


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THE SEARCH FOR THE HOLY GRAIL IN OKLAHOMA: PARTNERING WITH FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS TO DELIVER SOCIAL SERVICES

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University of Central Oklahoma

Oklahoma should be fertile ground for faith-based social service initiatives. This bible-belt state fares poorly on numerous economic, health, and social indicators. Despite the overwhelming optimism that initially inspired key leaders to involve faith organizations in helping to solve Oklahoma's pressing problems, the results so far have been less than dramatic. New financial relationships with faith-based organizations in Oklahoma appear minimal. The honeymoon for charitable choice implementation in Oklahoma is over. The state is now focusing on non-financial collaborations with the faith community.

More than most states, Oklahoma should be fertile ground for successful implementation of faith-based initiatives. Many Oklahomans describe their state "as the buckle of the Bible Belt" and with good reason. Out of the fifty states and the District of Columbia, Oklahoma

ranks sixth in terms of regular church attendance (U.S. Census Bureau 2003b, 56). Furthermore, the opportunities to make a difference among Oklahoma's disadvantaged groups are immense. On many economic, health, and social measures, the state fares rather poorly. According to the latest U.S. Census Bureau's three-year average (2000-2002), the percent of Oklahomans living in poverty is 14.7 percent compared to a national average of 11.7 percent (2003a). Hence, Oklahoma ranks among the bottom ten states on this key measure. The United Health Foundation's 2002 State Health Rankings reports that 20.3 percent of children in Oklahoma live in poverty. In the same study, Oklahoma ranks among the bottom five states in overall health, health insurance coverage, and support for public health care. Oklahoma also appeared third on a list of *Worst Welfare States* released by the National Campaign for Jobs and Income Support (2002). Oklahoma received unwanted national attention after being ranked as a state with one of the highest divorce rates—second only to atypical Nevada, already well known for its relaxed marriage and divorce provisions (Ross 2002, 1-A). Domestic violence is also a severe problem in Oklahoma. According to an analysis of 2001 homicide data, Oklahoma ranked 10th in the United States for the rate among females murdered by intimate males (Violence Policy Center 2003, 26). In the recently released *Means to a Better End: A Report on Dying in America Today*, Oklahoma received average to failing grades on several palliative care measures (Last Acts 2002). Finally, public transportation in the state is extremely inadequate to fully address the needs of individuals who do not have access to private transportation due to economic circumstance or disability (Sharp 2001, 10-11). State metropolitan areas are geographically dispersed and merely getting to a job can be an extremely difficult challenge. These problems are interrelated and state leaders from all political persuasions have begun to address them with renewed vigor.

Charitable choice and the president's faith-based initiative generally received a warm welcome among Oklahoman officialdom. Oklahoma's former congressional representative, J.C. Watts, was one of the earliest proponents of a national faith-based initiative. At the state level, recognition dawned early that the challenges were so great that a full partnership among all levels of government, businesses, faith-based organizations (FBOs), and non-profit agencies would be required. Involving the faith community in addressing public policy problems is

not without precedent in Oklahoma and is now becoming an increasingly important strategy for addressing the disturbing social issues facing the state.

Former Governor Frank Keating appointed a faith-based liaison to coordinate that effort and even issued an executive order calling upon state agencies to actively collaborate with faith communities. Despite the overwhelming hope and optimism that initially inspired key leaders to involve faith organizations in helping to solve Oklahoma's pressing problems, the results so far have been less than dramatic. Although some encouraging progress has been made, those on the frontlines of community action are experiencing battle fatigue in their attempts to involve new faith partners. The honeymoon for charitable choice implementation in Oklahoma appears to be over. The serious, hard work necessary to fully engage FBOs in social service partnerships is just now beginning.

OKLAHOMA'S POLITICAL CULTURE

Oklahoma is a very complicated state in terms of its efforts to deliver social welfare services. These complexities are more clearly understood when placed within the overall context of Oklahoma's culture. The state has been undergoing a steady transition in terms of its political and social orientations over the last few decades. Oklahoma is noted for its socialist, populist, and progressive heritage (Bissett 1999; Markwood 2000, 22-23). Yet, modern conservatism increasingly influences its politics and policies. Once a stronghold of the Democratic Party, Oklahoma has become an arena for intense partisan competition. In addition, forceful rural interests have surrendered some power to new urban and suburban political muscle (Birdsong 2002). The state is quite diverse with a substantial number of Native Americans and African Americans along with a rapidly growing number of Hispanics. Identifiable Asian communities have also formed within major urban areas.

Oklahoma's constitution was formed during the Progressive Era. As such, it fragments executive authority among numerous elected officials. The state constitution also promotes ample opportunities for democratic expression through referendums and initiative petitions. One major consequence of the state initiative process has been to limit the

power of the state legislature to increase taxes without either a statewide vote or an approval by a super-majority of legislators. These political cleavages and constitutional limitations hamper the state's ability to confront social service issues in a coherent fashion. Moreover, encouraging coordination and building capacity for community action are difficult tasks when the state faces severe revenue shortfalls (Krehbiel 2003, A21). Politically, raising revenues at the state level is nearly impossible. Cutting programs and services usually remains as the only remaining feasible response to limited resources.

OKLAHOMA'S SOCIAL SERVICES SYSTEM

The major overhauling of Oklahoma's welfare system was actually initiated a few years before passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. As Kim Hoffman explains,

In 1992, the Democratic governor of Oklahoma requested that the Oklahoma Commission for Human Services develop recommendations for reforming the welfare system Early in 1993, the Oklahoma Department of Human Services created a task force to study welfare reform and make recommendations to improve the delivery of welfare services. . . . From this study came 47 recommendations, of which most were authorized for implementation in the Oklahoma Welfare Reform Law of 1995. . . . The Oklahoma Department of Human Services requested waivers from the federal government to implement the 1995 legislation. Some of the key provisions of this waiver included a family cap, requirements for the enrollment of children in early childhood education programs, school attendance through age 18, childhood immunizations, an extension of transitional Medicaid and child care, and a time limit on assistance. . . . In 1997, welfare reform legislation was essentially "clean up" legislation to conform with the new federal law (2000, 16-17).

Like most states, Oklahoma's social services system is best described as a patchwork of agencies and programs. The largest and most important institution in this area has been the Department of Human Services which is given general responsibility for helping "individuals and families in need" to "lead safer, healthier, more independent and

productive lives” (Hamilton 2001, 256). The Department of Human Services offers several programs and services such as Adult Protective Services, Aging Services, Child Care, Child Protective Services, Commodity Distribution, Day Care, Family Support Assistance, Food Stamps, Long Term Care Ombudsman Program, Medicaid, Nutrition Program, and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF).

Likewise, the Oklahoma State Department of Health has the broad mission of protecting and improving the health of Oklahoma citizens. Specific responsibilities include childhood immunization, disease control, vital statistics, tobacco use prevention, health education, elderly services, nutritional programs, health care oversight, prenatal care promotion, injury prevention, consumer protection, and statewide health care planning. Both the Department of Human Services and the Department of Health operate separate county extension offices throughout the state.

The Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services is charged with caring for individuals with mental disabilities and operates several programs addressing domestic violence, alcohol and drug dependency, and residential care. The Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services operates three hospitals and nineteen Community Mental Health Centers (Hamilton 2001, 274).

The Workforce Investment Act is administered through the State of Oklahoma Workforce Investment Board which has divided the state into twelve workforce investment areas, each overseen by Local Workforce Development Councils. One-stop centers comprising a cross-section of public and private agencies are well distributed throughout the state.

The Oklahoma Department of Commerce is responsible for managing several human development programs such as Community Food and Nutrition, Emergency Shelter Grant Program, Homeless Assistance Program, Community Services Block Grant, Oklahoma First Start, and Oklahoma Head Start. Other agencies that address specialized human services needs in Oklahoma are the Office of Juvenile Affairs, Oklahoma Department of Rehabilitation Services, Oklahoma Department of Veterans Affairs, Office of Handicapped Concerns, Oklahoma Health Care Authority, Oklahoma Center for Rural Development, and the Oklahoma Housing Finance Agency.

FUNDED FBO PARTICIPATION IN SOCIAL SERVICES

Although no significant legislative initiatives in Oklahoma came after the national welfare reform efforts in 1996, the executive side of Oklahoma state government began to take the lead in this area. In 1998, the Director of the Department of Human Services for the State of Oklahoma, Howard Hendrick, asked a local pastor named Brad Yarbrough to attend a series of conferences related to the changing role of FBOs in social service delivery. At Hendrick's request, Yarbrough prepared and submitted a "Planning Document" emphasizing the need for the creation of a state liaison's office to help encourage collaboration among state social service agencies and FBOs. Jerry Regier who was then Governor Keating's Cabinet Secretary for Health and Human Services read the document and with the Governor's support, used it as a basis to establish Oklahoma's Office of the Faith-Based Liaison. In July 2000, Regier appointed Yarbrough to serve as the first director of the new office. Yarbrough's office was initially located in the Oklahoma State Department of Health but was funded by the federal TANF program. Money for the fledgling program was arranged through a \$173,633 contract with the Department of Human Services. Because the office began to broaden its mission, the name of the office was changed to the *Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives* when the contract was renewed the following year. The office established a home web site (www.faithlinks.state.ok.us) and has held annual conferences in both Tulsa and Oklahoma City.

Then Governor Frank Keating (Republican) later issued Executive Order 2001-18 on May 17, 2001 with this command to state agencies:

Make all necessary changes to actively engage in collaborative efforts (in the form of contracts, grants, vouchers, or other forms of disbursements, or volunteer programs) with FBOs for the provision of social services on the same basis as other non-governmental providers.

When the new Governor Brad Henry (Democrat) succeeded Frank Keating in 2003, he issued an Executive Order 2003-7 which listed the previous executive orders that would remain in full force and effect. Keating's Executive Order 2001-18 concerning charitable choice implementation in the state was not included and is therefore officially

no longer in effect. However, the Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives (OFBCI) remains active. It has moved from the Health Department to its original funding agency, the Department of Human Services. Howard Hendrick who initiated the administrative efforts in this area was reappointed in the new administration. According to Brad Yarbrough, the status of his office was never involved in any significant politics related to the change in political parties (personal interview, August 22, 2003). It appears to have the full support of the current Democratic administration.

The main mission of the Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives is to promote both funded and unfunded collaborations among government agencies and FBOs in meeting the needs of Oklahoma's poor and needy. This Office has statewide jurisdiction and oversees statewide activities and programs related to charitable choice and involvement of faith organizations in social services delivery. The staffing is minimal with only two full-time employees: the Director and the Executive Assistant. The state's liaison to the faith community gives numerous presentations to interested parties about governmental funding of FBOs and other related issues. The Office also sent a statewide survey out to over 6,000 churches, congregations, synagogues, mosques and other community outreach ministries to try to obtain an overall picture in the state concerning the role that these organizations believe should be played by FBOs. By April 15, 2001, 751 FBOs had responded (Office of Faith-based and Community Initiatives [OFBCI] 2001).

This FaithLinks survey cannot be considered scientific since there is no way to determine if the respondents are systematically different than non-respondents. With a response rate of less than 13 percent, making any meaningful generalizations would be speculative. The results are nonetheless revealing of the sentiments of at least some of the FBOs operating in the state. The overwhelming majority of denominations that responded are variants of the Christian faith—certainly not a surprise in Oklahoma. Baptist denominations make up almost a third of the denominations that responded. A little over two percent of the responses are from Catholic churches. Only two Buddhist and one Jewish group were represented. The survey covered three general areas: services provided, marriage issues, and governmental collaboration.

A few FBOs in the survey provided support groups such as parenting classes (23%), grief counseling groups (19%), aging services

(12%), drug and alcohol counseling (12%), and divorce counseling (12%). In contrast, less than five percent of the respondents offered any programs to address domestic violence (p. 7). Private counseling was much more common among the FBO respondents. Over seventy percent provided marriage counseling. Other types of personal counseling included personal/family crisis counseling (58%), youth issues (53%), grief counseling (51%), personal finance (23%), career guidance and employment (12%) and legal counseling (4%). The respondents offered a wide variety of life skill classes in such areas as marriage (38%), parenting (30%), abstinence (22%), anger and conflict resolution (14%), personal finance (13%), tutoring (10%), and literacy/language (9%). Less than five percent of the respondents offered life skill classes in homemaking skills (4.8%), careers and employment (4.1%), and GED equivalency (3.8%). In terms of community services, Oklahoma FBOs appear to be focused on limited programs and outreach to individuals who are homebound or in nursing homes. Most of the visits to nursing homes and shut-ins may be directed to those persons already affiliated with the FBOs. The second part of the survey dealt with marriage issues. This information was used in conjunction with the Oklahoma Marriage Initiative discussed in greater detail below.

Perhaps the most interesting results of the survey cover issues related to church and state. The survey results indicate that among the FBOs that responded, about three-quarters supported a collaboration among religious organizations and governmental agencies and wanted to see the creation of a national Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives. Somewhat fewer respondents indicated support for receiving governmental funds (68%). Only seven percent had already received government funds. Almost ninety percent of the respondents were not familiar with charitable choice at that time. Despite the overwhelmingly favorable response to faith-based initiatives, these FBOs still expressed significant concerns. Among these concerns were possible compromising of faith missions (82%), intrusion into the faith organization's internal affairs (71%), excessive red tape (62%), over-dependence on governmental funds (44.2%), and violation of First Amendment rights (28%).

Toward encouragement of FBO collaborations, the state contracts with two intermediary organizations. The state is divided regionally into the eastern and western halves for purposes of assigning the two faith-

based intermediaries. The Tulsa Cornerstone Assistance Network is responsible for Eastern Oklahoma. The Oklahoma City Cornerstone Assistance Network is responsible for the central and western sections of Oklahoma. Since both of these organizations were inspired by a similar venture in Fort Worth, Texas, they share the same name and purpose. Yet they are legally separate and independent. The Tulsa Cornerstone Assistance Network receives approximately \$40,000 annually to serve as the faith-based intermediary for Oklahoma's eastern counties. The Oklahoma City Cornerstone Assistance Network receives approximately \$60,000 annually to serve as the faith-based intermediary for Oklahoma's western counties.

Each is charged among other duties with helping "congregations find available financial resources" in order to build capacity for assisting in the delivery of social services. According to Chris Beach, Director of the Tulsa Cornerstone Assistance Network, the typical process is to sponsor a forum in which interested parties come to learn about the basics. Some organizations then become extremely interested. They are then connected with "experts or consultants with good reputations" so that they can advance even further in their quest for funding. When the two intermediary organizations became operational, their role expanded the ongoing activities in terms of strategic outreach to the faith community. They have also participated in numerous and wide ranging forums addressing charitable choice issues, have distributed brochures and promotional materials, provided consultative services, and have acted as the mechanism to funnel grant monies to eligible organizations.

Broad charitable choice language has not been incorporated into Oklahoma statutes. Furthermore, Oklahoma is one of the states that has a so-called Blaine Amendment in its constitution [Oklahoma Constitution Article II, § 5]:

No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, donated, or used directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary, or sectarian institution as such.

For purposes of contracting with FBOs, this section of the Oklahoma Constitution is not viewed as prohibitive by any relevant legal authorities.

Included among the standard contracting language for state invitations to bid and state contracts is the following section addressed specifically to charitable choice providers:

Providers who are members of the faith community are eligible to compete for contracts with the State of Oklahoma on the same basis as any other provider. Such providers shall not be required to alter their forms of internal governance, their religious character or remove religious art, icons, scripture or other symbols.

The standard contracting language also prohibits providers from discriminating “against clients on the basis of their religion, religious beliefs or clients’ refusal to participate in religious practices.” According to the State Purchasing Director, Tom Jaworsky, FBOs are not allowed to commingle monies and they must open up their accounts as far as state and federal money is concerned; but the state does not have to audit the whole FBO, just as much as is sufficient per contract (personal interview August 29, 2003). According to Jaworski, no specific efforts have been made to simplify or streamline the contracting process for faith-based providers. The contracting FBOs must maintain records and documentation associated with federal and state contracts for up to 3 years even after contract termination. Contractors are also required to adhere to nondiscrimination in employment by agreeing to the following standard language issued by the Department of Central Services Central Purchasing Division:

The Contractor is an Equal Opportunity Employer, a provider of services and/or assistance, and is in compliance with the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended and Executive Orders 11246 and 11375. The provider assures compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-336), all amendments to, and all requirements imposed by the regulations issued pursuant to this act.

The official position is that religious preference for hiring by FBOs is consistent with these laws even with federal funding.

Recently, a legislative initiative originated in the Oklahoma House of Representatives related to funding of FBOs. House Bill 1811, proposed during the first sessions of the 49th Legislature (2003) pertained to nondiscrimination in service delivery. The bill stated in part:

Any faith-based organization contracting with a state agency shall not discriminate against a person or entity with respect to rendering assistance funded under any state program on the basis of religion, a religious belief or refusal to participate in a religious practice or on the basis of race, age, color, sex, or national origin. Proven discrimination shall be grounds for termination of any contract with the state agency.

However, this bill died in the Rules Committee.

Currently, child care in Oklahoma runs like a voucher system in that clients may select their own provider among licensed day care facilities. The state uses an electronic card system to reimburse the facilities directly. In addition, a new law has been passed effective November 1, 2002 and is still in the implementation stage. It states, in part:

The Department of Human Services shall establish a service delivery system under the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Program that provides for redemption of voucher for TANF services at participating private faith-based providers and federally recognized Indian tribes if they are effective and competitively prices for the results achieved. . . . The vouchers shall be made payable, on behalf of the TANF recipient, for the provision of TANF services that include, but are not limited to, subsidized and unsubsidized hourly employment, work experience, on-the-job training, assisted job search, job readiness assistance, job skills training, community service, substance abuse treatment, literacy and adult basic education, vocational-educational programs, and child care. . . . The Department shall establish a procedure whereby a qualified private faith-based provider that wishes to provide services to TANF recipients may register with the Department (*Oklahoma Statutes* Section 56-230.77).

The faith-based intermediaries cover the restriction on proselytization at length in their training workshops and during informational forums. The language covering this is also built into their contract. Judging by statements from various program administrators, enforcing this restriction is probably a weak point in the Oklahoma system. Typically, recipients of social services are informed about religious activities but not required to attend. According to a volunteer at a food pantry conducted by the Northwest Praise Center, “We always let them know, ‘Now if you want to hear about Jesus Christ, we’d love to tell you. But if you don’t, God bless you still’” (Helping the Helpers 2001, March 10). The boundaries about what is permissible do not seem to be drawn sharply in Oklahoma. Problems would come to the attention of relevant authorities only if recipients made complaints, which has not yet happened.

