating tribal government into 3 branches. After the Civil War, Anglo incursion into the Indian Territory increased and in 1887 the U. S. Congress passed the General Allotment Act parcelling out tribal lands to individual Indians. The Act was expanded to cover the Five Civilized Tribes in 1893.

The Chickasaw Nation realized that they would have to negotiate with the federal government to assure the best possible terms for allotment and in 1898 signed an agreement for allotment. The 1898 agreement was rejected by the Chickasaw people. The issue of allotment became moot when the U. S. Congress enacted the Curtis Act of 1898 terminating all tribal governments. The Chickasaw government was scheduled for termination on March 4, 1906. The Chickasaw Nation asked the U. S. Congress to permit tribal leaders to remain in office "until tribal business was completed" (Chickasaw National Collection). The termination of the tribe was temporarily suspended and the "present tribal government" was extended (Chickasaw National Collection). This congressional resolution reserved the right to appoint the Chickasaw governor to the President of the United States (Deloria 1988). Presidents continued to do so until 1971. Only three governors, Johnston, Maytubby, and James held the office from 1908 to 1971.

The 1970s saw a change in national government policy toward the Indians and a commitment to allow the nations more self-determination. In 1970, Public Law 91-495 was adopted to permit Indian nations the right to vote for tribal officials once again (Deloria 1988). In 1971, Overton James was elected governor of the Chickasaws in the first tribal election held since the turn of the century. All did not remain well for the Chickasaw Nation after the election of 1971. Upon the renewal of tribal government, friction developed between the tribal legislature and the governor over the authority to appropriate money and initiate legislation.

The Chickasaw Nation sued the U. S. Department of Interior, U. S. Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the Governor of the Chickasaw Nation in *Morris v. Watt* (1981). At issue was the authority of the governor under the 1868 Chickasaw Constitution. The plaintiffs objected to the relationship that had developed over the years between the governor and the U. S. government. Many Chickasaws felt that the governor had overstepped his constitutional authority and usurped the authority of the tribal legislature. The Supreme Court held that the 1868 Chickasaw Constitution had not been repudiated by any federal acts and ruled that a referendum was to be held to devise a new constitution for the Nation. A new Chickasaw constitution was ratified in 1987.

Chickasaw governors had usurped legislative powers as a result of tribal termination in 1906. The governor's position as the official head of the Chickasaw Nation and, until 1971, his appointment by the President of the United States effectively altered the 1868 Constitution in interpretation and intent. *Morris v. Watt* corrected these usurpations of legislative power by the governors. That is not to say that friction between the two branches ceased. Conflict between the executive and legislative branches continue. In 1991, members of the legislature brought suit against the governor (Chickasaw Tribal Court 1991, Case 9105) challenging whether the governor has the constitutional power to censure members of the tribal legislature. The case is still pending.

This brief review of the history of the Chickasaw government delineates two points. There is a continuing conflict between the executive and legislative branches, which began with the adoption of the British governor concept of government by the tribe in the 1700s and continues to influence tribal politics today. There is also the exacerbation of this issue as a result of the tribal governor being appointed by the President of the United States for 63 years.

RESEARCH DESIGN

A set of pre- and post-election survey questions were developed for the officials of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the Chickasaw government and for a random sample of Chickasaw voters. Prior to the August 1991 Chickasaw tribal elections, all of the candidates for governor of the Chickasaw Nation and all members of the Chickasaw tribal legislature and judiciary were sent questionnaires. The two candidates for governor agreed to participate in the pre-election study as did 10 of the 13 tribal legislators (two of the 13 seats were vacant in 1991) and 2 of the 3 members of the tribal judiciary (1 of 3 positions was vacant in 1991). This was a 92 percent response rate among Chickasaw elected officials. After the August 1991 elections a post election survey of tribal officers was conducted. The governor, one of three tribal judges, and 9 of 13 legislators participated (62% response rate).

BARRIERS TO RESEARCH

The Governor of the Chickasaws informed us that we would not be allowed access to voter registration lists of Chickasaw tribal members claiming that "tribal law prohibited giving out registered voter lists to anyone other than

candidates running for tribal offices.” Without voter registration lists, we were unable to gain access to members of the Chickasaw Nation who were legally entitled to participate in tribal elections. He informed us that to gain access to vote lists would require the Chickasaw Legislature to pass a bill to that affect. He thought it was unlikely that anyone would be given permission to use the lists, even for purposes of research. The Chickasaw Nation had adopted a policy of “no access” so that voter lists could not be sold to commercial interests (James 1992). Only Chickasaws with Certificates of Degree of Indian Blood (CDIB cards) are allowed to vote. In 1991 there were 8,330 Chickasaws with CDIB cards. Fifty-five percent of these voters lived outside the Chickasaw Nation and were unreachable without voter lists.

Since all voting in the Chickasaw Nation is done by mail, exit polling was not a possibility. We finally decided to conduct a small, nonrandom survey of Chickasaws attending community dinners and meetings. Fifty Chickasaws were surveyed prior to the August 1991 elections.

PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS

THE CHICKASAW VOTER

When the two candidates for governor, Anoatubby and Keel, were asked to profile a typical Chickasaw voter their major disagreement was over whether more in-Nation or out-of-Nation tribal members voted and the relative impact of these two groups on tribal elections. Governor Anoatubby believed that out-of-Nation members are more likely to vote and have the most significant impact on elections while Mr. Keel thought it was in-Nation voters who have the most impact. Over 60 percent of the members of the legislative and judicial branches surveyed agreed that out-of-Nation voters have a significant impact on all tribal elections. They thought the impact of out-of-Nation voters was negative in that these voters have little knowledge of either candidates or issues.

In 1983, the Chickasaw Constitution gave out-of-Nation voters the right to affiliate with any district in the Nation and to vote in tribal elections. The members of the legislative and judiciary thought that if the Nation stopped using mail-in ballots and, instead, used polling places that this would remove the undue influences of out-of-Nation voters. They said it is most unlikely the Nation will change to voting at the polls because the Nation receives money from the federal government for these out-of-Nation members, as long as they are given tribal privileges in the Nation.

The views of the two candidates for governor on this issue had a critical effect on their campaigns. Governor Anoatubby had a mail campaign aimed at out-of-Nation voters and made a number of out-of-Nation visits to these voters (to Dallas, Houston, and San Antonio, Texas, and to California). Mr. Keel's campaign concentrated on in-Nation voters. Governor Anoatubby's belief that out-of-Nation voters have a significant impact on tribal elections may have been correct since he won reelection. However, since the Nation does no post-election voter analysis, it was impossible to ascertain whether out-of-Nation or in-Nation voters had the most influence on the 1991 elections.

Both the candidates for governor and other elected officials thought personal contacts with voters were the only way to win an election in the Nation. Of the potential voters queried, 46 percent identified "word-of-mouth" as the way they received information concerning the campaigns. However, 49 percent said they relied on newspapers for campaign information, specifically *The Chickasaw Times*. Since out-of-Nation voters are also predominantly dependent on written campaign material (they also receive *The Chickasaw Times*), candidates may be overemphasizing the importance of personal contacts.

Of the voters questioned, over 51 percent did not know enough about the candidate for governor, Mr. Keel, to respond to questions concerning his candidacy for governor. The majority of elected tribal officials surveyed were unable to respond to Mr. Keel's candidacy. Those who did respond thought he lacked potential for leadership and was a "trouble-maker." The elected officials felt that Keel had neither the leadership ability needed nor ability to implement his ideas if he became governor.

The majority of the voters surveyed thought Governor Anoatubby was smart, a strong leader, and was able to work well on the state and federal levels. The majority of elected officials surveyed identified similar traits for Anoatubby – his effectiveness in his first term, political experience, and good relations on the state and federal levels. These are many of the same traits Governor Anoatubby identified as being important to the voter; that is, leadership ability and experience in tribal government. It seems clear that Mr. Keel's candidacy had three major drawbacks: his lack of name identification, his negative campaign, and his inability to overcome the advantages of the sitting governor's incumbency (name identification, political experience, track record).

