

OKLAHOMA POLITICS

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REPRESENTATION ON THE OKLAHOMA DEMOCRATIC PARTY'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE: ONE PERSON/ONE VOTE?

THEODORE M. VESTAL
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In the 1980s the Democratic party went through a series of reforms that restricted autonomy of state parties and democratized delegate selection for presidential nomination conventions. Between 1985 and 1988 rural and urban factions of the Democratic party of Oklahoma struggled over the question of one person/one vote in representation in the State Central Committee (SCC). The matter was resolved only when the Democratic National Committee threatened to bar a delegation from Oklahoma at the 1988 national convention unless the SCC was apportioned in accordance with the national party's constitution. The SCC was reconstituted on more democratic lines, and the state party, operating under a new constitution, has enjoyed a more united leadership. The struggle to reapportion the Democratic party of Oklahoma looms as the most important episode in the organization's fifty year history.

The Democratic Party, through reforms of the McGovern-Fraser Commission and its successors in the 1970s, restricted the autonomy of state parties and democratized delegate selection processes for the presidential nomination conventions. Most of these reforms were upheld in court decisions, further solidifying the new found authority of the national party. The confederated structure of the party, in which each state was sovereign in internal affairs, gave way to a centralized national authority on questions of representation and participation. By the early 1980s, the national Democratic party generally had achieved organizational reform throughout the country, and almost all state central committees were more representative of the rank and file membership.

Between 1985 and 1988, Oklahoma was the scene of a prolonged struggle over representation in the linchpin of the state Democratic party organization, the State Central Committee (SCC). This battle was the culmination of a longstanding feud between urban and rural factions—what former National Committeewoman Lou Watkins describes as the "most feared, divisive issue going back to the 1960s." At various times in the clash, the contestants were divided into two great camps on the basis of socioeconomic status, the faction in power versus the

faction out of power, and by ideology into liberals and conservatives. For three years, the conflict rocked the foundations of the party, drained energies of the faithful activists, and diverted their efforts from more important matters. The result was a more "democratic" SCC and a more unified party, but the toll on human capital had been debilitating.

THE URBAN CHALLENGE

The constitution of the Democratic Party of Oklahoma was adopted in 1921. The document reflected and reinforced the political power of rural interests that dominated state and local government at that time. Representation was by county rather than on the basis of population, the same scheme of representation used in the original Senate of the State of Oklahoma. Each county had an equal number of representatives on the SCC. This insured that rural party officials were overrepresented in the supreme governing body of the Democratic Party of Oklahoma. Although the number of registered Democrats and party votes in urban areas grew dramatically in the years after World War II, rural malapportionment in the SCC continued into the 1980s and remained an anomaly in the era of reform by the national Democratic party.

In 1985 the SCC had 259 members; 234 came from three-member county executive committees of the 77 counties and the special "Eastern Oklahoma County" created by the Oklahoma Democratic Party in 1969 to participate in party activities. In addition there were three members from each of the state's six Congressional districts, three state party officers, two national committee persons, and two national committee members-at-large.

In 1973, 1975, and again in 1977, urban Democrats brought suit to reapportion the Oklahoma State Democratic Party in Federal District Court (*Todd v. Oklahoma State Democratic Central Committee*, 361 F Supp 491 (1973); *Hunt et al. v. Democratic Party of Oklahoma*, 439 F Supp 788 (1977)). In all instances, the court held that it lacked jurisdiction to decide the issue, which was a "political question," and denied plaintiffs relief. The court ruled that the state party had the sole power to reapportion itself. Because the State of Oklahoma had "light" regulation of political parties, the Democratic Party could not be considered a part of the state's operation. Thus the urban plaintiffs found themselves in the same predicament as urban voters attempting

to change malapportioned legislatures prior to *Baker v. Carr*, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). All that needed to be done was to get rural interests to give up their power—not a very likely prospect in light of their having enjoyed dominance within the party for more than half a century.

In 1983 a dissatisfied contingent of urban Democrats turned to the Democratic National Committee (DNC) as the only body that might move the SCC to action. Representatives of the Democratic party of Oklahoma County, led by Professor Tim Mauldin of the History and Political Science Department, Oklahoma City University, brought a challenge against the Oklahoma Delegate Selection Plan of 1984, based on malapportionment of the Oklahoma Democratic Party. The challenge was withdrawn, in part, to insure harmony during the Presidential election year, but also because of a promise by the officers of the Oklahoma Democratic Party to diligently pursue reapportionment. The DNC gave the state party until March 1985 to reapportion, but no action was taken.

On 23 April 1985, a challenge to the credentials of the Oklahoma State Party officers as voting members of the DNC was filed by Mauldin on behalf of the Democratic Party of Oklahoma County. The petition requested the DNC to uphold its earlier challenge by withholding seating of the Oklahoma State Chair Jim Frasier and Co-Chair Betty Hall until "new elections are conducted by the Democratic party of Oklahoma" (Statement, 1985) under rules consistent with the Charter and By-Laws of the DNC. The Oklahoma County petition stated that the SCC was "malapportioned to the point that a minority of registered Democrats (21%) ... control the Party organization" (Statement, 1985). The petition pointed out that SCC malapportionment discriminated against a majority of Party members in Oklahoma, against a majority of Democratic voters, and against key constituencies including blacks, Hispanics, Native Americans, and labor (Statement, 1985).

The Credentials Committee of the Democratic National Committee held a hearing on the Oklahoma County challenge on 24 June 1985. Urban Democrats maintained that inequities in representation on the SCC made some votes worth far more than others. Statistics backed up that claim. In the most extreme instances, the Democratic voters in the previous gubernatorial and presidential elections from Cimarron County carried 111 times the value of the votes from Oklahoma County. Furthermore, the 12 most populous counties that make up only 15% of

the SCC contained more than half the State's population and registered Democrats, 60% of the civilian labor force, 61% of the Hispanics, 76% of the blacks, and 40% of the Native Americans (Statement, 1985).

The Oklahoma County Party submitted its own SCC reorganization plan asking that the DNC require the Oklahoma Democratic Party to adopt it. The oral presentation of the challenge concluded by stating that the DNC's charter "calls very strongly and clearly for fairness based upon one person/one vote" (Transcript, 1985, p. 17). Opponents of the challenge contended that the Oklahoma State Officers should be seated since the SCC had scheduled an autumn meeting that would address the malapportionment problem and "cure the inequities" (Transcript, 1985, p. 26). When pressed by the committee chair to address the one man, one vote issue, the opponents' main contention was that the Oklahoma Democrats should be allowed to clean their own house "with a plan which is a consensus of all Democrats and not one county dictating to 76 others" (Transcript, 1985, p. 24).

The Credentials Committee voted unanimously to withhold seating of the Oklahoma State officers until new elections were conducted by a more representative body. Chairman Tom McGee bluntly warned the Oklahoma delegation: "Goddamit, don't come back unless and until you've done the one man/one vote, and that's it" (Transcript, 1985, pp. 44-45).

RURAL FACTION RESPONSE: THE SAM PLAN

The Oklahoma SCC immediately set about developing plans to restructure the State party leadership. Rather than working on a single joint plan, representatives of various factions developed their own models with little consultation with other groups. All of the plans provided for amendments to the state party constitution. A two-thirds majority vote of the SCC was required to ratify an amendment. Five different plans were given serious consideration by the SCC. These plans were:

1. The Oklahoma County challengers' plan greatly enlarged the SCC size to 1,315 members. This one person/one vote plan was calculated on the basis of one delegate for every 1,000 registered Democrats in each county (with a minimum three-person delegation from each county).

Jim McGoodwin, an Oklahoma City attorney, drafted the Oklahoma County Plan to show rural Democrats what a pure one person, one vote apportionment plan would do. He "felt this was necessary because the plans submitted by urban factions were viewed by rural interests as a baseline bargaining position from which to negotiate rather than good faith attempts to find a compromise." (Letter, McGoodwin to Vestal, 11/22/91).

2. Jim McGoodwin's second plan, presented as a member of the Democratic Party of Oklahoma, was based on the average vote by county in the last two presidential and gubernatorial elections (which would increase urban representation on the SCC) tempered by including elected Democratic legislators as members (which would somewhat dilute the urban shift). This SCC would have had 481 members.

3. The Cleveland County Democratic Party plan based SCC membership on another formula involving party registration by county with an increase in representation in the delegations of the 14 most populous counties. This plan produced a slightly smaller SCC of 318 members.

4. Rural forces' SAM Plan, an acronym for the co-authors, Holly Samples of Sapulpa, Pat Anderson of Tulsa, and Kenny Monroe of LeFlore, was the most complicated of the five and was based on a formula that included the average county party vote in the last previous congressional elections with bonus delegates for counties based on the percentage of registered Democrats who voted Democratic in the last two presidential, gubernatorial, and House elections. The 323 member SCC under this plan would have maintained rural strength and provided the smallest increase in delegates from Oklahoma City and Tulsa.

5. State Chair Frasier and National Committeeman George Krumme's middle ground plan would have expanded the SCC and the representation of the urban counties, while at the same time preserving the minimum three-person representation of the less populous counties and rural dominance of the Central Committee. The Frasier plan was based on the total number of Democratic votes cast in the last gubernatorial and presidential elections divided by the 77 counties (producing a denominator of 12,202 votes) with additional delegates based on the county vote above that median number (i.e., $12,202 \text{ votes} = \text{a } 3 \text{ person county committee on the SCC}$; $1/3 \text{ of } 12,202 = 4,067$ which provides one additional delegate to the SCC). Frasier thought the Democrat votes cast were a better measure than the "meaningless facade" found in some of

the registration figures. Under his plan, the SCC would have had a membership of 321.

A special task force to restructure the SCC met with the State Executive Committee in Tulsa on 8 September 1985. Chairman Frasier reminded the members that the DNC demanded intellectual integrity in the Oklahoma Party's efforts to reach a one man/one vote solution. He noted that even on a strict one person/one vote representation, rural interests would still dominate the SCC. Frasier urged "substantial compromise on the part of all factions" (Author's notes).

George Krumme warned that Oklahoma would not participate in the Democratic Party's 1988 Presidential selection plan unless the state chair and co-chair were chosen under new rules that reflected more democratic values. Spokesmen for rural interests discredited the DNC challenge as lacking teeth. They expounded a strong federalist theory of association, maintaining that the Bylaws of the Democratic Party of the U.S. set up a national organization and that therefore, state party organization could not be challenged. The Task Force duly passed a motion to adopt the SAM Plan with a roll call vote of 11 to 3.

The State Executive Committee was then convened and voted 16 for and 5 against the SAM Plan (with three members absent). The SAM Plan had not received a single vote from representatives of Tulsa or Oklahoma City. Frasier believed that the adopted plan would "not pass muster" with the DNC, but supporters of the plan thought that it would (Minutes, SEC, 14 July 1985). Rural proponents of the plan stated that they had compromised and acted in the best interest of the whole [Democratic Party] family." Furthermore, it was pointed out that representation of Tulsa County Democrats on the SCC had increased six-fold as a result of the day's actions. What had been missing in the formulation of the plan was communication and negotiation between rural and urban factions, actually delegates from Cleveland, Comanche, Oklahoma, and Tulsa counties on the one hand, and the rest of the state, on the other.

At the meeting of the State party in Oklahoma City on 6 October 1985, the SCC voted 164 to 23 to adopt the SAM Plan. The vote was divided on a strict urban-rural basis. The other plans were tabled by voice vote. The Chair of the Oklahoma County Party insisted that a minority report stressing the discrimination in favor of rural party members be included in the minutes of the meeting.

At the conclusion of the SCC meeting, the Executive Committee met and voted unanimously to (1) send the revised state party constitution to the DNC; (2) send representatives and supporters of the SAM Plan to the next meeting of the DNC prepared to defend the revised constitution in case it was challenged; and (3) postpone elections, if any, until after the DNC meeting.

SECOND WARNING FROM THE DNC

On 6 March 1986, the Oklahoma SCC's delegation met in Washington, D.C., with Chairman Kirk's handpicked mediator, Joe Riser, legal counsel for the DNC. The DNC had reviewed the action of the Oklahoma party and the challenge by the Oklahoma County delegation and concluded that the revised constitutional amendments did not properly address the one person/one vote mandate. Riser found the numbers of the SAM Plan "horrific." Therefore, the previous ruling of the Credentials Committee stood, and the Oklahoma Chair and Co-Chair would have no votes in the DNC meeting. There were also hints that the DNC would "shut down activities in the state" (Recording, 5 March 1986) if the apportionment question were not resolved. This would mean that DNC financial support would go to candidates rather than to the state party.

Riser recommended that the Oklahoma SCC make use of the services of the DNC's Committee on State Participation (CSP), a five member body chaired by Ron Brown, a rising star in the ranks of the Democratic party. The CSP could provide a mechanism to mediate disputes and reach a political solution. Riser suggested the CSP could act as a catalyst to aid communication and to work out a compromise between the two factions. He estimated that the process would probably take a year and that it would create a standard that was fair.

The next day, on 7 March 1986, the Oklahoma delegation met with Ron Brown, the chairman of the DNC's Committee on State Participation. A short time before, Brown had established his reputation as party peacemaker by successfully mediating an intraparty battle in Puerto Rico. Brown was confident that the CSP could help negotiate a solution mutually satisfactory to both Sooner sides well before the 1988 national convention. The alternative would be adjudication which would probably take far more time.

Brown expressed his willingness to convene the CSP within two weeks and to hold meetings in Oklahoma if necessary. The session ended inconclusively with the SCC delegation promising to send Brown the names of contact people who could speak for each side of the dispute (Recording, 7 March 1986).

THE RURAL FACTION STONEWALLS

A month later, the Executive Committee of the SCC met in Oklahoma City to critique the actions taken by the DNC. Lou Watkins questioned by what authority the SCC delegation had asked for SPC intervention. Watkins believed that the Executive Committee should have been the body to take such action. She also pointed out that according to the new DNC Charter and Bylaws, all remedies at the state level should be exhausted before calling in the SPC (Recording, 6 Apr 1986).

Krumme noted that the Credentials Committee could refer the Oklahoma challenge to the SPC for adjudication and that it was up to the SCC to accept Brown's proffered help or face the possibility of such a move by the DNC. Despite the warning, the Executive Committee voted to send (1) "a letter of appreciation" to Ron Brown saying in effect, don't call us, we'll call you, and (2) a missive to National Chairman Paul Kirk stating that "Oklahoma is being held to a different standard of full participation than are other states and the DNC itself." Watkins maintained that only the Oklahoma party had been instructed by the DNC "to go home and write a plan based on one man, one vote." She went on to say that the Oklahoma party should challenge the apportionment of the DNC itself (Recording, 6 Apr 1986).

The Executive Committee decided to take no further action on apportionment until after the November elections, and by a vote of 18 to 8, the group resolved that the Oklahoma party was "to exhaust all remedies at the state level before calling in the State Participation Committee of the DNC" (Recording, 6 April 1986). Krumme reminded the members that a new Executive Committee would have to be elected before the state party could adopt a presidential delegate selection plan and that such action would have to be accomplished by May, 1987. With that Draconian timetable emblazoned in their minds, the members of the SCC then busied themselves "getting Democrats elected."

RAPPROCHEMENT ON THE POTOMAC

After the elections in November, the Oklahoma County party presented yet another challenge to the Credentials Committee of the DNC (Statement, November 1986). This time the dispute centered on the malapportioned Oklahoma party leadership's promulgating rules for the selection of delegates to the 1988 national convention. The challenge questioned the right of the Oklahoma party to send a delegation to the convention. In response to the challenge, Chairman Kirk wrote Frasier indicating that Scott Lang, a Boston attorney and, for the preceding fifteen years, special counsel to the DNC, had been assigned to work with the Oklahoma representatives at the next meeting of the DNC on November 21.

At the DNC meeting in Washington, D.C., the Oklahoma Chair and Co-Chair were again refused seating as voting members. The Oklahoma delegation—Lou Watkins and her husband, Congressman Wes Watkins, Krumme, Frasier, Monroe, McGoodwin, Betty McElderry of Purcell, State Co-Chair elect, and Pat Anderson, President of the Oklahoma Democratic Party Federated Women—faced the problem of finding some form of rapprochement with the national party.

To hammer out the mechanics of a compromise, the Oklahoma delegation was closeted in the National Democratic Party Headquarters for eight hours with Scott Lang. Speaking for the DNC, Lang reported that the Credentials Committee would not seat Oklahoma's Chair and Co-Chair and that the committee was also going to refuse to recognize the state's National Committeeman and Committeewoman. Lang further warned that the DNC might "do the presidential delegate selection plan for the State" (Notes of McGoodwin).

In such a situation—with the prospect of no longer being a part of the Democratic Party hanging in the balance—the negotiating committee from the SCC made the pragmatic choice of reaching a reconciliation on apportionment. The SAM Plan, with its organization weighted heavily in favor of rural counties, was quickly buried. Lang, in a patient, evenhanded way, guided the delegation with persuasion, new ideas, incentives, and threats—the whole basket of instruments available. He suggested that the easiest way to settle the matter would be to add

additional members to the SCC representing a certain percentage of membership, i.e., if current members accounted for 25% of the reapportioned body, 75% more should be "add-ons." Such an arrangement would require about 536 new members. Representatives of the rural faction believed that Lang's plan was the best they could get under the circumstances. After an exhausting day of negotiating, a consensus was reached that further action, in keeping with the tenor of the meeting, should be taken (Notes of McGoodwin).

Three weeks later the Executive Committee of the SCC held a retreat at Lake Texoma and heard a report on the Washington meeting. Amidst continued grumbling from the rural faction, a committee on style composed of the eight SCC members who had been in the meeting with Lang, was appointed to work out the wording of the proposed constitutional amendments and the mathematical details of a reapportionment plan (Notes of McGoodwin).

The committee met on 20 December at Jim Frasier's office in Tulsa and completed the new calculus of representation. The proposed plan would enlarge central committee membership from 307 to 786, giving every county additional voting members and realigning the power structure more toward urban representatives. It would include at least three county officers from each county but also add members on the basis of Democratic voting strength, as judged by both presidential and gubernatorial elections. At the conclusion of the meeting, Frasier telephoned Lang to inform him of the new Oklahoma formula. Lang wrote Frasier on 14 January 1987 indicating that the proposed changes in the SCC would receive the DNC's approval (Notes of McGoodwin). On 24 January, the Executive Committee of the SCC adopted the report of the committee on style.

ONCE MORE INTO THE BREACH

On 28 March 1987, the SCC met in Oklahoma City, and Bill Bullard of Oklahoma City, was elected state chairman, succeeding Jim Frasier. Betty McElderry was elected co-chairman. The Oklahoma party then "in effect dared the DNC to take control of the state party and reconstitute the SCC by mandate" (Hammer, 1987a). On three separate votes, the SCC turned down the amendment to the state party's constitution

agreed to in principle in the meeting in Lang's office the month before.