Three recent laws have been promulgated dealing with charitable choice and faith-based issues:

(1) the Oklahoma Center for Rural Development has been granted the power and duty to build the capacity of FBOs in promoting rural economic development (OK Statutes §70-4807);

(2) the Department of Human Services is authorized through Oklahoma statute to contract with FBOs for the TANF program (OK Statutes §56-230.62); and

(3) the state Department of Corrections and private prisons are encouraged to offer faith-based programs in their institutions (OK Statutes §57-614).

In addition, a well-established support institute called the Center for Nonprofits (www.centerforprofits.us) regularly hosts workshops on grant writing specifically for FBOs as well as other charitable entities. At some of their conferences, they have allowed participants to choose from two parallel tracks: one for FBOs and other for more secular nonprofit agencies. Finally, the Interfaith Alliance, a state faith-based coalition has sponsored forums to help faith communities understand what is meant by “faith-based funding” and “charitable choice.”

No systematic review or audit has been conducted concerning the state's contracting statutes and procedures. During an interview with Brad Yarbrough, the state's faith-based liaison, he reported that the Department of Central Services had assured him that contracts are in compliance with charitable choice guidelines (August 22, 2003). However, the State Purchasing Director, Tom Jaworski, reports that to his knowledge, the state has not conducted a sweeping audit or performance review. According to Jaworski, the state of Oklahoma has moved away from a strategy of evaluating the performance of every contract because it became nothing more than a clerical exercise. Now, the attention of those evaluating performance is directed to those programs demonstrating obvious problems. Reviewing the performance of FBOs is the same for secular counterparts in Oklahoma. The Department of Central Services has its own Office of Inspector General and of course there are program monitors assigned throughout all of the numerous social service delivery efforts. More likely, any attention paid to potential accounting irregularities and performance problems has been by program monitors and through internal audits. According to Jaworski, the Oklahoma Department of Health does not usually conduct internal audits in this area. In contrast, the Department of Human Services has established its own Office of Inspector General. Staff there reported no general review of the state's contracting statutes and procedures related to charitable choice compliance (Mike Fair, personal interview, August 29, 2003). One specific program was audited for Fiscal Year 2002 and found to have no problems related to charitable choice. That program was Oklahoma's Marriage Initiative Contract which involved several faith-based organizations.

In a separate effort, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services awarded a \$37,000 grant to the nonprofit organization Domestic Violence Intervention Services in order to coordinate a community training and education project involving congregations and FBOs in the Tulsa area so that they can team together to respond to domestic violence problems.

Some of Oklahoma's faith initiatives have been undertaken at the local level. Last year for example, the City of Tulsa entered into partnerships with local churches to take over daily management of a few of its community centers. In response to budgetary pressures to scale back services or even close facilities operated by the City's Parks

Department, Mayor Bill LaFortune proposed expansion of community center management by three churches and another faith-based organization. Families of Murdered Children, an FBO founded in 1997 by Edith Shoals in honor of her 18-year old murdered daughter, operates Amos T. Hall Community Center. Paradise Baptist Church operates the Ben Hill Community Center. Both of these FBO partnerships began under the previous mayor. LaFortune expanded these existing arrangements and used them as a model to partner with Redeeming Faith Church to operate the B.C. Franklin Community Center and Sanctuary Evangelistic to operate Owen Park Community Center. The City of Tulsa used Community Development Block Grant funds to maintain and improve these park programs (Lassek 2002, July 21).

The full scope of Oklahoma's efforts in funded partnerships with faith organizations is almost impossible to determine. The data in Oklahoma are simply not tracked in a manner that allows the identification and matching of social service contracts with FBOs. This has been a matter of concern to the faith liaison Brad Yarbrough who has complained about it during repeated interviews. Similar frustrations have been expressed by other participants in the process. The 2001 FaithLinks Survey does provide some overall perspective on the FBO activity throughout the state although no inquiries were made about actual monies involved. The response rate is also only about 12.5 percent and makes the findings suspect. Beyond the more longstanding charitable organizations and the highly visible Oklahoma Marriage Initiative, new financial relationships in the state of Oklahoma appear minimal.

THE OKLAHOMA MARRIAGE INITIATIVE

Former Governor Keating instigated the Oklahoma Marriage Initiative (OMI), a continuing effort that has received significant national attention. OMI was funded through TANF funds totaling approximately ten million dollars and was driven by the goal to lower Oklahoma's extremely high divorce rate (Oklahoma Marriage Initiative 2003a). The rationale for OMI was that it addressed expressed TANF Goals. The first TANF Goal of "providing assistance to needy families so that the children may be cared for in their homes or in the homes of relatives" (Fagnoni 2001, 1) is addressed by the OMI research-based supposition

that “children do better in healthy, two-parent family arrangements” by being “healthier, more likely to attend college, less likely to get pregnant out of wedlock, do drugs or end up in prison” (OMI 2003a). The three remaining TANF Goals are specifically related to marriage:

ending the dependence of needy parents on government benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage; preventing and reducing the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies; and encouraging the formation and maintenance of two-parent families (Fagnoni 2001, 1).

The initial goals of the Oklahoma Marriage Initiative were to reduce the divorce rate, number of out-of-wedlock births, alcohol and drug addiction, and child abuse and neglect (Johnson, Stanley, Glenn, Amato, Nock, Markman, & Dion 2002, 5).

Oklahoma’s effort to address marriage as a weapon against poverty and other social ills is based on a wealth of research. First and foremost, Oklahoma State University’s Bureau of Social Research conducted a large-scale Baseline Survey in order to understand the culture of both marriage and divorce within the state. Two separate, random samples were drawn for the survey. “Subjects in the first sample are [2,020] adult residents of randomly selected households in Oklahoma” (Johnson, et al. 2002, 41). The second sample was comprised of 303 current Oklahoma Medicaid clients Johnson, et al. 2002, 41). Some of the key findings revealed by the survey results include the following:

- Oklahoma is a marrying state, with 8% of adults having been married at some point compared to 73% nationally.
- Oklahoma is a divorcing state with 32% of all adults having divorced compared to 21% nationally.
- Oklahomans marry an average of 2.5 years younger than the national median age at first marriage.
- Over one-third of married respondents considered their marriage to be in serious trouble at some point and of these, 92% said that they were glad they were still together.

- Most ever-divorced Oklahomans (78%) have a child from a previous marriage that ended in divorce. (Johnson, et al. 2002, Executive Summary)

Neither the survey nor the analysis of its results mentions Oklahoma's gay citizens. The Oklahoma Marriage Initiative does not address the issue of same sex marriage. In fact, some of the participants in Oklahoma's marriage initiative are openly hostile to homosexuality. For example, among the longstanding organizational members of the OMI Steering Council is the Oklahoma Family Policy Council. It recently hosted a variety of pro-family workshops, conferences, and other events. The Oklahoma Family Policy Council also recently recommended a conference called *Love Won Out* billed as a "dynamic one-day conference addressing, understanding and preventing homosexuality" (Oklahoma Family Policy Council 2003).

Oklahoma's unprecedented, comprehensive approach for addressing marriages among its population seems a logical policy extension of the federal government's desired direction for social interventions. Pulitzer Prize winning journalist Katherine Boo has recently spent several months in Oklahoma observing close encounters with Oklahoma's marriage program. She is sympathetic to a policy initiative addressing marriage and asks,

Why wouldn't governments want people to marry? The economics are terribly seductive . . . marriage is probably the most cost-efficient antipoverty instrument a society possesses (Davidson 2003).

However, Boo delivers a powerful critique of the implementation of Oklahoma's marriage initiative in a recent story published in *The New Yorker* magazine (2003). She follows two of only five women who show up for a marriage workshop sponsored by OMI—no men bother to attend. The workshop takes place in Sooner Haven, a public housing project in Oklahoma City. Boo's article centers around two very different African American women. They are best friends helping each other with daily life in and out of the project. Kim Henderson is an attractive 22-year-old single woman trying to escape the projects for what she hopes will be "a healthy, wealthy, normal-lady life" (p.105). Corean Brothers is a 49-year-old divorced mother of five. This disturbing story

portrays how these disadvantaged but nevertheless ambitious women face everyday indignities, both large and small: pizza parlors that won't deliver to certain parts of town (p. 107); interested employers contacting the ladies for job interview appointments at telephone numbers disconnected for outstanding bills (p. 110); bus drivers who routinely "bypass would-be riders in very poor neighborhoods, and blacks in less poor ones" (p.110); pregnant women about to give birth turned away from hospitals (p.111); and the threat of a year's jail time for what started out as a bad check for \$12.18 (p.116).

Pastor George E. Young, Sr. of Holy Temple Baptist Church in Oklahoma City served as the leader of the marriage workshop at Sooner Haven. Boo describes Young as having a better grip on the reality of Oklahoma's underprivileged than the developers of the state's marriage curriculum, psychologists Scott Stanley and Howard Markman of the University of Denver. With some support from the National Institute of Mental Health, they have been developing the Prevention and Relationship Enhancement Program (PREP) curriculum for the past 25 years. PREP is geared toward typical couples that are either contemplating marriage or are already married. As part of Oklahoma's adoption of the PREP program, the state supplies a video showing such vignettes as a spouse hogging a home computer or a spouse procrastinating about cleaning a guest bedroom (Boo 2003, 109). Trainers readily admit that there can be an obvious cultural disconnect for TANF participants facing the more immediate challenges of poverty, substance abuse, or domestic violence (Robinson 2003, 6). Even more distressing for eventual program success, is that half of the target audience is usually missing—men. As one Oklahoma City pastor who is deeply involved in social service programs stated, "Most of the problem facing these [disadvantaged] women is bad relationships with men and their unwillingness to break from that" (Steve Kern, personal interview September 9, 2003). Boo quotes Young as saying,

I wish I could get more men into this room, instead of asking you [women] all to go out and be the messengers for a what a meaningful, committed relationship might be . . . but for now it's up to you to go out and teach the men (2003, 110).

Encouraging marriage within a subculture that resists the inherent constraints and responsibilities will require more than tinkering with

existing public policy. As a working woman attending the Sooner Haven workshop asked, “How do you get a man to talk about marriage when you’re pretty sure he’s still sleeping with his baby’s mother?” (Boo 2003, 109). In particular, the percentage of African American men in Oklahoma who are chronically unemployed or even incarcerated is staggering. As Boo states,

In northeast Oklahoma City, the question ‘Where he away at?’ is widely understood to mean, In what prison is he serving time? Nearly one in ten black men is a prison inmate—one of the highest incarceration rates in the country (2003, 117).

On the other hand, the state of Oklahoma may have greater chance for success at strengthening existing marriages and preventing unworkable marriages. OMI calls upon members of the faith community in particular to cooperate in helping couples contemplating marriage. They are asked to sign the Oklahoma Marriage Covenant in order to confirm their pledge to hold off performing marriage ceremonies until couples complete at least four to six premarital counseling sessions. In addition, they pledge to train “mentoring couples to assist young couples during the crucial first years of marriage” (OMI 2003b). According to Kendy Cox, Director of the Training and Resource Center for the Oklahoma Marriage Initiative, over 1,200 faith leaders have signed the Oklahoma Marriage Covenant as of October 1, 2003. In fact, she states that the Oklahoma Marriage Covenant has had very little resistance. According to Cox, most of the faith leaders who have not signed have been worried about whether they had sufficient resources to meet the level of counseling and training required (personal interview, October 1, 2003).

The statewide discussion on marriage inspired the Oklahoma House of Representatives to pass a covenant marriage bill during its 2001-2002 legislative session. A similar law in Louisiana served as a model. However, the state senate ultimately failed to pass its version of the bill. The proposed covenant marriage provision would have created a marriage option that would require premarital counseling and the obligation to seek marital counseling if difficulties arose within the marriage (OK House Bill 2641).

UNFUNDED FBO PARTICIPATION IN SOCIAL SERVICES

Oklahoma has had the most success in establishing and developing rewarding collaborative efforts with the faith community in the non-financial arena. For a variety of reasons, both the director of the Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives and the state intermediaries report that their current emphasis is on building effective non-financial arrangements. According to Brad Yarbrough, the faith liaison, “The promoting of unfunded collaborations has been one of the primary strategies of Oklahoma” (personal interview, August 22). In explaining this, he cited his recent attendance at a national grant review in which over thirty panels of reviewers were each assigned about 30 grant applications each. That of course left many of the reviewers with only 4-5 hours of sleep each night. Yarbrough’s point is that if you begin to make grants more widely available and encourage even the smallest groups to apply you will presumably have a much greater number of candidates from which to choose awardees. However, he points to the downside:

If you have all of these groups taking the time to develop what they hope will be a winning proposal, and in the process discovering that in most instances they will not receive—how many times will such groups spend the 40-50 hours of preparation time, plus associated expenses to write a grant proposal before they decide it’s not a fruitful exercise?

Yarbrough believes that preventing discrimination in the awarding of grants and contracts as well as building up the technical expertise of FBOs to apply for funding is still important—it just should not overshadow the longstanding success that the state of Oklahoma has already enjoyed in developing and maintaining productive partnerships between the state’s social service agencies and FBOs (personal interview, August 22, 2003).

Likewise, Chris Beach, who directs the faith intermediary organization for Eastern Oklahoma says that the biggest challenge is to find out what the government is not able to do, and then to train FBOs to help close the gap by delivering those services to the needy. He describes a capacity-building strategy. For example, when a congregation expresses a desire to enter into the social services arena, it will often

choose something basic like developing a food pantry. He'll try not to discourage its interest even though numerous food pantries already exist in the region. Often, the same FBO will return a few months later discovering that the food pantry is not accomplishing what it had hoped. The FBO is often disappointed to find that the same patrons are visiting the pantry on a regular basis with little real progress. Even so, Beach says that the experience helps to build the confidence of these FBOs and that they will likely want to take on a greater challenge. Maybe five years down the road, according to Beach, these FBOs may need government assistance to help them accomplish a worthy goal. Until then, they are developing experience and technical expertise. What he fears most in this area are FBOs jumping into the grant-writing game without developing a track record; they will likely find themselves awarded a responsibility that they are not equipped to fulfill. For these reasons, his intermediary group emphasizes non-financial relationships, at least initially. State agencies have been open and flexible on partnering with FBOs. For example, Beach spoke openly about how cooperative and supportive the professionals working with the Oklahoma Department of Human Services have been.

The most interesting analysis of the current state of faith-based partnerships in Oklahoma comes from Scott Manley, Director of the Oklahoma City Cornerstone Assistance Network. He says,

I think everybody's a lot more optimistic and euphoric about the situation than from how it appears at grassroots level. Seeing a church come alive and getting more involved is so far more in the talk than in the action (personal interview, September 8, 2003).

In other words, the positive attention paid to faith-based partnerships has yet to translate into significant change on the frontlines of social services delivery. The practical aspect is that charitable choice leveled the playing field for FBOs to go after government funding on an equal basis; but according to Manley, the government's clarion call for faith involvement has not lead to a stampede for the money—at least not among FBOs in Oklahoma. The simplistic understanding among many of the faith groups is that the government has set aside a separate pot of money for their use. “So when FBOs call up and they say, ‘Show me the money,’” says Manley, “it demonstrates gross ignorance or at least

a lack of understanding. Having said that, the faith groups aren't ready for the money even if it were there. They're not at a point even to request it." In Manley's perspective the FBOs have allowed their "muscles to atrophy" over the last century, especially after Roosevelt's New Deal and Johnson's Great Society programs. He declares that most churches do not have socially active programs that go much beyond the walls of the church.

Dr. Steve Kern, a pastor at Olivet Baptist, an urban church active in the Oklahoma City community, agrees: "I'm afraid that for a lot of churches the bottom line is how many members a program brings into the church or helps to contribute to the support of the church." Kern states flatly, "You don't do things because you're going to get paid back for it; you do things because they're the right things to do" (Personal Interview, September 9, 2003). Kern and his church receive wonderful accolades for their community programs. Unfortunately, as Kern points out, "I get lots of pats on my back, but not a lot of people are jumping on the bandwagon."

Both Kern and Manley point to the history of American Christian churches in which there was an early split between the evangelical churches and the activist churches; or as Manley describes the "Word People" and the "Deed People" respectively. Manley explains,

The evangelical church—or Word People—just want to tell people about Jesus. The Deed People—the social gospel folk said, 'Okay, you go ahead and do that but there are real people out here with problems and Jesus would do something about that.' They lived and acted out the message. Perhaps what we're experiencing here is a drawing together of these two poles.

Kern confirms Manley's thesis to a point. Coming from a traditional, evangelical church, Kern states,

We're not into the social gospel at all. It just seems to us that meeting needs is what Christians are all about. I think that's starting to change. There are opportunities that churches are beginning to see that help meet needs. The younger generation is starting to ask to be in a faith that requires more than sitting in a pew.

Olivet Baptist Church is involved with the Even Start program through the Oklahoma City Public Schools. The program is allowed to use the church facilities for a preschool program for non-English speaking kids. Their mothers are required to attend class with them because parental involvement is seen as a key to educational success. The mothers are challenged to help their kids learn to succeed. Olivet Baptist attempted to get involved with the Head Start program but lost by only a few points when another contractor was able to renew, at least in part, due to the built-in scoring advantage awarded for administering the previous contract. In spite of the current involvement with public programs and the recent attempt to get funding, Kern comments,

We really feel the church needs to learn how to do this stuff without government. We hope to be an inspiration for other churches, so when the churches start waking up and doing ministries, they will eventually work the government out of the entitlement programs that it's doing now. (Interview with author.)

The faith-based intermediaries also have instigated and coordinated several projects such as encouraging FBOs to establish medical clinics. They capitalize on the existing health service expertise already present in their respective congregations. Other projects have been auto-care clinics because Oklahoma communities typically lack feasible public transportation options. Therefore, efforts to employ disadvantaged workers often hit the major roadblock, almost literally in this case, of getting them to and from work. Getting older cars up and running has been an effective strategy in this area.

A particularly memorable example of state government's intentional recruitment of FBOs to help with a specific policy problem relates to the efforts to service the state's growing Hispanic population. The problem for one agency was that it had an insufficient number of Spanish translators on staff. The reality was that if a Hispanic individual came to the agency for services, that individual would often be placed at the bottom of the stack since it would take a while for translators to become available. The agency recognized the problem. After going through the faith intermediaries, the agency was able to partner with local FBOs to provide Hispanic translators and virtually solved the problem overnight at minimal cost.

A deliberate and consistent effort to include faith representatives on various welfare advisory committees does not appear to have taken place. However, there is at least one example: the governor has appointed Brad Yarbrough, the state's faith liaison to serve on the Governor's Advisory Committee on the Homeless.

