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ARTICLES

BOOK REVIEW SECTION

A POLITICAL PARTICIPATION MODEL OF CITIZEN NIMBY OPPOSITION

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Why citizens choose to oppose sitings of noxious facilities in their communities is examined in a 1991 survey of Oklahoma adults' risk judgments. Regression models of both actual and hypothetical NIMBY-motivated political participation are tested. The composite risk-judgment component proves significantly related to NIMBY participation in both actual and hypothetical siting scenarios, but not in the same way. An important finding is that the existence of hypothetical bias in greenfield communities can invalidate survey findings conducted as part of community relations planning.

Nowhere has citizen involvement in local politics been more influential than in decisions concerning the siting of facilities that are perceived to pose a high risk to the community. Proposals to locate locally unwanted land uses (LULUs) such as radioactive waste repositories, hazardous waste disposal facilities, solid waste landfills, prisons, dams, nuclear power plants, roads, and even day care centers and senior citizen housing, have met with fierce citizen opposition (Davis 1993, 103-8; Lester and

Bowman 1983; Tener 1996; Wheeler 1994). Oklahoma's experience with hazardous waste controversies mirrors that of other states. An upsurge of citizen activism has been largely successful in preventing new facility sitings (Lawler, Focht and Hatley 1994). The so-called "NIMBY (not in my backyard) syndrome," a pattern of intense public opposition to local siting or operation of technologies and facilities perceived to be risky, has been a major obstacle to the development of new facilities (Dorshimer 1996; Fruedenburg and Pastor 1992; Hunter and Leyden 1995; Rabe 1994).

Some writers use the term "NIMBY" pejoratively to imply that virtually all opposition to LULUs is motivated by selfish parochialism (O'Looney 1995; Tener 1996; Wildavsky and Dake 1990.) Yet NIMBY activities may have positive results in blocking ill-conceived or uneconomic projects and inducing government decision-makers to be more sensitive to local opinion (Eckstein 1997;Gerrard 1994; Lake 1993; Rabe 1994). Nevertheless, NIMBY-induced public policy gridlock creates an incentive for the illegal dumping of hazardous waste, escalates treatment and disposal costs, and forces existing, often substandard, facilities to remain open longer. It also is a factor in the increasing difficulty that state and local governments have in successfully siting new prisons to relieve the chronic overcrowding of existing facilities. An answer to the NIMBY problem must be found to the question "what motivates NIMBY political behavior?"

The NIMBY phenomenon has been variously attributed to "chemophobic" misperceptions of actual risk (Kunreuther, Fitzgerald, and Aarts 1993; Visocki and Breman 1993), to outrage at having self and loved ones placed in jeopardy, and to "rational" calculations of localized risk in relation to diffuse national benefits (Kraft and Clary 1991; Sellers 1993). One study finds that the mobilization of citizens in NIMBY controversies is facilitated by the high cost of not acting, the low perceived cost of protesting, and the high probability of success (Hadden, Veillette and Brandt 1983). Other explanations center on the political process, citizen trust, and responsiveness of institutions (Hunter and Leyden 1995; Leroy and Nadler 1993, 103; Rabe 1994).

This study develops and tests a new model of NIMBY-motivated political participation that integrates political participation and risk perception theories in an effort to better explain this unique form of political participation. Major theories of political participation stress the

importance of socioeconomic status (Verba and Nie 1972), resource mobilization (Jenkins 1983; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tilly 1978), group identification (Smith 1985), grievance (Barnes and Kaase 1979; Muller and Jukam 1983), and a desire for individual or collective influence (Muller and Opp 1986). Yet these theories do not specifically address a dimension of motivation that appears to be prominent in NIMBY protests: the perception of unacceptable risk. Our study is designed to assess the ability of risk judgment variables to explain why citizens choose to oppose siting of risky facilities in their communities.

A RISK-BASED MODEL OF NIMBY-MOTIVATED POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

If citizens judge the risk posed to themselves and to their community by a government siting proposal as unacceptable, then, given sufficient resources, they will collectively act to oppose it. NIMBY-motivated political participation is caused by perceived risk, a sense of community, availability of social resources, as well as one's age, and race.

Following Verba and Nie (1972, 2), we define political participation as "those activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions they take." NIMBY-motivated participation is a type of political participation that aims at influencing decisions about the local siting of facilities that are generally considered "risky" or "noxious."

In their socioeconomic model of political participation, Verba and Nie (1972) identify two types of political activity: electoral (voting and campaigning) and non-electoral (communal and parochial). This study does not consider electoral political participation because NIMBY is rarely expressed in this arena. Non-electoral participation is aimed at directly influencing the decisions of government, and it is in this arena that NIMBY is manifested. Verba and Nie distinguish between two types of activist participants: communalists, who participate collectively in groups or who contact government alone but in the collective public interest; and parochialists, who engage in particularized citizen-initiated contacting for concerns limited to themselves or their family. Communalists and parochialists are both described in their model as non-conflictual, since they rarely take sides in a conflict.

Yet the NIMBY activist appears to be a unique form of participant not anticipated by Verba and Nie: a risk-averse activist. The NIMBY activist is best classified as an amalgam: a parochially-motivated communalist who participates in a conflictual setting. Mature NIMBY controversies tend to evolve by melding individual concerns into collective action (siting decisions ordinarily affect many citizens, spurring their collective effort to influence those decisions). In this respect, NIMBY participants resemble communalists. In other respects, NIMBY resembles parochial participation—they are often more motivated by concerns for the safety and welfare of themselves and their families than that of the community (Gunter and Finlay 1988). Unlike either communalists or parochialists, however, NIMBY activists are prone to conflictual participation: counter-participants are usually present. The unique nature of risk-averse activists is summarized in Table 1.

In our study, political participation includes both actual activities in opposition to real siting plans and hypothetical activities in opposition to fictitious siting plans described in scenarios. Both actual and hypothetical participation are included in this study partly as a measure of "hypothetical bias," which has been criticized in other studies of NIMBY

TABLE 1

Comparison of Ideal Types of Political Participants

Participant Type	Conflict Setting	Collective Action	Parochial Concern
Parochialist	No	No	Yes
Communalist	No	Yes	No
Risk Averse Activist	Yes	Yes	Yes

(Portney 1991). Hypotheticals lack the salience of real situations and thus may lead to different patterns of response. Since siting proponents will most likely target communities that have not previously experienced a siting controversy, hypothetical scenarios provide a means of assessing participatory attitudes in those communities most likely to be impacted by future siting decisions.

HYPOTHESIZED CAUSES OF NIMBY BEHAVIOR

The literature on risk perception and political participation is summarized below.

RISK JUDGMENT

Risk is a measure of the probability and severity of an adverse outcome (Regens, Dietz, and Rycroft 1983). This study defines risk judgment as citizens' subjective assessment of the acceptability of the imposition of potentially adverse consequences. Here, risk judgment is defined with a composite of: risk perception, risk (perception squared) coping, risk aversion, attitude strength, trust in government, and familiarity.

Risk Perception. Risk perception is the subjective process by which individuals estimate the extent of risk. The important role that citizen perceptions of risk play in NIMBY disputes has been supported by several studies (Armour 1991; Dear and Taylor 1982; Lake 1987; O'Hare 1977; Portney 1991). In these studies, cognitive psychologists have called attention to the influence of non-rational decision heuristics (rules of thumb) on subjective estimations of risk (Fischhoff et al. 1981; Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982; Slovic 1987). Risk perception factors and heuristics are important in understanding NIMBY behavior.

Coping. There is a limit to how much stress a citizen may productively tolerate. When a community stressor such as the risk of siting a hazardous waste facility is imposed on citizens of a community, those who perceive the risk as great may respond by switching to emotional or affective coping mechanisms, which may lead to disengagement from political participation (Bachrach and Zautra 1985; Brody 1988). Brody (1988) identifies a threshold that seems to separate

problem-oriented coping from emotion-oriented coping. At the threshold where increasingly perceived risk is too stressful to handle merely by political activity, the citizen will use the psychological defense mechanisms of emotional coping, such as minimization, escape, or denial. This will decrease political participation.

Risk Aversion. While not all NIMBY activists are necessarily risk avoiders, risk aversion is an important variable in siting controversies (O'Looney 1995, 297). Risk aversion is the psychological predisposition to avoid risk. Citizens may range from risk phobic, through risk tolerant, to risk seeking. The more risk averse an individual is toward a siting proposal, the more he or she would be politically motivated to oppose it.

Attitude Strength. In our NIMBY model, attitude strength conveys the intensity of citizen opposition to a government siting decision. Mohai (1985) shows that attitude strength correlates with political participation, though more weakly than do efficacy and resource availability. He views attitude strength as useful in discriminating between environmental and non-environmental activism. Likewise, our model includes a measure of risk attitude in order to discriminate between NIMBY-motivated participation and other types of participation.

Trust in Government. If citizens do not believe that governments can be trusted with protecting their communities and families from threats posed by risky facilities, they will be motivated to participate in NIMBY activity. Several studies confirm that NIMBY is heightened by low trust and confidence in governmental institutions (Flynn et al. 1992; Kasperson 1986; Kraft and Kraut 1985; Portney 1991; Slovic 1992). We hypothesize an inverse relationship between trust and NIMBY participation. Participation in NIMBY disputes will increase as trust in government to protect the community decreases.

Familiarity. Familiarity refers to the extent to which citizens become accustomed to risks through constant association or experience. Familiarity is one of the decision heuristics which cognitive psychologists find to be negatively related to risk, as acclimation lowers subjective levels of concern (Slovic, Fischhoff and Lichtenstein 1981).

SENSE OF COMMUNITY

Sense of community is a shared recognition of the value of the local society and one's contribution to it. Following Edelstein (1988), we expect that the more citizens believe their community has a stake in the outcome of the proposed siting, the more they will be motivated to oppose it. Besides including a composite measure of sense of community, our study also considers separately three components of sense of community: cohesiveness, rootedness, and social fabric.

Cohesiveness. Cohesiveness is the sense of solidarity resulting from group membership. Group membership is positively related to public participation (Verba and Nie 1972; Brown 1982; Peterson 1986). We expect group membership to increase the likelihood of NIMBY participation.

Rootedness. Rootedness refers to the depth of attachment to the community, measured by length of residence. Following McMillan and Chavis (1986), we hypothesize that rootedness exerts a strong positive influence on political participation.

Social Fabric. Social fabric denotes satisfaction with neighborhood quality. McMillan and Chavis (1986) found a strong positive correlation between social fabric and parochial participation, while Thomas (1982), Sharp (1984), and Hero (1986) found that the perception of neighborhood quality correlates negatively with parochial contacting behavior. We hypothesize a positive relationship between social fabric and NIMBY-motivated political participation.

POLITICAL RESOURCES

Political resources include any assets that directly increase actual or perceived influence in community decisions. Resource mobilization theory (Jenkins 1983; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tilly 1978) stresses the importance of political resources as a precondition and motivator for collective action. Following Verba and Nie (1972), perceived personal political efficacy and history of political participation are included in our model.

Perceived Personal Political Efficacy. The more politically efficacious one feels, the greater the likelihood of political participation

(Hirlinger 1992; Peterson 1986; Sharp 1982; Verba and Nie 1972). We expect a positive relationship between perceived personal political efficacy and NIMBY participation, once risk perception and risk aversion are controlled.

History of Political Participation. To account for the effect of general political activism on NIMBY participation, our model includes political participation history. While "first time" participants, like housewife Lois Gibbs of Love Canal, can become prominent leaders of NIMBY movements (Levine 1982), a history of political participation, such as voting, campaigning, protesting, and contacting government officials, is positively related to NIMBY participation.

NON-POLITICAL RESOURCES: SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS

The standard socioeconomic model of Verba and Nie (1972) shows socioeconomic status (SES) as a determinant of political participation through intervening civic orientations. SES appears to be a particularly reliable predictor of non-parochial participation (Hero 1986; Jacob 1972; Mladenka 1977; Sharp 1984; Verba and Nie 1972; Zuckerman and West 1985). It is a less consistent predictor of parochial participation (Brown 1982; Eisinger 1972; Sharp 1982). Vedlitz, Dyer and Durand (1980) found a negative relationship, while Hirlinger (1992) found no relationship. Perhaps, these discrepancies are the fact that after a certain income level is achieved, further gains may not lead to increases in parochial participation (Jones et al. 1977).

DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS

Age. Several studies show older people are more likely to engage in parochial participation (Brown and Coulter 1983; Hero 1986; Verba and Nie 1972), although younger people are more concerned with the environment (Buttel and Flinn 1978, 1974). The published research is not consistent, however. Samdahl and Robertson (1989) found that older people tend to be more environmentally activist, while Mohai (1985) found no relationship between age and environmental activism. Since NIMBY activism may reflect self-interest rather than a generalized

environmental concern, we expect a positive relationship between age and NIMBY-motivated participation.

Race. Although whites seem to be more likely than non-whites to initiate parochial political contacts (Eisinger 1972; Hero 1986; Hirlinger 1992; Jacob 1972; Thomas 1982), Verba and Nie (1972) found that blacks are more likely to participate in communal political action than whites of the same socioeconomic status. The disproportionately greater incidence of sitings of risky facilities in minority neighborhoods (Bullard 1990; Dick 1990) creates a potential for minority environmental activism. We expect non-whites of a given SES to be more likely than whites to be NIMBY activists.

NIMBY-MOTIVATED POLITICAL PARTICIPATION MODEL

Several related questions were used to tap the same general concept. Composite measures were developed for these items by converting the raw scores to z scores and summing the z scores of the different composited items. These composite measures were developed for NIMBY-motivated political participation, risk perception, trust in government, sense of community, personal political efficacy, history of political participation and socio-economic status.

NIMBY-motivated political participation, is measured in two ways: actual NIMBY participation and hypothetical participation. For actual participation, a composite measure was developed by summing the number of types of participation in which the respondents had engaged for each of three kinds of issues: a hazardous waste facility siting, a hazardous waste cleanup, and a prison siting. The five types of participation provided on the telephone survey instrument were: contacting a government official; signing a petition; speaking at a public hearing; joining a community organization; and participating in a public demonstration. The range of values for this variable is "0," no participation to "15," maximum participation. Of the 729 respondents who completed the survey, 132 indicated that they had experienced at least one of these potentially risky proposals.

Hypothetical NIMBY participation was similarly constructed. If respondents indicated that they had not experienced any of these

scenarios, they were asked what they would do in equivalent hypothetical scenarios. Scores for this measure could also vary from "0" to "15," with higher scores indicating greater levels of participation. In all, 597 respondents indicated that they had not experienced at least one of these three risky proposals.

Risk perception was measured by asking the survey respondents how much danger they believed each of the siting or cleanup scenarios posed to them and their families. A composite risk perception measure was developed by summing response values to three items concerning hazardous waste facility siting, hazardous substance cleanup that involved the on-site use of treatment technologies, and prison siting. A square of the risk perception term was used to capture the non-linear, parabolic (second degree) relationship postulated between risk perception and NIMBY-motivated political participation.

To assess risk aversion, three questions concerning respondents' willingness to engage in risky activity were included. A composite risk aversion score was computed by summing the values to these questions for each of the siting or cleanup scenarios.

In order to capture the variety of reasons that a citizen may elect to oppose hazardous waste and prison facility sitings and cleanup proposals that involved the use of on-site treatment technologies, our study includes a general measure of NIMBY attitude strength. Attitude strength was measured by asking respondents how strongly they had opposed or supported an actual siting or cleanup proposal for a hazardous waste facility and a prison facility siting. These responses were standardized and summed separately for actual and hypothetical NIMBY scenarios. Higher values represent greater opposition to the siting or cleanup proposals.