TRIBAL ISSUES

Table 1 identifies the issues the tribal legislative and judiciary voters and the two candidates for governor regarded as being most important to the

Chickasaw Nation. Governor Anoatubby's agenda appears to be closer to that of the voters than is Mr. Keel's. Both the voters (63%) and elected tribal officials (63%) felt Governor Anoatubby would be able to handle these issues better than would Mr. Keel. Mr. Keel, who resigned from the legislature to run for governor, has an agenda more similar to that of his legislative colleagues than to the agenda of the voters. Since all elected officials run at large in the Chickasaw elections, the differences in agenda cannot be as a result of the governor representing all the people and each legislator representing a specific district. The

TABLE 1

PRE-ELECTION TRIBAL AGENDAS

<i>Voters Poll</i>	<i>Legislative and Judicial</i>	<i>Anoatubby</i>	<i>Keel</i>
1. education (34%)	1. economic development (42%)	1. social services services	1. jobs/economic development
2. health care (23%)	2. health care (25%)	2. economic development	2. health care
3. economic development (17%)	2. education (25%)	3. tribal culture	3. education
4. the elderly (14%)	4. the elderly (17%)	4. conflict in tribal government/ quality of tribal government	4. the elderly
5. conflict in tribal government (11%)	4. tribal self sufficiency (17%)		5. conflict in tribal government

Source: Author's calculations from survey and interviews

legislative and judicial respondents were the only group surveyed who did not mention the conflict between the branches of tribal government as an important tribal issue.

Governor Anoatubby had been interviewed for a study of tribal leaders' political agendas in 1989 (McCoy 1990), and his agenda in 1989 and 1991 were compared. In the earlier study Governor Anoatubby had ranked the issue of economic development first and had not ranked tribal culture or tribal government at all. When asked why his agenda had changed, he replied that it had changed as a result of experience in office and political maturity. The Governor thought the Chickasaw Nation had made progress in the area of general economic development but the Nation now needed to concentrate more on each individual tribal member becoming more self-sufficient and less dependent on the tribal health, education, and housing programs. Anoatubby said he had also come to realize there was a close connection between tribal culture and tribal government. He thought that if the Chickasaw Nation lost its history and culture that there would be no viable future for the Nation.

One of the economic enterprises Governor Anoatubby supported during his first term was the development of tribal bingo establishments. Eighty percent of the voters supported the tribe's bingo enterprises, although the respondents "damned bingo with faint praise." The voters thought the tribe might as well make money off bingo (they thought it was quite profitable) while it could. None of these respondents thought bingo was a long-term economic solution for the tribe nor believed that the state and federal governments would allow tribal bingo enterprises to remain profitable or even to survive for very long. Seventy-five percent of the legislative and judicial respondents supported the tribe's bingo enterprises but a majority had mixed feelings about the enterprise. Some of the responses were that they opposed it personally but thought it did bring needed money into the tribe; that bingo was not a long-term solution to the tribe's economic problems; and that they thought the bingo enterprises would eventually be phased out because of pressure from the states and federal government

TRIBAL CULTURE AND HISTORY

Sixty-seven percent of the members of the legislature and judiciary surveyed thought tribal culture and history did affect voting in modern tribal elections. They thought it had more effect on the less educated tribal members living in rural areas of the Nation. The 33 percent of the respondents who thought tribal culture and history had no effect on modern tribal elections said there was not enough tribal culture left to have an effect and that it was the Anglo culture

which most influenced modern tribal elections. Neither candidate for governor thought tribal culture and history had a significant effect on modern tribal election. Governor Anoatubby did say that he thought that if the Chickasaw heritage was restored, tribal culture and heritage would begin to play a more decisive role in tribal elections.

KINSHIP PATTERNS

The legislative and judicial respondents thought kinship patterns did have an effect on modern tribal elections (67%). They thought kinship had more effect on voting for members of the legislature than for governor. They also stated that certain families have historically dominated Chickasaw politics, for example, the Kemps, Colberts, Loves and Carters. Governor Anoatubby did not see kinship patterns as affecting modern tribal elections but Mr. Keel disagreed. He stated that tribal history shows that certain families have historically been elected as tribal leaders.

CONFLICT BETWEEN LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE BRANCHES

Sixty percent of the legislative and judicial respondents thought there was serious conflict between the legislative and executive branches of tribal government. These respondents believed that the tribal legislature should be equal in power to the governor. Some of the reasons given for the present lack of legislative power were because so many legislative candidates run unopposed; because tribal legislators are "part-time legislators;" and because Chickasaw voters are much less interested in, and knowledgeable about, legislative races than the governor's race.

Other respondents thought the Chickasaw Constitution grants equal power to the legislature but that the legislature does not know how to exercise its power effectively. These respondents stated that the conflict between the two branches worsened in 1991 when the death of a legislator caused a 6-6 stalemate with six legislators supporting Governor Anoatubby and six supporting Legislator Keel.

Mr. Keel stated in his interview that this conflict was one of the major reasons he decided to run for governor. He believed that many Chickasaw leaders have been the enemies of their people rather than the federal government. He spoke of Governor Anoatubby attempting to censure members of the legislature on two different occasions. Mr. Keel thought the Nation needed a stronger tribal court which would stand up to the Governor instead of "rubber stamping his decisions."

POST ELECTION SURVEY

The Tribal Agenda

The tribal legislators and justices were asked to identify the issues most important to Chickasaw voters in the August 1991 elections. A comparison of the pre- and post-responses of the two branches is shown in Table 2.

The most important difference between these two agendas is the addition of the conflict between the executive and legislative branches of tribal government as an issue. Three of the six legislators who opposed Governor Anoatubby and ran for reelection lost their bids. The new legislators ran on "reform" tickets saying that tribal members were "fed up with the fight between the governor and the legislature." Respondents also stated that the judicial branch had been dragged into the controversy because of the suit brought against the governor challenging whether he had the constitutional right to censure members of the legislature (Chickasaw Tribal Court 1991, Case 9105). Governor Anoatubby also changed the order of the issues he thought were most important. After the election, Governor Anoatubby moved the issue of conflict in tribal government from a fourth place ranking to first in importance.

TABLE 2
AGENDA IDENTIFIED BY LEGISLATIVE
AND JUDICIAL RESPONDENT

<i>Pre-Election Voter Issues</i>	<i>Post-Election Voter Issues</i>
1. Economic development (42%)	1. Economic development (40%)
2. Health care (25%)	1. Education (40%)
2. Education (25%)	1. Tribal government (40%)
4. The elderly (17%)	4. Health care (30%)
4. Tribal self-sufficiency (17%)	4. The elderly (30%)

Source: See Table 1

Asked for their personal agendas for their term in office, the tribal legislators continued to identify economic development as the most important issue (56%) with social services (44%) a close second. The judicial respondent identified his personal agenda as the development of a comprehensive tribal code, strengthening the position of the judiciary and promoting the balance of power among the three branches of tribal government.

Campaigning

When asked why those elected to the legislature in 1991 won rather than their opponents, legislative respondents stated that it was personal characteristics rather than issues which helped elect them to office (90%). The traits they believed to be important to voters were character and reputation, honesty, and expertise and knowledge. The judicial member also identified character (honesty, responsibility) as the reason he was elected. Both the judicial member and a number of legislators also mentioned that they thought their opponents had run "negative campaigns." Governor Anoatubby responded that he won over his opponent because he had a plan to present to the people and Mr. Keel did not. He also said he was more qualified and had more experience than his opponent. He stated that, of course, incumbency was an advantage to him. However, he thought a qualified challenger with an alternative program to present to the tribe could overcome the incumbency advantage. He also stated that he thought there were historical patterns in the Chickasaw culture which encouraged tribal members to be loyal to the tribal leader and not to change leaders as long as the leader is doing an adequate job. Anoatubby thought the tribe would throw out a scoundrel as tribal leader but would not throw out a leader just because he had made mistakes. Past Governor Overton James (James 1992) stated that the advantages of incumbency in the Nation's elections require a challenger to have name recognition and his own political record. James stated that Anoatubby had name recognition and experience in office (eight years as lieutenant governor) before he ran for governor the first time.