Unfortunately, Oklahoma has had its share of disasters in the past decade including the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building and several major tornadoes tracking through densely populated areas. After these incidents and in preparation for future disasters, FBOs have played significant roles in terms of grievance counseling, support for rescue workers, providing shelter and medical relief to disaster victims, as well as a host of other related activities.

PROBLEMS WITH FBO PARTICIPATION IN SOCIAL SERVICES

Participation by FBOs in public programs has not been without problems in Oklahoma. Recently, a minor scandal erupted in the El Reno School District (a suburb of Oklahoma City) when it contracted with Sacred Heart Catholic and First Christian churches in order to send students to a pre-kindergarten program. The district counted the pre-K students as its own and then subsequently shared monies from the state with the two participating El Reno churches. The State Department of Education discovered these irregularities and pointed to provisions that said that the children could not be reported as "public school students" since they were charged private tuition and taught religious tenets. El Reno's questionable arrangements were about to become a model for schools statewide who have had pressure to begin pre-K programs while at the same time facing incredible financial difficulties. Still, the problem here is not a matter of an FBO offering a secular service, but rather the state directly subsidizing religious indoctrination. This incident shows that despite the overwhelming dominance of Christian denominations in the state, there are some limits to proselytization.

During the City of Tulsa's deliberations over management of its community centers by FBOs last year, a minor controversy arose over the mayor's proposal to contract with the Tulsa Cornerstone Assistance Network to provide intermediary services similar to those provided to

the state. At issue among the City Council members was the question of the necessity for an additional layer of bureaucracy. Sandra Rana of the Islamic Society of Tulsa described the other source of controversy as a “clause that allows religious indoctrination to be provided on the permission of the person being indoctrinated or provided the service” (Lassek 2002, July 26). Ultimately, the Tulsa City Council decided not to fund Cornerstone’s intermediary services (Lassek 2003).

CONCLUSION

Governmental grant programs do not appear to discriminate against religious organizations in Oklahoma. In fact, the state has made a comprehensive attempt to engage the state’s FBOs in social service delivery. This effort has occurred at multiple levels involving numerous stakeholders in the process. In interviews with a wide variety of parties involved in the process, the consistent theme emerges that Oklahoma has always been willing to undertake partnerships between state government and willing supporters in the faith community. After the 1996 charitable choice provisions, these efforts became more intensified and formalized. The first wave of activities arose out of the creation of the Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives. The participation by the faith liaison in forums throughout the state and attendant press coverage helped to publicize the governor’s efforts in this regard. In certain areas such as education, business interests have led the way for reform and improvement. The federal and state initiatives generated quite a lot of excitement, but reality is now setting in. The vision of Oklahoma’s faith communities being fully involved in addressing the needs of the state’s poor and disadvantaged may require a lot of handholding and mentoring by those who are already engaged in community action.

NOTE

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THE OKLAHOMA TERRITORIAL ELECTION SYSTEM: 1890 - 1905

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Oklahoma's first Territorial election, administered under the 1890 Organic Act, was typical of the early Nineteenth Century. By today's standards it was primitive. By the end of the Territorial period in 1907, Oklahoma had a modern election system. The shape this election system took was a product of Territorial political struggles.

Oklahoma Territorial government emerged just as American election administration was taking its modern form. The Australian ballot, straight-party voting, voter registration, ballot access, anti-fusion, woman suffrage and party primaries either did not exist in the United States prior to the Oklahoma Territory organization in 1890 or were experimental, local and scattered in application. By the end of the Territorial period in 1907, election administration throughout much of the country, including in the Territory, had taken its present form.

The Territory underwent the same political struggles that produced election systems elsewhere. The shape the election system took here was a product of Territorial political balances. The process by which the Territory established its election system yields insights into the politics of the Territorial period. It also gives insight into the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Century reasons for election practices that are obscure today.

1890

ORGANIC ACT

Oklahoma's first Territory-wide election took place August 5, 1890. It was for the Territorial legislature scheduled to meet August 12, 1890 (Peery 1929). The election was conducted under the provisions of the Organic Act passed by Congress, May 2, 1890. The Organic act provided the first election would include a county vote to name the counties (Section 4). Hence, the first Oklahoma election was also its first referendum. Republican governor George Washington Steele, apportioned the thirteen Council and twenty-six House seats of the Territorial Assembly based on population. The Organic Act required legislators be resident inhabitants of the district from which they were elected (Section 4). The Governor also appointed the officials that would conduct the election. "The number of persons authorized to be elected, having the highest number of legal votes in each of said council districts for members of the council, shall be declared by the governor to be duly elected to the council"(Section 4). A similar provision was made for the House. The implication is that candidates ran at large within counties and did not declare for particular seats. Oklahoma County, for example, elected three to the Council and five to the House. These would have been elected at large; the three or five candidates getting the most votes were elected.

The Organic Act provided for election of a Delegate to Congress. Voters would have the same qualification as voters for the legislative assembly (Section 16).

Eligible voters were

all male citizens of the United States above the age of twenty-one, and male persons of foreign birth...who shall have, twelve months prior thereto, declared their intentions to become citizens of the United States...who are actually resident at the time of the Passage of this act of that portion of said Territory which was declared by the proclamation of the President to be open for settlement on the twenty-second day of April, anno domini, eighteen hundred and eighty-nine, and that portion of said Territory heretofore known as the Public Land Strip (Section 5).

The Organic Act allowed the Territorial legislature to set voter qualifications for subsequent elections with these exceptions. Suffrage and holding office shall be restricted to citizens over twenty-one

and by persons of foreign birth above that age who have declared, on oath, before a competent court of record, as required by the naturalization laws of the United States, their intention to become citizens, and have taken an oath to support the constitution of the United States, and who shall have been residents of the United States for the term of twelve months before the election (Section 5).

The Organic Act also specified,

There shall be no denial of elective franchise or of holding office, to a citizen, on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude (Section 5).

Finally, the Organic Act specified no military could vote or hold office in the Territory by virtue of residence due to service (Section 5).

It appears ballots were printed by clubs and distributed to voters. The ballot would have the organization's 'ticket.' Or the voter could write his votes on a piece of paper he prepared himself, if Oklahoma followed the then prevalent pattern. That was how American elections were conducted during most of the Nineteenth century. (Argersinger 1992) Evidence that Oklahoma voted this way in August, 1890, is provided by Dan Peery, a participant in that election. The Crutcho Democratic Club nominated him for a House seat. Other groups in Oklahoma County nominating slates were the Kickapoo, the Seminole factions.

Mr. R.W. McAdams, who was the editor and publisher of the *Oklahoma Chief*, a weekly publication, showed me a ticket he had printed containing the names of three democrats and two republicans and my name was on the ticket. It was a Kickapoo ticket. This was before the adoption of the present system of voting (Peery 1929:432).

1890 LEGISLATURE

The election produced a majority of seven Republicans in the Council and fourteen in the House (Rock 1890). The new legislature would locate the Territorial capitol, its university and other institutions as well as hiring legislative staff and other things. The five Democrats in the Council and eight in the House put together 'The Organization' of Democrats, Populists and defecting Republicans. Populists would be given the leadership positions in the Council and House. They would also get the Territorial Agricultural and Mechanical College for Payne County where four of the five Populists were elected. The defecting Republicans were from Oklahoma County. They would get the Territorial capitol. Democrats, thereby, were able to organize both legislative houses. Their coalition held for most votes (Peery 1929).

The 1890 Territorial legislature began the creation of Oklahoma's election system. Of interest here is the administrative structure, the candidate nomination process, ballot design and voter registration.

ADMINISTRATION

The 1890 statutes provided for three levels of election administration, the township, the county and the Territory. "Township trustees shall by virtue of their office, be inspectors of elections in the precincts in which they respectively reside" (SO 1890:548-9). The chairs of the county central committees of the two political parties gaining the highest Territorial vote in the last general election each designated a party member as a judge. The judges and the inspector were the township board of elections. The chair of the county central committees of the two largest Territorial political parties designated a poll clerk for each precinct. The township board of elections supervised the voting.

The county clerk and two persons designated by chairs of the county central committees of the two political parties gaining the highest Territorial vote in the last general election constitute the county board of election commissioners. The task of the county board of election was to prepare and distribute the county ballots. The clerk and county board of commissioners provided administrative support for the election and defined precincts. The county clerk received the nomination petitions and certificates for district and local offices.

The Territorial board of elections was the Governor and two persons designated by chairs of the Territorial central committees of the two political parties gaining the highest Territorial vote in the last general election. The Territorial election board prepared ballots for offices for which the entire Territory voted and received the corresponding nomination petitions and certificates. Thus, there were to be at least two ballots. One, prepared by the Territorial election board for Delegate to Congress and one prepared by the county election board for the legislature and county offices. This is because the legislative districts, as a matter of practice, were expected to be entirely within a single county.

Counting ballots and certification of the election results was at the county and township level. Once the ballots were counted they were to be immediately destroyed by fire (SO 1890).

CANDIDATE NOMINATION

There were two routes provided for access to the ballot. Any political party gaining one percent of the Territorial votes in the last general election could nominate a ticket by party convention or party primary. The parties themselves, not the government, conducted the primaries. Candidate certification was by the county or Territorial party chair to the appropriate election board. Nominations for Delegate to Congress went to the Territorial Governor; nominations for the legislature and for county offices went to the county clerks. Groups and factions could nominate by petition. Five hundred signatures were required for a Territorial official, of which there were none elected; two hundred signatures for a Delegate to Congress; twenty-five signatures for a

county officer or member of the legislature; twenty signatures for an office of a subdivision of the county.

In case of division in any party, and claimed by two or more factions in the same party, name or title, or figure or device, the board of election commissioners shall give preference of name to the convention held at the time and place designated in the call of the regularly constituted party authorized, and if the other faction shall present no other party name, title or device, the board of election commissioners shall select a name or title, and place the same upon the list of candidates of said faction on the ballot, and select some suitable device to designate its candidates. If two or more conventions be called by authorities claimed to be the rightful authorities of any party, the proper board of election commissioners shall select some suitable devices to distinguish one faction from the other (SO 1890:555-6).

Finally there was this provision. Should a political party entitled to nominate by convention not do so, then

the name of all the nominees by petition for any office who shall be designated in their petitions as members of and candidates of such party shall be printed under the device and title of such party on the ballots, as if nominated by convention (SO 1890:555-6).

This last provision creates a potential problem should two or more parties agree on a common fusion ticket, as was the case in 1896 and 1898 when the Democrats and Populists joined under the Free Silver banner. Insurgent Democrats or Populists could petition and claim the Democratic or Populist ballot device and title, thereby confusing the voter and dividing the vote. It is instructive that this provision was retained in the statutes of 1893 and 1895 but dropped when the Democrats and Populists controlled the Territorial legislature and governor's office in 1897. Back in control in 1899, the Republicans restored it (SL 1899) and it remained in effect with the 1901, 1903, and 1905 statutes (see SL 1905). The provision was benign in 1890.

BALLOTS

Ballots printed by the State originated in the South Australia legislative session of 1857-8 (Evans 1917). Prior to this political parties printed their tickets, sometimes under state regulation of color and size, and made them available to voters, or voters simply made their own list on their own paper. The Oklahoma Territorial election of August 5, 1890 was of this sort (Peery 1929). The Kentucky legislature passed an Australian ballot law restricted to Louisville in 1888 and later that year Massachusetts passed a mandatory statewide Australian ballot law. By 1892 thirty-two of the then thirty-six states had adopted the Australian ballot (Ray 1924).

Ballots were of two sorts, Massachusetts or office-block ballot and Indiana or party-column ballot. The Massachusetts office-block ballot listed candidates, typically alphabetically, under the office. Party was printed in smaller type and the implication offered was the voter should select the best candidate regardless of party. The Indiana party column ballot organized all candidates of one party in a single column and provided for voting for all with a single mark at the top of the list. The implication was the voter should vote a party ticket (Ray 1924). Voters, of course, were free to vote for whatever candidates they preferred with either type but voting their preferences was easier or more difficult depending on the ballot type and voter preference pattern.

The ballots themselves were to be printed on red tinted paper

and the device named and list of candidates of the democratic party shall be placed in the first column on the left hand side of said ballot, of the republican party in the second column, of the people's party in the third column, and any other party in such order as the board of election commissioners shall decide (SO 1890:557).

This is the Indiana ballot. Oklahoma County Democratic Councilor Leander Pitman moved that the election bill then being considered be amended. "That all after the enacting clause be stricken out and the election law of the state of Indiana be substituted" (JFS 1890:528). This passed on a 10 - 1 vote. The Oklahoma statute actually reproduced the 1888 Indiana Governor and Lieutenant Governor candidates in

illustrating the ballot form. Oklahoma did not have a Lieutenant Governor nor did it have the Prohibition Party the ballot illustrated. The Territory did not elect any statewide officials other than the Delegate to Congress. Territorial voters were given a chance to express their preference for President in 1892 although the Territory did not have any electoral votes.

There was an additional provision.

In the case of death, removal or resignation of any candidate after the printing of such ballots and before such election, it shall be lawful for the chairman of the Territory, district, or county political organization of which such candidate was a member to make a nomination to fill such vacancy, and to provide the election board of each precinct in which such candidate is to be voted for, and a number of pasters containing only the name of such candidate at least equal to the number of ballots provided each precinct, but no pasters shall be given or received by any one except such election board and such chairman, and it shall be the duty of the polling clerks to put one of such pasters in a careful and proper manner and in the proper place, on each ticket before they shall sign their initials thereon (SO 1890:558).

The Daily Oklahoman describes how this worked in the 1892 election.

Six years ago. The day before the election the republicans and populists made a trade whereby the populist candidate for county attorney was withdrawn and J.H. Woods republican candidate for that office was placed on both the republican and populist ticket. In turn on the trade the republican candidate for Sheriff Beard, was withdrawn and Fightmaster the populist candidate was placed on both tickets. The night before election republican henchmen on horseback were sent to each precinct with slips containing the names of Woods and Fightmaster and these slips were pasted on the Australian ballot. The trade resulted in the election of Wood and Fightmaster, defeating Taylor and Colcord (November 11, 1898:2).

The provision for ‘pasters’ remained throughout the Territorial period except, perhaps, for the 1898 election.

FIGURE 1

1890 Oklahoma Ballot

Device	Device	Device
Democratic Ticket	Republican Ticket	Prohibition Ticket
For Governor, Courtland C. Matson	For Governor, Alvin P. Hovey	For Governor Jos. D. Hughes
For Lieut. Governor Wm. R. Meyers	For Lieut. Governor Ira J. Chase	For Lieut. Governor Robt. Gale

SOURCE: SO 1890: 558

Ballot party order was an outcome of Territorial legislative politics. The Republican appointed Governor had a veto and Republicans were the largest party in both the Territorial Council and House. Republican defections, however, allowed a Democrat-People's Party coalition to organize and control both houses (Peery 1929; Miller 1987). The structure of the ballot provides an accurate gauge of legislative control during the Territorial period.

Under the statute enacted, voting was secret and restricted to *bona fide* residents. The actual vote was by means of a stamp.

When a voter shall have been passed by the challengers, or shall have been sworn in, he shall be admitted to the election room. . . . On entering the room, the voter shall announce his name to the poll clerks, who shall register it. The clerk holding the ballots shall deliver to him one Territorial and one local ballot, and the other clerk shall there upon deliver to him a stamp and both poll clerks, on request, shall give explanation of the manner of voting. . . . The voter shall then, and without leaving the room, go to any of the booths which may be unoccupied and indicate the candidates for whom he desires to vote by stamping the square immediately preceding their names, and indicates his preference on any question or constitutional amendment or other

special matter by stamping in front of the words ‘yes’ or ‘no’ under such questions. Provided however, that if he shall desire to vote for all the candidates of one party or group of petitioners, and none other, he may place the stamp on the square preceding the title under which the candidates of said party or group of petitioners are printed, and the vote shall be then counted for all the candidates under that title, unless the name of one or more candidates under another shall also be stamped, in which case the names of the candidates so stamped shall be counted (SO 1890:564-5).

This is the origin of the slogan “Stamp the Rooster,” the rooster being the Democratic Party symbol on the ballots.

WRITE-IN VOTES

The statute provided “any ballot which shall bear any distinguishing mark or mutilation shall be void and shall not be counted” (SO 1890:566). This provision combined with voting by means of a stamp, made write-in voting invalid. A write-in vote was a ‘mutilation’ or a ‘distinguishing mark.’ The write-in ban continued through the Territorial period. The 1905 statute, for example, provided “any name written with pen or pencil upon the said ballot shall cause it to be rejected as a mutilated ballot” (SL 1905:231; see also SO 1893:576; SL 1895:116; SL 1897:151; SL 1899:154; SO 1903:724). The 1895 statutes provided the township ballot on the same paper but separate and under as the county ballot. It went on “a mutilation of the township ticket shall not affect the county ticket” (SL 1895:114). From the language of the various statutes in the Territorial period it appears the ban on write-in votes had two purposes. It strengthened the party organizations against attempts to bypass official nominations and it prevented a voter from identifying his ballot with special marks, thereby revealing who cast the vote.

Should a question be put to the voters on the ballot voters were required to stamp the place before the words “yes” or “no.” If neither was stamped a vote on that question was not recorded. This provision persisted throughout the Territorial period.

VOTER REGISTRATION

Qualified electors. . .shall include all male persons of the age of twenty-one years upward. . .who have resided in the Territory for the period of six months next preceding any election [who are]. . . Citizens of the United States [or]. . . Persons of Foreign birth who shall have complied with the provisions of the laws of the United States on the subject of naturalization [or]. . . Civilized persons of Indian descent not members of any tribe” (SO 1890:547-8).

Voters need not be citizens.

Any person, who having been a resident of Oklahoma Territory, shall have absented himself from the Territory. . .shall before being entitled to vote at any election in the Territory register a notice of his intention to become a qualified elector therein, in the office of the county clerk. . .such clerk [will] enter the name and residence of said elector. . .in a book furnished for said purpose. . .and deliver a certified copy of the same to the elector so registering, and on demand of any challenger. . .produce the same before being allowed to vote (SO 1890:552-3).

Each political organization could designate a challenger. If a person was challenged he could not vote unless he made an affidavit in writing that he was qualified with the details of his residence. Such a person would be allowed to vote unless someone else made an affidavit that the proposed voter was not a resident or otherwise not eligible. A false affidavit of either sort subjected one to arrest and subject to a charge of perjury.

The 1890 statute thus provided a dual system of voter qualification. Most voters would be known in their precincts and townships and be allowed to vote with little formality. Some voters would register or swear an affidavit of eligibility. Penalties were severe for improperly preventing an eligible elector from voting *and* for improperly voting. Some of this was racial and partisan. An example is the following 1900 story.