Trust in government was measured by asking respondents how much trust they had in federal, state and local governments to protect the public interest. An overall trust score was developed by summing the z-score transformations of the responses to the three governmental trust questions. Higher values in the composite score measure greater levels of trust in governmental institutions.

Two sets of items were included in the questionnaire to measure familiarity: one regarding present or past employment by a hazardous waste or prison facility, and another asking whether the respondent had ever lived within one-half mile of such facilities. Familiarity was treated

as a dichotomous variable in the regression equation: an affirmative answer to either question in any of the three scenarios resulted in a score of "1" and a negative answer to both questions was scored as "0."

Cohesion was measured by summing the number of groups to which respondents said they belonged, from three alternatives provided: service club, fraternal organization, and neighborhood organization. Rootedness was measured by the number of years that a respondent has lived in the community. Social fabric was measured by responses to a question concerning perception of neighborhood quality ranging from poor to excellent. A composite sense of community measure was developed by summing the z-score transformations of the responses. Higher values of the composite measure represent a greater sense of community.

Perceived efficacy was measured by asking respondents how much influence they believe they have over hazardous waste and prison facilities siting decisions and whether they would need an intermediary to exert influence on federal, state, and local units of government. A composite measure of efficacy was developed by summing the z-score transformations of the responses to these five items. The higher the composite score, the greater is the respondent's perceived efficacy.

History of political participation was measured by responses to questions concerning voting, campaigning, contacting, and protesting. A composite measure of this variable was constructed by summing z-score transformations of the responses to these questions. The more activities that a respondent engaged in, the greater the score assigned to the measure.

In this study, SES is a composite measure of income, educational level, and occupational prestige based on the Duncan socioeconomic index. This measure was developed by summing the z-score transformations of responses to these questions.

Age and race were addressed specifically in questionnaire items. Responses about race were categorized as a dichotomous variable in which non-whites were coded as "0" and whites as "1."

DATA AND METHODS

A 50-item pretested questionnaire was administered by telephone during October and November, 1991, by professionally trained interviewers. The survey population was defined as the adult resident population of Oklahoma. A stratified-by-county random sample of 801 residents was obtained by selecting non-commercial telephone numbers by random digit dialing from pre-selected exchanges. The survey was then administered to the first respondent in the household over 18 years of age who was a resident of the state. Usable data was obtained from 729 completed questionnaires, a 91 percent response rate.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

The hypothesized risk based model of NIMBY-motivated political participation was tested using multiple linear regression. The results for both actual NIMBY and hypothetical NIMBY participation are shown in Table 2.

We computed correlation coefficients among all possible pairs of variables in the NIMBY model. We used intercorrelations of 0.5 or higher as the test for multicolinearity. All interrelationships among independent variables included in our model were well below this threshold.

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN AN ACTUAL NIMBY DISPUTE

The equation for actual NIMBY participation is based on data from the 132 respondents who indicated that they had experienced a NIMBY dispute. The regression model explains 29 percent of the variation in actual NIMBY participation. Of the 13 variables tested, four reach statistical significance in actual NIMBY controversies, as shown in Table 2. The regression analysis supports the expectation that risk perception is an important influence on citizens' decisions to participate in NIMBY political activity. Those who perceive the facility as risky to themselves, family, or community are more likely to participate

TABLE 2

Multiple Regression Equations Predicting Actual and Hypothetical NIMBY-Motivated Political Participation[1]

Independent Variable	Actual NIMBY Participation (N = 132)		Hypothetical NIMBY Participation (N = 597)	
Risk Judgment				
Perceived Risk	0.99*	(0.72)	-0.01	(-0.03)
Perceived Risk Squared	-0.95*	(-0.06)	0.30	(0.06)
Risk Aversion	-0.09	(-0.06)	0.00	(0.01)
Trust in Government	-0.10	(-0.04)	-0.06	(-0.08)
Attitude Strength	0.06	(0.08)	0.08*	(0.19)
Familiarity	0.11	(0.30)	-0.12**	(-1.15)
Sense of Community	0.14	(0.10)	0.06	(0.14)
Political Resources				
Perceived Efficacy	0.27**	(0.09)	0.12**	(0.13)
Participation History	0.30**	(0.28)	0.12*	(0.36)
Non-Political Resources				
Socioeconomic Status (SES)	-0.18	(-0.11)	0.10*	(0.18)
SES^2	-0.07	(-0.02)	-0.02	(-0.01)
Demographic Characteristics				
Age	-1.97	(-0.01)	-0.16**	(-3.40)
Race	0.20	(0.07)	-0.07	(-0.99)
Constant	-0.63		8.77	
R^2	0.29		0.20	
Adj. R^2	0.21		0.18	
F	3.64		10.92	

[1]Equations show partial standardized regression coefficients, with unstandardized regression coefficients in parentheses.

*p < .05, **p < .01

SOURCE: Author's calculations from 1991 survey of Oklahoma adults.

than those who do not perceive an unacceptable risk, even when other factors are controlled.

Evidence of a threshold between problem-focused and emotion-focused coping is also verified. The positive relationship between NIMBY participation and risk perception, coupled with thenegative relationship between NIMBY participation and risk perception squared, support the expectation that citizens in actual NIMBY disputes will participate more as risk increases, but only up to a point. Beyond that point participation declines with further increases in perceived risk. This point, we surmise, represents the transition to affective coping styles.

The only other two variables to reach statistical significance are two social resource measures. Both perceived personal political efficacy and political participation history prove to exert a strong positive influence on actual NIMBY participation. Since NIMBY participation requires substantial initiative, citizens are more likely to participate if they believe they have a good chance of being successful and if they have been actively involved in the political process in the past. This finding supports the expectation that NIMBY is a resource-driven phenomenon. While the lack of significance of the other variables might be the result of inadequate measures, it is also possible that these variables are not important in actual NIMBY controversies.

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN A HYPOTHETICAL NIMBY DISPUTE

Our model explains twenty percent of the variation of the hypothetical NIMBY participation variable. The regression results in Table 2 show a pattern for hypothetical NIMBY participation, which is quite different from that portrayed in actual NIMBY controversies. Only political resources prove to be significant predictors in both cases. In stark contrast to the actual NIMBY case, risk perception fails to exhibit any significant relationship, but attitude strength and facility familiarity are significant. The familiarity measure exhibits a strong negative relationship, as predicted, supporting the hypothesis that familiarity fosters acclimation.

Contrary to the findings for actual NIMBY participation, SES is important in predicting hypothetical NIMBY participation. However,

perception and decrease the potentially buffering influence of familiarity. Previous political success will increase citizens' perceived efficacy and add to the community's repertoire of political participation skills. This finding confirms the adage that it is foolish to attempt to site a risky facility in a community that has already defeated prior risky proposals.

Fourth, this study indicates that attitudes toward siting do change. Contrary to the findings of Portney (1991), our results suggest that attitude strength (antipathy toward siting) becomes less important as risk perception becomes more salient. Thus, the door is not closed to the possibility that solutions can be found to the NIMBY policy gridlock.

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CAPITALIZING ON THE WOMAN QUESTION: ORGANIZING OKLAHOMA WOMEN INTO THE SOCIALIST PARTY IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY

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In Oklahoma, three women, Winnie Branstetter, Kate Richards O'Hare and Caroline Lowe stand out as strong Socialist party organizers who capitalized on the women suffrage question to gain recruits to the party and, therefore, a new voting strength with which to initiate social change in turn-of-the-century Oklahoma.

In 1910 Winnie Branstetter, Assistant State Secretary of the Oklahoma Socialist party, walked into the state headquarters of the Oklahoma Suffrage Association to offer assistance in promoting suffrage for Oklahoma women. Ida Porter-Boyer, national suffrage organizer from Pennsylvania assigned to Oklahoma, received Branstetter's visit with caution; she was uncertain whether an affiliation with the Socialist party would do more harm than good in promoting woman suffrage. She later wrote, "at that time all of us were wary of the effect socialism might have on our advocacy"(Meredith 1969, 70; see also Ameringer 1983; Green 1978).

Women's suffrage was an important issue to Branstetter and other Socialist women in Oklahoma who considered suffrage a weapon with which to fight a capitalist system that subjected women to low-paying jobs, the drudgery of farm labor, and the dependency of marriage. With suffrage, women could vote for advocates of political and economic equality and share responsibility for a cooperative commonwealth. Socialist women also viewed suffrage as an opportunity to recruit women into the party. There was immediacy to their recruitment efforts. Although American Socialists were the first to include equal suffrage in their party platform, many believed that it was only a matter of time before the Republicans and Democrats followed suit. By 1910, a number of states, especially in the West, passed suffrage amendments. The race was on to see which party would capture women's votes.

Early twentieth-century American society called women's struggle for political equality the "woman question." Socialist women expanded the definition to include the struggle of working class women for economic and social equality in the work place of industrial and rural America. Socialist women believed that with suffrage they could change political, economic, and social system that affected adversely the quality of their lives. In Oklahoma, three women, Winnie Branstetter, Kate Richards O'Hare and Caroline Lowe stand out as strong party organizers who capitalized on the woman question to gain recruits into the party and, therefore, a new voting strength with which to initiate social change.

Socialist party organization in Oklahoma began when the national party leadership asked Otto and Winnie Branstetter to organize for the state. The Branstetters were followers of Victor Berger who, along with Eugene Debs and Morris Hillquit, founded the Socialist party of America in 1901 (Meredith 1969; Green 1978). It was not difficult for Oklahoma Socialists to establish a successful party organization. As early as 1895, they had organized their first meeting at Medford, where they wrote a party platform that reflected the principles of late nineteenth-century Populists. Socialists added to their plank universal suffrage regardless of sex, color and creed. After the founding of a national organization, the party sent organizers into the Southwest to establish Socialist chapters. Oklahoma became fertile ground for recruitment because of rural discontent and the need for agricultural reform. Socialists began to view agriculture in the same light as industrial capitalism: agricultural operation required capital and ownership of land

and market forces determined profit. Farm laborers, like their industrial counterpart, profited little from their work. When Socialists began their work in Oklahoma, farmers' problems were not addressed by the major political parties. This left an opening for Socialists to propose programs appealing to farmers (Miller 1981; Dancis 1976).

Women's involvement in the socialist movement began shortly after the organization of the national party in 1901. Initially, however, the party barely acknowledged the woman question. The platform of 1901 included little mention of equal rights. The 1904 platform supported equal suffrage, but only as an afterthought. It was apparent to Socialist women that they needed to form their own organizations to promote women's political and economic equality with educational programs on women's issues and political outreach (*Socialist Woman* July 1907, November 1907, January 1909).

Of primary concern to Socialist women was the effect that capitalism had on marriage and the home. Most agreed that a woman's place was in the home, where they contributed to the welfare of the family and society. The high divorce rate in the twentieth century indicated a breakdown in the family, which Socialist women viewed as a by-product of industrialization. Socialists argued that the capitalist system forced women into marriage for economic salvation and that most women did not marry for love but out of "fear of hunger and starvation." If women were economically independent they would not find it necessary to marry, but would do so for natural reasons such as love and companionship. Therefore, educating women to the societal ills created by capitalism and the solutions provided by socialism would better women's economic and social condition. It was important to work toward removing elements of the law that subjected women to unequal status in society and to fight for full citizenship including the right to suffrage (Porter-Boyer 1910).

Unlike many women in the Socialist party, Winnie Branstetter believed that Socialist women could work with existing suffrage organizations. Branstetter served for three years as vice president of the Oklahoma Suffrage Association, and in 1912 attended the National Suffrage Convention in Philadelphia as an Oklahoma delegate (Leonard 1914, 123). Branstetter maintained that her working class background helped her to understand the oppression of American workers.

Born Winnie Shirley in Missouri in 1879, she attended Kansas City schools and worked as a department store clerk until her marriage to Otto Branstetter in 1899. The couple subsequently moved to Oklahoma where they maintained a farm in Cleveland County. In 1904 they relocated to Norman, Oklahoma where Otto worked as a paperhanger (*Oklahoma Pioneer* October 29, 1910). Four years after settling in the Sooner State, Winnie moved her two girls, Gertrude and Theresa, to a homestead in Roswell, New Mexico. The purpose of the New Mexico interlude was to organize the New Mexico area for the Socialist party. With few resources, Branstetter conducted Socialist meetings in schoolhouses and lodge halls. As her daughter Gertrude later recalled, "Mother conducted most of the meetings alone, talking, teaching, distributing literature, debating local politicians, discussing local problems, and bringing the socialist interpretation to territorial and national economics and politics" (Stone and Taft n.d.).

Branstetter eventually became the first secretary of the Socialist party in New Mexico. Once the government approved her claim to 160 acres, she sold the farm and rejoined her husband in Oklahoma City.

Back in Oklahoma, Branstetter worked to increase women's membership in the party. One method was to sell subscriptions to the *Socialist Woman*, a magazine for women established in Chicago in 1907 by Japanese Socialist Kiicki Kaneko. The magazine was a propaganda tool designed to educate women to the merits of socialism and to solicit their help in party recruitment (Buhle 1983). As one Oklahoma woman wrote to the magazine's editor,

> We have a field to work to get the Socialist principles before the women. First let us get acquainted, then make every member of our organized body a worker, starting propaganda to pay for papers, magazines, and leaflets, the latter to be given away to women who don't know what socialism means" (*Socialist Woman* June 1907).

Branstetter was a frequent contributor to the *Socialist Woman*. Her articles related her concerns for the economic dependency of women and children under the capitalist system and the lack of party initiative in addressing the woman question. In the February, 1908 issue, she wrote that the Socialist party needed to take an active stand on female suffrage. She reasoned that the advancement of capitalist-class women toward

the ownership of private property would induce both the Democrat and Republican parties to advocate woman suffrage. She recommended that the Socialist party pay less attention to reforming the capitalists and more attention to reform within the party. She urged the national party to accept resolutions similar to those adopted in Oklahoma that pledged strong support for woman suffrage (*Socialist Woman* February 1908).

Branstetter followed the party line in her arguments for woman suffrage. Suffrage was not a sex question but an economic question. If there was sex discrimination, the economic struggle inherent in the capitalist system was the culprit. Branstetter directed her remarks to the wives of Oklahoma tenant farmers, who along with their families suffered a decline in agricultural markets and economic disadvantage under the landlord system (*Oklahoma Pioneer* March 9, 1910).

Woman suffrage was expected to save the nation's youth from undue toil and labor. Branstetter pointed out that in Oklahoma child labor was just as much an issue as it was in industrial cities. Branstetter estimated that tenant farmers raised seventy-five percent of the cotton upon which the state's economy depended. In order for a tenant family to make a living from cotton, every member of the family had to work in the fields. She wrote that,

> We have a condition in Oklahoma bordering on feudalism, where the entire family, father, mother and children, are forced to work in the field in order to produce the barest necessities of life (*Progressive Woman* July 1912).

Even the compulsory education law did not protect children from the rigors of fieldwork. Branstetter explained that the law only required children to attend school three months of the year, which left nine months for field labor. Branstetter hoped that the child labor problem would be solved by increasing the membership of women in the party, thereby increasing the voting strength of the working class.