Lang, representing the DNC, was present at the meeting and observed in amazement the debate of the one person/one vote topic. McGoodwin presented the new plan to the meeting. The opposition was led by three state legislators, Darrel Roberts of Ardmore, Larry Dickerson of Poteau, and Bill Brewster of Marietta, who preached persuasively to rural caucuses that a vote against the plan was a vote for democracy and for "the people" (Notes of McGoodwin).

Since the proposed plan amended the state party constitution, it required a two-thirds majority vote to pass. The plan was approved by a show of hands 168 to 95, but that was nine votes shy of the two-thirds majority. A roll call then was ordered by chairman Bullard, and the second vote was 155 to 103, some 18 votes shy.

At that point Lang talked for ten minutes pointing out that the formula of the proposed amendments was based on one used in other states and would give the Oklahoma party "full participation and fair apportionment" (Biskupic, 1987). But he warned that Oklahoma Democrats were risking control of their party being taken away from them. Said Lang: "The national rules have to be adhered to or we won't have a national party" ("State Demos Reject," 1987). He noted that there was nothing to prevent the DNC from calling a new meeting and imposing its own formula on the state.

Krumme pleaded with the delegates to approve the new plan on the basis of fairness and broadening the party's base. He then asked the SCC to vote to reconsider the plan presented by McGoodwin. The measure again failed to gain the requisite majority by a vote of 154 to 85, only seven votes shy of two-thirds. After the final vote, most of the delegates left the meeting and failed to consider 66 pending resolutions, leaving the state Democratic Party without a new platform until 1988 (Hammer, 1987a).

Lang indicated that the next move would be for the DNC, meeting the following month in Santa Fe, New Mexico, to hold a full hearing on whether the Oklahoma SCC was apportioned correctly. If Oklahoma lost the ruling from the hearing, the DNC then would issue an ultimatum to the Oklahoma party, take control of it and reconstitute it according to its own numerical formula. Lang indicated that states normally lose at such hearings ("State Demos Reject," 1987).

At the DNC's April 1987 meeting, Credentials Committee chairman,

Charles Whitehead of Florida, issued an edict to the Oklahomans: "Either weight your votes [to reflect party voting strength] on the present SCC or adopt a new constitution" (Notes of McGoodwin). The DNC ruled that until the state committee was reapportioned, it could not sponsor a delegation to the 1988 national convention. This was the third time that the DNC had found that the Oklahoma party was apportioned in violation of the national party's constitution (Findings, 1987).

This action led to a joint statement by Oklahoma's leading elected Democratic officials—Senator David Boren and Representatives Mike Synar, Wes Watkins, Dave McCurdy and Glenn English—urging the reapportionment of the SCC. State Chairman Bullard responded that he was optimistic the SCC would "now approve reapportionment" (English, 1987).

COMPLIANCE BY ACCLAMATION

At a special meeting of the Oklahoma SCC in Oklahoma City on 30 May 1987, the party leadership finally ratified constitutional amendments to enlarge the SCC and provide greater representation to urban counties. The meeting started with three proposed amendments to the state party constitution. Amid pleas to end bickering, the SCC voted to uphold a Bullard ruling that it was proper to consolidate the three amendments and then approve the actual consolidations. Consolidated were the overall formula reapportioning the SCC; a section to retain the separate eastern Oklahoma County delegation; and a section to use Democratic votes in primary elections as part of the continuing apportionment formula ("State Demos Comply," 1987). The consolidated measure would not bring the representation all that close to the one person, one vote concept, but it was a bona fide reapportionment effort that party leaders thought should be acceptable to the DNC.

SCC members accepted the amendments by acclamation, and Bullard had all members stand and link hands to signify their new-found unity and renewed dedication to beating Republicans in the 1988 election (Hammer, 1987b). Bullard had wisely bent the motion-amending rules to offer an olive branch to what remained of the rural faction. By winning a hard fought battle on the use of primary election votes in the formula, actually a minor point, the rural folk saved face and felt

sufficiently victorious to join in the amen!of acclamation.

The DNC, pleased to get the Oklahoma thorn out from under its saddle, approved the reorganization plan, and the Sooner State's delegation to the national party was again accorded the rights and privileges of full membership. Scott Lang, the veteran negotiator in many of the McGovern-Fraser reform battles of the previous 15 years, told Lou Watkins that "the Oklahoma group was the toughest he had ever worked with" (Interview with Watkins, 18 October 1991).

SWEET ARE THE USES OF ADVERSITY

Why was the Oklahoma Democratic Party able to resist the tide of representation reform that swept the national party and almost all of the other state parties in the 1970s and early 1980s? One factor was opposition to change by the state party's top leadership. Jim Frasier had been handpicked for the state Chairmanship by newly elected Senator David Boren and Governor George Nigh, who admonished him not to bring up the one man, one vote apportionment issue in the SCC (Interview with Frasier, 29 October 1991). Such benevolent neglect reinforced the instinct of rural interests to maintain their accustomed powers in party circles.

The challenge to the status quo by the Oklahoma County party created a polarization of views. Instead of working with urban forces to correct imbalances or to give and get a quid pro quo, the ruralites isolated themselves and proceeded to denigrate their opponents as unseemly "radicals." All too often public debates were mean-spirited and self-serving. Shabby *ad hominem* attacks on individuals were common instead of the civil deliberations that, in theory, should be the stock in trade of a democratic party. Rural hostility was focused on Tim Mauldin, who brought the first challenges against the state party, Jamie Pitts, chair of the Oklahoma County party, and Frasier, who despite his best efforts to remain neutral was forced into the role of adversary.

Rural interests were only united by a strong hostility toward change in the party structure. The underlying splintered nature of the rural faction was demonstrated by the hiring of attorney Brad Morelli to respond to a DNC challenge without any rural member of the SEC knowing who had contacted him or who had authorized him to represent

the state party.

Communication problems were exacerbated by the lack of a recognized leader of the rural forces. While McGoodwin, of Oklahoma City, could serve as a spokesman for the urban interests, there was no single leader in the rural faction. When Ron Brown requested a spokesman for the rural side to work with the SPC, no one was identified. McGoodwin recalls rural leadership being a moving target with first one person and then another appearing to be dominant. Among those who "came and went" were Dwight Rymer of Morrison, Lorry Dyson of Guthrie, State Co-Chair Betty Hall, and National Committeewoman Lou Watkins—none of whom seemed to acknowledge the leadership of another (Interview with McGoodwin, 10 Nov 1991). This lack of a chief contributed to the ambiguity of whom to complain to or about—and ultimately it slowed down the restructuring of the apportionment system.

The metropolitans, being the minority, were acutely aware of their need of the support of the chuffs to bring about any reform. Urban members were frustrated by ups and downs, walkouts, consultations, assurances, clarifications, votes in assorted caucuses—every postponement tactic that rural forces could use—but rarely did tempers flare. Urban party activists continually stressed compromise and sought dialogue with their opponents. In contrast, correspondence from some members of the rural caucus were indicative of a bunker mentality.

The DNC had assumed it could ease the process of accommodation by providing the Oklahomans with its teams for handholding. The national party was somewhat nonplussed when the Oklahoma party, instead of grasping, nipped at the hand that fed it. When the carrot failed, only the stick of severance from the national party in a presidential election whipped the intractable rural faction into a new, more representative covenant.

What brought about the change in attitude in the ambiguous rural leadership to convert a critical mass of their faction to the side of one man/one vote? McGoodwin believes the shift slowly evolved through an educational process in which leading rural members of the SCC spent enough time with the DNC in Washington, D.C., to understand how boorishly the Oklahoma party was perceived by the national party. The fracas had also become an embarrassment to Oklahoma's Democratic congressional delegation, who tired of offering *apologia* for their recalcitrant party brethren (Interview with McGoodwin, 10 Nov 1991).

The persistence of the Oklahoma County party in maintaining challenges to malapportionment provided ample time for the tempering of attitudes. The mailed fist of the DNC, when finally it hit home in the solar plexus of the Oklahoma party, was, of course, the ultimate discourager of further hesitancy.

In the end, what did all the fuss accomplish? Most Oklahomans and many Democrats were not aware of the SCC dispute nor did they care. The media really showed an interest only in the last year of the squabble when the state's embarrassment index was reaching the danger zone.

Since resolving the apportionment donnybrook, there has been little rural and urban dissension. Personal animosities have dissolved into the background of a united party leadership. The Oklahoma Democratic Party did get one significant by-product of the travail in reconstituting the SCC—a revised Constitution and By-Laws adopted 18 March 1989.

The struggle to reapportion the Democratic party of Oklahoma looms as the most important episode in the organization's fifty year history. As a result of the conflict, the Oklahoma party, while maintaining its rural roots, could take its rightful place in the national party of representation.

NOTES

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THE OKLAHOMA COUNTY COMMISSIONER SCANDAL: REVIEW, REFORM, AND THE COUNTY LOBBY

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This article reviews the findings of an extended study of Oklahoma's county commissioner scandal (Okscam). A basic finding is that institutional weaknesses allowed county commissioners to operate with a combination of resources and discretion that invited abuse. Second, reforms definitely improved the system but left in place much of the traditional system of county road building, a system one observer described as "road districtitis." Third, the growing strength of the county lobby in support of county government poses a potential long term threat to the persistence of the reforms enacted in reaction to Okscam.

This article is a part of a larger study of the Oklahoma county commissioner scandal (Okscam) of the early 1980s (Holloway with Meyers, forthcoming). Here we shall focus on highlights of the summary findings, some of the reforms instituted, and on the county lobby that matters much in the future of those reforms. Theoretically speaking, Daniel Elazar's concept of agrarian populism, which he himself applied to Oklahoma, proved to be quite fruitful in explaining major features of the state's politics (Elazar, 1991).

SUMMARY FINDINGS

The basic framework used to analyze Okscam encompassed political culture, institutions, and personnel. In the course of the inquiry we reached a number of conclusions. One was that Okscam was not chiefly a product of a culture of corruption handed down from the past, although the state's colorful past held plenty of scandal. Second, it was not a product of a corrupt culture in the present, although scandals continued to erupt all through the 1980s and beyond. In comparisons drawn with

others, the state seemed mostly average and not much better--or worse--than most. Then in the tests applied to check on the willingness to break the rules, the people upheld virtue and rejected wrongdoing. A rather small minority of perhaps 15 to 20 percent may be willing to undertake wrongdoing without much worry about rationalizing already weak norms. But a group of this size is probably close to the national norm. They could not account in any event for Okscam. The corrupt culture thesis does not stand up.

Second in our framework were hypotheses about institutions. Mainly implicated in Okscam was a system of local government institutions with structural and political weaknesses that fostered corruption. The old Sandlin Report of 1958 was quite right in pointing to a "spawning ground" for corruption.¹ The system was such that it corrupted normally decent good ol' boys. They had money, discretion, and a largely friendly environment that protected them.

Other states have complex and fragmented systems of local government. What made Oklahoma's system especially liable to abuse was the heavy reliance upon county commissioners for local road building. Oklahoma Farm Bureau (OFB) spokesman Ken McFall claimed that Oklahoma stood out in its reliance on the counties for local road building and called it "road districtitis" (McFall, 1990).

But one further key point needs to be made in recapitulation. The heavy involvement of Oklahoma counties in road building, given the structure of county government and the politics of road districtitis, fostered institutional corruption. It also fostered rationalizations by which everyone could justify themselves, the process of norm neutralization as sociologists label it (Coleman, 1989; 211). The commissioners could see themselves as doing a good job of responding to constituents in a difficult situation that justified their own illegal deeds. And their constituents could also justify themselves. Constituents would not take "No!" for an answer but sought favors that were at times illegal. Constituents deserve some of the blame. As for personnel, the third element in our framework, the federal prosecutions cleaned out almost all of the corrupt people in office. There were a total of some 220 convictions that came out of Okscam and they touched 60 of the state's 77 counties. Any prosecution that achieves so many convictions in just a few years in one state has to be described as successful, indeed, spectacularly so. Having reviewed our Okscam findings briefly, the next

task is to describe the reforms. There was an obvious need for change but disagreement over how much change should occur.

AFTER OKSCAM: SOME THINGS CHANGE AND SOME DO NOT

Governor George Nigh responded to Okscam by appointing a 36 member Task Force in August of 1981 to study the situation and recommend reform. In addition, the governor called the legislature into special session to consider reform legislation. The legislature created its own joint committee to develop reform proposals.

The governor's Task Force submitted its report on November 23, 1981. At the outset in its "Statement of Purpose" the authors of the report reminded readers of the Sandlin Report of 1958 and the problems found in county government at that time. According to the authors of the 1981 Report,

The greatest deficiency in the administration of county government in Oklahoma is the segmentation of authority which results from the unchecked autonomy of the commissioner. Though required by state law to function as a three member board, county commissioners have historically operated individually, with only the most superficial compliance with statutes requiring collective action. As a consequence, accountability is virtually totally absent in our counties' government. (Task Force, 1981:4).

These were harsh words directed against a splintered system of government, not just against bad people.

Having identified the major problems as segmentation of authority and the virtually total lack of accountability, the Task Force then entertained possible reforms. The authors admitted the "importance of district representation in the election process." Nonetheless, the Task Force authors pointed to the possible benefits of countywide election and to an expansion of the number of commissioners beyond three. Yet another proposed reform would have furthered professionalism by creating three full-time county officers in the areas of administration, highways, and purchasing. Still another proposal would have consolidated the elected offices of county treasurer and county assessor and abolished altogether the offices of county surveyor, county superintendent of schools, and county court clerk.

These reform proposals were potentially far-reaching. They would indeed have drastically altered the structure of county government. The number of commissioners would increase and their election countywide would alter their constituencies fundamentally. Commissioners could no longer cater only to their own specific districts. Control, supervision, and accountability were to be additionally strengthened by the abolition of several elective offices. The creation of the office of county administrator was designed to take politics out of the county's administrative operation. The function of purchasing agent would be separated from the authority of the commissioners. The commissioners' total control over the county road program would also be broken up by the creation of the office of county road superintendent. Road districtitis as traditionally practiced would hardly be possible. As we might expect, there was criticism of the Task Force Report.

One critic was Phillip M. Simpson, Professor of Political Science at Cameron University. Simpson charged that the Task Force had no budget or subpoena powers, its deliberation time was short, most witnesses were from government, academic input was "woefully inadequate," and the Task Force "did not have the time nor the inclination to call out-of-state witnesses." Reformer Simpson was quite critical of the Task Force Report and procedures. Still, the Task Force Report did propose reforms that would have radically altered Oklahoma county government.

Quite different criticism arose from county officials. Their criticisms differed sharply from those of Simpson. Above all, they saw that election of commissioners countywide and the creation of a county road superintendent would enormously alter the county commissioners' relationships with constituents. The county lobby therefore strenuously opposed these reform ideas. As reformer Simpson later wrote about this period, "The county lobby was aggressively working the legislature against change while most average people were silent.... genuine reform bills failed one by one, as the forces opposed to county reform successfully mobilized and pro-reform forces fizzled". (Task Force, 1981: 31) The county lobby was a potent force to be reckoned with.

Governor Nigh, an experienced and popular politician, had never been known as a reformer willing to take on entrenched interests. Nigh did not openly disavow the work of the Task Force. Instead, he proposed his own plan for the reform of county government. His plan drew

partially from the recommendations of the task force and partially from the work of a joint legislative committee. The governor shied away from proposing major changes. Instead, he laid down a series of incremental reforms:

1. Creating a county purchasing officer.
2. Requiring the counties to use the state's central purchasing system for large items such as bulldozers, etc.
3. Requiring all county officers to participate in county government training programs.
4. Reducing the maximum allowable limits for the purchase of items without advertising for bids.
5. Shifting the funding of the district attorney from the county budget to the state's budget.
6. Strengthening the state's grand jury system.

(Daily Oklahoman, 1982:13)

The reform package that became law closely resembled the governor's plan. And the changes made amounted to alterations in the procedures of local government rather than any restructuring. Certainly it left county commissioners in the business of building county roads.

Among further changes was the separation of the commissioners' roles as purchasing agents and as receiving agents. Furthermore, the commissioners lost their authority to lease/purchase heavy equipment and machines. This authority was replaced by expanding the state's central purchasing system to include these items and by requiring the counties to participate in it. These changes did modify importantly the purchasing practices which had been at the heart of Okscam malpractices.

Another modification was the provision for reapportionment of the commissioners' districts. They were still to be elected from the traditional districts within each county. But the districts were to be reapportioned after each federal census every 10 years, as they had not been in past. Additional reform legislation sought to strengthen local and state level checks. There was to be full state funding of the local district attorneys, with the intent of insulating this office from the budgetary influence of the county commissioners. Another law strengthened the power of the Oklahoma Attorney General to investigate and prosecute violations of the law by local officials.² And there was a strengthening of requirements for local record keeping. The inadequacies of local

record keeping had been one of the persistent complaints of state officials.

To enhance the professionalism of county officeholders they were urged to retain the services of an engineer and to formulate long range plans. Professionalism was further enhanced with the establishment of an education center and the requirement for county officials to participate in annual training seminars. In addition, the office of county surveyor was abolished. This last was a step in the right direction but was in itself a minor step. Eventually the county superintendent of schools was to be phased out but not completely so until 1993. Abolition of the surveyor and the school superintendent together reduced the row officers from eight to six.

One further law enforcement reform was the enhancement of the powers of local officials to create multicounty grand juries. The lack of this power had severely hampered local prosecution. All evidence had to be from within the county. Removal of this constraint had considerable potential for the long run. Enacting the reform enabled multicounty grand juries to function and by the late 1980s this reform was being used effectively (*Norman Transcript*, 1990).

Thus the defenders of the governor's program could compose a lengthy and detailed list of the various changes in local government finally adopted or under way that seemed impressive.

But the critics could blast these reforms as little enough and as leaving much of the bad old system in place. The number of commissioners remained at three and they were still elected from their separate districts within the county. In principle they were supposed to serve the county at large but in practice they retained their district constituencies. Road funds remained free from line item budget control and were still under the control of the commissioners, in spite of the strengthening of the powers of the Oklahoma Department of Transportation. In the end, commissioners retained much of their discretion over the road and bridge programs within the counties. Thus the basic electoral system, with much fragmentation of authority, remained in place. These reforms fell far short of what the reformers sought. What OFB spokesman Ken McFall referred to as "road districtitis" essentially remained in place in an inefficient, highly politicized system.

Resistance to the reforms became manifest not long after they went into effect. An example of this pressure and its success on a small scale

occurred in the 1990 legislative session. The governor vetoed a bill that changed somewhat the way county commissioners could buy equipment. In his veto message Governor Henry Bellmon stated that, "I am opposed to any relaxation of controls on county purchases of equipment. The 1980s should have taught the state a bitter lesson we don't need to learn again" (*Daily Oklahoman*, 1990: 9). But the legislature overrode the governor's veto. Thus, as the decade of the 1980s closed, there was a movement under way to erode the reforms instituted.