Ed Durford, the colored voter caught in the act of illegal voting was released on bond signed by Seymour Price yesterday

afternoon. The case against Durford is a very strong one and all parties who wish to have clean politics hope he will receive the maximum punishment, so that his case will serve as an example to men of his stamp (*The Daily Oklahoman* November 7, 1900:4).

The race-baiting partisan Democratic *Oklahoman* did not explicitly identify what ‘men of his stamp’ meant but Durford’s only characteristic mentioned was being ‘colored.’ Readers would understand what was suggested.

This managed to work itself out in a partisan manner in some instances with a county prosecutor or sheriff of one party being overruled by a judge of another. After statehood A. P. Blakemore presented himself to vote November 11, 1910 in Tulsa. Election Inspector A. J. Show challenged him and refused to let him vote based on the newly passed ‘grandfather’ clause, Blakemore being African-American. Blakemore appealed to the county judge and a warrant was issued. The sheriff arrested Show. A Democratic controlled Criminal Court of Appeals released Show and declared the ‘grandfather clause’ constitutional (see *Ex parte A.J. Show* 4 Okla. Crim. 416; 113 P. 1062).

WOMAN SUFFRAGE

On July 10, 1890, Wyoming became the first state in which women had full suffrage. In 1893 Colorado and in 1896 Utah and Idaho granted women full suffrage. During Oklahoma’s Territorial period they were the only full suffrage states (Darcy, Welch and Clark 1994; see Bryce 1888). The matter repeatedly came up in the Territorial legislature. Generally, Populists and Democrats were opposed to suffrage and Republicans were split with a majority of those voting favoring suffrage. The 1890 session had two suffrage votes. One, a motion by Populist Ira Terrill to strike the word ‘male’ from one line of the election code. Republicans and Populists supported the measure two to one while Democrats were almost uniformly opposed. Miller (1987) reports a different count that cannot be reconciled with the legislative journal.

The matter came up again the next day on a motion by Republican Robert J. Barker of Logan County. The next year, 1891, Barker would be appointed President of the Oklahoma A&M College. The purport of

TABLE 1

House Vote on Woman Suffrage December 11, 1890
“Strike out the word ‘male’“
Council Substitute For HB54

Party	For	Against	Not Voting	Total
Republican	6	3	5	14
Democrat	1	7	0	8
Populist	2	1	1	4
Total	9	11	6	26

SOURCE: JFS 1890:819-20; Rock, 1890:207

Barker's motion was clearer than Terrill's. It would grant equal suffrage. All voting Republicans supported it, all Democrats and Populists voted against. Equal suffrage lost. The seven absent Republicans also missed the votes before and after the equal suffrage vote so their absence cannot be attributed to avoiding the suffrage issue.

TABLE 2

House Vote on Woman Suffrage December 12, 1890
“That all citizens of the Territory of Oklahoma shall be entitled
to the right of elective franchise regardless of sex.”

Party	For	Against	Not Voting	Total
Republican	7	0	7	14
Democrat	0	8	0	8
Populist	0	4	0	4
Total	7	12*	7	26

*Recorded as 13 but only 12 individuals were listed.

SOURCE: JFS 1890:834-5; Rock, 1890:207

The 1890 election law passed the Council with eleven votes in favor, one opposed (JFS 1890:591). In the House Republicans were opposed while Democrats and Populists were in favor.

LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT

The Council, 9 in favor, 2 opposed, 2 not voting, and House, 15 in favor, none opposed, 11 not voting, passed a legislative apportionment but it was not signed by the governor. Instead, Congress appointed a three-member commission to survey the population and lay out the districts. By 1892 the Oklahoma Territory had expanded to include the vast Cheyenne and Arapaho lands as well as the lands of the Iowa, Sac and Fox, Pawnee, Pottawatomie and Shawnee. The Cherokee Outlet, however, still separated the bulk of the Territory from Beaver County (now Beaver, Cimarron and Texas counties) in the Panhandle (Miller 1987). The Congressional commission consisted of the Republican governor, Seay, a Democrat and a Populist. Democrats and Populists had the majority and some called the result a Gerrymander (Miller 1987). The 1892 election favored Democrats and Populists.

TABLE 3

**House Election Law Vote December 12, 1890
Council Substitute for HB 34 "Shall the bill pass?"**

Party	For	Against	Not Voting	Total
Republican	1	6	7	14
Democrat	8	0	0	8
Populist	4	0	0	4
Total	13	6	7	26

SOURCE: JFS 1890: 835; Rock, 1890:207

1893

Republicans had a majority in the Territorial Council but a defection allowed Democrats and Populists to organize it (Miller 1987). Democrats and Populists held a fourteen-seat majority in the House (*Norman Transcript*, January 13, 1893). The governor was Republican Abraham Jefferson Seay. The ballot law remained unchanged in essential details and Democrats retained the first column. The 1893 legislature did eliminate the requirement for publishing sample ballots in newspapers (SO 1893).

1895

The Republicans gained control of the Territorial Legislature for the first time in 1895 with eight Council and sixteen House seats. Democrats voted with Republicans, against Populists, to organize the legislature (JC 1895; JH 1895; *Payne County Populist* December 14, 1894). But the Governor was partisan Democrat William Cary Renfrow.

The legislature amended the election statutes in several ways. The township or precinct board of election commissioners was changed. The township trustee would appoint two judges from among the three political parties gaining the highest Territorial vote in the last general election. These judges would be appointed such that the three commissioners would represent different political parties. The political parties themselves would not appoint the judges. The township board of election commissioners arranged and supervised actual voting.

The board of county election commissioners was the county clerk and individuals nominated by the chair of the county central committee of any political party having in nomination candidates to be voted at that election. The county board of election commissioners prepared and distributed ballots for contests other than those to be voted on by the entire Territory.

The Territorial board of election commissioners became the Governor and persons, nominated by the chair of the central committee of any Territorial political party having candidates in the next election. The Territorial board of elections will

prepare and distribute ballots and stamps for election of members of the legislative assembly, constitutional convention and all officers for whom the electors of the Territory are entitled to vote. . .and all such names shall be on one ballot under the proper heading and device (SL 1895:110).




This shifted administration of the legislative ballot from the county to the Territorial board of election commissioners and extended the straight party vote from the delegate to congress, or President, down through the legislature. As had been the case from 1890, the Territorial ballot was to be red tinted paper while the county ballot was on white. Likewise the canvassing of the election was modified. All ballots were to be preserved by the county clerk for one year, not immediately burned, as previously. The county clerk was to issue a certificate of election for winners of county and township offices. Results of the legislative and Territorial election were to be forwarded to the Territorial secretary. Any three or more of the governor, secretary, auditor, treasurer or attorney general of the Territory constituted the Territorial canvassing board. The results of the canvass were to be reported to this board which, in turn, would certify the results as correct and issue certificates of election.

The election law was changed to specify the “list of candidates of the republican party shall be placed in the first column on the left-hand side of said ballot; of the democratic party, in the second column, of the people’s party in the third column. . . .” (SL 1895:114).

An anti-fusion provision was added: “the name of no candidate shall be printed on the ticket of more than one political party for the same office” (SL 1895:113). Fusion became a policy issue with the Australian ballot. The typical American election was won by the candidate with the most votes. If there were two candidates this would be a majority. But if there were three or more parties the winner might not have a majority. If one party was dominant but short of a majority, that often led to fusion deals among minority parties. The fusion parties would agree on a common slate of candidates and offer the same tickets or close to the same tickets. Thus in one district the fusion legislative candidate would be the Populist. He would appear for the office on both the Democratic and Populist lists. In another district the Democrat would appear on both lists. This increased the chances of a Populist or Democrat getting elected as their vote total would come from two parties.

FIGURE 2

1895 Oklahoma Ballot

REPUBLICAN TICKET	DEMOCRATIC TICKET	PEOPLE'S PARTY TICKET
		
For Governor, COURTLAND C. MATSON	For Governor ALLEN PROUTY	For Governor DAVID KING
For Sheriff WM. R. MEYERS	For Sheriff IRA J. SHERMAN	For Sheriff JONES JONES

SOURCE: SL 1895:114

Fusion served the dual purpose of electing third party candidates who might otherwise not stand a chance, and enabling the weaker of the two major parties to defeat the stronger. Further, those who would never vote for a Democrat, African Americans for example, might vote for a fusion candidate on some other ticket (Benson 1995).

In Oklahoma, as with much of the north and west at the time, Republicans were dominant. Fusion, therefore attracted Democrats and third parties. Republicans responded with anti-fusion ballot laws prohibiting a candidate from being listed more than once on the ballot. Oregon Republicans enacted an anti-fusion law for their office-block, Massachusetts-style ballot in 1891 (Argersinger 1992). South Dakota Republicans passed an anti-fusion law for the party column or Indiana-style ballot in 1893 and Washington followed in 1895 (Argersinger 1992).

Oklahoma Republicans experienced the same frustrations as Republicans elsewhere. Democrats and Populists, helped by Republican defections, were able to organize both legislative houses in 1890 and

TABLE 4

Council Vote on Election Law by Political Party 1895
Vote on Council Bill 150 to Amend Election Law

Party	Aye	Nay	Total
Republican	8	0	8
Democrat	0	1	1
Populist	4	0	4
Total	12	1	13

SOURCE: JC 1895:839; *Payne County Populist* December 14, 1894; *The Daily Oklahoman* January 13, 1897.

1893 despite the Republicans being the largest party. The solution, once in power, was a Republican anti-fusion law (Miller 1987). By limiting a candidate to one ballot position on a straight party ballot the Republicans hoped to limit Populists and Democrats to the few legislative districts in which one or the other party was in the majority.

TABLE 5

House Vote on Election Law by Political Party 1895
Vote on Council Bill 150 to Amend Election Law

Party	Aye	Nay	Total
Republican	16	0	16
Democrat	3	0	3
Populist	1	6	7
Total	20	6	26

SOURCE: JH 1895:876; *Payne County Populist* December 14, 1894; *The Daily Oklahoman* January 13, 1897.

In the Council Republicans were joined by Populists against the Democrat in passing the election law; in the House it was the Republicans and Democrats against the Populists. Republicans did not need any help in either house, however.

Republicans were also accused of gerrymandering the districts by carefully spreading Republican voters to be the plurality in as many districts as possible (Miller 1987). Oklahoma Territory required frequent redistricting because the area of the Territory was expanding and population rapidly increasing. But this was the only time the legislature succeeded at districting.

Any districting scheme can be called a Gerrymander. The governor's countywide districts in 1890 were designed to give Republicans an advantage (Miller 1987). The 1892 districts were also said to be Gerrymandered by Democrats and Populists (Cross 1950-1; Miller 1987). The 1895 apportionment process began in the House with Populist N.B. DeFord's bill passing on a fifteen to seven vote with four not voting. All seven Nay votes were Republican as were six of the Aye votes. All seven Populists and two Democrats also voted Aye.

Three Republicans and a Democrat did not vote. The Council substituted its own apportionment for the House version in a series of votes with all eight Republicans voting against all four Populists and Democrats. The matter now returned to the House where thirteen Republicans, a Populist and a Democrat voted for the changes against two Republicans, five Populists and two Democrats. A Populist and a Republican did not vote. Democratic Governor William Renfrow signed the legislation (JH 1895).

Democrats and Populists responded to the anti-fusion law as they had done in other states (Argersinger 1992). They created a new political party, Free Silver, which would run a mixture of Democratic and Populist candidates (*The Daily Oklahoman* of October 14, 1896 shows a Free Silver Ticket on page 2). Republicans ran in all districts. Free Silver ran in twelve of the thirteen Council districts and twenty-one of the twenty-six House districts (*Payne County Populist* November 26, 1896; but see Miller 1987). In the end, Republicans lost all the Council races and all but three of the House seats. Attributing this to a Gerrymander that backfired may be too facile (see Miller 1987). Republicans also lost the Territory-wide delegate race for the only time in Territorial history, (Scales and Goble 1982; Scales 1949) and lost the Territorial Presidential

preference race to Bryan. Republicans won the Oklahoma Presidential preference vote in 1892, 1900 and 1904. Finally, Republicans saw their House seats drop nationally from 254 to 206. 1896 was not a good Republican year in Oklahoma.

1897

The Free Silver Party was the fusion vehicle for Democratic and Populist candidates. (*The Daily Oklahoman* October 29, 1898 shows a sample ballot). Democrats and Populists, most running for the Free Silver Party, took all the Council seats in the 1896 election and all but three of the House seats (*Daily Oklahoman* November 26, 1896). The Governor was Democrat William Cary Renfrow. This was the first time one Territorial party was able to organize both houses of the legislature with a governor of the same party.

The legislature changed the Territory board of election commissioners to be the Governor and designees of the chair of the Territorial central committees of the People's party, the Democratic party, the Free Silver party and the Republican party. Likewise the board of county election commissioners consisted of the county clerk and similar party representatives appointed by the chair of party county central committees. The Democrats and their allies could expect a three to two majority on the Territorial or county board of election commissioners, even should the governor or county clerk be a Republican.

The old statute had the boards of election commissioners comprising individuals from the three parties gaining the most votes in the previous Territorial election or individuals from parties running in the ensuing election. Free Silver complicated these arrangements. Democrats and Populists did not contest the Territory-wide Delegate race in 1896 and, if fusion was tried again, would not contest many, if any, legislative seats in 1898. The two parties, therefore, would not be represented on important boards and commissions. The statute was changed to naming specific political parties rather than basing representation on electoral performance. Otherwise the Democratic and Populist parties would have 'officially' disappeared in so far as participation in elections (see Argersinger 1992).

Democrats changed ballot access. From 1890 through 1895 any political party gaining one percent of the vote in the previous Territorial election was guaranteed a place for its ticket. Others would have to petition for candidates that could be grouped as a ticket on the ballot. The 1897 legislature changed this. "The board of election commissioners shall designate as the persons to be voted for the names of the candidates nominated by the convention of any party that has kept up its organization since the last general election" (SL 1897). This, too, was a response to the Free Silver party problem. The petitioning requirements for those not on qualified party tickets were modified as well. Delegates to Congress would need five hundred rather than the two hundred signatures required previously and legislative and county officers would need fifty rather than the previously required twenty-five petition signatures (SL 1897).

Why would Democrats increase the petition signature requirements? In 1895 Republicans passed an anti-fusion law preventing a candidate from being listed on more than one party ticket. This, in turn, led to the formation of the Free Silver fusion party by Populists and Democrats. The 1890 provision then became an anti-fusion device because anyone could then claim the vacant Democratic or Populist labels by filing petitions. Increasing the petition signature requirements protected the Democrat and Populist ballot space when those parties fused as Free Silver.

This same amended section eliminated the 1895 anti-fusion prohibition against multiple party placements for the same candidate. Instead, a new article was added explicitly allowing fusion.

Ballot legislation reflected the Democrats' focus on racial segregation as well as the struggle between a Republican Territorial and a sometimes-Democratic county administration. African Americans were not particularly numerous in the Territory. The 1890 Census reported 3.8 percent of the Oklahoma Territory population as African American. The African American proportion was a far larger 10.4 percent in the Indian Territory. (U. S. Department of Commerce and Labor 1907; Tolson 1966). These African American voters were strongly Republican (Benson 1995) but had lower literacy levels than white voters (Myrdal 1944).

One Democratic solution was to make the ballot as confusing as possible. This was accomplished by switching to the Massachusetts

office block ballot. Candidates were grouped under the office in no particular order. Party symbols were eliminated and only abbreviations were used to designate political party. The straight party provision was eliminated, as was the use of a stamp to register choice. Instead, a voter was required to

indicate the candidate for whom he desires to vote, by marking a cross [x] with an indelible pencil in the square immediately preceding their names, and indicate his preference on any question of constitutional amendment or other special matter by making a cross [x] to the left of the words 'yes' or 'no' under such questions" (SL 1897:148-50). The legislature's attitude toward the ballot can be seen in their use of 'clever' names in the example ballot, "Will Drink," and "Noah Lott.

The 1897 statute does not explicitly mention 'pasters.' The effect of the new statute, however, may have been the same, continuing to permit official 'pasters.' "In case of death, resignation, or removal of any candidate subsequent to nomination, unless a supplemental certificate or petition of nomination be filed, the chairman of the Territory, county, city or township committee, shall fill such vacancy" (SL 1897:147-8).

The Massachusetts or office-block 1897 ballot accomplished another purpose. Between 1890 and 1895 the law provided for two or more ballot papers. The red tinted Territorial and legislative ballot was prepared and distributed by the Territorial board of election commissioners, typically Republican. The white county ballot was prepared and distributed by the county board of election commissioners, sometimes Democrat. The 1897 ballot would be one white paper with all offices and would be prepared and distributed by the county board of election commissioners. There was no straight party vote provision and no party devices (SL 1897).

Elimination of the straight party provision protected legislative and county offices from the powerful pro-Republican presidential preference and Territorial Delegate vote.

The 1893 statute specified the precinct would have three judges, one each from the Republican, Democrat and People's parties. These were to be appointed by the county commissioners. The 1897 statute provided two judges would be nominated by the chair of the county central committee of the parties of which the trustee was not a member

FIGURE 3
1897 Oklahoma Ballot

TERRITORIAL OFFICERS	COUNTY OFFICERS	TOWNSHIP OFFICERS
For Delegate to Congress	For Probate Judge	For Trustee
John Crow (Pop.)	James Adams (Dem.)	Wm. Fisher (Rep.)
Chas. Jones (Dem.)	John Clute (Rep.)	Henry Johns (Pop.)
Fred Ivens (Rep.)	Allen Scott (Pop.)	Will Drink (Dem.)
For Councilman, First District	For County Clerk	For Clerk
Alva Ditson (Dem.)	Robert Boyd (Rep.)	Noah Lott (Pop.)
James Miller (Rep.)	Alfred Nevins (Pop.)	Luke Wright (Dem.)
Henry Jensen (Pop.)	Albert Burton (Dem.)	Horace Mann (Rep.)
For Representative, First District	For Commissioner, First District	For Road Overseer, District No. 1
Jacob Allen (Rep.)	Henry Andrews (Pop.)	Ray Wilson (Dem.)
Cyrus Bolus (Dem.)	John Smith (Rep.)	Marion Butler (Pop.)
Frank Clary (Pop.)	Albert Jones (Dem.)	Mark Hanna (Rep.)
	For Road Overseer, District No. 2	
	Harold Hixon (Dem.)	
	Joe Jamison (Rep.)	
	Hugh Dinsmore (Pop.)	

SOURCE: SL 1897:149

from among the Republican, Democratic or People's parties. This constituted the precinct board of elections (SL 1897).

