OKLAHOMA POLITICS

ISSN: 1065-0695

Oklahoma Politics, an annual publication of the Oklahoma Political Science Association, publishes political science articles that have a significant Oklahoma component as well as reviews, notes, and data on subjects relating to Oklahoma politics. Submissions should be sent to John Ulrich, Department of Political Science and Legal Studies, East Central University, 1100 E. 14th Street, Ada, OK 74820. E-mail julrich@ecok.edu.

Subscriptions are $25 per year from the East Central University Department of Political Science and Legal Studies, Ada, OK 74820. Oklahoma Political Science Association members receive copies of the annual journal as part of their memberships.

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OKLAHOMA POLITICS

2010 Volume 20

OKLAHOMA POLITICS Vol. 20
November 2010

NOTES FROM THE EDITOR

Welcome to the 2010 edition of *Oklahoma Politics*. We begin this year's edition on a sad note. Brian Rader, our good friend and colleague from Northeastern State Univesity, passed away in January. The richness of Brian's celebration of life and his unflagging contributions to our organization, his community, his university, his students, his colleagues, his friends, and his family cannot be overstated; neither can the depth of his loss be measured. Rick Farmer--our colleague and a former student of Brian's--has written a poignant, moving memorial that leads our journal.

As elections dominate current news media headlines, so too do they dominate our journal again this year. By the time of the OPSA annual conference in November, the 2010 midterm elections will have run their course. It will be fascinating to discover whether the historic electoral trends identified and analyzed in our next three articles continue their course in Oklahoma's politics or whether these midterm elections follow a divergent pattern. Jeff Birdsong's essay, "From Springtime to Winter: The '92 and '94 Elections and the Impact on Oklahoma Politics," traces the transition from historic Democratic Party dominance of state-level Oklahoma politics to Republican Party control of both chambers of the Oklahoma State Legislature following the 2008 election. His assessment of the reasons behind the Democratic Party collapse and the rise of Republican Party political fortunes not only makes for captivating reading, Jeff's analysis reflects a cogent, penetrating grasp of the subtleties and nuances of Oklahoma's unique political landscape.

Next, Bob Darcy and a group of his Oklahoma State University student's bring us yet another intriguing evaluation of Oklahoma's electoral politics in, "The Oklahoma Voter 2008". Last year, Bob and his students gave us a sophisticated--and highly accurate--model for predicting state legislative electoral outcomes (see Darcy, *et al.* 2009. "Predicting Oklahoma State Legislative Outcomes with Occam's Razor." *Oklahoma Politics* 19: 41-70). This year's offering focuses on the

demographics of "the Oklahoma Voter." Given the trend of Oklahoma's recent electoral outcomes, their somewhat surprising and paradoxical conclusion is that the average Oklahoma voter in the 2008 election was a Democrat...and a woman. Should the 2008 demographic pattern hold in this year's elections, it will be exciting to see what the impact turned out to be. Particularly interesting will be assessing the impact on Oklahoma's 2010 gubernatorial race, where both major political parties fielded women candidates.

Rounding out our trio of electoral essays, Jan Hardt presents a detailed analysis of trends in Political Action Committee (PAC) spending and campaign contributions in Oklahoma for the 2006 and 2008 state legislative elections, in "Where Did the Political Party Money Go?" One of her most intriguing findings is that, while overall 2008 PAC fundraising and campaign contributions increased slightly over 2006 levels, ideological PACS--particularly political party PACs--declined. And, 2008 Republican Party PACs--the party of success in 2008 legislative races--declined significantly over 2006.

Our final two articles offer absorbing glimpes into two significant topics for Oklahoma politics and economics. First, Aaron Mason's "Cherokee Tribal Citizenship:Traditional Ideas and New Realities" explores the history and issues surrounding the complex and controversial subject of Cherokee Nation tribal membership. Mason's insights and mastery of the topic sheds much needed light on this critically important, but often murky and poorly understood subject. Finally, Jeff Widener explores a little-known, but significant issue for Oklahoma politics and economics: the Oklahoma wine industry. Tracing the uphill battle Oklahoma vintners have fought to be able to sell their product--both inside Oklahoma and outside of it--Widener's "A Political Quagmire Within the Oklahoma Wine Industry" offers a classic case study of the political processes at work in our state.

Completing our journal is the Book Review section. Once again, Book Review Editor Ken Hicks has done a masterful job of soliciting (and, in one case, offering himself) reviews of current books that will be of great interest to our membership. I want to thank all who have contributed to making this year's journal a success--as submitters and

reviewers--and I would encourage you all to submit your finished research for consideration in future editions of *Oklahoma Politics*. Ultimately, it is your research and your efforts that make *Oklahoma Politics* the successful and significant voice of the Oklahoma Political Science Associtation that it is. Thank you!

MANUSCRIPT SUBMISSION

Oklahoma Politics invites and encourages submissions that explore the broad context of politics affecting Oklahoma and its place in the surrounding region. We are especially interested in submissions that bring to bear a variety of methodological, analytical, and disciplinary perspectives on state and local politics of the central-south region of the United States: Oklahoma, Kansas, Colorado, New Mexico, Texas, Arkansas, and Louisiana. Because "politics" cannot be thoroughly explored from only a single disciplinary point of view trans-disciplinary and collaborative projects are encouraged. Though we are the journal of the Oklahoma Political Science Association, we encourage submissions from economists, sociologists, environmental scientists, policymakers, analysts, as well as political scientists and other scientists and practitioners whose substantive research bears on the politics and issues of the state and region.

Oklahoma Politics is a fully peer reviewed journal. Each submission receives at least three anonymous reviews and each is reviewed by the editors before a decision is made to accept a manuscript for publication.

MANUSCRIPTS

Manuscripts should be no longer than 30 pages, double-spaced; text, graphics, notes, and references included; no extra space between paragraphs. Do not indent paragraphs. Type font: New Times Roman;

12 point. Notes should be endnotes, not footnotes; references included last. Graphics (tables and figures) submitted separately, one per page, with internal reference indicating the approximate placement in the body of the text (i.e.: "[Table 1 about here]"). Tables/figures must not be larger than a single page.

REFERENCE AND NOTE STYLE

Internal reference style (preferred)

(authorlastname year); e.g. (Jefferson 2007).

Internal reference with page number

(authorlastname year, page#); e.g. (Jefferson 2007, 32). Multiple internal references separated by semi-colon; alphabetical first, then by year: (AuthorA 2007; AuthorB1994; Author CA1 2007; Author CA2 1992).

Internal note style

endnotes, sequentially numbered superscript (e.g. [1], [2], [3], [4]...).

MANUSCRIPTS AND REVIEWS - GENERAL

Manuscripts and Book Reviews must follow the general format and citation styles found in the journals of the American Political Science Association: *American Political Science Review*, *Perspectives on Politics*, and *PS: Political Science & Politics*.

Examples:

Journals: Author last, author first or initial. Date. "Article Title." *Publication* Volume (Number): Page-Page. Example: Budge, Ian. 1973. "Recent Legislative Research: Assumptions and Strategies." *European Journal of Political Research* 1 (4): 317-330.

Books: Author last, author first or initial. Date. *Title*. Publication City: Publisher. Example: Green, Donald, and Ian Shapiro. 1994. *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Chapters: Author last, author first or initial. Date. "Chapter Title." In *Book Title*, ed. Book Author First, Last. Publication City: Publisher. Example: Mezey, Michael L. 1991. "Studying Legislatures: Lessons for Comparing Russian Experience." In *Democratization in Russia: The Development of Legislative Institutions*, ed. W.H. Jeffrey. New York: M.E. Sharpe.

Table and Figure style

TABLE 1

Votes Missed, of First 100, by Term Limited

	Mean*	SD
Not Term Limited (n=72)	2.4	7.5
Term Limited (n=28	5.0	8.6

*Difference significant at the .01 level

Organization/Headings

MAJOR SECTION HEAD (BOLD CAPS & CENTERED)

SUBSECTION HEAD (CAPS & LEFT; NO PERIOD)

Sub-sub Section Head (Title Caps, Left, & Italicized; No Period)

MANUSCRIPT SUBMISSION

Manuscripts must contain: A cover page with title, author, and author affiliation and contact information; a separate cover page with title only;

an abstract of no more than 150 words; and, the text of the manuscript. Authors whose manuscripts are accepted for publication must submit a short biographical sketch for inclusion in the journal.

Manuscripts (or ideas for manuscripts) should be submitted to:

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BOOK REVIEWS

Book Reviews should generally be no longer than 1500 words, though longer reviews of significance will be considered. Reviews should be of books on topics relevant to the journal as delineated above, especially if written by Oklahoma-based authors. Review style should follow that of the journal as a whole. Full bibliographic information (to include ISBN and price, if available) should be included as the heading to the review.

Book Reviews (or ideas for book reviews) should be submitted to:

Kenneth Hicks
Book Review Editor, *Oklahoma Politics*
1701 W. Will Rogers Blvd.
Claremore, OK 74017-3252
Telephone: 918.343.7687
E-mail: KennethHicks@rsu.edu

Manuscripts and book reviews must be submitted electronically, in either Microsoft Word 2003 (or later) format (.doc/.docx) or Rich Text Format (.rft). No other forms of submission will be accepted. Manuscripts not in format compliance will be returned to authors without review.

John Ulrich
Editor, *Oklahoma Politics*

LET NOTHING STAND IN YOUR WAY: IN MEMORY OF BRIAN RADER

RICK FARMER
Oklahoma State House of Representatives

When Brian Rader began his remarkable career at Northeastern State, he could not have envisioned the impact he would have on students, the university, the community, the state or the Political Science discipline. Although the specifics of his career were unique, in many ways his career was typical of its time and place.

Like James Hilton's fictional Mr. Chips, Rader entered the teaching profession with minimal qualifications. He left having risen to the highest levels of distinction within his sphere. He provided great service, changed lives and made a difference everywhere he went.

EARLY LIFE

Brian Farmer Rader was born December 31, 1940 in Washington DC. He grew up in Denver CO, where he graduated from West High School. As a young child he survived polio (which might explain some his expressive grit). As a teen, again demonstrating an ability to see a long and arduous process to completion, he earned the distinction of Eagle Scout. He remained active in Scouting right up until his death. In fact, an emotionally shaken Scout leader spoke at his memorial and indicated he was scheduled to participate in a Scouting event a few weeks hence.

After high school he entered Colorado State University, earning a BA in 1964. In 1966 CSU issued its first MA in political science to Brian Rader. Later that year he moved to Tahlequah, OK and began his widely acclaimed 43 years of service to NSU.

TEACHING CAREER

Armed with a Masters Degree, Rader was hired by NSU on a temporary contract as an instructor. The following year he received a permanent instructor's appointment. He did not become an assistant

professor until 1972. Having completed an MA and PhD at the University of Oklahoma in 1977, he was granted tenure and promoted to associate professor in 1978. In 1982 he earned the distinction of full professor.

When NSU built branch campuses he began teaching in Muskogee, Tulsa and Broken Arrow. The hours were grueling and included a lot of windshield time. NSU faculty were expected to teach 12 or 15 credits on the main campus and conduct night and weekend classes at the satellite campuses as overload. He frequently taught two courses in the summer. Over 15,000 students took classes from Rader.

As is typical of faculty at one of Oklahoma's regional universities, in recent years he taught 10 different courses. For many of those courses he was the only faculty member available. The courses covered a wide range of topics: from state and local government, to public administration, to political parties, to minority politics and current issues.

Role playing and simulations were a teaching technique frequently used by Rader. He regularly invited guest lecturers and encouraged student projects that involved interviewing people in the community. Rader wanted his students to experience the practical aspects of politics. He once wrote, "I believe my role is to guide students to apply political theory to real world situations so they can learn about the challenges that political and governmental professionals face in their daily routines." He said applying theory to everyday situations makes learning more meaningful and memorable.

His efforts at teaching practical politics were fruitful. A large number of state and local officials passed under his influence. In 2007, of 101 current members of the Oklahoma House of Representatives 13 were former students of Rader. The total number of former office holders, municipal and tribal office holders who sat under his tutelage is difficult to estimate.

Both students and peers honored his efforts. The Oklahoma Political Science Association awarded Brian Rader their Teacher of the Year award in 1995. In 2007 he was named NSU Student Government Association Faculty Member of the Year for Teaching.

SERVICE TO THE UNIVERSITY AND COMMUNITY

As is typical of a long serving faculty member, Rader served the university in a variety of ways. He chaired the Department of

Political Science from 1982-1990. He served on many committees and was faculty advisor to various student groups including: Oklahoma Intercollegiate Legislature, Pi Sigma Alpha, College Democrats and College Republicans. He worked with NSU's entry year teacher program, mentoring teachers in Midway, Tulsa, Checotah, Union, Broken Arrow, Sallisaw, Pocola, and Bokoshe. He was president of the local and state conference of the American Association of University Professors and vice-president of Pi Delta Kappa.

An early member of the Oklahoma Political Science Association, Rader served as president in 1979. He faithfully participated in the annual meetings, helping to organize several of them at NSU. In 2009 he wrote two pieces that appeared in *Oklahoma Politics,* participated in a panel at the annual meeting and agreed to lead a project to construct a history of OPSA.

Rader's service extended well beyond the campus. He was both a dedicated teacher and a dedicated public servant. His career stood at the nexus of political science theory and political action. He practiced what he taught. He was in the truest sense of the word a public servant.

He was elected to Tahlequah's city council in 1985, serving until 1997. Elected again in 2001 he served until 2005. During the later stint he was president of the council and interim mayor. As a councilor he also served on the Tahlequah Hospital Board, the Eastern Oklahoma Development District Board and a host of other committees, taking his turn as chairman. Early in his career he was assigned oversight of the Tahlequah sanitation department. He took this assignment with pride and was featured in a news photo driving a garbage truck. His efforts helped create one of the first residential pick-up recycling programs in the state. He envisioned writing a book about his experiences on the city council.

In both 1980 and 2000 he worked with the US Census office in Muskogee. A classic Tocquevillian joiner, Rader was a member of both Rotary and Kiwanis. He was the Kiwanis local president and lieutenant governor for the Oklahoma-Texas district. His active participation in the community earned him the "Big T" award from the Tahlequah Chamber of Commerce. In 1995 he was awarded Faculty Member of the Year for Community Service at NSU. He was honored as a member of the Leadership Oklahoma class of 1997.

Photo Courtesy of Northeastern State University

MEMORIES

Students remember Brian Rader for his wit and humor, for his infamous stories and distinctive laugh. He would frequently remark that a story he had just told was "a true story." In class, he would say that there are many stories "some of which are true." In the 1980s he often joked about rushing home to watch Little Rascals reruns on afternoon television. He would refer to students in the classroom as "Boss" after Boss JD Hogg from the Dukes of Hazard television series.

Jim Marrow of Tulsa Community College wrote, "I was in his class the first semester at NSU and also knew him at OU when he was finishing his degree. He was an unforgettable character. My late friend Hank Comby also had Brian and we always referred to him as Deputy Dog."

Anyone who knew Brian Rader knew his distinct mannerisms. Aaron Mason of Northwestern recalls his tendency to fully extend his raised right arm in class and point directly toward a particular student in class as he was about to make an important point. If no one commented on the issue at hand, he would then say, "Well it may not make sense to you now, but undoubtedly it will come to you later tonight when you are

at Ned's". Of course Ned's was one of the favorite college bars in Tahlequah at that time. This was his way to interject humor and to emphasize his point.

A broken chair is another of Mason's memories. A student was giving a paper presentation in Seminary Hall before it was renovated. The furniture was very decrepit. "As the student was delivering his findings, I noticed that Dr. Rader who was sitting across the room from me seemed to be fidgeting in his chair which was one of these old decrepit desks. Then all of the sudden, and in the middle of this student's talk, the desk collapsed. When I say collapsed, I mean it was totally demolished. There was little left except splinters. At that point the room went silent. The only voice that was heard next was Dr. Rader who stated to himself in a loud and laughing tone, 'Well Brian, you did it again.' At that point the entire class erupted into hysterics and probably for 2 to 3 minutes people laughed themselves silly. I tell the story not only for its comic affect but also for its value into the insight of Dr. Rader's mind and that was that he did not take himself too seriously. Rather, he could have something so embarrassing happen to him and yet, he just laughed it off. I find that to be a refreshing quality that too few of us have."

Murray State College's Kirk Rodden recalls, "Anytime he cracked a joke in class and there was little by way of response from the bleary eyed students he would always remark 'there's no humor here.'" Rodden notes the small world of Oklahoma political science. Early in his career he attended a meeting where "Several people in the room had either gone to school together or to each other." Dr. Harry Holloway was there, Rader had been Holloway's student and Rodden Rader's student. (Note: I was Rodden's classmate in Rader's courses at NSU and later Holloway's student at OU.) This is one more indication of the common path Rader illustrates and we all share.

Loren Gresham, president of Southern Nazarene University wrote, "We were classmates, took several courses together, studied for General Exams over several months together. He was a truly unique person who loved his discipline and particularly enjoyed talking about the phenomena related to politics. It was sometimes difficult to stay focused on our studies as his fertile mind would get on various sidetracks that would consume time from our subject matter. In all that, he was an instigator, a stimulator of ideas and perspectives that made those times rich in my memory. Occasionally I would see him again at a professional

meeting or in conferences around the state or region. It was as if no time had lapsed since our graduate school days. He was a true friend, a colleague, a genuine and good man. I cherish his memory."

According to the University of Central Oklahoma's Randal Jones, "Brian was a prime example of an effective applied political scientist for whom scholarship and public service appeared to be equally important and complementary." Jones notes the famous picture of Rader driving the garbage truck saying, "Yes, Virginia, there really are public officials who ride in garbage trucks!"

"He has had an impact on my life that I consider to be significant and taught me the value of active participation in the political process," wrote Owasso's city manager Rodney Ray. "...Dr. Rader has brought to his classroom an excitement and energy that has resulted in intellectual growth and the improvement of his student's ability to think in expanded terms. I personally know several of his former students that attribute their success in business and government to this tutorial skills and willingness to fire an excitement for service to the public"

Kim Cherry, interim president at NSU wrote, "He has contributed to the education and enrichment of our student body beyond compare. He is truly one of those individuals who has made Northeastern State University a better place for all."

Photo Courtesy of Northeastern State University

My own memories are of a mentor who pushed me and encouraged me to reach beyond. He often told us (his students) we were limited only by our own imaginations. In the early 1980s when I was an aspiring Republican and he was a very active Democrat, he agreed to become my faculty advisor because our academic interests were so similar. We both became "roving registrars" for the county election board and conducted voter registration drives together in the Tahlequah High School cafeteria. When I decided to explore a PhD program, he said, "If you have figured out what you want to do in life, by all means do it and let nothing stand in your way, because I submit to you that 9 out of 10 people have not figured it out." Those simple but profound words became my inspiration to complete the marathon that is a PhD.

We kept in touch over the years. He was a proud man. He was proud of his kids and bragged on them anytime anyone would listen. He was proud of his wife Debby, constantly updating me on her remarkable career in the public schools. She was one of the first teachers in Oklahoma to receive National Board Certification. At his urging she became active in politics, serving on the Oklahoma Education Association Board of Directors and Political Action Committee. She says he taught her everything she needed to be successful in politics. He was proud of his students, those in faculty positions and those in public office. He was proud of me and he regularly let me know.

In the last year of his life I was privileged to coauthor a piece with him that appeared in *Oklahoma Politics*. He told me frequently how pleased he was with that article. I tell everyone who will listen, "If you have not written a paper with your undergraduate mentor call them up and suggest a topic. You will cherish the memories."

The last conversation I had with him, he called the Capitol to ask me for a copy of a legislative bill. He was engaged in a coffee shop discussion on campus and wanted to have the document. When I returned his call, he recognized my phone number and answered, "JD Hogg here." Of course, anyone who has read his dissertation or knows his political career is well aware that he loved sarcasms and hated racism.

A TYPICAL OKLAHOMA CAREER

Brian Rader's career spanned 6 decades from the 1960s to the 2010s. His career took on many of the characteristics that were common to its time. He began college teaching with an MA. He earned his PhD

while teaching a full load of classes, fulfilling his responsibilities on campus, raising a family, and participating in community activities. He earned teaching and service awards at the university. More importantly, he earned tenure and promotion. Ultimately, he became a full professor and one of the pillars on which the university stood. He was a fixture in the state political science association.

He was active in his community. He joined several service clubs and became active in politics. In many of those clubs he eventually served a term or two as president. In the city he became a city councilman, chairman of several boards, and mayor. His reputation grew regionally and statewide. His career as a public servant and as a political scientist were inexorably intertwined.

Rader was an uncommon man, but his career illustrates that of many Oklahoma political scientists in the 1960s. He reached the pinnacle of his profession within his sphere. In 2007 the Oklahoma Legislature recognized his achievements with a citation. In 2009 to commemorate the university's 100th Anniversary he was named an NSU Centurion.

Many of us will simply remember him as our friend.

FROM SPRINGTIME TO WINTER: THE '92 AND '94 ELECTIONS AND THE IMPACT ON OKLAHOMA POLITICS

JEFF BIRDSONG
Northeastern Oklahoma A&M College

The 1992 election was one in which the Democrats were competitive in almost all elections in the state of Oklahoma, yet the 1994 election was one that the Oklahoma Democrats have yet to recover from. This paper analyzes those two elections and the time span in between to determine the cause of the Democratic Party's precipitous decline in Oklahoma. The paper determines that there was a populists' backlash against the Democratic Party during the 1992 to 1994 time span. This form of populism, which is cultural, has remained a primary explanation for the failures of Democrats in Oklahoma. Also the built-in demographic advantages for Republicans put the Democrats in an increasingly minority status that does not appear to be changing.

In the spring of 1993, James Carville, the campaign manager for Bill Clinton's successful presidential bid, addressed the Oklahoma Young Democrats' convention in Stillwater. The large crowd heard one stemwinder after another from the Democratic officials on the podium. To the people in the audience, Oklahoma appeared to be a strong Democratic state. Four of the six U.S. Representatives were Democrats. One of the most influential leaders in the U.S. Senate, David Boren, was the top Democratic voice in the state. The Governor, Lieutenant Governor, and all other statewide officials, with the exception of the State Treasurer, were Democrats. At the state level, the Democrats had large majorities in the both Statehouses. As it was springtime in Stillwater with the air

of re-birth, it also seemed a time of reemergence for the Democrats in Oklahoma. Yet politics, like the weather in Oklahoma, can make some abrupt changes. The Democratic Party went from springtime straight to a deep winter from which it has yet recovered. Within a span of eighteen months, the Democratic Party of Oklahoma would sustain overwhelming losses that would put the party in a weakened status, which it continues to maintain sixteen years after the 1994 election. This paper will review the time period between the 1992 and 1994 elections to determine what events were the culprits for the downturn of the Oklahoma Democratic Party.

THE CHANGING POLITICAL WINDS

The 1994 election is known as one of the most significant mid-term elections for the United States and for good reason. The Republican Party gained fifty-two House seats and defeated thirty-four incumbent Democrats, which elevated its status as the majority in the House of Representatives for the first time in forty years. In the Senate, the Republicans won in all nine open-seat elections that year and also defeated two incumbents to gain the majority for the first time eight years. In Oklahoma, the partisan makeup of the House delegation went from a four-to-two advantage for the Democrats to a five-to-one advantage for the Republicans. In the Senate open-seat election, former Democratic House member Dave McCurdy lost to former Republican House member Jim Inhofe by fifteen-percentage points and carried only twenty-eight of the seventy-seven counties in the state. Of those counties only Comanche county would be considered heavily populated. The governor's race in 1994 also went to the Republican for only the third time in the history of the state. This was also the first time the state elected a Republican for Lieutenant Governor.

In the 1994 U.S. House races, the margin of victory was substantial in two of the three open seats. In District One Steve Largent defeated his Democratic opponent Stuart Price by twenty-six percentage points, and in District Six Frank Lucas won by an astounding forty percentage points. As shown by the breakdown of the congressional elections from 1992 and 1994 in Table 1, the First District race was competitive in 1992, and the Sixth District was one that had a Democratic incumbent.

Table1also shows the decrease in support for Democratic

candidates from 1992 to 1994 in each competitive election. In Districts Four and Six, which represented at the time the Southwest and Western areas of the state, there was a percentage decrease of twenty-seven and thirty-eight percent for the Democratic candidates respectively. Only the Democratic stronghold of Northeastern Oklahoma was the percentage decrease under ten percent for the Democratic candidate. In District Five, which is dominated by Oklahoma City, the Democrats could not find a candidate to compete against Republican incumbent Earnest Istook.

Table 1.
Percentage Change in '92-'94 Elections for Democratic Candidate in Oklahoma Congressional Delegation

1992	1994	Percentage Difference
District One	District One	
R. Inhofe 53%	R. Largent 63%	
D. Selph 47%	D. Price 37%	-10%
District Two	District Two	
R. Hill 41%	R. Coburn 52%	
D. Synar 56%	D. Cooper 48%	-8%
I. Vardeman 3%		
District Three	District Three	
R. Stokes 25%	R. Tallant 36%	
D. Brewster 75%	D. Brewster 64%	-11%
District Four	District Four	
R. Bell 30%	R. Watts 52%	
D. McCurdy 70%	D. Perryman 43%	
	I. Tiffee 5%	-27%
District Five	District Five	
R. Istook 54%	R. Istook 78%	
D. Williams 47%	I. Keith 22%	NA*
District Six	District Six	
R. Anthony 32%	R. Lucas 70%	
D. English 68%	D. Tollett 30%	-38%

*There was no Democratic candidate.

Source: Election Results and Statistics 1992 and 1994, Compiled by State Election Board, Lance Ward Secretary, State Capitol, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma

If 1994 is the starting point to analyze elections in Oklahoma, then any analysis would conclude that the state is firmly in the Republican camp. Yet one election before 1994 showed a different side to Oklahoma. The congressional races of 1992, as noted in Table one, were not competitive in the four districts with incumbent Democrats. In the two districts won by Republicans, incumbent Jim Inhofe won in Republican stronghold District One by a six-percent margin, and in the open seat of District Five Republican challenger Earnest Istook won by seven percentage points. In these same districts in 1990, Inhofe won by twelve percent, and Republican incumbent Mickey Edwards won by forty percent (*Election results and statistics*, 1990).

The 1992 election was a good year for Democrats in the state. In 1992, Democrats were able to tap into the anxiety many Americans felt about the economy. In fact, according to polls before the 1992 presidential election, the economy was the number one issue followed by healthcare in second place. This worked to the advantage of the winner in the campaign, Bill Clinton, whose unofficial campaign slogan was "It's the economy stupid." This slogan signified the Clinton camp's desire to keep the focus on the economy instead of foreign policy or social issues. The key to the election, according to Clinton, was to "[win] the debate over what the election was about" (Clinton, 2004, 445). The nationwide success of the Governor of Arkansas also had some improvement over past Democratic candidates in the state of Oklahoma. In the 1988 presidential race, Vice President George H.W. Bush defeated the Massachusetts Governor, Michael Dukakis, by a margin of seventeen points in Oklahoma. In 1992, Clinton lost to Bush by nine points. While Dukakis carried thirty-one counties in 1988, Clinton carried forty counties in 1992. Certainly Clinton had advantages that Dukakis did not have: he was from a bordering state, and significant third-party candidate Ross Perot was on the ballot. Perot's primary issue was the rising debt in the federal government, and his call to reduce spending might have taken away conservative voters from Bush (Clinton, 2004, 412). But Clinton's form of economic populism might have caused more Democrats to stay with their party, perhaps not to vote for him, but to support other Democrats on the ballot.

ECONOMIC POPULISM

Clinton campaigned in 1992 with the backing of studies that supported his claim found often among economic populists that the "rich were getting richer and the poor were getting poorer" (Clinton, 2004, 412). His proposal to change the inequality was to raise taxes on wealthier Americans and corporations, who many voters believed had benefited most from the economic success of the eighties (Clinton, 2004, 412). This was a strategy rooted in economic populism. Populism can be considered a "clash between those who feel themselves on the 'periphery' and those perceived to be at the 'core' of economic and cultural life"(Hertzke, 1993, 4). Michael Kazin (1995) describes populism as "a language whose speakers conceive of ordinary people as a noble assemblage not bounded narrowly by class, view their elite opponents as self-serving and undemocratic, and seek to mobilize the former against the latter" (1). From the economic perspective, populism is the struggle between the perceived "haves and have nots."

Oklahoma's early days were shaped by populism. At the time of statehood, the leaders of Oklahoma were influenced by the populism found in farm country of states in the South and West. The populism that stressed a greater opportunity for the farmer and the worker was one developed from the excesses of the Gilded Age in the 1890s. Agricultural production in that age increased beyond consumption, which caused prices to go down and then led to foreclosures on farms whose owners could not pay their debts. All this occurred at a time when government supported protective tariffs for manufacturers and land grants for railroads, but it provided no help for the farmer (Miller, 1987, 182). This form of populism was created from the failure of aid to farmers from the political elite (Miller 1987, 182). To the populists of the 1890s, what government most needed to do was to attack the "ultimate consolidation of wealth and power—monopoly" (Miller 1987, 184). The populists' antipathy for monopoly found a home in Oklahoma's constitution. The constitution for the Sooner State declared that attempts to form monopolies are illegal. The constitution also created a three-member Corporation Commission that set rates for utility companies (Scales & Goble, 1982, 24).

The heritage of Oklahoma suggests candidates that stand up for

the little guy on the economic food chain can do well. George Wallace, the Alabama Governor who ran on the American Independent ticket for president in 1968, campaigned for a government that aided the common folk. He pledged to create a government that would do more for the workingman (Kazin, 1995, 236). In Oklahoma he received twenty percent of the vote while nationally he received thirteen percent. In 1992, presidential candidate Ross Perot campaigned against the two-party system and the era of greed and trickle-down economics, which branded the 1980s (Kazin, 1995, 280). He received twenty-three percent of the vote in Oklahoma while garnering nineteen percent nationally.