In February 1908, the Oklahoma Socialist party elected Winnie Branstetter Assistant State Secretary and appointed her as a delegate to the Socialist National Convention in Chicago (*Socialist Woman* June 1908). While in Chicago, Branstetter attended the Women's Socialist League of Chicago, a meeting to unite Socialist women and to address the woman question. The delegates agreed that suffrage was an important tool with which to fight for their rights in the industrial world. They

reasoned that women and men were physically and mentally equal and suffered under the same industrial conditions. Now that the working class struggle included women, they, like their male counterparts, should be able to use their vote to better their condition. Women called on the party to take an active stand on the suffrage issue. They also believed that they must organize to fight for suffrage. As Branstetter told women, "I don't blame the men for overlooking us; they have enough to look after in fighting their own battles. We must fight for ourselves" (*Socialist Woman* June 1908).

At the 1908 Chicago convention, the party made women's fight for suffrage a more organized effort by establishing the Women's National Committee (WNC). The founding of the committee was also the result of a recommendation of the 1907 Second International meeting in Stuttgart, Germany. At the Stuttgart meeting, delegates adopted a resolution that called upon socialists to campaign for woman suffrage within their own organizations. The function of the committee was to manage the organization of women into the party and to maintain funds for a woman activist in the field (*Encyclopedia of American Left* 1990, 830). Ultimately, the *Socialist Woman* magazine, with ever-increasing readership, served as a news outlet for the WNC. Kate Richards O'Hare and Winnie Branstetter were founding members of the Women's National Committee. Like Branstetter, O'Hare fought for the Socialist cause in Oklahoma. Her oratorical skills and ability to reach her audience made her a popular speaker and one of the leading Socialists of the early twentieth century.

O'Hare was born Kate Richards on March 26, 1876 on a 160-acre farm in Ottawa County, Kansas. Her family lost their farm in the drought of 1887 and moved to Kansas City, Missouri, where they lived in relative poverty until her father secured permanent employment. It was during this period that Kate experienced city crime and adverse industrial conditions. To help improve city conditions, O'Hare joined the Christian Endeavor Society, Women's Christian Temperance Union, and the Florence Crittenton Missionary Society. She also attended Pawnee City Academy in Pawnee City, Nebraska, where she received her teaching certificate in 1894. She taught school for a couple of years but eventually resigned because of stress from overwork. O'Hare returned to Kansas City, where she moved in with her parents and secured a job as a secretary in her father's machinist shop. She acquired a share of

the enterprise and entered the machinist crafts industry with a membership in the International Association of Machinists. Through her union activities, O'Hare became acquainted with the doctrines of socialism. She listened to Socialist speakers like "Mother" Jones and Julius A. Wayland, editor of the Socialist paper, *Appeal to Reason*. In 1901, Kate moved to Girard, Kansas, to attend the International School of Social Economy. Here she met Frank P. O'Hare. The two were married in Julius Wayland's home in Girard, Kansas, in 1902. Their honeymoon was a tour of the Midwest, where they lectured on socialism. (*Socialist Woman* October 1908; Basen 1980). In 1904, the O'Hares moved to Chandler, Oklahoma Territory, where Frank accepted a job writing for the Socialist-oriented newspaper the Chandler Publicist (Miller 1981).

Kate O'Hare was instrumental in building a strong grass roots Socialist organization in Oklahoma. She traveled throughout the state and the Southwest delivering the Socialist message in town meetings or at Socialist encampments (Basen 1980). Camp meeting forums borrowed from the Populists were much like a religious revival. Although the initial encampment was held outside Saline, Texas, in 1904, Frank O'Hare quickly saw the effectiveness of such gatherings and recommended that Oklahoma Socialists schedule encampments across Oklahoma (Green 1978). A typical summer season of encampments lasted more than four weeks. One source noted there were "sixty red hot propaganda meetings a month, with an attendance of from 500 to 10,000 at each lecture" (*International Socialist Review* 1909). Under big canvass tents that could accommodate over 1,000 people, Socialist speakers, including Eugene V. Debs, Oscar Ameringer and Kate Richards O'Hare lectured Oklahoma farmers on how socialism could reduce the high rate of farm tenancy by initiating cooperative land ownership.

Kate O'Hare differed from Winnie Branstetter in the priority of her message to women. Branstetter fought to increase Socialist membership by explaining to women how suffrage was an important tool. This tool was to be used to vote for candidates and programs that promoted the Socialist cause and therefore women's causes. Kate O'Hare, on the other hand, crafted her message as an indictment against capitalism. O'Hare did agree with Branstetter that suffrage was a very important issue for women. Like Branstetter, O'Hare attended the Socialist Convention in Chicago in 1908 and joined Branstetter at the

Women's Socialist League of Chicago meeting. She informed the ladies at the meeting that the Republican party of Oklahoma planned to insert a plank in its platform supporting woman suffrage. The threat, she warned, was that Republicans would recruit the support of Oklahoma women. O'Hare urged Socialists to defeat the Republicans by actively supporting woman suffrage (*Socialist Woman* June 1908; Green 1978).

Woman suffrage, however, was only one of many issues that concerned Kate Richards O'Hare. Like many Socialist women, O'Hare did not view suffrage as the solution to societal ills (Miller 1981). She believed that regardless of whether women could vote, the bigger issue was informing men and women of the possibilities of a socialist utopia where all enjoyed the egalitarian world of a cooperative commonwealth. O'Hare pulled at the heartstrings of her listeners with stories about the lives of women and children who toiled in factories or farm fields. She wrote about silk mill operators who hired young girls because "little girls have nimble fingers, and besides they are cheaper," and of women who had "stooped shoulders and dead faces" (*Chandler Publicist* June 21, 1904). The low wages that they earned and the high cost of living decreased women's chances for lasting love and marriage. O'Hare claimed that under socialism children would know the joys of childhood, women the joys of wifehood, and all would enjoy the wealth of the universe.

Winnie Branstetter and Kate Richards O'Hare were pioneers in speaking out on women's behalf during the early years of party organization. They were, however, part of a small minority of women who participated in party affairs. In 1908, women were only ten percent of the membership in the Socialist party and of the delegates to the national convention. But compared to the other major political parties, where less than one percent of the women participated in party politics, the Socialists had a significant female representation. After the establishment of the Women's National Committee, Socialist women became more visible and organized in their recruitment efforts. They appointed a general correspondent for the Woman's National Committee and an office of Woman's State Correspondent to act as a liaison for local, state and national committees. Simultaneously, the national parties recommended that in each state Socialist locals organize a woman's committee (Miller 1981).

Besides organizing communication networks between state and national committees, women participated in national speaking tours to recruit men and women into the Socialist party. Oklahoma and the Southwest was a popular region on the lyceum circuit. Kate Richards O'Hare was already well known throughout the country and especially Oklahoma. Next to O'Hare, Caroline Lowe was probably the most popular speaker in the Southwest. She was sent by the party to organize for Kansas and Oklahoma, where she presented her view of socialism to the farmers of the region. Lowe was born November 28, 1874 in Essex County, Ontario. By 1890, her family had relocated to Kansas City, Missouri. After graduating from Kansas City High School, Lowe obtained her teaching credentials and taught school in the Kansas City system, where she also organized the first teachers union in 1898. It was through her union activities that Lowe became acquainted with the tenets of socialism. By 1908, she abandoned the teaching profession and became a lecturer for the Socialist party. Lowe was also a member of the Woman's National Committee of the Socialist party and was the first to hold office as general correspondent (*Encyclopedia of the American Left* 1990, 437).

As national lecturer and organizer of the party, Lowe first concentrated her recruitment work in the coal region of southeastern Kansas, where she organized schoolhouse meetings to recruit women into the party. Lowe was also a popular speaker at Socialist encampments in Oklahoma. Throughout the summer encampment seasons, Lowe presented her views to Oklahoma farmers on the religious, political and economic conditions of the country (*Vinita Daily Chieftain* September 12, 1906).

On the woman question, Lowe agreed with Branstetter and O'Hare that the question was part of the working class struggle for political and economic equality. She looked at the struggle from a historical perspective. In her testimony before congressional hearings on woman suffrage, Lowe explained that women once worked at home spinning, making bread, or butter for a limited market. Women's status changed when machines and factory work replaced home industry. This change forced women into a work place where they labored long hours for low pay under autocratic bosses. She agreed that suffrage would give women the self-protection they needed in the industrial work place — a voice in making laws that affected their lives (U.S. Congress 1912, 16-20).

Women in Oklahoma echoed Lowe's analysis. Stella Ruch from the Union Social Club explained that woman suffrage was,

> an important question to every wage earning woman since the ballot is the only means whereby we could secure the laws which control our wages, hours of labor, and the many conditions which we are employed . . . as voting workers we would cease to be cheap labor in the wage market" (*Oklahoma Pioneer* October 13, 1910).

Ruth Williamson of Shattuck, Oklahoma wrote in the *Ellis County Socialists* that women should join the Socialist party because it was the only party to endorse woman suffrage and that with suffrage, "Many evils now prevalent in the world, such as the whiskey traffic will be eradicated when women have the privilege of asserting their rights at the ballot" (*Ellis County Socialist* August 19, 1915).

The Oklahoma Socialist party made significant gains in recruitment from 1907 until 1916. Eugene V. Debs, Socialist candidate for president, received eight percent of the Oklahoma vote in 1908 and sixteen percent in 1912. By 1914 the Socialist candidate for governor received twenty-one percent of the vote and five Socialists won state legislative offices. The gain in the ranks of Oklahoma Socialists held steady in 1916 but lost significant ground by 1918. The decline in the Socialist party after 1916 was due to President Woodrow Wilson's preparedness program and the eventual involvement of American forces in World War One (Burbank 1973). At the Socialist convention in St. Louis, in 1916, the party took a stand against American involvement in the European conflict. This branded the party as pro-German and drew criticism from many sectors of American Society. Even though the Oklahoma party did not endorse the anti-war stand, Socialists in the state spoke out against American foreign policy. This "un-American" attitude, along with radical activities of the Working Class Union, a militant tenant farmers union, which initiated draft riots called the Green Corn Rebellion throughout several Oklahoma counties, caused many in Oklahoma to abandon the Socialist party. Also significant were the improved economic conditions for the farmers. President Wilson's economic programs to prepare America for involvement in the war enhanced the economic well-being of the country. In Oklahoma, the federal government encouraged farmers to expand their acreage and the production of wheat and corn. Farmers

often went into debt to do so, but the high price of commodities and the increased European demand assured economic success. The farming community no longer found socialism an attractive alternative to a good market economy. When the Oklahoma party began to wane in 1916, so too did the work of Socialist women and their recruitment efforts in Oklahoma. In 1917, Socialist Patrick Nagle sponsored a party resolution that disbanded the Socialist party in Oklahoma (Meredith 1969).

Fighting within the party caused Otto and Winnie Branstetter to leave Oklahoma in 1913. Many considered Otto an outsider from Chicago and refused him a seat at the state convention. The Branstetters moved to Chicago, where Otto eventually became Executive Secretary of the national party and Winnie continued her involvement in the Woman's National Committee, succeeding Caroline Lowe as general correspondent. During the war years, Winnie Branstetter served as liaison from the national office to anti-war Socialist activists imprisoned at Leavenworth, Kansas. In 1921, she represented Cook County, Illinois, as a delegate to the Amnesty International Conference held in Washington, D.C. (*Socialist Party of American Papers*, n.d.). She died in 1960.

Frank and Kate Richards O'Hare moved from Chandler, Oklahoma, to Kansas City, Kansas, in 1909. Kate continued her work for the party and was elected to the National Executive Committee of the party in 1910. In that year O'Hare also ran for Congress, the first woman to do so from Kansas. A few months after her failed candidacy, both Frank and Kate accepted positions as editors of the Socialist newspaper, the *National Rip-Saw*. In 1917, O'Hare served as Chairwoman of the War and Militarism Committee at the St. Louis Emergency Convention and was elected International Secretary of the Socialist party (Basen 1980). With the approaching American involvement in the European conflict, Kate O'Hare became an outspoken critic of American foreign policy. Officials of the federal government arrested her for her anti-war stand and she spent four years in Missouri State Penitentiary. After her release, she put her energy into prison reform for women. She died in 1948 (Basen 1980).

Unlike Branstetter and O'Hare, Caroline Lowe never took up residence in Oklahoma. She did, however, spend a significant amount of time in the state working the encampment circuit to recruit for the party. Similar to O'Hare, Lowe ran for political office, managing a thirty-

five percent return in the 1914 election for Kansas state legislature. That year she enrolled in law school and four years later the State of Kansas admitted her to the bar. During the war years Lowe defended members of the Industrial Workers of the World who were on trial in various Midwest cities for anti-war activities. In 1923, she served as the official counsel for the United Mine Workers. Lowe continued practicing law in Pittsburg, Kansas, until her death in 1933 (*Encyclopedia of the American Left* 1990).

In 1910 national suffrage organizer Ida Porter-Boyer wrote a letter to Carrie Chapman Catt updating her on the progress of the suffrage campaign in Oklahoma. Boyer made a point to discuss the role of Socialist women in helping to promote suffrage to Oklahoma women. Boyer related the success of Socialists and suffragists in placing an initiative on women's suffrage on the ballot in 1910. Boyer noted that the Socialists had collected more signatures for the initiative petition than women suffragettes. Ultimately, however, the initiative failed by 40,000 votes (Porter-Boyer 1910; Harper 1969, 526). It was shortly after the initiative campaign that Winnie Branstetter, Kate Richards O'Hare, and Caroline Lowe moved out of Oklahoma. They continued, however, to serve as national spokeswomen for the party and to capitalize on the woman question until the first world war brought a temporary halt to Socialist activities in the country. The issues that were of concern to Socialist women continued to be of concern to politically active women in the Republican and Democrat parties in Oklahoma in the 1920s. In their new role as political citizens, women worked through the political process for improved working conditions and wage equality for women in industry, for better health care of women and children, for enforcement of child labor laws, and for the establishment of Women's Bureau in the State Department of Labor.

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LEGISLATIVE TERM LIMITS AND ELECTORAL COMPETITION IN OKLAHOMA: A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT

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This paper examines the consequences of term limits on competition in primary and general elections for the Oklahoma House of Representatives. Term limits appear to have had little effect on competition. In fact, term limits may have a negative effect on competition in primary and general elections. Increased competition may only occur when incumbents are prohibited from seeking reelection.

The term limit movement is a 90s political phenomenon. While the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in *U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton* (1995) forced advocates to consider new strategies for enacting congressional term limits, the Court allowed state legislative term limits to remain in force. From 1990 through 1997, voters in 22 states enacted state legislative term limits. While the speed at which term limits spread across the states is impressive, more impressive still is action by lower levels of government. Fagre (1995, 1) reports that "over 58 million Americans

live in localities with limits of various sorts, and more than 14,000 politicians serve in 2,791 term limit cities, counties and towns." The cities include Los Angeles, New York, Kansas City, Houston, Cincinnati, and San Antonio. In Orange County, California, for example, eleven out of 31 cities operate with term limits. Many of these cities have had term limits for a number of years (Petracca and O'Brien 1994, 183).

Recently a number of scholars have begun studying the consequences of term limits empirically (Farmer 1995; Opheim 1994; Thompson and Moncrief 1994; Petracca and O'Brien 1994; Rausch 1993; Copeland 1992). The present research continues the effort toward more completely understanding the consequences of term limits by examining the effect of term limits on competition for seats in the Oklahoma House of Representatives.