The 1897 legislature created a voter registration system for cities of the first class. The city clerk would register voters and provide lists of registered voters to the wards. Individuals not on the lists would not be permitted to vote (SL 1897). Voter registration began in Massachusetts in 1800 and gradually spread, first to urban areas where the population was more fluid and then to rural areas (Sait 1939). Registration could also be partisan, especially in urban areas, as was the case in Oklahoma. Whigs in the 1830s and Republicans in the 1870s enacted voter registration aimed at Democratic urban strongholds. Such laws effectively reduced the Democratic vote (Argersinger 1992). The situation in Oklahoma was the reverse of that further east. "The GOP . . . received strong support from the Oklahoma Territory's black and European-born settlers, who. . . were more likely to reside in or near urban areas" (Miller 1987:42). The Democrats' registration law could easily be seen as an attempt to limit Republican votes, especially those of African Americans.

1899

Democrats and Populists again ran under the Free Silver ticket. (*The Daily Oklahoman* October 29, 1898, has a sample ticket on page 2.) This time they lost. For the first time Republicans completely controlled Territorial government. Republican Cassius McDonald Barnes was governor. Republicans held eight Council seats and seventeen House seats (*The Daily Oklahoman* November 12, 1898). Governor C.M. Barnes, in his address to the legislature, took aim at the 1897 ballot law, charging it was aimed at disenfranchising African Americans.

The last legislature passed an act regulating elections in Oklahoma with the open and avowed intention of practically disenfranchising a large and worthy class of citizens who are entitled by law to equal rights and privileges of the ballot with any other citizen. A law, which by its intricate machinery and cumbersome and unfair methods, seeks by indirection to establish and enforce an educational qualification and has for its object the mystification and confusion of the voter so as to destroy a

right clearly guaranteed to him by the law which they have not the manhood to repeal openly and above board, stamps the makers as political cowards and is a disgrace to any progressive community and a menace to good government” (JC 1899:43).

Republicans changed the ballot design back to that of 1895. The ballot was once again organized by party columns with the Republicans in the first column. Votes again would be cast with a stamp rather than a pencil and the straight party vote was restored. The statute again explicitly provided for ‘pasters’ in case of death, resignation, removal or withdrawal of a candidate. Republicans eliminated the registration system for cities of the first class much as Democrats elsewhere, when they could, reversed Republican urban registration aimed at Democratic voters (Argersinger 1992). Voters would establish their eligibility as they did under the statutes in force 1890 - 1896, typically at the time of voting itself (SL 1899).

Republicans changed the election administration back to something similar to the system used in 1895. The precinct board of elections was the township trustee from the precinct and two members appointed by the chairman of the county central committees of the two political parties gaining the largest Territorial vote in the last general election. The county board of election commissioners was to be the county clerk and the nominees of the chairman of the county central committee of the two parties gaining the most votes in the last Territorial election. Their task was to prepare the county ballot that, once again, would be separate from the Territorial ballot. Likewise, the Governor and members nominated by the Chairmen of the Territorial Central Committee of the two political parties gaining the largest vote in the previous Territorial general election constituted the Territorial Board of Election Commissioners. They would prepare and distribute the Territorial ballot for Territorial Delegate and, when appropriate, President. The county board of election commissioners prepared the county ballot that included the legislative positions. We can note that the Democrats and Populists, should they fuse as Free Silver, would give up places on election boards as a consequence.

Ballot access by petition was also reduced from the numbers imposed by the 1897 legislature back to the 1890 - 1895 levels: two-hundred for delegate to Congress, twenty-five for legislative or county

officer. Why might the Republicans have favored eased ballot access and the fusionists oppose?

The Territorial legislature contests in November 1896 might give an insight. Republicans contested all thirteen Council and all twenty-six House districts. Free Silver candidates entered only twelve Council contests and twenty-one House contests. A Populist and a Democrat contested for the Council as well and four Populists, four Democrats and five independents, one of whom, N.B. DeFord, was the Populist incumbent. Thus, maverick candidates troubled the fusionists, probably from the very nature of fusion. Republicans had a 'True Republican' contest against the regular Republican in one Council and one House district but the problem of spoiler candidates was clearly greater for the fusionists than the Republicans (*Daily Oklahoman* November 26, 1896; see also Miller 1987). Republicans had greater unity and every motivation to divide the opposition to the greatest extent possible.

Woman suffrage came up in several contexts in the 1899 legislature. Because nothing passed it is difficult to determine the exact purport of the votes. Failed and preliminary legislation was typically not printed. One House bill, however, appeared to be related to suffrage because it was referred to the committee on elections. This was House Bill 41 "An Act Defining the Rights of Women" introduced by Republican C.F. McElrath. It passed the House on a vote that split Republicans. The Council did not act on the bill.

The Council passed a Territorial legislative apportionment in a partisan vote but there was no House action and the matter died. Others carried out the apportionment.

Republicans did not reinstate their anti-fusion law. Candidates could be listed on multiple party tickets. Fusion continued to be permitted in 1901 and 1903 legislation (see SO 1903). The 1900 elections accomplished Democrat-Populist fusion with party columns, one for each party, rather than the Free Silver Party vehicle used in the 1896 and 1898 elections. In Payne County, for example, the November 1900 county ballot Democratic and People's Party tickets had identical candidates (*Payne County Populist* November 1, 1900). We can note the sample ballot shows the Republican ticket last when, in fact, the statute provides for it being first. The *Payne County Populist* was being partisan. We can also note the incumbent Republican woman Superintendent of Schools lost her re-election contest. Finally, we note the Territorial ballot was a

TABLE 6

House Vote on HB 41 Rights of Women by Political Party (1899)
Passage of House Bill 41 Rights of Women

Party	Aye	Nay	Not Voting	Total
Republican	8	6	3	17
Democrat	1	3	0	4
Populist	4	0	0	4
Fusion	1	0	0	1
Total	14	9	3	26

SOURCE: JH 1899:243; *The Daily Oklahoman* November 12, 1898; *Payne County Populist*, November 23, 1900; *Beaver Herald* October 27, 1898.

separate piece of paper with the Territorial Delegate and Presidential preference election, prepared by the Territorial election board.

The 1899 election law passed the House unanimously. That is not to say it was nonpartisan. Democrat J.P. Ballard “explained his vote as follows: ‘I concede the fact that our election laws must be changed, and

TABLE 7

Council Vote on CB 133 Apportionment by Political Party (1899)
Passage of Council Bill 133 Apportionment

Party	Aye	Nay	Absent	Total
Republican	7	0	1	8
Democrat	0	3	1	4
Populist	0	1	0	1
Total	7	4	2	13

SOURCE: JC 1899:1081; *The Daily Oklahoman* November 12, 1898.

FIGURE 4

November 1900 Payne County Ballot

Democratic Ticket	People's Party Ticket	Republican Ticket
[DEVICE HERE]	[DEVICE HERE]	[DEVICE HERE]
For Councilman Third District FREEMAN E. MILLER	For Councilman Third District FREEMAN E. MILLER	For Councilman Third District J.J. SHAFFER
For Representative Fifth District J.L. MATHEWS	For Representative Fifth District J.L. MATHEWS	For Representative Fifth District G.W. HALL
County Ticket	County Ticket	County Ticket
For Probate Judge JOHN R. CLARK	For Probate Judge JOHN R. CLARK	For Probate Judge R. E. BURNS
For County Attorney C.L. BURDICK	For County Attorney C.L. BURDICK	For County Attorney S.P. KING
For Probate Judge For Treasurer C.W. DUTTON	For Probate Judge For Treasurer C.W. DUTTON	For Probate Judge For Treasurer L.K. McGUFFIN
For County Clerk A.J. HARTENBOWER	For County Clerk A.J. HARTENBOWER	For County Clerk W. H. PITTMAN
For Recorder WILLIAM M.BARKER	For Recorder WILLIAM M.BARKER	For Recorder G.L. LYONS
For Sheriff JAMES P. HESSER	For Sheriff JAMES P. HESSER	For Sheriff W.L. SCOTT
For Assessor R.O. HUDSON	For Assessor R.O. HUDSON	For Assessor A.F. MOOD
For Superintendent C.L. KEZER	For Superintendent C.L. KEZER	For Superintendent HATTIE R. DARNELL
For Weigher J.E. POWELL	For Weigher J.E. POWELL	For Weigher P.W. HARPOLE
For Surveyor T. P. GERMAN	For Surveyor T. P. GERMAN	For Surveyor J.K. HASTINGS
For Coroner DR. J.M. SHARPLESS	For Coroner DR. J.M. SHARPLESS	For Coroner DR.N.W. MAYGINNES
For Commissioner 2nd District P.H. SULLIVAN	For Commissioner 2nd District P.H. SULLIVAN	For Commissioner 2nd District D.H. DODGE

Source: *Payne County Populist* November 1, 1900, p. 5.

TABLE 8

Council Vote on HB 54 Election Law by Political Party (1899)
Passage of House Bill 54 Election Law

Party	Aye	Nay	Total
Republican	8	0	8
Democrat	0	4	4
Populist	0	1	1
Total	8	5	13

SOURCE: JC 1899:1115; *The Daily Oklahoman* November 12, 1898.

I believe that this is as equitable a bill as it is possible for a republican to frame. I vote aye' “ (JH 1899:215). The Council was not so agreeable and the vote was by party lines.

1901

Republican Cassius McDonald Barnes continued as Governor. The 1901 Territorial Council was controlled by eight fusion Democrats and Populists. Sixteen Republicans controlled the House (*Stillwater Gazette*, November 22, 1900; *Payne County Populist* November 23, 1900; *Daily Oklahoman* January 6, 1901). There were no significant changes in the election laws (see SL 1901).

1903

Oklahoma Populists essentially disappeared after the 1902 elections. As Worth Robert Miller, put it: “Populists fused with Democrats in five districts, with Republicans in two, and with Socialists in one. In another district they fielded a middle-of-the-road candidate. All lost. The Populist

TABLE 9

**Council Vote on HB 27 Primary Election by Political Party (1903)
Final Passage Vote on House Bill 27 Primary Elections**

Party	Aye	Nay	Total
Republican	0	7	7
Democrat	6	0	6
Total	6	7	13

SOURCE: JC 1903:302; *The Daily Oklahoman* January 13, 1903; *Stillwater Advance* November 13, 1902.

Revolt in Oklahoma was at an end” (Miller 1987). After 1902 Socialists would be the major third party in terms of Territory-wide votes, although they would not elect any legislators until 1914 (see Scales 1949). The 1903 Territorial legislature was divided between a Council controlled by seven Republicans and a House controlled by fourteen Democrats (*Daily Oklahoman*, January 13, 1903; *Stillwater Advance*, November 13, 1902). The Governor was Republican Thompson Benton Ferguson.

The 1903 Territorial Legislature created severe penalties for offering anything of value in exchange for a vote. It restored the 1897 voter registration in cities of the first class. The city clerk was obligated to keep a book

in which he shall enter the name, age, and residence by ward or precinct of all voters who may apply to him in person for such purpose. . . . No voter shall be permitted to vote in said ward or precinct who has not registered as herein provided (SL 1903:157-8).

The vote was unanimous in both houses (JC 1903; JH 1903).

The House unanimously passed a primary election law (JH 1903) but it was defeated in the Council on a party vote.

1905

Republicans had complete control over Territorial government for only the second time. Republican Thompson Benton Ferguson remained governor. Republicans held eight Council seats and fifteen House seats (*The Daily Oklahoman* November 11, 1904; *Stillwater Advance* November 24, 1904).

Republicans, when they previously controlled the legislature in 1899, did not forbid fusion. The 1901 and 1903 statutes permitted fusion as well. The 1905 legislature, however, forbade fusion again.

The name of no candidate shall be printed in more than one place on such ballot, and in the event any candidate be nominated by more than one political party for the same office, such candidate may elect under which title and device his name shall be printed, and notify the board of election commissioners of his decision ten days prior to the time for printing such ballots, and should any such candidate fail to make such election, the board of election commissioners shall decide under which design and title of the parties nominating such candidate that the name of such candidate shall be printed (SL 1905:230).

The ballot order was specified.

. . . the Republican party shall be placed in the first column on the left hand side of said ballot; and of the Democratic party in the second column, of the People's party in the third column, of the Socialist party in the fourth column, of the Prohibition party in the fifth column; provided each of said parties have candidates to be voted for at such election (SL 1905:230-1).

The 1899 statutes provided the nomination forms for legislative assembly, constitutional convention, and all officers to be voted for by the entire Territory be filed with the Governor, "candidates for offices to be voted for by electors of any district or division of the Territory exclusively, shall be filed with the county clerks of the counties or county included in or including such districts or divisions" (SL 1899:138). This was changed in 1905. Nominations for the legislature, constitutional convention and offices in any "division greater than a county shall be filed with the Governor of the Territory" (SL 1905:243). The present

FIGURE 5

Oklahoma 1905 Ballot

REPUBLICAN TICKET	DEMOCRATIC TICKET	PEOPLE'S PARTY TICKET	SOCIALIST TICKET
<p>(Device)</p> <p style="text-align: center; font-size: 2em;">O</p>	<p>(Device)</p> <p style="text-align: center; font-size: 2em;">O</p>	<p>(Device)</p> <p style="text-align: center; font-size: 2em;">O</p>	<p>(Device)</p> <p style="text-align: center; font-size: 2em;">O</p>
<p><input type="checkbox"/> For Governor T. R.. REID</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> For Governor T. H. DOYLE</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> For Governor J. F. TODD</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> For Governor A. G. COPELAND</p>
<p><input type="checkbox"/> For Sheriff C. E. CARPENTER</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> For Sheriff W. M. TIGHLMAN</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> For Sheriff W. ANNIS</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> For Sheriff JOHN DOE</p>

SOURCE: SL 1905: 232

practice is similar to that established in 1905. Today nominations for offices contained entirely within the county, except associate district judge, are filed with the county election board, offices of districts that can cross county lines are filed with the State Election Board (SO 2001 Title 26 Chapter A1, Article V, sections 5-102, 5-103).

PRIMARY ELECTIONS

Abuses in the control over political party control resulted in California passing the first primary law in 1866. "The immediate occasion for the passage of the California law was the desperate struggle between the 'long hair' and 'short hair' factions of the Union party. This contest was accompanied by scenes of great violence, disorder, and glaring fraud, especially in San Francisco and Sacramento" (Merriam and Overacker 1928:8; see also Meyer 1902:193-204). California's was an *optional primary* a political party could request. Wisconsin and Oregon adopted *mandatory primaries* in 1904 (Sait 1939). These 1904 statutes shifted political parties from private organizations to organizations subject to state regulation.

Oklahoma Territory enacted a primary law in 1905. This law provided for an *optional primary* election if the central committee of any political party requested it. The statute also provided for a *closed primary* to all but members of the party requesting the primary election.

TABLE 10

**Council Vote on HB 23 Primary Election Law by Political Party (1905)
Passage of House Bill 23 Primary Elections**

Party	Aye	Nay	Absent	Total
Republican	4	3	1	8
Democrat	5	0	0	5
Total	9	3	1	13

SOURCE: JC 1905:203; *The Daily Oklahoman* November 11, 1904; *Stillwater Advance* November 24, 1904.

In all cities or districts where registration is now or shall hereafter be by law required for general elections, no person shall be entitled to vote at the primary election unless registered for the last preceding election, or shall have registered after such preceding election and prior to such primary election (SL 1905:246).

If any person offering to vote is challenged as unqualified, one of the judges shall tender to him the oath provided by statute for general elections, and propound the question as in said statute provided, and if the vote is challenged on the ground that the voter does not belong to the political party whose ticket he is attempting to vote, they shall propound to him the following questions, to-wit: 'With which political party did you affiliate during the last general election?' 'With which political party do you intend to affiliate in the ensuing election?' (SL 1905:248-9).

If the challenge was not withdrawn the voter was required to swear an oath that he would support the party in the next election.

The primary bill overwhelmingly passed the House with only two dissenting votes, both Republican. The vote in the Council was more divisive for Republicans.

CONCLUSION

By the end of the Territorial period Oklahoma's election system approximated in a broad way the election system the state uses today. Ballots were straight party divided into sections of Territorial and Federal officers, county and township officers and questions. Write-in votes were prohibited. Administration was at two levels, a Territorial and a County election board. A voter registration system for cities was in place as were optional party primaries. In some ways statehood would be a step backward. African-Americans would find voting more difficult in the first half-century of statehood but women would get the franchise. The state began the regulation of campaign funds and created legislative control over election boards as opposed to the Governor's control in the Territorial period. Nevertheless, much of today's election system and procedures are the heritage of Territorial political battles.

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RELIGION, ETHNICITY AND RISK-TAKING: EVIDENCE FROM A NEW LOTTERY - TEXAS

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A debate over Oklahoma's possible adoption of a lottery was a highlight of the 2002 gubernatorial election. In 1992, Texas joined the many states already conducting lotteries. While dissimilar in some ways, the populations of Oklahoma and Texas are alike in many ways. Therefore, policymakers considering an Oklahoma lottery can gain considerable insight from examining Texas's lottery. Texas is a state characterized by divisions between Whites and Hispanics and divisions between Baptists and Catholics. Based on academic research, Baptists were expected to shun lottery participation, and Catholics were expected to be eager lottery participants. This article, analyzing county data from the introductory period of the Texas Lottery, finds that reality is more complicated than anticipated. As expected, Baptists do not participate in the lottery, but Catholics are not homogenous. Concentrations of White Catholics indicate high levels of lottery participation, as expected. However, concentrations of Hispanic Catholics indicate lower levels of lottery participation. In Texas's new lottery, participation is a White non-Baptist experience. As expected, lower incomes and lower educations signal higher levels of lottery participation. Lottery play fell with middle-income concentrations, only unexpectedly to rise again with concentrations of people with higher incomes. At the highest incomes, lottery play again declined.

Like many states suffering from financial dislocations, Texas turned to a lottery for additional revenue. Texas established an Instant game in May 1992, added Lotto in November 1992, started Pick Three in October 1993, and adopted Cash Five in October 1995, joining the 36 states and the District of Columbia that then offered legal games of chance. The Texas Lottery Commission reported in January 1995 that 71 percent of all adult Texans had played the lottery at least once in the previous year. Echoing the March 1993 biennial demographic study of Texas Lottery players, the report said the Commission was “pleased” to find that people with the lowest levels of education and those with the smallest incomes are least likely to play the Texas Lottery.