One of Oklahoma's own politicians was at the center of the attempt to bring the Democrats back to the message of economic populism after two devastating losses to Republican Richard Nixon in 1968 and 1972. Oklahoma's former U.S. Senator Fred R. Harris "urged a return to 'bread-and-butter issues' that could separate 'the little guy' from the corporate elites that were the backbone of the GOP" (Kazin, 1995, 275). However, such appeals fell on deaf ears. Too often Harris's remedy would be derided in the Democratic Party as advocating "class warfare." Even Clinton's election in 1992 was, by his own account of the campaign, grounded on a strategy to merge the needs of Main Street with Wall Street (Clinton, 2004, 391). Michael Kazin (1995) writes that the appeal to economic populism by Democrats was a "strategy hatched by candidates and their consultants who sought an honorable and efficacious way to abandon the liberal label" (277). Voters in Oklahoma who had in large part supported the Democratic Party in 1992 soon realized how economic populism was not a primary belief of the Clinton administration with its support for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

The North American Free Trade Agreement was put into operation on January 1, 1994. It was an agreement between Canada, the United States, and Mexico to reduce trade barriers between the three countries. Because of its potential to transport working class jobs to Mexico, it was opposed by labor unions. There was a stark difference of opinion among Americans on NAFTA. Americans with incomes higher than the national average supported NAFTA, while Americans with incomes lower than the national average opposed it (Kazin, 1995, 277). President Clinton's own account of the 1994 election indicates the disaster for Democrats was based on the disenchantment among his base after the

passage of NAFTA (Clinton, 2004, 629). Thomas Frank (2004), in his book What's the Matter with Kansas, writes that NAFTA meant that "Democrats no longer speak to the people on the losing end of a free-market system that is becoming more brutal and more arrogant by the day" (245). The support of NAFTA by Democratic president Bill Clinton and by many Democrats in the South and Border states, including all four Democrats in Oklahoma's congressional delegation, highlighted the divisions within the party. The Democrats could not fully support the economic populist cause without alienating the well-financed segment of the base. Economic populism was marginalized by the Democratic leadership in the 1993-1994 Congress. Republicans, during this same time span, could rally around the other form of populism, which was cultural.

CULTURAL POPULISM

Kevin Phillips, an advisor for Richard Nixon in his 1968 bid for president and the author of The Emerging Republican Majority, summed up the resentment many felt against another form of elites than the bankers and industrialists. These elites were the so-called cultural leaders of the country, or those who are collectively called, *the liberals*. Phillips would refer to the liberals as the people "who make their money out of plans, ideas, communication, social upheaval, happenings, excitement [and] whose vision of the 'general good' could come at the expense of other Americans' simple desire for stability" (qtd. In Perlstein, 2008, 277). Like economic populism, cultural populism is centered on the opposition between the elites who believe they know what's good for the masses and those in the ranks of the masses who believe they are on the fringes in society with no voice. There are few groups in America that believe they are being pushed around by the cultural elitists more than Evangelical Christians. Oklahoma is a state with a high percentage of Evangelical Christians in its population. This state ranks seventh as the most Protestant state in the union and the majority of the Protestants in Oklahoma are Evangelicals (Harrison, Harris, & Tochin 2009, 222: Olsen 2008).

Evangelicals split from the mainstream Protestant faiths, such as Methodist and Episcopalian, in two main ways: "the belief that the Bible is the ultimate and only source of religious authority and the belief in a

life-altering event in which the individual accepts Jesus as her or his personal savior" (Brewer & Stonecash, 2007, 154). Mark Brewer and Jeffrey Stonecash (2007), who wrote on the cultural divides in America, describe how the word "tradition" applies in most all events in the daily life of Evangelicals. They note that Evangelicals place a strong emphasis on traditional family life and oppose any possible threat to its foundation. Evangelicals would then approve of Texas Congressman Tom DeLay's statement in 1993 in his opposition to allowing homosexuals to serve in the military. DeLay believed such an allowance was merely a beginning skirmish in a greater culture war. DeLay stated, "we feel strongly that the homosexual movement is not asking for tolerance; they're asking for a social endorsement" (qtd. In *Congressional quarterly almanac 103rd Congress, first session*, 1993, 445). Ultimately the debate over homosexuals openly serving was voted down. In fact, Southern Democrats voted against allowing homosexuals to openly serve, as did the majority in Congress, with the exception of only one member in the Oklahoma delegation, Mike Synar, who supported the legislation. The compromise, known as "Don't ask, don't tell," was approved, which allowed homosexuals to serve in the military, but not openly. Although it was not supported by a majority of Northern Democrats, it was supported by a majority of Southern Democrats and Republicans. However, to cultural populists, the message was clear that this issue signified a behavior among cultural elites that they knew better and the traditional lifestyles of Americans must change.

Gun control became another issue to rally cultural populists against those they identified as the elites. To the cultural populists, it was the elite policymakers in Washington or other big cities that wanted gun control. Legislation that banned the sale of assault weapons was not supported by the majority of Southern Democrats. Congressmen Mike Synar and Dave McCurdy and Senator David Boren from the Oklahoma delegation supported such a ban. The same three were the ones from Oklahoma to support the "Brady Bill," which required a five-day waiting period before an individual could purchase a handgun.

The 1994 election became a perfect storm of alienation and anger among the two forms of populism. For the economic populists, the ones most likely to support the Democrats, NAFTA reduced their belief the party worked for them instead of elites and made them more likely to stay home. For the cultural populists, the ones most likely to support

Republicans, votes on gays in the military and gun control increased their belief that the Republicans needed to be in control to check the power of elites. The outcome was one of the more significant elections in American history.

THE IMPACT OF THE 1994 ELECTION ON OKLAHOMA

Perhaps no mid-term election in American history has been as one-sided as the 1994 election. The Republican House candidates received a surge of close to nine million more votes than the party did just four years earlier in 1990 (*Congressional quarterly almanac 103rd Congress 2nd session*, 1994, 564). No party had ever had that great a turnaround of voter support. In contrast to the increase of support for Republicans, the Democrats had a decrease in voter support. This was especially the case in the Midwest and the South. The crime bill that called for more gun control had a negative impact on Democratic incumbents. Of the thirty-four Democratic House incumbents that were defeated, twenty-nine had supported the crime bill (*Congressional quarterly almanac 103rd Congress, 2nd session*, 1994, 563). Close to half of the defeated Democratic incumbents had also voted for NAFTA. Both pieces of legislation, gun control and free trade, left voters with populist leanings a sense that the elites did not embrace their interests, and Democratic incumbents paid accordingly.

However, none of the incumbent Oklahoma Congressmen lost in the 1994 general election. One Democratic incumbent that lost his reelection bid, Mike Synar, was defeated in the primary. His loss in the primary embodied the surge of cultural pluralism in Oklahoma. Synar went against the grain of the typical Oklahoma Democrat in Congress. From a rural district in a state classified as the South in the *Congressional Quarterly*, Synar was one of only four rural, Southern congressmen to vote for striking the ban on homosexuals in the military. He was also only one of ten in that category to vote for the waiting period on handguns. Most glaring was Synar's opposition to the conservative coalition. *Congressional Quarterly* uses this measure called the "conservative coalition" to see how often a member of Congress vote against legislation supported by a coalition of conservative interest groups. In 1994, Synar went against the conservative coalition eighty-six percent of the time, while the average for Southern Democrats was thirty-one percent, and

the rest of the Oklahoma Democratic delegation only seven percent of the time (*Congressional quarterly almanac, 103rd Congress 2nd session*, 1994, 582). Synar's loss in the primary is not too surprising based on his voting record. His defeat to seventy-one-year old political novice Virgil Cooper did signify the depth of alienation felt by voters in the Second District (Swindle, 1994).

The rest of the Democratic delegation, with the exception of Third District Congressman Bill Brewster, dropped out of their positions before the 1994 election. In 1993, Glen English of the Sixth District in Western Oklahoma had left to become a lobbyist for the Rural Electric Corporation. In May of 1994, Senator David Boren resigned from the Senate to become President of the University of Oklahoma. Also in 1994, David McCurdy of the Fourth District decided to forgo reelection to run for the Senate seat vacated by Boren. The resignations all suggested a strategic decision on the part of the incumbents to avoid either a difficult reelection or an outright defeat at the polls (Jacobson & Kernell, 1981, 50). While defeat of an incumbent is an infrequent occurrence, even in a watershed year like 1994, incumbents such as McCurdy and English may have decided the expense to win reelection and the possibility of serving in the House in the minority made other job opportunities seem more attractive. Table one notes how each district, even the stronghold for conservative Democrats, the so-called "little Dixie" of the then Third District, had decreased support for Democratic Congressman Bill Brewster. Even more telling was the lack of quality candidates the Democrats had to replace the retired incumbents. None of the Democratic candidates in the open-seat elections of the First, Second, Fourth, and Sixth Districts had ever won an election. It then came as little surprise that the Democrats would be left with one Congressman after the 1994 election. In a ten-year period the Democrats in Oklahoma would go from having all but one member of Congress in the state in 1984 to having only one by 1994. However, the bottom still had yet to fall out.

Oklahoma is usually considered by social scientists to be either a Southern state, with Kentucky and the eleven states of the Confederacy as it is classified in the *Congressional Quarterly*, or a Border state with Missouri, Kentucky, Maryland, and West Virginia, as it is described in *Vital Statistics on Congress* (Ornstein, Mann & Malbin, 2002, 59). States in the South and those that border the South certainly were

favorable to the Republicans as Table 2 describes. While some states had a greater number of seats change from Democrat to Republican, no state had a greater reversal percentage-wise than Oklahoma. Oklahoma's congressional delegation was sixty-seven percent Democratic in 1992 and had dropped down to just seventeen percent after 1994. The question raised from these results is why Democrats in Oklahoma took a greater hit in the 1994 election and the effects of the election have been greater than other states in these regions.

Table 2. Democratic Drop-Off '92-'94 Elections for Border and Southern States

State	1992 Delegation	1994 Delegation	Drop-Off
Alabama	R-3 (43%) D-4 (57%)	R-3 (43%) D-4 (57%)	0
Arkansas	R-2 (50%) D-2 (50%)	R-2 (50%) D-2 (50%)	0
Florida	R-13 (56%) D-10 (44%)	R-15 (65%) D-8 (35%)	-2 (-9%)
Georgia	R-3 (36%) D-7 (64%)	R-8 (73%) D-3 (27%)	-4 (-37%)
Kentucky	R-2 (33%) D-4 (67%)	R-4 (67%) D-2 (33%)	-2 (-34%)
Louisiana	R-3 (43%) D-4 (57%)	R-4 (57%) D-3 (43%)	-1 (-14%)
Maryland	R-4 (50%) D-4 (50%)	R-4 (50%) D-4 (50%)	0
Mississippi	R-0 (0%) D-5 (100%)	R-2 (40%) D-3 (60%)	-2 (-40%)
Missouri	R-3 (33%) D-6 (67%)	R-3 (33%) D-6 (67%)	0
North Carolina	R-4 (33%) D-8 (67%)	R-8 (67%) D-4 (33%)	-4 (34%)
Oklahoma	**R-2 (33%) D-4 (67%)**	**R-5 (83%) D-1 (17%)**	**-3 (-50%)**
South Carolina	R-3 (50%) D-3 (50%)	R-4 (67%) D-2 (33%)	-1 (-17%)
Tennessee	R-3 (33%) D-6 (67%)	R-5 (56%) D-4 (44%)	-2 (-23%)
Texas	R-9 (30%) D-21 (70%)	R-12 (40%) D-18 (60%)	-3 (-10%)
Virginia	R-4 (36%) D-7 (64%)	R-5 (45%) D-6 (55%)	-1 (-9%)
West Virginia	R-0 (0%) D-3 (100%)	R-0 (0%) D-3 (100%)	0

Source: Congressional Districts in the 1990s, Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1992, 1994.

OKLAHOMA DEMOGRAPHICS

The demographics of Oklahoma work in favor for the Republican Party to a degree that may be found only in Western states such as Utah or Idaho. Of the states included for comparison, the Border and South states, Oklahoma is among the Whitest, most Protestant, and with the advent of right-to-work, least union-supported state of the group. While other states such as Mississippi and Alabama may have a greater percentage of Evangelical Protestants, the most supportive group for Republicans, they also have a much larger percentage of African-Americans than Oklahoma. Mississippi's African-American population makes up thirty-seven percent of the total population, while Alabama has an African-American population of twenty-six percent. African-Americans are the most consistent voting bloc for Democrats. With a high percentage of African-Americans found in most Southern states, the Republican advantage found in the South is reduced. However, in Oklahoma, the African-American population is only eight percent of the population. Kentucky has a similar percentage, and only West Virginia among the states listed has a lower percentage with four percent.[1]

With a high percent of Evangelical Protestants, a high percent of Whites, and a low percent of union members, Oklahoma should be a very Republican state. However, the state still has support for Democrats at statewide races and currently has a Democratic Governor and a Democratic Lieutenant Governor. What may be occurring for the Democrats is the lingering effects of dual party loyalty that may help some Democratic officials hold on to their positions (Hadley, 1985, 256). Democrats in the state legislature had benefitted for years from dual loyalty as voters supported Republicans for President and voted locally for Democrats. This dual loyalty has started to wane as Democratic politicians lose their power in the Statehouses. As the incumbents in the legislature vacated their seats to term limits, voters shifted their loyalties in more races to the Republican candidates. In the 2010 election, with no Democratic incumbent running for Attorney General, Treasurer, Auditor, or for Superintendent of Public Instruction, voters will likely shift their support for the Republican candidates in these positions. While the Democrats have elected a governor to the state since the 1994 debacle, it was in large part due to the split within the state Republican

Party in 2002. It was also the only high profile success for the party since the 1994 election. As Table three denotes, Oklahoma Democrats have had the least amount of success in congressional elections of any Southern or Border state since 1994.

Since 1994 in most instances the states of the South and along the South's border are not supportive of Democrats. According to legislative scholar Gary Jacobsen, the 1994 election marks a time when the Democrats became the permanent minority in this region (*Congressional quarterly almanac, 103rd Congress 2nd session 1994*, 563). Of the ninety congressional delegations produced by the states and congresses listed in Table 3, only twenty had a Democratic majority. Of the four presidential elections since 1994, only nine states out of a potential sixty from the combined elections in that period have been carried by the Democratic candidate. It is also worth noting that Oklahoma was the only state in this heavily Republican area to have a period of time with no Democratic members of Congress.

Table 3.

Party Memberships of Congressional Delegations in South and Border States, 105th-110th Congresses

State	1997/105th	1999/106th	2001/107th	2003/108th	2005/109th	2007/110th
Alabama	5R/2D	5R/2D	5R/2D	5R/2D	5R/2D	5R/2D
Arkansas	2R/2D	2R/2D	2R/2D	1R/3D	1R/3D	1R/3D
Florida	15R/8D	15R/8D	15R/8D	18R/7D	18R/7D	16R/9D
Georgia	8R/3D	8R/3D	8R/3D	8R/5D	7R/6D	6R/6D
Kentucky	5R/1D	5R/1D	5R/1D	5R/1D	5R/1D	4R/2D
Louisiana	5R/2D	5R/2D	5R/2D	4R/3D	5R/2D	5R/2D
Maryland	4R/4D	4R/4D	4R/4D	2R/6D	2R/6D	2R/6D
Mississippi	3R/2D	2R/3D	2R/3D	2R/2D	2R/2D	2R/2D
Missouri	4R/5D	4R/5D	5R/4D	5R/4D	5R/4D	5R/4D
North Carolina	6R/6D	7R/5D	7R/5D	7R/6D	7R/6D	6R/7D
Oklahoma	**6R/0D**	**6R/0D**	**5R/1D**	**4R/1D**	**4R/1D**	**4R/1D**
South Carolina	4R/2D	4R/2D	4R/2D	4R/2D	4R/2D	4R/2D
Tennessee	5R/4D	5R/4D	5R/4D	4R/5D	4R/5D	4R/5D
Texas	13R/17D	13R/17D	13R/17D	15R/17D	21R/11D	19R/13D
Virginia	5R/6D	5R/6D	6R/4D	8R/3D	8R/3D	8R/3D
West Virginia	0R/3D	0R/3D	1R/2D	1R/2D	1R/2D	1R/2D

Source: Congressional Districts in the 1990s, Congressional Districts in the 2000s, Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007.

SINCE 1994

In sixteen years since the 1994 election, there has not been a time that Oklahoma Democrats appear to be thawing themselves out of the deep political winter. As noted earlier, the only real bright spot for Democrats has been the election and reelection of Governor Brad Henry. This election was in large part based on a division within the Republican Party that allowed Henry to win. Henry managed to defeat Congressman Steve Largent by six-thousand votes out of total of nine-hundred thousand votes cast. Largent had to contend with Gary Richardson, a former Republican from Tulsa who took votes from him in heavily Republican Tulsa County (Ervin, 2002). From his tenuous first election and a Republican majority in the legislature, Henry has chosen not to be an innovative leader but to be a defender. This means that the one great political success for Oklahoma Democrats since 1994 has been a Democratic governor's surviving rather than thriving. Historians and political scientists will regard Henry's primary accomplishment as governor to be his use of the veto pen against Republican plans to aggressively alter the gun laws and abortion laws of the state (Krehbiel, 2010).

Other major changes since 1994 in the political landscape of Oklahoma have also favored the Republicans. Term-limits, which first went in to effect in 2002, have created more open seats for Democrats to defend since they were the majority party in the legislature at the time. In those four elections since 2002, Republicans have captured nineteen seats that were previously held by Democrats in open-seat elections, whereas Democrats have captured only four open seats previously held by Republicans in the same span of elections.

In a transition of interest group power, in the fall of 2001 big labor was shown the door in Oklahoma with the passage of right-to-work. In the early days of Oklahoma, the state had more socialists and labor activists per capita of any state. Radicals had their moment in the sun in 1917 with a violent protest against the draft for World War I, which resulted in the arrests of over four-hundred people (Murolo & Chitty, 2001, 163). Since that time, the state's major newspapers have been decidedly anti-labor, and the rural parts of the state have mistrusted labor leaders (Scales & Goble, 1982, 222, 284, 290). Still in 1964 the

state had narrowly defeated a state question that favored the anti-labor practices known as "right-to-work." The passage of right-to-work would allow workers in unionized workplaces to no longer be required to join the union. In the most expensive special election held in the state, unions spent five million dollars to defeat state question 695, while business interest and the chamber of commerce spent five million as well ("Right to work becomes the newest law," 2001). Without union backing, Democrats in the state lacked a traditional supporter for their campaigns. A year after the passage of right-to-work, the congressional districts in the state were re-drawn to accommodate the reduction from six congressional districts to five. The plan that was approved eliminated the well-known Third District, "little Dixie" from the southeast part of the state, and moved the Third out to the Western half of the state. The move, according to the *Tulsa World,* "guarantees that Oklahoma will have four Republicans and only one Democrat in Congress for the next ten years" ("Redistricting debate: ruling favors plan by Keating," 2002).

From the failure to protect traditional strongholds for Democrats in Congress to the inability to keep Democratic interest groups as influential stakeholders to the failure to find competitive candidates to defend open-seats, the last decade and a half have been a string of defeats for the Democratic Party in Oklahoma. Demographically, the Republican Party has an advantage over the Democratic Party that does not look to be changing soon. This advantage is well-known for the strategic politicians in the Democratic ranks and causes them to not take chances (Jacobson & Kernell, 1981, 23). As a result, in the 2010 election, of the three Republican incumbents in Oklahoma's congressional delegation, only one had a Democratic challenger. In the open-seat election in District Five, the two Democratic challengers in the race had not held elected office. The only Democratic challenger that had success in winning elections, State Senator Jim Wilson, took on the Democratic incumbent, Dan Boren, in District Two. Wilson challenged Boren because he thought the incumbent did not represent the beliefs of the Democratic Party. In fact, Boren did not publically support Barack Obama in 2008 and ran against the national party's "liberal" agenda ("Dan Boren won't endorse Obama," 2008). With the exception of the party in-fighting in the 2nd District, the Democratic Party has difficulty getting challengers for congressional races, and when it gets candidates, they are usually not the most qualified of candidates that a party would be seeking. While

the Democrats did get quality candidates for the open- seat gubernatorial race, the current Lieutenant Governor and current Attorney General respectively, the lack of quality candidates for congressional races signifies that the party is resigning itself to minority status. The Republican Party, as observed by its chairman, has won the recruiting battle in Oklahoma (Hoberock, 2010).

A CHANGE IN SEASONS?

For the Democrats, winter is still the season in Oklahoma. The party has not recovered from the election of 1994. The cultural populists turned out against the Democrats in this state in that election, despite the conservative leanings for many Democratic candidates. The economic populists had less reason to vote for Democrats as the party turned to free trade, which alienated a core segment of the party. In the state of Oklahoma, the two largest groups of supporters for Republicans, the cultural populists and business interests, not necessarily congruent on all issues, have stayed united to the benefit of the Republicans. A coalition of anti-government free-marketers and cultural populists who want to shore up America's morality may seem to be an odd marriage, but it stays together because the coalition's goals are ultimately to create virtuous individuals that won't need government (Brewer & Stonecash, 2007, 172). Plus, as long as this coalition stays together, the "condescending and self-serving" liberals will be on the defensive (Perlstein, 2008, 277). As for the Democrats, the coalition of economic populists and social progressives does not stay united because ultimately the party leans towards the interests of the upper-middle class (Frank, 2004, 243). There is not a consistent message of party unity for Democrats in Oklahoma.

Could the Republicans suffer a dramatic turnaround as did the Democrats in 1994? At another time in the Sooner State's history, the Republicans had made gains towards a two-party system only to be "obliterated" by Hoover and the Great Depression of 1929 (Scales & Goble, 1982, 161). However at this time there does not appear to be any election debacle on the horizon for Republicans, especially since it is the Democrats that are dominant at the national level. Another reason for continued Republican success would be demographics. As long as the

state remains as strongly Evangelical Protestant, nonunion, and White, the Republicans will have a base of support to weather poor candidates in the state or disfavor with the party at the national level. Democrats have a long road back just to get to competitiveness. These are a few indications that the Democrats will have started the process of rebuilding. First, there should be quality candidates at the congressional level. Former state legislators or other candidates with election success will run in congressional campaigns. Second, Democratic candidates will run in support of the national platform, not against it. This would signify party unity and mark a clear opposition to the Republican Party. The reality for Democrats is that the remedy for rebuilding is to get their best candidates to campaign in a currently unreceptive atmosphere. Most strategic politicians are going to avoid such circumstances. However, until leaders of the party are willing to take risks that can make them competitive, there will be no change of seasons for the Democrats in Oklahoma.

NOTES

1. Oklahoma's other significant minority, its American Indian population, could also influence the state's politics. However, since no other Southern or Border state has a comparable American Indian population, it was not be used in the analysis. Also, American Indians do not appear to be a monolithic voting bloc when compared to the other groups used in this research.

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THE OKLAHOMA VOTER 2008

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In the November 4, 2008 election the Oklahoma voter was a woman. Differences between Oklahoma men and women in party affiliation, women are more Democrat, men more Republican; and voter turnout, women have a higher probability of voting than do men; result in Oklahoma women Democrats enjoying a numerical advantage in the electorate. This suggests a paradox as Oklahoma is consistently rated at the bottom among states in women's concerns and support for Democrats.

INTRODUCTION

We seek to understand the place of women in the Oklahoma electorate, first through the literature, then the Census and finally in an analysis of voter registration data.

PUBLISHED RESEARCH

Early work on the Oklahoma voter by Oliver Benson and his coworkers was essentially geographical, seeking to examine voting and registration patterns in Oklahoma's counties, congressional districts and regions (Benson, et al. 1964; Benson, et al. 1965). The finding was that

Oklahoma politics was dominated by rural Democrats, especially in the southeast, while there was an increasing tendency to vote Republican in urban Oklahoma City and Tulsa, west of what is now Interstate 35, and north of what is now Interstate 40. This is accounted for by traditions extending back to the Civil War and subsequent migration. The nature of Benson's data prevented any analysis of the role of women in Oklahoma voting.

The Oklahoma Voter used Tom Kielhorn's extensive political polling to supplement the previous analysis of registration and voting patterns from State Election Board reports (Kirkpatrick, et al. 1977). But the book makes no reference to women voters – offering the tacit assumption that women and men, politically, are indistinguishable.

U.S. CENSUS

In 1918 Oklahoma tied with Michigan in being the thirteenth states to give women the vote (Darcy, 2005). Thus, 1920 was the first presidential election in which the state's women could vote. A comparison of the voting turnout before and after 1920 found women voted at half the rate of men (Darcy, 2005). The percent of women voting slowly increased. By 1980 U.S. Census estimates showed the percent of women voting nationally first exceeded that of men. Nationally since 1980, while the proportion of people casting votes has fluctuated, a greater percent of women, than men, cast votes and more women than men voted.

In 1992 the U.S. Census began reporting voting rates for Oklahoma men and women and the trend observed nationally was observed for Oklahoma. However, we can notice a sharp drop in the probability an Oklahoma woman would vote in 2008 in contrast with both Oklahoma men and national trends for both sexes. The 2008 U.S. Census estimates showed an insignificant difference between the voting rates of Oklahoma women citizens age 18+ (58.8%) and men (58.6%) (see Chart 1).

The U.S. Census reports are based on random samples of the population taken after each national election. Subjects were asked several questions, including their sex and whether or not they voted.

U.S. Census samples are subject to three limitations.

The first is sampling error. In 2008 the U.S. Census reported nationwide 61.5% of males and 65.7% of females voted – a difference of 4.2%. The margin of error for each was +/- .4% allowing us to be



Source: Authors' calculations from U.S. Census reports:
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/p20/char1968/tab02-03.pdf;
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/p20/1968/tab01.pdf;
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/p20/1972/tab01.pdf;
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/p20/1976/tab01.pdf;
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http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/p20/1996/tab4B.txt;
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/p20/2000/tables.html;
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/p20/2004/tables.html;
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/p20/2008/tables.html

confident the difference was not due to sample variation. The Census also reported 58.8% of Oklahoma male citizens voted and 58.6% of women with margins of error of +/- 3.8% and +/- 3.6%, too large to be confident the sample difference was not due to sample variation. The sample for the entire United States is sufficiently large to detect voting rate differences. The sample size for Oklahoma was not.

A second problem is that the U.S. Census estimated only reported, not actual, voting. More people report voting than actually do (Campbell, et al. 1960:93-6). Further, there is no particular reason to think everyone is equally accurate in reporting their non-voting. A person that hardly ever misses an election, for example, has less opportunity to exaggerate voting than someone who hardly ever votes.

The third difficulty with the U.S. Census is it does not ask questions on partisanship or political tendency.

Why might we expect a difference in the voting rates of Oklahoma men and women? One answer is age distribution. More males are born than females but males do not survive at the same rate as females. As each cohort ages the proportion of males diminish. In Oklahoma females first exceed males in the age group 35-39 (see Chart 2).

Chart 2. Female Percent of Population by Age Group: Oklahoma and US 2000



Source: Authors' calculations from U.S. Census 2000 Summary File 1 (SF 1) 100-Percent Data Accessed using American FactFinder http://factfinder.census.gov

We know that the probability an individual will report voting increases with age up to approximately age 75 when voting rates decrease. This pattern was observed in US Census data for the November 4, 2008 Oklahoma general election (see Table 1).

TABLE 1
Estimated percent of Registered Voting in November 4, 2008 Election by Age (percents)

	Voted November 4, 2008			
Age	**No**	**Yes**	**Total**	**Change**
All	16.18	83.82	100	
18 to 24	22.81	77.19	100	
25 to 44	20.64	79.36	100	2.17
45 to 64	13.06	86.94	100	7.57
65 to 74	10.45	89.55	100	2.62
75+	12.80	87.20	100	-2.36

Source: Author's calculations from U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, November 2008
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/voting/cps2008.html
Internet Release date: Month xx, 2009 accessed September 25, 2009.

Because women, on average, are older than men we might expect differences in voting rates. But U.S. Census estimates show no significant differences between Oklahoma men and women age 18+ in population proportions, citizen proportions, registered citizen proportions or registered that voted proportions (see Table 2).

In summary, the U.S. Census sample is silent on political affiliation differences between Oklahoma men and women and, unexpectedly, evidences no differences between them in 2008 voting rates.

OKLAHOMA VOTER REGISTRATION RECORDS

Oklahoma maintains electronic voter registration records and makes these available at a small cost. The data lists each registered person by name, party affiliation, birth date and notes each election the person

TABLE 2
U.S. Census estimates of male and female aged 18+ population, citizen registered and voting populations November 4, 2008.

Sex	Estimated population	% of estimated population	Citizen % of estimated population	Estimated registered % of citizens	Estimated % of registered voted	Standard error
Male	1,280,000	48.01	95.86	70.70	83.28	2.31
Female	1,386,000	51.99	96.61	69.50	84.32	2.19
z		-1.2495	-0.2356	0.3771	-0.3275	
p (two tail)		0.2115	0.8138	0.7061	0.7433	

Source: Authors' calculations from U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, November 2008; http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/voting/cps2008.html accessed September 25, 2009. For calculation of z see "2008 ACS Accuracy of the Data (US)" page 20, accessed at http://www.census.gov/acs/www/Downloads/ACS/accuracy2008.pdf. We estimated the Oklahoma Census sample to be 6,600.

voted, among other things. The sex of the voter is not recorded. We obtained the data from the State Election Board, segregated the files by county, and drew a simple random sample from each county. Individuals sampled were categorized as male or female based on their first names and other identifications (e.g. Sr., Jr., Mrs., III). Only a few individuals, about five percent, proved problematic. The number sampled was 15,309. The number sampled from a county varied from 89 to 621. As the number sampled from a county was not in proportion to the county's population, state totals were weighted to accurately reflect each county's contribution to the state total.