The legislative and judicial respondents thought Anoatubby defeated Keel because of the advantage of incumbency (90%), but emphasized that incumbency cannot overcome the record of a tribal leader who is doing a bad job. These respondents also stated that Keel was not a serious candidate in that he had run for governor in 1987 and had won only 10 percent of the vote. In the 1991 election he won 23 percent of the vote. They criticized Mr. Keel for his lack of an agenda, his lack of leadership qualities, and the fact that he ran against the present governor rather than for the office itself.

Conflict in Tribal Government

Governor Anoatubby thought that this issue had a significant effect on his winning reelection and on the defeat of members of the legislative faction who had opposed him. Sixty percent of the legislative and judicial respondents thought this conflict in government did affect the 1991 elections. They thought it had more effect on in-Nation voters than out-of-Nation voters since out-of-Nation voters are not very aware of tribal politics. Generally, the officials thought the voters were fed up with the conflict and were sending a message that the three branches of tribal government should communicate with each other and learn to work together. The legislative respondents thought the conflict had a more significant effect on the governor's race than on their own. When asked if relations between the governor and legislature had improved after the 1991 elections, the governor stated that relations were better but that some animosity still remained. The legislative and judicial respondents (80%) thought relations were much better and improving following the 1991 elections.

Governor Anoatubby emphasized that Chickasaw tribal government, just as many other tribal governments, is still in an evolutionary process. He is presently working on a tribal code which was to be in draft form by March 1992. At that time, he hoped the legislature would take an active role in helping develop the code. He stated that the legislature had never known its proper role and he thought this codification would help the legislature define its role. He thought that it had never been clear that it is the role of the legislature to create law while it is the role of the executive to implement the laws.

Differences Between Tribal and Anglo Elections

Eighty percent of the legislative and judicial respondents thought there were important differences in tribal and Anglo elections. They spoke of the effect of out-of-Nation voters on campaigning in tribal elections. They spoke of the difficulties in campaigning when the voters (Chickasaws) are a population within the larger Anglo population. They stated that this makes media campaigns almost useless and forced reliance on personal contact between candidate and voter (in-Nation) or mail-outs (out-of-Nation).

CONCLUSIONS AND FINDINGS

The Chickasaw Nation has a long history of attempting to assimilate into Anglo culture (both the British culture and American culture). This move toward assimilation encouraged the ascendancy of the mixed bloods into tribal leadership and dominance, which prevailed after the tribe's removal to the Indian Territory. The termination of the tribe and its reformation with the governor appointed by the U. S. President for 64 years further tied the Nation to the federal government and Anglo culture. The fact that the Chickasaw Nation has no contiguous land base (no reservation) means that the Chickasaws must live among the Anglo population and this has also had a significant effect on both tribal culture and politics.

The past governor of the Chickasaws, Overton James, stated that the advancement of the Chickasaw Nation is a direct result of the Nation knowing how to get things done in Washington, D.C., and Oklahoma City. He said many of the Nation's accomplishments are a result of Chickasaw leaders' rapport with state and federal officials and agencies (James 1992). However, there is a negative side to tribal assimilation into the Anglo culture. Many western tribes do not consider Chickasaws "real Indians" (James 1992), lessening the influence of the Chickasaw Nation in national tribal politics. This assimilation into Anglo culture has also resulted in the potential loss of the Chickasaw culture. This erosion of tribal culture is one of the major reasons Governor Anoatubby has made the restoration of tribal culture one of his primary issues in 1992.

It is clear that the political history of the Chickasaw Nation (the governor appointed by the president for the past 64 years, conflicting tribal constitutions, court cases pitting members of the tribal government against each other) has encouraged and exacerbated the conflict between the executive and legislative branches of tribal government. This conflict has worked to the detriment of the tribe in that it has deflected attention from tribal problems and issues to infighting between the two branches. This factionalism has also had a significant effect on some tribal elections in that the issue of legislative-executive conflict has been the deciding factor in elections rather than choosing the best candidate for the job. This conflict has probably also increased the amount of negative campaigning and personal attacks in tribal elections.

It also seems clear that tribal culture and history affect campaigning in Chickasaw tribal elections. The most important finding in this study may be the potential impact of out-of-Nation voters on tribal elections, their effect on campaigning and on who is elected to tribal office. An in-depth study of in-Nation voters versus out-of-Nation voters is recommended. Another interesting find of this study was the possibility that clan and kinship patterns may still have an

effect on some tribal voting patterns (depending on the voter's education level, rural or urban, in-Nation or out-of-Nation). An in-depth study of the Chickasaw voter is also recommended.

There is a serious barrier to either of these studies being initiated. Article III, Section I, of the Election Rules and Regulations of the Chickasaw Nation (1986) deny access to anyone, other than official candidates for tribal office, to tribal voter lists. The Chickasaw government and tribal members do not want tribal member lists to be accessible to businesses and they also believe that unauthorized use of the lists invades the privacy of tribal members. Compounding this problem is that in January 1991 there was an unauthorized survey of Chickasaw voters by a university researcher. The Nation notified the individual to cease and desist and he did so. If voter research is to be done in the Chickasaw Nation, the research would have to be a joint venture between the Nation and the researcher. This would allow the Nation to control access to tribal members while still allowing the data needed for the research to be collected. As serious as the barriers to research of tribal elections may be, the need for such research in Oklahoma is unquestioned if we are to understand the electoral behavior of this important minority political group.

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VITAL STATISTICS ON OKLAHOMA POLITICS

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This section of Oklahoma Politics presents Oklahoma political data of interest to teachers and scholars. Here we examine the results of a survey of candidates for the state legislature conducted by the Carl Albert Center at the University of Oklahoma. The principle investigators are Gary Copeland, Jonathan Mott, and J. David Rausch.¹ The survey was conducted as part of an on-going project with a primary interest in how and when term limitations begin to influence the decisions and career calculations of the politically ambitious in our state. Conducted in the Fall of 1992, the survey respondents were among the first group of candidates who ran for state legislative office knowing that they would be affected by term limitations.

The survey was sent to all 278 candidates for the state legislature – 110 incumbents and 168 challengers. The survey instruments for incumbents and challengers were substantively identical, but there were slight differences in wording reflecting an awareness of previous service and previous campaign experience for incumbents. An initial mailing was conducted in August, prior to the primary election. There was a follow-up mailing in mid-September. Sixty surveys were returned for a response rate of about 22 percent. The response rate is not as high as one might hope, but considering it was conducted in the midst of the campaign with its alternative demands and political paranoia, the rate is satisfactory. Further, as will be shown below, the responses seem to reflect the population in the most obvious ways.

POPULATION COMPARISON FOR SAMPLE

Table 1 indicates that the sample reasonably approximates the population. There is essentially no bias when comparing whether the sample reflects the appropriate proportion of House as opposed to Senate candidates. The sample does appear to have a marginally low response rate for Republicans. It also over-samples incumbents as 47 percent of the respondents are incumbents. Other

data, not shown, indicate that 20 percent of the sampled respondents were in uncontested races and 18 percent were running for an open seat. Two percent of respondents are women and 4 percent are non-white. The average age of respondents is 49.3.

TABLE 1

Comparison of Candidate Sample and Population

	Candidate Population	Candidate Sample
Chamber		
House	77%	78%
Senate	23%	22%
Total	100%	100%
n =	(278)	(60)
Party		
Democrat	62%	72%
Republican	38%	28%
Total	100%	100%
n =	(278)	(60)

WHO ARE THE CANDIDATES?