TERM LIMITS IN OKLAHOMA

Since the process which led to Oklahoma becoming the first state to enact legislative term limits has been examined elsewhere (Copeland and Rausch 1993; McGuigan 1991), only a brief discussion is necessary. Learning that the members of a constitutional revision commission refused to consider legislative term limits in their deliberations, Lloyd Noble, a Tulsa oilman and unsuccessful Republican candidate for the state legislature, decided to organize a campaign to have a term limit initiative placed on the ballot. With mostly his own money and donations from his family, he successfully qualified an initiative which was approved by the voters in a run-off election on September 18, 1990. Voters supported the initiative by a two-to-one margin.

The initiative approved by Oklahoma voters differs from the limits enacted in other states. Oklahoma legislators are limited to twelve years of service, in either chamber or both. For example, "a member of the state house could serve four years in that body and seek election to the state senate where he or she would be able to serve only eight more years" (Copeland and Rausch 1993, 34-35). The ban on service is a lifetime ban. According to Farmer (1995, 2), "Oklahoma's term limits law will not affect state legislative re-elections until 2004."

To date, the only indication of the real impact of term limits on competition in Oklahoma legislative races are the biennial reports in the

Oklahoma City *Daily Oklahoman*. In 1992, the first election after term limits were imposed, the newspaper reported that 30 percent of the legislators seeking reelection had no opponent. In 35 of the 101 House races, no one filed to challenge the incumbent. Nine of these lucky incumbents were Republicans with the remainder being Democrats (Greiner 1992). There were fewer challengers in 1994. "Nearly 40 percent of the state legislators who were up for reelection" was unopposed. While the report is not clear on the breakdown between the House and the Senate, it indicated that the Republican Party "assembled the second-largest slate of candidates in the party's history" (Greiner 1994). In 1996, Greiner (1996) reported that 21 House members (11 Democrats and 10 Republicans) were unopposed. This evidence suggests that term limits may have little impact on the number of competitive races.

DECLINING COMPETITION IN LEGISLATIVE RACES

Observers have been concerned about causes and consequences of declining rates of competition in congressional races (Mayhew 1974; Ferejohn 1977; Jacobson 1987) and a decline in the turnover rate (Witmer 1964; Polsby 1968; Price 1971; Bullock 1972; Fiorina, Rohde, and Wissel 1975) for a number of years. However, only recently has similar questions been considered in state legislative elections (see Weber, Tucker, and Brace 1991). Compared to congressional elections, more competition is found in state legislative elections, but there is great variation among the states. Jewell (1982) finds that, in the 1970s, competition was higher in the West and Midwest and lower in the South and Border States. In a longitudinal study of party competition in eight states, Ray and Havick (1981) discovered a general decline in competition over 80 years, interrupted only during periods of partisan realignment. A major shortcoming of the literature on state legislative electoral competition is the disparity of measures of competition (Weber, Tucker, and Brace 1991, 30).

A significant body of research examines intraparty competition in state legislative primary elections (Ragsdale 1985, 70). Using the number of candidates as a measure, Key (1956) finds that states with sharp competition between parties exhibit strong competition within parties.

Important for the present research, Jewell (1967) concludes that races with incumbents have less competition. He also finds that rural districts tend to be less competitive than metropolitan districts. Grau's (1981) study of lower houses confirms Jewell's findings: incumbents dampen competition by discouraging opponents from their own party as well as opponents from the opposing party. Therefore, previous research suggests that by limiting the number of times incumbents may seek reelection, states may experience more competitive primary and general elections for legislative seats.

Electoral competition increased legislative accountability. Through elections, citizens are linked to the legislative process (Ragsdale 1985, 58). The link is weakened when legislators are elected and reelected with little or no opposition. Term limit advocates regularly voice this concern:

> What we have now is a system in which members of Congress are like the non-custodial parent in a divorced family: they visit on weekends, they come to see us on holidays, and they send money. But they don't live with us, and over time they become mere acquaintances rather than people who really know their constituents (Mitchell 1991, 5).

Discounting the hyperbole, the American system of elections was designed to take advantage of frequent elections. Through regular elections, citizens oversee the actions of elected public officials. If there is no competition in elections, our oversight capability is severely weakened. Of course, it is possible that less competition results from an increased linkage between an incumbent and his or her constituency.

Term limit advocates also voice a compelling argument about the relationship between competitive races and voter interest and turnout. Empirical analysis lends support to their position (see Dye 1966; Milbrath 1971; Patterson and Caldeira 1983). An individual voter is more likely to have a greater impact in a close election spurring additional interest in voting. Competitive elections also are more likely to generate more easily accessible information, reducing a potential voter's costs (see Holbrook and Van Dunk 1993, 955).

WILL TERM LIMITS INCREASE COMPETITION?

Most of the speculation on the effects of term limits on electoral competition has been negative. Copeland and Rausch (1991) posit that term limits may decrease competition as potential candidates wait for an open seat. While term limits will create open seats at regular intervals, nothing has been done to increase the chances that a particular candidate will be elected from a particular district. Moncrief, et al. (1992) concur in this assessment.

The few empirical analyses of the effects of term limits on electoral competition are remarkable in their agreement that enacting term limits has so far not increased competition. Studying the Board of Supervisors of San Mateo County, California, a body combining executive and legislative functions and which has had term limits since 1980, Rausch (1993) finds that the number of candidates vying for seats on the Board has not increased and that limits seem to have caused a negative effect on margins of victory. Petracca and O'Brien (1994, 191) find that term limits "have not *increased* the number of individuals seeking to serve on city councils in Orange County (California)" (emphasis in original).

Armor (1994a) reports that term limits have altered the political environment in California. He believes California's legislature provides "a close analogy to Congressional races, both in size of districts and costs of campaigning (Armor 1994a, 1). He notes:

> Although limits will not force any members of the California Assembly or Senate from office prior to 1996, an unexpected change occurred in 1992. Before, during and even after the election, one-quarter of the members of that legislature, 30 of the 120 members of the assembly and senate, resigned to take full-time jobs in the private sector, in education or in government (Armor 1994b, 79).

Armor also finds that fewer former legislative aides were elected to the legislature in 1992.

Armor does not address the question of electoral competition in California. However, Armor (1993) examines electoral competition in research on gubernatorial elections. Specifically, he seeks to determine "how term limits affect even the elections in which the incumbent is*not* limited" (Armor 1993, 15), a challenge to Copeland and Rausch's (1991)

speculation that competitive elections under term limits will occur only for open seats. He finds that, for governors, "*non*-limited elections in limited states are more competitive than elections in the other states. Better candidates with better fund-raising and better staffs run in *all* elections in limited states, not just in the open seats when an incumbent is barred from running again"(Armor 1993, 16). Strong potential challengers run in the election before the open seat in order to build name recognition on which to capitalize when the seat becomes vacant (Armor 1993, 16). Thus, gubernatorial elections are more competitive because governors typically serve two terms before being forced to step down.

Clucas (1994) also examines California's 1992 legislative elections. He finds that term limits has not "decreased competition for Assembly seats" measured by the number of candidates competing for the seats in the primary elections (Clucas 1994, 7). He also finds that open seats do not necessarily increase the fairness of general election campaigns based on campaign resources (Clucas 1994, 8). Even in open seat campaigns, money still matters. Although term limits may have the effect of bringing "new faces" to the legislature, Ruth Holton of California Common Cause argues that "those faces are going to be just as beholden to the same special interests that the old faces were beholden to" (quoted in Hull 1993).

In seeking to understand the effects of term limits on legislative campaigns, we must be aware of the influence of redistricting (Clucas 1994, 7). Legislative term limits in Colorado, California, and Oklahoma were enacted in 1990. But we must be cautious in attributing subsequent changes solely to this.

WILL TERM LIMITS INCREASE COMPETITION IN OKLAHOMA?

Everson (1992) posits that the real impacts of term limits will depend on the degree of turnover in a state's legislature, whether or not the legislature is a "citizen" or "professional" legislature, and the length of the limits enacted. The Oklahoma legislature is clearly a citizen legislature with most lawmakers viewing "themselves as part-time, citizen legislators . . . large numbers of incumbents . . . regularly fail to win reelection."

(Morgan, England, and Humphreys 1991, 98). The legislature is limited by the increasing use of the citizen initiative and referendum. In recent years, voters have acted to constrain the legislature by setting constitutional limits on its session and by limiting the legislature's ability to raise taxes (Rausch 1994). It was through the initiative process that state legislative term limits were enacted.

This paper examines the effects of term limits on one aspect of the political environment in Oklahoma — competition in races for the Oklahoma House of Representatives. Oklahoma voters approved state legislative term limits in 1990. Data collected from voting records maintained by the State Election Board are used to test the argument that term limits increase electoral competition. I utilize two measures of competition. First, I examine the number of candidates for each state legislative seat in both primary and general elections. The second measure is margin of victory in primary and general elections. An effort was made to completely replicate Rausch (1993) and Clucas (1994), but pertinent longitudinal data on turnout and campaign financing are not easily accessible and vary in quality over time.

ANALYSIS

PRIMARY ELECTIONS

The reports in the Oklahoma City *Daily Oklahoman* largely serve as the impetus for this research. Figure 1 illustrates the percentage of seats left unchallenged by each party. The trend shows that the Republican Party is now coming close to finding as many candidates as the Democratic Party. In 1996 the two parties were equal. In 1980, in contrast, nearly 60 percent of Oklahoma House races did not have a Republican candidate in the primary; therefore, the winner in the Democratic primary was elected to the House. From 1988 to 1996, the Republican Party has been giving away less than 40 percent of the seats and in 1998, less than 30 percent. Term limits were enacted as more Republicans were already entering legislative races.

Care must be exercised in drawing conclusions about term limit effects from these data. The Oklahoma Republican Party, like its national counterpart, has made an effort to recruit quality candidates for state

Figure 1

The percentage of Oklahoma House primary races without a party candidate (101 House Districts).



SOURCE: Author's calculations from Oklahoma State Election Board data.

House and Senate races. The increase in Republican candidates has been achieved before any Oklahoma legislator has been forced by term limits to vacate a seat.

The average number of candidates in each party's primary is presented in Figure 2. These data illustrate competition in primary elections. If term limits were having an effect, one would expect to see more candidates running in primaries. While the average for the Democratic Party remains above one candidate per district, there has been a decline in the number of multi-candidate races since the 1970s. The Republican trend line suggests that the party field at least one candidate in many more districts than in the past. Term limits may be having an effect here as potential Democratic candidates are deciding to sit on the sidelines until an incumbent is forced to forego reelection.

The second measure of competition is margin of victory. Figure 3 examines the average margin of victory in the Democratic and Republican primaries. For each election the number of districts included in the average differs depending upon the number of races with candidates. Candidates who were unopposed were coded as having received 100 percent of the vote.

The data show that the average primary contest for either party is won by a margin of more than fifty percent. Republican primary candidates tend to have less competitive races. It is possible that the party recruits one candidate and, in an effort to avoid intraparty battles, encourages other potential candidates to stay out of the race. One would expect both parties to discourage primary competition in favor of reserving resources for the interparty contest at the general election. Additional research is required to determine whether or not the Republican Party discourages primary competition. As the number of unopposed candidates in primaries increases, average margin of victory will approach 100 percent.

GENERAL ELECTIONS

Since Lloyd Noble is a Republican and many of the contributors to the term limit campaign are Republicans, one hypothesis is that term limits were enacted to benefit the Republican Party. Noble's arguments do not indicate an anti-Democratic position as much as a dislike of the

Figure 2

Average number of candidates in Democratic and Republican primaries (101 House Districts).



SOURCE: Author's calculations from Oklahoma State Election Board data.

Figure 3

The average margin of victory in the Democratic and Republican Party primaries in Oklahoma (101 House Districts).



SOURCE: Author's calculations from Oklahoma State Election Board data.

Legislature. In a post-election discussion, Noble related that he had "often thought . . . we [Oklahomans] could limit our state legislators via the initiative-petition process" (Noble 1992, 24). After his successful term limit effort, Noble helped direct the tax limitation initiative, State Question 640 (see Rausch 1994).

Noble's comments notwithstanding, term limits should have some impact on the number of seats won by the minority. This is a central concern of interparty competition. The data do not show a dramatic change in the number of seats won by the minority Republicans after term limits are enacted. After the 1980 elections, Republicans held 28 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives. In 1982, Republicans won only 24 percent of the seats. The party crossed the 30 percent threshold in 1984 taking 32 percent of the seats. In 1986, Republicans were victorious in 31 percent of the House districts. Republicans won 33 percent of the races in 1988, the high point for the decade of the 1980s. Prior to redistricting, the Republican Party won 32 percent of the seats in 1990. In both 1992 and 1994, Republicans were victorious in 35 percent of the districts. In fact, the percentage of seats won in 1994 is an accurate reflection of the percentage of registered Republicans in that year. The State Election Board reports that 33 percent of registered voters are Republican (Oklahoma State Election Board 1994, 1-2). In 1996, Republican candidates won in 35 percent of the districts.

Again, we should not hastily conclude that term limits have worked against Republicans. In 1992, candidates were running in districts drawn by the majority Democrats and although the redistricting effort took place after term limits were enacted in 1990, none of the legislators involved were immediately affected by the limits.

The average margin of victory in House races increased in 1990 after a decade of decline (see Figure 4). This finding suggests that term limits have caused a decrease in competition in general election contests. However, House races were much more competitive in 1996 with the average candidate winning by about 45 percent. Third party candidates have minimal effects on the reported margins of victory.

Figure 4

Margin of victory in general election contests for the Oklahoma House of Representatives (101 House Districts).



SOURCE: Author's calculations from Oklahoma State Election Board data.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

To the ardent supporter of term limits, Oklahoma's experience might be disheartening. However, these results are preliminary. There are other aspects of term limits not examined here. The number of incumbents seeking reelection has not been examined. Senate races were not included in this research because only one-half of the members are elected every two years, making it more difficult to track trends in the Senate. House members who run for the Senate and Senators who decide to go "down" to the "lower chamber" are not identified and analyzed. Additional research focusing on who leaves the House and who runs for the Senate will greatly improve our understanding of the impacts of term limits.

It is probable that term limits have not "kicked in" in Oklahoma. Term limit advocates have not clearly identified the time when change will occur in legislative bodies after the imposition of term limits. Most observers agree that it takes time for the effects of term limits to emerge, but there is little agreement on how much time is required. This paper is just one effort toward trying to identify when term limits have "kicked in."

Legislative term limits so far appear to have had little effect on electoral competition in Oklahoma. If Lloyd Noble's goal was to reform the Oklahoma Legislature into a citizen legislature, he may have labored under some misconceptions about the professional nature of the body or he advocated a term limit initiative that was too lenient. In the Oklahoma case at least, Everson (1992) is correct in suggesting that the impact of term limits differs depending on the level of professionalism in the legislature and the formulation of term limits.

There are many other aspects of term limits that can be explored in Oklahoma, the first state to enact term limits. In a "Hyde Park" discussion of term limits at the 1994 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, one discussant suggested that term limits make voters feel good (Jost 1994). Through term limits, voters are able to "punish" the legislature without punishing individual legislators. This line of research should be pursued. We need to better understand how voters feel about their legislators and legislatures after voting for term limits. Do term limits serve as a palliative for voters? Do they actually

feel better after casting a vote for term limits? Are voters more efficacious after term limits?

Additionally, students of state politics can assist in raising the discussion of term limits to a much higher level. With the Republican tsunami in the 1994 congressional elections, term limits reached the top of the political agenda in the GOP "Contract with America." The Contract called for only a vote on a constitutional amendment limiting members of the U.S. House to six two-year terms or a substitute amendment limiting House members to three two-year terms (both amendments would limit Senators to two six-year terms). Political scientists should assist in the process of determining what limits are appropriate. By studying the different limits enacted on state legislatures, we may find an answer. Less professional legislative bodies may require more severe limits; the more professional bodies may only need "limited" limits. Additional study of the effects of term limits over long time periods in a variety of states will help us understand the consequences of legislative term limits.