In addition, we were given access to the Democratic National Committee's Oklahoma Voter Activation Network (Oklahoma VAN) data. This takes the Oklahoma voter registration data and does several things. A computer algorithm categorized approximately ninety-five percent of registered persons by sex and a user interface simplifies analysis. Generally, our sample data and the Oklahoma VAN data showed the same results.

No one can vote in Oklahoma without being registered and, generally, record keeping is accurate at all levels (see Off, 2009). The state voter registration data, including party affiliation and supplemented by identifying a sample of voter's sex provides a more comprehensive and accurate view of the Oklahoma voter than does the U.S. Census. Our sample was 2.3 times that of the U.S. Census, did not rely on self-reporting of voting, and it included political affiliation data. The Oklahoma VAN data included all registered persons.

As we wish to describe the November 2008 voter there is a problem with our Election Board data. The sampled data reflects the registered voters as of early 2009 while the Oklahoma VAN data we used reflects mid 2010. Registrants were added and purged after November, 2008. We adjusted for this by looking only at individuals eligible to vote in November 2008.

EFFECT OF AGE ON PARTY AFFILIATION AND VOTING TURNOUT

The percent of Democrats increases with each older age group while the percent of independents decreases. The percent of Republicans increases between ages 18 - 47 and decreases with age after that. However, if Republican and independent are combined, there

TABLE 3
Oklahoma age, party affiliation and vote (percents)

	Party Affiliation					Voted on November 4, 2008 if eligible			
Age	**Democrat**	**Independent**	**Republican**	**Total**	**(n)**	**Yes**	**No**	**Total**	**(n)**
18-27	41.55	19.33	39.12	100	331,264	57.65	42.35	100	323,221
28-37	42.74	16.69	40.57	100	319,003	66.50	33.50	100	313,273
38-47	44.63	11.23	44.14	100	344,125	74.46	25.54	100	339,577
48-57	49.63	8.18	42.19	100	392,681	80.14	19.86	100	389,136
58-67	54.62	6.22	39.16	100	309,370	83.22	16.78	100	307,350
68+	62.08	3.17	34.74	100	352,715	75.36	24.64	100	351,189
Total	49.31	10.66	40.03	100	2,049,158	73.12	26.88	100	2,023,746

Source: Authors' calculations from State Election Board registration data.

is a clear decrease of that group with age. The youngest age group is 58.45% Republican or independent while the oldest age group is only 37.42%.

The percent of the age group voting increases with age until the group 68 years and older where there is a 7.86% decrease in the percent voting (see Table 3).

EFFECT OF SEX ON PARTY AFFILIATION

Oklahoma women are significantly more likely to register as Democrat and significantly less likely to register as independent or Republican than are men (see Table 4). This shadows the well-documented national gender gap dating back through the early 1980s (Center for the American Woman and Politics, 2005).

Why are Oklahoma women more likely to register as Democrats than men? Oklahoma was once strongly Democratic, now Republicans are making gains (Kirkpatrick, et al., 1977). One possibility is that women, on average, are older than are men and their party registration more reflects the era of Democratic Party dominance. Younger, on average, male registration reflects Oklahoma's more contemporary Republican trend. If this hypothesis is correct we expect the proportions of Republicans, Democrats and independents to be the same for males and females of the same age group.

On the other hand, if we hypothesize females, because they are females, are more attracted to the Democrats and males, because they are male, are more attracted to Republicans then we expect to observe a greater proportion of females than males in each age group to register Democrat.

For every age group women are more Democratic than are men. For every age group men are more independent or Republican than are women. For every age group men are more Republican than are women. For every age group but one, where there is but a slight difference, men are more independent than women. If we look at newly registering voters as either those registering for the first time in 2008 before the November 4 election, or as persons eligible to vote in their first Presidential election, that is age 18 – 21 prior to November 4, 2008, new women voters register Democrat in greater proportions than do new men and as independents or Republicans in smaller proportions than do men (see Table 5).

TABLE 4
Oklahoma Registered Voters: Sex by Party Affiliation (percents)

	State Election Board Data June 2009					Oklahoma VAN June 2010				
	Party Affiliation					Party Affiliation				
Sex	Democrat	Independent	Republican	Total	(n)	Democrat	Independent	Republican	Total	(n)
Female	51.86	9.34	38.80	100	8274	51.80	9.18	39.02	100	865,864
Male	45.09	13.19	41.72	100	6779	46.10	11.00	42.90	100	740,866
Unknown						51.16	14.28	34.56	100	77,335
All	48.81	11.08	40.11	100	15053	49.26	10.21	40.52	100	1,684,065
$?^2$=	92.67	DF=2	p=	7.54E-21						

Source: Authors' calculations from Oklahoma State Election Board and Oklahoma VAN data.

TABLE 5
Oklahoma Party Affiliation by Age and Sex, November 2008 (percents)

	Democrat		Independent		Republican			Female		Male
Age	**Female**	**Male**	**Female**	**Male**	**Female**	**Male**	**Total**	**(n)**	**Total**	**(n)**
18-24	42.44	38.81	19.42	19.40	38.14	41.79	100	80,894	100	74,677
25-44	44.98	38.76	15.68	17.10	39.34	44.14	100	337,491	100	286,238
45-64	53.14	46.68	7.05	9.17	39.81	44.15	100	381,846	100	333,857
65-74	59.15	55.94	4.20	5.25	36.66	38.82	100	120,450	100	104,904
75+	65.53	62.76	2.00	2.86	32.47	34.38	100	123,075	100	85,956
Total	51.83	46.11	9.88	11.52	38.30	42.37	100	1,043,756	100	885,632
Persons registering between 1 January 2008 and 4 November 2008	45.11	39.80	17.04	19.19	37.85	41.01	100	98,358	100	88,342
Persons age 18-21 registered to vote prior to November 4, 2008	42.95	39.78	18.71	18.37	38.34	41.85	100	32,479	100	31,010

Source: Authors' calculations with Oklahoma VAN accessed December, 2009

Oklahoma's party affiliation gender gap is not simply due to women being older and men younger. Rather, mirroring national trends, there is a tendency drawing Oklahoma men and women in different political directions. Further, Oklahoma men are more likely to consider themselves politically independent than are women. Generally independents contribute less to political outcomes than partisans. They vote less and are less involved (Flanigan and Zingale, 1987). Our State Election Board data showed 73% of registered Democrats and 78% of registered Republicans voting November 4, 2008 but only 53% of registered independents.

Oklahoma Republican and independent voter registration has been increasing at the expense of Democrats. We can get an insight into the dynamics producing this change by looking at new registrations over time. Chart 3 shows in 1998 50.04% of new registrants were Democrats. By 2010 this had dropped to 35.46%. But Chart 4 also shows a drop in Republican registrations from 40.67% in 1998 to 37.33% in 2010, not as large as the Democratic drop, but a drop nevertheless. It is independents that have increased, from 9.29% of new registrants in 1998 to 27.21% in 2010 (Chart 4). If new registrants are not the source of Republican gains, the source must be those being purged from the rolls. While we do not have direct evidence we can note 65.53% of those 75 and older are Democrats. For every Republican in that age group that dies, two Democrats die.

EFFECT OF SEX ON VOTER TURNOUT

The U.S. Census reported about twelve percent more of the registered individuals voting than Oklahoma's voting records document. This is due to persons saying they voted when they did not. The U.S. Census also showed an insignificant .014 difference in Oklahoma male and female probabilities of voting (Table 2).

Our data tells a different story. Women, overall, have a 1.33% higher rate of voting than do men. But this overall difference has been dampened by the average age differences between males and females.

The gap between male and female voting rates in Oklahoma is largest for youngest voters (4.21%) and declines until the age group 65+, the only group in which a higher portion of registered men than women vote. Why do the oldest age group men outvote similar women? Moore, Kaitlyn Russell, Garrett Stone and Kelsey Wells, Oklahoma State



Source: Authors' calculations from Oklahoma VAN data accessed July, 2010.



Source: Authors' calculations from Oklahoma VAN data accessed July, 2010.



Source: Authors' calculations from Oklahoma VAN data accessed July, 2010.

The explanation is simple. In the group 65+ women, on average, are massively older than men. Voting rates decline greatly as persons enter their seventies. If we look only at persons under age 65, women's turnout is 2.69% higher than men's (see Table 6).

A problem with the Oklahoma VAN data presented in Table 6 is that it reflects the voter registration after non-voters were purged following the November 4, 2008 election. We cannot be confident that males and females of various ages had the same probability of being purged. We do have some additional evidence from Oklahoma's three most populous counties, however, prior to the purging (see Table 7).

Like the Oklahoma VAN data, in each age group registered women were more likely to vote than men, the only exception being the oldest age group. Again, the failure to follow the pattern for the oldest group is likely the greater age of the women than the men in that group and the fact that voting declines after age 67.

TABLE 6
November 4, 2008 vote by age and sex registered voters (percents)

	Voted			Did not Vote			Total			n		
Age	**Female**	**Male**	**Unk**	**Female**	**Male**	**Unk**	**Female**	**Male**	**Unk**	**Female**	**Male**	**Unk**
18 to 24	60.61	56.40	66.36	39.39	43.60	33.64	100	100	100	55,007	53,599	19,618
25 to 34	60.38	56.87	65.30	39.62	43.13	34.70	100	100	100	131,019	113,924	14,315
35 to 49	76.19	73.39	74.28	23.81	26.61	25.72	100	100	100	213,079	182,117	14,624
50 to 64	84.16	82.69	81.40	15.84	17.31	18.60	100	100	100	250,913	219,466	13,836
65+	80.04	83.59	76.95	19.96	16.41	23.05	100	100	100	215,190	171,197	14,821
Unknown	47.33	52.08	50.44	52.67	47.92	49.56	100	100	100	619	528	113
All	76.05	74.72	72.36	23.95	25.28	27.64	100	100	100	865,827	740,831	77,327
n	658,502	553,528	55,954	207,325	187,303	21,373	865827	740831	77327			
18 to 64	74.76	72.07	71.31	25.24	27.93	28.69	100	100	100	650,018	569,106	62,393

Source: Authors' calculations from Oklahoma VAN June, 2010.

TABLE 7

Oklahoma registered voters: sex by November 4, 2008 vote by age in Cleveland, Oklahoma & Tulsa counties (percents)

	Voted November 4, 2008 Election								
	No		Yes		Total		Sample Size		
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Significance of Male-Female Difference One Tail
Age									
18-27	42.72	44.04	57.28	55.96	100	100	154	123	0.4130
28-37	31.15	39.13	68.85	60.87	100	100	131	122	0.0919
38-47	21.24	26.15	78.76	73.85	100	100	137	114	0.1804
48-57	14.53	22.59	85.47	77.41	100	100	166	135	0.0355
58-67	13.42	17.16	86.58	82.84	100	100	128	89	0.2241
68+	19.96	18.82	80.04	81.18	100	100	126	91	0.4169

Source: Authors' calculations from sampled Oklahoma State Election Board data.

SEX AND THE COMPOSITION OF THE OKLAHOMA ELECTORATE

While behavioral differences between Oklahoma women and men were small, their differing relative portion in the several age groups produces a massive impact on the voting electorate. Women cast the majority of votes in the November 4, 2008 election. We estimate 150,991 more women, than men, voted. The difference is significant. Likewise, women make up a strong majority of both the Democrats and the Republicans while men are a majority of the independents. Again these differences are significant for each party group (see Table 8).

In November, 2008 the registered Oklahoma voter was a woman and she was a Democrat.

DISCUSSION

We have uncovered a paradox. A large majority of Oklahoma voters are women but Oklahoma continues to have a reputation of being politically, socially and economically unfriendly to women (Averill, 2009). Oklahoma is behind only South Carolina as the state with the lowest proportion of women in its legislature (11.4%) in 2009 (Center for the American Woman in Politics, 2009). The Center for Women in Government and Civil Society at SUNY Albany ranked Oklahoma 42nd of 50 states in appointing women to policy positions – this is up from 50th in 1997 (Center for Women in Government and Civil Society, 2008). Oklahoma incarcerates a greater percent of its female population — 143% higher than the national average — than any other state (Special Task Force for Women Incarcerated in Oklahoma, 2004). The National Women's Law Center and the Oregon Health and Science University ranked Oklahoma 47th in overall women's health (DeNoon, 2009). Oklahoma ranks 41st in the proportion of women living above the poverty level: 85.6% (Institute for Women's Policy Research, 2004). Oklahoma ranks 49th in uninsured women of childbearing age (15-44) and 45th in uninsured children under age 19 (March of Dimes, 2006). These are a sample of such rankings.

Why is this? There is a disconnect between Oklahomans' registration behavior and voting. Our analysis of the U.S. Census and the state's voter registration data alone cannot bridge this. There are

TABLE 8
Estimated composition of Oklahoma registered party groups and voting electorate November 4, 2008 by sex

	Voted		Party Affiliation		
Sex	**No**	**Yes**	**Democrat**	**Independent**	**Republican**
Female (est.)	393,063	806,826	630,326	113,533	457,125
Male (est.)	328,368	655,835	449,047	131,314	402,747
Total	721,431	1,462,661	1,079,373	244,847	859,872
Female - Male	64,695	150,991	181,279	(17,781)	54,378
Sample n	4,141	10,774	7,348	1,667	6,038
$?^2=$	57.4047		207.2500	8.7919	24.1481
df=	1		1	1	1
two tail p=	8.664E-27		5.468E-47	3.026E-03	8.920E-07

Source: Authors' calculations from State Election Board sampled data and State Election Board http://www.ok.gov/elections/documents/vr_1108.pdf

some possibilities, however. One is that Oklahoma women want things the way they are and use their voting power to ensure Oklahoma stays the way it is. However this is at variance with their consistent behavior when registering. A second possibility is that regardless of their registration, Oklahoma men are more monolithic in voting Republican and in support for fiscal and social conservative agendas while women are more divided, thereby yielding their numerical advantage. A third alternative is that Oklahoma has not offered sufficient candidates appealing to, and touching, Oklahoma's women and their interests. Women cannot vote their interests if there is nothing for them on the ballot. Evidence in favor of this last conclusion is the fact women, even newly eligible women, given a choice, continue to register as Democrats more than as Republicans while men, up to their mid-forties, are registering Republican more than Democrat. In any case, the two parties have an asymmetric appeal to Oklahoma's two sexes.

NOTES

[1] R. Darcy is Regents Professor Emeritus of Political Science and Statistics at Oklahoma StateUniversity. Cordon DeKock, Charles England, Evan Hadaway, Kyle Kassen and Phyllis McLemore were Oklahoma State University undergraduate students. Miguel Bekkevold, Jacob Carley, Katlin Gossett, Jennifer Harney, Cara Hendrix, Ross Henry, Gabrielle Tennery, Cody Turner, Michelle Houston, Chelsea Jensen, Cody Moore, Kaitlyn Russell, Garrett Stone and Kelsey Wells, Oklahoma State University students, helped gather, code and analyze the data reported here.

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WHERE DID THE POLITICAL PARTY MONEY GO?: A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE 2006 AND 2008 OKLAHOMA ELECTIONS

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With the decline of the economy and the implementation of term limits in Oklahoma, campaign money has become increasingly more important to state legislative candidates in Oklahoma. Featuring data from every state legislative contest in the 2006 and 2008 elections, this article seeks to explore the role of money in political campaigns. While many of the traditional expectations held (winners spent more losers, Senate candidates spent more than House candidates, and candidates spent more money overall), the spending of the political parties was the most drastic change in the 2006 and 2008 elections. Both parties, but especially the Democrats, experienced a significant decline in their campaign spending. With Republicans controlling both houses of the Oklahoma legislature, this does not bode well for Oklahoma Democrats in the future if this trend does not change.

In Oklahoma in 2008, the excitement was not with the presidential elections. State experts had long predicted that Republican John McCain would win Oklahoma's popular vote tally. Not only were they correct, but Oklahoma gave the largest vote percentage to John McCain of any

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2009 Oklahoma Political Science Association Meeting at East Central University, in Ada, Oklahoma, November 5-6, 2009.

state in the union. Rather, most of the excitement was with the state races. The Republicans won a majority of seats in the State Senate for the first time in history, picking up two seats for a 26 to 22 advantage. In the House Republicans gained four seats, guaranteeing a 61-40 margin and the largest number of seats in both houses held by Republicans in state history.

Yet, the McCain-Obama election was not without impact in Oklahoma. Prior to the election, state Democrats had been worried. Given McCain's predicted strong win in Oklahoma, Democrat Barack Obama chose not to campaign in the state. This had put state Democrats on edge, fearing that their voters would fail to turn out to vote as heavily not only for the presidential race, but for the state races as well. The Democrats knew that having Obama in Oklahoma could have helped their candidates since loyal Democrats would have been more likely to give money if Obama visited the state. Republicans, on the other hand, knew that the presidential race, with McCain and Sarah Palin at the top of the ballot, could only help their candidates, particularly in a "red" state like Oklahoma.

As it turns out, though, the results of these statewide elections should not have been a surprise. The last few elections have brought some ominous signs for Democrats. One of these signs has been campaign finance. A quick glance at House candidate average fundraising in the 2006 elections shows this. Oklahoma House Democrats raised only $30,573 while their House Republican colleagues raised $51,201. Even scarier for Democrats was the list of the top 10 political action committees, or PACs, in 2006. These are the PACs that gave the largest average donation to candidates, with a minimum of 20 donations. These are exactly the PACs that candidates covet, because with high average donations, candidates might be able to get by with fewer donors. Yet, a glance at this list reads like a Who's Who in the Republican Party; the Oklahoma State Republican Senatorial Committee was #1 with a $4,166 average donation, but was followed at #2 by the Republican State House Committee, at #4 by the Republican PAC to the Future, and at #6 by the Fund for a Conservative Future. All told, of the 10 PACs, seven gave either entirely or almost entirely to Republicans, two PACs split their donations between the two parties, and only one, LEGAL, gave exclusively to Democrats. Yet, in the 2008 elections this news got even worse for Democrats: LEGAL, the one PAC on the

2006 list that gave exclusively to Democrats donated only to two candidates in 2008.

This essay will examine these signs and others by looking at campaign finance in both the 2006 and 2008 elections. Unfortunately for Democrats, these 2006 election numbers should have made Democrats fear 2008, while sending Republicans running to the polls. But, 2008 was not much better for Democrats. Several days before the November 2008 election, the Republican state legislative candidates had raised $6 million or about $1.8 million more than their Democratic challengers (Killman and Hoberock 2008). This essay will also look at the trend of expensive campaigns to see if state-level candidates followed the trend of extensive campaign spending at the federal level, with candidates spending more money to win elections. This essay will also investigate the role of PACs. Who receives money from these PACs? Does it make a difference if it is a House or Senate candidate, a Democrat or Republican, or an incumbent or a challenger? This essay will answer these questions by exploring the role of money in Oklahoma elections. The data for this information was gathered candidate by candidate using Oklahoma Ethics Commission website information for races in 2006 and 2008.[1]

OVERALL SPENDING AND AVERAGES BY CANDIDATE

At first glance there seemed to be some remarkable similarities between the 2006 and 2008 Oklahoma legislative elections. For example, in 2008, a total of $10,347,694.64 was received by House legislative candidates while in 2006, that amount was $9,413,899.05 (Table 1). There are similar results for the Senate with $6,654,587.45 received in 2008, and $8,123,077.64 in 2006. Likewise, House candidates spent $9,229,494.73 in 2008 and $8,124,363.76 in 2006. For the Senate, those numbers were $5,482,185.17 in 2008 and $6,911,798.07 in 2006, respectively. With total PAC money, $4,772,273.00 was received in PAC money by state legislative candidates in 2006 and $5,004,641.01 in the 2008 elections.

These similarities continue when the location of the PAC money is considered (see Table 2). All PAC contributions were coded for whether they came from in-state or out-of-state contributors. This was done by

TABLE 1
Receipts, Expenditures, PAC $, PAC Donations by type of candidate -- 2008

Year	House Candidates' Receipts	House Candidates' Expenditures	Senate Candidates' Receipts	Senate Candidates' Expenditures	Total PAC $
2006	$9,413,899.05	$8,124,363.76	$8,123,077.64	$6,911,798.07	$4,772,273.00
2008	$10,347,694.64	$9,229,494.73	$6,654,587.45	$5,482,185.17	$5,004,641.01

TABLE 2
In or Out of State PAC Money in the 2006 and 2008 Legislative Elections

Year	Amount	IN or OUT	Count	Average	% by Amount	% Count
2008	$4,324,950	IN	4747	$911.09	86.4	81.1
2008	$679,691	OUT	1017	$667.82	13.6	18.9
2006	$4,771,725	IN	4989	$956.45	83.2	83.2
2006	$548,087	OUT	1011	$542.12	16.9	16.9

looking at the PAC's address, and not its name, as occasionally there are PACs that sound like they should be from Oklahoma (anything with "Sooner" in it, for example), but are actually based elsewhere, including Texas. The lion's share of out-of-state PAC money comes from Texas, which is not surprising considering the large number of oil and gas PACs on the list. There were 4,989 in-state contributions in the 2006 elections and 4,747 in 2008, accounting for 89.7% of the PAC money in 2006 and 86.4% in 2008. The average amount given by in-state PACs was $956.45 in 2006 and $911.09 in 2008. The out-of-state PACs were even more similar with 1,011 in 2006 for 10.3% of the donations, and 1,017 in 2008 for 13.6% of the donations. The average donation in 2006, though for out-of-state PACs was $542.12, while in 2008 it was $667.82. Thus, the average in-state donation went down slightly from the 2006 to 2008 elections, while the average out-of-state donation increased.

Typically, both House and Senate candidates would be expected to raise and spend more in the 2008 elections than they did in 2006 (Table 3). This matches the general trend for increased campaign finance spending every election year (Jacobson 2008). However, in Oklahoma, the results were a bit different with this being true for the House, but not the Senate. This was despite the fact that the House was considerably less competitive in 2008 than it was in the 2006 elections, and the races for Senate seats were actually more competitive in 2008 when the candidates raised and spent less.

One of the factors to consider in Oklahoma is the difference in political party spending. Until recently, Oklahomans traditionally voted for Democrats for state legislative seats and were more likely to vote for Republicans for congressional seats and for President (Harris 2009). In fact, no Democrat has won Oklahoma's presidential vote since 1964 (Hardt 2005). This explains why President Barack Obama, a Democrat, did not visit this state while campaigning for President in 2008. Yet, the trend of voting for Democrats in local elections has clearly changed, with Republicans holding now both the state House and the State Senate after the 2008 elections. Thus, it would be natural to expect that Republican candidates should receive more money than the Democrats. That certainly is the case. In 2006, the House Democratic candidates received only $30,573 on average while House Republicans received $51,201. In 2008, the difference between the two parties in the House

stayed about the same, although with slightly higher amounts as the Democrats received $36,110, while the Republicans received $57,083 on average. There are similar expenditures in the House with the Democrats spending $22,416 in 2006 ($30,584 in 2008) and the Republicans spending $45,673 ($52,593 in 2008).

Given the prestige of Senate seats and the fact that they are up every four years compared to two in the House, Senate candidates should raise and spend more than their House colleagues. This is similar to results at the federal level, where US Senate candidates have typically out-raised and spent their House counterparts about 7 to 1 (Jacobson 2008). The Oklahoma Senate candidates spent and raised more on average in 2008 than they did in 2006 (Table 3). Yet, here is where the story differs, with Oklahoma Senate Democrats doing much better than their Republican colleagues in 2006 and in 2008. The Senate Democrats for example raised $125,764 in 2006 and $173,042 in 2008 on average, while for Republicans it was only $86,470 and $120,242. With expenditures, Democrats spent $105,725 in 2006 and $137,909 in 2008, while only $75,517 in 2006 and $102,211 in 2008 for the Republicans on average.

Winner should also be expected to raise more money than the losers. Donors typically want to give money to a winning campaign, so that they will not waste their money. Any money given to a candidate tends to attract more money, just furthering the advantage for winning candidates (Gierzynski 2000). Many of these winners were either incumbents or open seat candidates, but not challengers. In fact, in the 2006 and 2008 elections only seven challengers were successful in defeating incumbents. Thus, not surprisingly most of the winners raised and spent more than their losing competitors. House winners raised $67,612 on average in the 2008 elections, while the losers only raised $24,597 (Table 4). This represents a 2.7 to 1 advantage for House winners over losers. This gap has actually increased since 2006 when it was only 2.5 to 1. The gap also exists with the House, with winners spending $60,245 while the losers only spent $22,207. This too is a 2.7 to 1 advantage for the winners. In the Senate, the gap fell from the 2006 to 2008 elections, although the winners still outspent the winners. In 2006, the winners outraised the losers 2.8 to 1 ($207,669 to $74,872). But in 2008, that gap was only 2.3 to 1 ($194,508 to $86,365 for the losers). Likewise, the winning Senate candidates spent more than their

TABLE 3
Partisan Differences – Receipts/Expenditures

	Democrats	Republicans	Independents
2008 House Receipts	$36,110	$57,083	$3,419
2006 House Receipts	$30,573	$51,201	$1,543
2008 House Expenditures	$30,584	$52,593	$3,184
2006 House Expenditures	$22,416	$45,673	$996
2008 Senate Receipts	$173,042	$120,242	
2006 Senate Receipts	$125,764	$86,470	
2008 Senate Expenditures	$137,909	$102,211	
2006 Senate Expenditures	$105,725	$75,517	

TABLE 4
Winners/Losers – Receipts and Expenditures

	Winners	Losers
2008 House Receipts	$67,612	$24,597
2006 House Receipts	$58,063	$22,924
2008 House Expenditures	$60,245	$22,207
2006 House Expenditures	$51,592	$22,054
2008 Senate Receipts	$194,508	$86,365
2006 Senate Receipts	$207,669	$74,872
2008 Senate Expenditures	$149,775	$82,069
2006 Senate Expenditures	$171,478	$69,477

losing colleagues in 2008 with a 1.8 to 1 advantage ($149,775 to $82,069), compared to 2.4 to 1 in the 2006 election ($171,478 to $69,477 for the losers).

In past Oklahoma elections, the incumbent has typically raised more than the challenger, with open seat candidates usually falling in between the two in terms of money raised (Gierzynski 2000). Oklahoma donors clearly considered incumbent candidates to be the safer bet in both the 2006 and 2008 elections (Table 5). House incumbents received $50,399 and $62,657 on average while their challengers only received $16,427 and $22,545, for a 2.8 to 1 difference in the 2008 elections, down from 3.1 in 2006. For House expenditures the tale is the same, with 2.5 to 1 difference in 2008 ($55,021 to $21,288). Similarly, Senate incumbents ($185,243 and spending $130,811) also received and spent more money than their challengers ($116,428 and $112,086). It is interesting to note, however, that the winner to loser gap narrows considerably for the Senate with only 1.6 to 1 for receipts, and 1.2 to 1 for expenditures. Senate races, though, tend to attract higher-quality challengers, both in experience and in fundraising than do House races so this may not be as much of a surprise as one might first think.

Open seat races, where no incumbent is running, are typically much more competitive than incumbent-challenger races. Given the advantages of incumbents, potential candidates will wait for an open seat to develop, so when it does there are usually a large number of candidates (Francis-Smith 2009). This has been particularly the case in Oklahoma which has been experiencing the impact of twelve-year term limits. While they were first enacted in 1990, they did not take effect for the legislators until 2004, and as a result there have been more open seat races in Oklahoma in recent years. For example, there were fourteen open seat races in the House in 2008 and eight in the Senate. Thus, open seat races should be competitive in terms of the money raised, with typically greater amounts than raised by the challenger candidates (Francis-Smith 2009). Open seat candidates raised and spent around $40-50,000 in 2006 and 2008, which is more than the $15-25,000 raised/spent by challengers but considerably less than the $45-62,000 raised/spent by incumbents (Table 5). One exception is House District seat 1, where Dennis Bailey (D) and Rusty Farley (R) raised only $21,944 *combined* prior to the election (Killman and Hoberock 2008). Yet the 2008 Senate races were more competitive, with Senate open seat

TABLE 5
Incumbents/Challengers/OS – Receipts/Expenditures

	Incumbents	Challengers	Open Seats
2008 House Receipts	$62,658	$22,545	$48,792
2006 House Receipts	$50,399	$16,427	$45,038
2008 House Expenditures	$55,021	$21,288	$44,233
2006 House Expenditures	$44,995	$15,362	$37,140
2008 Senate Receipts	$185,243	$116,428	$116,976
2006 Senate Receipts	$111,003	$59,818	$138,112
2008 Senate Expenditures	$130,811	$112,086	$107,556
2006 Senate Expenditures	$81,718	$53,974	$127,777

candidates raising $116,976 and spending $107,556 on average. This is actually down from the 2006 elections, with $138,112 raised and $127,777 spent.