Further perspective on the limitations of the Oklahoma reforms may be gleaned from a comparison with an Okscam-like experience in Mississippi. They had their own equivalent of Okscam during the mid 1980s (*Daily Oklahoman*, 1988). In this case the local officials involved were called supervisors but resembled Oklahoma county commissioners. There were roughly 50 convictions, an impressive number but far below Okscam's 220. Yet with a much smaller number of convictions this rural Southern state instituted large scale reform. For one, the scandal helped put a new man in the governor's chair. Second, there was a striking change in local government. The governor and legislature mandated some reforms. And the voters themselves in the fall of 1988 voted in 48 of the 82 counties to reform local government road operations by ditching the old district system and replacing it with a form of county manager government (*Daily Oklahoman*, 1988). For the counties thus altered, the change went far beyond anything done in Oklahoma.

Confirmation of this contrast may be found in the words of Oklahoma's own Okscam prosecutor, William S. Price. Thus Price was quoted in this same news story as observing that, "A state like Mississippi, that is very rural, they are light years ahead of us." This rural and Southern state, with far fewer convictions of local officials than Oklahoma had known, had pretty drastically reformed over half of its counties. The contrast does not speak well for the Sooner state. Mississippians seemed much more willing to change than Oklahomans.⁴

Were the Oklahoma reforms worthless or did they make a real difference? In the study's findings above we argued that the fundamental weakness in the prereform system was a fragmented pattern of county government in which the county commissioners received an uneven but substantial supply of state money for county roads that they could spend with virtually complete discretion. And in doing so both commissioners and constituents could see themselves as good citizens.

Yet, in spite of their limitations, the reforms did make a difference in the state's culture, institutions, and personnel. As for the personnel, most of the corrupt personnel were caught and convicted. This in itself was a far-reaching improvement, although it was federal officials who deserve credit for it.

As for culture and institutions, they too changed importantly. Thus as regards culture and public opinion, the scandal was a wrenching experience for the state and it seemed to alter public attitudes. There did not seem to be much inclination to go back to the old free-wheeling ways. Finally, there was significant institutional reform, even though as we have also shown above the basic structure of road districtitis remained in place. Still, as we have also shown, the reforms instituted did leave county commissioners with considerably less unfettered discretion than they had enjoyed in the past. These institutional modifications coupled with altered public and official attitudes made a real difference, even if less than reformers wanted, or less than states like Mississippi accomplished.⁵ Perhaps the best way to make the point is to cite again the old Sandlin Report of 1958 with its damning charge that county government was a "spawning ground" for corruption. A similar inquiry carried out 30 years later in 1988 would not, we believe, reach such harsh conclusions. There would be plenty to criticize but not the "spawning ground" for corruption that then prevailed.

For the short run, at least, Oklahoma had improved quite a bit. As for the long term, much depended upon the county lobby and what it wanted. A close look at the county lobby is in order.

THE COUNTY LOBBY: AGRARIAN POPULISM RENEWED

Our assessment of the county lobby includes some history and an account of its values and its preference for decentralized government.

As we noted above the leading authority on state political cultures, Daniel Elazar, characterized Oklahoma as an agrarian populist state. We would extend Elazar's perceptive statement to argue that this same agrarian populism has reinforced tendencies toward decentralization and fragmentation all through state and local government. What OFB writer Kenneth McFall calls road districtitis is part of a larger whole of fragmented government from top to bottom. Then there is former

Governor Johnston Murray's account of the "mess" in Oklahoma, a mess he ascribed both to corruption and to the many poor counties that threw their burdens on the state (Murray and Dewlen, 1955). Each if these writers in one way or another invokes agrarian populism. Okscam-induced reforms largely did away with the corruption that Murray condemned. But the culture of agrarian populism has remained. Indeed we believe that, in the form of what we call the county lobby, it is has prospered and grown over the years. And it is this culture and its influence upon the system that we believe poses a potential long term threat to the reforms Okscam brought.

One place to start in assessing the county lobby is with comparisons between periods or eras like the 1950s and the 1980s. The comparison begins with the political agenda of each, and the allocation of resources to education, one of the state's most essential functions. When we look back to the pre-Okscam days we find that Governor Johnston Murray, in his parting remarks to the state, frankly advocated county consolidation and a reduction of the power of county commissioners. Governor J. Howard Edmondson, elected in 1958, made reform of county government one of his basic themes. Among his reforms he actually proposed to take road money away from the county commissioners and to channel it through the state's Department of Transportation. As for education, historian Arrell Morgan Gibson cited a National Education Association study of 1964 that found counties in Oklahoma provided 69 percent of school funding while the state provided a modest 31 percent (Gibson, 1981: 255). During this same era reapportionment of the legislature was a big issue, with the federal courts in 1964 forcing a resistant state to reapportion in spite of itself. In sum, the 1950s and 1960's were a time when the urban-rural split was in the air, leaders like Murray and Edmondson openly tried to curb the power of local officials, and Oklahoma's counties provided most of the money to support education.

Roughly two decades later in the 1980s both the political agenda and the urban-rural allocation of resources were quite different. Education was, as usual, a vital issue and perhaps more so because it was widely seen as essential to economic development and relief from the state's prolonged recession. But, by this time the allocation of education resources from the state and county funds was almost exactly reversed. County support amounted to only 30 percent and state support was

somewhat above 60 percent.⁶ No one advocated consolidation of counties anymore, nor did state leaders openly try to curb the powers of county officials.⁷

County consolidation had faded as an issue but school consolidation did arise on the state agenda. The state had over 600 school districts in the late 1980s. This was far higher than most states with a similar population. Each district had its own administrators, teachers, staff and students. School district consolidation is obviously less drastic than county consolidation. School consolidation became a lively issue in the early 1990s in part because of a major school reform and tax increase passed in 1990. It seemed unlikely that many of the small rural school districts could meet the goals of education reform without consolidation to improve the teaching of subjects such as science and foreign languages. And a small number of districts did consolidate but much resistance persisted. A kind of school district equivalent of road districtitis persisted.⁸ At any rate county consolidation was not on the agenda and even school consolidation was quite contentious and threatening to rural interests.

The property tax persisted as a bone of contention between urban and rural interests. Johnston Murray had complained long ago that many of the counties kept their taxes low and turned to the state for aid. This same issue figured in a legislative battle in 1991 between urban and rural interests. Representative Ed Crocker, a Democrat from the city of Norman, contended that property in rural areas was undervalued so that property owners paid less taxes than their urban counterparts. According to this story Crocker claimed that, "Metropolitan and suburban areas have been subsidizing" the rural areas, particularly when it comes to state aid (*Daily Oklahoman*, 1991:21). Tulsa Representative Russ Roach, also a Democrat, seconded Crocker in contending "that rural counties don't have tax money for their schools because of low property assessments." Roach claimed that in his home city of Tulsa "We are in compliance (with the state law) and we pay our share." In this case the House rejected the relaxing of standards that rural interests sought but the battle went on. These comments by urban legislators reflected unhappiness with the success rural interests had enjoyed since the 1960s in transferring much of the burden of school financing to the state and the state's cities. The county lobby had been quite successful over the years even if it lost some battles.

Up to this point we have marshalled evidence for the growing vigor of this agrarian populist tradition over time. Its core values are our next subject. Basic values include opposition to elitism and the concentration of resources. The preference is for the decentralization and dispersion rather than concentration. One perceptive observer of the state, Alan Ehrenhalt, spelled out the nature of this influence in the state's higher education system as of the 1980s. What he found was a relatively poor state with a conservative tradition of opposition to higher taxes combined with a pattern of some 27 institutions of higher education.⁹ Yet, with all this higher education there was no outstanding university like the University of Texas in Austin. Fully twelve of Oklahoma's 27 institutions were four-year schools. Ehrenhalt then contrasted Oklahoma with Iowa, which had a population about the same as Oklahoma's, but which had just three four year colleges. Florida with some 12 million people had only nine. The University of Oklahoma, Ehrenhalt further noted, could compete in football with Texas and other major schools, but was not really competitive academically. The state had limited resources to begin with and dispersed what it had in a multitude of institutions, none of which could be really outstanding. In effect the state provided access but not the focused resources necessary for excellence in one or a few institutions.¹⁰

In this agrarian populist tradition, decentralization and access mattered more than concentration and excellence. The popular former Governor George Nigh, the only governor to serve two consecutive terms in office, expressed this set of values pretty well. In his words, "If you don't do things for everybody, you don't do them for anybody." He continued in this vein by invoking words from his wife, who was said to believe that "It can't be right for all of us until it's right for each of us."¹¹ This same story reported that Nigh defended a rehabilitation center built outside the major urban centers that came under fire as not fully utilized. Nigh's response was clear: "I hope it never is full." Access mattered above all and cost was not a controlling factor. Nigh we may recall was the political leader whose Okscam reform ideas heavily shaped the final legislative product. Nigh always took pride in the lack of scandal in his two terms of office but he was one well tuned to the state's rural populist interests.

The best documentation of this agrarian populist tendency to decentralize and fragment government is contained in the treatment of

Oklahoma politics by David R. Morgan and his collaborators. This book, published in 1991, is the best single account of Oklahoma government, politics, and policies. We have just noted above in Ehrenhalt's analysis of higher education that the state has a multitude of colleges and universities. And there are many boards of regents to govern them. According to Morgan, there were some seventeen governing boards in addition to the board of Higher Regents that was supposed to be over all of them. Nor should we forget, as we note this decentralization of higher education, that the state has a huge number of common education districts and a substantial vocational-education system, as well. The state's education system is highly decentralized and dispersed from top to bottom.

Similarly for the major fields of highways, welfare, and health, Morgan and company found that, "Each of these agencies has its own board or commission with the power to appoint a chief administrative officer" (Morgan, et. al, 1991: 110). But that was only the beginning. As the Morgan text continues,

In all, Oklahoma has 31 constitutionally created executive branch agencies, boards, and commissions. In addition, about 230 separate boards, commissions, trusts, committees, and advisory councils (including higher education) can be identified, depending upon what one counts Still, it is no wonder various experts have long complained that the executive branch of Oklahoma government is a 'many splintered thing.'

The very structure of the state's government is decentralized and dispersed to an extraordinary degree. This splintering of county government thus may be seen as an extension of a pattern that runs all through state and local government. Government as a 'many splintered thing' reflected the values of the prevailing agrarian populist political culture. Access mattered more than excellence and efficiency.

In this light it is not surprising to find that this splintering and decentralization carried over *within* functions and agencies. An example arose in a clash between the governor, David Walters, a Democrat elected in 1990 to succeed Republican Henry Bellmon, and the Democratic legislature. Walters proposed some law enforcement consolidation. A newspaper report described it as follows: "Walters proposed consolidating state law enforcement agencies, apparently not realizing

how some legislators would react -- particularly those from rural areas, one lawmaker said." As the story added, "Rural people are always concerned about that kind of proposal because they don't want to lose any law enforcement in rural areas" (*Sunday Oklahoman*, 1991: 10A). The rural interests that dominated the legislature favored decentralization and access. Again, there is the characteristic opposition to consolidation.

Oddly enough, these values of access and decentralization have been combined with an expansive welfare state, albeit one that favors local government. The liberal editor of *The Oklahoma Observer*, Frosty Troy, brought these characteristics to light nicely in addressing what he described as the "glut of government" in the early days of the 1991 legislature. Troy's essay of 1991 effectively updated and extended the agrarian populist perspective noted by Daniel Elazar and others.

Thus, Troy cited the remarkable growth in state government, including the welfare department, during the 1980s. Specifically Troy claimed that Oklahoma ranked eleventh nationally in terms of public employees per 100,000 population. As for welfare, Troy stated that, "The state's welfare agency, burgeoning under more than 13,000 employees, ranks fourth nationally in size." Oklahoma obviously had an outstanding welfare state of its own. These developments led Troy to a telling contrast between Oklahoma and other oil states: "Oklahoma bucked the oil patch trend by actually increasing the size of state government during a recession, while other oil states had employee layoffs and reductions in programs" (Troy, 1991: 1). Thus Oklahoma stood out even among the "oil patch" states in its willingness to expand government during a recession, at a time when other oil states were cutting back.

Nor did Troy see much chance for change, given the predominance of populist rural interests. He surmised that, "Things may get worse. With rural forces solidly in the saddle in a reorganized House of Representatives, it is likely that the push for 'decentralization' will continue." Rural forces were in control, were willing to continue previous policies, and would further decentralize. County government, Troy believed, would probably be the chief beneficiary: "County government remains the bumbling, corrupt, disorganized monster of Oklahoma politics, constantly coming to the Capitol for more money. The state has taken over the courts, district attorney system and local enterprises that were historically locally financed." As Troy portrayed

the system, rural interests dominated the state, were quite willing to expand government, including welfare, and would funnel the benefits chiefly to rural interests via county government. In Troy's eyes county government was a "bumbling, corrupt, and disorganized monster" but it was part of a system that dominated the state. Troy's words are intemperate, to say the least, but contain some truth. What Troy here describes is a system that joins an expansive government, heavy on welfare services, with decentralization gauged chiefly to rural interests operating through county government. The values of access and decentralization prevail. This pattern is one clearly in accord with agrarian populism. Nor should we forget that this scheme of things actually expanded during the 1980s as other oil states reduced government.

And it is county government that has mostly benefited. Officially the county was simply an administrative arm of the state but unofficially it was part of a complex of values, institutions, and people that has had pervasive influence throughout.

One further key feature of this remarkable pattern is the tie-in between local government and the legislature in supporting this decentralized access. It has been described briefly but trenchantly by one insider, Alexander Holmes, who served as finance director from 1987 to 1991 under Governor Henry Bellmon. Holmes was an University of Oklahoma economics professor both before and after his service as budget director. Holmes therefore combines the perspective of the academic observer and the insider to an unusual degree. *Tulsa World* editor Ken Neal interviewed him in 1992 after Holmes had left office.

In Neal's interview with Holmes, the latter described a surprising centralization of state legislative leadership: "Oklahoma has evolved a centralized structure. We fund county functions out of the state treasury basically because we recognize that if we force local governments to rely on local funds, we would end up with pockets of wretched service (Neal, interview with Holmes 1992: D2). And, Holmes added, not doing so would probably result in migration from country to the city and strains on the latter.

The centralized structure referred to by Holmes essentially centered on Democratic Party leadership in the legislature. It was this centralized party legislative leadership that led the way in expanding government and in channeling benefits to local government, especially counties. Legislative leaders and county officials were partners in offering decentralized

access. Agrarian populism centered in Democratic legislative leadership was indeed alive and well.

This state of affairs embodies Oklahoma's form of agrarian populism. The government is highly decentralized and access to it by all, in contrast to an elitist concentration in high quality services, widely practiced. What is available is dispersed rather than concentrated. Less expected are two key features, the expansive welfare state with its ability to continue expanding even in a recession and, second, the concentration of power in the Democratic legislative leadership.

CONCLUSIONS

This is agrarian populism with a twist. A curious mix of centralization and decentralization has prevailed basically to mobilize resources and disperse them chiefly to serve rural interests. Conservative Republican concerns have appeared to dominate major federal and state contests for office, particularly for president, senator, and for governor. But Democratic, populist, and agrarian concerns have dominated actual state policies and the decentralized governmental structure. In practice the small cities and counties have usually prevailed. The state seems to have a double personality. Conservative rhetoric abounds but when it comes down to it the state's policies serve agrarian populists. For that matter they are the kind of policies that many liberal Democrats nationally could easily applaud. Where does this leave us in assessing the county lobby and the prospects for the persistence of reforms in county government? In the first section of this chapter we reviewed Okscam and found the major flaw in institutional weaknesses that left county commissioners with money from the state flowing into their hands and much latitude in deciding how to spend it. The system also made it possible for those participating as both officials and constituents to cut corners and even to violate the law and yet excuse their villainy.

We traced the course of reform. We argued that reform made a real difference in what had been a pervasively corrupt system. But we also argued that much of the system of road districtitis was left in place. This last raised questions about the long term prospects for reform.

We can now see that the whole scheme of county government, road districtitis and all, is but part of a larger scheme of government pervaded by agrarian populist values from top to bottom. And it has actually grown

and become increasingly powerful since the 1950s, when former Governor Johnston Murray blasted it. Much of the corruption has been done away with but the counties have become stronger and ever more able to gain state support for their operations.

And this prospect does not speak well for the future of reform. The system left in place preserves the old county commissioner districts and the inefficient, highly political means of roadbuilding. Splintered government makes it difficult for the voters at large to control officials effectively. Constituents have access to individual commissioners to pester them to patch 'their' road and to seek favors for all manner of good causes. And in this decentralized system with access prized above all, commissioners have good reason to respond favorably. The result is not likely to be good roads built without fear or favor. Instead the result is likely to be the usual, a highly political local road system built in response to political pressures.

In the short run Okscam pretty well cleaned up what had been a pervasive pattern of corruption. But in the long run an erosion of reforms seemed all too likely if the state's agrarian populism and preference for splintered government continued to grow in strength.

NOTES

1. See State Legislative Subcommittee on Purchasing Procedures of County Commissioners, Report to Judiciary Committee, November 13, 1958, Finding 17, p. 4. Senator Hugh Sandlin chaired the committee and its work is hereafter referred to simply as the Sandlin Report.

The committee heard many witnesses and compiled an impressive body of evidence that detailed a host of practices that were unethical and/or illegal. Federal officials in their prosecutions in the 1980s confirmed that the "spawning ground" for corruption had persisted over the years, in spite of the warnings in the Sandlin Report.

2. The actual power conferred by this law was not clear. The entries for the office of Attorney General in the 1984-85 edition of *The Book of the States* were the same as they were for the 1980-81 edition. On the other hand, the language in the law seemed clearly to grant this authority.

3. The change at issue would allow commissioners to trade in used equipment like graders when buying new equipment instead of having to auction off the used equipment as before.

4. We take this opportunity to thank reporter Beverly Pettigrew of Mississippi's *Jackson Daily News* for sending us in May of 1989 extensive news clippings on Mississippi's scandal and reform efforts.

5. One state official in the Oklahoma Department of Transportation who was interviewed in 1992 supplied significant detail. This official had experience both of the old corrupt system and of the post-Okscam reforms. He felt there had been quite a change. Attitudes among local officials were different, there was better record keeping, there was a paper trail and better auditing, and there was more accountability. It sounded as though much of the casual, informal, and somewhat sloppy practices of the past had, in the main, given way to more professional operations. This of course is impressionistic but highly significant testimony from a key player on the inside.