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INTEREST GROUPS IN OKLAHOMA, 1986 AND 1997

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The interest group universe continues to expand in Oklahoma. While education, labor, oil and agriculture persist, church influence and the newspapers are declining. Service, professional, business, banking, telecommunications and utility lobbies are growing in power. Interest group influence in Oklahoma is becoming more diversified as the state continues to mature and develop economically.

In 1935 Senator Hugo Black (later to become Justice Black) saidon the radio that lobbies were "contrary to tradition, against the public morals, and hostile to good government." He went on to say, "the lobby has reached such a position of power that . . . its greed, trickery, deception and fraud condemn it to the death it deserves" (Schriftgiesser, 1951:74). Obviously the impending death of lobbyists and interest groups was not as near as Senator Black had thought (or hoped). Sentiments similar to those spoken by Justice Black remain intact today. Many citizens, journalists, and reformers continue to view interest groups and their lobbyists with skepticism. This skepticism is increased by revelations of

interest group influence in the electoral process through campaign contributions.

Despite popular distrust political scientists have viewed interest groups in a much more positive light, inspired by Madison's Federalist writings and the growth of the modern state. Arthur Bentley (1949) and David Truman (1971) have placed interest groups at the heart of politics and the governmental system. For them the interest group is an element of continuity, a stabilizing element in a complex, changing political world.

The constant presence of interest groups is evident in mass media coverage of current political events. This examination shows a persistent pattern of group conflict in nearly every major governmental decision. In fact, the passage of a particular bill in Congress or a state legislature is usually described as a victory or a defeat for an interest group or coalition of groups. For example, when the Oklahoma State Legislature passed a moratorium on hog farms, the vote was viewed as a defeat for corporate farm interests (*Daily Oklahoman* March 20, 1998).

There is growing literature on interest group activity in the states (Nownes and Freeman 1998; Gray and Lowery 1993; Lowery and Gray 1993; Hrebenar and Thomas 1987, 1992, 1993a, 1993b). A focus on Oklahoma in the context of this literature provides a comparative perspective of the changing nature of group politics in a Midwestern state. The article is organized into five sections. We first provide a brief overview of Oklahoma politics. Second, we outline the legal and political environments affecting interest groups in the state. Third, we discuss the interest group universe in the state, including interest group tactics. Fourth, we look at previous assessments of group power in Oklahoma, and groups thought to be powerful in 1986 and 1997 by state legislators. Finally, we discuss the implications of the study.

OKLAHOMA POLITICS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE STATE

Some researchers contend that Oklahoma is in the midst of social, economic, and political transition. Kirkpatrick Sale (1975), for instance, includes Oklahoma as part of the contemporary "power shift" from the eastern establishment to the newly emerging, economically and politically powerful Sunbelt. As a relatively new state, having joined the Union only in 1907, Oklahoma is still in the process of development and

maturation. Historically, the people of the state have had strong ties to the land through agricultural or mineral extraction. These traditionally dominant economic interests are giving way, however, as the state becomes more urban and the economic base diversifies. Nevertheless, the rural frontier nature of Oklahoma has significantly affected the state's character.

OKLAHOMA'S CHARACTER: A TRADITIONAL VIEW

A state's historical, social, economic and demographic characteristics help shape its political outlook and behavior. In 1984 Daniel Elazar (1984), contended that such factors helped to explain the presence of political subcultures within the states. He classified Oklahoma's political culture as predominantly "traditional" in nature, one that "retains some of the organic characteristics of the preindustrial social order." The role of government is to maintain the status quo. A single political party usually dominates state politics, but party cohesion is weak, politics are personal, and politicians are personalities.

Traditional political culture is quite evident in Oklahoma's politics and history. Although the state is usually divided into a Republican North and Democratic South (Key 1983), since statehood Oklahoma has remained a one- or modified one-party state controlled by the Democrats (Kirkpatrick, Morgan, and Kielhorn 1977; Bibby, et. al. 1983). In fact, up until the 1996 election, state law required that Democratic candidates be listed first on all election ballots. With respect to party cohesion in the state legislature, Stephen Jones (1974, 181) asserts that "Oklahoma is a state in which the influence of pressure politics and local issues is greater than party cohesion or national issues."

As a state with strong ties to the land, Oklahoma lacks much of the diversity associated with more urbanized, heterogeneous states. In 1990, Oklahoma ranked 28th in percentage of population living in urban areas (67.7%) (Morgan, Morgan, and Quitno 1997). The national average was 75 percent. In many respects, the state can be viewed as a collectivity of preurban, agriculturally based, small communities. There are only two moderately large cities: Oklahoma City and Tulsa. Racial, ethnic and religious differences in the state are minimal. In 1995 whites were approximately 83 percent of the population, African-Americans

were about seven percent, American Indians seven percent, and Latinos three percent. Not only is Oklahoma largely white, it is overwhelmingly Protestant. Oklahoma has one of the highest percentages of any fundamentalists state in the Union (Johnson, Picard and Quinn 1971).

Oklahoma is a poor state. In 1995 Oklahoma ranked 44th among the states in per capita personal income ($18,580) and 46th in median household income (Morgan, Morgan, and Quitno 1997). According to a recent State Senate report average annual pay in Oklahoma in 1994 was $22,292, 12.6 percent less than the 50 state average of $25,109. Mining, transportation, communication, utilities and wholesale and retail trade workers in Oklahoma make up a larger percentage of the private sector workforce than in other states. Oklahoma has relatively fewer manufacturing, service, finance, insurance and real estate workers than the national average. But services, wholesale and retail trade, manufacturing and finance, insurance and real estate are the largest components of the Oklahoma economy, comprising 65 percent of total output. Oklahoma's economy has diversified and is no longer dependent on oil and agriculture. Oil and agriculture make up only about 7.6 percent ($5.4 billion) of the state's total economic output ($71.87 billion) (State Senate Staff 1996).

What does this overview of the traditional character of the state have to do with interest group activity? Previous research suggests that many of the characteristics associated with Oklahoma's socioeconomic and political environment should give rise to moderate to strong interest group power. Specifically, a rural agricultural economic base, as opposed to a more urbanized industrial base, the presence of a limited number of dominant economic interests and the general lack of wealth and interparty competition often positively correlate with interest group influence.

In Oklahoma a few interest groups historically have played a prominent role in state affairs. Moreover, groups that have traditionally been categorized as influential — such as the oil lobby, agriculture, the Baptist church, and local officials — are still formidable forces. But just as Oklahoma is undergoing tremendous social, economic, and political change, the interest group universe is also in transition.

OKLAHOMA'S CHARACTER: A TRANSITIONAL VIEW

Jerome O. Steffen (1982, 29) argues that "Oklahoma is on the verge of experiencing a major growth period." Douglas Hale offers a similar message: transitional Oklahoma is much different than traditional Oklahoma. He contends that the state at present is in an "Age of Resurgence." This era began in the 1950s, following the difficult years of the dust bowl and "Okie" out-migration (Hale 1982). In brief, Oklahoma is changing. Economic development is the "buzz" word among state and local officials.

Education has become a central issue as the state attempts to attract industry and diversify its economic base. Concerns related to the manufacturing sector such as tort reform and right-to-work legislation are salient in transitional Oklahoma. Population changes, urbanization, and changing economic patterns have brought new heterogeneity to a once agrarian state. Associated with heterogeneity, of course, is conflict and diversity of opinion. Russell L. Hanson (1983) hypothesizes that migration trends toward states in the Sunbelt "could transform their political institutions and policies." Oklahoma certainly seems to be a state in which the interest group universe is expanding, where old, traditional groups must now compete with new developing lobbies.

Interparty competition is increasing; voters in 1994 elected only the fourth Republican governor in the state history and going into the 1998 elections Republicans constituted 36 percent of House members and 31 percent of state Senators. In 1979 these were 24 percent for the House and 18 percent for the Senate.

THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTS OF INTEREST GROUPS IN OKLAHOMA

THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT

In 1985 Oklahoma laws regulating lobbying activities were probably best classified as only moderately stringent (England and Morgan 1993). They basically involved two requirements: registration and disclosure of expenditures. Under state statutes passed in 1978,

any person (1) who spent in excess of $250 in a calendar quarter for lobbying activities, (2) who received compensation in excess of $250 in a calendar quarter for lobbying services rendered, or (3) whose employment duties in whole or part required lobbying regardless of whether the individual was compensated for the service above normal salary, was required to register each year with the Oklahoma Ethics Commission. Employees of state agencies and local governments, however, were not included in the definition of lobbyists and were therefore not required to register to lobby (Council of State Governments 1986a; 1986b).

Oklahoma Statutes adopted in 1996 define a lobbyist as an individual (1) who is employed or retained by another for financial or other compensation to perform services that include lobbying, other than an individual whose lobbying activities are only incidental to, and not a significant part of, the services provided by such individual to the client; (2) who is seeking to do business or doing business with a governmental entity; or (3) who has a substantial financial interest in actions or matters before or affecting a governmental entity. Every lobbyist is required to register with the Ethics Commission on a lobbyist registration form during the month of January of each odd-numbered year or within five days after engaging in lobbying. Lobbyists are restricted to a $300 annual limit on items of value given to any state officer or state employee or their immediate family (Oklahoma Ethics Commission 1997).

In April 1986, 343 lobbyists were registered in Oklahoma representing more than three hundred different organizations. In 1976 only 83 lobbyists were registered. By 1997, the number of registered lobbyists in Oklahoma had grown to approximately 400.

LEGISLATOR ATTITUDES

In 1986, all 149 members of the Oklahoma legislature (101 House members and 48 Senators) were mailed a survey soliciting their views about interest groups in Oklahoma. In 1997, the same survey was mailed once again to all members of the Oklahoma legislature. In 1986, 87 members of the state legislature provided responses to some or all of the questions; in 1997, 45 Oklahoma state legislators responded to the survey.

State legislators were asked to characterize lobbyists in the Oklahoma political system along several dimensions. Specifically, we asked the lawmakers to asses (1) the honesty of lobbyists, (2) the degree to which lobbyists provide accurate information, (3) the degree to which lobbyists have a positive influence on politics, (4) the overall influence of lobbyists, and (5) the degree to which lobbyists act in the public interest. The questions were designed to capture legislators' perceptions of state lobbyists. In turn, these attitudes may affect how state lawmakers receive lobbyists. Table 1 provides both 1986 and 1997 responses of legislators to the five questions.

Results from the 1986 survey reveal that most state lawmakers hold positive attitudes about the honesty of lobbyists and feel that group representatives supply accurate information. Eleven years later, in 1997, new survey results indicate that Oklahoma state legislators hold even more positive attitudes about the honesty of lobbyists and the accuracy of information supplied by their representatives. In fact, 42 percent of those responding to the 1997 survey feel that lobbyists are "very" honest and 33 percent feel that lobbyists provide "very" accurate information, nearly doubling the percentages for these two attitudinal questions recorded a decade earlier.

Legislators are less sure, however, that such groups act in the public interest. The most recent feelings are consistent with results from the 1986 survey. In 1986, 52 percent of the legislators agreed with the statement that lobbyists did not generally act in the public interest compared to 43 percent in 1997. Additionally, in 1997 some legislators are suspect of the influence of groups; 45 percent feel that pressure groups are "somewhat" (36 percent) or "very" (9 percent) overly influential.

The legislators were asked whether they believed that stricter regulations governing lobbying are needed. Surprisingly, despite such strong feelings about the influence of pressure groups in Oklahoma, only 32 percent of state legislators in 1997 either "strongly agree" or "agree" that stricter regulations governing lobbying are required. In 1986 this was 61 percent. Legislators appear largely satisfied with the current lobbying regulations.

In sum, findings from the 1997 survey of state legislators when compared to 1986 survey results show legislators today feel that lobbyists are more honest and provide much more accurate information than they

TABLE 1

State Legislators' Attitudes about Lobbyists in Oklahoma in 1986 (N=87) and 1997 (N=42)

	Positive						Negative				
	Very		Somewhat		Uncertain		Somewhat		Very		
Lobbyists	1986	1997	1986	1997	1986	1997	1986	1997	1986	1997	Lobbyists
Are honest	22	42	64	54	7	4	7	0	0	0	Are dishonest
Provide accurate information	17	33	62	60	8	7	13	0	0	0	Provide inaccurate information
Have positive influence overall	13	22	49	58	19	13	12	5	7	2	Have negative influence overall
Are not overly influential	8	4	34	29	12	22	24	36	22	9	Are overly influential
Generally act in the public interest	5	4	28	29	15	24	32	27	20	16	Generally do not act in public interest

Note: All figures in table are percentages.

SOURCE: Authors' surveys of state legislators, 1986 and 1997

In 1997, according to the *Tulsa World's* capitol bureau correspondent Brian Ford (1997), many of the heavy hitter lobbyists today are former legislators. Don McCorkell and Don Williams became the latest additions to a group of legislators-turned-lobbyists in Oklahoma. In 1997 twenty-five of the nearly four hundred lobbyists registered with the Oklahoma State Legislature were former legislators. McCorkell, a Tulsa Democrat, became a registered lobbyist for Commercial Financial Services Inc., after running an unsuccessful campaign for the U.S. Senate. Don Williams, a Democrat from Balko and former chairman of the Senate Education Committee, now lobbies for the Oklahoma Telephone Association and Philip Morris, Inc. Former two-term Oklahoma Attorney General Larry Derryberry, who also served in the House, claims the title of top insurance lobbyist in the state. Other legislators-turned-lobbyists represent a variety of interests, ranging from the Oklahoma Pork Council to the Oklahoma State Chiropractors Association to El Paso Natural Gas Company.

By law, former U.S. Congressmen are prohibited from serving as lobbyists for one year after leaving office. No such restriction exists for former Oklahoma state legislators. Oklahoma does, however, prohibit former state legislators from obtaining state agency jobs for at least one year after leaving office. State lawmakers have authored bills in the past that attempt to place restrictions on the legislator-turned-lobbyist, but none have passed. Lobbyist and former Oklahoma City lawmaker Kenneth Nance suggests that the edge you have as a former legislator is that you not only understand the legislative process, but you also know how legislators think (Ford 1997).

We might note that some things never seem to change. Of the four 1986 "heavy hitters," Kenneth Nance is a lawyer and former state representative; Richard Huddleston is a former House administrator; and Clem McSpadden is a former President Pro Tempore of the state Senate.

INTEREST GROUP TACTICS

Lobbyists in Oklahoma employ a wide variety of techniques in their effort to influence public policy. Overwhelmingly, the locus of attention is on the legislature. Respondents to our 1986 lobbyists survey

indicated that almost 82 percent of the time spent lobbying is directed toward the legislature, another 15 percent devoted to administrative agencies and less than one percent aimed at the judiciary. In 1997, lobbyists said they devoted 77 percent of their time lobbying the legislature, 17 percent lobbying administrative agencies, and less than one percent of their efforts were aimed at the judiciary.

Following the lead of Scholzman and Tierney (1982), we asked lobbyists in Oklahoma to indicate whether they used twelve specific techniques to advance their legislative goals. They were also asked to assess the effectiveness of each tactic. Table 2 organizes lobbyists' responses into three basic categories of techniques — legislator assisting, influence seeking, and organizational-directed.