The candidates are a diverse group. A sizeable percentage of candidates have a graduate degree, but a small percentage never moved beyond high school. Incomes range from poor to wealthy. Eight percent of the respondents have family incomes of over \$100,000 and 3 percent consider themselves to be "upper class". There are also a substantial number of political neophytes involved in state legislative politics. Only 20 percent said their parents were active in politics and 30 percent had never run for office before. Among the non-incumbents, more than 53 percent were first-time candidates.

TABLE 2
Respondent Candidate Backgrounds

	All-% (n=60)	Incumbents-% (n=28)	Challengers-% (n=32)
What was the last level of school you completed?			
Some high school	0.0	0.0	0.0
High school diploma	5.0	7.2	3.1
Some college	25.0	25.0	25.0
College degree	25.0	28.6	21.9
Some grad school	8.3	7.1	9.4
Graduate degree	36.7	32.1	40.6
What is your occupation?			
Attorney	15.0	10.6	18.7
Rancher/Farmer	11.7	14.3	9.3
Business	25.0	39.3	12.4
Teacher	6.7	3.6	9.4
Petroleum industry	3.3	0.0	6.3
Insurance	3.3	0.0	6.3
Retired	5.0	0.0	9.4
Politician	10.0	14.3	6.3
Other	20.0	17.9	21.9
What is your annual family income?			
Less than \$10,000	1.7	0.0	3.1
\$10,001-\$20,000	1.7	0.0	3.1
\$20,001-\$30,000	6.7	3.6	9.4
\$30,001-\$40,000	16.6	7.1	25.0
\$40,001-\$50,000	23.3	28.6	18.7
\$50,001-\$70,000	28.3	32.2	25.0
70,001-\$100,000	13.4	21.4	6.3
more than \$100,000	8.3	7.1	9.4
Economically, do you think of yourself as:			
Lower class	0.0	0.0	0.0
Working class	16.6	25.0	9.4
Middle class	60.0	50.0	68.7
Upper-middle class	20.0	25.0	15.6
Upper class	3.4	0.0	6.3
Were your parents active in politics?			
yes	20.0	17.9	21.9
no	80.0	82.1	78.1
Before this campaign, had you ever run for political office?			
yes	70.0	96.4	46.9
no	30.0	3.6	53.1

WHAT ARE THE POLITICS OF THE CANDIDATES?

An examination of the politics of the candidates shows a decidedly conservative group. Fifty-four percent considered themselves to be moderately or strongly conservative. Incumbents are even more conservative than challengers. The candidates are also primarily concerned about pocket book issues such as the budget, health care and the economy. But, incumbents seem to have a more practical view of the key issues than do challengers – more often citing the budget and health care issues. Not surprisingly, they all tend to think the legislature is the branch of government best suited to address these issues.

TABLE 3

Candidate Politics

	All-%	Incumbents-%	Challengers-%
Generally Speaking, do you consider yourself to be:			
Strong liberal	1.7	0.0	3.2
Moderate liberal	6.8	10.7	3.3
Moderate	37.3	28.6	45.2
Moderate conservative	42.4	46.4	38.7
Strong conservative	11.8	14.3	9.6
n =	59	28	31
What is the most important issue facing state legislators in the 1990s? (first response)			
Budget	32.1	39.2	26.7
Health care	16.9	25.0	10.0
Education	6.8	3.6	10.0
Corrections	1.7	3.6	0.0
Economy	15.3	10.7	20.0
Other	23.7	17.9	30.0
Don't know	1.7	0.0	3.3
n =	59	28	30

(continued)

TABLE 3 (con't)

Candidate Politics

	All-%	Incumbents-%	Challengers-%
What is the most important issue facing state legislators in the 1990s? (second response)			
Budget	22.2	28.6	15.4
Health care	7.4	14.2	0.0
Education	14.8	7.2	23.1
Corrections	11.1	14.2	7.7
Economy	18.6	0.0	38.5
Other	25.9	35.8	15.3
Don't know	0.0	0.0	0.0
n =	27	14	13
Which branch of government should we look to first to solve the state's problems?			
Judiciary	5.1	7.4	3.1
Executive	11.9	11.1	12.5
Legislative	83.0	81.5	84.4
n =	59	27	32

WHAT THE CANDIDATES THINK ABOUT CAREERS AND TERM LIMITS

Many of the candidates in the survey have clear political ambitions (over 85 percent would run again if elected and nearly half have considered running for higher office) and tend to be less supportive of term limits than is the typical citizen of the state (Table 4). Nearly half would support the removal of term limits and even more do not consider twelve years too long of a limit if there is to be one. Still, few considered term limits to be a factor in their decision to seek election to the legislature.

TABLE 4
Candidate Views on Term Limits

	All -%	Incumbents-%	Challengers-%
If you are elected, do you plan on running for this office again			
Yes	85.5	91.3	81.3
No	14.5	8.7	18.7
n =	55	23	32
Have you considered running for higher office after you leave the legislature?			
Yes	44.6	62.5	31.3
No	55.4	37.5	68.7
n =	56	24	32
How long do you plan on staying in office?			
One term	5.1	0.0	9.4
Two terms	6.8	3.7	9.4
Three terms	10.2	11.1	9.4
Four terms	15.3	14.8	15.5
Five terms	5.1	0.0	9.4
Six terms (limit)	18.6	18.5	18.8
Don't know	3.4	3.7	3.1
As long as possible	35.5	48.2	25.0
n =	59	28	32
If there were no limit on the number of terms you could serve how long would you stay in office?			
One term	1.7	0.0	3.1
Two terms	1.7	0.0	3.1
Three terms	11.8	7.4	15.6
Four terms	16.9	14.8	18.8
Five terms	6.8	3.7	9.4
Six terms (limit)	15.3	14.8	15.6
Don't know	5.1	7.4	3.1
As long as possible	40.7	51.9	31.3
n =	59	27	32

(continued)

TABLE 4 (con't)

Candidate Views on Term Limits

	All -%	Incumbents-%	Challengers-%
How much of a role did the existence of term limits in Oklahoma play in your decision to run for office? (if incumbent, run again)			
Very important	3.3	7.1	0.0
Somewhat important	5.0	3.6	6.3
Not much at all	91.7	89.3	93.7
n =	60	28	32
Would you support or oppose a measure to remove limits on state legislators' terms.			
Strongly oppose	33.4	21.4	43.8
Somewhat oppose	6.7	7.1	6.3
No opinion	13.3	14.3	12.5
Somewhat support	23.3	25.1	21.8
Strongly support	23.3	32.1	15.6
n =	60	28	32
Do you agree that Oklahoma's limit of 12 years of service in the legislature is still too long for a legislator to serve?			
Strongly agree	6.7	0.0	12.5
Somewhat agree	15.0	3.6	25.0
No opinion	15.0	7.1	21.9
Somewhat disagree	18.3	21.4	15.6
Strongly disagree	45.0	67.9	25.0
n =	60	28	32

CONCLUSION

This set of tables provides some insights into who in the State of Oklahoma becomes a candidate for legislative office. They are, of course, atypical. The minute they decide to run for office, they become unlike the rest of the citizens in the state. But, given that conclusion, we are as struck by the diversity of the candidates as by the fact that they are atypical. These candidates reflect a view that elective office in this state is not closed to an ascribed elite but is available to those who seek it.

NOTES

1. The editors of this section greatly appreciate the willingness of Jonathan Mott, J. David Rausch, and the Carl Albert Center to share their data. We also appreciate the cooperation and efforts of Jonathan Mott in the preparation of the data for presentation. Errors in the interpretation of the data are, of course, the responsibility of the editors.

BOOK REVIEW ESSAY

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Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on School Governance, *Facing The Challenge* (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1992) pp. 130. \$9.95 ISBN 0-87078-337-8.