The Texas Lottery studies contrast with scholarly literature that almost universally supports the notion that the tax inherent in the lottery is regressive, because lottery players tend to be poor, uneducated and unemployed (Spiro, 1974; Suits, 1974; Brinner and Clotfelter, 1975; Heavey, 1978; Clotfelter, 1979; Mikesell and Zorn, 1986; Clotfelter and Cook, 1987; Borg and Mason, 1988; Mobilia, 1992). Pirog-Good and Mikesell (1995) find that a lottery’s regressivity increases with time. Examining Texas, Deer and Dyer (1994) find that although Texans with family incomes below \$10,000 earn just 2 percent of all income in the state, these Texans account for almost 10 percent of all spending for the Texas Lottery.

TEXANS AND RELIGIOUS INFLUENCES

Texas became the thirty-fourth state to offer gambling, despite the fact that Martin and Yandle (1990) had only cautiously predicted that it would. They surmised Southern Baptist opposition might block a Texas lottery. Similarly, Clotfelter and Cook (1989) list Baptists among the denominations on record against gambling. They report that a California survey found that Catholics and Jews were the least likely to oppose that state’s lottery. Southern Baptists and Catholics are the two predominant denominations in Texas, providing a unique opportunity to determine religious influences on participation in a state lottery.

TEXANS, THEIR TAX BURDEN, AND THEIR NEIGHBORS

The greater the overall tax burden on the voter in the state, the greater the restrictions upon raising other tax rates, and the greater the opportunity to export the tax to constituents of other states increase the probability that a state will adopt a lottery as an alternative source of revenue (Filer, Moak and Uze, 1988). Texas, a tourist-industry state that shares borders with Mexico and three states, including Oklahoma as of this date, which do not have lotteries in 1993 adopted a constitutional amendment which forbids a personal income tax unless it is approved by voters. Mikesell and Zorn (1985) speculate that lottery states bordering jurisdictions without lotteries may extract sales from nonresidents. Mikesell (1991) asserts that although a lottery was regressive, lottery legalization might be justified on the basis of reducing the regressive outflow of revenue to bordering states.

Facing the existence of contradictory evidence about the regressivity of state lotteries, this article examines one of the newest and largest state lotteries to determine its participation and income distribution effects. This article examines several important issues of lottery analysis that other analysts have examined and extends this research. The income, racial, educational, gender, and interstate distributions of lottery players are well documented in the academic literature. While this article extends the literature to look at the international nature of the Texas Lottery, it makes a unique contribution to the lottery literature with important results concerning the religious and ethnic distributions of lottery players.

DATA, METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS

This article analyzes Texas Lottery participation from May 1992 to November 1992, the months during which only an Instant game was available, and from November 1992 to November 1993, the first year that both Instant and Lotto games were available. The ordinary least squares regression models of this analysis include county per capita gambling dollar amounts as the dependent variable and geographical and population demographic descriptions as independent variables.

DATA/VARIABLES

Texas Lottery month summaries and 1990 United States Census Bureau data combined to produce county per capita spending on Instant and Lotto games. Census Bureau data provided demographic and financial information. *Churches and Church Membership in the United States: 1990* (Bradley, et al, 1992) provided data on the number of total adherents of each religious group.

Because it was hypothesized that Catholics would be major supporters of the Texas Lottery and active Lottery participants, and that Southern Baptists would oppose a lottery and would not be active Lottery participants, the initial research designed included Catholic and Southern Baptist independent variables. The initial trail model included White, Hispanic and Black independent variables. However, the number of Catholics and the number of Hispanics in a county is highly correlated, with a correlation coefficient of 0.8241. (The number of African-Americans in a county is highly correlated with the number of Baptists in a county that attend a church that is not Southern Baptist-affiliated.) Therefore, the models include independent variables created by multiplying the probability that a county's resident would be White or Hispanic times the probability that the county's resident would be Catholic or Baptist. The variables become the probability that any person in a county would be Hispanic Catholic, White Catholic, Hispanic Baptist, Hispanic Catholic or Black.

To analyze the income distribution of lottery players, the models include variables representing the percentage of households that have incomes of less than \$19,999, incomes between \$20,000 and \$49,999, incomes between \$60,000 and \$99,999, and incomes of more than \$100,000. (The percentage of households having incomes between \$50,000 and \$59,999 was omitted to avoid perfect multicollinearity.)

A regression model was computed in the following form:

$$\text{GAMBLING} = a + b*\text{ENTRY} + c*\text{NOENTRY} + d*\text{BORDER} + e*\text{LOUISIANA} + f*\text{COASTAL} + g*\text{BIGCITY} + h*\text{HISTCATH} + i*\text{WHITECATH} + j*\text{HISTBAPT} + k*\text{WHITEBAPT} + l*\text{BLACK} + m*\text{OTHER} + n*\text{INCOME1} + o*\text{INCOME2} + p*\text{INCOME4} + q*\text{INCOME5} + r*\text{WOMEN} + s*\text{ELEMENTARY} + t*\text{HIGHSCHOOL} + u*\text{COLLEGE} + e$$

where

ENTRY is a dummy variable indicating that a county on the Mexican border has a legal entry route from Mexico;

NOENTRY is a dummy variable indicating that a county on the Mexican border has no legal entry route from Mexico;

BORDER is a dummy variable indicating that a county is adjoining a state without a state lottery;

LOUISIANA is a dummy variable indicating that a county is adjoining Louisiana, which has a state lottery;

COASTAL is a dummy variable indicating that a county is on the Gulf of Mexico coast;

BIG CITY is a dummy variable indicating that a county is in the metropolitan San Antonio, Dallas, Fort Worth or Houston areas, which are hypothesized to have the most out-of-state business visitors;

HISTCATH, WHITECATH, HISTBAPT and WHITECATH are percentage variables indicating the probability that a resident of a county will be combinations of Hispanic or White and Catholic or Southern Baptist;

BLACK is a percentage variable indicating each county's African-American population;

INCOME1 is the percentage of households having incomes less than \$19,000;

INCOME2 is the percentage of households having incomes between \$20,000 and \$49,999;

INCOME4 is the percentage of households having incomes between \$60,000 and \$99,000;

INCOME5 is the percentage of households having incomes greater than \$100,000;

WOMEN is the percentage of a county's population that is female;

ELEMENTARY is the percentage of a county's population that has not graduated from high school;

HIGHSCHOOL is the percentage of a county's population that has a high school degree but no higher-education experience, and

COLLEGE is the percentage of a county's population that has higher-education experience, but has no advanced degree.

GAMBLING, the dependent variable, is the per capita amount of money gambled in each Texas county. The models omits a very few Texas counties which do not have legal gambling outlets. (Most of these counties are rural and do not have any churches.)

RESULTS

The regression was repeated three times:

First — Instant gambling per capita by county from May 1992 to November 1993, the months when only an Instant game was available in Texas (see Table 1),

TABLE 1
Instant Game, May 1992 to November 1992
N = 247 (of 254 counties)

Variable	Slope	T value	Significance
Intercept	-219.061	-1.913	0.057
Entry to Mexico	2.145	0.307	0.759
No Entry to Mexico	-4.783	-0.503	0.615
Border on Non-Lottery	9.957	3.143	***0.002
Louisiana	-5.486	-0.905	0.366
Coast of Gulf of Mexico	9.944	2.266	**0.024
Big Cities	2.293	0.269	0.788
Hispanic Catholics	-27.258	-2.311	**0.022
White Catholics	27.182	1.991	**0.048
Hispanic Baptists	-23.664	-0.973	0.332
White Baptists	-19.374	-1.746	*0.082
African Americans	-28.303	-1.662	*0.098
Other Minorities	255.924	1.649	0.101
Income Up to \$19,999	164.482	1.702	*0.090
\$20,000 to \$49,999	164.954	1.490	0.138
\$60,000 to \$99,999	354.822	2.389	**0.018
\$100,000 and More	39.309	0.252	0.801
Women	31.821	0.492	0.623
Elementary School	100.656	2.102	**0.037
High School	120.166	2.455	**0.015
College Educated	-15.816	-0.371	0.711

R-Square: 0.1808

*** = $p < .01$

** = $p < .05$

* = $p < .10$

Second — Instant gambling per capita by county from November 1992 to November 1993, to examine if legal Lotto gambling changed Texans' Instant gambling habits (see Table 2),

TABLE 2
Instant Game, November 1992 to November 1993
N = 249 (of 254 counties)

Variable	Slope	T value	Significance
Intercept	-260.152	-1.349	0.179
Entry to Mexico	-3.275	-0.271	0.786
No Entry to Mexico	-18.106	-1.261	0.209
Border on Non-Lottery	17.862	3.279	**0.001
Louisiana	-6.920	-0.661	0.509
Coast of Gulf of Mexico	10.128	1.341	0.181
Big Cities	-2.781	-0.189	0.850
Hispanic Catholics	-73.581	-3.640	***0.000
White Catholics	42.478	1.812	*0.071
Hispanic Baptists	-74.076	-1.773	*0.078
White Baptists	-32.680	-1.733	*0.084
African Americans	-44.213	-1.517	0.131
Other Minorities	393.597	1.487	0.138
Income Up to \$19,999	204.179	1.312	0.191
\$20,000 to \$49,999	150.504	0.863	0.389
\$60,000 to \$99,999	364.741	1.529	0.128
\$100,000 and More	81.508	0.306	0.760
Women	12.772	0.115	0.909
Elementary School	212.909	2.683	***0.008
High School	188.624	2.407	**0.017
College Educated	-21.722	-0.300	0.765

R-Square: 0.2097

*** = $p < .01$

** = $p < .05$

* = $p < .10$

and

Third — Lotto gambling per capita by county from November 1992 to November 1993, Texas' first full year of Lotto gambling (see Table 3).

TABLE 3

Lotto Game, November 1992 to November 1993
N = 246 (of 250 counties)

Variable	Slope	T value	Significance
Intercept	-118.831	-0.600	0.549
Entry to Mexico	-0.823	-0.068	0.946
No Entry to Mexico	-7.742	-0.474	0.636
Border on Non-Lottery	21.721	3.982	***0.000
Louisiana	-6.302	-0.605	0.546
Coast of Gulf of Mexico	12.119	1.605	0.110
Big Cities	3.419	0.233	0.816
Hispanic Catholics	-79.642	-2.112	**0.036
White Catholics	30.867	1.315	0.190
Hispanic Baptists	-88.319	-2.112	**0.036
White Baptists	-43.368	-2.274	**0.024
African Americans	-22.865	-0.779	0.437
Other Minorities	273.734	1.026	0.306
Income Up to \$19,999	85.097	0.505	0.614
\$20,000 to \$49,999	62.664	0.325	0.746
\$60,000 to \$99,999	298.530	1.156	0.249
\$100,000 and More	-51.816	-0.193	0.847
Women	-26.092	-0.235	0.815
Elementary School	180.640	2.173	**0.031
High School	117.231	1.390	0.166
College Educated	12.820	0.174	0.862

R-Square: 0.1897

*** = $p < .01$ ** = $p < .05$ * = $p < .10$

The model measuring the Instant game's introductory period has a 0.1808 R-square, indicating the model explains 18.08 percent of the variation in gambling between counties. The Instant game model for the first year of the Lotto game has a 0.2097 R-square. The Lotto model has a 0.1897 R-square.

INCOME

Based on the estimated county-level model, Texans conform to income/gambling expectations in an unexpected way. While Spiro (1974), Suits (1974) Brinner and Clotfelter (1975), Heavey (1978), Clotfelter (1979), Mikesell and Zorn (1986), Clotfelter and Cook (1987), Borg and Mason (1988), Mobilia, (1992), Deer and Dyer (1994) and Pirog-Good and Mikesell (1995) found that lottery players tended to be poor, uneducated and unemployed, the level of lottery play rose with income. Lottery play was regressive because the proportion of income spent falls as individual income rise (Mikesell, 1991). Conversely, in Texas, lottery play declined with concentrations of middle-income households. Lottery play then rose with concentrations of upper-income households, only to fall again with concentrations of the highest-income households.

Texans with incomes below \$20,000 are active participants in the Instant game (although the variable is not statistically significant after the introduction of Lotto), but are not active participants in Lotto. The positive estimated variables indicate that concentrations of low-income Texans indicate more active per capita Lottery participation than concentrations of Texans with incomes between \$50,000 and \$59,999. Texans with incomes between \$20,000 and \$49,999 are not significantly different than those with incomes between \$50,000 and \$59,999, but the estimated variable is positive in every model. Contrary to expectations, Texans with incomes between \$60,000 and \$99,000 are active participants in all lottery games (although the positive variable estimates are not statistically significant after the introduction of Lotto).

The models' results support a conclusion that low-income Texans and higher-income Texans are both more active in Lottery games than middle-income Texans. The low-income Texans conform to previous lottery studies, and higher-income Texans conform to the state's image of being a home of risk-seekers, including oil wildcatters. However, the

Texas “big rich” - for these models, concentrations of households with incomes above \$100,000 - are not attracted to the Lottery. Previous research had not identified a lottery drop-off in the middle income levels, a subsequent increase in wealthier areas, and final decline in high-income areas.

RELIGION AND ETHNICITY

Texans also conform to religious/gambling expectations in an unexpected way. According to the county-level model estimates, counties having large numbers of Baptists uniformly shun the Lottery (although the Hispanic Baptist variable is not statistically significant in the introductory-period Instant model). Although White Catholics are active Lottery participants, as expected, Hispanic Catholics are not active Lottery participants. The Hispanic Catholic variable is negative and statistically significant in every model. In Texas, Lottery participation is a White experience, with all Hispanics joining White Baptists as nonparticipants. The African American variable estimate is uniformly negative, although it is statistically significant only in the introductory-period Instant model; the Other Minorities variable estimate is uniformly positive, although it is never statistically significant. The Women variable is statistically insignificant in all models.

This article supports Clotfelter and Cook’s (1989) hypothesis about Catholic and Baptist lottery participation, with amendments. All Baptists were active lottery participants, but areas with concentrations of Hispanic Catholics had low lottery participation.

EDUCATION

According to the model estimates, and according to expectations, counties with concentrations of lower levels of education have higher incidence of gambling. The Elementary School variable estimate is uniformly positive and statistically significant in all models. High School education is uniformly positive, but not statistically significant in the Lotto model. College Educated is statistically insignificant, possibly because

this variable primarily measures current university students who are financially unable to be active Lottery participants.

LOCATION

The county-level models indicate that the Texas Lottery has active participation from surrounding states that do not have lotteries. The Border variable is uniformly positive and statistically significant. Results for Louisiana, which has a lottery, were uniformly negative, although not statistically significant. The variables indicating the Mexican border are all statistically insignificant. This article's results supports Mikesell and Zorn's (1985) conclusion that lottery states bordering states without lotteries may extract sales from nonresidents.

The Big City and Coast variables, which were hypothesized to indicate business and tourism travelers, are not statistically significant. The Coast variable was positive and statistically significant at the introduction of the Instant game.

CONCLUSION

Based on the estimation of the Instant and Lotto models, this article supports and extends previous research by Clotfelter and Cook and Mikesell (with Zorn and Pirog-Good), among others. Texas counties with concentrations of people with lower incomes and lower educations have higher incidence of legal gambling.

Consistent with previous hypotheses of Clotfelter and Cook, Texas counties with higher levels of White Catholics have higher incidence of legal gambling. However, surprisingly, concentrations of Hispanic Catholics are not associated with higher incidence of legal gambling. Hispanic Catholics are similar to White Baptists and Hispanic Baptists, two groups which are expected to oppose gambling. Since the level of lottery play in Texas, first falls with income, and then rises, only to fall again, the results of these models offer interesting insights into interactions between religion, ethnicity and risk-taking in a diverse society. While the importance of White Baptists in Oklahoma's population would seemingly preclude their proportionate participation in any future state

lottery, an important unknown would be the anticipated participation rates of Native- American populations. In any event, concerns over the regressive impact of participation in a future Oklahoma lottery are not quieted by the results presented here.

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OKLAHOMA WOMEN AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

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This paper reveals obstacles and challenges women politicians in Oklahoma feel they themselves or women in general face as officeholders. Also examined in this paper is whether attending leadership programs for women, such as N.E.W. Leadership institute held each year at the University of Oklahoma's Carl Albert Center provide an extra edge for women politicians. In determining fact from fiction with regards to these issues, an analysis was done using a mail-in survey of 49 female officeholders in county, city, and state level political positions.

In 2003, 73 women serve in the U.S. Congress. Thirteen women serve in the Senate, and 60 women serve in the House, both all-time highs. Nationally, women comprise 22.4% of members of state legislatures (Center for Women in Politics, 2002). In Oklahoma, there are six women in the of 48-seat State Senate (12.5%), and eight women

in the 101-seat (7.9%) House of Representatives (Almanac of Oklahoma Politics 1998). Although several women politicians such as Mary Fallin, Jari Askins and Angela Monson have emerged as powerful leaders, Cindy Simon Rosenthal's characterization of Oklahoma as "no-woman's land" is still apt (Rosenthal 1998, 96).

The research question driving this study is whether women in Oklahoma politics face different obstacles than men in Oklahoma politics. We sent questionnaires to 49 women who hold public office at the state, city, and county level. Twenty state senators and representatives, district attorneys, lieutenant governors, and city council members returned our surveys. We will use their answers to test the following hypotheses:

H1: Women in politics feel that *women in general* face different obstacles than men

H2: Women in politics feel that *they themselves* face different obstacles than men

H3: Women who have attended leadership programs for women succeed in politics at a higher rate than women who have not attended leadership programs for women.

In short, we believe that women politicians in the state of Oklahoma will feel that women in general face different obstacles than men in running for and holding public office. Also, that women politicians will feel that *they themselves* face different obstacles than men. Finally, we believe that training programs—such as the National Education for Women (N.E.W.) Leadership institute for women sponsored by the National Center for the Study of Women in Politics and OU's Carl Albert Center—should boost the success rate of women getting elected and being effective once elected to office.

LITERATURE REVIEW

According to Conway, Steuernagel, and Ahern (1997) underrepresentation of women among the political elite appears to stem from two interrelated sets of problems—environmental/structural and attitudinal—that have created barriers to women's political participation.

There are three sets of environmental/structural problems. The first is the sociocultural problem of family responsibilities. McGlen and O'Connor (1998) identify family obligations as a tough hurdle for women. Women with children are less suited for public office. Even if a woman could reject or overcome the alleged incompatibility of the two roles of mother and politician, she might not run for office for fear of the public's or her own family's negative reaction. Mothers of young children who have run for office tell many stories about the hostile and snide questions asked by some voters and reporters about who was taking care of their children. When faced with this role conflict, following the pattern of women in other high-powered careers, women politicians seem to solve the problem either by remaining childless, having fewer children, delaying their political careers until their children are older, remaining single, or marrying a supportive spouse.