6. There was some dispute about the exact proportions, but there was little question but that the state share was far higher than the counties' share. Federal funds accounted for about 7 percent. See David R. Morgan, et al., *Oklahoma Politics*, p. 200.

7. There was discussion of revising the state constitution in the late 1980's. The idea of county consolidation was clearly rejected, in part because county officials showed up at meetings held to discuss revision and attacked consolidation. No one at this time seemed to be advocating it but local officials were out in force to attack it. See "County Mergers Unlikely to Constitution," *The Daily Oklahoman*, February 9, 1989, p. 9.

8. One fine journalistic account of the urban-rural clash over school consolidation is "Coming Together: School Consolidation Still Controversial", *The Sunday Oklahoman*, May 20, 1990, p. 1. At this time there were 604 districts, one of them with only 26 students. Champions of consolidation, such as Representative Carolyn Thompson of Norman, are quoted as anticipating a "flood" of consolidations with reform. On the other hand rural interests saw the local school as the "glue" which held the community together and which they did not want to give up.

An example of the persisting opposition to school consolidation is "Suggestion Has Consolidated Anger, Not Schools," *Tulsa World*, August 29, 1991, p. 1. In this article there is mention that state officials had graded some 200 of the state's school districts as not up to standard. This judgement was what had angered many local officials. At this point the state still had more than 580 districts. The task of upgrading education in all of these districts would be onerous indeed.

9. Alan Ehrenhalt, "'Higher Ed,' Sooner Style," *Governing*, Vol. 2, November 1988, p. 40.

One good analysis of the state's finances, including tax effort, see David R. Morgan, et al., *Oklahoma Politics* Chapter 10, "Financing Government in Oklahoma", pp. 155 ff. According to Morgan, Oklahoma ranked forty third in tax effort in the late 1980s (p. 157).

10. Another example of this populist opposition to elitism or excellence came up in the late 1980's with the attack by a rural representative on a proposed special science and math high school to be located in Oklahoma City. He charged that rural people would see this school as serving an "elite" and as draining good students away from country schools. See "Math-Science School Fighting Charges of Costly Elitism," *The Daily Oklahoman*, February 19, 1989, p. 1.

11. "George Nigh: Oklahoma's Best Former Governor," *The Journal Record*, April 20, 1991, p. 1. *The Journal Record* is an Oklahoma City daily devoted to business news.

Nigh probably represented some of the best of the state's good ol' boy politics and some of its weaknesses as well.

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STRATEGIC OKLAHOMA POLITICIANS: ANALYSIS OF THE OKLAHOMA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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In this study, Oklahoma House of Representatives races from 1974-1988 are examined to the conclusion that attorneys and previous officeholders are the two best employment categories from which to stage successful challenges to an incumbent or election to an open seat. Additionally, although open seats are more easily obtained than when an incumbent is present, parity can be approached by a minority party over time by adhering to the suggested electability model. If the public mood is changing in the 90's, the implications of the model could become even more significant.

As a one-party dominant Democratic state, Oklahoma is not markedly different from other Southern states. The state legislature is dominated by Democrats who seem to continue in office, often unchallenged, for as long as they choose. The attitude seems to be that incumbents cannot be defeated, therefore, why challenge them? The traditional political culture of the state further encourages waiting one's turn rather than challenging political, social and economic elites (Darcy, 1983; Darcy, Brewer, and Clay, 1984).

As a result, the potential candidates appear to act strategically, waiting for an incumbent to die, retire or move on before running themselves. This pattern varies considerably from that found in some other areas of the country, such as California, Texas, and Florida where fierce challenges to incumbents are the rule.

It is the purpose of this research to examine the consequences of strategic candidacies in Oklahoma. This examination will be organized around three questions about candidates for the Oklahoma State House of Representatives from 1974 to 1988. 1) Who runs? 2) Who wins? 3) When do winners run? The sources of the data are the *Daily Oklahoman* and the *Directory of Oklahoma*, an annual publication of the State of Oklahoma. The *Daily Oklahoman* publishes lists of candidates who have filed for office and includes their occupation, age, and party.

Directory of Oklahoma, incumbency, whether or not there was a primary, runoff, or general election, and who won can be learned. This information is the basis for examining a strategic candidate model. Briefly, according to this model, the strategic candidate would be part of the traditional establishment, an attorney or previous officeholder, for example, who avoids running against an incumbent. The sacrificial lamb, in contrast, is an outsider with little status, indifferent to the ruling norms, who runs independently regardless of whether there is an incumbent.

THE STRATEGIC CANDIDATE MODEL

Numerous modern researchers have contributed immensely to the scholarly understanding of legislative candidate behavior. James David Barber has taken a psychological approach. Barber sees the very success that is necessary for the potential candidate to decide to run, to be a deterrent factor in running. Barber notes that, "The greater [the candidate's] achievements in business or the law, the more likely it is that these [financial and career] calculations will work to the disadvantage of legislative recruitment" (Barber, 1965:7-8). People who are most able, from a financial perspective to run, are least likely to do so, he argues, because of the high cost in time and money.

According to Barber, in addition to financial considerations, prospective candidates must occupy flexible occupations, be able to delegate time-consuming responsibilities to others, or have understanding superiors. Therefore, certain financial and occupational groups should be better represented among candidates than others.

Joseph A. Schlesinger, however, has presented an ambition theory which focuses on the way in which people cooperate, form organizations, coalitions, or factions to serve their political ends (Schlesinger, 1966). The potential candidate engages in political behavior and makes strategic decisions which are appropriate to being elected. Schlesinger found that only certain individuals were even in a position to aspire to become officeholders. According to this basic assumption, there is order and predictability to the process of advancement into political office. Combining aspects of these two models, we expect candidates who were from certain occupations to act rationally and make more calculated

decisions about when and when not to run.

More recently, Jacobson and Kernell have looked at U.S. Congressional elections and found predictability among ambitious political office seekers. They make the assumption that politicians are not fools. Therefore, whether or not a quality candidate decides to run is not random (Jacobson and Kernell, 1981:424). Instead, high quality candidates (lawyers and previous officeholders) act strategically and run only when the chances of winning are good.

Policy and representational implications are notable. If states such as Oklahoma have incumbents who are only challenged occasionally, if at all, their conduct in office might also vary from that of legislators in more competitive states. It is entirely possible that one effect of the high rate of unchallenged incumbents is on public policy.

WHO RUNS FOR THE OKLAHOMA HOUSE?

Races in Oklahoma's 101 House of Representatives districts were examined between 1974 to 1988. In the 808 elections, there were 662 races with incumbents present and those incumbents represented 36.3% of all 1,826 candidates. The typical race involved one Democratic incumbent and slightly less than two opponents. Usually, only one party was involved in a primary. The majority of all candidates, 70.0%, filed for office as Democrats, while 29.2% were Republicans and 0.8% were independents. The median candidate was 43 years of age, younger than was found by Schlesinger for first time officeholders. He found that over half were from 45 to 55 years of age (Schlesinger, 1966:184).

Of the 1,826 total candidates, 8.5% were women. Previous research indicates that women do not run as sacrificial lambs. Rather women select races more carefully. Women candidates in Oklahoma have more success in raising money than men, both in primaries and general elections. This indicates that more women are not elected to office only because there is a limited pool of potential women candidates (Darcy, 1983; Darcy, Brewer, and Clay, 1984).

A candidate's previous occupation gives insight into who runs for the Oklahoma House. The wide variation in candidate's employment has been reduced to six categories: blue collar worker, small businessman, professional, attorney, non-incumbent previous officeholder, and other.

The blue collar category includes such occupations as plumber, welder, or other manually skilled employee. Small business includes those individuals who own or work in individual local retail businesses. Professionals are individuals such as doctors, professors, or individuals whose job requires considerable higher education, but who are not attorneys. Attorneys are treated as a single category. Previous officeholders are individuals who are, or have been, in an elected office other than the one being contested. County sheriffs and county commissioners are examples. "Other" is a miscellaneous category which includes individuals not otherwise categorized including housewives, retired persons, and individuals who did not otherwise categorize themselves.

Small businessmen and professionals provide the largest groups of non-incumbent (new) candidates, which may indicate their freedom to delegate some of their business duties to employees or managers as predicted by Duncan MacRae (Barber, 1965:233; see Table 1). Non-incumbent attorneys had a moderate percentage of the total and non-incumbent previous office holders were only slightly represented. It may be speculated that the reason so few previous officeholders appear to run

TABLE 1
Background on Non-Incumbent Lower House Candidates
by Type of Race (1974-1988)

	<i>No Incumbent Running</i>	<i>Incumbent Running</i>	<i>All</i>	<i>(N)</i>
Blue Collar	7.8%	9.5%	8.7%	(102)
Other	10.2%	14.0%	12.2%	(142)
Small Business	33.2%	30.8%	31.9%	(371)
Professional	34.7%	33.4%	34.0%	(396)
Previous Officeholder	1.5%	1.5%	1.5%	(17)
Attorney	12.6%	10.9%	11.7%	(136)
Total (N)	100.0(524)	100.0(640)	100.0%	(1164)

NOTE: While categories are not mutually exclusive, candidates are assigned into only one category.

SOURCE: Author's calculations from data published in the *Daily Oklahoman* and in the *Directory of Oklahoma* for the various years.

is that their previous occupation rather than previous office is being reflected in the data. Regarding race selection by non-incumbents, blue collar and "other" categories make up larger portions of those running against incumbents than those running in open races. According to Table 1, these outsiders tend to behave more often as "sacrificial lambs" than the more established types.

WHO WINS?

Regardless of their strategies, or lack thereof, some types of candidates should be more likely to win than others. For example, most new candidates lose. Of the 1,164 non-incumbent candidates, 207 (17.8%) won and 957 (82.2%) lost. The chances of losing varies considerably by occupation, however (see Table 2). Attorneys (24.3%) and previous office holders (23.5%) have the greatest probability of winning an election as new candidates while blue collar workers (3.9%) have the least.

Table 3 examines the outcome of races involving new candidates by whether or not an incumbent is in the race and new candidate background. Challengers win at an overall 9.7% rate, but it should be noted that in a race involving more than one challenger, whenever an

TABLE 2

Outcome of Race Involving New Candidate by the Candidate's Background (1974-1988)

	<i>Elected</i>	<i>Loses</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>(N)</i>
Blue Collar	3.9%	96.1%	100.0%	(102)
Other	13.8%	86.2%	100.0%	(142)
Small Business	19.3%	81.7%	100.0%	(371)
Professional	20.2%	79.8%	100.0%	(396)
Previous				
Office Holder	23.5%	76.5%	100.0%	(17)
Attorney	24.3%	75.7%	100.0%	(136)
Total	17.8%	82.2%	100.0%	(1164)

NOTE: While categories are not mutually exclusive, candidates are assigned into only one category.

SOURCE: As with Table 1.

TABLE 3

Outcome of Race Involving New Candidates by Whether or not an Incumbent is in the Race and New, and New Candidate Background

	<i>Against Incumbent</i>				<i>No Incumbent</i>			
	<i>New Candidate</i>			<i>(N)</i>	<i>New Candidate</i>			<i>(N)</i>
	<i>Wins</i>	<i>Loses</i>	<i>Total</i>		<i>Wins</i>	<i>Loses</i>	<i>Total</i>	
Blue Collar, Other								
Small Business and Professional	9.6%	90.4%	100.0%	(561)	25.8%	74.2%	100.0%	(450)
Previous Office	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%	(9)	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%	(8)
Attorney	11.4%	89.6%	100.0%	(70)	37.9%	62.1%	100.0%	(66)
Total	9.7%	90.3%	100.0%	(640)	27.7%	72.3%	100.0%	(524)

SOURCE: As with Table 1.

incumbent wins, all challengers are defeated. This is also true of individual categories. Therefore, attorneys who appear to win at the rate of 11.4% against incumbents are often running against other challengers, some of whom are attorneys.

The real power of attorney candidates can be seen in the open races. Attorneys are more likely to get elected than are other groups, even previous officeholders. Even the other categories are three times more likely to be elected in open seats than against incumbents.

If candidates do act strategically, then current House members are former strategic candidates who survive largely because they go unchallenged by other strategic candidates. Who, then, does defeat incumbents? According to the strategic candidate model, both non-incumbent attorneys and non-incumbent previous officeholders prefer to run in open races. The non-incumbent attorneys clearly performed better than their non-attorney counterparts, therefore, the attorneys make better candidates. The greater success of attorneys is, therefore, partly responsible for the relatively high percentage of attorneys in the Oklahoma House compared to their proportion of the population. But most House members are not attorneys or previous officeholders. Small business and professional categories (32.9% and 38.6% respectively) are most represented among winners because of the large number who run. Many are elected in spite of their mediocre election rates (see Table 4). Therefore, the number of house winners who come from lower status

TABLE 4

Composition of Winners and Losers among New Candidates (1974-1988)

	<i>New Candidate Elected</i>	<i>New Candidate Loses</i>
Blue Collar	3.9%	9.8%
Other	6.8%	13.4%
Small Business	32.9%	31.7%
Professional	38.6%	33.0%
Prev. Office Holder	1.9%	1.3%
Attorney	15.9%	10.8%
Total (N)	100.0% (207)	100.0% (957)

SOURCE: As with Table 1.

occupations are elected because there is a larger number of them who run compared to those with higher status occupations.

From the partisan perspective, Republican and Democratic non-incumbent candidates are roughly similar in backgrounds, although the Democrats outnumbered the Republicans 2 to 1.

Overall, Democrats acted slightly more strategically than Republicans by more often selecting an open race. According to Table 5, of all backgrounds, strategic race selection was most visible among Republican attorneys. Generally, attorneys are, as a profession, traditionally more familiar with politics.

Table 6 examines how party and background effect the chances of a new candidate getting elected. Since all independents were losers, this table reflects only the relative successes of background categories between the Republican and Democratic parties.

According to this analysis, Republican attorneys, again, are shown to be the background category with the highest winning percentage. Republican blue collar workers and previous officeholders performed the poorest. Even more striking is that, among new candidates, overall Republican success in winning legislative seats is 2.5 percentage points greater than for Democrats (19.7% vs 17.2%). The Democratic advantage in the legislature is due, in part, to the fact that there are twice as many new Democratic candidates as Republican.

For both parties, the bulk of new candidates elected come from small business and professional backgrounds. Their large numbers compen-

TABLE 5

**Background of Non-Incumbent Lower House
by Party and Type of Race (1974-1988)**

	<i>Republicans</i>			<i>Democrats</i>		
	<i>No Inc Running</i>	<i>Inc Running</i>	<i>All</i>	<i>No Inc Running</i>	<i>Inc Running</i>	<i>All</i>
Blue Collar	6.2%	9.8%	8.2%	8.1%	9.2%	8.7%
Other	12.5%	14.8%	13.9%	9.3%	13.7%	11.7%
Small Business	29.2%	32.6%	31.1%	35.1%	30.1%	32.4%
Professional	38.5%	32.6%	35.1%	33.1%	33.5%	33.3%
Previous Officeholder	0.6%	0.9%	0.8%	1.9%	1.7%	1.8%
Attorney	13.0%	9.3%	10.9%	12.5%	11.8%	12.1%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
(N)	(161)	(215)	(376)	(359)	(415)	(774)
	(42.8%)	(57.2%)	(100%)	(46.4%)	(53.6%)	(100%)

SOURCE: As with Table 1.

sate for their relatively poor chances of being elected. Attorneys and previous office holders, who have much better chances of being elected, are relatively poorly represented because so few of them run.

TABLE 6

Outcome of Race by Non-Incumbent Background and Party

	<i>Republicans</i>			<i>Democrats</i>		
	<i>Non-Inc Elected</i>	<i>Non-Inc Loses</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Non-Inc Elected</i>	<i>Non-Inc Loses</i>	<i>Total</i>
Blue Collar	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%	11.9%	88.1%	100.0%
Other	13.5%	86.5%	100.0%	7.8%	92.2%	100.0%
Small Business	22.2%	77.8%	100.0%	16.7%	83.3%	100.0%
Professional	21.2%	78.8%	100.0%	20.2%	79.8%	100.0%
Previous Officeholder	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%	28.6%	71.4%	100.0%
Attorney	31.7%	68.3%	100.0%	21.3%	78.7%	100.0%
Total	19.7%	80.3%	100.0%	17.2%	82.8%	100.0%
(N)	(74)	(302)	(376)	(359)	(133)	(774)

SOURCE: As with Table 1.

TABLE 7

**Composition of Winner and Loser Categories among
Non-Incumbents by Party (1974-1988)**

	<i>Republican</i>		<i>Democrat</i>	
	<i>New Candidate Elected</i>	<i>Loses</i>	<i>New Candidate Elected</i>	<i>Loses</i>
Blue Collar	0.0%	10.3%	6.0%	9.2%
Other	9.5%	14.9%	5.3%	12.9%
Small Business	35.1%	30.1%	31.6%	32.6%
Professional	37.8%	34.4%	39.1%	32.1%
Previous Officeholder	0.0%	1.0%	3.0%	1.6%
Attorney	17.6%	9.3%	15.0%	11.6%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
(N)	(161)	(215) (376)	(359)	(415) (774)

SOURCE: As with Table 1.

INCUMBENTS

Legislative races can also be examined from the perspective of the incumbent. When one or more challengers were present, incumbents won 85.6% of the time. They were defeated 14.4% of the time (Table 8).

However, the incumbent was challenged only 59% of the time. In the other 41% of the races, incumbents were re-elected by default boosting their overall election rate to 91.49% when defending their seat. Clearly, a great deal of the incumbent re-election rate success is due to opponents acting non-strategically, not waiting until the incumbent retires (Table 8). The implication is that non-incumbents should wait and act strategically before attempting to run for office.

APPLICATION

If an individual candidate follows the strategic model, the candidate's individual chances for election will improve. The party's chances of gains, whether it is in the majority or minority, will be limited by strategic action, however. Republican non-incumbents were found to

TABLE 8

**Chances of an Incumbent Winning when Running for Re-election
by Whether or not There is an Opponent in the Race (1974-1988)**

<i>Challenger In Race</i>	<i>Incumbent</i>		<i>Total</i>	<i>(N)</i>
	<i>Wins</i>	<i>Loses</i>		
Yes	85.6%	14.4%	100.0%	(390)
No	100.0%	0.0%	100.0%	(272)
Total	91.4%	8.6%	100.0%	(662)

SOURCE: As with Table 1.


challenge incumbents at the rate of 57.2%, while Democrats do so at a rate of 53.6% (Table 5). From a party perspective, the Republicans are often running "sacrificial lambs" whose chances of winning are minor because they are acting less strategically. In order for the minority Republican party to achieve a greater gain of seats in the Oklahoma House, it is necessary to further break away from the traditional strategic methodology.