Danzberger, Jacqueline P.; Michael W. Kerst; and Michael D. Usdan *Governing Public Schools* (Washington, D.C.: The Institute for Educational Leadership, Inc., 1992) pp. 108. \$9.95 ISBN 0-937846-56-2.

Education reform has been on policy agendas in the U.S. and Oklahoma for a decade. Yet school boards have been conspicuously absent from discussion. One will get well into the famous *A Nation At Risk* report before finding the word “board” linked to “school” and can count total references to boards without getting much onto one’s toes. Similarly, the Oklahoma Educational Reform and Revenue Act of 1990 (H.B. 1017) deals only cursorily with boards and their activities. Yet, if education reform is to be successful, here or nationally, school boards, or realistic alternatives to them, must be addressed. To that end, two recent books from think tanks have offered analyses of boards and their future – The Twentieth Century Fund’s Task Force on School Governance’s *Facing the Challenge* and the Institute for Educational Leadership’s (IEL) *Governing Public Schools*.

Facing The Challenge is actually two reports – the task force’s summary report and a background paper by Jacqueline Danzberger, a co-author of *Governing Public Schools*. The task force’s view of school boards is simple: while some have been desirable models, the average school board is an “obstacle to – rather than a force for – fundamental education reform” (p. 2). The authors explicitly eschew a “one best way” approach and recommend diverse alternatives to boards popular in the current literature: (1) charter schools, (2) competitive contracted management, (3) merger with children’s policy boards or into general purpose local government, (4) site-based school management, (5) elected local school committees, and even (6) state-run schools.

The reader will find an excellent introduction to the arguments for and against continuing traditional board governance. If current boards are retained, the task force recommends their transformation into "policy boards instead of [the presently common] collective management committees" (p. 5). This means that boards should "establish policy and provide policy oversight, not... implement policy in detail" (p. 9). Two sets of actors exacerbate the overwhelming management perspective and complicate adoption of the desired policy emphasis – superintendents and state governments. According to the task force, the system today allows administrators to "control" policy through detail and information overload, a tendency trained specifically into these administrators in schools of education. Similarly, states overregulate, in the task force's view, and need instead to set performance criteria to maintain accountability while permitting districts to pursue their own paths to reaching them.

The task force's recommendations have varying degrees of feasibility. It wants board elections to be held in conjunction with general elections to increase participation and recommends holding election results invalid if fewer than 20 percent of those eligible participate. For large city districts, it prefers a closer relationship between boards and local governments, appointment of board members by the mayor rather than election, and mixture of at-large and district-based elections to ensure representativeness of districts.

Danzberger's fuller background paper is a good statement of the philosophy and history of school boards, particularly their roles (or lack of) in the two "waves" of education reform in the 1980s-90s. She also well documents the development of the superintendency and the IEL's 1986 study of school boards as a crash course for education policy enthusiasts. Her description of state involvement with boards and the attendant difficulties will be familiar to students of decentralization and centralization issues generally and federalism particularly.

Danzberger argues strongly for "putting governance on the national education reform agenda" (p. 27) and blasts state policy-makers for criticizing boards and their members while avoiding "discussion about possible changes in the governance structure" or "initiatives to strengthen the current system..." (p. 39). She is also mildly critical of state board associations which responded to the reform challenges with "programs of workshops to 'certify' board members" which "have not generally made use of external analysis of governance issues" and "continue to focus on individual members, not school boards as corporate governing bodies" (p. 39).

According to Danzberger, boards are responsible for the governing (but not managing) the system and responsible to the general public rather than subgroups. Students are their central focus and are obligated to assess their own

ability and performance. Most citizens judge their local boards as good, as do the boards themselves, as demonstrated in the 1986 IEL study. Boards, however, admit relative failure at what the task force sees as their basic job. They feel too much time is spent on governance and not enough on policymaking or oversight, with urban boards describing themselves most negatively.

One reason for that perception is the inherently tense relationship between the board and the superintendent and the still-prominent “politics-administration dichotomy” at the center of it. Again, schools of education are maligned for perpetuating the dichotomy myth, but the boards and administrators are also faulted for failure to adapt “to new demands and the fraying of the boundaries of responsibility” (p. 74). No “one best way” exists to structure the relationship; it is a function of “the nature of each party’s conduct of its role, the condition of its district, the dynamics of community relations, and other political and environmental variables” (p. 78). It also results from the issues of information flow and access that can dissolve trust or promote unhealthy dependence of the board on chief administrators. Indeed, resolving information problems is seen as fundamental to effective board-superintendent performances.

Danzberger follows with examination of the following institutional problems facing school boards: (1) uncertain board relationships with the various publics they represent, (2) American distrust of intellectualism, (3) changing demographics, such as children’s diverse cultural and socioeconomic backgrounds and their declining proportion of the population, and (4) American expectations of “quick fixes” to solve education problems. She proposes these board reforms: (1) improvement of qualifications for board service, (2) election of boards through political parties, (3) linkage of educational and general service government, (4) continuing board assessment and development, and (5) new labor-management models for discussion and implementation of education reform.

Danzberger also recommends that state governments: (1) remove boards’ quasi-judicial responsibilities, (2) institute collective bargaining and state salary schedules, (3) direct assistance to strengthen local governance, (4) establish state-appointed masters to assist school districts, and (5) create state-local working partnerships for educational reforms. She concludes with a brief discussion of alternatives to school boards similar to those suggested by the task force.

The IEL report is similar to the task force’s, unsurprisingly given the shared co-author. Still, while echoing background and recommendations, it adds to and aids our understanding of boards’ environments. It focuses more on (1) national policy; (2) specific examples of good districts and efforts, including Kentucky’s on-going state reform and Chicago’s tenuous decentralization; (3) comparative examples from Canada, Great Britain, and Japan; and (4) in-depth review of the IEL 1986 study of boards, including useful survey data missing from the task

force's brief references. Combined with the first report, it provides laymen a full picture of school boards, what is happening to them and their worlds, and what alternatives and reforms are available and possible in this crucial period of education reform, nationally and in Oklahoma.

As a eight-year member of the Weatherford School Board and the Oklahoma State School Boards Association (OSSBA), I read these books with more than academic interest. As Oklahoma has been very aggressive in school reform, another means of analyzing these works is to examine their applicability to the situation both in my district and in the state as well given my experience with the reform effort thus far.

Despite Oklahoma's progress in education reform, most of the proposals advanced in these books remain unachieved, unconsidered, and unlikely in the near term. H.B. 1017 and other related recent legislation have indeed updated a few items regarding board members, such as requiring high school diplomas and more OSSBA workshop hours. However, these reforms are superficial. OSSBA workshops, for example, focus heavily on management problems and procedures and rarely deal with the policy-making roles of board members. At best, the OSSBA has set itself up to be irrelevant in Oklahoma education reform.

The OSSBA admonishes board member policy activity outside board meetings and against challenge of what it perceives as legitimate superintendent actions. This is stressed in all the workshops. The best that can be said for the board member model advocated by the OSSBA is that the member will not get in the way of enlightened administrators. That does not bode well for developing the kinds of boards proposed in the reports.

Inadequate preparation of teachers and administrators for the reforms proposed is another concern of the reports applicable to Oklahoma. Oklahoma's schools of education do little to prepare future practitioners for dealing with parents, volunteers, reform, and change in general, or even school boards and their roles. Even the new requirement that schools of education prepare graduates for outcomes-based techniques starting in 1995 is limited to one area of the wide range of proposed reforms and unlikely to have a positive effect until the next century.

There is as yet little reason to see professional educators in Oklahoma as anxious to have boards playing the active role advocated in these reports. It might interfere with academic freedom and the nuances and needs of individual classes and classrooms. "Top-down" direction by boards without extensive involvement of those affected casts doubt on any lasting large-scale effect of education reform. More consideration of the importance and means for such input is essential.