The second environmental/structural problem is limited career opportunities, which is an economic problem. Fewer women than men are found in the pipeline professions to political activism. Women who run for office generally tend to have occupied "women's careers," for example, educator/teacher and nurse type occupations (McGlen and O'Connor 1998).

The third environmental/structural problem lies with the American electoral and party system, which is a political problem. For example, women have a harder time in raising money to run for office. Women are not actively recruited to run for office by political parties because they are not seen as strong candidates, nor are they often appointed to powerful committee chairs. Finally, the incumbency effect is one woman's greatest enemy because in protecting the status quo, women are kept from office.

Conway, Steuernagel, and Ahern (1997) also identify attitudinal obstacles that women face. They note that the perceptions of women as politicians held by the public, party leaders, as well as women themselves are difficult to overcome. According to McGlen and O'Connor (1998), women face stereotypes and sex discrimination—which includes ideas of what is appropriate or inappropriate for women, concepts as to their behavior, and public perceptions in general.

Women in Oklahoma politics face these problems as well as others. Rosenthal (1998) identifies three special obstacles for women in the Oklahoma legislature. First, the Southern-traditionalistic political culture

of the state favors male politicians. Second, women are seen as “tokens,” which place them under higher scrutiny for their actions because they are seen to represent women as a group. Finally, procedures for decision making are aggregative rather than deliberative or consensus building. In sum, when women achieve power, they have a very hard time using it in the male political context. For these reasons and others, Rosenthal calls Oklahoma “no-woman’s land” (Rosenthal 1998, 96). Although she writes only of the legislature, we can assume that these attributes probably exist in the political bodies throughout the state.

METHODS

This study was conducted using a mail-questionnaire that contained both close-ended and open-ended questions. Forty-nine women who currently hold office in the State of Oklahoma were selected. The lieutenant governor, state senators and state house representatives, city council members, and district attorneys were selected to receive questionnaires. Of the 49 surveys mailed, one was returned as undeliverable, and 20 were returned completed. Answers to the close-ended survey questions were coded and entered into SPSS. Answers to the open-ended questions were coded into broad categories for qualitative evaluation.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Hypothesis 1 stated that women in politics feel that *women in general* face different obstacles than men. There were several questions on the questionnaire that pertain to hypothesis 1. Respondents were asked, “Do you agree that **most women** who run for office face different challenges or obstacles than most men who have run for office?” Possible answers range from 1, or “strongly agree” to 6, or “strongly disagree.” Sixteen respondents generally agreed with this question, whereas 11 disagreed. The mean score is 2.4, somewhere between “slightly agree” and “agree.”

TABLE 1

Do you agree that most women who run for office face different challenges or obstacles than most men who have run for office?

	Frequency	Percent Valid	Percent Valid
Strongly Agree (1)	5	25.0	29.4
Slightly Agree (2)	1	5.0	5.9
Agree (3)	10	50.0	58.8
Disagree (4)	1	5.0	5.9
Slightly Disagree (5)	0	0	0
Strongly Disagree (6)	0	0	0
Total	17	85.0	100.0
Missing	3	15.0	
Total	20	100.0	
Mean	2.4		

Respondents were also asked “While serving in office, do you feel that women public servants face different challenges or obstacles than men who serve in office?” Possible answers range from 1, or “strongly agree” to 6, or “strongly disagree.” The mean answer for this question is 2.9, with 13 women generally agreeing, and 7 women disagreeing.

In looking at the results from Tables 1 and 2, we can conclude that the respondents to this questionnaire feel that women in general face different obstacles than men in both running for office and serving in office. Table 1 demonstrates that all of the women who answered this question except one agrees with the statement. One woman indicated that she “disagreed” that women faced different challenges when running for office. Table 2 shows that of the 20 women who answered this question, 65% agreed that women face different challenges while serving in office. Seven respondents, or 35% disagreed.

In an open-ended question, respondents had an opportunity to list “additional challenges or obstacles” that women face. One woman wrote, “Motherhood carries more and different responsibilities than fatherhood. There is not a ‘good-ole-girl’ network like the ‘good-ole-boy’ network.

TABLE 2

While serving in office, do you feel that women public servants face different challenges or obstacles than men who serve in office?

	Frequency	Percent Valid	Percent Valid
Strongly Agree (1)	4	20.0	20.0
Slightly Agree (2)	1	5.0	5.0
Agree (3)	8	40.0	40.0
Disagree (4)	7	35.0	35.0
Slightly Disagree (5)	0	0	0
Strongly Disagree (6)	0	0	0
Total	20	100.0	100.0
Mean	2.9		

Some women have a harder time raising money. Some male legislators are sexist.” This response seems to echo both what Conway, Steuernagel, and Ahern (1997) would call “environmental/structural” obstacles as well as “attitudinal” obstacles.

Other attitudinal obstacles are mentioned by another woman politician: “I believe voters require that a woman be gracious and be neat and tidy in appearance, more so than they expect of a man. Women have to get past our tendency to want everyone to like us and be willing to be firm and clear on issues.” Similarly, a respondent complained that women face “accusations of abandoning family and young children.” A woman politician is “Not a good mother.” Another woman writes that women are hampered by: “Male opinion that ‘skirts don’t belong in politics.’ Male bonding/networking that allows stopping by a business for coffee and talk—women aren’t allowed.”

In summary, hypothesis 1, that women in politics feel that *women in general* face different obstacles than men, is supported by the data we collected. The majority of the politicians who responded to our survey indicated that they agreed that “most women who run for office face different challenges or obstacles than most men who have run for office,” and that while serving in office, women public servants face different

challenges or obstacles than men who serve in office.” Respondents also provided a variety of environmental/structural and attitudinal obstacles that they have faced.

In order to test Hypothesis 2, women were asked “In running for office, do you agree that **you personally** have faced different challenges or obstacles than most men who have run for office?” Possible answers range from 1, or “strongly agree” to 6, or “strongly disagree.” In answering this question, 13 women agreed that they had personally faced different challenges than men, and nine women disagreed. The mean answer is 2.65, or between “slightly agree” and “agree.”

Women were also asked, “Do you agree that you are taken as seriously as a male political figure of equal standing?” The mean answer to this question is 2.74, indicating that, on average, women agree that they have been taken seriously as politicians. Only three women indicated that they had not been taken seriously.

In looking at the open-ended responses to this question, women had many interesting things to say that indicate that being taken seriously by colleagues and constituents may come on a more conditional basis. One politician wrote that she felt taken seriously by constituents but not

TABLE 3

In running for office, do you agree that you personally have faced different challenges or obstacles than most men who have run for office?”

	Frequency	Percent Valid	Percent Valid
Strongly Agree (1)	4	20.0	23.5
Slightly Agree (2)	3	15.0	17.6
Agree (3)	6	30.0	35.3
Disagree (4)	3	15.0	17.6
Slightly Disagree (5)	0	0	0
Strongly Disagree (6)	1	5.0	5.9
Total	17	85.0	100.0
Missing System	3	15.0	
Total		20	100.0
Mean	2.65		

TABLE 4

**Do you agree that you are taken as seriously as a
male political figure of equal standing?**

	Frequency	Percent Valid	Percent Valid
Strongly Agree 1.00	5	25.0	26.3
Slightly Agree 2.00	1	5.0	5.3
Agree 3.00	10	50.0	52.6
Disagree 4.00	1	5.0	5.3
Slightly Disagree 5.00	1	5.0	5.3
Strongly Disagree 6.00	1	5.0	5.3
Total	19	95.0	100.0
Missing	1	5.0	
Total		20	100.0
Mean	2.74		

by fellow politicians: “[I’m taken seriously] By citizens, lots of phone calls for ‘at a girl’. Generally, the public doesn’t have a good opinion of the ‘good-ole-boys’ council and Mayor. The city council members and Mayor don’t take me seriously. City staff and employees do.” Another politician felt that once she gained office, she was taken seriously, “Once you are in office, I feel I’ve been treated no differently than my male counterparts.” This sentiment also shows up in another response: “Not initially, the old adage applies that as a woman I do have to work twice as hard for some recognition.” Finally, one woman provided a completely negative answer: “People tend to listen to men because they’re more stern and forceful.” On the whole, it seems that the respondents feel that they are taken seriously at least part of the time, although respect from constituents and co-office holders might be hard to earn at first.

We also asked women whether “your role as a political figure has been limited by your gender?” In general, women’s responses about feeling limited by their gender are ambivalent. The mean score on this question is 3.85, putting the average answer between “disagree” and

“agree.” Only six politicians noted that they agreed that their roles as political figures have been limited by gender. The open-ended responses to this question confirm this ambivalence. One woman wrote, “Citizens back me. Council members and Mayor don’t give me credit and work around me, often shut me out of information.” Her response seems to show that she may feel limited because of her gender. Another woman wrote, “There are some that still feel we should stay home and cook instead of running a business or seeking an office.” Her answer reflects the general attitudes that society holds regarding the proper roles for women. Some women simply do not feel limited at all. One woman wrote, “I do not feel limited simply because I am a woman. I am judged more on my performance and competency.”

Women were asked in an open-ended question, “Have you ever felt discriminated against as a woman in politics?” We coded their responses either 1 for yes, or 0 for no. Twelve of the 20 women who answered this question felt that they had been discriminated against and they provided many examples. One woman wrote, “[the] Mayor talks down to me, explains things as though I couldn’t possibly know; telling me what my role and agenda is, getting in my face, don’t give my opinion credit, blow it off—including a black councilman.” Similarly, another

TABLE 5

Do you agree that your role as a political figure has been limited by your gender?

	Frequency	Percent Valid	Percent Valid
Strongly Agree (1)	1	5.0	5.0
Slightly Agree (2)	3	15.0	15.0
Agree (3)	2	10.0	10.0
Disagree (4)	6	30.0	30.0
Slightly Disagree (5)	2	10.0	10.0
Strongly Disagree (6)	5	25.0	25.0
Total	19	100.0	100.0
Mean	3.85		

TABLE 6

Have you ever felt discriminated against as a woman in politics?

	Frequency	Percent Valid	Percent Valid
No .00	8	40.0	40.0
Yes 1.00	12	60.0	60.0
Total	20	100.0	100.0
Mean	.6		

woman writes that she felt disrespected by her constituents: “Fellow members of my City Council are not discriminatory but some constituents do not talk business with a woman or worse, believe surely the lone female is the ‘weakest link’.” A third respondent linked attitudes toward women to her difficulty in gaining power: “Paternal attitudes of some male representatives, [and] [d]ifficulty to move into leadership position because of focus on ‘soft issues’—education, children, etc.” Although not all women claimed to have felt discrimination, these three examples outline some of the obstacles that women face.

In conclusion, can hypothesis 2—that women in politics feel that *they themselves* face different obstacles than men—be accepted? Women generally agree that they have faced different obstacles (Table 3), but these politicians also say they have been taken as seriously as men (Table 4), and they have not been limited by their gender (Table 5). When asked outright if they “ever felt discriminated against,” 12 women provided examples that they had, whereas eight claimed they had not (Table 6). The evidence is indeed mixed. One woman writes, “The old adage applies that as a woman, I do have to work twice as hard for the same recognition,” but she does imply that equality can be earned.

Hypothesis 3 asks whether women who have attended leadership programs for women succeed in politics at a higher rate than women who have not attended leadership programs for women. In 2001, the Carl Albert Center at the University of Oklahoma established the National Education for Women’s Leadership (NEW) institute to encourage more women to consider careers in public service, including running for public

elective office. We were interested to learn whether current women politicians had benefitted from such a program in the past.

Women were asked if they had "attended any leadership programs specifically designed for women." Of the twenty women who responded to our survey, only four had attended such a program. Using means-tests to compare these groups would be inappropriate due to their small size, so qualitative analysis only will be used to evaluate whether hypothesis 3 can be supported.

One woman who attended leadership programs for women stated they were beneficial because "they made me think on more sides of an issue." Another woman attended a program for Women in Municipal Government, which she found valuable: "It helped me build a network of other women to talk with." Most women had not attended a leadership program for women. Some thought one would be a good idea: "I would endorse a leadership program such as NEW. Leadership programs are very important." Another woman wrote, "I currently encourage young women to attend schools and seminars in order to build their confidence and self-esteem so they can survive in the world outside of the home."

We were surprised to find that many women had a dim view of such programs. One woman wrote, "sometimes we need to remember we are all Oklahomans—gender is not the issue." Another seemed to think that the set of skills she needed to be successful in office were not the ones taught at such an institute: "The real art is to be a lady among men who promotes her causes and ideals with facts for the good of the constituents, while understanding the male role in the deal."

One woman thought that a special program for women would actually be a hindrance: "If women truly believe in equality then they shouldn't need the crutch of separate programs. Special women-only programs perpetuate the notion that women need special help to bring them up to par with male candidates."

CONCLUSION

It seems that female politicians on the whole sense discrimination against women in politics in general, but not discrimination against themselves personally. One woman wrote, "I do not feel limited simply because I am a woman. I am judged more on my performance and

competency.” Our findings agree with the conclusions of Cantor and Bernay (1992), who found that women who are successful in politics do not tend to be daunted by the obstacles before them.

We could not properly evaluate hypothesis 3—that women who have attended leadership programs for women succeed in politics at a higher rate than women who have not attended leadership programs for women—because of the lack of data. We were surprised to learn that such programs would not earn total support from women currently in office.

On a methodological note, these are the “winners” with whom we spoke. It is likely that the women who have been most disadvantaged by their gender are not sitting in public office. Women in office today are pioneers in “no-woman’s land,” and they are willing and able to overcome any obstacle.

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APPENDIX: SURVEY

1. How many times have you run for office? _____
Have you ever run unsuccessfully? Yes / No

2. What level of office have you held? (Circle all that apply.)
a. City
b. County
c. State
d. National

3. What is the longest you have held an office and what office was it?

4. In running for office, do you agree that **you personally** have faced different challenges or obstacles than most men who have run for office?
a. strongly agree
b. slightly agree
c. agree
d. disagree
e. slightly disagree
f. strongly disagree
g. no opinion

5. Do you agree that **most women** who run for office face different challenges or obstacles than most men who have run for office?

- a. strongly agree
- b. slightly agree
- c. agree
- d. disagree
- e. slightly disagree
- f. strongly disagree
- g. no opinion

If so, what are some of these additional challenges or obstacles?

6. While serving in office, do you feel that women public servants face different challenges or obstacles than men who serve in office?

- a. strongly agree
- b. slightly agree
- c. agree
- d. disagree
- e. slightly disagree
- f. strongly disagree
- g. no opinion

7. Have you ever felt discriminated against as a woman in politics? Explain. _____

8. Do you agree that you are taken as seriously as a male political figure of equal standing?

- a. strongly agree
- b. slightly agree
- c. agree
- d. disagree
- e. slightly disagree
- f. strongly disagree
- g. no opinion

Please explain your answer:

9. Do you agree that your role as a political figure has been limited by your gender?

- a. strongly agree
- b. slightly agree
- c. agree
- d. disagree
- e. slightly disagree
- f. strongly disagree
- g. no opinion

Please explain your answer:

10. Did you ever attend any leadership programs specifically designed for women in your past? If yes, please give examples:

11. If yes to question 10, do you feel it has helped you in any way? If no, do you think it would have benefitted you? And why do you feel the way you do?

12. Consider the experiences you have had when running for office and while in office. Would you, or do you, endorse such leadership programs such as NEW (which is a week long residential program during which college students learn about women's leadership roles and women's political participation for scholars and practitioners) for young women who are interested in political careers?

13. What factors motivated you to seek public office?

BOOK REVIEW SECTION

Cindy Simon Rosenthal, ed. *Women Transforming Congress*. Forward by Richard F. Fenno, Jr. (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 2002) pp. 453. \$29.95 ISBN 0806134550

Hillary Clinton, Nancy Pelosi, Barbara Boxer and Diane Feinstein: will one among them be the first female President of the United States? Political research will no doubt one day confront this event. In the meantime, the selections in *Women Transforming Congress* represent an excellent start to understanding the significance of gender in national politics. This important collaborative work confronts the important question of whether and how the 200 women who have served in the previous century have transformed the U.S. Congress as an institution.

Much of the existing research on women in politics has taken the form of individual case studies that defy broad generalizations. Editor Cindy Rosenthal's initial chapter takes note of four specific limitations of this research: it has been confined to state legislative experiences, since the available data are richest there; it focuses on women in office after the "feminist era" of the late '60s; it concentrates upon female elected officials to the neglect of the massive support staff surrounding legislative work; and it ignores the institutional norms and behaviors driving the actions of both men and women. Rosenthal and her collaborators endeavor to shift the research agenda to the national level despite her own admission that the data sample is small and conclusions necessarily tentative.

Published with assistance from the National Endowment for the Humanities, this work emerged out of the first-ever national research conference on women and the U.S. Congress, held at the Carl Albert Congressional Research and Studies Center at the University of

Oklahoma in April 2000. The collection of individual works represents a broad foundation of research and analysis upon which future scholarship may build.

Story-like progressions of themes provide great breadth to this volume. The editor's initial chapter anticipates many later conclusions, allowing the reader to identify sections or topics of particular interest. Beginning with the gendered nature of institutional norms, the second chapter discusses the "gender ideology" affecting all members. The next section teaches that women represent far more than their individual constituencies. This is followed by an argument that while women's issues are championed predominately by female legislators, they do have a transforming effect upon their male counterparts. In one of the best contributions to the volume, female institutional support staffs are studied. It is noted that while female staff tend to concentrate on certain issue areas and contribute to the representation of issues and constituencies, they are by and large absent from most male-dominated committees.

The contributions on campaigns and elections focus on the experiences of "strategic politicians,"—those female candidates with the experience, skills and resources—who gain election only to find that they typically conform to institutional norms to succeed once elected rather than transforming the environment. The following chapter admits, however, that the electioneering of men has been impacted by women to the extent that they include "softer" presentation modes and female-oriented issues.

Another under-researched area addressed by this work is women and the committee structure. A good contribution to this subject is the essay which evaluates the effect of the Clarence Thomas-Anita Hill episode. While this had a temporary effect in that more women gained increased representation on committees and subcommittees, the seniority of males largely prevailed to take command of the committee leadership structure and function in later years. The following essay seemingly reinforces the earlier "strategic politician" conclusion by considering female policy transformation. It finds that women who rise to leadership positions, albeit in female-friendly issues, can be successful, even as their achievements are overshadowed by the preponderance of "pivotal" committees with traditional male dominance. Little composite change has thus been noted overall in impact of gender at the committee level.