TOP 10 PAC LISTS

Since it has been shown that Senate candidates raise more money than House candidates, it is also not a surprise to look at the top 10 recipients and spenders of campaign funds in 2006 and 2008 and find mostly Senate candidates on the list. In fact, in 2008 as Table 6 shows, only one House candidate made the list of the top 10 recipients, although two House candidates made the list for top 10 spenders. At the top of the list was Senate candidate Richard Lerblance who raised $583,469.70 for his Senate bid. Part of this money came from personal loans, over $137,500 in loans prior to the election (Killman and Hoberock 2008). The next four candidates were in the $400,000-$500,000 range with Senate candidates Nancy Riley, Thomas Adelson, Daniel Newberry, and James Edmund Halligan. The lone House candidate on the list was Douglas Gene Cox who raised $269,240.16. Lerblance and Riley competed against each other for the Senate District 37 seat. This race attracted considerable attention because Nancy Riley had switched her party registration from Republican to Democrat and the Senate was now evenly divided, with 24 Republicans and 24 Democrats. Thus, many felt that this race would decide majority party control. Newberry took advantage of PAC money in this race raising more than $344,000 from PACs, and defeated the incumbent Riley, winning 63 percent of the vote (Francis-Smith 2009).

It is interesting to note, however, that Lerblance's fundraising did not match the top recipient of 2006, Senate candidate Michael Burrage who raised $651,755. In that election year, only three candidates were $400,000+ fundraisers, compared to five in the 2008 elections. This does not mean though that the candidates spent all that money. In fact, looking at the top 10 list of spenders, only four were in the $400,000+ range, with once again Senate candidate Richard Lerblance getting the top slot, spending $573,141. Yet, five of the top ten candidates only spent in the $200,000-$300,000 range. Among these spenders were Douglas Gene Cox and Todd Mark Thomsen, both House candidates, with $258,030 and $237,698 respectively. In the 2006 elections, the top spender was once again Michael Burrage who spent $639,493.

TABLE 6
Top 10 Recipients & Spenders

2008 Candidates -- Recipients	Amount
1. Lerblance, Richard for Senate	$583,470
2. Riley, Nancy for Senate	$447,924
3. Adelson, Thomas for Senate	$446,551
4. Newberry, Daniel for Senate	$446,364
5. Halligan, James Edmund for Senate	$440,942
6. Paddack, Susan for Senate	$372,560
7. Erwin, Keith for Senate	$349,635
8. Barrington, Don for Senate	$338,746
9. Nichols, Jonathan E. for Senate	$278,166
10. Cox, Douglas for Rep	$269,240

2006 Candidates--Recipients	Amount
1. Burrage, Michael for Senate	$651,755
2. Cargill, Lance for House	$445,675
3. Kerr, Robbie C. for Senate	$419,043
4. Bingman, J. Brian for Senate	$399,913
5. Ivester, Thomas for Senate	$384,693
6. Sparks, John Hunt for Senate	$374,359
7. Schulz, Mike for Senate	$369,025
8. Branan, Cliff for Senate	$325,137
9. Potts, Patricia J. for Senate	$293,647
10. Easley, Mary L. for Senate	$273,106

2008 Candidates -- Spenders	Amount
1. Lerblance, Richard for Senate	$573,141
2. Riley, Nancy for Senate	$446,488
3. Halligan, James Edmund for Senate	$430,756
4. Newberry, Daniel for Senate	$426,250
5. Erwin, Keith for Senate	$326,902
6. Adelson, Thomas for Senate	$296,242
7. Barrington, Don for Senate	$294,641
8. Cox, Douglas for Rep	$258,030
9. Nichols, Jonathan E. for Senate	$254,353
10. Thomsen, Todd Mark	$237,698

2006 Candidates--Spenders	Amount
1. Burrage, Michael for Senate	$639,493
2. Cargill, Lance for House	$423,357
3. Kerr, Robbie C. for Senate	$406,109
4. Bingman, J. Brian for Senate	$398,178
5. Ivester, Thomas for Senate	$369,678
6. Schulz, Mike for Senate	$361,149
7. Sparks, John Hunt for Senate	$336,505
8. Branan, Cliff for Senate	$329,353
9. Potts, Patricia J. for Senate	$293,533
10. Easley, Mary L. for Senate	$254,477

Another way to examine the top fundraisers is to look at the top 10 PAC recipients of the 2006 and 2008 elections (Table 7). Once again, there are not many similarities on these lists because many of the top PAC recipients were Senate candidates and they run only every four years. These amounts ranged from $228,169 for Daniel Newberry (#4 on Top 10 recipient list) to $107,000 for Jonathan Nichols (#9 on the Top 10 recipient list). Two House candidates were on this list, Todd Thomsen who raised $118,200 in PAC money and Guy Liebmann who raised $107,311 in PAC money. Somewhat surprisingly, the top recipient of overall money in 2008, Senate candidate Richard Lerblance, was not on the Top 10 PAC recipient list.

One can also look at who received the largest number of PAC contributions in the 2006 and 2008. Analyzing the amount of PAC contribution list (Table 7) and the number of PAC contribution list (Table 8), it is not a surprise to see a strong similarity between these lists. After all, a candidate who receives the most amount of PAC money probably will be a strong candidate for the largest number of contributions. Thus, in the 2006 and 2008 elections, there were six repeat players in 2006 and seven repeats in 2008. These lists are remarkably alike with the exception of Senate candidate Don Barrington who was able to get 166 PAC contributions, the most of any candidate in the two elections. One difference does appear between the 2006 and 2008 elections, however. The 2008 election is dominated by Senate candidates, with only one House candidate, Mike Thomson, on the list. Yet the 2006 elections seemed to buck the trend as four House candidates were on this list: Cargill, Peters, Worthen, and Morgan.[2]

Up to this point, there have been more similarities than differences with the 2006 and 2008 elections. The amount of fundraising and the total amount of PAC money raised were about the same. Moreover, most of the expectations held for both elections: Senate candidates raised and spent more than House candidates, Republicans generally outraised and spent the Democrats, particularly in the House, and the winners outraised and spent the losers (Jacobson 2008). There were numerous changes in the Top 10 lists of fundraisers, but much of that can be explained by the high number of Senate candidates on each list and the fact that they run for four-year terms.

Yet when one looks at the top 10 PAC lists, one can see clear differences in these two elections. As stated previously, the top 10

TABLE 7
Top 10 PAC $ Recipients

2008 Candidates	PAC Amount	2006 Candidates	PAC Amount
1. Newberry, Daniel	$228,169	1. Schulz, Mike	$183,450
2. Barrington, Don	$191,272	2. Bingman, Brian	$174,000
3. Laster, Charlie M.	$150,532	3. Shaffer, Ami	$122,725
4. Paddack, Susan	$125,542	4. Cargill, Lance	$120,850
5. Riley, Nancy	$119,550	5. Wofford, Mark	$119,800
6. Thomsen, Todd Mark	$118,200	6. Easley, Mary	$112,700
7. Halligan, James Edmund	$117,150	7. Balkman, Thad	$108,403
8. Adelson, Thomas	$112,595	8. Lawler, Daisy	$106,850
9. Liebmann, Guy H. for House	$107,311	9. Ivester, Thomas	$104,200
10. Nichols, Jonathan E. for Senate	$107,000	10. Branan, Cliff	$101,300

TABLE 8
Top 10 PAC Recipients for # of Donations

2008 PACs	2008 Avg	2006 PACs	2006 Avg
1. Barrington, Don	166	1. Cargill, Lance	134
2. Newberry, Daniel	137	2. Bingman, Brian	133
3. Laster, Charles	136	4. Branan, Cliff	113
4. Lerblance, Richard	123	4. Peters, Ron	113
5. Adelson, Thomas	111	5. Worthen, Trebor	112
6. Jolley, Clark	106	6. Lawler, Daisy	111
7. Nichols, Jonathan	105	7. Schulz, Mike	105
8. Thompson, Mike	100	8. Easley, Mary	101
9. Paddack, Susan	92	9. Morgan, Danny	99
10. Riley, Nancy	88	10. Sweeden, Joe	96

PAC donation average list (with a minimum of 20 donations) was dominated by the Republicans in 2006 (Table 9). Four of the top six PACs that gave the highest average donation were Republican Party PACs or Republican ideological PACs. These include the Oklahoma State Republican Committee, the Oklahoma Republican State House Committee, the Republican PAC to the Future, and the Fund for the Conservative Future. In fact, arguably only one PAC on the "average" list gave mostly to Democrats, LEGAL, or a fund for attorneys to give money. The average donations for the Republican groups ranged from $2,479 to $4,176 which can be a lot of money for Oklahoma candidates considering that the maximum legal donation for a PAC is $5,000. As one lobbyist said, "If you really want to make a difference in races these days, you have to give in the $5,000 range" (Francis-Smith 2009).

Yet, in looking at 2008, it is almost an entirely different list. The only similar organization was the Energy for Oklahomans PAC which was 7th in 2006, but 3rd in 2008. All the other PACs were different, with only one ideological PAC making the list, Gro-PAC Growing Rural Oklahomans which gives to Democrats. Thus, no Republican Party or Republican ideological PACs made the list. Most PACs on the top 20 list for 2008 were business-related PACs or professional PACs such as the Oklahoma City Business Council or the Associated Anesthesiologists PAC. Given the poor economy in 2008, the average PAC donation decreased, with a range of $1,789 to $4,166 for 2006, but $1,349 to $3,475 for 2008.

The most notable feature on this list was the almost complete absence of party/ideological PACs. So where did they go? They still gave money in the 2008 elections, but just not as much. As an example, the two top PACs in the Democratic Party in terms of the number of contributions were both county PACs, from Cleveland and Canadian counties. But they gave only six contributions each, and they averaged between $300-400, so they were not eligible for the list. What about the Democratic Party of Oklahoma, one might ask? Well, it gave only five contributions for a total of $949.99, with an average of $189.99 per candidate. The Republicans fared better with the Oklahoma Republican Party giving fifteen contributions with an average contribution of $2133.33, and a total of $32,000. But again, these totals were not sufficient to make the list. Three Senate Republican PACs, the Republican Senate Victory PAC, the Oklahoma State Republican Senatorial Committee,

TABLE 9
Top 10 – Average (but minimum of 20 donations)

2008 PACs	2008 Avg	2006 PACs	2006 Avg
1. Oklahoma City Business Council	$3,475	1. OK State Republican Sen Committee	$4,166
2. Gro-PAC Growing Rural Oklahoma	$2,935	2. Repub State House Committee	$3,576
3. Energy for Oklahomans PAC	$2,321	3. Central OK Business Alliance	$2,981
4. Associated Anesthesiologists PAC	$2,295	4. Republican PAC to the Future	$2,785
5. Devon Energy Corporation Oklahoma PAC	$2,097	5. LEGAL	$2,724
6. Realtors PAC of Oklahoma	$1,860	6. Fund for a Conservative Future	$2,479
7. Okla Society of Anesthesiologists PAC	$1,696	7. Energy for Oklahomans	$2,017
8. Oklahoma Public Employees Association PAC	$1,471	8. Working Oklahomans Alliance	$1,964
9. Oklahoma Medical PAC (OMPAC)	$1,462	9. Sooner Fund PAC	$1,934
10. Okla Independent Energy PAC (OKIE PAC)	$1,349	10. Center for Legislative Excellence	$1,789

and the Senate Opportunity PAC, if combined would have topped the list, because together they gave 24 contributions at just over $104,000, with an average contribution of $4,306. But this list since the 2000 elections has treated each named PAC separately, and since the 2000 elections typically 2-4 Republican Party or ideological PACs have made the list, but not for the 2008 elections (Hardt 2006).

Given the above results, it is not a surprise that there are also no ideological or party PACs on the 2008 top 10 total PAC donation list, even though three Republican Party PACs were there in 2006 (Oklahoma State Republican Senatorial Committee, Republican State House Committee, and the Republican Media Fund) as shown in Table 10. In 2008, once again, business groups, energy organizations, and professional groups topped the list. The largest contributor of PAC money in the 2008 elections was the Energy for Oklahomans PAC ($181,000). The second and third largest were the Realtors PAC and Oklahoma Independent Energy PAC ($143,200 and $122,750 respectively). These total amounts are actually higher than those for the 2006 elections, with Chesapeake Energy Corporation topping that list at only $139,250.

The one top 10 PAC list where there is some similarity is the top 10 number of donation list (Table 11). This is probably not a surprise. Many of these PACs give small donations to a large number of candidates, hoping to influence public policy in Oklahoma. With the exception of the Oklahoma Independent Energy PAC (OKIE PAC), the average contribution of these PACs is under $1000, and it took a minimum of 91 donations to make this list for the 2008 elections. In fact, four of the top five PACS were the same in the 2006 and 2008 elections. The Oklahoma Optometric PAC and SURE (Speak Up for Rural Electrification) were #1 and #2 respectively in both the 2006 and 2008 elections, with the Oklahoma Optometric PAC giving a high of 167 donations in 2006, and 188 in 2008. The other two similar PACS were the Oklahoma Osteopathic PAC (#4 in 2006, #3 in 2008), and the OK Ag Fund (#3 in 2006, #5 in 2008).

In considering these top 10 PAC lists, Indian organizations were not included. This is because under Oklahoma Ethics Commission guidelines, Indian organizations are not treated as committees (on a schedule A1 form); rather, they are considered as separate contributors. Thus accounting for Indian donations in Oklahoma is more difficult, because one needs to know all of the possible Indian tribe names in

TABLE 10
Top 10 – Amount of PAC Donations

2008 PACs	2008 Amt	2006 PACs	2006 Amt
1. Energy for Oklahomans PAC	$181,000	1. Chesapeake Energy Corporation	$139,250
2. Realtors PAC of Oklahoma	$143,200	2. Center for Legislative Excellence	$130,450
3. Okla Independent Energy PAC (OKIE PAC)	$122,750	3. Oklahoma Independent Energy PAC	$128,100
4. Oklahoma Medical PAC (OMPAC)	$115,500	4. OK Ag Fund	$100,200
5. OK Ag Fund	$104,000	5. Okla State Rep Sen Comm	$100,000
6. Chiropractic PAC	$94,050	6. Working Oklahomans Alliance PAC	$96,250
7. Oklahoma Public Employees Assoc PAC	$82,350	7. Realtors PAC of Oklahoma	$86,600
8. Gro-PAC, Growing Rural Oklahoma PAC	$79,250	8. Repub State House Comm	$82,250
9. Okla Society of Anesthesiologists PAC	$78,000	9. Central Oklahoma Business Alliance	$80,500
10. Cox Communications PAC Fund	$77,750	11. LEGAL	$79,000
		11. Republican Media Fund	$79,000

TABLE 11
Top 10 in # of Donations

2008 PACs	#	2006 PACs	#
1. Okla Optometric PAC	188	1. Okla Optometric PAC	167
2. SURE – Speak Up for Rural Electrification	137	2. SURE	117
3. Oklahoma Osteopathic PAC	132	3. OK Ag Fund	112
4. American Electric Power Comm for Responsible Government (AEPPAC)	125	4. Oklahoma Osteopathic PAC	106
5. OK Ag Fund	110	5. Oklahoma Dental PAC	97
6. Chiropractic PAC	109	6. Okla Assn of Career & Tech	94
7. Farmers Employees and Agent PAC (FEAPAC)	108	7. ConocoPhillips SPIRITPAC	88
8. Thoroughbred PAC	104	8. Okla Bankers	87
9. Cox Communications Oklahoma PAC Fund	91	9. Okla Society of CPAs	86
9. Okla Independent Energy PAC (OKIE PAC)	91	10. Okla Independent Energy PAC	82

Oklahoma to look up Indian donations, using the Advanced Contributor List. Another complicating factor is that these contributions can be listed in multiple ways, making it very difficult to tell exactly how much is given by each tribe. In addition to the advanced contributor list, one can look at Indian donations by looking at the employer or even by the tribe's address (even though the tribe may/may not be listed as an employer).

Three tribes in Oklahoma gave more than others in the 2006 and 2008 elections: the Chickasaw Nation, the Cherokee Nation, and the Choctaw Nation. This is not a surprise because if anyone has ever watched TV in Oklahoma he/she is sure to have seen a TV commercial for one of these three tribes. The Cherokee Nation would in fact have reached the #1 position on two of the top 10 PAC lists in 2008. It had the highest total PAC donations ($218,900), and the highest average PAC donation ($3,980). It would not have made the third list because it gave only 55 contributions in 2008. Choctaw Nation, on the other hand, would have been 9th on the top 10 average PAC donation list, giving $1,684.52 on average in 2008. All total in the 2008 elections, there were 9 Indian tribes or organizations that gave a total of 250 contributions, averaging $1736.21 to state legislative candidates. The Chickasaw Nation would have also made these lists, although its donations are woefully undercounted if looking only at the advanced contributor search. At first glance the total amount of money as shown under the advanced contributor search for Indian organizations, $434.051.60, might suggest that Indian organizations might have a role in actually deciding elections. But the reality is actually very different, because while the amount of money is substantial, often Indian organizations will "hedge their bets" by giving equal amounts to both candidates in a state legislative race. Such was the case in the 2008 House District 25 race, in which the Chickasaw Nation gave the maximum $5000 contribution to three candidates: two candidates in the Democratic primary (Gary Starns and Darrel Nemecek) and to Todd Thomsen, the Republican Incumbent.

LOOKING AT THE PAC DONATIONS CODED BY CATEGORY

Two other interesting PAC lists to look at for the 2006 and 2008 elections can be created by arranging the PACs first by the number of

contributions they gave and then by the size of the contribution. When this is done, some obvious similarities emerge. First, looking at the number of contribution list (Table 12), 75-76% of PACs in Oklahoma in 2006 and 2008, gave less than 20 contributions. Thus, while there is much talk about powerful special interests, Oklahoma PACs still give to relatively few candidates. This trend was also evident in the 2000, 2002, and 2004 elections (Hardt 2006). Moreover, these PACs do not necessarily give large amounts of contributions as seen in size of the contribution list (Table 13). The top PAC in the 2008 legislative elections only gave $181,100 (Energy for Oklahomans PAC) and there were only six that gave $100,000+ in the 2008 elections, with five in the 2006 elections. In fact, in both elections, 65% of the PACs gave less than $10,000 each.

Once the PAC information was collected for every legislative candidate in the 2006 and 2008 elections, each PAC contribution was then coded by category, such as agriculture, education, or telecommunications. Then the PAC contributions were sorted by category, thus allowing the opportunity to see which type of PAC is most active (Table 14). In both the 2006 and 2008 elections health PACs were the #1 contributors. In the 2008 elections, health PACs such as Oklahoma Hospital Association (OHA) and the Okla Medical PAC gave $874,247.43, the most of any type of PAC. Moreover, the health PACs also gave 531 more contributions than the second largest type of PAC, oil and gas PACs, for a total of 1246 contributions.

The biggest surprise, however, was the decline of the political parties. Republican Party PACs were the #4 category of PAC in 2006, giving $501,518.00 in 256 contributions, with an average of $1,960.61 per candidate and accounting for 14.9% of the contributions. Yet in 2008, the Republicans ranked 10th among all types of PACs, with a measly 3.89% of the contributions, and giving $203,395.45 and an average of $1,937.09 per candidate with only 105 contributions. Thus, although the average amount is the same, some Republican candidates probably were not helped in the 2008 elections, when they might have been during the 2006 elections. This might have been okay if the Republicans had received some "make-up" money in 2008 from another Republican-oriented source, such as an ideological PAC. However, this was not the case. Compared to 2006, Republican ideological PACs did give more money, $313,950 (2008) compared to $219,990 (2006), with a

TABLE 12
# of Contributions – PACS

	2008 Elections	**2006 Elections**
1-2	10	107
3-9	111	106
10-19	42	63
20-50	53	58
51-99	22	30
100+	8	5

TABLE 13
Total Amount Donated by PACs

	2008 Elections	2006 Elections
$100,000+	6	5
$250,000-$99,999	16	19
$25,000-$49,999	27	29
$15,000-$24,999	42	42
$10,000-$14,999	28	32
$5,000-$9,999	55	65
$1,000-$4,999	113	59
$0-$999	57	87

TABLE 14
2006 vs 2008 Elections -- Type of PAC -- Which Ones Give the Most and Least?

	2006 Elections				2008 Elections			
TYPE OF PAC	**SUM**	**%**	**#**	**AVG**	**Sum**	**%**	**#**	**AVG**
AGRICULTURE	$201,735.00	4.39	327	$616.93	$284,675.00	6.42	471	$604.41
BANKING	$234,250.00	5.09	458	$511.46	$199,053.84	4.49	376	$529.40
BUSINESS	$387,918.44	8.44	455	$852.57	$338,870.00	7.64	359	$943.93
CONSTRUCTION	$76,750.00	1.67	140	$548.21	$98,950.00	2.23	110	$899.55
EDUCATION	$97,930.00	2.13	279	$351.00	$84,950.00	1.92	232	$366.16
ENVIRONMENT	$4,200.00	0.09	11	$381.82	$3,100.00	0.07	8	$387.50
GUNS	$17,210.00	0.37	69	$249.42	$2,450.00	0.06	7	$350.00
HEALTH	$747,434.00	16.25	1,187	$629.68	$874,247.43	19.72	1246	$701.64
IDEOLOGY- R	$219,990.00	4.78	142	$2,056.27	$313,950.00	7.08	129	$2,433.72
IDEOLOGY-D	$93,128.00	2.03	60	$1,552.14	$106,049.99	2.39	44	$2,410.23
INSURANCE	$86,650.00	1.88	145	$597.59	$114,850.00	2.59	207	$554.83
LABOR	$222,625.00	4.84	315	$706.75	$139,899.99	3.16	144	$971.53
OIL AND GAS	$587,275.00	12.77	706	$831.83	$718,350.16	16.20	714	$1,006.09
OTHER	$519,433.34	11.30	297	$1,748.93	$205,600.00	4.64	143	$1,437.76
PARTY -- REPUBS	$501,918.00	10.91	256	$1,960.61	$203,395.46	4.59	105	$1,937.10
PARTY -- DEMS	$73,462.64	1.60	96	$765.24	$23,199.99	0.52	52	$446.15
PROFESSIONAL	$303,550.00	6.60	438	$693.04	$292,965.55	6.61	231	$1,268.25
PUB EMPLOYEE	$9,550.00	0.21	16	$596.88	$88,200.00	1.99	60	$1,470.00
SENIOR	$11,650.00	0.25	33	$353.03	$2,000.00	0.05	2	$1,000.00
TELECOMM	$79,450.00	1.73	167	$475.75	$134,900.00	3.04	196	$688.27
TOBACCO	$2,500.00	0.05	11	$227.27	$13,360.00	0.30	33	$404.85
TRANSPORTATION	$67,800.00	1.47	131	$517.56	$69,850.00	1.58	133	$525.19
UTILITIES	$52,150.00	1.13	222	$234.91	$120,950.00	2.73	137	$882.85

slightly higher average contribution of $2433.72, compared to $2,056.27 in 2006. Yet, this "little bit" more money cannot make up for the fact that Republican Party spent almost $300,000 less on its candidates in 2008, than it did in 2006.[3]

With the Democratic Party, the story is similar, except the numbers were even more dismal. The Democratic Party spent only $73,462.64 on 96 candidates in the 2006 elections, for an average contribution of $765.24. Thus, the Democrats were outspent by the Republicans 6.8 to 1, with more than double the average contribution. Then, in the 2008 elections, the Republicans spent $203,295.46 on their candidates while the Democrats only spent $23,199.99 for an 8.8 to 1 difference. The average contribution per candidate also decreased for the Democrats, spending only $446.15, while the Republicans spent $1,937.10. Unfortunately for the Democratic Party, they did not make up for that deficit in ideological PAC money, with the ideological Republican PACs outspending the ideological Democrat PACs 3:1 in 2008.

Another large source of PAC funds in both the 2006 and 2008 elections was not surprisingly oil and gas money. Oil and gas PACs were #2 for both elections, giving $718,350.16 in 2008 to 714 candidates for an average of $1,006.09. Oil and gas PACs along with a few other PACs (insurance PACs, public employee PACs, telecommunications PACs, and utility PACs) are the anomalies; they are the few types of PACs where more money was spent in the 2008 elections than in 2006. As an example, utility PACs more than doubled their donations in the 2006 elections for 2008, going from $52,150 to $120,950. This allowed utility PACs to increase their average per candidate from $234.91 in 2006 to $882.85 in the 2008 elections.

DIFFERENCES IN DONATING MONEY BY TYPE OF CANDIDATE

THE POLITICAL PARTIES

The PAC money given in the 2006 and 2008 elections was compared by party (Table 15). In previous Oklahoma elections, certain types of PACs were attracted to just Democratic candidates, including education PACs, labor PACs, Democratic Party/ideological PACs, and fire PACs. Similarly, Republicans received more of their money from banking, business, insurance, and Republican Party/ideological PACs.

Moreover, some Oklahoma PACs (agriculture, oil and gas, telecommunications and utility PACs) have been party neutral – giving to both sides to ensure that the PACs are represented no matter which party wins (Hardt 2006).

One fact is obvious after a careful glance at the table for both elections by type of party (Table 15). Especially in 2008, with almost every type of PAC, the Republicans received more, both in total amounts, and in the amount of contributions. This was true in the 2008 elections for 14 of the 22 types of PACs, including agriculture, banking, business, health, transportation, telecommunications, and many others. Two glaring examples of this are with the health and oil and gas PACs. With the health PACs the Democrats received only 390 contributions for a total of $244,689.00, while the Republicans got 856 contributions for a total of $692,558.53. With the oil and gas PACs, the Republicans again came out the winners receiving 312 more contributions (513 to 201) and over $200,000 more ($329,750 to $108,550) in the 2008 elections.

Yet for many of these 14 types of PACs where Republicans received both more money overall and more contributions, they often managed to get about the same amount on average as did the Democrats. Telecommunications PACs, for example, gave $682.26 to Democrats on average and $691.04 to Republicans in the 2008 elections. Utilities PACs reacted the same way, giving $326.45 to Democrats and $381.41 to Republicans. These overall averages might give the impression that the utilities were "hedging their bets" by giving to both parties. In reality, however, the utilities mostly gave to incumbents in 2008, regardless of party. One notable exception to this was Senate seat 37 featuring Daniel Newberry (R) and Nancy Riley (D) where AEPPAC (American Electric Power) and SURE (Speak Up for Rural Electrification) each gave almost the same amounts to the two candidates.

Some PACs besides the Democratic Party/ideological PACs gave substantially more to Democrats, but they are not very many. In both the 2006 and 2008 elections, construction, education, environment, fire, and labor PACs all gave more to Democrats than they did Republicans. The case of labor is interesting because as expected Democrats received more donations in 2008 (136 to 8), and also a larger overall amount ($121,199.99 to $18.700), yet the eight Republican contributions from labor were obviously substantial ones because the average per Democrat was $891.18, while a Republican received $2,227.50. This is a marked

change from the 2006 elections, when labor PACs averaged $725.00 per Republican candidate.

In addition to the party/ideological PACs, some PACs clearly changed their spending patterns from the 2006 to the 2008 elections. Perhaps because of the poor national economy in 2008, several PACs reduced their donations, especially those from nationally oriented PACs. Gun PACs, for example, gave 136 contributions for a total of $30,950 in 2006, but only 4 contributions for a total of $1,150 in 2008. Tobacco PACs also substantially altered their donations, with $2,562.50 on average to Democrats in the 2006 elections, but $358.23 for 2008. The 2008 Republicans also lost tobacco money, with only $415.19 per candidate, but $2,050 in 2006. Some PACs that were more local in nature actually increased their contributions from the 2006 to the 2008 elections. These included construction PACs who gave more on average to Republicans, Democratic ideological PACs which gave more on average as well as professional and state employee PACs which both gave more to Democrats and Republicans. Professional PACs are a notable example, donating $993.33 and $627.28 to Democrats and Republicans respectively in the 2006 elections, but giving $1,513.24 and $1,074.54 for 2008.

WINNERS VERSUS LOSERS

In previous elections in Oklahoma, PACs were more likely to donate to winners, rather than losers. Thus, winning candidates should receive a larger number of contributions and more money overall (see Table 16). However, the average donations for losers are sometimes higher than those for winners (Hardt 2006). This can happen for several reasons: a) the PAC mistakenly thought that the candidate had a chance to win; b) the PAC thought the candidate would lose but was still hopeful that a big donation might make a difference; c) the PAC had given to both candidates, hoping to "hedge its bets." Of the 24 types of PACs in the 2006 and 2008 elections, only 4 gave more overall money to losers in the 2008 elections (fire, ideology-Democrats, labor, and the Democratic Party), and only one did in the 2006 elections (the Democratic Party). All of these PACs give mostly (or entirely) to Democrats. During the last few years, the Democrats were scared that they would lose control of the Oklahoma legislature and in the 2008 elections they finally did. Thus, these PACs may have been trying to stem the tide by giving to some weaker Democratic candidates, hoping they would prevail.