Finally, probably the biggest problem with the reports and with Oklahoma's reform effort is the lack of institutional mechanisms to implement the highly touted increased public involvement and input in school improvement. Everyone talks about "forums", and "surveys", but few mechanisms are available to translate public preferences into meaningful district action or to connect the public to actual school policy. Again, many schools frown on outside interference, and many which do not nevertheless have few models to follow.

In the end, these two books are applicable to Oklahoma's situation and thus useful for students of Oklahoma government or education policy, but with a considerable gap between report recommendation and Oklahoma reality. As nationally, Oklahoma's reforms have been sought and attained conspicuously without much involvement of or need for its school boards. Oklahoma, in the forefront of education reform, has or will have all the problems discussed in the reports. As a consequence, Oklahoma must pay heed to suggestions for resolution if the reforms of H.B. 1017 and other legislation are not to fail due to the failure of the bodies governing the reforms.

David R. Morgan, Robert E. England and George G. Humphreys, *Oklahoma Politics and Policies: Governing the Sooner State* (Lincoln: The University of Nebraska Press, 1991) pp. 263. \$15.95 ISBN 0-8032-8136-6

Oklahoma Politics and Policies is designed to provide a broad survey of Oklahoma political history and to provide an introduction to the government of our state. It is written by two veteran professors of political science, David R. Morgan from the University of Oklahoma and Robert E. England, a professor of political science at Oklahoma State University. A third author, George G. Humphreys, is the research director of the Oklahoma House of Representatives and is well recognized as a quality practitioner of state government. This book fills a void that has existed for a general public review of Oklahoma politics and governmental processes. As such, it will serve as entertaining reading for the general Oklahoma public and as a valuable reference for the expert. This book is particularly strong in providing a survey of the contradictions that have been built into our state. As one of the last places of major settlement of the frontier, Oklahoma brought together in one state elements that represented the whole diversity of America. The origins of early settlers can be transparently seen in ways as obvious as the names of Oklahoma counties: Republican counties in the northern part of the state that were named after Republican presidents favored by the northern settlers such as Grant and Garfield; and, Democratic counties in the southern part of the state named after presidents favored by the southern Democratic settlers such as Jefferson and Jackson. The names of Indian tribes resettled to Oklahoma from other places are also well reported, as well as the names of the economic interests of the settlers (Coal, Cotton, Alfalfa, etc.). Oklahoma was not only the product of a rapid assembling of disparate people but Oklahoma, as a state, experienced the strongest federal role in its early history. All of these factors combined with the economic ups and downs of our state provided an early history that was often tumultuous and almost always quite colorful.

For most of us *Oklahoma Politics and Policies* will be most enjoyable as it describes our early roots as a state and the fascinating experiences of these roots in agrarian radicalism and lively politics. Few Oklahomans today, who recognize their state to be Republican and conservative, can imagine that we were once a place that had a strong socialist movement. The socialist candidate for governor in 1914 received 20 percent of the vote, and socialists served in the state legislature and in local offices. In fact, Oklahoma had more registered socialist voters than the state of New York. But, while New York socialists were a product of the urban environment, the Oklahoma socialists were agrarian. It is difficult today to imagine that the same city that is now the home of the *Daily*

Oklahoman was once also the home of a prominent national socialist publication.

This book reminds Oklahomans that we do not have to look to our neighbor state south of the Red River to define an entertaining heritage of political color. As we are reminded of Jack Walton and other impeached governors, of Alfalfa "Bill" Murray and of the strong role of the Ku Klux Klan, we can see that our own state's history provides a truly Oklahoma contribution to the idiosyncratic episodes of American state government.

As Oklahoma emerged into the mainstream of the country following World War II, our politics settled down to a slower rate of change and we saw fewer excesses of political showmanship. Governor Robert Kerr, as the book reminds us, typified the transition to a more settled and more traditional pattern of development. In contemporary government *Oklahoma Politics and Policies* analyzes the legislative and executive roles of state government, as well as the organization of counties and municipal government in Oklahoma. As someone who was a participant at the capitol for much of recent political history and was a first-hand participant in many of the things described by this book, I regret that little academic attention (in this book or elsewhere) has been given to the dynamics of legislative – gubernatorial relationships. Oklahoma, it seems to me, has had very little of the kind of gubernatorial leadership that was envisioned under the form of government in contemporary history. This has not always been bad and is not intended as a criticism of any particular governor, but it has meant that the roles of the branches of government have had to perform differently than classic textbooks described. The legislative branch has more often in recent years been thrust into leadership responsibilities that were structurally difficult for a legislative body to perform. Management of the most interesting aspects of modern Oklahoma government and politics as they have shaped public policies, in my opinion, revolves around the effects of how actual legislative–gubernatorial roles have been played compared to the way in which the structure of our government envisions them. Perhaps this will be a good study for future political scientists.

This is an excellent book that I am comfortable recommending to the enjoyment of any Oklahoman. We are now old enough as a state to look back and find the lessons of our history. We are fortunate in Oklahoma to be inheritors of a wonderful history that is a worthy study in American development.

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John George and Laid Wilcox, *Nazis, Communists, Klansmen, and Others on the Fringe: Political Extremism in America*. (New York: Prometheus Books, 1992) pp.523. \$27.95 ISBN 0879756802

The many faces of extremism evoke great emotion within American political life. The contentious debates between the left and the right and the attempt by those in the middle to understand the beliefs and actions of those on the edges of the ideological spectrum require objective analysis by scholars who can cut through the rhetoric that obscures understanding “True Believers.” John George, a professor of Political Science at The University of Central Oklahoma and Laid Wilcox, the founder of the Wilcox Collection of Contemporary Political Movements, have combined their long-term interest and impressive research to give the reader a road map to, and detailed guide of, American extremist groups.

After a succinct overview of the long history of American extremism, Wilcox provides an excellent conceptualization on what constitutes extremism. He makes a telling case for the view that “extremism is more an issue of style than content” (p. 54). In so doing, he underscores the commonality that exists between both extremes of the political spectrum. He then provides a cogent discussion of the major traits of extremism – a virtual check list that can be used by students wanting to identify and achieve a basic understanding of individuals and groups on the extreme left and right. George further refines the major characteristics of extremist groups, contending that they would subvert the basic principles of the Constitution in an attempt to impose their values on American society.

The authors provide a fine survey of the literature which seeks to explain the motivation among those who join extremist movements and organizations. They are circumspect in seeking simplistic answers for the motivation and “. . . tend to view the existence of an extremist-prone personality as a more reasonable hypothesis than attempts to account for the ‘pathology’ of a particular point of view” (p. 72). In viewing extremist motivation in this manner they are careful not to simply label extremism as a form of a political disease. They “posit the notion that extremists are potentially useful, usually of little consequence, and rarely dangerous” (p. 72). The motivation theories behind extremism is summarized as is the major conspiracies theories that form the foundation for the world view of various extremist groups. The summary will be of particular use to those interested in the development of social and political movements.

In Part II, *The Far Left*, George and Wilcox describe the evolution of Marxism-Leninism in the United States. They are sensitive to the fact that organizations subscribing to Marxist now face the task of adjusting their beliefs to the post-Cold War era. The authors’ readable and well documented description of groups, ranging from the Communist Party to the Black Panthers, offers an

insightful walk through the landscape of the contemporary left. They effectively lead the reader through the schisms, fragmentations, and personality conflicts that have characterized highly diverse groups. George and Wilcox's analysis of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) will be of particular interest for those students and faculty who experienced the campus turmoil of the 60s and 70s. The authors note that the legacy of these groups continues today for a number of these former radicals have fueled "the trend for authoritarianism on some campuses" under the banner of "political correctness" (p. 162).