Lobbyists employ most of the twelve techniques quite frequently. With the single exception of using the press, more than two-thirds of the group representatives rely on each of the lobbying strategies. Personal contact with legislators is the most widely used tactic (97.7%), and it is also rated as the most effective by lobbyists. Of the three types of lobbying behavior, legislator-assisting techniques, which include helping draft legislation, appearing before committees, and presenting research results, receive the highest mean frequency of usage (84.5%). But the second and third most effective tactics are found in the organizational-directed category. Lobbyists rate joint lobbying by several organizations and mounting grassroots lobbying efforts as productive strategies. More than four-fifths of the lobbyists use other grassroot tactics such as letter-writing campaigns and having clients lobby legislators to reach their goals.

Given the general overall lack of variation in usage and mean effectiveness of techniques in 1986, in the 1997 survey we did not ask state lobbyists the same questions. Rather, we asked the group representatives to rank order the five most effective tactics they use to achieve their goals. Table 3 summarizes their responses.

The most effective tactics employed by Oklahoma lobbyists in 1997 mirrors those used a decade earlier. Personal contacts with legislators were identified as the most effective lobbying tactic. This finding supports the intuitive notion that this tactic is the most expedient method of influencing legislators. The lobbyists mentioned personal contacts with legislators as being the most effective technique at least twice as often (and in many cases three or even four times as often) as

TABLE 2

Lobbying Techniques Used by Oklahoma Lobbyists in 1986 (N-168)

Type of Activity and Technique	Percent Using Technique	Mean Perceived Effectiveness[a]
Legislator Assisting		
Helping draft legislation	85.1	4.0
Appearing before committees	86.9	3.5
Presenting research results	81.6	3.5
Mean score for 3 techniques[b]	84.5	3.6
Influence Seeking		
Personal contacts with legislators	97.7	4.2
Personal contacts with elected/ politically appointed executive personnel	85.1	3.7
Supporting a legislator at election time	82.0	3.7
Using the press	62.5	3.1
Mean score for 4 techniques[b]	81.8	3.7
Organizational Directed		
Mobilizing public opinion behind a bill	69.7	3.7
Letter-writing campaigns by clients or constituents	80.3	3.6
Joint lobbying by several organizations	84.6	4.0
Using clients to lobby legislators	82.8	3.9
Mounting grassroots lobbying efforts	74.5	4.0
Mean score for 5 techniques[b]	78.5	3.8

[a]Range is from 1 (ineffective) to 5 (very effective).

[b]Mean scores are for each lobbying activity area. Scores are calculated by summing percentage usage and effectiveness and dividing by the number of techniques in activity area.

SOURCE: Authors' survey of lobbyists.

almost every other available tactic. While individually personal contacts with legislators were identified as the most effective tactic employed by lobbyists, as a group influence-seeking was not the objective.

In the aggregate, lobbyists focused their activities on mobilizing public support. These tactics include efforts to gain public support for legislation, letter-writing campaigns, joint lobbying efforts, client lobbying, and general grass-roots efforts. Table 3 reveals that those techniques characterized as organizational directed were collectively the most effective lobbying tactics the lobbyists employed. The overall interpretation of the results between both the individual and group effectiveness of the various lobbying techniques indicates a remarkable consistency across the two time periods.

INTEREST GROUP POWER IN OKLAHOMA

Sarah M. Morehouse (1982), a pioneer in the study of state interest group politics, poses an important question: "How do you go about measuring the power of pressure groups?" Findings are likely to be divergent based on the respondent — political analysts of the state, legislators, lobbyists, etc. Perhaps there are no absolute answers. Interest group power may vary according to organization size, fiscal resources, lobbying skills, and frequency of contact (Truman 1971). Similarly, legislators' representational role orientations may affect their responsiveness to pressure group activities. Since the legislative agenda is dynamic, interest group involvement in politics may vary over time as well. With these caveats in mind, in this section we first provide a brief overview of the literature focusing on interest groups in Oklahoma. Next we summarize the groups identified as the most powerful in 1986 based on legislators' perceptions. Finally, we offer a reassessment of group power based on legislators' perceptions in 1997.

TABLE 3

Most Effective Lobbying Techniques used by Oklahoma Lobbyists in 1997 (N=124)

Type of Activity and Technique	Rank: No. of 1st Rank Mentions	No. of 2nd Rank Mentions	No. of 3rd Rank Mentions	No. of 4th Rank Mentions	No. of 5th Rank Mentions	N	Weighted Score[a]	
Legislator Assisting								
Helping draft legislation	6	1	6	7	10	30	76	
Appearing before committees	9	1	9	10	6	35	102	
Presenting research results	5	2	7	6	8	28	74	
Mean score for 3 techniques								2.69
Influence Seeking								
Personal contacts with legislators	23	56	12	9	4	104	397	
Personal contacts with elected/ politically appointed executive personnel	8	3	10	10	6	37	108	
Supporting a legislator at election time	12	4	18	9	11	54	159	
Using the press	0	0	1	7	7	15	24	
Mean score for 4 techniques								2.82

TABLE 3 (continued)

Most Effective Lobbying Techniques Used by Oklahoma Lobbyists in 1997 (N=124)

Type of Activity and Technique	Rank					N	Weighted Score[a]	
	No. of 1st Rank Mentions	No. of 2nd Rank Mentions	No. of 3rd Rank Mentions	No. of 4th Rank Mentions	No. of 5th Rank Mentions			
Organizational Directed								
Mobilizing public opinion behind a bill	5	15	11	3	6	40	130	
Letterwriting campaigns by clients or constitutents	11	1	10	4	9	35	106	
Joint lobbying by several organizations	15	7	9	17	13	61	177	
Using clients to lobby legislators	10	13	10	11	11	55	165	
Mounting grassroots lobbying efforts	9	15	12	14	12	62	181	
Mean score for 5 techniques								3.02

[a]Derived by multiplying number of 1st rank mentions by 5, 2nd rank mentions by 4, 3rd rank mentions by 3, 4th rank mentions by 2, 5th rank mentions by 1 and summing products.

SOURCE: Authors' survey of lobbyists.

GROUP POWER: PREVIOUS ASSESSMENTS

Previous research suggests that a limited number of pressure groups have played a prominent role in Oklahoma politics. In 1947, for example, American journalist John Gunther (1947) identified five groups that he claimed "all . . . [had] something to do with running Oklahoma": the Baptist church, oil interests, the aged (the welfare lobby), education, and local officials. Similarly, writing about Oklahoma politics in the 1960s, Jones (1974) surmised that these five groups were still dominant and added two new powerful interests: labor unions and newspapers. Samuel Patterson (1962) found that lobbyists registered with the House of Representatives in 1961 primarily represented business, farm, labor and governmental groups. Finally, in her comparative interest group study, Sarah Morehouse (1982) asserted that oil interests, local officials, power companies (utilities), and transportation associations are the powerbrokers in Oklahoma.

Only Patterson's assessment is based on empirical data. Gunther isolated salient groups on his travels through the state in the early 1940s. Jones's analysis of group power in the 1960s is an extensive elaboration of Gunther's earlier work but still largely impressionistic in nature. Morehouse (1982, 112) identified significant groups according "to the judicious consideration of . . . available evidence."Perhaps a more appropriate way to measure group strength is to ask legislators, the principal target of lobbying efforts, to list and rank the most influential interest groups in the state. We did just that.

GROUP POWER IN THE LEGISLATURE: 1986

To assess interest group power, members of the state legislature were asked to list and rank the most influential or successful interest groups in recent legislative sessions. Table 4 shows state legislators' perceptions of influential lobbies in Oklahoma in 1986.

Four lobbies emerged as the most powerful. In rank-order by their weighted influence scores, they are education, labor, professional groups, and banking/finance. Only two of these lobbies have been deemed significant in previous analyses of interest groups in Oklahoma: education

TABLE 4

State Legislators' Perceptions of Influential Lobbies in Oklahoma in 1986 (N=87)

	Legislators' Rankings					
Lobby	No. of 1st Rank Mentions	No. of 2nd Rank Mentions	No. of 3rd Rank Mentions	No. of 4th Rank Mentions	Total No. of Mentions	Weighted Influence Score[a]
Education	54	10	12	8	84	278
Labor	7	16	14	10	47	114
Professional groups	4	16	12	15	47	103
Banking/Finance	7	13	5	5	30	82
Public Employees	2	6	5	2	15	38
Oil	2	2	7	8	19	36
Business	3	4	2	6	15	34
Agriculture	2	1	6	6	15	29
Realtors/ Insurance	3	1	3	3	10	24
Human Services	0	3	3	4	10	19
Communications/ Transportation	0	4	2	0	6	16
Utilities	1	1	2	4	8	15
Senior Citizens	0	2	2	3	7	13
City-County Officials	0	2	2	1	5	9
Media	0	1	1	2	4	7
Construction	1	0	0	1	2	5
Other	0	0	3	2	5	8

[a]Derived by multiplying number of 1st rank mentions by 4, 2nd rank mentions by 3, 3rd rank mentions by 2, 4th rank mentions by 1 and summing products.

SOURCE: Authors' calculations from 1986 survey of state legislators.

and labor. Banking/finance and professional groups seem to be the new powerbrokers. Also, every lobby, with the single exception of church interests, identified as prominent in the past was influential in 1986. Given 1986 legislative rankings, however, it seems that the traditionally accorded status of some groups is questionable. For example, oil and agriculture are in the middle of the influence hierarchy. Other interests, such as transportation, utilities, senior citizens, local officials, and the media (newspapers), though still successful, have low aggregate influence scores.

Two generalizations seem plausible from these findings. First, in support of our original thesis, the interest group universe in Oklahoma appears to be in transition. Second and highly related, the power of some traditionally influential groups in the state is changing, either in intensity or in locus of attention. Based on previous studies, findings from our survey of state legislators, and our own understanding of state politics, in 1986 we argued that the "influential group universe" in Oklahoma consisted of ten groups. They can be organized into three categories: (1) traditional, continuing power, (2) traditional, declining power, and (3) nontraditional, emerging power.

Traditional, Continuing Power Groups. In 1986 we put four groups in the traditional, with continuing power category: education, labor, newspapers, and local officials. According to Jones (1974, 176), education "is probably the strongest lobby or pressure group in Oklahoma." Based on our analysis, we concur. The education lobby received fifty-four first rank mentions as the most influential group in the state by legislators, almost eight times the number of its closest rivals — labor and banking/finance. Education's power expressed as a weighted influence score also suggests that the interest be in an "influential class" all by itself.

The power of education in public affairs is somewhat paradoxical. Oklahoma does not rate particularly high nationally on educational indicators. For example, in 1984 Oklahoma ranked 31st among the states in per pupil expenditure for elementary and secondary schools and tied for 39th in average annual salaries for public elementary and secondary classroom teachers (Statistical Abstract 1985). Nevertheless, as Gunther (1947, 881) commented in 1947, teachers in Oklahoma are "sophisticated politically and highly vocal." Also, in recent years, legislators and state

leaders increasingly have acknowledged the importance of education in economic development.

Although Oklahoma seems an unlikely state where labor should be powerful, in the mid-1980s it ranked 43rd nationally in percentage of nonagricultural employees belonging to labor organizations — labor interests have a long and active history in state politics. For a number of years labor has been the beneficiary of sympathetic support from key leadership in the state legislature (Jones 1974; Patterson 1962). Important legislative leaders, for example, helped defeat right-to-work legislation in 1961 and have kept it from reaching a vote of the full legislature in recent years.

The third group in this category is newspapers. Although Table 4 shows a low weighted influence score for the media, as Frosty Troy, editor of the *Oklahoma Observer* and longtime commentator on state politics surmised in a January 1987 interview with the authors, "There is not a lobby more feared among legislators than the newspapers." Particularly influential is the *Daily Oklahoman*. E. K. Gaylord, founder and publisher of the newspaper, is considered one of the state's patriarchs. Until his death in 1974 at the age of 101, Gaylord played an important role in state affairs. In 1947 Gunther (1947, 881) went as far as to assert that Gaylord was "the nearest thing to a boss the city [Oklahoma City] has." Similarly, commenting on the power of Gaylord through the 1960s, Jones claims, "Whatever position Gaylord supports usually wins" (Jones 1974, 187). The domineering and much-feared titan was succeeded by his son, E. L. Gaylord, who has carried on his father's powerful influence.

The final group is local officials. Associated with Oklahoma's traditionalistic political culture is the importance of local interests in state politics. The power of local officials appears quite stable and may even be increasing. Despite the fact that county government was recently the focus of national attention in the wake of widespread corruption, county commissioners remain a political force. Simply put, they can still help "deliver the votes."

Traditional, Declining Power Groups. Historically, three other groups have been especially prominent in state affairs. They continue to be important, but in 1986 their influence seemed to be diminishing or changing in locus. Perhaps the most important is the Baptist church. In Oklahoma, a state with a strong fundamentalist religious orientation, the

Baptist church has been a powerful force in state and local politics. But church interests seem to be losing vitality. In recent years voters approved liquor-by-the-drink (1984) and pari-mutuel betting (1985), long opposed by the Baptists and other conservative Protestant denominations. It is interesting to note, however, that in recent years a state lottery initiative as well as off-track betting (1998) failed in a statewide vote.

Two other groups are also categorized as traditional but declining in influence: agriculture and the energy lobby. These two interests represent, of course, the paramount economic interests of the past. Since 1982 the oil industry in Oklahoma has been in a deep recession. Agricultural interests have fared similarly. The influence of both groups, however, may not be attenuating as much as it is changing location. Jones (1974, 175) argues, for example, that "the influence of oil in Oklahoma is more readily evident on the national scene . . . than on the state scene."

Because agricultural policy, like energy legislation, is in many respects nationally defined, the hypothesis that agribusiness interests have been nationalized could be advanced. Regardless of whether one accepts our argument, there is no doubt that agriculture and mineral extraction activities no longer hold the premier positions of power they enjoyed in the past. Both groups, however, continued to be ranked as influential by state legislators in 1986; oil had the sixth highest weighted influence score and agriculture the eighth. In contrast, new groups seem to be growing in power along with Oklahoma's transitional economy.

Nontraditional, Emerging Power Groups. In 1986, three groups were included in this nontraditional, emerging power category: professional groups (primarily lawyers and doctors), banking/finance, and business. The three types of interests were ranked by legislators in 1986, respectively, as the third, fourth, and seventh most influential lobbies in Oklahoma. Only one of the groups, business, has been mentioned in previous research as important. The emerging power of these three lobbies illustrates the thesis that interest group power in Oklahoma is in transition. The fact that legislators rank these types of interests as influential adds support to Steffen (1982) and Hale's (1982) contentions that the state is in the midst of economic change. As the economic base of the state moves from a reliance on activities tied to the land to one on manufacturing and services, lobbying activities by business interests and

service-oriented professional groups that are regulated by state laws are likely also to increase.

That state legislators consider banking/finance as an important lobby is not surprising. Since the failure of the Penn Square Bank in 1982, more than fifty other banks in the state have either failed or been declared insolvent, more than twenty alone in 1987. The troubles of banking and finance enterprises have been directly linked to the sagging oil and agriculture economies in the state. In response, the state legislature has been heavily involved in matters of concern to financial interests. Lawmakers recently approved out-of-state ownership of local banks and branch banking, for instance.

GROUP POWER IN OKLAHOMA: 1997

In order to offer a reassessment of powerful interest groups in Oklahoma, in 1997 we once again asked members of the state legislature to list and rank the most influential or successful interest groups in recent legislative sessions. Table 5 summarizes the results of the survey data. Like Table 4, Table 5 shows the number of first through fourth rank mentions and a weighted influence score (WIS) for each lobby.