In establishing the congressional agenda and making policy, women have proven to be transforming, according to the contributions in the next section. An analysis of the introduction of legislation reveals that majority and minority party identification seem to determine to what extent risk-taking behavior occurs rather than simply whether congresswomen are driven by gender to assume the lead on gender-specific issues. The essay analyzing debate in the chambers from four specific floor debates in the 104th Congress again notes a broadening of the substance and approach to policy issues and concludes females have a tendency to speak out more on behalf of “underrepresented groups.” This adds credibility to the earlier conclusions that once elected, women represent far more than the constituency from which they came.

Interest groups and their roles are next. Gender-specific contributions in the breast cancer issue assisted the promotion policy initiatives regarding prostate cancer. Increased women’s involvement in issues through a “community” of interest groups reveals that the priorities of Congress soon followed. A particularly disturbing essay reveals, however, that protest and violence approaches, i.e., “tactics,” make women’s groups “targets” and not promoters.

This work finishes concludes with a series of essays identifying barriers to true transformation. Until more women are elected, gain seniority and ascend to more strategic committee and leadership positions, institutional norms will continue to limit their lasting contributions. Women running as Republicans on the ballot particularly encounter serious obstacles to change. Female responsibilities and lifestyle demands pose high hurdles for continuity and success and lead women to postpone political aspirations until later in life (while not particularly mentioned, this could also be a factor in the preference for state legislative service—closer to home). In a good global comparison, female parliament members in Great Britain are contrasted with their U.S. equivalents. Different institutional configurations make it far easier for female parliament members to succeed in the gender transformation of their institution than for U.S. congresswomen to do so.

Whether or not women’s impact upon national politics has indeed been transformative, this scholarly collection will certainly transform the study of Congress. Readers will gain new insights and perspectives on women in politics. Until the time that a “strategic” politician becomes

the first female president, this work should set the tone for how scholars approach the study of gender in our national political institutions.

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Robin Kolodny. *Pursuing Majorities: Congressional Campaign Committees in American Politics*. (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998) pp. 320. \$9.98 ISBN 0806130695

Robin Kolodny stretches congressional scholarship into the relatively unexplored area of Congressional Campaign Committees (CCC) in the House and Senate. Kolodny traces the historical development of the CCC over the last 150 years and concludes her analysis in the modern era. Kolodny asserts that the political parties are unable to provide remedies or strategies for overcoming political fragmentation, the CCC confirm that well-established theoretical assertion at a fundamental political party level. By choice and design congressmen desire a separate electoral strategy. If not, they will be consumed by the affiliated presidential party and consequentially, lose or never attain majority power in their own institution. The CCC become an efficient manner to apply the latest campaign techniques, tap into sources of funding, and allow the congressional party to govern with or without an affiliated president.

Kolodny answers a variety of questions: How do Congressional Campaign Committees contribute to congressional vibrancy? What do the CCC do? Who controls the CCC and for what purposes? When did the CCC become critical to the overall congressional process? How do the CCC Chairs benefit from service in the committee? And why should scholars and citizens care about the CCC?

Congressional Campaign Committees are an integral part of the congressional process because political parties strive to attain or maintain majority control over their chambers. The goal of majority control often differs from the party's other goal of winning a presidential election.

Hence, the CCC tend to serve the needs of the institution and the congressional leadership contributing to weak party structures.

Pursuing Majorities applies to those interested in institutional development, congressional seniority, congressional leadership, and modern campaigns. Kolodny traces the development of CCC and clearly makes the case that the CCC are in a fluid, obscure, and untenable situation. They maintain a cousin-like relationship with the national party committee; whereas, whenever it is mutually beneficial, and they cooperate; otherwise they operate in separate universes and at times at cross-purposes. The reader may agree with Kolodny that the party in government is hindered by party fragmentation. However, I tend to rejoice in that CCC bolster checks and balances. Kolodny remains steadfast and correct in her analysis that CCC serve the members of Congress and not the whole political system.

The weaknesses of the book are minor ones. The book is not well suited for a general audience. Scholars can benefit from Kolodny's in-depth historical research yet undergraduates will more than likely struggle with the density of the reading. The other minor observation is that the bibliography did not reference the Carl Albert Archives located at the University of Oklahoma's Carl Albert Congressional Research Center. The Carl Albert Archives is one of the nation's best collections of congressional papers and may contribute to further research in this area.

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Rundquist, Barry S. and Thomas M. Carsey. *Congress and Defense Spending: The Distributive Politics of Military Procurement*. (Norman: The University of Oklahoma Press, 2002) pp.200. \$24.95 ISBN 0-8061-3402-X (pb)

It is important to define what this monograph (volume three in the Congressional Studies Series edited by Ronald M. Peters, Jr.) is not. It is not a behind-the-scenes look at how Congressional committees operate, it does not explore the complex paths of policy making in the Pentagon, and it won't put a face on those who decide how our defense dollars are expended. One will search the index in vain for names of important Congressmen, prominent military personalities, a description of specific weapons systems, or even a reference to the "Pentagon."

Now to define what it is: This book is a policy analysis of distributive politics theory as it pertains to military procurement. The study is based on a 35-year empirical investigation that focuses on the results of Congressional action on one aspect of the defense budget. "Distributive Politics" as contained in the book's title refers to distributive politics theory which (p. 3) "purports to account for the geographic distribution of the benefits of any policy that is paid for from general tax revenues and can be subdivided easily and allocated piece by piece to different claimants."

The authors address the fact that past studies have demonstrated few if any indications of distributive politics functioning in military procurement. As they state (p. 5) "This book reports on a new study designed to test distributive theories of military procurement spending." However, by the end of the book they decide (p. 155) "that earlier studies of the distributive politics of military procurement spending (including some of our own) were limited in conceptualization and design and that a new empirical investigation was justified. Our study suggests

that there is a distributive politics of military procurement spending, although it takes a form more complicated than previously considered.” Their summation of nineteen figures, ten chapters, nine pages of references, eight tables, seven pages of notes, and two appendixes, is (p. 164): “By constructing a new study of the distributive politics of military procurement spending, we have been able to both dismiss an important anomaly in the distributive politics literature and to refine the understanding of distributive politics.”

If one is keenly interested in empirical investigations, policy analysis, or distributive politics theory, this paperback presents an important contribution: how policy analysis, especially distributive politics, can be further refined, re-examined, and reinterpreted. If, however, one is a disciple of Robert A. Caro and believes that roads were built not as the result of anonymous though measurable factors which can be tracked by charts and graphs, but because Robert Moses wanted to build them (as Caro describes in *The Power Broker*) this study may not invite your attention. Or if one believes that Congressional politics can best be understood by analyzing the history and personality of a Congressional leader such Lyndon B. Johnson (as Caro has done in *The Path to Power*, *Means of Ascent*, and *Master of the Senate*) rather than emphasizing the tools of policy analysis, studying distributive politics theory, or performing an empirical investigation, then this book may not be for you.

As a teacher of political science you want your students to understand both approaches. Would I recommend this volume as a text book for a college class? It would depend on the class. If I wanted to demonstrate to beginning students the bureaucratic workings of our governmental infrastructure, shed light on the day-to-day operations of our legislative system, and stress the importance of individual members and their values, the answer would be “no.” But if the goal was to expose the advanced student to the methodology of policy analysis, especially distributive politics theory, or empirically explore the hidden economic implications behind the news headlines, the answer would have to be an emphatic “Yes.”

Thomas H. Clapper
Oklahoma State Senate Staff Committee

Rick Farmer, John David Rausch, Jr., and John C. Green, eds. *The Test of Time: Coping with Legislative Term Limits*. (Lexington Books, 2003) pp. 298. \$75.00 ISBN: 0-7391-0444-6 (hb); \$26.95 ISBN: 0-7391-0445-4 (pb).

The time has come to quit telling the non-political scientist world that we cannot say for sure whether terms limits will make a difference because “we don’t have any data yet.” By now we do have data. Some state legislators were first prohibited from further service in 1996. In 1998, term limits had completely taken effect in Maine and California. By 2002 a dozen states had been affected. In Oklahoma, in 2004, we finally see the results from the first citizen initiative on legislative term limits. The accumulation of data is not great, but it certainly enough to merit serious attention to this important topic.

The fine collection of articles in the *Test of Time* begins the serious process of systematically sorting through the hypotheses that have accumulated around term limits to determine which have merit, which are wrong, and which need more careful scrutiny. The editors of this book provide a valuable service by trying to organize expectations and, therefore, the essays into a manageable approach.

The first set of papers in this volume is a series of case studies of the states which have experienced the earliest impact of term limits. Generally, these parallel case studies look at how the legislatures operate under term limits, the electoral consequences of term limits, and whether the demographics of the legislatures have changed. The second section focuses on select topics: leadership, career paths, representation, and legislative performance or success. In the final section, the editors pull together essays that address the linkages between term limited legislatures and other political actors such as the media, interest groups, and citizens.

It is impossible to summarize the findings of this important book in a brief review, but reading it should dispel any notion that because nothing tragic has happened in these states (excepting, perhaps, California), that term limits have not done much. These essays routinely talk about increased volatility and commotion, challenges to make the legislature work, shifting loci of power, and surprising little change in demographics.

Reading these essays reminds one how adaptable legislative institutions are. That they survived term limits should not be a surprise; they are, after all, nearly ubiquitous because they are so adaptable. But, the powers they have and the functions they serve are quite different in different settings. The mere survival of legislatures that are term limited tells us little. When the editors conclude that term limits “are neither the panacea that proponents hoped for nor the Pandora’s box that opponents feared” caution is in order. These essays demonstrate great changes taking place in these state legislatures; changes that do seriously affect who wins and who loses. And, that is exactly what proponents wanted and opponents feared.

Gary Copeland
Carl Albert Congressional Research and Studies Center

NOTE

Oklahoma has been at the center of both the term limits movement and the analysis of it. Continuing that tradition, this book has strong Oklahoma ties. Two of the three editors, Farmer and Rausch, received their Ph.D.’s from the University of Oklahoma as did another contributor, Matthew Moen.

Richard Lowitt. *Fred Harris: His Journey from Liberalism to Populism*. (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002) pp. 285. \$39.95 ISBN 0742521621

Fred Harris was the keynote speaker at one of the first Oklahoma Political Science Association conferences that I ever attended. He was a great choice because he served in the Oklahoma State Senate, was sent to Washington in 1964 as Oklahoma's U.S. Senator, chaired the Democratic National Committee, was a finalist for the vice-presidential nomination, ran for the American presidency *twice*, and not least—he has become an accomplished political scientist with numerous books to his credit. I was not quite politically aware when Harris was most visibly active in politics. His name is rarely mentioned anymore, even in discussions about politics during the sixties and seventies when he was often in the national spotlight. Reading a well-written biography about his life and political times was therefore a welcome opportunity.

Richard Lowitt's *Fred Harris: His Journey from Liberalism to Populism* is an important contribution toward Oklahoma political scholarship. The book is extremely thorough. It tells a compelling story—admittedly not always in the most compelling way, but Lowitt's work is certainly not a difficult read. The book provides some background about Harris's childhood and briefly updates his life after politics. However, the main emphasis of this book is the time period when Harris at age 33 was elected as the youngest Senator ever from Oklahoma through his failed presidential bid in 1976. Lowitt sympathetically sketches an almost tragic political career. The author tackles this essential question: How could a young man with such incredible political promise—who was mentored and strategically supported by the political giants of his day—fade so quickly into political obscurity?

One of the answers that emerges from Lowitt's perspective is that any time Harris was faced with a choice between political expediency and his own principles, he tended to choose the latter. The author chronicles the fascinating evolution of Harris's political thinking. This perspective provides a valuable view of the myriad complex issues that were at play during this turbulent period of American history. For example, the Johnson administration throughout its early years could reliably count on Harris to support the Vietnam War. By the time he was a senior senator, Harris became a vocal critical of the nation's war policies. Harris's changing views is a metaphor for the nation's own struggle through the Vietnam years.

Lowitt opens up almost every chapter with the percentage of roll call votes Harris answered. Although this statistic is less than dramatic at first, it becomes a useful indicator for tracking Harris's continual diversion to other political activities beyond the Senate floor. As a freshman senator, Harris answered 95 percent of Senate votes but during his last term he would ultimately answer to only 51 percent. At one point, Harris was serving two masters: his own party as director of the Democratic National Committee and his home state as Senator. Both of these were formidable challenges. The DNC at the time was over \$6 million in debt and divided over the war. Oklahoma's electoral base was changing from Democratic dominance to a true two-party system. As time progressed, Harris became increasingly separated from the mainstream of both.

Harris was on the cutting edge of a number of critical issues. He became a champion of civil rights calling racism a mental health disease that did more actual harm to children than mental retardation. His wife was a member of the Choctaw tribe which helped him to become more sensitive to the needs of Native American tribes. He was also one of the early advocates for lowering the voting age to 18. As a good political scientist, Harris used his position to argue forcefully for social scientists to have a seat at the policy table and to have their fair share of federal funds. He helped to civilianize military research and to promote the democratization of federal grants supporting the nation's science and technology policies. He even pushed for a national foundation for the social sciences in particular.

Harris fought at every opportunity to address the needs of the nation's poor. Not satisfied with surface explanations, he would attempt

to delve deep in the subject in order to understand the underlying causes of poverty. He was a vocal critic of predatory lending practices which kept urban minorities down economically. Harris was also particularly concerned about the much neglected rural part of America. He recognized that a different world existed in the rural heartland. The unique needs exhibited there were not recognized by the Washington elites. He became more active in the growing peace movement. These key components of his developing worldview would result in an extremely populist orientation. Harris would use his unique brand of populism to launch his subsequent presidential campaigns. He would often draw large crowds. Unfortunately, Harris's presidential ambitions were tempered by the fact that his natural constituencies were not organized or politically powerful. His final campaign was crippled at the start because federal matching funds were withheld due to pending court decisions on campaign finance. Finally, his support was diluted as his political opponents "began to echo some of his views" (p. 264).

The biggest criticism that can be leveled at this book is the author's intentional strategy not to talk or correspond with Fred Harris directly. Lowitt avoided meeting with Fred Harris in order to come to his own conclusions (p. xiv). Since Harris is very much still alive, this is like Walter Isaacson writing his biography of Benjamin Franklin and turning down the chance to travel back in time to interview Ben in person. Interviewing Harris would serve as an important check on not only facts but interpretation. Political scientist Richard Fenno, the erstwhile "soak and poke" observer of politicians, would not likely approve of Lowitt's research strategy. Even so, Lowitt's book is the definitive biography of an underappreciated politician who had an outsized influence on American politics during a critical period of history.

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David Schultz, ed. *Money, Politics, and Campaign Finance Reform in the States*. (Durham, North Carolina: Caroline Academic Press, 2002) pp. 409. \$39.95. ISBN 0890890722.

Justice Louis Brandeis famously observed that, in our federal system “a single courage state, may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try out novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.” Yet scholars and analysts of American politics have never been entirely comfortable with states in their role as ‘laboratories’ for policy experimentation. No one, for instance, would in the present day applaud state experiments in racial segregation; and, as recent conflicts over the medical use of marijuana, assisted suicide or gay marriage illustrate, views of state policy innovation seem to depend upon one’s view of the issue about which innovation is taking place. Ultimately, our ambivalence about state policy in a federal system resolves into two contending perspectives. The first, and positive, perspective values state policy for its creative potential-to boldly go where no national government has gone before. The second, and negative, perspective faults state policy independence for facilitating various ‘races to the bottom’, as the lack of authoritative national standards gives play to the states’ worst policy instincts. Indeed, as a rejuvenated commitment to federalism leads to greater devolution of policy responsibilities to the states, this ambivalence can only become more prominent.

With what perspective should we view state campaign finance regulation? Hitherto the issue of campaign finance has been addressed almost entirely at the national level, as the effects of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) are refracted by decisions like *Buckley* and subsequent legislative efforts culminating in the Bipartisan Campaign

Reform Act of 2002. It is well known with what ingenuity both national parties have parsed campaign finance rulings and statutes, respecting their letter while circumventing their spirit. Less well known is how state developments have either followed, or deviated from, the national experience. In this edited volume, David Schultz and his contributors shine a welcome light upon the practices of twelve states. It is undeniable that state politics themselves have become more important. With the ‘nationalization’ of state and local elections, media-driven campaigns, and their associated expenses, have raised the electoral stakes of once-obscure contests. In the current polarized political climate, divisive national alignments spill into state politics, bestowing them with new attention and money. Moreover, thanks to term limits, state contests are inherently more competitive than national races. Most ominously, national campaign law limiting soft money contributions has encouraged a new appreciation of state parties as devices for circumventing regulation.

While the diversity of state campaign finance regulation defies easy generalization, some common tendencies are apparent. States have not been unaffected by national developments in campaign finance, as soft money becomes a greater factor in increasingly-expensive races. State races have also seen the intrusion of independent expenditures and issue ads by organizations nominally independent of the established parties and interest groups. In what seems almost an iron law of campaign finance regulation, expenditures restricted for one purpose will reappear in other forms, and under other pretexts.

For students of Oklahoma politics, a notable contribution to this volume is Jan Hardt’s chapter, *The Fuel Behind Oklahoma’s Politics: The Role of Money*, where she provides careful dissection of Oklahoma’s campaign finance contributions (239-272). Given both the state’s history of political corruption and its populist instincts, campaign finance reform has had mixed results. In some respects stricter than national standards, Oklahoma also permits financing practices—most notably corporate donations—that are illegal under federal law. In Hardt’s words, “a palpable tension exists between the need for strong ethics laws and the recognition that member of the legislature are reluctant to pass laws that could damage their re-election campaigns (241).” Emblematic of this tension is the fate of the Oklahoma Ethics Commission, created by popular vote in 1990. Its fact-collecting and investigatory

powers are not backed up (apart from the threat of fines for late reporting) by any ability to enforce criminal penalties for noncompliance. As a result, it relies upon the uncertain club of publicity to secure enforcement.

If these were not difficulties enough, the unwillingness of the legislature to mandate electronic filing makes the task of wading through the reported financing data even more arduous. Incredibly, the Ethics Commission is not required to aggregate its reports into a comprehensive picture of Oklahoma's campaign spending, leaving the task instead to the initiative of private citizens. At the center of Jan Hardt's research lies a meticulous and exhaustive effort to provide such a picture for the 2000 election cycle. In this regard, Hardt is to be commended not merely for having accomplished a formidable empirical feat, but for setting an example for the sort of ongoing factual record that any serious future discussion of Oklahoma campaign finance will require. For scholars interested in a comprehensive picture of Oklahoma campaign financing at both the state and local levels, this contribution to the volume is a must read and should set the standard for future investigations.

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REVIEWERS

The editors appreciate the careful reading and helpful comments of the following reviewers for this issue of *OKLAHOMA POLITICS*.

Kenneth Brown
Randall Jones
Brett Sharp
Ann-Marie Szymanski

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