Part III, *The Far Right*, also enables the reader to have the opportunity to understand the development of those individuals and groups who, under the call for "core values" of individualism, capitalism, religiosity and nationalism, have sought to impose their own agenda on the American political and social environment. George and Wilcox describe those, who by the force of their personalities, astute political manipulation, and clever use of television, have sought to achieve their own version of Utopia. The discussion of Billy James Hargis and the Christian Crusade, and Robert Welch and the John Birch Society should serve to remind us that the merchants of fear and conspiracy, however outlandish many of their claims, spread their own form of rhetorical terrorism. At their zenith, they hit a resonant chord among those who were gripped by the paranoia that surrounded the coldest days of the Cold War. Chapter 31: *The LaRouche Network* is a treatment of a personality and group that could not easily be ideologically labeled.

The authors' treatment of The Jewish Defense League, the Nation of Islam, various neo-Nazi Groups, and the Klu Klux Klan, are a must to read for those who want to understand the history, tactics, and dynamics of organizations using racism and violence in pursuit of intolerance.

The appendices will be of use to the student of extremism. The section on fake quotes and documents follows in the tradition of John George's earlier co-authored book *They Never Said It*, (Oxford University Press, 1993). The section on characteristics of extremism will be useful for those wishing to chart future development on the far sides of the political spectrum.

Nazi, Communism, Klansmen and Others on the Fringe is an outstanding book. It should be in the library of, and required reading for, those who wish to understand forms of belief, organizations, and actions that will continue to challenge the political mainstream.

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Allen D. Hertzke, *Echoes of Discontent: Jesse Jackson, Pat Robertson, and the Resurgence of Populism* (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1993) pp. 293. \$29.95 ISBN 0871877449.

In this engaging and informative book, Allen Hertzke examines the protestations of Reverend Jesse Jackson and Reverend Pat Robertson over the existing state of affairs. Hertzke's thesis is that both ministers, despite many obvious differences, propound a very similar populist message in the tradition of William Jennings Bryan – a combination of "political progressivism and moral traditionalism" (p.45).

Both men attack societal elites for practicing economic exploitation and for fostering moral degeneracy, albeit aim at different targets: Jackson concentrates his fire on the way that the rich treat the poor, and on social issues like drug abuse, while Robertson focuses on bankers and financiers, along with cultural issues like abortion and pornography. Those few examples oversimplify the author's sophisticated rendition, which plausibly sets many issues in the context of a populist framework.

The author brings many sources of information to bear. He conducted personal interviews with Jackson and Robertson, traveled to national and state party meetings where he interviewed their aides and supporters, and analyzed 1988 National Election Study and Super Tuesday data. He weaves those materials together nicely, stepping in to make detailed observations about presidential and party politics, and stepping back to theorize about philosophical issues, such as the degree of communitarianism versus individualism in modern life. The result is an enjoyable read, especially for those who seek a book that treats the concerns of Jackson and Robertson seriously.

The information of greatest interest to political scientists is found in chapters 4-6. Earlier chapters mostly lay out the book's theme, provide an historical overview of populism, and trace its message up to Jackson and Robertson. Chapter 4 focuses on the role of black and evangelical churches in mobilizing voters for their chosen candidate during the 1988 presidential campaign. The chapter is full of information that will interest scholars of religion and politics; those studying political parties will learn from its detailed discussion of the controversial Michigan caucuses, and from its examination of the church rather than the party as the focal point for organizing precincts. Chapter 5 focuses on the assimilation of Jackson and Robertson activists into respectively, the Democratic and Republican parties. A particularly interesting dimension is the awkward relationship that existed between the national Democratic Party and Jesse Jackson, but the relatively harmonious interaction at state and local levels, which was opposite for Robertson and the GOP. Chapter 6 compares the characteris

tics and opinions of Jackson and Robertson supporters, principally through percentage differences in 1988 NES data. It reports some striking findings: the deep suspicion of Jackson and Robertson supporters toward elites; the relatively positive view that each minister and his supporters hold toward the other; the overwhelmingly female composition of each minister's constituency. Hertzke also reports differences, which are pronounced, on issues such as abortion and feminism. Some of these findings warrant a rethinking of propositions that journalists report as fact, and require examination by students of voting behavior and public opinion.

As with any book, there is cause to quibble over some things. Chapter 3, for instance, treats the spiritual and political development of Jackson and Robertson. It offers psychological explanations that are plausible, but that may strike political scientists as rather interpretive. Chapter 7 contains almost all of the criticism of both ministers, thereby preventing the reader from receiving a different perspective on their message and conduct until the waning pages of the book. There are also instances where further discussion is probably warranted. What are the implications for the populist thesis, given Robertson's resistance to the label (p. 80)? How can Jackson and Robertson arrive at such different positions on most public policy issues, if they share a common populist heritage?

Those criticisms and questions are at the periphery; at the core is a solid contribution to the literature. Hertzke provides a framework for understanding the message and political campaigns of Jesse Jackson and Pat Robertson in 1988, and a means for assessing the candidates and issues of the early 1990s. The book went to press before Ross Perot's candidacy fully blossomed, but given Hertzke's comments in the final chapter, he had to be among the least surprised observers about its contours. He demonstrates a depth of understanding about the intersection of politics and culture that few can match, and this book shows it.

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Harry Holloway with Frank S. Meyers. *Bad Times for Good Ol' Boys: The Oklahoma County Commissioner Scandal*. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993) \$24.95 ISBN 0806125489

With Bad Times for Good Ol' Boys, Holloway and Meyers have hit an outstanding triple play. First, they have advanced corruption studies by applying method and theory to an actual situation of widespread corruption. The strengths of various corruption theories are discussed and tested against the backdrop of the Oklahoma case. Of special note is the way the authors attempt to bring the study of corruption away from the world of speculation to the testing of generalizations with empirical evidence. They use survey research analysis, for example, to examine the thesis that government corruption in Oklahoma is caused by a corrupt political culture. Secondly, the authors have greatly advanced the study of Oklahoma government and politics. As we all know, there is not a lot of political science scholarship on Oklahoma government and politics. This book does much to fill that void. A reading of the book gives one a feel for the way the art of government is practiced in Oklahoma. In addition to learning about reform and scandal in state politics we are introduced to the central role of the governor, the legislature-local government nexus, the role of lobbies (including the county lobby), and the often central role of the media, especially the metropolitan press. One central thing we learn about state politics is that some things are very hard to reform, and county government heads the list. Thirdly, this study solidly advances our knowledge about county government, an area of government that has been generally neglected in the political science literature. What comes through in the study is the importance of county government, both in terms of function and dollars spent. The reader gets a good feel for both the formal and informal aspects of governmental operations at this level. This book is an important contribution to political science generally and several subfields specifically.

The book is organized into seven well-arranged chapters, each building on what precedes. Chapters 1, 2, and 3 deal with the eruption of the scandal, corruption theory, and a review of Oklahoma's "dark past." Chapters 4, 5, and 6 treat Oklahoma demographics and opinion, the operation of county government institutions, and compares attitudes of commissioners and the public. The last chapter sums up Okscam (the Oklahoma county commissioner scandal), articulates the theories of political ecology and agrarian populism, and applies these theories to the recent referendum on education bonds. These chapters very much "hang together" and they provide the reader with a smooth transition from one idea to another.