First, we should note that when compared to 1986, the interest group universe as well as the powerful lobbies in the state had not changed considerably by 1997. In 1997, two groups emerge as the most powerful — education and professional groups. Education, like in 1986, is in a class by itself, with a weighted influence score (WIS) of 114. The third ranked interest group in 1986 emerges as the second most powerful group in 1997 (based on its weighted influence score) — professional groups. Following these two lobbies, are three traditionally powerful groups in Oklahoma politics. Labor has a WIS of 37 and is ranked third in 1997 (second rank in 1986). Agriculture has a WIS of 35 and has a fourth rank in 1997 (eighth rank in 1986). And business has a WIS of 32 and a fifth rank in 1997 (seventh rank in 1986).

Next comes a group of four lobbies that have weighted influence scores in the twenties and high teens — telecommunications, oil, utilities, and banking/finance. Finally, other influential lobbies according to state legislators, but that have lower weighted index scores, are human services/health care, insurance, government officials, and senior citizens.

TABLE 5

State Legislators' Perceptions of Influential Lobbies in Oklahoma in 1997 (N=45)

	Legislators' Rankings[a]						
Groups	Rank In 1986	No. of 1st Rank Mentions	No. of 2nd Rank Mentions	No. of 3rd Rank Mentions	No. of 4th Rank Mentions	Total No. of Mentions	Weighted Influence Score (WIS)[b]
Education	1	20	6	6	4	36	114
Professional groups	3	7	7	5	7	26	66
Labor[c]	2	1	4	8	5	18	37
Agriculture	8	2	5	5	2	14	35
Business	7	3	3	3	5	14	32
Telecommunications	11	3	2	3	2	10	26
Oil	6	2	5	0	1	8	24
Utilities	12	2	0	4	4	10	20
Banking/Finance	4	1	3	2	1	7	18

TABLE 5 (continued)

State Legislators' Perceptions of Influential Lobbies in Oklahoma in 1997 (N=45)

	Legislators' Rankings[a]						
Groups	Rank In 1986	No. of 1st Rank Mentions	No. of 2nd Rank Mentions	No. of 3rd Rank Mentions	No. of 4th Rank Mentions	Total No. of Mentions	Weighted Inbluence Score (WIS)[b]
Healthcare/Human Services	10	0	2	3	1	6	13
Insurance	9	1	1	1	0	3	12
City-County officials and Indian Tribes	14	0	2	0	3	5	9
Senior Citizens	13	0	1	1	2	4	7
Other		0	3	0	3	6	9

[a]Total number of times each lobby was ranked 1st through 4th most influential in recent legislative session by state legislators.
[b]Derived by multiplying number of 1st rank mentions by 4, 2nd rank mentions by 3, 3rd rank mentions by 2, 4th rank mentions by 1 and summing products.
[c]Unlike in 1986, in 1997 public employees were included in the labor category.

SOURCE: 1997 survey of state legislators.

Based on previous studies, findings from our survey of state legislators in 1986, and our own understanding of state politics, in 1997 we argue that the influential group universe in Oklahoma consists of two general types of groups — traditional, continuing lobbies; and continuing, emerging lobbies.

Traditional, Continuing Power Groups. In our opinion, seven groups belong to this category — education, oil, agribusiness, business, labor, government officials, and the media. Education continues to be recognized as *the* most influential lobbying group in Oklahoma. The continued strength of the educational lobby a decade later is still somewhat ironic. Oklahoma's national rankings on educational indicators are even lower today than they were in the 1980s. As of 1996-1997, Oklahoma ranked 46th among the states in per pupil expenditure for elementary and secondary schools and 46th in average annual salaries for public elementary and secondary classroom teachers (Hovey and Hovey 1998). But, the primary theme underlying the powerful emerging lobbies, as well as the more traditional lobbies in Oklahoma, is economic development and diversification of the state's economic base. The importance of education to the process of economic development appears to remain a stimulus for the support and influence of these groups.

Another traditional, continuing lobby is the oil industry, which seems to have rebounded from the crash of the early 1980s. In recent years it seems, based on legislator's perceptions, the oil lobby has reemerged as a prominent group at the state capitol. The obvious conclusion that can be drawn from this is that oil will always be important in Oklahoma.

Agricultural issues have also seen resurgence at the state House. While agricultural policy has always been a major part of Oklahoma's heritage and captured immense national attention, the focus today is not to lobby for price supports or subsidies. Rather, in the last year or so agribusiness has become big business in the state of Oklahoma primarily through corporate hog and chicken farms. The recent rise in corporate farming throughout the state may be considered one of the new economic development initiatives in the state. Some environmentalists and citizen groups are up in arms, however, about the potential harm of these enterprises to the environment due to the smell and other social costs associated with corporate animal farming. The winners and losers in this battle will not be defined in the nation's capitol, but rather they will be decided in Oklahoma City.

The business lobby and labor lobby, although seemingly incompatible, still remain traditional powerful lobbies in the state. Both in 1986 and 1997, business lobbies were perceived by legislators as moderately powerful groups. Labor slipped slightly from second rank in terms of the weighted influence score in 1986 to third in 1997. Labor remains impressive, however, in its continued ability to prevent right-to-work legislation from being passed in the state legislature. Teachers' unions, firefighters and police unions/associations, and state employees remain active and vocal in Oklahoma politics.

The last two groups in this category of traditional, continuing groups are government officials (city/county officials and Indian Tribes) and the media. City and county officials remain prominent lobbies at the state House. The county courthouses are still the centers of "real politics." The Oklahoma Municipal League effectively represents the needs of local officials.

The absence of the media among the most effective lobbies in the state is worthy of mentioning. The influence of this lobby was so strong just a decade ago that it was noted that legislators were "fearful" of it. In 1997, not a single legislator identified the media as an influential lobby in the state. Nevertheless, we steadfastly assert that the media (i.e., newspapers) remain very influential in state politics.

Continuing, Emerging Power Groups. It appears that the nontraditional emerging groups we identified in 1986 have arrived. In fact, in 1997 we refer to these groups as continuing, emerging. These groups include professional groups (second 1997 rank, WIS=66), telecommunications (sixth rank, WIS=26), utilities (eighth rank, WIS=20) banking and finance (ninth rank, WIS=18), human services/healthcare (tenth rank, WIS=13), and insurance (eleventh rank, WIS=9). All of these lobbies reflect the diversification of the state's economic base.

These lobbies and the groups they represent are essential to the current and long-term development of the state, economically and socially. In fact, one could argue that the group category name could be changed from continuing, emerging groups to simply economic development.

Most prominent of the continued, emerging lobbies is professional groups. These groups, as identified by state legislators, are primarily doctors and lawyers. In recent years these professional groups have

been very active in large political battles such as tort reform, workers compensation reform, truth in sentencing, regulation of the professions.

Advancements in technology in many respects are responsible for propelling some of the other groups to positions of elevated power in the state. The increased demand for better and faster communications certainly accounts for the elevated status of the telecommunications lobby. Advancements in laser technology, for example, appear to be at the heart of a current debate raging in the state between the optometrists and the opthamologists.

These findings regarding the nontraditional emerging powers vividly echo the sentiments of one member of the Oklahoma State Senate. The legislator mentioned to us that the perceived strength of groups in Oklahoma is highly dependent on current issues. It was noted that the influence of groups is better identified within the context of the "hot" issues facing the legislature. Thus, while traditional lobbies such as education, labor, oil, and agriculture plod along with generally fixed agendas, issues facing the new emerging lobbies such as professional groups, telecommunications, banking and finance, and healthcare are more dynamic and transitory. We would reiterate that the constant among these groups is the strong nexus to the state's attempt to improve its economic base.

CONCLUSION

Oklahoma has been characterized as a "strong" pressure group state, where a few "significant groups" in the past have been successful in achieving favorable policy responses (Morehouse 1982). We agree with this characterization of interest groups in the Oklahoma political system. Survey data presented here indicate that groups deemed influential in the past are currently actively engaged in lobbying and that legislators rate the influence of interest groups in the legislative process as important. A sizable number of legislators felt that lobbyists were "somewhat" or "very" overly influential in state politics, 46 percent in 1986 and 45 percent in 1997. Moreover, 52 percent of legislators in 1986 and 43 percent of legislators in 1997 "somewhat agree" or "very much" agree with the statement that lobbyists generally do not act in the public interest.

Disagreement would surely arise over which interests in the state are the most powerful. Most observers over the years have recognized education as one of the strongest state lobbies. The Oklahoma Education Association, with its membership of over 45,000 teachers and administrators, in particular, has long been identified as among the most active groups in the state. Legislators as the overall most influential pressure group also singled out education both in 1986 and 1997. In fact, giving the number of first ranks mention by legislators in both 1986 and 1997, the education lobby is in a class by itself. Labor continues to be strong in the state, second ranked in 1986 and third rank in 1997. Business, professional groups, and banking/finance follow these two lobbies. The latter two interests traditionally have not been recognized as among the state's more powerful groups. Even though Oklahoma still depends quite heavily on oil and agriculture, the appearance of these two new powers suggests that the state has indeed caught up in the overall national trends toward a service and information economy. And though these particular issues may recede, it seems likely that state interests organized around the service, financial, and information sectors of the economy will remain powerful forces for some time to come.

Oil still accounts for a substantial portion of Oklahoma State taxes. And no one doubts agriculture's critical contribution to the state's economy will continue, especially given new state laws that authorize large corporate hog and chicken farms. But these traditional interests no longer dominate the policy agenda at the state capital. No doubt, as the state's economy is transformed, the interests represented in the halls of the legislature will also change.

How long Oklahoma will remain a state in which interest groups occupy a dominate/complimentary position in state politics is a question of debate. The interest group universe continues to expand. While some interests persist (e.g., education, labor, oil, agriculture), others seem to be declining (e.g., church interests, newspapers). But as new interests and new demands related to the state's changing economy make their presence felt, group influence is likely to become more diversified and pluralistic, characteristics often associated with moderate or low interest group power in state affairs. In the final analysis, as Oklahoma continues to mature and develop economically, service, professional, business, banking/finance, telecommunications, and utility lobbies will continue to grow in power. In addition, since a trained and well-educated labor force

is essential for economic development, the education lobby will continue to dominate the group universe in Oklahoma.

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Donley T. Studler, *Great Britain: Decline or Renewal?* (Boulder, Westview Press, 1996) pp 256. $19.95 ISBN 0813315093 (paperback)

For most Americans, the British political system is a paradox. On the one hand it is the best known foreign country. The similarity of language makes Britain the most visited by American tourists and the most prominent country in American newspapers. On the other hand, the organization and style of politics is vastly different. Nowhere do the basic institutions of parliamentary democracy differ so sharply from the American presidential system as in Great Britain. Class distinctions permeate British politics in dramatic contrast to American populism.

Given the American fascination with British society, there is a compelling case for a textbook that would introduce university students to the fundamental aspects of politics in that country and clarify some of these contrasts. Donley Studlar has written such a text, and its insights and perspective will be useful for instructors as well as undergraduates. Britain is typically one of the countries included in survey courses of comparative politics or specialized courses in European democracies. Those who teach these courses will find a wealth of insights that breathe life into British politics and address issues such as why the British monarchy seems so peculiar in its behavior, how England lost the world's largest colonial empire, and why Britain continues to play a prominent role in world affairs with a relatively weak economy.

Studlar views these questions as paradoxes that defy explanation based on the typical understanding of British politics and he searches deeper to unravel the puzzles. The typical account of the British system holds that tradition and deference to an educated elite comprise the mortar in the wall of British society. British politics, therefore, is supposed to be

relatively conservative in character, operating according to unwritten rules that are obeyed because everyone knows them without speaking them aloud. Studlar counters that within this general understanding there is actually much room in which political leaders have freedom to operate. Freedom allows them to pursue quick changes in policy direction when necessary and adapt rapidly to new circumstances. They do not always choose wisely, however, and a system that allows for dramatic reversals of policy can allow decisions to get fairly far along before they are corrected. Thus the major contribution of Studlar's book is to describe and explain key aspects of British public policy.

The discussion is organized in a conventional way, with chapters devoted to foreign affairs, economic policy, social welfare, and the vehement debate over the breakdown in civic morality. The chapter titles alone are provocative and indicate the important paradoxes the author seeks to explain. The chapter on foreign policy is titled "From Great Power to European Periphery," and explains how an establishment ill-equipped to recognize the importance of global change adhered to a nineteenth century notion of British imperialism while their empire crumbled around them. Studlar suggests that conflict between traditional notions of national interest and a new cadre of global thinkers splits the establishment on issues such as European integration.

The chapter on economic policy is titled "From Industrial Giant to Britaly." It is an examination of the decline of British industry (ship building, coal and textiles) in the postwar period. The chapter title is an unflattering reference to the parallels between Britain and Italy, another European country noted for its inability to adapt to a post-industrial service economy because of rent-seeking and complacency among those who should be entrepreneurs.

"From Leader to Laggard" is the title of a chapter that traces the tumultuous adjustment in the British welfare state. After World War II Britain was hailed as the world's most progressive innovator in social policy, adopting a universal system of health care and providing basic pension assistance for the elderly. Over the last twenty years the system has been much maligned and has undergone dramatic privatization. Opinion is divided on whether the rising levels of poverty and decline in health standards justify the reforms.

British society's awkward adjustment to these changes provides the theme for a chapter subtitled "From Public Morality to Social

Permissiveness." New immigrants from the former colonies challenge the historic tradition of assuming that all social truths are self-evident to everyone. Brits themselves are less inclined to be deferential to political leaders.

The result has been a rise in uncivil behavior, ranging from crime to direct action campaigns. The official response to these developments has reflected changes taking place across Europe. States take on a greater regulatory role as society demonstrates it is unable to regulate itself.

Studlar concludes that all these changes have made it more difficult for the political elite to set the policy agenda beset by pressures imposed by global changes. Also, a more discerning and demanding public scrutinizes its decisions more carefully and has less patience for elite arrogance.

Britain is nowhere near a political crisis, but the challenges it faces are perhaps the most numerous and acute it has faced in the last century. Institutional responses to the pressures have led to the devolution of political power to regions, particularly Scotland and Wales, as well as a greater acceptance of directives from the European Union. For a country steeped in tradition, however, the adjustment is not easy.

This book does a marvelous job of placing all these pressures and responses in their proper historic and global context. Thus Donley Studlar has managed to write a book that is a probing examination of an important country, and he has placed that country in a broader comparative perspective.

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Sandra Faiman-Silva, *Choctaws at the Crossroads: The Political Economy of Class and Culture in the Oklahoma Timber Region.* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997) pp. 273. $45.00
ISBN 0803220014

In the early 1980s Sandra Faiman-Silva, then a doctoral student in anthropology, lived near Talihina, Oklahoma. She took advantage of her location, receiving a grant from the National Science Foundation to investigate the lives of Choctaw Indians living in the timber region of southeastern Oklahoma (mostly in Pushmataha and McCurtain Counties). This book is the product of her efforts. She used detailed survey instruments and on-site visits as part of her investigation. Also, she conducted an extensive review of existing literature, supplemented with considerable archival research at libraries and in county court houses. She also drew upon several theoretical models to structure her findings. The result is a comprehensive discussion of the Choctaws in the timber region and a solid estimation of the condition of the Choctaw tribe today.