TABLE 15
2008 PAC Donations by type of PAC and by Party

2008 Elections

	Democrats			Republicans		
Type	#	Amount	Average	#	Amount	Average
Agriculture	190	$117,700.00	$619.47	281	$166,975.00	$594.22
Banking	112	$52,651.12	$470.10	264	$146,402.72	$554.56
Business	108	$102,350.00	$947.69	251	$236,520.00	$942.31
Construction	40	$55,100.00	$1,377.50	70	$43,850.00	$626.43
Education	140	$56,900.00	$406.43	92	$28,050.00	$304.89
Environment	8	$3,100.00	$387.50			
Fire	132	$79,850.00	$604.92	25	$19,800.00	$792.00
Guns	4	$1,150.00	$287.50	3	$1,300.00	$433.33
Health	390	$244,689.00	$627.41	856	$692,558.43	$735.47
Ideology	44	$106,049.99	$2,410.23	129	$313,950.00	$2,433.72
Insurance	65	$33,650.00	$517.69	142	$81,200.00	$571.83
Labor	136	$121,199.99	$891.18	8	$18,700.00	$2,337.50
Oil and Gas	201	$108,550.00	$540.05	513	$329,750.00	$642.79
Other	36	$64,350.00	$1,787.50	110	$142,750.00	$1,297.73
Party all	52	$24,099.99	$463.46	105	$202,495.46	$1,928.53
Professional	102	$154,350.00	$1,513.24	129	$138,615.55	$1,074.54
Senior				2	$2,000.00	$1,000.00
State Employees	31	$38,250.00	$1,233.87	29	$49,950.00	$1,722.41
Telecommunications	62	$42,300.00	$682.26	134	$92,600.00	$691.04
Tobacco	6	$2,150.00	$358.23	27	$11,210.00	$415.19
Transportation	45	$17,800.00	$395.56	88	$52,050.00	$591.48
Utilities	138	$45,050.00	$326.45	199	$75,900.00	$381.41

2006 Elections

	Democrats			Republicans		
Type	#	Amount	Average	#	Amount	Average
Agriculture	163	$83,325.00	$511.20	164	$118,410.00	$722.01
Banking	165	$81,450.00	$493.64	293	$152,800.00	$521.50
Business	168	$103,170.00	$614.11	287	$284,748.00	$992.15
Construction	84	$46,700.00	$555.95	56	$30,050.00	$536.61
Education	204	$76,360.00	$374.31	75	$21,570.00	$287.60
Environment	11	$4,200.00	$381.82	0		
Fire	14	$67,850.00	$498.90	14	$5,550.00	$396.43
Guns	136	$30,950.00	$483.59	5	$1,200.00	$240.00
Health	64	$228,934.00	$495.53	724	$518,250.00	$715.81
Ideology	462	$93,128.00	$1,552.14	142	$219,990.00	$2,056.27
Insurance	60	$16,550.00	$424.36	106	$70,100.00	$661.32
Labor	39	$213,925.00	$706.90	12	$8,700.00	$725.00
Oil and Gas	273	$207,725.00	$760.90	433	$379,550.00	$876.56
Other	151	$247,583.00	$1,639.62	131	$226,450.00	$1,728.63
Party all	96	$73,462.00	$765.24	256	$501,618.00	$1,959.45
Professional	135	$134,100.00	$993.33	153	$96,050.00	$627.78
Senior	5	$1,800.00	$360.00	11	$7,750.00	$704.55
State Employees	21	$16,250.00	$773.81	12	$7,100.00	$591.67
Telecommunications	54	$22,650.00	$419.44	113	$56,800.00	$502.65
Tobacco	4	$10,250.00	$2,562.50	5	$10,250.00	$2,050.00
Transportation	58	$21,400.00	$368.97	73	$76,400.00	$1,046.58
Utilities	111	$34,550.00	$311.26	111	$37,600.00	$338.74

TABLE 16

2006 and 2008 Election PAC Donations to OK Legislative Candidates divided by Winner and Loser

2008 Elections

	Winners			Losers		
Type	Count	Total	Average	Count	Total	Average
Agriculture	423	$234,825.00	$555.14	48	$49,850.00	$1,038.54
Banking	319	$161,553.84	$506.44	57	$37,500.00	$657.89
Business	306	$250,870.00	$819.84	53	$88,000.00	$1,660.38
Construction	87	$53,500.00	$614.94	23	$45,450.00	$1,976.09
Education	199	$66,800.00	$335.68	33	$18,150.00	$550.00
Environment	6	$2,400.00	$400.00	2	$700.00	$350.00
Fire	101	$48,900.00	$481.16	56	$50,750.00	$906.25
Guns	5	$2,150.00	$430.00	2	$300.00	$150.00
Health	1118	$786,558.16	$703.54	128	$87,689.27	$685.07
Ideology – Democrat	5	$11,000.00	$2,200.00	39	$90,549.99	$2,321.79
Ideology – Republican	109	$253,200.00	$2,327.52	20	$60,250.00	$3,012.50
Insurance	179	$93,000.00	$519.55	28	$21,850.00	$780.36
Labor	79	$62,350.00	$789.24	65	$77,549.99	$1,193.08
Oil and Gas	628	$314,400.00	$500.00	86	$124,300.00	$1,445.35
Other	110	$134,500.00	$1,222.73	36	$72,600.00	$2,016.67
Party – Democrat	6	$5,450.00	$908.33	47	$18,249.99	$388.30
Party – Republican	82	$160,204.46	$1,953.71	22	$42,691.00	$1,940.50
Professional	196	$240,915.55	$1,229.16	35	$52,050.00	$1,487.14
Public Employees	43	$63,350.00	$1,473.26	17	$24,850.00	$1,461.76
Senior	2	$2,000.00	$1,000.00			
Telecommunications	175	$119,300.00	$681.71	21	$15,600.00	$742.86
Tobacco	27	$11,110.00	$411.48	6	$2,250.00	$375.00
Transportation	116	$61,550.00	$530.60	17	$8,300.00	$488.24
Utilities	310	$108,800.00	$350.97	27	$12,150.00	$450.00

2006 Elections

	Winners			Losers		
	Count	Total	Average	Count	Total	Average
Agriculture	266	$155,535.00	$584.72	52	$43,450.00	$853.58
Banking	406	$207,050.00	$509.97	45	$24,650.00	$547.78
Business	380	$267,450.00	$703.81	65	$116,668.44	$1,794.90
Construction	114	$59,450.00	$521.49	26	$17,300.00	$665.38
Education	221	$69,730.00	$315.52	51	$26,450.00	$518.63
Environment	6	$2,350.00	$391.67	5	$1,850.00	$370.00
Fire	108	$53,900.00	$459.07	42	$19,500.00	$464.28
Guns	53	$17,100.00	$322.64	14	$14,450.00	$1,032.14
Health	1003	$598,984.00	$597.19	145	$134,350.00	$926.55
Ideology - Democrat	48	$53,828.00	$1,312.88	19	$39,300.00	$2,068.42
Ideology - Republican	90	$183,340.00	$2,037.11	53	$111,400.00	$2,101.89
Insurance	126	$72,800.00	$577.78	14	$11,600.00	$828.57
Labor	207	$134,475.00	$649.64	107	$87,650.00	$819.16
Oil and Gas	611	$493,975.00	$808.47	55	$53,650.00	$975.45
Other	2047	$299,983.34	$1,449.19	73	$173,600.00	$2,378.08
Party-Dem.	43	$34,143.85	$794.04	53	$39,318.79	$741.86
Party-Rep.	159	$324,373.00	$2,040.08	97	$177,545.00	$1,830.36
Professional	255	$181,500.00	$711.76	30	$47,450.00	$1,581.67
Public Employees	18	$13,650.00	$758.33	15	$9,700.00	$646.67
Senior	14	$6,800.00	$485.71	2	$2,750.00	$1,375.00
Telecommunications	151	$72,500.00	$480.13	10	$4,450.00	$445.00
Tobacco	9	$2,500.00	$277.78	0	$0.00	$0.00
Transportation	118	$48,950.00	$414.83	12	$18,350.00	$1,529.16
Utilities	193	$63,150.00	$327.20	16	$4,850.00	$303.12

Some changes took place with the 2006 and 2008 elections in terms of the different types of PACs giving to winners and losers. Several types of PACs stayed consistent in giving and these were for the most part PACs that could weather the national economic turmoil surrounding the 2008 elections. These included PACs such as utilities, education, public employees, and the environment. There is always going to be a need for education and there is always going to be the need for utilities, no matter what the economic situation is. One potential surprise in this group was the addition of banking PACs given all the economic crises in 2008. Yet in earlier elections such as 2000, 2002, and 2004, the banking PACs were known for their consistency. They gave evenly to both sides, whether winners or losers, perhaps hedging their bets (Hardt 2006). Yet the business PACs in both the 2006 and 2008 elections did not follow that pattern; instead, they contributed consistently more to losers rather than winners on average. A number of PACs donated more to losers in the 2006 elections, but either roughly equal amounts or much less in 2008. This included health PACs, gun PACs, ideology-Democrat PACs, the professional PACs, and the transportation PACs. The transportation PACs as an example gave $1,529.16 to losers in the 2006 elections, but only $414.83 to winners. Yet, in the 2008 elections, they donated around $500.00 each to both candidates.

HOUSE VERSUS SENATE

Another difference is whether a candidate is running for the House or the Senate (Table 17). In previous Oklahoma elections, PACs donated more to Senate rather than House candidates (Hardt 2006). In comparing the size of donations for House and Senate candidates, per candidate averages should be examined, not overall amounts, given the greater number of House candidates. In the 2006 and 2008 elections, the expectation mostly held. Of the 24 types of PACs, 20 each in those elections gave more to Senate candidates than House candidates on average. Sometimes it was considerably more. This was certainly the case with both ideological PACs and both Party PACs. In the 2008 elections, the control of the Senate was at stake, with the Democrats wanting to retain at least one body, the Senate, while the Republicans hoping to control both for the first time. Both the party and ideological PACs were thus fighting for every Senate seat and so they donated substantially more to Senate candidates. Another big difference was

with state employee PACs who gave about twice as many contributions for the 2008 elections compared to 2006, but on a per average basis donated substantially more to Senate candidates ($1,040.28 to House candidates in 2008, but $2,114.58 to Senate candidates). This is despite the fact that in both elections state employees actually gave a larger number of contributions to House candidates (36 to 24 in 2008, 25 to 8 in 2006). House candidates in the 2006 elections only received a measly $52.00 per candidate from the state employee PACs.

Which PACs gave more to House candidates than Senate candidates? As shown in Table 17, there were only four each in both the 2006 and 2008 elections. Two of these, gun and senior PACs, appeared on both lists, but they perhaps should not matter as much because they gave such small donations. Senior PACs only donated two $1,000 contributions in 2008 to House candidates, and in 2006 there were only 16 contributions for a total of $9,500 to both houses. With the gun PACs it was a similar story. Gun PACs had only 7 contributions in 2008, for a total of $2,450. In 2006, they had more contributions (69 total), but the total was still low ($17,210). Thus, Senate candidates received a measly $59.29 each on average. The pattern of giving for environment PACs, one of the four from 2008, was similar with 8 contributions totaling $3,100 in 2008 and 11 totaling $4,200 in 2006. Tobacco was on this list for 2006, but it only gave 11 contributions in that election compared to 33 for the 2008 elections. The two notable exceptions that gave more to House candidates than Senate candidates, and yet still gave substantial contributions were oil and gas PACs in 2008 ($644.72 on average to House candidates, only $549.35 to Senate candidates) and banking PACs in 2006 ($513.29 to $453.57), but these differences are small.

INCUMBENT, CHALLENGER, OR OPEN SEAT CANDIDATES?

The last significant difference among candidates is whether they were incumbents, challengers, or running for open seats. In previous Oklahoma elections PACs have given more overall money to incumbents, even though the average donation might favor the challenger over the incumbent (Hardt 2002; Hardt 2005). The reason for this is that in recent years the majority control of the House and the Senate has been an issue and PACs want to insure that they are helping certain legislators get re-elected. Another advantage of giving more money to a challenger

TABLE 17

2006 and 2008 elections: PAC Donations divided by House and Senate

	2008 House			2008 Senate		
Type of PAC	Count	Total	Average	Count	Total	Average
Agriculture	291	$146,000.00	$501.72	180	$138,675.00	$770.42
Banking	222	$110,452.72	$497.53	154	$88,601.12	$575.33
Business	300	$152,470.00	$508.23	154	$186,400.00	$1,210.39
Construction	52	$39,850.00	$766.35	58	$59,100.00	$1,018.97
Education	161	$48,450.00	$300.93	71	$36,500.00	$514.08
Environment	6	$2,600.00	$433.33	2	$500.00	$250.00
Fire	110	$60,250.00	$547.73	47	$39,400.00	$838.30
Guns	3	$1,300.00	$433.33	4	$1,150.00	$287.50
Health	858	$466,339.00	$543.52	434	$407,908.43	$939.88
Ideology-D	17	$16,549.99	$973.53	27	$89,500.00	$3,314.81
Ideology-R	72	$131,750.00	$1,829.86	57	$182,200.00	$3,196.49
Indian	181	$332,251.60	$1,835.64	82	$126,900.00	$1,547.56
Insurance	141	$72,050.00	$510.99	66	$42,800.00	$648.48
Labor	89	$58,199.99	$653.93	55	$81,700.00	$1,485.45
Oil and Gas	483	$311,400.00	$644.72	231	$126,900.00	$549.35
Other	87	$82,650.00	$950.00	59	$124,450.00	$2,109.32
Party – Dem.	34	$8,649.99	$254.41	18	$14,550.00	$808.33
Party – Rep.	55	$61,976.50	$1,126.85	50	$141,418.96	$2,828.38
Professional	152	$149,190.55	$981.52	79	$143,775.00	$1,819.94
Senior	2	$2,000.00	$1,000.00			
State Employees	36	$37,450.00	$1,040.28	24	$50,750.00	$2,114.58
Telecommunication	140	$85,100.00	$607.86	56	$49,800.00	$889.29
Tobacco	27	$8,860.00	$328.15	6	$4,500.00	$750.00
Transportation	85	$35,500.00	$417.65	48	$34,350.00	$715.63
Utilities	240	$79,900.00	$332.92	97	$41,050.00	$423.20

	2006 House			2006 Senate	
Type of PAC	Count	Total	Average	Count	Total	Average
Agriculture	216	$106,885.00	$494.84	111	$94,850.00	$854.50
Banking	444	$227,900.00	$513.29	14	$6,350.00	$453.57
Business	273	$137,968.44	$505.38	182	$249,950.00	$1,373.35
Construction	90	$35,200.00	$391.11	50	$41,550.00	$831.00
Education	178	$43,955.00	$246.94	101	$53,975.00	$534.41
Environment	7	$2,600.00	$371.43	4	$1,600.00	$400.00
Fire	103	$47,150.00	$457.77	47	$26,250.00	$558.51
Guns	41	$15,550.00	$379.27	28	$1,660.00	$59.29
Health	858	$492,634.00	$574.17	329	$254,800.00	$774.47
Ideology-D	85	$152,140.14	$1,789.88	59	$142,850.00	$2,421.19
Ideology-R	20	$22,728.10	$1,136.41	40	$70,400.00	$1,760.00
Indian	19	$17,000.00	$894.74	5	$22,000.00	$4,400.00
Insurance	100	$46,200.00	$462.00	45	$40,450.00	$898.89
Labor	225	$129,500.00	$575.56	90	$93,125.00	$1,034.72
Oil and Gas	447	$368,975.00	$825.45	229	$218,300.00	$953.28
Other	111	$127,683.34	$1,150.30	171	$346,350.00	$2,025.44
Party – Democrat	74	$35,368.54	$477.95	22	$38,094.10	$1,731.55
Party – Republican	172	$302,293.00	$1,757.52	84	$199,325.00	$2,372.92
Professional	194	$122,050.00	$629.12	94	$108,100.00	$1,150.00
Senior	14	$8,550.00	$610.71	2	$1,000.00	$500.00
State Employees	25	$1,300.00	$52.00	8	$10,350.00	$1,293.75
Telecommunication	123	$56,050.00	$455.69	44	$23,400.00	$531.82
Tobacco	4	$100.00	$25.00	7	$1,500.00	$214.29
Transportation	89	$28,750.00	$323.03	42	$39,050.00	$929.76
Utilities	158	$27,750.00	$175.63	64	$24,400.00	$381.25

over an incumbent is that a large PAC contribution usually means more to a challenger because of the fewer funds from individual sources. Yet at the same time, PACs still give more to incumbents because they know that they have a better chance of getting into office.

In the 2006 and 2008 elections, two trends were certainly evident with PACs giving to incumbents and challengers (see Table 18). Most of the PACs (21/24 in the 2008 elections, 22/24 in 2006) gave more money to incumbents than challengers. For most PACs this was not even a contest. Thus, looking at overall donations by PACs in the 2008 elections, the incumbents received $2,635,317.39 while the challengers only received $495,530.24, for a 5.3 to 1 difference. For the 2006 elections, the numbers were fairly similar, providing a 4.7 to 1 difference. The professional PACs were a perfect example; they gave $681,639.00 in the 2008 elections to incumbents, but only $24,089.27 to the challengers.

Four of the five exceptions were all ideological or party PACs, with the fifth being gun PACs in the 2006 elections, but these were rather small amounts. The four ideological/party PACs (ideological Republicans in 2006 and 2008, ideological Democrats and party Democrats in 2008) all gave considerably more money overall to challengers rather than incumbents. In the 2008 elections, for example, the ideological Democrat PACs gave $54,349.99 to challengers, but only $600 to incumbents. The ideological Republican PACs had a similar pattern of giving for the 2008 elections: $70,500 to challengers and $50,750 to incumbents. This was clearly a partisan strategy. The Democrats decided to spend their money on challengers hoping to prevent Republicans from capturing additional House and Senate seats. Unfortunately, in the 2008 elections the Democrats had reason to worry; they lost the Senate to the Republicans.

The distribution of the number of PAC contributions was even more lopsided. In the 2008 elections there were 4,574 PAC contributions, with 92.5% or 4,232, going to incumbents. In the 2006 elections, challengers did not do much better, because the incumbents had 92.2% of all contributions. This inequality is especially evident when a particular type of PAC is examined. Health PACs, for example, in the 2008 elections gave incumbents 1040 contributions, but only 29 to challengers. All total of the 24 types of PACs in the 2006 and 2008 elections, 22 gave more to incumbents in 2008, and 23 did in the 2006 elections. Once again, the Democrats were the notable exception in the 2008

elections, with both the party and ideological PACs giving considerably more to challengers (23 to 4 for ideological PACs, 25 to 3 for the party PACs). In the 2006 elections, it was the ideological Republican PACs who donated more to challengers, but with only 41 to 38 contributions.

The Democrats' strategy, whether through the party or ideological PACs, becomes more evident when the average contribution is compared to the overall amount of money. The Democratic Party PACs in 2008 clearly had to devise a strategy. They only had $13,849.99 to spend compared to the Republican Party PACs who had $111,845.96. As a result, the Democrats used their meager funds and gave the most to challengers, figuring that the incumbents would probably win anyway. Yet with so little to spend, their meager amounts just dwindled when distributed among 28 candidates in the 2008 elections. So they gave to a few incumbent candidates who were potentially in trouble with a $1,450 average among those 3 candidates, with the poor Democratic challengers getting only $380 each on average. The Republicans had the luxury with so much money of actually giving more on average to their incumbents in the 2008 elections than in 2006, $2,167.12 compared to $1,562.20.

The Democratic Party PACs were not the only type of PAC giving more in average donations to challengers than incumbents in the 2008 elections. In fact, in the 2008 elections 17 categories of PACs gave more to challengers, compared to only 13 in 2006. The categories of PACs that did this in both elections include agriculture, business, health, ideological Republican, insurance, oil and gas, other and professional PACs. Agriculture PACs, which include the Ag PAC, the Thoroughbred PAC, and the Okla Quarter Racing PAC, gave about 4-5 times more on average to challengers than incumbents in both the 2006 and 2006 elections. Thus, in the 2008 elections, they gave $2085.71 per challenger, but only $513.87 per incumbent. This was made easier, however, by the fact that there were only 12 agriculture donations to challengers in the 2008 elections, but 351 to incumbents.

CONCLUSIONS

Campaign finance data from the 2006 and 2008 elections revealed a lot about Oklahoma campaign finance. First, it was clear that some of the standard old adages still apply. Incumbents do raise more money

Table 18
PAC MONEY -- divided by TYPE OF PAC and I/C/OS

	Incumbents			Challengers			Open Seats		
2008 ELECTIONS	#	Sum	Avg.	#	Sum	Avg.	#	Sum	Avg.
Agriculture	366	$188,075.00	$513.87	14	$29,200.00	$2,085.71	91	$67,400.00	$740.66
Banking	305	$166,202.88	$544.93	14	$5,500.00	$392.86	57	$27,350.96	$479.84
Business	282	$183,470.00	$650.60	18	$41,250.00	$2,291.67	59	$114,150.00	$1,934.75
Construction	63	$41,100.00	$652.38	13	$17,350.00	$1,334.62	34	$40,500.00	$1,191.18
Education	190	$63,550.00	$334.47	14	$6,550.00	$467.86	28	$14,850.00	$530.36
Environment	4	$1,900.00	$475.00	1	$200.00	$200.00	3	$1,000.00	$333.33
Fire	93	$44,900.00	$482.80	36	$31,050.00	$862.50	28	$23,700.00	$846.43
Guns	5	$1,700.00	$340.00				2	$750.00	$375.00
Health	1040	$681,639.00	$655.42	29	$24,089.27	$830.66	177	$168,519.16	$952.09
Ideology - Repubs	42	$50,750.00	$1,208.33	18	$70,500.00	$3,916.67	69	$192,700.00	$2,792.75
Ideology - Dems	4	$600.00	$1,500.00	23	$54,349.99	$2,363.04	17	$45,700.00	$2,688.24
Insurance	176	$92,800.00	$527.27	4	$3,650.00	$912.50	27	$18,400.00	$681.48
Labor	72	$47,900.00	$665.28	35	$24,649.99	$704.29	37	$67,350.00	$1,820.27
Oil and Gas	598	$335,250.00	$560.62	25	$44,250.00	$1,770.00	91	$58,800.00	$646.15
Other	84	$81,750.00	$973.21	25	$53,100.00	$2,124.00	37	$72,250.00	$1,952.70
Party -- Democrat	3	$4,350.00	$1,450.00	25	$9,499.99	$380.00	24	$9,350.00	$389.58
Party -- Republican	48	$75,004.96	$1,562.60	17	$36,841.00	$2,167.12	40	$91,549.50	$2,288.74
Professional	191	$227,065.55	$1,188.22	10	$20,750.00	$2,075.00	30	$45,150.00	$1,505.00
Public Employees	45	$57,700.00	$1,282.22	6	$14,500.00	$2,416.67	9	$16,000.00	$1,777.78
Senior	2	$2,000.00	$1,000.00						
Telecommunications	177	$117,750.00	$665.25	4	$2,250.00	$562.50	15	$14,900.00	$993.33
Tobacco	28	$9,610.00	$343.21	2	$750.00	$375.00	3	$3,000.00	$1,000.00
Transportation	112	$55,950.00	$499.55	4	$1,200.00	$300.00	17	$12,700.00	$747.06
Utilities	302	$104,300.00	$345.36	5	$3,050.00	$610.00	30	$13,600.00	$453.33

	Incumbents			Challengers			Open Seats		
2006 ELECTIONS	#	Sum	Avg.	#	Sum	Avg.	#	Sum	Avg.
Agriculture	212	$115,135.00	$543.09	8	$15,000.00	$1,875.00	107	$71,600.00	$669.16
Banking	359	$183,700.00	$511.70	7	$3,250.00	$464.29	92	$47,300.00	$514.13
Business	325	$195,228.44	$600.70	31	$62,690.00	$2,022.26	99	$130,000.00	$1,313.13
Construction	89	$48,050.00	$539.89	9	$2,750.00	$305.56	42	$25,950.00	$617.86
Education	184	$54,280.00	$295.00	5	$1,400.00	$280.00	90	$42,250.00	$469.44
Environment	3	$1,300.00	$433.33	3	$1,100.00	$366.67	5	$1,800.00	$360.00
Fire	87	$44,250.00	$508.62	10	$4,400.00	$440.00	53	$24,750.00	$466.98
Guns	47	$1,400.00	$29.79	4	$3,000.00	$750.00	18	$14,950.00	$830.56
Health	852	$481,834.00	$565.53	32	$48,000.00	$1,500.00	305	$218,550.00	$716.56
Ideology - Repubs	38	$78,391.25	$2,062.93	41	$93,098.89	$2,270.70	70	$125,900.00	$1,798.57
Ideology - Dems	13	$10,400.00	$800.00				47	$82,778.10	$1,761.24
Insurance	110	$57,450.00	$522.27	8	$14,350.00	$1,793.75	27	$14,850.00	$550.00
Labor	113	$91,275.00	$807.74	38	$23,850.00	$627.63	144	$107,500.00	$746.53
Oil and Gas	562	$415,825.00	$739.90	14	$21,450.00	$1,532.14	130	$150,000.00	$1,153.85
Other	146	$179,200.00	$1,227.40	23	$59,900.00	$2,604.35	113	$234,933.34	$2,079.06
Party -- Democrat	22	$20,539.83	$933.63	20	$7,668.85	$383.44	54	$45,253.96	$838.04
Party -- Republican	83	$198,013.00	$2,385.70	62	$120,515.00	$1,943.79	111	$183,390.00	$1,652.16
Professional	216	$139,900.00	$647.69	7	$22,500.00	$3,214.29	65	$67,750.00	$1,042.31
Public Employees	14	$7,900.00	$564.29				19	$15,450.00	$813.16
Senior	14	$8,550.00	$610.71				2	$1,000.00	$500.00
Telecommunications	126	$60,400.00	$479.37	2	$600.00	$300.00	39	$18,450.00	$473.08
Tobacco	8	$2,250.00	$281.25				1	$250.00	$250.00
Transportation	101	$32,900.00	$325.74	4	$15,500.00	$3,875.00	26	$19,400.00	$746.15
Utilities	176	$57,400.00	$326.14	2	$500.00	$250.00	44	$14,250.00	$323.86

overall than challengers, Senate candidates raise more money than House candidates, and in this state at least, Republicans tend to raise more money than Democrats. Despite the downturn in the national economy, more money was also spent on the 2008 elections than the 2006 elections, although some PACs clearly cut back, while some actually spent more. As a contrast, in the 2000 elections, House candidates raised $27,647 on average and spent $26,495. For the 2008 elections, those averages were $46,402 and $41,388. Thus, House candidates are raising and spending nearly double the amounts they did in the 2000 elections, in just eight years. For the Senate elections, the change was even more dramatic. The 2000 elections for raising and spending were $58,279 and $53,806, while today they are $138,637 and $114,212, respectively (Hardt 2002). Thus, it is not a surprise that PAC money has increased as well. Although there were fewer PACs in the 2008 elections compared to the 2000 elections (344 in 2008, 416 in 2000), they are giving more money in total contributions ($5,941,827 compared to $3,490,313 in the 2000 elections), and more money in average contributions ($21,295 compared to $11,912 in the 2000 elections) (Hardt 2002). Thus despite the drop in PACs and the number of candidates since the 2000 elections, PACs actually increased the percentage of total money spent from 36.4% in 2000 to 39.7% for the 2008 elections (Hardt 2002).

These increases in spending though may not be a surprise considered what has happened in Oklahoma since the 2000 elections. From 2000 to 2008, the Oklahoma legislature experienced a major shift in partisan power in both houses from the Democrats to the Republicans. This included an election where there was a 24-24 split in the Oklahoma Senate and a 57-44 split in the House (2006), thus creating more partisan competition. Another factor that created a need to spend money, however, was the addition of term limits. Although enacted in 1992, they did not take effect in Oklahoma until the 2004 elections. Oklahoma has 12-year lifetime term limits for its legislators. The term limits have created a tremendous increase in open seats with 28 in the 2004 House elections and 20 in the 2006 House elections alone. In the 2008 elections, there were 15 open seats in the House and 8 in the Senate. Open seats tend to traditionally be very competitive with multiple candidates raising great sums of money.

Yet although greater fundraising was generally the norm, there were some huge changes in campaign finance spending from the 2006

to the 2008 elections. Most notable among these, and also the title of this paper, is the drop in party/ideological contributions over this time period for BOTH parties. While the Democrats clearly were affected the most, raising very diminutive amounts compared to their Republican colleagues in 2008, the Republicans were clearly impacted as well. The Republican Party and ideological PACs held seven of the top 10 slots on the PAC money average donation list, and four of the top 10 slots on the overall PAC money list for the 2006 elections. In the 2008 elections, none of those PACs made either list. As a result of the loss of funds, the ideological and party PACs of both parties clearly changed their strategies for 2008. The Republican ideological PACs gave more of their money to winners rather than losers ($253,200 versus $60,250), but gave a slightly average higher donation to losers ($3,012.50) than winners ($2,357.52). With the Democratic ideological PACs, it was a different story. With over $200,000 less to spend, the Democratic ideological PACs gave more in contributions to losers ($90,549.99) than winners ($11,000.00), but kept the average donations roughly the same ($2200 for winners, $2322 for losers).

With the party PACs in the 2008 elections, the tale was almost exactly the opposite with the Republicans giving more overall to incumbents ($160,204.56 to $42,961.00), but still keeping the average contributions consistent for the 2008 elections ($1,953.71 to $1,940.50 for losers). The Democrats, however, clearly had the greater challenge – how to stay competitive with the Republicans with almost $180,000 less to spend. The Democrats chose to give more of their money to losing candidates ($5,450 to $18,249.99 for the losers), but the average contribution was much smaller ($388.30, compared to $908.33 for the winners).

One question that could be asked is "why?" – as in why the decline in political party money in Oklahoma? Answering this question is difficult as there are a number of factors that are involved. Most notably, Oklahoma is considered to be a "red" state, or a state where Republicans are more likely to be successful. This has been true in presidential and congressional elections, and more increasingly, with state legislative elections. Yet, the Republican Party experienced major challenges in fundraising in the 2008 elections. Not only did McCain raise considerably less money than Obama, but the Republican congressional committees also raised less money than their Democratic counterparts and the RNC

while raising more money was too busy at the national level trying to help McCain. For the Democrats in Oklahoma, their political party has experienced its share of troubles with both organizational and financial difficulties, and thus has not been able to match the success it had in the 2000 and 2002 elections.