As with all studies, there are some possible points of disagreement. The authors essentially conclude that the "corrupt culture thesis does not stand up" as a cause of Okscam, and it is clear that elite and mass surveys in the study fail to reveal extensive corruption as an attitude structure. This reviewer would not so easily dismiss the cultural thesis for several reasons, however. For one, sur-

vey analysis of contemporary elites and masses may not capture the full impact of political culture in Oklahoma. Respondents may, for example, "inflate" their morality when reacting to "good-bad" scales of attitudes. Also, one can assume that political culture in Oklahoma has changed since statehood. (Is it possible that if one could go back in time, one would find both an elite and mass political culture more supportive of corruption?) When did Okscam begin? No one seems to know exactly, but it probably goes far back into the state's past. Oklahoma has undergone considerable modernization and urbanization since World War II, and these changes have caused vast changes in political attitudes and political culture. Recent surveys may pick up these new attitudes but they may tell us very little about the state's "dark past." Political culture is also more than public opinion. Part of political culture is the set of subtle arrangements and agreements between the public and its leadership class. In a moralistic culture, a public office is seen as a public trust not to be broken, whereas in an individualistic culture a public office is seen as another business opportunity. In one culture, the public is capable of enforcing ethical norms, in the other there are lapses. The authors go to some lengths to chronicle official misdeeds in Oklahoma which have touched all branches and levels of government. In most cases the public has been unable (or unwilling) to demand and get better government. One might suggest that the relationship between leaders led in Oklahoma is somewhat weak when it comes to enforcing a concept of the public good. Is this not "political culture" as a variable, and is it not separate from institutional and structural variables? At the very least, the study should perhaps be more tentative about the role of political culture in the state.

In conclusion, the authors need to be given credit, not only for an excellent study, but also for their courage in doing the study at all. When academics take on government in their home state – and especially when the topic is widespread corruption – they are taking many possible risks. There have been instances in the past in which state and local government has been hostile to the scrutiny of scholarship. Hopefully times are changing in Oklahoma, and with that change we can see more scholarship of this quality.

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Henry Bellmon with Pat Bellmon, *The Life and Times of Henry Bellmon*. (Tulsa, Oklahoma: Council Oaks Books, 1992) pp.381. \$24.95 ISBN 093303147.

A day or two spent with Henry Bellmon's reminiscence of his 44 years in public service is the equivalent of taking a three-hour graduate course on Campaigns and Elections. Clearly, retrospection endows one with marvelous insights about whatever the matter at hand, but Bellmon's account of his various campaigns leaves little doubt that much of his success can be attributed to his innate sense of "politics." Presented in anecdotal fashion, the author reveals time and again that understanding and mastering the fundamentals is an imperative. How simple it is to walk the streets meeting the voters, but how important not to spend more than a few seconds before moving on. Or, who would naturally think to begin working a pool hall from the rear of the building rather than the front in order to avoid being waylaid by boozy conversationalists? Many are the lessons to be learned about the "art" of politics from this master practitioner.

But more than a political primer, the book is a catalogue of events that reveals how an ordinary American farmer responded to one of the most exciting and challenging periods in American history. In Bellmon's accounting, the ordinary becomes uncommon and the results are history.

Those who have had reason to observe Oklahoma politics over the years are familiar with Henry Bellmon, and although constituent enthusiasm for his brand of representation may have been seriously challenged on occasion, most can agree that his hallmark has been his integrity. In this book his character is more fully revealed by the stories he tells, and as he does so, a personality emerges that enables the reader to better understand the motivation that powered his most controversial choices.

Bellmon's wartime experiences were paramount in the development of his interest in elective office. The juxtaposition of killing Japanese on Iwo Jima one week and fraternizing with them in Hawaii the next cast the concept of war in such a bizarre light that he was never able to get over the senselessness of the military solution. This experience contributed to the development of a sense of fairness that is revealed often as he recounts the subsequent events of his life.

Returning to Oklahoma as a highly decorated marine officer, he was easily elected to the state house of representatives. Two years later, he was defeated because he failed to campaign for the seat he held. It was the only loss he ever sustained in his long career and one of the most important political lessons he ever learned.

When serving as Oklahoma's first Republican governor and the first Southern Republican governor elected since Reconstruction, his sense of fairness led him in the opposite direction of his party and most other Oklahomans as well.

He readily declared his support for the federal mandate to integrate the schools by busing students if, when, and where necessary. This position, repeated again on numerous occasions after Bellmon was elected to the U.S. Senate, was not popular with much of his constituency, but the forthrightness of his declaration inured to his benefit. He was reelected to the Senate by voters who said, "I don't always like his position, but at least I know where he stands."

Bellmon goes to great lengths to justify his vote on the Panama Canal protocols. It apparently was the one event in his career that made a greater impact on him than anything else and his feelings for it show through as he reprints for the reader his speech on the floor of the Senate. Here again, his thoughtful approach to making his decision focused on fairness and conflict resolution by peaceful means. Unfortunately, his constituents were not as concerned with peace and reason as Bellmon was and many considered his vote an act of treason.

Bellmon writes his memoirs in a Hubert Humphrey, "Happy Warrior" style. Can life be all that great? After 44 years of dealing with politicians at all levels of government, isn't there something mad, bad, or mean you would like to say? For instance, after confounding his constituents for the better part of his life, Bellmon is true to form by confusing his readers about his feelings for Ed Gaylord, publisher of the *Daily Oklahoman*. In his book, Bellmon tells us much about his friendship with Gaylord but fails to reveal how he really felt when Gaylord abused him unmercifully on his editorial pages for years.

On another occasion, Bellmon tells the story of his hairbreadth victory in the U.S. Senate race in 1974. After a lengthy court challenge by his opponent, followed by Senate consideration of the dispute, Bellmon won the race by one vote, which he attributes to Senator Lloyd Bentsen. His anger and dismay over the whole proceeding, mildly summed up in one word, "Baloney", is not convincing. If Senators Humphrey and Muskie had been more emphatically characterized by deleted expletives for their deceitful behavior, the reader could have experienced a greater level of edification and Bellmon would have been more believable.

Bellmon's relatively benign reaction, as recounted in these remarkable events, is a reflection of the manner in which he responded to most things. He rarely lost control of his temper. When confronted by disconcerting news, he would often just shake his head, ponder the information in a detached sort of way, and move on to the next subject.

In his final chapter entitled "Swan Song", Bellmon reminisces about President Bush's visit to the state during the campaign of 1992. It is a fitting, though melancholy, note on which to conclude the story of a distinguished political career. Bellmon, whose popularity has sagged under the burden of years of as-

suming controversial positions, was denied a place on the platform with the official presidential greeters, in spite of the fact that he was the Oklahoma State Chair of the Bush for President campaign two years earlier. Instead, he stands alone in a crowd of partisan enthusiasts, watching the congressman, senator, and candidate for governor – all of whom denied the Bush candidacy in its early days – posture for the cameras and crowd as they try to soak up as much reflected glory as they can. The hypocrisy of the moment is not lost on Bellmon as he considers the irony of it all. He concludes that he had been there too long, and leaves – the symbolic finale of his political career.

After all the anecdotes and riveting references to people and events long gone, Henry Bellmon offers advice on what it takes to serve the public. In his words,

“My own career has shown that it is not necessary for an individual to be rich, handsome, eloquent, famous, brilliant, charismatic, or clairvoyant to be elected and serve in high political office. What seems to be necessary is a common touch, a closet free of skeletons, an abundance of energy, the ability to communicate clearly and directly, a supportive family, and a wealth of friends. A refusal to be cowed by long odds helps, as does a sense of humility and a thick skin. Most of my political life, even in the midst of heated controversy, I have felt good about my involvement in politics and government. Sometimes I won; sometimes I lost; but on balance my sense of accomplishment greatly exceeds the frustrations... Its been a good forty-four years. At the same time I'm glad the phoniness is over for me and my family.”

As historical and political science literature, *The Life and Times of Henry Bellmon* should be required reading. It covers a period of nearly fifty years and sheds light on a raft of people, some forgotten and some still in power. It is a volume that is easily read and full of insights. However, other accounts of the Bellmon years must be added to the literature because this one autobiography simply does not do justice to the subject of Henry Bellmon: enduring, respected, public servant.

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REVIEWERS

The editors appreciate the careful reading and helpful comments of the following reviewers for this issue of OKLAHOMA POLITICS.

Gary Allison

Ed Brooks

Michael Connelly

Michael Hirlinger

Harry Holloway

George Largent

David Morgan

Brian Rader

Kirk Rodden

Phillip Simpson

Don Studlar

Gary Tompkins

Larkin Warner

David Weber

Mark Weinstein

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