Faiman-Silva uses roughly the first half of the book to discuss various theoretical models and to describe the social, economic, and political history of the Choctaws. The author especially endorses those theoretical models that emphasize world-systems and neo-Marxist explanations. She admires the original Choctaw system, which was "rooted in kinship idioms, reciprocity, and gender complementarity" (p.19). Through a dialectical change process, the Choctaws were reduced from a sovereign nation to a dependent domestic nation to a tribe to a marginalized ethnic enclave. Most recently, according to Faiman-Silva, the Weyerhaeuser timber corporation and Tyson Foods–both multinational

corporations–have devised policies of exploitation that has kept the Choctaws and others in southeastern Oklahoma in a pre-proletariat condition. Many Choctaws are currently exploited by multinational corporations and the harsh realities of a new global economy.

Faiman-Silva's discussion of the history of the Choctaws draws upon solid sources. She describes the pre-contact conditions in Mississippi, the early European confrontations, the use of the factory system to make the Choctaws dependent, demands for land cessions, and the removal from their southeastern homelands. She then covers the antebellum golden era and the horrors of the Civil War in Indian Territory. Finally, she explains the process of forced allotment and subsequent alienation of Choctaw lands in the early twentieth century. These first chapters of the book dealing with history suffer from some small errors and vagueness. For example, she over simplifies the full-blood, mixed-blood arguments about removal. She also incorrectly indicates that the Reconstruction Treaties with the federal government in 1866 created the first federal courts in Indian Territory (p. 62) and mistakenly implies that railroad land grant legislation applied to the Choctaw Nation (p.77).

Another flaw of the book is the repetition found throughout. In the early chapters, the theoretical considerations seem unnecessarily redundant, which makes for tedious reading at times. Likewise, the second half of the book suffers from repetition of recent and contemporary patterns among the Choctaws. In all, a reduction of about one fourth of the verbiage in the book would have improved the outcome.

The most useful information in the book comes in the later chapters. Here Faiman-Silva reports her findings of the extensive surveys she conducted, which included fifty households over an eighteen-month period from 1980 to 1982. The data of the surveys included the number of residents in the home, details of the condition of the dwelling, income of the residents, and a variety of economic conditions of each home. The family surveys revealed several clear patterns, Both nuclear and extended families crowded into inadequate houses, some resorting to living in unimproved shacks that surround the old Indian churches in the area. Also, the incomes were seldom adequate to meet basic needs, reflecting

chronic underemployment and unemployment.

The last few chapters describe the economic practices of the Weyerhaeuser Corporation and Tyson Foods, current conditions of the tribal government, and recent attempts by the tribe to provide economic benefits to the Choctaws. Weyerhaeuser has followed strategies of downsizing the workforce, outsourcing a considerable amount of the cutting and planting of the forests, and making strong demands on the remaining unionized workforce. Consequently, few full time job opportunities above minimum wage have been available for the Choctaws of the timber region.

Throughout the 1980s and even more so in the 1990s, the Choctaw tribal government has followed a policy of economic development to deal with many of the problems of tribal members. Bingo palaces, truck plazas, partnerships with various industries, community health centers, and other new institutions and practices have led to greater self-sufficiency for the Choctaws. Still, however, the new jobs created by the tribe remain unskilled service employment, and many of the economic enterprises–such as gambling operations–remain precarious due to politics and competition. The welfare and selfhelp services now provided by the tribe have become necessary due to the severe governmental cut backs in services, a product of President Ronald Reagan's New Federalism.

All in all, Faiman-Silva's book is an insightful and helpful discussion of the conditions of the Choctaws who live in the timber region and of the tribe as a whole. It is an important addition of knowledge that updates the story of the lives of the Choctaws who live in the most culturally "Choctaw" portion of Oklahoma. Historians and anthropologists dealing with the tribe must include the book with the other standard studies. Public administrators and social service workers will find the work especially helpful in dealing not only with Choctaws but also with other tribal groups.

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Jeffrey D. Hockett, *New Deal Justice: The Constitutional Jurisprudence of Hugo L. Black, Felix Frankfurter, and Robert H. Jackson* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996) pp. 322.
$67.50 ISBN 0847682102 (hardcover);
$24.95 ISBN 0847682110 (paperback)

The first thing to note about *New Deal Justice* is that the subtitle describes the book far better than the title. In the work, Jeffrey Hockett, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Tulsa, provides an excellent study of the constitutional jurisprudence of three significant justices: Hugo Black, Felix Frankfurter, and Robert Jackson. He compares and contrasts the justices, arguing that they are best understood in light of their ideological backgrounds.

Hockett begins by providing a broad sketch of the historical and cultural background preceding the justices' arrival on the Court. He briefly describes pre-industrial America, focusing on the roles of political parties, lawyers, and courts in an era marked by decentralized authority. He then explores the effects of industrialization and the Populist and Progressive movements that arose to combat the worst of these effects.

After setting the historical context, Hockett turns to his three subjects. In each case he provides a biography of the justice's pre-Court years before examining his jurisprudence and voting record. He argues that their experiences formed their ideologies, which in turn affected their judicial performances.

For instance, Hockett argues that Hugo Black's participation in Alabama Populist politics caused him to develop a hierarchical view of society. Once on the Court, he adopted a "profoundly result-oriented" jurisprudence aimed at antihierarchical ends (15). Black disguised his result-oriented jurisprudence by claiming to adhere to a "literalist" approach to the Constitution that required him to decide cases without

regard to his personal preferences but which, Hockett suggests, almost always led him to vote in an antihierarchical manner.

Felix Frankfurter, on the other hand, was deeply influenced by his involvement in the Progressive politics of the Northeast. His view that modern society was enormously complex and interdependent, along with his skepticism about the fact-finding ability of courts, led him toalmost always defer to elected officials and administrative agents. Frankfurter's famous but rare departures from this doctrine, such as where he advocated striking down actions of officials iftheir conduct "shocks the conscious," are merely exceptions that prove the rule.

Finally, Hockett argues that Robert Jackson, the last person appointed to the Court who did not have a college or law degree, was tremendously influenced by the "court-centered thought patterns of the pre-industrial legal community (215)." Jackson learned his law as an apprentice from lawyers who had him read the great nineteenth century treatise writers (most notably James Kent), study the common law, and practice law in county courts where facts were of central importance. His education led him to embrace a pragmatic jurisprudence that emphasized judicial supremacy and a respect for minority rights. Significantly, Hockett argues, contrary to received wisdom, that Jackson's role as U.S. Chief Prosecutor at the Nuremberg Nazi War Crime Trials, did not change the substance of his jurisprudence.

This brief summary does not do justice to Hockett's long and extensive discussion of Black, Frankfurter, and Jackson. He examines virtually every important case decided by the justices and he carefully compares and contrasts their opinions. Further, he discusses each justice in the light of the relevant secondary literature, which in the case of Black and Frankfurter is no small feat.

Hockett's analysis is generally persuasive, although I am not convinced that Black's jurisprudence is as "profoundly result oriented" as he suggests. Hockett admits that there are numerous instances where Black's decisions went against his personal preferences (e.g. *Griswold v. Connecticut*), and it seems plausible that in other areas, such as his First Amendment jurisprudence and his view of incorporation, that he sincerely believed he was merely interpreting the Constitution literally. Hockett's analysis of Frankfurter and Jackson is thoroughly convincing, however, and his discussion of Jackson will go a long way toward remedying that justice's undeserved neglect.

In the final analysis Hockett provides an excellent study of the constitutional jurisprudence of Hugo Black, Felix Frankfurter, and Robert Jackson. His book will obviously be of interest to students of these justices, but it will also be valuable to political scientists, historians, and academic lawyers who study or teach about this period of the Supreme Court's history.

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Gregory M. Scott. *Political Science: Foundations for a Fifth Millennium.* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1997), pp 425. $ 48.00 ISBN 0132075725

It is rare when introductory texts for political science are not structured around the themes of institutions and processes. For the seasoned political scientists such works seldom stimulate our way of thinking or teaching about the fundamental concepts in our discipline. Gregory Scott informs his readers that there can be an alternative approach organized around the progress and accomplishments in the field. Institutions, ideologies, and methodologies are still discussed, but Scott offers a unique, and at times challenging perspective which will enlighten students and scholars alike. Nevertheless, there are instances, though few in number, where this reader would like to have seen Scott go further in his quest to have students think creatively and imaginatively about political science.

After the first chapter prepares students for their first foray into politics, the author devotes time to a detailed summary of the history of political science. Beginning with primitive peoples' early self-awareness and their conceptions of good and evil, this retrospective moves from the ancient Hebrew and Greek eras of two millennia ago to what Scott calls the current, "era of eclecticism." The journey not only provides a glimpse of where political science has been, but also where it might be headed in the future. Scott's discussion of our era, whose beginning he traces to around 1970, is especially important because of his defense of the discipline. Many non-political scientists, and some political scientists for that matter, have lamented the lack of general theory and methodology and cohesiveness in the field. All too often, this absence of general theory

is assumed to be a weakness. Much to his credit, Scott disputes that claim, insisting instead that this is an era of creative potential which finds us borrowing a variety of ideas from every branch of knowledge, thereby providing political scientists with challenging and exciting opportunities.

The next three chapters deal with what can be characterized as essential elements in political science: major issues, ideologies, and institutions and processes. Issues such as equality, authority, and justice are treated in a thorough and thought-provoking manner. The important theorists and their ideas are compared with one another. It should be noted though, that while this book is intended to be an introduction to the field, the discussion of the major ideas is generally at a level which may be a bit beyond the capabilities of some first-year political science students. For example, the examination of Erik Erikson's stages of development complicates what could be an easier discussion of community and individuality, especially given the target audience. While the political issues section requires careful reading, the chapters on ideologies and institutions and processes are clear and well done. Especially insightful is the author's use of the comparative method to explore the political institutions and processes of the United States and Israel and North and South Korea.

It is the section on how to study politics where Scott seems to fall short in his mission to encourage students to think imaginatively about political science. Rather than pushing the frontiers of the discipline, his discussion of approaches and methodologies reinforces the notion that quantitative research is more desirable. The author does briefly discuss some qualitative methods, but his chapter is titled simply, "*Quantitative Methodology,*" and that body of research is described as more value-free, objective, and fact-based. This emphasis, coupled with his use of Gabriel Almond's dichotomy between "soft" (i.e., descriptive) and "hard" (i.e., quantitative) methodologies, may lead those who are new to political science to conclude that qualitative methods are somehow weaker. If political science is in an era of eclecticism, characterized by theoretical and methodological borrowing, it seems illogical to gloss over or ignore the effect that in-depth and open-ended interviews, discoarse analysis, q methodology, participant observations, and historical analysis, among others, have had on the discipline. Moreover, what better way of encouraging students to think thoughtfully and creatively than by introducing them to alternative methodologies.

Despite a slip in the "approaches" section, Scott rebounds with an excellent overview of the subfields and new developments in political science. To compliment a general summary for each subfield, the author also includes a recently published article which provides an opportunity for critical analysis and discussion. By way of conclusion, Scott turns to the innovative and engaging studies being done throughout the discipline today. Drawing upon recent APSA panels, the author highlights different activities and debates taking place within sectional divisions of the field (e.g., urban politics, comparative politics of developing countries, presidency research, political economy, etc.). Attempting to show both the breadth and depth of the discipline, Scott proves his assertion that we are indeed living in an era of eclecticism.

This is a clever approach for acquainting students with the field of political science, and aside from some lapses in the methodological material, it is a useful alternative to the standard introductory text. Scott's effort to inspire the next generation of political scientists to think creatively is an important collective responsibilitiy, and this work, for its part, largely succeeds in that endeavor.

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Gregory G. Brunk, Donald Secrest, and Howard Tameshire, *Understanding Attitudes About War: Modeling Moral Judgments.*(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996) pp. 237.
$45.00 ISBN 0-8229-3926-6 (hardcover)
$19.95 ISBN 0-8229-5585-7 (paperback)

In part, synthesizing the authors' previous work on the subject, this book examines attitudes of American foreign policy elites regarding the morality of U. S. involvement in war. It is based on 2152 completed mail questionnaires received from persons in government service and members of the "attentive public." Respondents were retired military officers (29% of the total), current diplomats (24%), former members of Congress (8%), Catholic clergy (22%), and newspaper editorial page editors (17%). (Priests were surveyed in 1987, and former members of Congress in 1988. Survey dates for the remaining groups are not reported.)

The surveys included open-ended questions but the heart of the study are 34 Likert-scale statements to which the respondents' extent of agreement or disagreement is measured in ordinal categories: strongly agree, agree, uncertain, disagree, and strongly disagree.

The 34 statements are classified into 10 categories, derived from a careful analysis of existing literature. To illustrate, four of the categories are listed below, each with a statement from that category:

Just War — "It is not moral to fight a war until all peaceful alternatives have been tried first."

Legalism — "If legally ordered by our government, it is all right to launch an attack against another country."

Supreme Emergency Principle — "If an enemy goal is total destruction of our nation, morality should still influence our actions in times of war." A *negative* response reflects the principle.

Moral Perfectionism — "Our country's decision to go to war should be based only on universal moral principles and not on the particular context facing our nation."

As might be expected, the greatest difference in attitudes toward such statements is between Catholic priests and retired military officers, the officers evidencing fewer moral constraints than priests on the use of military force. For example, Just War statements on average were supported by 65% of priests but only 36% of military officers. Support for the Supreme Emergency concept was not strong in any group, though again military officers and priests were on opposite ends of the spectrum (44% of officers in favor, compared to a mere 8% of priests). The greatest contrast among groups was in the Moral Perfectionism category. Statements supporting that concept were favored by 68% of priests and only 19% of military officers. In all 10 categories opinions of journalists, diplomats, and former members of Congress fall between those of priests and military officers, though generally are closer to views of the military.

Following this type of data summary, enhanced by discussion of the theoretical context, the authors compute a factor analysis. Three primary dimensions are identified that account for 42% of the variance in responses to the 34 statements. (Presumably the factors were orthogonally rotated since they are treated as being independent of one another.)

The three factors are:

Risk Aversion. Statements loading on this factor support minimizing the risk of military defeat and reflect the belief that the national interest rather than morality should guide foreign policy, a clear Realist Perspective.

Legitimacy of Force. Statements related to pacifism are the most strongly, and positively, related to this factor (which suggests that a more appropriate factor name would have been "illegitimacy of force").

Moral Constraints on War. Statements supporting the Just War load strongly on this factor, thereby reflecting an Idealist Perspective.

After describing these factors the authors develop three models of individuals' foreign policy belief systems. Although different labels are used, these models are theoretical constructs based on the above three factors, and attempt to explain the varying perspectives of the groups of respondents.

While recognizing that other views exist on this subject, I must confess to being uncomfortable with the use of factor analysis when–as in this study–the underlying data are ordinal, rather than interval or ratio. How can variances and product moment correlations be calculated meaningfully in factor analysis using ordinal data?

As an alternative, the authors might have had the respondents register their opinions on an interval scale. An example is the "feeling thermometer," calibrated from 0 to 100, that was developed in the 1940s.

On balance, the book is a unique contribution to the study of influences of morality on elite opinions toward war because it is based on empirical data from survey research, not conjecture or anecdotal evidence. Moreover, it is valuable for its synthesis of an impressive body of literature that the authors link to the subject, ranging from game theory to philosophy to social psychology to mainstream international politics.

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The editors appreciate the careful reading and helpful comments of the following reviewers for this issue of *OKLAHOMA POLITICS*.

Wolfgang Hirczy de Mino

Edward Dreyer

John George

Jan Hardt

James Lester

Frank Meyers

Roxanne Dunbar Ortiz

Brian Rader

Michael Sharp

Kaye Tatro