While attorneys and previous officeholders win more seats than candidates from other occupational categories, party seats will be gained by running greater numbers of candidates of all backgrounds against incumbents. It would be advantageous to either party to eliminate automatic wins that result from the lack of opposition. Because the rate of winning is less for the non-strategic candidates, the numbers of contested races must increase for party gains to occur.

We have established that incumbents will win re-election, when challenged, at a rate of 85.6%. They lose 14.4% of the time. If these findings are applied to an existing election model, it can be shown how majority and minority parties, by acting strategically, have restricted their chances of increasing seats in a legislative body. Using a tree diagram in a similar method as R. Darcy and J. Choike, the rates of success and failure of the 808 Oklahoma House elections can be graphically expressed (Darcy and Choike, 1989).

The data thus far developed on the Oklahoma House of Representatives from 1974-1988 are shown in Figure 1. Each electoral contingency is accounted for by individual percentages and representative numbers. According to this model, winning and unchallenged incumbents combined represent 75% of the legislature in each session. Since the unchal-

FIGURE 1
Model of Electoral Process Producing New Legislature



lenged incumbent who wins represents another 41.3%, the proportion of winners who are non-incumbents is 25%, which could be called the "House turn-over" rate.

A hypothetical model of the electoral process producing a new legislature with idealized parameters would eliminate unchallenged incumbents (Figure 2). If the unchallenged incumbents were challenged at the established win rate of 14.4% for non-incumbents, new seats would have been gained (207 x 144 = 30) for an average of 3.75 new seats for each of the eight elections studied. This hypothetical model produces a 70% incumbent return rate, 5% less than the current real model.

A second hypothetical model could be constructed in which all incumbents are challenged and better challengers are present. This could be accomplished by recruiting more attorneys and previous office holders. The change would produce a 1.9% reduction in the rate of returning incumbents (Figure 3). Comparing the two strategies, challenging all incumbents with the existing mix of new candidates is twice as effective in defeating incumbents (5% increase) while upgrading new candidates produces the additional increase.

FIGURE 2
Hypothetical Model of Electoral Process Producing New Legislature with Idealized Parameters. . . All Incumbents Challenged





FIGURE 3
Hypothetical Model of Electoral Process with Idealized Parameters. . . All Incumbents Challenged and Better Challengers. (Challenger Increases Chances of Winning against Incumbent by 2%)



CONCLUSION

Historically, legislators who have secure seats are less responsive to their constituencies than those facing hotly contested races. Therefore, incumbents who are challenged more often could not afford to become complacent. They would be forced to concentrate on developing records of legislative accomplishment with which to face their voters.

Oklahoma is a one-party Democratic state, primarily because the voters are often given no choice. In many districts the real election occurs in the primary. Because some voters who are ideologically aligned with the minority party are registered as members of the majority party, there is a tendency toward one party dominance. Therefore, by having more and better qualified challengers, greater democratization of Oklahoma or any other one-party Democratic or Republican state, would occur.

A related study is suggested by the renewed anti-incumbent mood promulgated by the recent U.S. House banking scandal and a public perception of legislative ineffectiveness, neither of which are validated in this study. From the conclusions of this present research, challengers should have even greater successes against incumbents impacted by these additional factors.

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THE IMPACT OF OKLAHOMA INDIAN TRIBES ON THE POLITICAL AGENDA OF THE U. S. GOVERNMENT

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This study of the effect of Oklahoma Indian tribes on the political agenda of the U.S. government attempted to answer two research questions: whether the unique legal and political status of Indian tribes provides them with special access to, and influence on, the agenda-setting and policymaking of the national government and whether Oklahoma Indian tribes are able to advance a political agenda they define. The results of this study support the conclusions that the special status of the tribes does give them special access to, and influence on, national policies only after they are established by other political actors. Therefore, Indian tribes are not able to advance a political agenda they define. The national Indian policy agenda is set by other political actors.

According to E. E. Schattschneider (1960), defining the issues in any given society is the supreme instrument of power. The social and political significance of agenda-setting arises from its structuring of government policy choices. The ability of any group to influence the formal agenda of the national government depends on the group's resources; that is, number of members, status, wealth, effect on the economy and group cohesion (Kingdon, 1984). If a group has no position of strength in the political system, then it has little bargaining basis (Cobb and Elder, 1983). A minority group which many researchers describe as having historically failed to obtain government policies representing their interests are American Indian tribes. Because of deliberate cultural separateness, Indian agenda items tend to be largely confined to the group itself. As a result, such issues have great difficulty in gaining the attention of political elites. Many scholars believe that American Indian/federal relations are a study in the failure of democratic processes to protect the interests and well-being of American Indian tribes (Gross, 1989).

When one looks at a list of resources that can be used to place a group's issues on the federal government agenda—numbers in the group, status, wealth, effect of the group on the economy, and group cohesion—it would be reasonable to conclude that American Indian tribes lack the resources to place their items on the federal government's agenda or to

attain successful resolution of these items. Deloria and Lytle (1983) state that tribes are accorded low priority by the federal government when it comes to allocating resources. They contend that the federal government responds to more visible and vocal interest groups and to more populous racial minorities than it does to Indian tribes. The present status of Indian tribes is that of an identifiable racial minority. Indian issues are now social issues and are resolved as such; that is, small changes in federal Indian policies will continue to occupy tribal leaders and policymakers instead of the development of broad national policies (Deloria, 1985).

Gross, in a 1989 study of Indian tribes' impact on federal policies, contends that although it may be paradoxical, American Indian tribes, who have been viewed as historically oppressed, have transcended the limits of their oppression. Gross suggests that Indians are playing a prominent role in the development of pro-Indian policy on the national level. She further contends that even though Indian groups are accused of internecine conflict, are fragmented on goals and strategies, and unable to manage planning processes well, they are, nevertheless, very effective in influencing federal policies. Her contention is that most federal Indian legislation enacted after 1968 has incorporated the policy goals and preferences of Indian constituencies and groups. She states that Indian constituencies and groups are advancing their political agenda. Gross further states that the tribes' semi-sovereign status places them in the constitutional system of intergovernmental relations and that the continuing controversy over their sovereignty sets the agenda for the U. S. Congress.

The question that arises is whether the unique political and legal status of Indian tribes overcomes their historical oppression and lack of resources enough to allow them to significantly effect federal agenda-setting and policymaking. It seems clear that Indian tribes do have extra-constitutional rights, even if these rights are ill-defined and controversial. However, setting the agenda of the federal government and federal policymaking are decisions made within the constitutional framework. When tribes attempt to influence federal agenda-setting and policymaking are they acting as sovereign nations or as political interest groups? Does the very fact that the tribes attempt to solve sovereignty issues and federal trust questions by lobbying Congress, rather than negotiating as a sovereign nation with the United States, imply that Indian tribes are not, dealing "government-to-government" with the United States? Is it

contradictory and, ultimately, unsuccessful for the tribes to attempt to act inside the constitutional framework to answer extra-constitutional questions? Does the very fact that the tribes do attempt to act within the constitutional framework implicitly admit that Congress does have plenary authority over the tribes.

This study will attempt to answer two research questions:

1) Does the unique legal and political status of Oklahoma Indian tribes provide them special access and influence on political agenda-setting and policymaking at the federal level?

2) Are Oklahoma Indian tribes able to advance a political agenda they have defined?

RESEARCH DESIGN

A political agenda is defined as a list of issues viewed at a specific point in time and ranked in a hierarchy of importance by political elites. The formal agenda of the national government is defined as the set of agenda items explicitly up for active and serious consideration by government decision makers. The tribal agenda are those ranked political agenda items identified by study respondents. Tribal agenda items on the formal agenda of the U.S. Congress and the federal courts were identified through secondary sources, tribal-related cases on the federal court dockets, and tribal-related legislation considered by the 99th and 100th Congresses.

Agenda-setting actors, other than the Assistant Secretary of Interior for Indian Affairs and the case study group of tribal leaders, were identified using a "snowball" technique in which each person interviewed identified other actors to be included in the study. Ultimately, 51 political elites who were perceived to have an influence on tribal agendas were identified and, of these, 50 were included in the study (see Appendix 1).

An open-ended interview instrument, modeled on the instrument used in Kingdon's study, was used to interview study respondents. The same instrument was used whether the interviews were done in writing, by telephone, or in-person. The responses of these 50 government and non-government actors in the Indian policy sub-system were used to identify and rank tribal agenda items and to identify and rank the perceived

influence of various actors on the political agenda of American Indian tribes. All study interviews were conducted from December, 1989, to August, 1990.

FINDINGS

Study respondents were asked to identify the most important issues facing Indian tribes today and asked to rank the issues they mentioned. Table 1 compares the agenda item ranking by subgroup of respondents and by all respondents.

AGENDA ITEM ONE: TRIBAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Congressional respondents identified a number of impediments they saw to tribal economic development: hostility of non-Indians, a critical lack of understanding by non-Indians of the legal status of the tribes, and the lack of adequate tribal resources and capital necessary for economic development. They emphasized that there is a direct correlation between the lack of tribal economic development and other tribal problems (such as alcoholism, drug abuse, and broken families).

Tribal leaders pointed out that the tribes cannot be sovereign nations until they are self-sufficient. They stressed that the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) is of little assistance in tribal economic development because it does not have the qualified people needed to provide the necessary technical assistance (for example, specialists in raising capital and marketing).

Representatives of state interest groups thought widespread tribal economic development would not occur until the non-Indian business community saw more stability and credibility in tribal government. They said the private sector must be assured that no matter who the tribal leader may be or how many leadership changes occur, contracts will not be arbitrarily terminated or constantly renegotiated.

TABLE 1
Ranking of Indian Agenda Items by Individual Subgroups, Open-ended Question

<i>Rank</i>	<i>Congressmen & Congressional Staff (n=14)</i>	<i>Relevant Congressmen (n=5)</i>	<i>Tribal Leaders (n=14)</i>	<i>State Groups (n=7)</i>	<i>Indian Groups (n=6)</i>	<i>Executive Branch (n=4)</i>	<i>All Respondents (n=5)</i>
1	economic development health	economic development	economic development	sovereignty	sovereignty	economic development federal relations	economic development health
2		federal relations	federal relations	economic development	economic development education health		health sovereignty
3	education	sovereignty education health	health	federal relations education health		sovereignty education	
4	sovereignty federal		education sovereignty				federal relations
5					federal relations	health	education

NOTE: Issues are ranked in order of importance, with the issue ranked number one as the most important. There were some ties.

AGENDA ITEM TWO: INDIAN HEALTH

Congressional respondents stated that the quality of human capital in the tribes is of paramount importance; therefore, improved Indian health is essential to political and economic development. They thought Indian health problems are directly related to Indian feelings of powerlessness and to the highly unstable society in which many Indians live. Tribal respondents believed that the federal government's inadequate funding of Indian health programs directly contradicts federal efforts to improve the tribes economically.

AGENDA ITEM THREE: TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY

The tribal leaders thought that all tribal agenda items are subsets of the issue of tribal sovereignty. They mentioned that the arena where the issue of tribal sovereignty is being fought may be moving from Washington, D.C., to state capitals. However, the tribal leaders thought that the issue of tribal sovereignty would have to be in the final analysis resolved by Congress. It is Congress, they said, which has the ultimate power to either destroy or preserve tribal sovereignty. Congressional respondents pointed out that the tribes are forced to constantly defend their sovereignty (for example, the power to tax and tribal law enforcement) instead of putting their energies into solving critical tribal problems such as health, education or tribal economic development.

AGENDA ITEM FOUR: TRIBAL/FEDERAL RELATIONS

The majority of study respondents, regardless of their affiliation, were critical of the U. S. Bureau of Indian Affairs. They believed that in the 1980s there had been little connection between tribal priorities and the federal Indian programs actually funded. They contended that the federal government developed these programs with little input from the tribes. Many study respondents, especially congressmen and executive branch officials, called for major reform of the BIA. They suggested the BIA be made an independent board or commission with the primary function of overseeing the government's trust responsibilities to the tribes. They saw the primary role of this reformed BIA as advisory and as a protector

of federal trust responsibilities, while letting the tribes administer all federal Indian programs.

AGENDA ITEM FIVE: INDIAN EDUCATION

Congressional and executive branch respondents thought that the lack of education of many tribal members makes it difficult for the tribes to be self-governing and economically self-sufficient. They spoke of the lack of community support for education in many tribes and a lack of incentive among many Indians to get an education. As one congressman said, generations of despair do not motivate Indians to become educated. Tribal leaders agreed stating that education and economic development are one and the same issue.

All responses to the open-ended interview questions were examined to identify the respondents' perceptions as to which actors had the most influence in placing tribal agenda items on the formal agenda of the national government. Explicit references to actors who influenced the agenda were counted (see Table 2).

THE INFLUENCE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS

The federal courts were perceived to be the single most important influence on the tribal agenda by all study respondents. Congressional respondents ranked the courts the most influential actor more than any other subgroup of respondents. They stated that the courts are the historical protector of Indian rights and the Supreme Court has helped shape the federal laws defining Indian rights and sovereignty. However, they also emphasized that the U. S. Constitution gives Congress plenary authority over all Indian tribes. They stated that the courts' influence is most often the result of the failure or refusal of the executive and legislative branches to act.

With the exception of executive branch respondents, the tribal leaders ranked the federal courts lower than any other group of study respondents. They stated that most federal court decisions are specific to one tribe and have little general applicability to all Indians. They further said that Indian tribes do not "win" cases because they are usually defendants,

TABLE 2

Ranking of Influences on the Indian Agenda by Subgroups and All Respondents

<i>Rank</i>	<i>Congressmen & Congressional Staff (n=14)</i>	<i>Relevant Congressmen (n=5)</i>	<i>Tribal Leaders (n=14)</i>	<i>State Interest Groups (n=7)</i>	<i>Indian Interest Groups (n=6)</i>	<i>Executive Branch (n=4)</i>	<i>Combined Subgroup Ranking (n=50)</i>
1	federal courts	federal courts	interest groups	relevant congressmembers federal courts	relevant congressmembers executive branch	relevant congressmembers	federal courts
2	tribal leaders	congress	congress			executive branch	relevant congressmembers
3	congress		relevant congressmembers	congress	courts	political appointees	congress
4	relevant congressmembers	relevant congressmembers		tribal leaders	congress tribal leaders	congress federal courts	tribal leaders
5	interest groups	interest groups tribal leaders	tribal leaders	interest groups			interest groups

not plaintiffs. Tribal leaders said that the tribes are more likely to react to cases brought against them than to use the courts to pursue a tribal agenda item.

Although the Indian interest groups thought the courts played a primary role in tribal agenda setting, they thought the final arbiter of Indian issues is the U. S. Congress. Even when the tribes do win in court (for example, court cases involving Indian gaming) Congress often will pass legislation to check the court's actions (for example, by setting up a National Indian Gaming Commission). The state interest groups agreed with Indian interest groups that court decisions tend to get Congress' attention and force Congress to take action. The state respondents said that Congress refuses to deal with controversial Indian policies, unless forced, because it is political suicide to be "anti-Indian."

According to the *Ninth Decennial Digest, Part II, 1984-88*, 496 tribal-related cases came before the federal courts. The Native American Rights Fund (NARF) identified only 79 of those cases as significant, that is, having widespread applicability to all Indian tribes (16% of the cases). This seems to confirm the perceptions of study respondents that most of these court cases are tribal specific and do not have widespread applicability to all tribes.

Looking at the subject matter of these 496 cases seems to further confirm the perception that there is little direct relation between the agenda items identified by tribal leaders as most important and the subject of cases brought before the federal courts (see Table 3).

THE INFLUENCE OF THE U.S. CONGRESS

Congress as a whole, and relevant congressmembers specifically, were ranked the second most important influences on the tribal agenda by study respondents. Many congressional respondents emphasized that the U. S. Constitution gives Congress plenary authority over Indian tribes and that the federal courts have historically upheld Congress' plenary authority. Many respondents believe that Congress and the federal courts equally influence policymaking in this area.

According to lists provided by the Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Indian Affairs and the Friends Committee on National Legislation, in the 99th and 100th Congresses (1984-88) 302 tribal-related bills were introduced (68 passed). The Friends Committee on National Legislation

TABLE 3

**Comparison of Tribal Agenda with
Federal Court Cases and Bills Passed by Congress**

Ranked Tribal Agenda Items	Subject of Federal Court Cases (Ranked by % of cases in category)	Subject Matter of Bills Passed by 99th and 100th Congresses (Ranked by % of bills in category)
1. Tribal economic development	Land, water, and fishing claims (52%)	Land, water, and fishing claims (45%)
2. Tribal/federal relations	Tribal governance issues (23%)	Indian education (13%)
3. Indian health	State/tribal disputes (10%)	Tribal governance (10%)
4. Indian education	Indian civil rights (8%)	Economic develop ment (7%)
5. Tribal sovereignty	Other (7%)	Indian health (7%)

and the Native American Rights Fund consider that the large majority of these 302 bills were of importance to one specific tribe and had no broad policy implications for all Indian tribes. These two groups identified only 2% of these bills as having widespread application. A comparison of the agenda items identified as most important by tribal leaders and the bills passed by Congress shows little similarity.

THE INFLUENCE OF THE TRIBAL LEADERS

Tribal leaders were identified as the fourth most important influence on the tribal agenda. State interest groups thought that tribal leaders more often react to tribal agenda items placed on the decision agenda of the federal government by other actors rather than placing items on the government's agenda themselves. Executive branch respondents said the federal government must define the tribal agenda because the tribes speak with 300 different voices. Congressional study respondents spoke of tribal factionalism as an impediment to tribal leaders influencing the

federal agenda. Although they saw the trend toward inter-tribal and regional tribal councils as a positive development, they said the councils continue to be largely ineffectual because of tribal factionalism. Congressional respondents also stated that Congress is more likely to listen to tribal leaders in formulating policy once the decision to develop such a policy has been made by others. That is, tribal leaders have more influence on policymaking than agenda-setting.

The tribal leaders, themselves, said they most often react to a tribal agenda set by Congress. The tribal leaders also spoke of the continuing problem of factionalism. They said an Indian is not just an "Indian" but rather a Chickasaw or Kiowa, and this encourages factionalism. They also said that the current trend is to form temporary coalitions to work on specific issues already on the government agenda but then to disband once the issues are resolved. Finally, the tribal leaders emphasized that the tribes are not organized politically. If a tribe cannot deliver the vote, it has little power with either the legislative or executive branches of government.

THE INFLUENCE OF POLITICAL INTEREST GROUPS

Interest groups were ranked the fifth most important influence on the tribal agenda. Executive branch respondents thought the influence of tribal leaders was diminished on the national level because interest groups who supposedly represent tribal interests rarely encourage input or participation by tribal leaders. An interest group consistently identified as an example of such an interest group was the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI).