Another change was that some PACs were clearly impacted by the declining national economic picture during the 2008 elections, compared to 2006, while some were not. Half of the PAC categories spent more in the 2008 elections than they did for the 2006 elections. Public employee PACs, for example, experienced the greatest percentage change, spending only $9,550 in total for the 2006 elections, but $88,200 for the 2008 elections, increasing their average per candidate by almost three times. The other types of PACs that increased their giving were probably some of the PACs least affected by the national economic picture, such as health, insurance, telecommunications, and utilities. People will need to spend money on their health and purchase utilities for their homes, regardless if the national economy is experiencing a slump. In Oklahoma, there was not as much of a slump with construction compared to elsewhere, so it is not a surprise that construction PACs spent more in the 2008 elections than they did in 2006. One of the more notable declines, besides the already discussed party PACs, was with labor in the 2008 elections which spent $222,625 in 2006, but only $139,899.99 for 2008. This makes sense though when the Obama factor gets figured into the equation. Many labor organizations were working hard to achieve for Obama in the 2008 elections, and perhaps spent less on local candidates. Despite the decline in the national economy, 18 of the 24 PACs spent more per average on the 2008 candidates than they did in 2006, even though they spent less overall. This includes such PACs as business, banking, education, guns, labor, professionals, and seniors. However, the average is probably what matters most to candidates. They probably don't care that professional PACs spent more than $10,000 less for the 2008 elections, but they may care that the average contribution went up from $693.04 in 2006 to $1,268.25 in 2008. After all, candidates are concerned about the money they can individually raise and spend.

What about the 2010 elections? The national picture clearly favors the Republicans. The federal stimulus money and bailouts have stirred a strong anti-Federal government sentiment in Oklahoma, and with

Oklahoma already being a strong red state, Republicans will do well. There will be a change in the PAC law, however, that could affect both parties' candidates in the 2010 elections. Mike Reynolds (R-OKC) requested a rule change that went into effect July 2008 which states that PACs are no longer allowed to give donations to each other. Although this rule change took place four months before the 2008 elections, its impact was not fully realized because many PACs were giving to each other before July 2008, thus still making a difference in the 2008 elections. An example of this is the Working Oklahomans Alliance which gave $113,750 before the law took effect (Francis-Smith 2009). However, the consequences of this law for the 2010 elections are unknown as for the first time this law will have taken full effect during the entire election. Thus, while both the Democratic and Republican parties in Oklahoma both had troubles raising money for their state legislative candidates in the 2008 elections, it looks like this trend will only continue in the 2010 elections.

NOTES

[1] Research done on any earlier races was gathered by hand as computerized campaign finance information for Oklahoma candidates was unreliable prior to 2006. Thus, the author looked at each individual paper copy of the campaign finance forms of all state legislative candidates to gather that information.
Native American tribes are not considered to be PACs in Oklahoma, and thus were treated separately later in the analysis after each tribe in Oklahoma was researched individually for the 2006 and 2008 elections.

[2] These names should look familiar to those who follow Oklahoma politics. Each one of these candidates left office early over issues with campaign funding and/or their taxes.

[3]Despite Republican electoral success in Oklahoma, the 2008 elections were not a good year nationally for Republican Party fundraising. Not only was there a strong decline in the economy in 2008, but the Republican Party was outraised significantly at the presidential candidate level (Obama versus McCain) as well as at the US Congress level. Thus, poor fundraising by state political parties may be a part of that larger picture.

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CHEROKEE TRIBAL CITIZENSHIP: TRADITIONAL IDEAS AND NEW REALITIES.

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Who is a Cherokee Indian? What elements make up the Cherokee Tribe? Who should decide what criteria determines citizenship within the Tribe? These are but a few of the many difficult, probing and yet inter-related questions that Cherokees in Northeastern Oklahoma are wrestling with today. They are however, fundamental questions since they lay the foundations for the modern Cherokee tribe in terms of its tribal policies and external relations. On the surface, it might seem that determining the answers to such questions would be relatively simple. However, issues of race, the distribution of resources, ethnic identity, and conflicting views regarding history tend to make even the simplest of issues complex.

This article will examine the nebulous issue of citizenship in the Cherokee Nation from a historical and political perspective by comparing some of the Tribe's modern initiatives regarding citizenship reform with the more traditional assumptions which once guided tribal citizenship policies. In order to do so, a brief history of the Cherokee Nation will be presented. Commensurate with this, attention will be focused upon the traditional political structures of the Nation; namely how the clan system was eventually replaced by western styled courts and how the traditional

definition of citizenship evolved overtime. Hopefully, by comparing this transition from clans to courts, we may gain a better perspective of the modern Cherokee Nation's struggle with identity and thereby better enable us to see more clearly the complexity of the issues involved. The central focus of this debate concerning citizenship will focus upon the role played by the Cherokee Freedmen's descendants and their situation. The article will examine the arguments on both sides of the controversy and compare some of their respective claims. Finally, a few concluding observations will be made regarding citizenship in the Cherokee Nation and how this issue fits into the larger nature of contemporary federal Indian policy regarding the issues of paternalism versus self determination.

INTRODUCTION

The Cherokee refer to themselves as *Ani Yun Wia* or the principal people. This proud and powerful Nation occupied a large segment of the southeastern United States upon Spanish, British and French contact. In 1785, only two years after the formal conclusion of the revolutionary war, the Cherokee Nation signed the Treaty of Hopewell in South Carolina. The provisions of this treaty stated the willingness of the United States government and the American people to respect the integrity of the borders of the Cherokee Nation and further provided that "any non-Indian who resided or had attempted to settle on Cherokee land who did not remove himself within six months following the ratification of the treaty would forfeit, the protection of the United States, and the Indians may punish him or not as they please" (Sober 1991, 11). Thus, at least on paper, the United States government had promised to protect and respect Cherokee political sovereignty. However, more and more land sessions would be facilitated in the not so distant future. These would ultimately result in the reduction of the Cherokee land base to only a small section of territory in the extreme eastern portion of Tennessee and Northwest Georgia. By the early 19th century, land sessions and broken treaties continued to threaten the political existence of the Cherokee Nation.

Perhaps another and equally important transformation of the Cherokee Nation was also occurring at this time. In fact it had been an on-going phenomenon for at least 200 years prior to this time. This

phenomenon dealt with the evolution of the Cherokee Nation's traditional political and social institutions which would eventually contribute to changes in traditional definitions of Cherokee citizenship.

FACTORS CHANGING FROM CLANS TO COURTS

With the exception of the family unit itself, the single most important social, political and economic institution of traditional Cherokee society was embodied in the concept of clans. In antiquity there may have been more than a dozen or so individual clans. However, traditionally seven distinct clans have existed: the Wolf, Deer, Bird, Paint, Blue, Wild Potato and Twister (Rozema 1998, 9). Each of these clans were essential to the manner in which traditional Cherokee society was ordered and structured and their importance can be illustrated in a number of examples which range from spheres of the political, social and familial.

The traditional Cherokee clan system was so important due to the fact that it governed and facilitated most of the social, political and economic aspects of Cherokee life. One of the best examples of this concerned the definition of citizenship which was defined via membership in a clan. This was done at birth wherein clan membership was determined by one's maternal clan affiliation. Also, the process of adoption into Cherokee citizenship by non-Cherokees was traditionally accomplished by the clan structure. It had been at times quite common, even before contact with whites, for the Cherokee people to accept and absorb all types of people into their society. The only requirement which an individual was obliged to fulfill was adoption by a clan. As Theda Perdue states, "only those who belonged to Cherokee clans, regardless of language, residence, or even race were Cherokee" (Perdue 1998, 59). From these and numerous other examples, it is easy to observe that traditional Cherokee identity hinged greatly upon membership in a clan. In this regard Reed and Taylor state that "To be without a clan in Cherokee society was to be without rights, even the right to live" (Reed and Taylor 1993, 15).

The clan system was also pivotal for regulating the concept of legitimate marriage. In traditional Cherokee society, an individual's closest blood based relationships are determined by ones mother's clan membership. In this arrangement, it is relatively easy to establish ones kinship with others. In the Cherokee mind, to attempt to enter into the

covenant of marriage with a person of their mother's clan was unthinkable. In fact traditional Cherokee law regarding marriage strictly prohibited such behavior and declared it to be an act of incest which was an offense punishable by death (Reed and Taylor 1993, 17). Therefore, this clan based approach provided the mechanisms by which individuals formed basic family units and as such were invaluable to the maintaining of traditional Cherokee society, politics, culture and citizenship.

But as contact with non-Cherokees increased over time, changing domestic conditions impacted the clan system by altering the traditional status of women in Cherokee society. The cumulative effect of these changes tended to displace women and to render them powerless by excluding them from the traditional roles which they had once played within the clan system. This was especially true concerning food and changing eating habits. The traditional staple of the Cherokee diet was corn. "Selu" or corn was more than a multi-purpose food which could provide nourishment in a variety of forms. Rather, Selu possesses a deep spiritual significance to the Cherokee people which remains to this day. It relates to the Cherokee creation story of the first man and woman and connects the *Ani Yun Wia* to the Earth and their Creator. In this way, Cherokee women held powerful roles in Cherokee society and as such were vital to the successful facilitation and operation of clan life. Thus, the tendency of many Cherokee to begin adopting other foods was in itself almost a symbolic form of repudiation of the role of women in Cherokee society and what it meant to be Cherokee (Perdue 1998, 59). This in turn translated into a repudiation of the clan system upon which the concept of citizenship had been predicated. Further, the inclusion of non-Cherokee men into the Tribe who desired to control property and children without the consultation or consent of clan leaders seriously undermined the traditional powers exercised by women in the clan system of government which began to change the traditional system of a clan based definition of Cherokee citizenship. Eventually the effects of this erosion of traditional governing clan structures via the assimilation process would come to fruition and transform the Cherokee Nation's political institutions and rules governing citizenship forever.

EARLY CHEROKEE-BLACK INTERACTIONS

Complicating this situation, another pivotal citizenship issue with which the tribe had to deal from an early time involved the introduction of black slaves into the Cherokee Nation. This was an inevitable event since the Cherokees occupied the Southern US where slave holding was most likely to be found. As southern whites began to intermarry and become citizens of the Nation, it was likely that slaves would also enter into the Nation. But even prior to this, the Cherokees were already dealing with blacks as slaves. On May 4, 1730 "a delegation of 7 Cherokees accompanied by two English representatives sailed from Charleston to the man of warship *Fox*. On June 5th they arrived in London and on June 18th signed a treaty with the British which stated that "if any Negro slave shall run away into the woods from their English Masters, the Cherokee Indians shall endeavor to apprehend them and either bring them back to the Plantation from whence they run away or to the Governor." The treaty also stipulated material rewards for the return of slaves such as guns, clothing and tools (Halliburton 1977, 8). Thus, there was little sympathy for blacks as slaves among the early Cherokees. They were seen largely as property and thus as something with which to bargain with the whites. This was quite different of course with other tribes such as the Seminole and the Creeks who more easily accepted and even embraced the concept of blacks as full citizens within their respective Nations.

As time passed, there was a greater willingness on the part of some Cherokees to accept the form of chattel slavery being practiced by whites. This was largely due to the aforementioned erosion of the formal clan structures and conventions of traditional Cherokee society. In fact by the late 1790s and early 1800's, many of the most well known and influential Cherokee families were slave owners. This list would include the following families: Ross, Vann, Foreman, Scales, Boudinot, Lowery, Rogers, Downing, Jolly, Adair and Waite. Of course slave holding in the Cherokee Nation was not universal. It tended to have parallels with slave holding among whites where wealthy individuals were involved. Statistics are interesting on this fact. An 1835, tribal census revealed that of the 16, 542 tribal members counted, there were also a total of 1,592 black slaves living in the Cherokee Nation. That roughly accounts for 1 slave per every 10 Cherokee citizens (Halliburton 1977, 57).

This is not to say that all Cherokees were pro slavery in their sentiments. To be sure, groups such as the Keetoowah Society, which was an organized group primarily composed of full bloods and traditionalists, often times opposed slavery and its adoption within the Nation. However, no serious active effort toward abolitionism existed in the antebellum Cherokee Nation.

Overall, attitudes toward slaves and their proper treatment among Cherokees were similar to whites in the south. In 1841, the Cherokee National Council passed the following acts and resolutions to control and regulate the institution of slavery within the Nation:

"Be it enacted by the National Council, That from and after the passage of this act, it shall be lawful to organize patrol companies in any neighborhood, where the people of such neighborhood shall deem it necessary; and such company, when organized, shall take up and bring to punishment any Negro or Negros that may be strolling about, not on their owners premises without a pass from their owner or owners.

"Be it further enacted that all masters or owners of slaves, who may suffer or allow their Negros to carry or own firearms of any description, bowie or butcher knives, dirks or any unlawful instrument shall be subject to be fined in a sum not less than 25 dollars."

"Be it further enacted that from and after the passage of this act, it shall not be lawful for any person or persons whatever to teach any free Negro or Negros not of Cherokee blood or any slave belonging to any citizen or citizens of the Nation to read or write" (Halliburton 1977, 80-81).

Thus with many of the elements of southern white culture having been firmly assimilated into the fabric of Cherokee society, including the institution of chattel slavery, it is not too difficult to understand how a majority of Cherokees would eventually go on to support the southern Confederacy in 1861. Echoing these sentiments, the Cherokee Tribal Constitutional adopted in 1839 excluded blacks from citizenship and made clear that the Cherokee Nation would exist as a political entity for Native Cherokees and intermarried and mixed blood whites. This was essentially the policy of the Cherokee Nation for the next 20 years. Then came the seismic shift which would forever alter the nature of federalism and its attendant relationships: the American Civil War.

POST CIVIL WAR ERA CITIZENSHIP ISSUES

As a result of its alliance with the Confederacy, the federal government felt justified in punishing the Cherokees and began an aggressive treaty making policy with the Cherokee Nation. The first action involved the settling of more tribes into Indian Territory. This could only be done by taking away certain lands from the Five Civilized Tribes and relocating other Indians, principally from the Great Plains like the Osage, Comanche, and Kiowa into Indian Territory. A second reason why many in Washington believed that new deals had to be made with the tribes concerned the presence of black slaves in the Indian Territory. The Lincoln administration had issued the Emancipation Proclamation of 1863. Subsequently, in late 1865 the 13th amendment abolished slavery forever "within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." This meant that slavery was indeed dead in Indian Country including the Cherokee Nation. Many in Washington DC began arguing that the status quo of the antebellum Indian Territory could not be maintained in light of these new constitutional provisions. As a result, the Federal Government compelled the Cherokee Nation to agree to the provisions of the Reconstruction Treaty of 1866. The specific terms of the treaty were:

1. All Freedman and all Negros, who had been in the Nation at the beginning of the war who were now living in the Nation or who would return within 6 months from the date of the Treaty of July 19, 1866 and their descendants, were to be given the rights of Native Cherokees

2. Full Citizenship rights such as the right to vote was to be given to all male Freedmen of age except in cases where they had been convicted of a crime or had not resided in the Cherokee Nation at least 6 months.

On paper then, the freedmen had rights guaranteed by treaty; however, the devil was in the details. The major issue here concerned the time sensitive nature of where a particular Freedman was or had been or would be in case of a return to the Cherokee Nation. In other words, there was a residency requirement for the Freedmen to benefit from the provisions of the treaty. This was complicated by the fact that the war had created numerous white, Indian and black refugees. As a result, many Freedmen who were eligible for citizenship and its benefits

were often unable to return to the Nation within the prescribed timetable. Consequently, many legitimate Freedmen claimants were denied by the Cherokee authorities.

Another important issue at the same time involved the so called per-capita payments of the tribe. These per capita payments were funds derived from the leasing of grazing lands on the Cherokee outlet of Northern and Western Oklahoma. As such, periodically the Cherokee National Council made these payments to "Cherokees by Blood" or in other words, to Cherokee Nation citizens who were citizens by blood. This narrow definition made Freedmen, intermarried whites and a small group of Shawnee and Delaware Indians who had been incorporated into Cherokee Citizenship via a treaty with the United States in 1867 ineligible for these funds. The Freedmen protested this and viewed the Nation's refusal to make the Freedmen and other tribal citizens eligible for the payments as further evidence of the Cherokee National Council's unwillingness to abide by the provisions of the Treaty of 1866.

The intervening years between the civil war and the allotment of the Cherokee Nation prior to statehood under the Dawes Act were filled with a variety of legal challenges between the Freedmen and the Cherokee Nation. Many of these involved issues such as the per capita payments and whether the legality of rolls over which neither the National Council nor the Freedmen could agree could accurately be used as a basis for establishing citizenship within the Nation. Eventually, by 1906 a contested roll of approximately 4,900 Freedmen and their descendants had been compiled and submitted who were to share in the allotments of Cherokee lands. This number would be altered by the Supreme Court case of Cherokee Nation vs. Whitmire (1912). Those on the final roll approved by the Supreme Court and their lawful descendants would constitute the basis of the Cherokee Freedmen who were supposed to be guaranteed their rights in perpetuity.

For the Cherokee Nation and the Freedmen of the Tribe, the period of time between1906 and the mid 1970's were characterized largely by malaise and inactivity. Congress had effectively stripped the tribes of their most basic powers and essentially were operated by the federal government itself. In fact, Cherokee leaders were not even chosen by election of the Cherokee people but rather were selected by the President of the United States. This practice complemented the Federal Government's posture of assimilation in the early 20th century and its

subsequent policy of termination of tribes in the1950's. Eventually, as with all aspects of Federal Indian Policy, this policy of direct and overbearing federal intervention was replaced with a new and conflicting policy. This new policy, known as the Era of Self Determination, initiated in part by President Richard Nixon, sought to return to the tribes a greater sense and exercise of sovereignty over their own affairs. Much of the relevant legislation that exists today that seeks to empower tribes emerged from this era, including the Indian Education Act of 1972, the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 and the American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978.

THE MODERN CHEROKEE FREEDMEN ISSUE

The modern controversy involving the Cherokee Nation and the Freedmen descendants became reignited in the 1970's during the era of modern self determination for American Indian Tribes. In 1975, the Nation created a new constitution and in doing so modified the criteria for tribal membership to include only those persons who could trace their ancestry to an enrolled Indian ancestor listed on the 1906 Dawes Rolls of the Cherokee Nation. The term "Indian ancestor" is used since this includes not only Cherokees by blood but also incorporates those modern individuals who are the descendants of the Shawnee and Delaware brought into the Cherokee Nation in the late 1860's. As a result, only those with an Indian ancestor are eligible for modern tribal membership in the Cherokee Nation.

THE CHEROKEE NATION'S PERSPECTIVE

The Cherokee Nation argues its right to exclude non-Indian ancestors such as intermarried whites and freedmen based upon three separate but related criteria. The first concerns the notion of sovereignty and self determination. If a nation is sovereign, then by logical extension, it possesses the power to determine for itself its citizenship criteria. Such an assumption is compatible with contemporary Federal Indian policy as well as with numerous statutory laws and judicial precedents to support it. The second assertion is based upon the idea that the Congress has since 1866 imposed upon the Cherokee Nation a series of laws and treaty provisions which have had the effect of modifying the

original 1866 Treaty which the Freedmen claim as the basis of their right to enrollment and citizenship. From the perspective of the Cherokee Nation, these modifications which were exercised under the plenary power of Congress forever altered the original nature and meaning of the 1866 Treaty and as such permits the Cherokee Nation and any other Indian Tribes under similar circumstances to exercise the right of sovereignty to determine the nature of its citizenship policies. In essence, the tribe is arguing that membership in an Indian Tribe should require that one have an Indian ancestor. This does not preclude the possibility of modern day Blacks, Asians, Whites or Hispanics from being Cherokee Citizens. Indeed, most Cherokee Nation Citizens are of mixed races. However, they must have decent from an Indian ancestor listed on the Dawes Roll of 1906 to be a bonifide citizen.

Finally, the Cherokee Nation argues for the validity of this practice by saying that an Indian Tribe should be composed of citizens who share a common ancestry. They argue that the Cherokee Nation should be made up of the descendants of Cherokees and the incorporated Indian tribes of the Shawnee and Delaware. In short, an Indian Tribe should be composed of Indians by blood. The policy now in use by the Nation accomplishes this goal in that anyone today admitted to citizenship has an ancestor who was at least at the time considered to be an Indian by the commissioners and tribal authorities who worked to complete the final enrollment process at the dawn of the 20th century. These policies are designed, so the nation says, to return the Nation back to a more Indian based population. Such a notion is reasonable, particularly from the perspective of some traditionalists who might be inclined to support a more "conservative" or "traditional" approach to citizenship. However, at the same time, such a policy is also at odds with the traditional clan based system which did not view blood or race as a requirement or pre-requisite for citizenship.

In order to implement this policy, the Cherokee Nation has for approximately the last 30 years been engaged in a series of legal contests both from within and without the tribal courts. For instance, in 1988, a Federal Appeals court ruled in the case of *Nero vs. Cherokee Nation* that the Cherokee Nation did indeed possess the right to establish its own citizenship requirements. Later, the Cherokee Nation Supreme Court ruled that the Tribe's citizenship policy had been both legally and constitutionally accomplished. Then in 2003, came the case of *Vann vs.*

Kempthorne wherein the descendants of six Cherokee Freedmen filed a grievance against the US Department of the Interior in reaction to the Cherokee Nation's policy of excluding the Freedmen from citizenship. Eventually in 2006, the Cherokee Nation would pass a popular referendum among its voters that clearly stated the electorate's support of eliminating Freedmen descendants from citizenship. Since then, a number of legal battles in both federal and tribal courts have been fought to determine the status of the Freedmen descendants. Currently, the issue is unresolved and will ultimately be determined by the federal courts.

THE FREEDMEN'S PERSPECTIVE

What do the Freedmen descendants say to all this? There are many different objections and arguments that are often raised. However, for purposes of brevity and clarity, I will present two of the primary objections that are often pronounced from their side of the aisle.

The first often involves the charge that enrolled Freedmen had no Indian blood. Many Freedmen supporters claim that despite the often rigid social system of the Cherokee Nation which had in fact historically discriminated against blacks, there was mixing of Black and Cherokee producing mixed African-Indian progeny. This was not restricted to the Cherokee Nation. According to the Freedmen, there are many discrepancies and errors associated with the Dawes Rolls in general which calls into question their reliability. For example, the Freedmen claim the case of Ed Johnson is emblematic of this. Johnson is listed as a Chickasaw Freedman and **not** as a Chickasaw by blood. However, the application card that Ed Johnson used to become enrolled as a Chickasaw Freedmen lists his father as being Frank Colbert. Strangely enough, Frank Colbert was, according to Chickasaw records, a Chickasaw by blood and also is listed as Ed Johnson's former owner (Freedmen's Website). If these discrepancies are the case, then the facts detailed here would require that Ed Johnson was indeed a Chickasaw by blood. As such, he should be listed on the Dawes Roll not as a Freedmen, but as a Chickasaw by blood. The Freedmen supporters say that such problems are not isolated and as a result the Dawes Rolls are not an accurate means by which to establish an Indian identity which the Cherokee Nation says is its paramount objective.

Such criticisms of the Dawes Rolls are bolstered by other historical instances involving famous Cherokee Citizenship cases. One of the more well known of these concerns the Watts family of Arkansas. The Watts Family, a non Freedmen based family, claimed to be Cherokees by blood and had resided in the Cherokee Nation for over 30 years prior to allotment and the Dawes Act. However, when they applied for inclusion on the Dawes Rolls they were denied. The Watts Family believed that politics were at work as they had supported the Downing Party which had fallen out of favor with the more prevalent Ross Party or National Party in Cherokee politics. Such a charge of prejudice is not easy to dismiss when one considers the list of evidence they presented to the commissioners to be admitted to the Dawes Rolls. Among other evidence the Watts family presented in support of their claim to citizenship were "affidavits from 24 private individuals asserting that the Watts Family was of Cherokee blood; a certificate dated 5 November 1874 from John Vann, then Chief Justice of the Cherokee Supreme Court, stating that W. J. Watts had appeared before him and furnished sufficient proof to be admitted to citizenship; correspondence from officials of the federal government and the Cherokee Nation all containing statements proving their position; a letter from Cherokee Nation Chief Joel Mayes dated February 9, 1889; a letter containing the opinion of the US Attorney General A.H. Garland in his support" (Sober 1991, 78-79). In addition, Watts also had letters of support from Cherokee leaders such as Elias Boudinot and US District Judge Isaac C. Parker who personally vouched for his character and his Cherokee identity (Sober 1991, 67). Despite such credentials, the Watts family was denied admission to the Dawes Rolls while other claimants were admitted without the benefit of such extensive evidence. The Watts' case causes many supporters of the Freedmen to suggest that various possible prejudices, be they political, racial or personal in nature may have indeed played a factor as to how the rolls were constructed. As such, they often contend that the Cherokee Nation's policy of using the Dawes Rolls as the only means of tracing "Indian Blood" is not as reliable as the Nation claims.

Another major argument against the Cherokee Nation concerns the treaty rights issue. The Cherokee Nation claims among other things that the US Government has effectively modified the terms of the Treaty of 1866 which granted the Freedmen certain basic rights that could not be abrogated. As a result, the Nation claims the provisions pertaining to

the Freedmen are null and void. The Freedmen and their allies however argue that this line of reasoning by the Cherokee Nation is untenable. They contend that regardless of the US Government's actions, the Cherokee Nation is bound by the Treaty and cannot honorably repudiate any of its contents or provisions. In accordance with this argument, many Freedmen supporters such as David Cornsilk (2009) also argue that the labor of slaves who served in the Cherokee Nation essentially created an obligation on the part of the Cherokee Nation to accept as citizens of the Nation the descendents of those slaves.

In addition to and in a related sense, the Freedmen descendants also point to the Cherokee Nation's evolving policies toward the Shawnee and Delaware among their midst. As was stated earlier, in the late 1860's, these two tribes were incorporated into the body politic of the Cherokee Nation. While they were given the rights of full citizenship within the Cherokee Nation under the modern tribal constitutions passed since the era of self determination, many individual Shawnee and Delaware have traditionally voiced their desire to facilitate their own tribal governing structures and maintain separate land holdings apart from the Cherokee Nation. During the 1990's, a series of legal attempts by both the Shawnee and Delaware were undertaken to achieve this separation. Initially, both tribes met with differing results. The Delaware gained independence only to loose their separate status in a court battle with the Cherokee Nation. Recently, however, the Delaware did achieve a formal separate governance recognized by the United States. However, this recognition did not involve any land transfer for the Delaware Tribe of Indians and the DTI does not control its own land claims including individually allotted lands which are still held in trust by the Cherokee Nation. Some observers such as the Freedmen have interpreted the general reluctance of many Cherokee Nation leaders to oppose mutual separation from both of these tribes as being motivated by the desire to maintain under Cherokee control certain natural resources located on the lands that independent Delaware and Shawnee Nations would possess. Of course, the Cherokee Nation has argued that the granting of a separate status for these Delaware and Shawnee would lead to a disintegration of current Cherokee land holdings which could contribute to a dissolution, at least in part of the Nation. Nonetheless, this controversy has served to reinforce in the minds of some, such as the Freedmen descendants that for many in the Cherokee Nation policy regarding citizenship status is

driven less by concerns regarding authentic identity and more about monetary considerations. This seems especially clear in their minds when one considers the fact that as was previously demonstrated in this article, traditional definitions of citizenship relied on clan adoption and not any particular blood ties.

OBSERVATIONS ON PATERNALISM, AND ASSIMILATION

What can be made of this very complicated and confusing issue? Perhaps the major issue here concerns the ubiquitous and seemingly never ending problem of modern federal Indian policy, namely the conflicting forces of paternalism and sovereignty. This has traditionally been one of the most difficult obstacles to overcome for modern tribal governments in the era of self determination. The Cherokee Nation demands the right of self government and in accordance with that the right to determine issues such as citizenship. At the same time however, the Nation also wrestles with the realities of the modern world and that due to the competitive nature of the American economy as well as the complex relationships commensurate with federalism, the Nation requires a degree of intervention from the Federal Government to ensure the enforcement of its rights as a unique government entity unlike states or municipal governments. An example of this might include issues such as the enforcement of taxation exemptions that the Nation possesses. The plenary power of Congress to recognize the legitimacy of the Cherokee government provides its modern de-facto and de-jure legal status. With this protection however comes a price in the form of paternalism which sometimes rears its head in the form of interference as in the case of the Freedmen.

A clear manifestation of this "interference" albeit originally guised in benevolence concerns the inclusion of Indians as citizens of the United States. In 1924 when Congress declared all Indians to be US Citizens, many who supported this measure saw it as a means by which to give Indians greater equality with others. Paradoxically however, it also complicated the ability of a tribal government to effectively exercise true sovereignty over its members as well as its territory. This is well demonstrated in the contemporary case of the Freedmen. Lately, certain members of Congress have threatened to terminate funding for the

Cherokee Nation in response to the Freedmen issue. Why are some in Congress doing this? The answer concerns the notion that while the Freedmen have been considered Cherokee Citizens, they are undoubtedly US Citizens and are thus afforded the protections of the US Constitution which of course includes the Bill of Rights as well as the 5th and 14th amendments with their respective assurances of due process and equal protection of the laws.

The question therefore is, does the US Constitution apply such protections to the Freedmen or is this an internal matter for the Cherokee Nation's polity and government to determine for themselves? Some would argue that the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 might apply here and afford the Freedmen a remedy in that regard. This of course brings us back to the plenary power of Congress. Can the Congress, under this power, apply certain constitutional protections for American citizens in conjunction to their relationships concerning tribal governments in which they may hold membership as citizens? There are numerous precedents that can be mentioned here which would bolster each side of the argument but that is immaterial to our discussion here as my purpose is not to take sides. Rather, the purpose here has been to demonstrate that the case of the Cherokee Freedmen is best understood within the context of federal paternalism. The Federal government's involvement in the Freedmen's case is far from being just another issue with which tribal governments must contend. Rather, it is emblematic of the type of interference which historically has and continues to plague tribal governments.