THE INFLUENCE OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

The Executive branch was ranked as the actor with the least influence on the tribal agenda, with the president ranked the lowest of all executive branch actors. Both tribal leaders and Indian interest groups emphasized that the role of the federal government in tribal affairs has changed over the last twenty years. They thought that the government's role was gradually becoming regulatory rather than service oriented. They felt

that the Bureau of Indian Affairs was fighting this trend because BIA staff perceive that their jobs are tied to the BIA's provision of social service programs to the tribes.

The majority of study respondents contended that President Reagan was "anti-Indian." They saw his ultimate goal as terminating tribes by eliminating federal Indian programs and drastically reducing funding for the programs that were left. Other respondents thought that the President had no "Indian agenda." State interest group respondents described President Reagan's attitude toward Indians as "studied indifference." The majority of respondents thought President Reagan's adverse actions impacting Indian tribes were budget driven rather than as a result of a presidential agenda. Indian tribes experienced budget cuts during his administration ten times greater than non-Indian groups (Josephy, 1982).

Congressional respondents said that if a president is to have influence in this area of policy he must put Indian policy on his presidential agenda early in his administration. They stated that President Nixon was the last president to place Indian policy on the presidential agenda and to take any significant actions in this field. Respondents did not believe that President Bush's role in Indian policymaking would be significantly different than that of President Reagan's. From 1984 to 1990 no Republican party platform nor presidential State of the Union Addresses mentioned Indian tribes or Indian agenda items.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

This study looked at two research questions, the first being whether the unique legal and political status of Indian tribes provides them special access and input into agenda-setting and policymaking at the federal level. The Gross study (1989) concluded that President Reagan's policy during his administration stipulated a relationship with the tribes similar to the sovereignty of states and local government. Gross contended that the tribes' "semi-sovereign" status placed them in the constitutional system of intergovernmental relations. This study does not support Gross' findings. No participant in this study thought that the federal government treated Indian tribes as a "third unit of government." Many participants spoke of President Reagan's rhetoric concerning self-

determination but thought his hidden agenda was to abolish the federal government's trust responsibilities toward the tribes. The Gross study, contrary to study conclusions, seems to support this contention. Gross stated that Reagans' rhetoric speaks of "self sufficiency" but not self-determination (political independence). She further stated that Reagan's actions did not support extending tribal jurisdiction or for legally and politically redefining the status of tribes. These statements contradict Gross' study conclusions that the tribes' sovereign status places them in the system of intergovernmental relations and that defining tribes as constitutional sovereigns has caught on. The only reference to treating tribes as third units of government in this study was in the context of state/tribal relations. State interest groups, state officials, and tribal leaders who participated in this study thought that progress had been made in dealing "government-to-government" on the state level, but saw no significant progress in this regard on the national level.

Study participants stated that the tribes most often react to an agenda set by others and rarely participate pro-actively in agenda-setting. Congressmembers and their staff members spoke of listening to, and being influenced by, tribal leaders when developing and implementing policies but not in deciding which issues were to be placed on the decision agenda of the federal government.

However, the unique legal and political status of Indian tribes has provided them a policy subsystem available to no other minority political group in the United States. The unique status of American Indian tribes has resulted in this .5% of the population accounting annually for over \$1 billion of the federal budget. American Indians have had created for their exclusive benefit a separate federal bureaucracy, the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, as well as specific Indian programs in at least six other major federal departments. There are at least three U.S. congressional committees that either deal with Indian policies exclusively or expend a significant amount of time on Indian policies. This information leads naturally to the second research question raised in this study: are Indian tribes able to advance a political agenda they define? The Gross study concludes that the tribes' "semi-sovereign status" causes conflict over jurisdiction that "sets the agenda of Congress"; the tribes ". . . advance a political agenda defined by the Indians themselves"; and that in the 1960s and 1970s Indian tribes created and realized a political agenda (Gross, 1989, 93-108). This study's findings do not agree with

the findings of the Gross' study.

The unique status of American Indian tribes has resulted in the formation of a closed policy subsystem. A closed policy subsystem is often composed of a federal agency, relevant congressmembers, congressional committees, and organized interest groups. These subsystem participants tend to share what is and what is not a problem and how to define the problem (Nimmo and Sanders, 1981). Cobb and Elder (1983) state that these subsystems tend to make only incremental changes in existing policies because they do not want to disrupt existing accommodations among subsystem members.

Low resource, low status groups such as Indian tribes often have agenda items that are endemic, that is, the government shares the responsibility for the current state of affairs. Eyestone (1978) has found that endemic issues are often best handled by closed policy subsystems. He states that these endemic agenda items often are "social issues," that is, conditions identified by groups within a population as a deviation from a social standard. In most endemic issue areas, groups continuously seek adjustments to existent policies but do not attempt to change the political agenda.

Orfield (1975) has also found that the U. S. Congress is often resistant to redressing social and economic imbalances because such issues tend to alienate segments of the congressmember's constituencies and other members of Congress. Therefore, congressmembers find it is easier to make small changes in existing programs and policies or to increase federal aid, actions which they hope may pass unnoticed. Deloria (1985) states that the present status of Indian tribes is that of an identifiable racial minority, that Indian issues are now social issues and that they are resolved as such.

This study and the Gross study came to very different conclusions concerning the influence of Indian tribes on federal tribal agenda-setting and policymaking. Both the Gross study and this study find Indian organizations and leaders play a significant role in *policymaking* but the data in neither study show that these actors are significant influences on the federal government's agenda.

Another point that needs to be made is that Gross may have studied a time period (1970s) that was a deviation from the normal course in the Indian policy field. Data collected in this study does not support Gross' generalizations drawn from Indian policymaking in the 1970s. Indian

in intergovernmental relations. Indian tribes have not transcended their "traditional survival ethic" and have not developed significant political clout (interest group activity, delivering the vote, election of tribal candidates). Nor have the tribes adopted political agendas which reflect universal goals rather than those specific to one tribe.

Even though Indian tribes may not have the influence Gross contributes to them, it is clear that the influence of the tribes has grown. The participants in this study do not think that Indian politics reverted back to the decade of the 1960s. There have been significant changes in this policy arena. This area of federal policy no longer seems to be dominated by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The quality of tribal leadership, according to study participants, continues to improve. The tribes continue to work toward self-sufficiency through economic development and by obtaining more tribal control over federal Indian programs. The tribes also continue, in the 1980s and 1990s, to challenge state and local governments in matters of jurisdiction, and many tribes say they now deal more often government-to-government with the states on issues critical to Indian tribes.

APPENDIX 1
Study Respondents

14 Eastern Oklahoma elected tribal leaders representing the Chickasaw, Osage, Quapaw, Eastern Shawnee, Seneca-Cayuga, Wyandotte, Miami, Choctaw, Creek, Ottawa, Modoc, Peoria, Seminole and Cherokee (in-person interviews).

Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs, U. S. Department of Interior (in-person interview).

Assistant to the Secretary of Indian Affairs, U. S. Department of Interior (telephone interview).

Special Assistant to the President, Intergovernmental Affairs (telephone interview).

Tribal Operations Officer, Muskogee Area Office, U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs (telephone interview).

6 U. S. Senators, two of whom were "relevant congressmembers" (congressmembers serving on congressional committees directly responsible for federal Indian policymaking) (Responded to written questionnaires).

4 U. S. Representatives, two of whom were relevant congressmembers (two telephone interviews and two responded to written questionnaires).

Chief Counsel, Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs (in-person interview).

Staff member, Interior Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee (in-person interview).

Staff member, Indian Affairs Subcommittee, House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee (in-person interview).

6 congressional staff members handling Indian legislative matters for their senator or representative (in-person interviews).

Representatives of 4 Indian political interest groups:

Association of American Indian Affairs

Americans for Indian Opportunity

Council of Energy Resource Tribes

Native American Rights Fund

(telephone interviews)

- Representatives of 3 groups who lobby Congress for Indian interests:
Bureau of Catholic Indian Missions
Friends Committee on National Legislation
Native American Ministries (Presbyterian)
(one-in-person interview and two telephone interviews)
- Representatives of 6 groups representing state interests in the area of Indian policymaking:
Western Governors Association
Conference of Western Attorney's General, Council of State Governments
Governor's Staff, Office of the Governor of Oklahoma
Executive Director, Oklahoma Indian Affairs Commission
National Association of Counties
National Conference of State Legislatures
(telephone interviews)

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BLACK WOMEN IN STATE LEGISLATURES: THE VIEW FROM OKLAHOMA

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Over the past 20 years the number of black women elected to public office has increased dramatically. However, beyond the act of holding office comes the ability to directly affect change in public policy. In order to bring about policy change, elected officials have to become an integral part of the policy-making process. This article examines the level of incorporation black women have achieved within the Oklahoma State Legislature. Through interviews conducted with members of the legislature, we attempt to see how well black women have adjusted to the legislative process. The results show that black women appear to have become effective members of the Oklahoma Legislature.

The progress of black women in state legislatures differs greatly from that of white women. While the first white women, Clara Cressingham, Frances S. Klock, and Carrie C. Holly, were elected to the Colorado legislature in 1894 (Anthony and Harper 1902), it was not until 1928 that a black woman served as a state legislator. Mrs. E. Howard (Minnie) Harper was appointed (to succeed her deceased husband) to the state legislature in West Virginia eight years after the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment (Githens and Prestage 1977). At the time, Mrs. Harper's position was the highest elective office held by a black woman. It was not until almost half a century after the first white women were elected to a state legislature that a black woman, Crystal Bird Fauset, in 1938 was elected in the Pennsylvania Assembly. Fourteen years later, in 1952, Cora Brown of Michigan became the first black woman elected state senator (Githens and Prestage 1977). In 1968, Hannah Atkins became the first black woman elected to serve in the Oklahoma legislature.

Jewel Prestage (1977), examined the situation of black women in state legislatures in the early 1970s. Between 1972 and 1974, she found only

35 black women held seats in the legislatures of 23 states. Twenty-seven states elected no black women. Table 1 shows this situation, as well as the subsequent growth in the numbers of elected black women in the legislatures. In 1972 and 1974 black women accounted for less than 1 percent (0.7 and 0.8 percent respectively) of the total number of legislators in those states. However, since that time, the number of black women serving in the legislatures of these 23 states increased dramatically. By 1989, there were 74 black women (2 percent of the total

TABLE 1.

Black Women Legislators in Twenty-Three States, 1972-1989.

STATE	Total Seats, Both Houses, 1989*	Number of Black Women					Black Women Percent 1989
		1972	1974	1980	1985	1989	
Arizona	90	0	0	0	1	2	2.2
California	120	1	0	4	4	4	3.3
Colorado	100	0	1	1	2	2	2.0
Connecticut	187	0	1	1	2	1	0.5
Delaware	62	1	1	0	0	0	0.0
Florida	160	1	2	1	2	2	1.3
Georgia	236	1	2	6	6	7	3.0
Illinois	177	0	1	4	6	9	5.1
Indiana	150	0	1	3	3	3	2.0
Iowa	150	1	0	0	0	0	0.0
Kentucky	138	3	3	2	1	0	0.0
Louisiana	144	1	1	1	2	3	2.1
Maryland	188	3	3	4	6	8	4.3
Massachusetts	200	0	1	2	1	2	1.0
Michigan	148	4	3	4	5	5	3.4
Missouri	197	2	2	4	1	3	1.5
New Jersey	120	1	1	2	2	2	1.7
New York	211	0	1	2	7	9	4.3
Oklahoma	149	1	1	1	1	3	2.0
Pennsylvania	253	1	0	1	3	3	1.2
Tennessee	132	0	1	1	1	2	1.5
Texas	181	1	2	4	3	4	2.2
Washington	147	1	1	1	0	0	0.0
Total	3646	24	29	49	59	74	2

Source: Author's calculations from data in Githens and Prestage (1977), p. 406; Preston, et al., (1982), pp. 96-97; and *Black Elected Officials: A National Roster*, 1985,1989.

*Total number of legislature in 1989.

membership) and 98 seats (12 percent). Overall, black women increased their representation in state legislatures by 180 percent in the past 20 years. Black women are still absent, however, from the legislatures of almost half (21) of the 50 states.

While much has been written about the lives and experiences of state legislators (see Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan and Ferguson 1962) and the experiences of white women legislators (see Kirkpatrick 1974; Diamond 1977), very little is known about black women legislators (but see Prestage 1977). Here we examine how black women in one state legislature, Oklahoma, view themselves, as well as how they are perceived by their colleagues.

THE OKLAHOMA LEGISLATURE

Oklahoma has a bicameral legislature with a Senate of 48 members and a House of 101. The legislature meets annually in regular session for a period of four months, from February to May. All members of the legislature come from single-member districts which several studies indicate promote the representation of blacks. Oklahoma's black voting-age population is 6 percent (Joint Center for Political Studies 1989). Currently, five blacks serve in the Oklahoma legislature accounting for 3.3 percent of its membership, approximately half the proportion of seats we expect from their population proportions. Two black women serve in the Senate and one in the House; both black men are in the House. Women hold 8.7 percent of the legislative seats.

Eleven members of the Oklahoma State Legislature were interviewed in their offices in May 1991. Each interview consisted of structured questions and lasted from half an hour to an hour. All of the black legislators (three women and two men) were interviewed along with four white women and two white men.

LEGISLATIVE EFFECTIVENESS

When asked about the legislative effectiveness of black women, we received mixed responses. Legislative effectiveness is typically measured in one of three ways: 1) "positional" (holding a formal leadership

position); (2) "reputational" (identification as such by other legislators); and (3) "decision-making" (by an ability to pass legislation) (Weissert 1991). Here all three methods are combined.

A number of respondents remarked that black women are hard working, enthusiastic, and energetic about their legislation. But one black woman pointed out black women get pigeonholed by their race. "There is a lot of 'press inflation' when it comes to black women; often times the black women in the legislature are perceived as being racial when they are not." She went on to say the press focuses on many issues involving black women not worthy of coverage while ignoring a number of important ones. She further felt there are constraints on black women's legislative effectiveness. Black women are expected to deal with only certain types of issues. "If you are a square peg, you only fit in a square hole."

RESPECT

The legislators were asked if they believed black women had a tougher time gaining respect among their peers than other members of the legislature. A black male legislator mentioned he has great respect for black women in the legislature because of what they accomplish. A white male legislator felt all legislators are respected regardless of race or sex. None of the white women legislators interviewed felt black women had a tougher time gaining respect than other legislators, including themselves.

The black women, however, did feel they have a tougher time getting the respect of other legislators. One black woman legislator said, "Black women are faced with a slight double disadvantage [being black and a woman] when it comes to getting respect in the legislature." Another of the black women remarked, "Yes, black women have a tougher time gaining respect than other legislators." The other black woman believed that while black women may not have a tougher time getting respect than other legislators, "it takes too long for us to be recognized. It takes too long for others to realize that we can do a great job and that we have the ability to be good legislators."

ADAPTATION TO THE LEGISLATURE

The earlier legislators adapt to legislative life, the greater their chances for success in these elected bodies. One black woman legislator mentioned that black women come into the legislature and adjust to it very quickly. A white woman legislator gave an example of how fast a freshmen black woman legislator introduced a controversial bill. But a black male legislator reversed the question of adjustment stating, "The legislature had to become creative as a result of the Civil Rights Movement and learn how to adjust to blacks." He felt black women had no problem coming into the legislature and were often better prepared than whites [women and men]. "Black women come to the legislature on a mission and they are married to it." None of the white male legislators felt black women had any problems adjusting to the legislature.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

When asked if black women accomplished as much as whites the general feeling among the legislators was they do. One white woman legislator replied, "In Oklahoma black women, and men, may accomplish more than whites because of their savvy. They work as a coalition and stick together." A black woman legislator said, "As individuals, blacks accomplish more than individual whites in the legislature." However, one black woman felt they do not accomplish as much as whites, especially in key leadership positions: "There are structural constraints which limit black women and men in the legislature." When asked to elaborate further on these constraints, she explained:

The fact that there are no women in the leadership nor has a black woman ever held a key leadership position as presiding officer, majority or minority leader, or even a whip seems to be unusual. It doesn't appear to be racism, instead there is the perception or, better, an attitude within the legislature that these aren't positions where women and particularly black women ought to be.

One white woman legislator interviewed felt the accomplishments of black women depend on the individual and how much they wished to accomplish. A white woman legislator observed, "Black women accom-

plish so much because they are very devoted and have deep feelings for their issues." A black woman legislator said, "Blacks accomplish more than whites because we are more persistent." Another black woman remarked, "Black women accomplish more than whites because we have broader and larger agendas." One black male legislator agreed that black women accomplished more than whites in the legislatures because they had bigger agendas. Another black woman mentioned black legislators are under more pressure than whites to get things done. She said, "I receive about 30 calls per day from people needing help. My constituency is much broader than just the district I represent. My constituents, as well as blacks in general, need more and expect more from their representatives." With the exception of holding key leadership positions, black women are perceived as being able to accomplish much in the legislature as a result of their "sticking together", as well as their ability to carry broad legislative agendas.

LEGISLATIVE LEADERSHIP ROLES

In state legislatures the most powerful and influential individuals are those in leadership positions; the presiding officer, majority and minority leaders, as well as committee chairs. For black women to be most effective in state legislatures they must become part of the leadership. We find women, and especially black women, to be quite rare among American legislative leaders. In 1988, only 10.7 percent of the total number of American state legislators holding committee chairmanships were women (Zeiger and Jeffe 1988). In 1989, of the 280 leadership positions in legislatures around the country, only 14 (5 percent) were occupied by women (Council of State Governments 1989). Table 2 identifies the states where women served in the leadership in 1989. Only two women served as speakers of state houses, Jane Dee Hull of Arizona and Vera Katz of Oregon, with just one woman holding the highest ranking position in state senates, Mary McClure of South Dakota. Among black women, only one was part of the upper echelon of state legislative leadership, Speaker Pro Tempore Lois DeBerry of Tennessee. When power and influence is measured in terms of holding key leadership positions, we generally find that women, and black women in particular, are not very powerful or influential within state

legislatures.

Within the Oklahoma State Legislature we find a similar situation. No women are among the top leadership. However, 5 of the 42 Senate and House committees are chaired by women and two of these by black women. Of the five blacks in the legislature, three chair committees. One black woman chairs the Senate Judiciary Committee and another heads up the Senate Government Operations and Agency Oversight Committee. At first glance, it appears black women in the Oklahoma legislature have the opportunity to be quite powerful and influential.

Committee chairs in Oklahoma are in some ways an extension of the leadership rather than sources of independent power. They are appointed

TABLE 2.

Women in Leadership Positions, 1989*

WOMEN IN STATE LEGISLATIVE LEADERSHIP POSITIONS, 1989	
Arizona	Speaker Jane Dee Hull (R)
Colorado	House Minority Leader Ruther Wright (D)
Delaware	Senate Minority Leader Myrna L. Bair (R)
Hawaii	Senate Minority Leader Mary George (R)
Maine	Senate Majority Leader Nancy Randall Clark (D) House Minority Leader Mary Clark Webster (R)
Maryland	House Minority Leader Ellen R. Sauerbrey (R)
Minnesota	House Majority Leader Ann Wynia (D)
New Hampshire	House Minority Leader Mary Chambers (D)
Oregon	Speaker Vera Katz (D)
South Dakota	Senate President Mary McClure (R)
Tennessee	Speaker Pro Tem Lois DeBerry (D)
Vermont	House Majority Leader Sarah M. Gear (R)
Washington	Senate Majority Leader Jeannette Hayner (R)

Source: *State Legislative Leadership, Committees and Staff 1989-90*, Council of State Governments, 1989.

* Hold position as presiding officer, majority leader or minority leader. Women may hold other assistant leader positions not noted above.

and serve more or less at the pleasure of the leadership. Thus, instead of concluding that black women (and men) are powerful individuals in the legislature, they may be fulfilling the needs of the leadership when they hold committee chairs.

AMBITION: BLACK WOMEN AND BLACK MEN

The legislators were asked if black women are more politically ambitious than black men. One black woman legislator replied, "Yes, somewhat. Probably most women are more politically ambitious than men. Women have to be. Women push their agendas more than men and they don't give up." She then gave an example of a bill authored by one of the black women legislators that was initially killed and later passed in the form of an amendment to another bill. Then she pointed out, "Women don't stop fighting." A white woman legislator remarked, "It appears black women are more motivated than black men." Another black woman responded, "Black women are more politically ambitious than black men, but it is more age related than gender. Younger black women work harder than younger black men."

When the legislators were asked, "Would you like to run for a higher office?" two of the three black women said they would or at least they would consider the possibility. The other said she would not like to because she felt raising money would be too difficult. Neither of the two black men held any ambitions of running for higher office. One black male legislator mentioned the opportunity for him to advance was available, but he was not interested. Other studies also show higher levels of political ambition among black women when compared to black men, something not found among whites (Frazier 1939; Safa 1971; Pierce, Avery and Carey 1977; Darcy and Hadley 1988; Clark, Hadley and Darcy 1989).

Prestage (1977) interviewed 32 black women legislators about their plans for re-election. Almost one third of the women were unsure or had no plans to return to the legislature. Although some of these women aspired to higher office, a significant number of them planned to leave the legislature. One possible explanation for the early departure of black women is their perception that they must work harder than other members of the legislature to get things accomplished.

The likelihood of black women advancing in the legislature depends on when the leadership begins to trust in their ability to exercise power and influence. Trust among legislative colleagues is earned through having similar social backgrounds or similar legislative experiences (Burton and Darcy 1985), neither of which black women in the legislature share with the white men who control it. Since the backgrounds of black women usually differ from those of whites (particularly white men), the only way for black women legislators to earn the trust of the white men is by sharing similar legislative experiences. Given the recent arrival of black women in the legislature, it will take some time before they will be able to gain power and influence.

BLACK WOMEN AND WHITE WOMEN

The legislators were asked if they noticed any differences between working with black women as opposed to white women in the legislature. Most of the legislators interviewed felt the black and white women in the legislature were different.

One white woman legislator felt black women do a good job. When asked in what ways, she explained:

Black women are dedicated, hard working 'go-getters'. They are very interested and involved in what is going on in the legislature, and black women are also very good debaters. Black women must be tough due to their extreme minority status in the legislature. Black women command respect through hard work, as well as by speaking their minds.

Another white woman legislator added, "Black women are more liberal and social issue oriented." A black male legislator said, "Black women are opposite of white women. Black women carry the same agenda as black men, family issues, health issues, etc. Black women are better rounded on issues."

Among the black women, one felt they were different from white women because their agendas are larger than white women's. She also acknowledged that black women have to justify their issues in the legislature. She said, "When black women work with the leadership [in comparison to white women] they must convince the leaders how

important their agenda is. Black women make the leadership become sensitive to their issues." Another black woman legislator also believed black women were different from white women, she remarked, "Black women don't have a luxury of choice on their issues. It depends on the area being represented. The legislature is the bread and butter for black women and black men." She then identified one of the white woman legislators who concentrates on the fine arts and literature legislation and noted, "Black women are unable to do this." She was also interested in arts and literature but could not make the time for it because of the type of agenda she needed to carry to satisfy the interest of her constituents.

Black women see themselves as working harder than white women in the legislature because black women are forced to deal with a wider range of issues. Black women also feel they must do more than white women to prove the worthiness of their legislation to the leadership. However, one white male legislator disagreed with that perception, stating, "There are no differences between black women and white women in the legislature because almost all women, black or white, work hard and are dedicated individuals. They all know their 'stuff'."

CONFLICTING IMAGES OF BLACK WOMEN: SELF AND COLLEAGUE PERCEPTIONS

One black woman legislator commented, "Black women are not given the same opportunities to hold leadership positions as other legislators. This is a definite area that is behind schedule. Black women are making gains holding leadership positions, but they still are not given enough opportunities to make these gains." Another black woman legislator echoed these feelings by saying there are so few black women in leadership positions "because there aren't as many opportunities as there ought to be for black women." A white woman remarked, "Black women are not given the same opportunities to hold leadership positions, not because they were black women, but simply because they were women."

On the other hand, a number of other legislators believed black women are given the same opportunities to hold leadership positions. A white male legislator said, "Yes, black women are given the same opportunities to hold leadership positions as other legislators." He then identified the two black women who chair committees. A black male legislator and a black woman legislator mentioned black women have just recently been

given the opportunity to hold leadership positions in Oklahoma. Several of the legislators black and white when asked, "Why so few black women hold leadership positions?", replied, "because there are only a few black women in the legislature."

RESULTS OF CONFLICTING PERCEPTIONS

The results of the interviews conducted with members of the Oklahoma legislature show there are clearly different (and often conflicting) perceptions of the legislative experiences of black women. The analysis attempted to identify how black women are perceived across a range of issues to determine how well black women have become integrated into the Oklahoma legislature.

Black women had little or no problem adapting to the legislative process. Part of this trend must certainly be attributed to history as one of the legislators pointed out; however, much of it is clearly the result of the level of confidence the black women have in their ability to be effective legislators. The black women were often described as coming into the legislature better prepared than any other group.

Black women are able to accomplish a great deal once inside the legislature. They were often described by their peers as dedicated and hard working, which undoubtedly was a major factor in their success. Also the broad nature of the agendas carried by black women is another explanation for the perception that they accomplish just as much if not more than other groups in the legislature. The constituencies represented by black women require more attention than those typically represented by whites, which in turn pressures them to get things accomplished.

As committee chairs, several black women in Oklahoma's legislature were included as part of the leadership team. However, the black women legislators identified structural constraints on their ability to exercise power and influence and viewed themselves as being unable to achieve their full legislative potential. This is in sharp contrast to how they were viewed by their legislative colleagues.

The problem of perceptions may indicate insensitivity to the situation of black women. By being black and a woman, black women had to overcome barriers their colleagues did not encounter. On the other hand, black women perceived some of the problems they faced as being unique

to them when clearly they were not. Thus, we see a perceptual difference between how black women viewed their legislative experience in Oklahoma's legislature and how their colleagues perceived them. The analysis indicates the appearance of a symptomatic problem of miscommunication and a lack of interaction between black women and their legislative colleagues.

An underlying question regarding the growing presence of black women in state legislatures concerns their ability to be effective. The "newness" of black women in Oklahoma's legislature, their small numbers and the wide ranging agenda demanding their attention limits what they can accomplish. On the other hand, the black women legislators are realistic; they recognize there are still barriers to overcome.

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VITAL STATISTICS ON OKLAHOMA POLITICS

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This section of *Oklahoma Politics* is aimed at enhancing the research and teaching of the politics of this state by sharing data with our readers. In some issues we will print raw data so that readers may use it as they wish; in others we will share information about sources of data our readers have discovered; in others we simply will serve as a clearinghouse for those who wish to share data that they or others have personally collected. We hope to contribute to both the understanding of politics in this state and to the teaching of it to our students.

LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT DATA

Two sets of statewide election data are presented in this inaugural issue. These data were provided by state legislative research staff and the Oklahoma State Election Board. We calculated the percentages.

The first data set identifies district-by-district voter registration by party affiliation. The categories represented here are Democratic, Republican, and independent. There is no Independent political party in Oklahoma. Registering independent means the same as nonpartisan. These data are presented for congressional, state senate and state house of representatives legislative districts separately. The second collection of data is a breakout of congressional, state senate and state house of representatives legislative districts. Racial categories are for whites, blacks, American Indians, and Asian/Pacific islanders. Oklahoma has six congressional districts, forty-eight state senate districts and one hundred and one state house of representative districts. We might note that at one point there were fifty-four state senate districts, but this number has been pared back to forty-eight. Some senators, however,

requested they be permitted to retain their old district number. Consequently, senate district numbers go to fifty-four, skipping some numbers.

STATE OF OKLAHOMA CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS

**Voter Registration By Party
(As of 5-11-92)**

<i>District</i>	<i>Democrat</i>	<i>Republican</i>	<i>Independent</i>	<i>Total*</i>
1	155,761 47.5%	160,637 49.0%	11,432 3.5%	327,830 100%
2	258,979 76.1%	76,623 22.5%	4,910 1.4%	340,512 100%
3	293,957 80.6%	65,396 17.9%	5,386 1.5%	364,739 100%
4	212,322 68.9%	87,984 28.5%	7,905 2.6%	308,211 100%
5	190,382 48.7%	186,855 47.8%	14,049 3.5%	391,286 100%
6	225,795 65.5%	110,664 32.1%	8,077 2.3%	344,536 99.9%
Totals	1,337,196 64.4%	688,159 33.1%	51,759 2.5%	2,077,114 100%

*Column totals may vary around 100% due to rounding.

STATE OF OKLAHOMA SENATE DISTRICTS

Voter Registration by Party
(as of 5-11-92)

<i>District</i>	<i>Democrat</i>	<i>Republican</i>	<i>Independent</i>	<i>Total*</i>
1	32,332 74.7%	10,366 24.0%	572 1.3%	43,270 100%
2	31,340 70.8%	12,184 27.5%	740 1.7%	44,264 100%
3	32,519 75.3%	9,949 23.0%	745 1.7%	43,213 100%
4	36,885 85.8%	5,611 13.0%	511 1.2%	43,007 100%
5	44,576 94.5%	2,216 4.7%	395 0.8%	47,187 100%
6	41,656 91.7%	3,513 7.7%	242 0.5%	45,411 99.9%
7	44,656 91.4%	3,734 7.6%	451 0.9%	48,841 99.9%
8	36,137 83.1%	6,834 15.7%	536 1.2%	43,507 100%
9	32,264 80.2%	7,419 18.5%	527 1.3%	40,210 100%
10	27,222 64.3%	14,296 33.8%	809 1.9%	42,327 100%
11	29,280 77.9%	7,108 18.9%	1,209 3.2%	37,597 100%
12	26,457 69.6%	10,921 28.7%	631 1.7%	38,009 100%
13	36,988 86.3%	5,589 13.0%	298 0.7%	42,875 100%
14	37,343 85.2%	6,080 13.9%	392 0.9%	43,815 100%
15	32,130 73.4%	10,827 24.7%	818 1.9%	43,775 100%
16	25,425 57.7%	16,391 37.2%	2,220 0.5%	44,036 99.9%

STATE OF OKLAHOMA SENATE DISTRICTS

<i>District</i>	<i>Democrat</i>	<i>Republican</i>	<i>Independent</i>	<i>Total*</i>
17	26,458 65.3%	12,890 31.8%	1,161 2.9%	40,509 100%
18	25,922 63.7%	13,854 34.0%	916 2.3%	40,692 100%
19	18,973 45.8%	21,671 52.3%	767 1.9%	41,411 100%
20	21,625 48.9%	21,553 48.8%	1,010 2.3%	44,188 100%
21	29,954 53.0%	24,363 43.1%	2,202 3.9%	56,519 100%
22	22,797 55.1%	17,503 42.3%	1,066 2.6%	41,366 100%
23	29,716 73.6%	10,177 25.2%	491 1.2%	40,384 100%
24	32,812 76.6%	9,486 22.1%	537 1.3%	42,835 100%
26	36,536 85.6%	5,740 13.4%	417 1.0%	42,693 100%
29	23,141 51.7%	20,408 45.6%	1,243 2.8%	44,792 100.1%
31	27,449 78.1%	7,092 20.2%	603 1.7%	35,144 100%
32	19,237 68.7%	8,034 28.7%	726 2.6%	27,997 100%
33	21,564 51.3%	18,740 44.6%	1,739 4.1%	42,043 100%
34	21,860 59.3%	13,915 37.7%	1,106 3.0%	36,881 100%
35	17,602 37.5%	27,883 59.3%	1,492 3.2%	46,977 100%
37	19,049 55.2%	14,474 41.9%	1,006 2.9%	34,529 100%
38	31,337 77.2%	8,801 21.7%	479 1.1%	40,617 100%

STATE OF OKLAHOMA SENATE DISTRICTS

<i>District</i>	<i>Democrat</i>	<i>Republican</i>	<i>Independent</i>	<i>Total*</i>
39	17,386 38.1%	26,736 58.6%	1,528 3.3%	46,650 100%
40	28,612 50.8%	25,689 45.6%	2,028 3.6%	56,329 100%
41	22,541 40.3%	31,192 55.8%	2,198 3.9%	55,931 100%
42	25,185 61.4%	14,388 35.1%	1,450 3.5%	41,023 100%
43	25,843 64.2%	12,951 32.2%	1,485 3.7%	40,279 100.1%
44	28,470 63.6%	14,828 33.1%	1,468 3.3%	44,766 100%
45	19,820 52.7%	16,601 44.1%	1,220 3.2%	37,641 100%
46	29,240 65.0%	13,305 29.6%	2,431 5.4%	44,976 100%
47	22,746 42.1%	29,262 54.1%	2,080 3.8%	54,088 100%
48	35,007 74.9%	10,311 22.1%	1,412 3.0%	46,730 100%
49	25,085 57.4%	17,996 41.2%	604 1.4%	43,685 100%
50	29,143 75.7%	8,780 22.8%	569 1.5%	38,492 100%
51	14,218 31.3%	29,485 64.8%	1,793 3.9%	45,496 100%
52	25,980 45.8%	28,585 50.4%	2,151 3.8%	56,716 100%
54	14,678 42.7%	18,428 53.6%	1,285 3.7%	34,391 100%
Totals	1,337,196 64.4%	688,159 33.1%	51,759 2.5%	2,077,114 100%

*Column totals may vary around 100% due to rounding.

STATE OF OKLAHOMA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DISTRICTS

Voter Registration by Party
(as of 5-11-92)

<i>District</i>	<i>Democrat</i>	<i>Republican</i>	<i>Independent</i>	<i>Total*</i>
1	20,500 93.4%	1,172 5.3%	267 1.2%	21,939 99.9%
2	17,631 83.5%	3,270 15.5%	209 1.0%	21,110 100%
3	16,165 86.6%	2,206 11.8%	286 1.5%	18,657 99.9%
4	16,672 76.4%	4,666 21.4%	492 2.2%	21,830 100%
5	15,422 70.6%	6,093 27.9%	321 1.4%	21,836 99.9%
6	15,252 73.7%	5,120 24.8%	310 1.4%	20,682 99.9%
7	15,112 76.7%	4,366 22.1%	247 1.2%	19,725 100%
8	13,976 68.3%	6,185 30.2%	296 1.4%	20,457 99.9%
9	15,561 69.2%	6,449 28.7%	470 2.1%	22,480 100%
10	10,766 60.8%	6,514 36.8%	417 2.4%	17,697 100%
11	9,383 39.7%	13,437 56.9%	794 3.4%	23,614 100%
12	13,996 69.2%	5,787 28.6%	449 2.2%	20,232 100%
13	14,803 80.6%	3,311 18.0%	255 1.4%	18,369 100%
14	15,771 77.6%	4,263 21.0%	292 1.4%	20,326 100%
15	22,285 93.0%	1,549 6.5%	138 0.5%	23,972 100%
16	17,060 84.3%	2,923 14.4%	259 1.3%	20,242 100%
17	20,850 91.9%	1,658 7.3%	185 0.8%	22,693 100%

STATE OF OKLAHOMA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DISTRICTS

<i>District</i>	<i>Democrat</i>	<i>Republican</i>	<i>Independent</i>	<i>Total*</i>
18	19,652 88.1%	2,353 10.6%	295 1.3%	22,300 100%
19	22,166 95.2%	976 4.2%	133 0.6%	23,275 100%
20	20,278 94.1%	1,211 5.6%	68 0.3%	21,557 100%
21	18,414 90.3%	1,840 9.0%	135 0.7%	20,389 100%
22	15,283 85.4%	2,401 13.4%	207 1.2%	17,891 100%
23	8,770 48.4%	8,723 48.2%	612 3.4%	18,105 100%
24	19,105 87.3%	2,642 12.1%	142 0.6%	21,889 100%
25	16,505 82.9%	3,259 16.3%	153 0.8%	19,917 100%
26	14,162 70.2%	5,573 27.6%	427 2.1%	20,162 99.9%
27	13,690 76.9%	3,825 21.5%	289 1.6%	17,804 100%
28	16,267 85.4%	2,576 13.5%	199 1.1%	19,042 100%
29	11,936 66.3%	5,726 31.8%	350 1.9%	18,012 100%
30	11,097 64.6%	5,744 33.5%	327 1.9%	17,168 100%
31	11,783 50.7%	10,679 46.0%	776 3.3%	23,238 100%
32	12,960 67.9%	5,888 30.8%	243 1.3%	19,091 100%
33	14,618 57.8%	9,863 39.0%	817 3.2%	25,298 100%
34	13,216 46.8%	13,696 48.5%	1,338 4.7%	28,250 100%
35	13,251 61.8%	7,807 36.4%	374 1.7%	21,432 99.9%