Nonetheless, the idea of federal paternalism influencing the concept of Cherokee Indian identity and citizenship is alive and well. Perhaps, in some ways, this paternalism is to a certain degree perpetuated by the tribes themselves. Consider the modern situation in which a number of state governments have begun to issue "formal state recognition" to non-federally recognized tribes within their borders. This is significant in that this policy deals with Cherokee identity. Many Cherokee authorities have decried this process such as Wilma Mankiller. In a 1993 letter to Governor Zell Miller of Georgia, she stated that,

"Our concern deals with states creating Indian Tribes without specific recognition criteria. We pointed out how the United States Constitution gives Congress the "power to regulate Commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian

tribes...." The US has a complex set of criteria and a federal acknowledgement process each tribal organization must undergo to determine recognition eligibility. Anyone even minimally versed in Indian legal or political affairs is aware that federal recognition of an Indian tribe is a very serious matter" (Western History Collection).

From this letter, it is clear that she voices her opposition to the idea of state recognition of Indian tribes. She does not believe that the states posses the constitutional right to engage in such a process. In conjunction with this idea, she voices her support for the idea that Congress has plenary power over Indian affairs and as such is the sole actor with the power to recognize tribes. While this makes sense in that she does not favor so-called "spin off Cherokee groups" and is based upon sound reasoning defending the integrity of the modern day Cherokee Nation, she is also, albeit indirectly, reinforcing the notion of paternalism in that she argues that the federal government must play an active role in determining the establishing of Indian identity.

If paternalism is objectionable, then why have the federal government act as a fellow gatekeeper in determining Cherokee identity? Of course there are clear reasons for this. However, it cuts to the heart of the citizenship issue in that in the minds of the Freedmen and others who have had their citizenship denied or revoked, that modern Cherokee identity can sometimes be based less upon traditional values and norms of citizenship (such as clans or adoption into the tribe without regard for blood ties) and more upon the capricious views of individuals. Indeed, one can certainly argue that if the Cherokee Nation is motivated by a desire to return the Tribe to a more traditional definition of citizenship, then its preoccupation with "Indian Blood" is perhaps misguided as the traditional definition was not concerned with race or biology. Rather, as it has been demonstrated, one's inclusion into a clan notwithstanding issues of race or blood provided one their citizenship privileges.

Such a preoccupation with blood seems to be more in line with certain modern European nations such as Germany which requires those seeking full citizenship to demonstrate proof of German blood. Some have contended that the use of federally established rolls and or blood quantums provides evidence that modern tribal identity has been largely if not completely co-opted by the dominant society. They argue that for a modern tribal government to use what the federal government imposed upon it over 100 years ago as the basis for tribal membership represents

a departure from all traditional notions of tribal citizenship. They argue that these rolls and blood quantums were imposed by federal authorities at the beginning of the 20th century in the hope that by allotting Indian lands and by dividing them up among existing tribal members, the tribes would within a few generations become absorbed into the melting pot of American society.

However, others argue that tribes using rolls and blood quantums as a means by which to trace Indian decent have found an effective and fireproof way to maintain a perpetual Indian identity in the face of overwhelming assimilation. This is well evidenced in the differing enrollment requirements for the two federally recognized Cherokee bands in Oklahoma. Membership in the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokees requires a minimum blood quantum of ¼ Cherokee Blood. Conversely, membership in the Cherokee Nation only requires that one demonstrate descent from an Indian ancestor listed on the Dawes Rolls. Such a policy clearly makes the membership base of the Cherokee Nation not only larger, but also more stable and more likely to increase over time. Also, some Cherokee leaders argue that the traditional clan system mentioned throughout this work is not a feasible option by which to grant citizenship. This is due to the fact that the old clan structure has disintegrated over the years and many citizens are not able to determine their clan membership. Therefore, the Dawes Rolls constitute the most objective and therefore viable option by which to determine citizenship based upon Indian descent.

Finally, we can observe the possibility that today there are still many in contemporary society in general and some in Congress in particular who are hostile to the notion of expanded tribal sovereignty. Further, it should be remembered that these individuals, acting as strategic participants in the game of politics often times look for advantageous situations by which to strike a blow against tribes whenever and in whatever way they may find at their disposal. The issue of the Freedmen just might provide fuel for such an ideological fire. Under the guise of protecting the Freedmen descendants as American citizens from the excess of the Tribe, certain members of Congress have already threatened to reduce or entirely eliminate federal funding for the Cherokee Nation. An example of this concerns Congresswoman Maxine Waters (D) of California who has attempted to do so. Thus, the anger of anti-tribal forces may be rallied against the tribes in such a way that the Cherokee

Nation may never have foreseen. Such a conflagration might be directed against other tribes in a preemptive fashion as well and unleash a backlash of anti-tribal legislation from Capitol Hill. In this way, the Cherokee Nation might be following a policy of "cutting off its nose to spite its face." On the other hand, the advocates of tribal sovereignty within the Cherokee Nation can be understood when they claim again, that this is the proper time and proper place for the Tribe to assert itself.

Clearly, the Cherokee Nation has come a long way from clan to courts in terms of defining citizenship. But in the end, the issue of federal paternalism coupled with a difficulty in reconciling traditional views of polity and identity with modern realities of the Cherokee Nation's population seems to constitute the central problem in constructing the concept of modern Cherokee citizenship. Nonetheless, so long as the tribes rely upon federal recognition, they will always have to contend with paternalism in all of its oppressive manifestations be they in the form of regulations on the disposition of tribal properties, interference in dealing with the creation of tribal laws or the determination of tribal membership.

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A POLITICAL QUAGMIRE WITHIN THE OKLAHOMA WINE INDUSTRY

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The history of viticulture and vinification in Oklahoma began in the early 1890's. As time passed and Oklahoma achieved statehood in 1907, the stipulations laid down within the newly constructed state constitution forbade wineries from selling their products to anyone. In 1918, the United States (U.S.) created a prohibition on alcohol that would permeate all alcohol-related industries. In 1933, Prohibition ended nationally and many alcohol-related industries reopened. It was not until 1959, however, that Oklahoma repealed prohibition. Stagnated for the next forty years because they still could not sell their products right from the source, the grape growers and wine makers stepped forward in 1999 to urge Oklahoma legislators to change the Oklahoma statutes and allow wineries to sell/ship their products directly. In 2000, the Oklahoma populace voted to change the Oklahoma statutes. Roadblocks, however, continue to arise and hamper the growth of the industry in the state.

Before Oklahoma became a state, Oklahoma and Indian Territories had the beginnings of a vineyard and wine industry. As time passed and Oklahoma achieved statehood in 1907, the stipulations laid down within the newly constructed state constitution forbade wineries from selling their products to anyone. Indeed, when the United States (U.S.) in 1918 created a prohibition on alcohol that would permeate all alcohol-related industries throughout the forty-eight continental states, wine-making and for the most part grape-growing in Oklahoma ceased (Struby 2006). Prohibition ended nationally in 1933 and many alcohol-related industries reopened. It was not until 1959, however, that Oklahoma

repealed prohibition within the state constitution to allow the sale and distribution of "intoxicating liquors;" and the wine industry remained in a state of stagnation for the next forty years (Adcock 2007).

In the 1990s, grape growers and wine makers stepped forward to urge Oklahoma legislators to change the Oklahoma statutes back to the way laws were in the territory days and allow wineries to sell/ship their products directly (Nascenzi 2000). In 2000, Oklahoma legislators and voters changed the Oklahoma statutes in order to allow wineries to sell their products directly to retailers and restaurants (Struby 2006). Thus the Oklahoma wine industry began to pick itself up by the bootstraps—wineries and vineyards have blossomed all over the state, growing from only three registered in 2000 to 55 wineries in 2008. Roadblocks, however, continue to arise and hamper the growth of the industry in the state.

Older than any recorded history is the story of wine (Johnson and Robinson 2007). Hugh Johnson and Jancis Robinson, in *The World Atlas of Wine* (7th edition), assert that, while the Egyptians painted vivid pictures involving wine, it was the Phoenicians and Greeks who began wine production as we know it today (Johnson and Robinson 2007). In fact, the Vikings, circa 1000 AD, called America "Vinland for the profusion of native vines" (Johnson and Robinson 2007, 12). According to Tim Unwin, author of *Wine and the Vine: An Historical Geography of Viticulture and the Wine Trade*, when the European settlers came to America, they brought with them their cultural interest in the production and consumption of wine and took immediate advantage of the grape-growing potential in the New World (Unwin 1991). Although prone to "pests, disease, climatic extreme, and disaster," North America stands today as the world's second foremost wine manufacturer and purchaser; Europe easily holds the number one spot (Johnson and Robinson 2007, 290).

Working their way up to number two status, however, was a lengthy process for Americans. One reason, Johnson and Robinson explain, was that native American grapes made odd-tasting wines. To remedy this, Europeans began bringing their own vine clippings with them to America (Johnson and Robinson 2007; Johnson 2005). For 300 years Europeans attempted to grow their own native vines in their new homeland but they learned over time that diseases and pests ruined their crops almost as soon as they would plant them (Johnson and

Robinson 2007). Finally, in the 1800s, American enologists realized that instead of wasting time trying to grow foreign vines they needed to push a grape vine more accustomed to American pests, diseases, climatic extremes, and disaster (Johnson 2005). As a result, an effort to produce European/American hybrid grape vines began and America's wine industry has enjoyed success ever since (Johnson and Robinson 2007; Johnson 2005).

Hugh Johnson makes clear in *The Story of Wine* that "three things determine the direction of a new wine industry: its natural conditions; the techniques, traditions and intelligence brought to it by its pioneers; but more even than these, it is the market-place that points the way" (Johnson 2005, 195). What Johnson says makes sense and there lies the problem for Oklahoma winemakers. The basic legal issue of allowing the consumption of wine has been resolved; but many aspects of the wine-making business as a profit-making entity and of the nature of its marketplace have been inadequately addressed by Oklahoma lawmakers over the years, thus the failure to bolster the local industry (Ervin 2008). Oklahoma's twentieth and twenty-first century winemakers have increased their knowledge by attending oenological courses at various universities in the state and have continued to work hard to put their training to practice over the years, but Oklahoma lawmakers have not allowed them to develop and serve a broad enough marketplace (Francis-Smith 2008a).

The history of viticulture and vinification in Oklahoma began in the early 1890's when Edward B. Fairchild moved to Oklahoma Territory from New York. Fairchild was born to an uprooted English family that had introduced viticulture to Steuben County, New York. While Fairchild was growing up, he received unsurpassed oenological and vinification training from his father (Fisher 1977; Ruth 1974). In 1889, Fairchild went to Oklahoma to participate in the land run (Fisher 1977; Ruth 1974). Fairchild settled on a section of land in present day Oklahoma City; and, making use of his background in viticulture and enology, he proceeded to make the new territory a wine-producing territory (Ruth 1974). Fairchild planted grape vines in 1891 and shortly afterwards constructed a wine vault in the side of a hill, a structure that is still standing today (Fisher 1977; Ruth 1974).

By the time Fairchild finished planting his "Concord, Delaware, and Catawaba" grape vines, his vineyard was reported to be about 200

acres, an area which by 1900 would produce about 5,000 gallons per year (Fisher 1977, 141; Ruth 1974). Singularly, Fairchild's oenological training in New York allowed him to monopolize the wine industry in Oklahoma City; he had the product to supply all of Oklahoma Territory with his "uniformly considered," "choice quality" wine (Fisher 1977, 147; Ruth 1974). Interestingly, his wine business did so well that he was often not able to keep the wine for the entire fermentation process, normally a solid year (Fisher 1977). As Oklahoma neared statehood, however, Fairchild became ever more concerned about whether or not his success in the wine industry could continue (Fisher 1977; Ruth 1974).

By 1906, it was obvious to most that Oklahoma would soon become a state and that the new constitution would undoubtedly prohibit the sale and/or production of all alcoholic beverages in the state (Ruth 1974). Speculators were correct: the constitution, along with "the article on state-wide prohibition separately submitted to a vote of the people," passed on September 17, 1907, and became law on November 16, 1907—the day that President Theodore Roosevelt signed Oklahoma into the Union (Murray to Filson, letter, 1907, in Jekel, 31). Prohibition ended Fairchild's wine years in Oklahoma; exactly two weeks after statehood day, he sold his quarter section complete with vineyard and orchard (Fisher 1977; Ruth 1974). At the time, no other state possessed such stringent laws on alcoholic beverages; but, in a little over a decade, that would all change when Amendment XVIII would prohibit alcohol throughout the U.S.

During the ensuing years of prohibition, Oklahoma was far from being dry. A reporter for the *Tulsa World* searched the records and reported that Oklahoma was a "hotbed of illicit alcoholic activity during Prohibition, a clash of Bible Belt and Wild West mentalities" (Adcock 2007). Furthermore, the oil boom during the 1920s brought in workers and a need for "spirits to keep them happy" (Adcock 2007). Of the prohibition era, it is well known that few imbibers stopped drinking and that abuse of the law occurred on both sides of the law (Adcock 2007). In 1933 Amendment XXI ended the much-disobeyed and widely half-heartedly-enforced law. With the repeal, Oklahomans were able to buy 3.2 beer, considered by Oklahoma statute to be non-intoxicating; however, even though votes were taken in "1936, 1940, 1949, respectively, aimed at repealing the state's prohibition laws, intoxicating beverages were not legal in Oklahoma until 1959 and even after repeal there were many

restrictions on alcohol, some that last to this day" (Adcock 2007). Some states, like California, had been able to get a head start on developing and serving the all-important marketplace; and some of Oklahoma's neighboring states, like Missouri and Texas, became wine marketplaces for Oklahoma customers due to their inveterate cultural history in the wine making industry.

Oklahoma lagged behind in producing grapes and wine, both before and after the U.S. repeal of prohibition. California's wine industry, however, revived quickly after the repeal and helped spur a wine boom throughout the U.S. in the 1970s and 1980s, particularly after they beat France in a blind wine tasting in 1976. The wine industry began in California in 1769, the same year construction of the first mission occurred (Amerine 1962). With its Mediterranean-like climate, California was ideal for wine-growing and vineyards flourished there (Peters 1997). As a result, until nationwide prohibition became the rule, vineyards and their accompanying wineries dotted the Californian landscape (Peters 1997). Many wineries shut down in 1918 for almost two decades until the repeal in 1933 (Phillips 2000). Wineries then began to reopen, not only in California but also in other grape and wine producing states, such as Missouri and Texas.

Before Amendment XVIII, the Missouri grape and wine industry was even stronger then than it is today ("Missouri Wine Timeline"). Germans and Italians had migrated to northern, eastern, and southwestern Missouri and reported it excellent for grape growing. In fact, Missouri became the second largest grape growing state in the union in 1866. As a result, by the beginning of the 20th century, over 100 wineries dotted the Missouri landscape; but prohibition abruptly ended the thriving industry ("Missouri Wine Timeline"). The grape and wine industry would not begin to invigorate until the late 1960s and early 1970s in Missouri ("Missouri Wine Timeline;" Ruth 1987). During those years, Missourians revamped old vineyards and began producing succulent wines ("Missouri Wine Timeline;" Ruth 1987). Since 2000, Missouri's wine industry has thrived, "producing diverse, complex and sophisticated wines, wines that easily earn top awards in national and international competitions," but Missouri's wine industry does not enjoy as many Oklahoma visitors as do the wine makers in Texas ("Missouri Wine Timeline;" Ruth 1987; Lang 2000).

Johnson and Robinson say that Texas is the "botanical heart of

America—and can boast more indigenous grapevine species than any other region on earth;" and, before prohibition, Texas had the vineyards and wineries to bear that out (Johnson and Robinson 2007, 312). Prohibition eradicated Texas' entire commercial wine industry, just as it did in Oklahoma; but after 1933 Texas' grape and wine industry began a sluggish movement towards expansion (Johnson and Robinson 2007; "The History of Texas Wines;" Giordano 1984). By 1986, after Texas wineries began winning awards, Texas even entered the world wine stage, even though over sixty of the 254 counties in the state are dry counties today ("The History of Texas Wines"). Furthermore, the fact that Texas had so many dry counties did not stop Oklahomans from crossing the Red River to indulge their appetites for wine (Ruth 1987; Lang 2000). Possessing wine cultures that dated back to the 1800's enabled these states to return to their wine cultures more quickly (Johnson and Robinson 2007, 312; de Blij 1983). Oklahoma wine producers realized something needed to be done to get a better hold on the marketplace that seemed to be escaping them; the antiquated alcohol laws inscribed in the state's constitution continued to trouble the Oklahoma winery marketplace.

After the repeal of prohibition, each state obtained control over their own alcohol laws regarding right to use and sales (LaFond). However, attempting to change alcohol laws in Oklahoma was more difficult than in any other state because they were part of the state constitution (Ervin 2008). In 1999, Oklahoma grape growers pushed legislation to change a law in the state's constitution that would aid wineries in production and in sales by allowing them to sell directly to restaurants and retail stores; and in 2000 State Question 688 became part of the ballot (Jones 2000; 2005a). Oklahoma's grape growers and wine producers argued the benefits of the law. Former Enid State Representative Curt Roggow aided the winemakers by proposing the state question that "would remove a constitutional barrier that prevents local wineries from being successful, namely, a requirement that they may sell only to consumers on site or to wholesalers" (Jones 2000). He was one of many who realized by then the truth of what the Oklahoma Grape Growers and Winemakers Association states today: "Small wineries are important to rural economies. They generate capital investment, create jobs, spur tourism and economic development, advance farmland protection and discourage urban sprawl" and "in areas where

wineries flourish, restaurants, bed-and-breakfasts, inns, retail boutiques, farm and other craft businesses also succeed" (Nascenzi 2004; Averill, 2000; Ervin 2008). On November 7, 2000, Oklahomans voted and passed the state question, with a seventy percent approval ("Oklahoma Wine Current Issues;" Ervin 2000).

Oklahoma wineries then enjoyed the advantage of the return to the territory days statutes and winemakers began to take pleasure and profit in a beneficial trade within the state (Francis-Smith 2007a). Oklahoma's three-tier system for distributing alcoholic beverages (producer-wholesaler-retailer) turned into a two-tier system when wineries were able to ship directly to retail stores and restaurants; however, they were still not able to ship directly to individuals interstate or intrastate (Francis-Smith 2007a; Zizzo 2000). Unfortunately, in 2004 and 2005 angry wholesalers and retailers in other states raised questions for the U.S. Supreme Court to answer that would bring about change to the direct shipment statute yet again in Oklahoma (Struby 2006; Gearan 2004; Barber 2004). Winemakers in Oklahoma expected trouble in their own state when the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the wholesalers by confirming the U.S. Constitution "implicitly prohibits states from passing laws that discriminate against out-of-state businesses," a ruling that meant "if they are going to let in-state wineries ship directly to a customer, they must also let out-of-state wineries ship to the customer" and that would seem to affect the Oklahoma law that went into effect with the passage of State Question 688 (Associate Press 2004; Yen 2005; Hoberock 2005). This marked the beginning of another period of struggle as small grape growers and wine makers fought hard to regain and maintain ground and their marketplace. Attorney General Drew Edmondson at the time stated that Oklahoma's laws "may be challenged" (Staff Reports 2005). In August 2005, Edmondson offered the opinion that "Oklahoma wineries can ship wine to retail package stores and restaurants in the state but are prohibited from shipping their products directly to consumers;" even though Missouri allowed direct shipment to customers with a two case limitation per month per winery—in state or out of state—and Texas law limited direct-shipped wine to three gallons (2005b; "Missouri Wine Shipping Laws;" "Texas Wine Shipping Laws"). For Oklahoma, the expected trouble came in 2006 when three major Oklahoma wholesalers, Action Wholesale Liquors, Central Liquor, and Jarobe Sales Company, led by attorney Robert McCampbell, filed

suit stating that Oklahoma's State Question 688 contravened the Interstate Commerce Clause (Houghton 2006; Hoberock 2006). The federal court judge in Norman, on November 15, 2006, agreed with the wholesalers and with the Supreme Court decision and deemed the state law unconstitutional; instead of immediately striking down the law, however, the judge gave legislators, grape growers, and wine makers a chance to fix the problem by the deadline of June 2007 (Butler 2006; Marks 2006, Evans 2007; Francis Smith 2007b).

Wine makers were hopeful and urged their lawmakers to help them (Marks 2006). Oklahoma Grape Growers and Wine Makers Association President Gary Butler pleaded:

Wine distribution has been managed in Oklahoma in a way that's antiquated and stifles competition. Why not move forward, not backward? Why not a solution that favors the consumer's choice over wholesalers' controls? Why damage the small farm-based family owned businesses that employ thousands, either directly or indirectly? Why keep an antiquated distribution system that was created before computers and the Internet (Butler 2006)?

Gary Butler regarded this as a power struggle rather than a money issue; after all, Oklahoma wineries already contributed strongly to the Oklahoma economy (Snyder 2007). Butler went on to state that the businesses he represented "construct trellis systems from material purchased from Oklahoma vendors," buy agricultural chemicals and materials from Oklahoma companies, "irrigate vines with drip line and emitters supplied by fellow Oklahomans," purchase "tractors, all-terrain vehicles, trailers, fuel and fertilizer from Oklahoma agribusiness, purchase corks, bottles and labels from newly formed Oklahoma firms that believed in this new and vibrant agriculture sector," remunerate fees to attain permits and licenses that pump money back into Oklahoma, buy insurance, and expand Oklahoma's employment opportunities by hiring workers (Hoberock 2006; Snyder 2007). The industry was growing, up to forty-one wineries and over 300 vineyards in the state by 2006, and a change in the law was "vital for their survival" (Associated Press 2006; Marks 2006). Nonetheless, legislators failed to listen and most of the bills that might have assisted the small wineries and still might have met constitutional provisions sat untouched on legislators' desks while wholesalers' lobbyists raised their voices in Oklahoma's capitol building (Ervin 2008).

One bill survived. On April 24, 2007, Governor Brad Henry signed Representative Trebor Worthen's House Bill 1753 into law; the law reflects the typical attitude of the legislature:

The state's system of regulating the manufacture, distribution and sale of alcoholic beverages has served this state and its civilians well and has contributed to the economic growth and stability of this state. Changes in market dynamic and advances in technology may have altered the way the alcoholic beverage industry operates, but have not changed the state's desire for strict regulation (Francis-Smith 2007b; Mock 2007).

The law, which went into effect November 1, 2007, permitted shipping to out-of-state customers but not to in-state customers: "Oklahoma wineries may ship products manufactured in the state to consumers in other states, so long as the recipient is of legal age and the laws of the recipient's state allow such shipments" (Francis-Smith 2007b; Mock 2007; Evans 2007). That change, however, was not enough; so the federal court judge ended the uncertainty and changed the law in Oklahoma with his final ruling on June 15, 2007 (Evans 2007).

From 2000 to the middle of 2007, Oklahoma wine producers were able to take a giant step forward in the growth of their industry in the state. In 1999, before the state question passed, there were two licensed wineries in the state; today over fifty wineries and 400 vineyards dot the Oklahoma landscape (Struby 2006; Bledsoe 2008, 2). After the court decision in 2007, Oklahoma winemakers were stymied about their on again, off again rights to peddle their products; wineries had to rely on wholesalers to buy and resell their products but the wholesalers could buy or not buy whatever they pleased (Francis-Smith 2007b; Ervin 2007). As Gary Butler had pointed out, Oklahoma started out at a disadvantage because the market for wine "isn't as much a part of the state's heritage and history as it is in other states," but the state did not have to continue that way (Ervin 2008).

One attempt to help since then, first proposed in 2007 by Representative Jeff Hickman and most recently as proposed by Representative Don Armes, involves setting a "production cap" of 10,000 gallons for the requirement of using a wholesaler (Ervin 2008; Evans 2007; 2008; Francis-Smith 2008a; Francis-Smith 2008b). *The Journal Record* reports that wineries that produce more than 10,000 gallons would require a wholesaler because the "size of the operation would

make self-distribution impractical" (Francis-Smith 2008a; Francis-Smith 2008b). Currently in Oklahoma, about five wineries produce over 10,000 gallons, ten wineries produce between 5,000 and 10,000 gallons, and forty wineries are still below 5,000 gallons in production (Francis-Smith 2008a; Francis-Smith 2008b).

Since 2003, State Representative Danny Morgan had taken an interest in trying to boost the wine industry as a vital part of growth in the state (Ervin 2008; Snyder 2005; 2005c). Morgan asserted that trying to meet legal, wholesaler, and local winery owners' needs and concerns is tough; however, both this newly proposed production cap law, Senate Bill 995, and Joint Resolution 29, which would once again create a ballot item "asking voters to decide if wineries may sell directly to retailers and restaurants," had the support of the Oklahoma Farm Bureau (Francis-Smith 2008a; Francis-Smith 2008b; Jenkins 2008). Morgan believes that the Farm Bureau's view of wine as a "new cash crop" provides a different and more comprehensible point-of-view as winemakers try to influence lawmakers (Francis-Smith 2008a). Even though the bills sought to be constitutional and treat small out-of-state wineries the same, these bills seemed to be unlikely to pass because of cost effectiveness issues for out-of-state wineries (Francis-Smith 2008a; Francis-Smith 2008b; Jenkins 2008). To explain, out-of-state wineries, like local wineries, would be obligated to transport their merchandise to Oklahoma vendors in their own company vehicles; thus, an out-of-state winery would not be able to use a "common carrier" (Ervin 2008; Francis-Smith 2008a; Francis-Smith 2008b). Indeed, small winery owners who wanted to transport their products would also have to purchase compulsory transportation licenses and permits from the Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Laws Enforcement Agency (Francis-Smith 2008a; Francis-Smith 2008b). Obviously a California or New York winery would be unlikely to want to pay the additional expenses that would be required to transport their wines to Oklahoma.

On the 4 November 2008 ballot, Senate Bill 995 and Joint Resolution 29, became State Question 743 and passed by a margin of over 70 percent with support all across the state (Associated Press 2008). This new law allows in-state as well as out-of-state wineries that produce less than 10,000 gallons of wine a year to self-distribute to restaurants and liquor stores (Associated Press 2008). Presently few wineries in the state produce wine in excess of that amount (DelCour

2008). Other stipulations in the law will pose a few problems for these small businesses: every winery has to use a company vehicle, meaning that a common carrier can not be used, and delivery charges "must be identical for all customers regardless of transportation costs" (Associated Press 2008; DelCour 2008). This decision by the voters marks the beginning of another chapter in the history of the Oklahoma wine industry and another step forward in the protracted struggle to effect changes in the law. Indeed, parts of this change in the law may be put to the test of constitutionality just as the November 2000 law was (DelCour 2008). The outcomes of both the vote of 2000 and also the vote of 2008 have sent a message to local grape growers and wine producers that the people of the state support the industry.

Will Rogers once joked that they ought to pass an amendment "prohibiting anybody from learning anything" and that, if it worked the way it did for the prohibition of alcohol, he thought that "in five years we would have the smartest race of people on earth" (Adcock 2007). Clearly, prohibiting alcohol did not work out in this country; prohibiting winemakers from selling their products without going through a wholesaler was not working out for the wine industry in Oklahoma. Oklahoma certainly has made significant strides toward success in the first two requirements of Hugh Johnson's formula for winemaking success. When legislators and wholesalers come between supply and demand, however, Johnson's third and most important requirement becomes difficult to effectively realize. Consumers and producers then either reap the benefits or suffer the consequences. The return of what have been called "arcane," "antiquated," and "squirrelly" laws hampered Oklahoma's wine industry and the development of a strong marketplace (Ervin 2008). Wine producers continue to try their best to keep their concerns on the agendas of their lawmakers. However, Oklahoma legislators still treat this industry as a stepchild, and few legislators in the state want anything attributed to alcohol associated with their names as they campaign—the result is a mostly closed-door policy (Ervin 2008). Thus, with changing legal limitations on transporting in and out of state, new and small wineries must continue to make an effort to be seen and heard. Time will tell for the liquor laws in Oklahoma; in the meantime, Oklahoma winery owners must continue to work together to improve their products and advance their case for their fair share of the marketplace.

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BOOK REVIEW SECTION

Michael Lewis. 2010. *The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine*. New York: W.W. Norton Company. pp. 266. $27.95. ISBN 978-0-39-307223-5

The collapse of the subprime mortgage bond market and the resulting "Great Recession" produced tremendous outrage at the evident corruption and fraud, which has in turn fueled a cottage industry of elegant postmortems of the crisis.[1] Michael Lewis, one of the more entertaining observers of the financial world, has woven a story which captures the convoluted pathology of the U.S. investment banking system. Oklahomans concerned about the health of the financial industry are well advised to read *The Big Short* for an entertaining account of how a few traders spotted the bubble, and won enormous sums of money betting on when it would burst.

Lewis's first big book, *Liar's Poker* (1989) captured the manic quality of the "go go" Wall Street culture of the 1980's. In *The Big Short* (2010), he capitalized on relationships forged during his earlier career in the financial world to tell the story of the financial crisis from the perspective of a small group of money managers who had the foresight to see the subprime mortgage crisis coming, and who had the strength of will to resist the "follow-the-leader" Wall Street mentality that spawned the crisis. For seasoned financial observers, the mechanics of the story are familiar; as the "smart money" found themselves ensorcelled by the escalating complexity of the derivatives market, they

became ever more tolerant of the risks they were willing to take to justify their lavish compensation packages.

THE SHORT-SELLER AS HEROIC ACTOR

Lewis's narrative is driven by four constellations of characters. Greg Lippman occupied the role of the universally disliked and mistrusted Machiavellian insider, as he ruthlessly advocated shorting[2] the subprime mortgage bond in which his fellow bond traders at Deutsche Bank were heavily invested. Steve Eisman is cast as the "rebel bond trader," someone who, like Lewis, had become outraged at the casual way Wall Street fleeced middle-class investors; unlike Lewis, Eisman stayed in the game, and become something of an dark crusader against the fraudulent practices of the "originate and sell" mortgage companies like Aames and The Money Store. Some of the more entertaining passages of the book involve Eisman's sarcasm-laced denunciations of the mendacity and incompetence of Wall Street's leading figures. Eisman's putative subordinates, Vincent Daniel and Danny Moses, often found themselves watching in horrified fascination as Eisman ridiculed Wall Street's heavy hitters.'"There is always the possibility of embarrassment,' Danny said. 'But it's like watching a car crash. You can't *not watch.*'" (p. 231).

Michael Burry, a neurosurgeon-turned-fledgling-hedge fund manager whose blogging on investing strategies brought him to the attention of some large-scale investors, is the beating heart of Lewis's narrative. Burry's extensive email communications with investors documented his growing fixation on the inner workings of the bond market; reading through "dozens of prospectuses... looking for the dodgiest pools of mortgages," Burry did the spadework that should have been a matter of due diligence for any financial analyst, but which was increasingly disdained by large investment banks and hedge funds (p. 50). Several of the more dramatic moments in Lewis's narrative involve Burry's (who readers would discover later in the book suffered from Asperger Syndrome) struggle to cajole his investors to stick with his long-term plan of shorting the subprime mortgage bond market, betting that an historic cascade of mortgage defaults would trigger a massive downturn in the market. The short-sighted and prone-to-panic description of Burry's investors is a pregnant commentary on the contemporary

investor.

The fourth set of characters – Charlie Ledley, Jamie Mai, and Ben Hocket of Cornwell Capital, derided by the Wall Street culture as "garage band hedge fund" (p. 167) – stand as a kind of comic relief. They were largely peripheral players who were deliberately playing a game of investing in relatively low-risk long shots; however, the more Ledley, Mai, and Hocket investigated the "collateralized debt obligations" that were proliferating throughout the subprime mortgage bond market, the more convinced they became that a huge collapse of the market was likely. As Lewis described the reasoning of Cornwell Capital's investment team,

> A CDO, in their view, was essentially just a pile a triple-B-rated mortgage bonds. Wall Street firms had conspired with the rating agencies to represent the pile as a diversified collection of assets, but anyone with eyes could see that if one triple-B subprime mortgage went bad, most would go bad, as they were all vulnerable to the same economic forces. Subprime mortgage loans in Florida would default for the same reasons, and at the same time, as subprime mortgage loans in California. And yet fully 80 percent of the CDO composed of nothing but triple-B bonds was rated higher than triple-B: triple-A, double-A, or A. To wipe out any triple-B bond – the ground floor of the building – all that was needed was a 7 percent loss in the underlying pool of human loans. That same 7 percent loss would thus wipe out, entirely, any CDO made up of triple-B bonds, no matter what rating was assigned it (p. 129).

Part of what lends sardonic charm to Lewis's narrative is his effort to imbue this cast of short-sellers with the virtues typical of classical protagonists. Often portrayed as the carrion-eaters of the financial world, and often blamed by beleaguered CEO's like Ken Lay and Richard Fuld as inspiring panicked flights from laboring corporations, Lewis describes these figures as clear-eyed crusaders speaking truth to power.

THE "BIG CON" FEEDS A "DOOMSDAY MACHINE"

Lewis's narrative is constructed around images and metaphors. The dominant narrative metaphor is "the Big Con." The short-sellers are cast as the "sharps," who saw a state of affairs ripe for exploitation,

but in order to short the market, they needed to undertake a complex set of maneuvers in order to make the "big score." In search of a lever with which to bet against the derivatives market, Michael Burry discovered one in 2004: a little-known device known as the credit default swap:

> In the beginning, credit default swaps had been a tool for hedging: Some bank had loaned more than they wanted to General Electric because GE asked for it, and they feared alienating a long-standing client; another bank changed its mind about the wisdom of lending to GE at all. Very quickly, however, the new derivatives became tools for speculation: A lot of people wanted to make bets on the likelihood of GE's defaulting. It struck Burry: Wall Street is bound to do the same thing with subprime mortgage bonds, too. Given what was happening in the real estate market – and given what subprime mortgage lenders were doing – a lot of smart people eventually were going to want to make side bets on subprime mortgage bonds. And the only way to do it would be to buy a credit default swap (p. 30).

Seeing an opportunity, and having identified a vehicle for speculating on the impending failure of the subprime mortgage bond market, one problem remained: finding a significant player willing to take the other side of the bet. Unsurprisingly, this small band of short-sellers had little trouble finding investment banks to take the other side of these bets.[3] The "mark," in this case, initially appeared to be the elite institutions of Wall Street. Lewis notes, however, that a small number of short-sellers like Burry sensed that these institutions were not on the other side of these bets, but were middlemen passing along the swaps to another, shadowy player. According to Lewis, "Only a triple-A-rated corporation could assume such risk, no money down, and no questions asked. Burry was right about this, too, but it would be three years before he knew it" (p. 68).

Ultimately, the mark would be revealed: American International Group. AIG Financial Products had the two qualities needed to act as a safe harbor for risky financial investments: first, AIG was not a bank, and hence was unregulated, and second, AIG's executives were willing to "bury exotic risks on its balance sheet" (p. 69). As Lewis put it, in "a matter of months, AIG FP, in effect, bought $50 billion in triple-B-rated

subprime mortgage bonds by insuring them against default" (p. 71). As to the obvious question of why any financial institution would take on such risk, the conventional wisdom was that these collateralized debt obligations were safe bets to take. The consensus among Wall Street investors was that these derivatives had been configured in such a way as to distribute the risks, and they persuaded themselves that the ratings agencies that a nation-wide collapse of the subprime mortgage bond market was prohibitively unlikely; hence, their willingness to take the other side of a series of speculative bets that would turn out spectacularly bad for those institutions that were long in the derivatives market. So collateralized debt obligations were hedged with credit default swaps – the trading of which exploded as institutions and investors began using them for speculative purposes – which enabled institutions to engage in increasingly risk-laden investment strategies without having to hold currency in reserve to meet their obligations. The likelihood of these investments drawing scrutiny was remote; the deregulatory spirit moved through the SEC and other regulatory bodies, and had even survived the political earthquake of the 2006 midterm elections that swept Democrats into power in Congress. The resulting leveraging of these major institutions would expose these institutions to existential risks; a state of affairs that many CEO's of the investment banking community would later confess that they did not understand.

Part of Lewis's skill lies in clearly describing how these complex derivatives were packaged:

> Having gathered 100 ground floors from 100 different subprime mortgage buildings (100 different triple-B-rated bonds), they persuaded the rating agencies that these weren't, as they might appear, all exactly the same things. They were another diversified portfolio of assets! This was absurd. The 100 buildings occupied the same floodplain; in the event of flood, the ground floors of all of them were equally exposed. But never mind: The rating agencies, who were paid fat fees by Goldman Sachs and other Wall Street firms for each deal they rated, pronounced 80 percent of the new tower of debt triple-A (p. 73).

The agents at Moody's and Standard and Poor do not come off as heroes in *The Big Short*. One As Wall Streeter sneered, "Guys who can't get a job on Wall Street get a job at Moody's" (p. 98).

Another important image – the game of "follow the leader" – captured the logic driving the conventional wisdom among the traders going long on subprime mortgage bonds. To illustrate, Lewis describes a dinner party in 2007 arranged by Greg Lippmann in which Lippmann very consciously seated a CDO manager named Wing Chau. According to Lewis, Chau, "spoke to Eisman in a tone of condescension. *I know better* (p. 143). Chau, who described himself as a "CDO manager," appeared to fundamentally misunderstand the nature of the risks he was taking on in purchasing CDO's; thinking that his role in the market was simply to maximize the cash for which his group was holding, he saw short-sellers like Eisman as helping to drive more business his way. As Eisman related, "He says to me, 'The more excited that you get that you're right, the more trades you'll do, and the more trades you do, the more product for me" (p. 143).

The conversation with Chau clarified Eisman's picture of the scope of problem in the financial sector; where most economists describe a variance between investment and intrinsic value as a "bubble," Eisman described the subprime mortgage bond market as a "doomsday machine." "They weren't satisfied getting lots of unqualified borrowers to borrow money and buy a house they couldn't afford"; instead, Eisman realized that the entire industry was complicit in multiplying the initial fraudulent loans hundreds of times over, creating the illusion of massive profits. The compulsion to join in the game was overpowering, drawing in the huge government corporations Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, who had aggressively lobbied Congress to take on huge sectors of the prime mortgage bond market, and was rapidly moving into the subprime market as well.

THE DENOUEMENT: LETTING GO OF THE BALLOON

In the early months of 2007, subprime mortgages began defaulting at an escalating rate, which began attracting media attention, and Lewis's short-sellers watched with increasing impatience as the market failed to correct in the face of mounting evidence of a massive collapse. As Michael Burry struggled to persuade his investors that his seemingly arcane long-term bet would eventually pay off, and the other short-sellers were wondering who or what was propping up the market, Morgan Stanley's Howie Hubler purchased $16 billion "in triple-A-rated

CDOs, composed entirely of triple-B-rated subprime mortgage bonds, which became valueless when the underlying pools of subprime loans experienced losses of roughly 8 percent" (p. 206). The imagery of musical chairs captures the essence of what happened when the marketplace collectively realized that the repackaging of loans had not actually "converted lead into gold," as Lewis described the mortgage repackaging; in the game playing out in 2007, bond traders like Howie Hubler and AIF FP's Joe Cassano were left standing when the music stopped.

Eventually, all the major Wall Street firms came to recognize the extent of their exposure to the subprime mortgage loan market's cascading implosion, and between February and June of 2007 began to frantically attempt to hedge themselves away from the blast zone. Lewis uses a particularly effective metaphor to capture the collective circumstance in which Wall Street found itself:

> In the murky and curious period from early February to June 2007, the subprime mortgage market resembled a giant helium balloon, bound to earth by a dozen or so big Wall Street firms. Each firm held its rope; one by one, they realized that no matter how strongly they pulled, the balloon would eventually lift them off their feet. In June, one by one, they silently released their grip (p. 209).

Here again the imagery of a mindless, panic-stricken game of "follow-the-leader" captures the final months before tens of thousands of defaults tore through the veil of ignorance posing as conventional wisdom on Wall Street. Beginning with Deutsche Bank's $1.2 billion claim against Morgan Stanley in late July of 2007, people long in the market realized too late the extent of their exposure to the rapidly imploding subprime mortgage bond market.

THE FALLOUT: NOAH DURING THE FLOOD

Short-sellers in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the subprime mortgage market had two fears. On the one hand, short-sellers were fearful that a massive government intervention would cause a rebound in the market; on the other hand, they were equally fearful that

the institutions with whom they had lodged their bets would collapse, wiping them out in the process. Fortunately, in the emerging panic the short-sellers had exactly what the big institutions long in the market desperately needed: credit default swaps. Holding a commodity for which most of Wall Street was in frantic demand, Charlie Ledley noted that it was "the first time we're seeing any prices that reflect anything close to like what they're really worth... We had positions that were being valued by Bear Sterns at six hundred grand that went to six million *the next day*" (p. 221).

Lewis combines two compelling images to capture the precarious situation in which his protagonists found themselves when the entire economy appeared on the verge of collapse:

> Greg Lippmann had imagined the subprime mortgage market as a great financial tug-of-war: on one side pulled the Wall Street machine making the loans, packaging the bonds, and repackaging the worst of the bonds into CDOs and then, when they ran out of loans, creating fake ones out of thin air; on the other side, his noble army of short sellers betting against the loans. The optimists versus the pessimists. The fantasists versus the realists. The sellers of credit default swaps versus the buyers. The wrong side versus the right. The metaphor was apt, up to a point: this point. Now the metaphor was two men in a boat, tied together by a rope, fighting to the death. One man kills the other, hurls his inert body over the side – only to discover himself being yanked over the side (pp. 226-227).

For Steve Eisman, the bets amounted to a series of insults aimed at arrogant institutions, but by 2008 he began to realize that the systemic risk might not just *hurt* the big investment firms like Bear Sterns and Lehman, but might also hurt the entire financial system, and could indeed cause its destruction. He noted to Lewis that his position was "sort of like the flood's about to happen and you're Noah. You're on the ark. Yeah, you're okay. But you are not happy looking out at the flood. That's not a *happy* moment for Noah" (p. 227).

By 2007, the guys at Cornwall Capital were convinced that a massive amount of fraud was being perpetrated within the subprime mortgage bond market, and were sufficiently concerned that they approached the Securities and Exchange Commission. Reading *The Big Short* leaves the reader convinced that SEC officials were generally clueless; in Lewis's narrative,

the SEC enforcement agents listened politely, but Ledley, Mai, and Hockett came to the conclusion that the agents could not wrap their minds around the complexity of the transactions taking place. As Ledley relates: "It was almost like a therapy session… We probably had this wild-eyed we've-been-up-for-three-days-straight look in our eyes… but they didn't know anything about CDO's, or asset-backed securities. We took them through our trade but I'm pretty sure they didn't understand it" (p. 166).

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Lewis is a talented storyteller, and he displays a real felicity for relating complex financial interactions using easily comprehended images and metaphors. The story that Lewis wanted to tell is undoubtedly a story that will resonate with a wide audience, and he is displays real skill in identifying and emphasizing character traits that connect his protagonists to the reader. For example, a writer with less aptitude might have struggled to render an affirmative portrait of the brash and opinionated Steve Eisman. Lewis succeeds by recognizing the Eisman's motivations, and encouraging the reader to look beneath Eisman's brusque exterior. In contrast, Lewis takes the opposite tack in his portrayal of Michael Burry, conveying real sensitivity to Burry's evident discomfort at human contact by holding back crucial information about Burry's Asperger's Syndrome until the latter half of the book.

However, Lewis's storytelling panache comes at a price. Certainly, Lewis is not the go-to guy for constructive depictions of Wall Street and its culture. Perhaps more importantly, readers seeking a careful analysis of the sequence of events that caused the subprime mortgage market to collapse, and a judicious apportionment of culpability to various suspects, will not find it in Lewis's narrative. For example, Lewis quickly loses interest in the regulators and the ratings agencies – major factors in the collapse – apparently because their role was so predictable. A nonfiction writer more interested in explanation than entertainment might have made different narrative decisions.

In conclusion, *The Big Short* is an entertaining and illuminating story about how a small band of investors saw the collapse coming, and whose foresight enabled them to survive and thrive despite Wall Street's near failure. Lewis's intuitive grasp of financial arcana, and his ability to discern the nuances of character and how they drive a

narrative marks him as the foremost chroniclers of the financial world. This book makes a valuable contribution to understanding what went wrong with Wall Street, and provides readers with a necessary counterpoise of skepticism to the cheerleaders at the business cable networks like CNBC and FOX Business.

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NOTES

[1] See, for example, Roger Lowenstein (2010) The End of Wall Street, New York, Penguin Press; Scott Patterson (2010), The Quants: How a New Breed of Math Whizzes Conquered Wall Street and Nearly Destroyed it, New York, Crown Business; Andrew Ross Sorkin (2009), Too Big toFail, New York, Viking Adult; Gregory Zuckerman (2009), The Greatest Trade Ever, New York, Broadway Business.

[2] For readers unversed in the vocabulary of investing, "going short" means that you are betting that a company or a sector of the industry will lose money. Conversely, "going long" means that an investor is betting that the stock they buy will increase in value.

[3] Later, Lewis would effectively use the imagery of another game– tug-of-war – to illustrate the interplay between short- and long-sellers.

Bullock, Charles S. and Ronald Keith Gaddie. 2010. *Georgia Politics in a State of Change*. Boston: Pearson Publishers. pp. 208. $24.80. ISBN 978-0-20-570685-3

Charles Bullock (University of Georgia)and Keith Gaddie (University of Oklahoma) author this brief but informative text. Professor Bullock is a senior scholar on Georgia and Southern politics, and has a written or coauthored numerous articles and books on these subjects. Professor Gaddie goes back to his Georgia roots to coauthor with his mentor Bullock. Gaddie is a familiar face as he is a frequent commentator or author on issues pertaining to Oklahoma politics and his work with the *Almanac of Oklahoma Politics*. His particular areas of expertise are Southern politics, elections and political behavior, and public policy. Gaddie will also author a forthcoming work from the University of Oklahoma Press, *Red State Rising*. The authors have also previously worked together on *The Triumph of Voting Rights in the South, Elections to Open Seats in the U.S. House* and *David Duke and the Politics of Race in the South.*

Georgia Politics in a State of Change is the kind of text on state politics that would benefit every state and its political science community. It provides an excellent historic context that the reader not steeped in either Southern or Georgia politics needs. The authors' development of the text is well supported by data or case studies, rather than depending

on sweeping generalizations that sometimes plague a text such as this. The book is densely written. The authors manage to provide the reader with a wealth of information and an economy of words.

The strongest portion of the text is its discussion of electoral issues and the root causes of their change. The authors methodically chronicle the upswing of the Republican Party and the decline of the once dominant Democratic Party. The Oklahoma reader will note a great deal of similarity to those changes in our state. The discussion of race and gender is likewise engrossing. The authors are clearly expert and comfortable dealing with race as an issue. Another thing I felt very satisfied with was the way Bullock and Gaddie are able to discuss the electoral geography in a way which the more novice readers can understand and apply to trends. The coverage of institutions of government was sound, especially the historic evolution of the branches to current day issues and conflicts. The authors consistently provide enough detail to for the reader to identify and understand the fault lines of Georgia politics, both past and present.

While this is a superior effort by the authors, it is not without shortcomings. Some readers might find the writing style distracting. While the writing is tersely academic, it is sprinkled with folksy examples and case studies that lighten the otherwise pedantic tone. Like Oklahoma, Georgia has its share of colorful characters, and their inclusion is probably necessary to gain a holistic perspective of Georgia's political landscape; however, at times it appears there is a battle taking place within the narrative between the academic and the homespun.

Another complaint is the paucity of policy analysis. There is one lone chapter on education, and while the discussion is worthwhile there are no other chapters specifically devoted to public policy. Consequently, political scientists and policy analysts are likely to find that the book ends rather abruptly, leaving some readers wanting more. This truncated treatment stands in stark contrast to the smooth transitions that characterize the rest of the book.

As an Oklahoman reading *Georgia Politics in a State of Change* two things stand out. One is that one can place Oklahoma next to Georgia and understand the southern strain apparent in Oklahoma politics, as well as the ways in which Oklahoma and its politics are a hybrid, not just southern. The second is the frank discussion of racial politics and its impact. It is one thing to have a general grasp of race and politics in

Jeff Sharlet. 2008. *The Family: The Secret Fundamentalism at the Heart of American Power.* New York, New York: Harper Collins. pp. 454. $29.95. ISBN-978-0-06-055979-3

In 2010, Dr. George Alan Rekers became the latest of Christian Conservative leaders to make a very public fall from grace. As one of the leading voices in the movement that aims to bring America back to a strong moral foundation, Dr. Rekers tried to explain his actions, which involved a ten-day European vacation with a male prostitute as his only traveling companion. The doctor has said that he hired the young man, whom he contacted from the website *rentboy*, to carry his luggage for him on the trip and to counsel his companion on the virtues of a healthy heterosexual life. Since then, many of Rekers' associates distanced themselves as his explanations became increasingly untenable. Rekers' *bona fides* as a Christian Conservative clearly show he has been at the forefront of the Christian Conservative movement. A Baptist minister, Rekers co-founded the Family Research Council with James Dobson in 1993. He was also a prominent member of the National Association for Research and Therapy on Homosexuality (NARTH), which advocates therapy on gay teenagers in order to cure them of their sexual orientation, and had been hired as a consultant for Republican office

*For clarity, references to the book *The Family* will be italics, and references to the actual group "The Family" will be in quotations.

holders on the possibility of converting homosexuals. In the wake of a series of improprieties on part of religious figures such as Jimmy Swaggart, Jim Baker, and Ted Haggard, the question has arisen as to whether religious conservatism can survive as a plausible influence in American politics.

Jeff Sharlet provides one perspective in his book *The Family: The Secret Fundamentalism at the Heart of American Power*. Published in 2008, *The Family** is part investigative journalism, part historical thesis, and part political analysis. *The Family* makes an important contribution to understanding how Christian fundamentalism has exerted such significant influence in American culture and politics.

For example, Sharlet writes that scandal does not destroy American fundamentalism, "rather, like a natural fire that purges the forest of overgrowth, it makes the movement stronger" (Sharlet, 2010: 322). The scandal *du jure* at the time of Sharlet's book was the downfall of Pastor Ted Haggard from Colorado. Haggard, who at the pinnacle of his power talked to President George W. Bush via conference call each Monday, was caught with methamphetamine and a male prostitute. For the believers, this just means that Haggard was doing great work and getting under the Devil's skin. The more powerful the Christian, the greater the temptation, hence the greater likelihood that sin will befall the devout. To the megachurch activists, these actions show the human frailties that can only be mended by God. However, Sharlet notes that finding the true way of life is not an act of individual discovery but an acceptance to follow the path cleared by trailblazers: the economic and political elites.

Sharlet begins his book with an introduction to "The Family" by describing his own experiences as an intern for this communal organization. Sharlet worked during the day cleaning up the rooms at places called "The Ceders" or "Ivanwald" in northern Virginia or the "C Street House" found in Washington DC. These establishments exist for political leaders to relax and to have Bible study and to also get below-market rent as in the case for the C Street House (Boston, 2009: 175). At night, Sharlet took notes of his observations and conversations with other interns in the Bible studies with members of "The Family," including the group's reputed leaders, Doug Coe.

Coe has led the family since 1966. Sharlet describes Coe as a man that advocates a transition to a comfortable, accepting type of "soft

authoritarianism" for the United States. Coe believes the path to this Christian paradise will be built through submission to Jesus and his earthly representatives, such as Coe himself. Once people "soften their hearts to authority," they will naturally lose interest in democracy, since it only fosters rebelliousness (Sharlet, p. 40). Sharlet documents how attractive this vision has been to conservatives by noting the number of elected officials that have taken up residence Ivanwald.

Anti-democratic religious groups would warrant little concern if they were confined to backwoods America, and remained small and isolated in their membership. Sharlet describes the "The Family" as a powerful, almost sinister group that works behind the scenes as a lobbying organization for many of the world's most infamous despots. Some of the twentieth century's best-known *generalissimos* such as Costa e Silva of Brazil, Suharto of Indonesia, and Park Chung Hee of South Korea all used their connections with "The Family" to get funding and military hardware from Washington to strengthen their regimes. Sharlet uses this group's support for autocrats as for his contention that Christian conservatism of this stripe is less a religion of charity and equality and more a religion of obeisance to the wealthy and powerful.

Sharlet delves into the growth of Christian fundamentalism throughout the text. In the process he answers the question how this segment of Christianity supports the rich and powerful rather than mistrusts them. Any reading of the New Testament would suggest that Christianity would find the excesses of capitalism to be damaging to the soul and harmful to one's fellow man. However, Sharlet documents how American fundamentalism, a Christian belief that followers should adhere to the "fundamentals" of the faith and avoid sectarian confusion, has evolved from "liberation to authoritarianism"(Sharlet, p. 4).

Sharlet writes that in the 1920s Billy Sunday, the Joel Osteen of his day, preached the prosperity gospel and that God loves the wealthy, setting the stage for the founder of "The Family," Abraham Vereide. A Norwegian immigrant, Vereide fell in love with the United States and the opportunities it could bring. What he loved most about his newly adopted country were the rich folks. He served as a missionary to them and counseled them not to give up their wealth but to carry the yolk of the powerful and to take care of the poor, much like a *caudillo* would be expected to take care of the peons in Mexico. Sharlet finds the best way to describe Vereide's world view by using the man's own

words: "To the big man went strength, to the little man went need. Only the big man was capable of mending the world"(p. 89). Vereide's family has been helping "big men" govern the world for well over seventy years.

Sharlet's research hypothesis—that would-be authoritarians are hiding in plain sight in the nation's capital—should concern anyone who believes in democracy. Such a statement is histrionic for those who believe democracy and pluralism still rule America. But are democracy and pluralism the governing forces of this country because the elites tell us so? As C. Wright Mills writes in his pivotal work The Power Elite, "many who believe that there is no elite, or at any rate none of any consequence, rest their argument upon what men of affairs believe about themselves, or at least assert in public" (Mill, 1959: 5). We find from Sharlet's investigative journalism that the assertions made in private by elites are not so democratic. For political scientists, Sharlet supplements the arguments made within our own research community that democracy is not in control of this country (Winters and Page, 2009: 744).

Of even greater concern for democrats in Oklahoma is the fact that so many prominent politicians of this state are active with "The Family." Former Senator Nickles and Senators Inhofe and Coburn have strong ties to Doug Coe and his organization. In fact a former aid of Senator Nickles' is quoted in *The Family* as pining for the day when a kingdom of believers would be established in America (Sharlet, p. 6). It is always paradoxical for a free country to debate how much freedom should be allowed for those who wish to take away freedom. Following Madison's admonition in *Federalist 10,* the best way to deal with antidemocrats in a democracy is to shed light on their practices and beliefs. This is Sharlet's most important contribution. Sharlet does not want this powerful network to be destroyed. That would only cause the group go deeper underground and behind the scenes or it would help the group make the case that its persecution shows how Satan is alive and well in the United States. Instead Sharlet advocates that "The Family" be exposed for what it truly is, which is another lobbying group. For all the handshakes, smiles and Bible studies, "The Family" turns out to be one more interest group with the intent to keep the rich and powerful , more rich and more powerful. Jeff Sharlet's *The Family* describes the marriage between religion and politics and how the offspring are a privileged lot. This reminds us that preservation of democracy requires

constant vigilance. But democracy cannot be preserved, let alone strengthened, unless the democrats know what they are up against. Sharlet lets us know, and that makes his research vital.

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Kevin J. Fernlund. 2009. *Lyndon B. Johnson and Modern America.* Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press. pp. xii, 175. $24.95. ISBN 978-0-806-14077-3

Kevin Fernlund offers a superb analysis of Lyndon Baines Johnson's western roots and President Johnson's expansive view of presidential leadership. Fernlund creates an insightful account of American political leadership, its potential and its limitations. Fernlund engages the reader with a readable prose and illuminating observations about the making of the man Lyndon and the government's role in developing western potential. President Johnson saw the west as a great desert lacking in infrastructure. In order to achieve its full potential, the government would have to redirect resources westward in order to exploit the land and favor the people. The iconic view of western independence needed government assistance. Johnson wasted little effort to make it happen.

President Johnson expanded this template of government assisting those in need and applied it to Vietnam. The Vietnamese needed help and Johnson wasted no time coming to their assistance. Fernlund's analysis asserts that one of the greatest Senatorial leaders ever to grace the halls of Congress found himself in a tsunami of trouble in Southeast Asia. One of Fernlund's best traits is the care he takes in explaining the initial attractiveness of LBJ's vision, and his sensitivity in describing the innate limitations of LBJ's appeal. Undergraduates in particular would benefit considerably from Fernlund's treatment of the fragile nature of

mass appeal, and how quickly wild popularity can be converted to visceral contempt in the fickle collective mind of the American electorate.

Fernlund asserts that Johnson's first big mistake was to leave the Senate and his second big mistake was to quit his 1968 reelection bid. The reader must ponder the magnitude of these mistakes. How far can a leader rise before they achieve incompetence? How much can government do to make things better? Moreover, how much change will citizens accept before they find a voice of resistance? These questions certainly seem relevant today. Hence, Fernlund's historical analysis speaks with particular force to the dilemmas facing our current president.

Fernlund summarizes Johnson's administration with the same fairness that Michael P. Riccards does in his Ferocious Engine of Democracy. Riccards and Fernlund both give credit where credit is due and do not hesitate to provide constructive criticism. Graduate students will not fail to find good analysis on numerous issues. Johnson provided sound leadership in the aftermath of the assassination of JFK, and while Johnson was adept at reading the political mood of the country, he often reached too far. He saw where the country needed to go, but was not so adept in handling the backlash and rejection.

Johnson saw the hidden flaws of poverty, racism, ignorance plaguing an otherwise affluent society. Fernlund addresses Johnson's willingness to enter into the struggle for meaningful racial equality. Many resisted and many demanded even greater reforms. Fernlund observes that the race riots of 1966 comprised a sort of revenge of rising expectations. The author is quite good at identifying the limits of power.

I would urge readers to consider Fernlund's thesis that leaders must lead and not quit when the road rises steeply to challenge them. LBJ's earthquake was the accumulation of years of change and activism that seemed too much for too many. 1968 appears to be the crescendo that stopped westward expansion 200 miles west of Hawaii and not all the way to Hanoi. It also awoke a growing sense of resistance to activist government. Fernlund's treatise will help the reader digest these limitations of government action.

Fernlund amply substantiates his claim that Johnson's vaulting ambitions in Vietnam and with the Great Society was halted by myriad forces. Fernlund enters into his prologue and speculates as to whether Johnson may have given in too early and too readily to protests. I applaud

Fernlund for venturing into the realm of the hypothetical. Scholars with their reasoned insights need to help reader's with the "what if's." In this case, Fernlund's analysis seems sound. Humphrey almost beat Nixon in 1968, and LBJ as the incumbent had an even better chance of success than Humphrey. American history would have been different, and much improved, according to Fernlund's projection, if President Johnson, instead of discovering his limitations, had recalled his stubborn will.

I wholeheartedly recommend Fernlund's book for anyone interested in presidential politics, 1960's policy development and the Vietnam era. Readers at all levels will find it a well-paced and intriguing read.

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