STATE OF OKLAHOMA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DISTRICTS

<i>District</i>	<i>Democrat</i>	<i>Republican</i>	<i>Independent</i>	<i>Total*</i>
36	13,850 76.4%	3,956 21.8%	325 1.8%	18,131 100%
37	10,427 48.0%	10,609 48.8%	701 3.2%	21,737 100%
38	11,214 53.7%	9,346 44.7%	337 1.6%	20,897 100%
39	12,579 57.2%	8,966 40.8%	450 2.0%	21,995 100%
40	8,178 49.6%	7,946 48.1%	375 2.3%	16,499 100%
41	9,061 42.1%	12,098 56.2%	356 1.7%	21,515 100%
42	16,239 82.7%	3,192 16.2%	215 1.1%	19,646 100%
43	8,657 45.5%	9,763 51.3%	597 3.1%	19,017 99.9%
44	13,464 53.7%	10,183 40.6%	1,431 5.7%	25,078 100%
45	11,603 59.1%	7,100 36.0%	939 4.8%	19,642 99.9%
46	14,192 72.0%	5,121 26.0%	388 2.0%	19,701 100%
47	14,032 69.8%	5,763 28.7%	300 1.5%	20,095 100%
48	16,384 81.2%	3,581 17.7%	217 1.1%	20,182 100%
49	18,766 87.8%	2,426 11.3%	185 0.9%	21,377 100%
50	17,175 79.5%	4,216 19.5%	200 1.0%	21,591 100%
51	19,150 91.3%	1,679 8.0%	142 0.7%	20,971 100%
52	13,177 82.6%	2,629 16.4%	153 1.0%	15,959 100%
53	10,380 52.5%	8,690 43.9%	715 3.6%	19,785 100%

STATE OF OKLAHOMA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DISTRICTS

<i>District</i>	<i>Democrat</i>	<i>Republican</i>	<i>Independent</i>	<i>Total*</i>
54	9,463 55.9%	6,980 41.2%	486 2.9%	16,929 100%
55	16,534 84.6%	2,794 14.3%	220 1.1%	19,548 100%
56	14,617 83.4%	2,740 15.6%	177 1.0%	17,534 100%
57	14,120 67.1%	6,602 31.4%	316 1.5%	21,038 100%
58	10,363 48.1%	10,800 50.2%	368 1.7%	21,531 100%
59	12,473 57.3%	9,023 41.5%	257 1.2%	21,753 100%
60	17,734 84.8%	2,960 14.2%	221 1.0%	20,915 100%
61	11,930 59.3%	7,935 39.4%	261 1.3%	20,126 100%
62	9,565 65.0%	4,757 32.3%	394 2.7%	14,716 100%
63	14,351 80.6%	3,189 17.9%	276 1.5%	17,816 100%
64	10,906 72.3%	3,783 25.1%	395 2.6%	15,084 100%
65	8,061 74.4%	2,561 23.6%	214 2.0%	10,836 100%
66	10,894 57.8%	7,164 38.0%	802 4.2%	18,860 100%
67	6,130 26.4%	16,158 69.6%	914 4.0%	23,202 100%
68	10,158 57.7%	6,944 39.4%	516 2.9%	17,618 100%
69	7,169 33.4%	13,601 63.4%	677 3.2%	21,447 100%
70	9,572 39.2%	14,110 57.8%	750 3.0%	24,432 100%
71	9,052 42.8%	11,322 53.6%	760 3.6%	21,134 100%

STATE OF OKLAHOMA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DISTRICTS

<i>District</i>	<i>Democrat</i>	<i>Republican</i>	<i>Independent</i>	<i>Total*</i>
72	11,065 67.3%	4,698 28.6%	678 4.1%	16,441 100%
73	16,528 83.8%	2,675 13.6%	518 2.6%	19,721 100%
74	10,294 56.9%	7,301 40.3%	501 2.8%	18,096 100%
75	7,926 43.0%	9,814 53.2%	691 3.8%	18,431 100%
76	6,896 36.6%	11,163 59.3%	769 4.1%	18,828 100%
77	10,530 57.3%	7,183 39.1%	675 3.6%	18,388 100%
78	10,914 49.1%	10,573 47.6%	743 3.3%	22,230 100%
79	8,007 34.8%	14,183 61.7%	803 3.5%	22,993 100%
80	7,073 37.6%	11,000 58.5%	715 3.8%	18,788 99.9%
81	11,171 39.6%	15,905 56.3%	1,157 4.1%	28,233 100%
82	10,087 37.2%	15,855 58.7%	1,113 4.1%	27,005 100%
83	13,174 44.1%	15,634 52.4%	1,041 3.5%	29,849 100%
84	12,696 48.7%	12,404 47.6%	978 3.8%	26,078 100.1%
85	13,224 47.9%	13,482 48.8%	916 3.3%	27,622 100%
86	14,222 71.4%	5,509 27.6%	196 1.0%	19,927 100%
87	14,305 56.3%	10,079 39.7%	1,017 4.0%	25,401 100%
88	13,939 61.8%	7,199 31.9%	1,426 6.3%	22,564 100%
89	11,057 67.0%	4,737 28.7%	706 4.3%	16,500 100%

STATE OF OKLAHOMA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DISTRICTS

<i>District</i>	<i>Democrat</i>	<i>Republican</i>	<i>Independent</i>	<i>Total*</i>
90	12,375 54.2%	9,497 41.6%	946 4.1%	22,818 99.9%
91	12,103 57.7%	8,237 39.3%	622 3.0%	20,962 100%
92	11,291 60.6%	6,605 35.5%	726 3.9%	18,622 100%
93	13,023 67.6%	5,566 28.9%	684 3.5%	19,273 100%
94	13,940 65.4%	6,632 31.1%	745 3.5%	21,317 100%
95	12,355 61.5%	7,006 34.9%	740 3.7%	20,101 100.1%
96	10,126 60.1%	6,154 36.5%	579 3.4%	16,859 100%
97	16,234 79.3%	3,712 18.1%	538 2.6%	20,484 100%
98	8,134 48.7%	8,020 48.0%	555 3.3%	16,709 100%
99	16,335 78.1%	3,926 18.8%	650 3.1%	20,911 100%
100	10,407 41.7%	13,456 53.9%	1,085 4.3%	24,948 99.9%
101	11,837 65.8%	5,516 30.6%	644 3.6%	17,997 100%
Total	1,337,196 64.4%	688,159 33.1%	51,759 2.5%	2,077,114 100%

*Column totals may vary around 100% due to rounding.

**STATE OF OKLAHOMA CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS
(1990 census)**

**Summary of Total Population by Race
(all ages)**

<i>District</i>	<i>Total Pop.</i>	<i>Total White</i>	<i>Total Black</i>	<i>Total Am. Ind.</i>	<i>Total Asian/PI</i>	<i>Total Other</i>
1	524,264 100.00%	436,341 83.23%	50,149 9.57%	26,996 5.15%	6,069 1.16%	4,709 0.90%
2	524,264 100.00%	404,216 77.10%	26,568 5.07%	90,154 17.20%	1,292 0.25%	2,034 0.39%
3	524,264 100.00%	437,177 83.39%	21,186 4.04%	59,979 11.44%	3,061 0.58%	2,861 0.55%
4	524,265 100.00%	441,223 84.16%	37,708 7.19%	25,168 4.80%	8,969 1.71%	11,197 2.14%
5	524,264 100.00%	453,965 86.59%	29,186 5.57%	24,240 4.62%	8,808 1.68%	8,065 1.54%
6	524,264 100.00%	410,590 78.32%	69,004 13.16%	25,883 4.94%	5,364 1.02%	13,423 2.56%
Totals	3,145,585 100.00%	2,583,512 82.13%	233,801 7.43%	252,420 8.02%	33,563 1.07%	42,289 1.34%

**STATE OF OKLAHOMA SENATE DISTRICTS
(1990 census)**

**District Summary of Total Population by Race
(All ages)**

<i>District</i>	<i>Total Pop</i>	<i>Total White</i>	<i>Total Black</i>	<i>Total Am. Ind.</i>	<i>Total Asian/PI</i>	<i>Total Other</i>
1	64,713 100.00%	50,109 77.43%	378 0.58%	13,786 21.30%	157 0.24%	283 0.44%
2	65,130 100.00%	55,430 85.11%	444 0.68%	8,838 13.57%	216 0.33%	202 0.31%
3	64,808 100.00%	40,997 63.26%	637 0.98%	22,774 35.14%	95 0.15%	305 0.47%
4	66,252 100.00%	55,242 83.38%	1,622 2.45%	9,047 13.66%	159 0.24%	182 0.27%
5	64,372 100.00%	48,526 75.38%	5,929 9.21%	9,457 14.69%	129 0.20%	331 0.51%
6	64,431 100.00%	54,013 83.83%	1,045 1.62%	8,811 13.68%	175 0.27%	387 0.60%
7	64,291 100.00%	53,381 83.03%	1,936 3.01%	8,534 13.27%	146 0.23%	294 0.46%
8	64,901 100.00%	49,285 75.94%	6,210 9.57%	9,029 13.91%	127 0.20%	250 0.39%
9	66,586 100.00%	47,723 71.67%	9,477 14.23%	8,785 13.19%	253 0.38%	348 0.52%
10	64,694 100.00%	56,012 86.58%	996 1.54%	7,285 11.26%	131 0.20%	270 0.42%
11	64,260 100.00%	25,431 39.58%	33,877 52.72%	3,524 5.48%	387 0.60%	1,041 1.62%
12	64,282 100.00%	55,339 86.09%	2,945 4.58%	5,664 8.81%	131 0.20%	203 0.32%
13	65,886 100.00%	53,910 81.82%	1,734 2.63%	9,832 14.92%	172 0.26%	238 0.36%
14	64,595 100.00%	53,875 83.40%	4,247 6.57%	5,626 8.71%	193 0.30%	654 1.01%
15	65,538 100.00%	59,202 90.33%	1,248 1.90%	4,003 6.11%	502 0.77%	583 0.89%

STATE OF OKLAHOMA SENATE DISTRICTS

<i>District</i>	<i>Total Pop.</i>	<i>Total White</i>	<i>Total Black</i>	<i>Total Am. Ind.</i>	<i>Total Asian/PI</i>	<i>Total Other</i>
16	66,228 100.00%	56,870 85.87%	2,934 4.43%	3,713 5.61%	2,096 3.16%	615 0.93%
17	66,785 100.00%	59,046 88.41%	1,483 2.22%	5,325 7.97%	485 0.73%	446 0.67%
18	66,273 100.00%	55,272 83.40%	2,092 3.16%	7,780 11.74%	747 1.13%	382 0.58%
19	66,339 100.00%	61,288 92.39%	2,284 3.44%	1,444 2.18%	596 0.90%	727 1.10%
20	64,239 100.00%	58,913 91.71%	1,059 1.65%	3,516 5.47%	260 0.40%	491 0.76%
21	66,747 100.00%	56,983 85.37%	4,746 7.11%	2,821 4.23%	1,769 2.65%	428 0.64%
22	66,622 100.00%	59,309 89.02%	2,698 4.05%	2,949 4.43%	918 1.38%	748 1.12%
23	65,367 100.00%	53,697 82.15%	3,270 5.00%	6,976 10.67%	176 0.27%	1,248 1.91%
24	65,779 100.00%	60,113 91.39%	1,203 1.83%	3,010 4.58%	328 0.50%	1,125 1.71%
26	65,096 100.00%	56,040 86.09%	2,527 3.88%	3,910 6.01%	172 0.26%	2,447 3.76%
29	65,647 100.00%	56,693 86.36%	1,716 2.61%	6,519 9.93%	437 0.67%	282 0.43%
31	65,356 100.00%	51,172 78.30%	8,059 12.33%	3,552 5.43%	992 1.52%	1,581 2.42%
32	65,781 100.00%	46,592 70.83%	12,003 18.25%	2,744 4.17%	2,111 3.21%	2,331 3.54%
33	64,387 100.00%	56,977 88.49%	2,508 3.90%	3,891 6.04%	504 0.78%	507 0.79%
34	65,445 100.00%	56,134 85.77%	1,773 2.71%	6,915 10.57%	270 0.41%	353 0.54%
35	64,473 100.00%	57,323 88.91%	3,674 5.70%	2,117 3.28%	806 1.25%	553 0.86%
37	64,431 100.00%	55,536 86.19%	3,181 4.94%	4,988 7.74%	298 0.46%	428 0.66%

STATE OF OKLAHOMA SENATE DISTRICTS

<i>District</i>	<i>Total Pop.</i>	<i>Total White</i>	<i>Total Black</i>	<i>Total Am. Ind.</i>	<i>Total Asian/PI</i>	<i>Total Other</i>
38	64,920 100.00%	54,023 83.21%	3,926 6.05%	2,385 3.67%	570 0.88%	4,016 6.19%
39	64,249 100.00%	57,418 89.37%	3,133 4.88%	2,094 3.26%	1,055 1.64%	549 0.85%
40	66,694 100.00%	58,243 87.33%	3,957 5.93%	2,174 3.26%	1,387 2.08%	933 1.40%
41	66,629 100.00%	61,168 91.80%	2,081 3.12%	1,740 2.61%	1,210 1.82%	430 0.65%
42	66,817 100.00%	56,113 83.98%	5,922 8.86%	2,765 4.14%	1,292 1.93%	725 1.09%
43	65,946 100.00%	50,467 76.53%	8,054 12.21%	3,681 5.58%	1,208 1.83%	2,536 3.85%
44	65,264 100.00%	54,874 84.08%	2,333 3.57%	4,143 6.35%	1,032 1.58%	2,882 4.42%
45	66,766 100.00%	59,971 89.82%	1,230 1.84%	2,973 4.45%	1,771 2.65%	821 1.23%
46	66,180 100.00%	41,829 63.20%	13,833 20.90%	4,163 6.29%	2,456 3.71%	3,899 5.89%
47	66,751 100.00%	58,398 87.49%	5,079 7.61%	1,530 2.29%	1,299 1.95%	445 0.67%
48	66,763 100.00%	22,171 33.21%	42,138 63.12%	1,346 2.02%	552 0.83%	556 0.83%
49	64,965 100.00%	61,172 94.16%	220 0.34%	1,446 2.23%	172 0.26%	1,955 3.01%
50	66,677 100.00%	54,864 82.28%	3,462 5.19%	7,884 11.82%	149 0.22%	318 0.48%
51	64,583 100.00%	60,370 93.48%	1,367 2.12%	1,777 2.75%	760 1.18%	309 0.48%
52	66,495 100.00%	58,138 87.43%	4,012 6.03%	2,203 3.31%	1,301 1.96%	841 1.26%
54	66,152 100.00%	57,860 87.47%	3,119 4.71%	2,951 4.46%	1,411 2.13%	811 1.23%
Totals	3,145,585 100.00%	2,583,512 82.13%	233,801 7.43%	252,420 8.02%	33,563 1.07%	42,289 1.34%

**STATE OF OKLAHOMA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DISTRICTS
(1990 census)**

**Summary of Total Population
(All ages)**

<i>District</i>	<i>Total Pop.</i>	<i>Total White</i>	<i>Total Black</i>	<i>Total Am. Ind.</i>	<i>Total Asian/PI</i>	<i>Total Other</i>
1	30,864 100.00%	22,460 72.77%	3,275 10.61%	4,854 15.73%	81 0.26%	194 0.63%
2	31,499 100.00%	24,152 76.68%	655 2.08%	6,552 20.80%	72 0.23%	68 0.22%
3	30,543 100.00%	26,596 87.08%	1,003 3.28%	2,779 9.10%	64 0.21%	101 0.33%
4	31,337 100.00%	20,597 65.73%	378 1.21%	10,140 32.36%	71 0.23%	151 0.48%
5	31,506 100.00%	23,845 75.68%	46 0.15%	7,494 23.79%	51 0.16%	70 0.22%
6	31,980 100.00%	26,538 82.98%	523 1.64%	4,778 14.94%	77 0.24%	64 0.20%
7	30,561 100.00%	24,495 80.15%	188 0.62%	5,568 18.22%	102 0.33%	208 0.68%
8	31,966 100.00%	27,869 87.18%	91 0.28%	3,761 11.77%	118 0.37%	127 0.40%
9	31,647 100.00%	26,418 83.48%	381 1.20%	4,601 14.54%	131 0.41%	116 0.37%
10	30,427 100.00%	25,124 82.57%	1,269 4.17%	3,780 12.42%	88 0.29%	166 0.55%
11	31,096 100.00%	28,138 90.49%	377 1.21%	2,117 6.81%	332 1.07%	132 0.42%
12	31,865 100.00%	26,539 83.29%	1,726 5.42%	3,406 10.69%	79 0.25%	115 0.36%
13	31,778 100.00%	20,343 64.02%	7,779 24.48%	3,351 10.55%	149 0.47%	156 0.49%
14	31,812 100.00%	25,570 80.38%	1,111 3.49%	4,808 15.11%	111 0.35%	212 0.67%
15	30,917 100.00%	24,223 78.35%	1,115 3.61%	5,472 17.70%	36 0.12%	71 0.23%

STATE OF OKLAHOMA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DISTRICTS

<i>District</i>	<i>Total Pop.</i>	<i>Total White</i>	<i>Total Black</i>	<i>Total Am. Ind.</i>	<i>Total Asian/PI</i>	<i>Total Other</i>
16	31,688 100.00%	23,603 74.49%	4,304 13.58%	3,571 11.27%	61 0.19%	149 0.47%
17	30,468 100.00%	24,866 81.61%	319 1.05%	5,064 16.62%	66 0.22%	153 0.50%
18	31,555 100.00%	26,510 84.01%	1,366 4.33%	3,459 10.96%	95 0.30%	125 0.40%
19	30,486 100.00%	23,682 77.68%	2,248 7.37%	4,396 14.42%	42 0.14%	118 0.39%
20	30,280 100.00%	24,748 81.73%	1,023 3.38%	4,349 14.36%	37 0.12%	123 0.41%
21	30,399 100.00%	25,337 83.35%	422 1.39%	4,333 14.25%	138 0.45%	169 0.56%
22	31,266 100.00%	26,454 84.61%	1,240 3.97%	3,293 10.53%	59 0.19%	220 0.70%
23	31,827 100.00%	27,241 85.59%	1,648 5.18%	1,825 5.73%	699 2.20%	414 1.30%
24	30,957 100.00%	23,581 76.17%	1,663 5.37%	5,562 17.97%	46 0.15%	105 0.34%
25	30,528 100.00%	25,172 82.46%	830 2.72%	4,285 14.04%	111 0.36%	130 0.43%
26	30,877 100.00%	25,518 82.64%	944 3.06%	3,920 12.70%	272 0.88%	223 0.72%
27	31,840 100.00%	28,120 88.32%	431 1.35%	3,080 9.67%	99 0.31%	110 0.35%
28	30,462 100.00%	22,603 74.20%	2,843 9.33%	4,846 15.91%	50 0.16%	120 0.39%
29	31,743 100.00%	27,862 87.77%	985 3.10%	2,766 8.71%	35 0.11%	95 0.30%
30	31,743 100.00%	27,463 86.52%	1,035 3.26%	2,952 9.30%	119 0.37%	174 0.55%
31	30,712 100.00%	26,813 87.30%	2,440 7.94%	964 3.14%	173 0.56%	322 1.05%
32	30,996 100.00%	28,117 90.71%	815 2.63%	1,877 6.06%	59 0.19%	128 0.41%

STATE OF OKLAHOMA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DISTRICTS

<i>District</i>	<i>Total Pop.</i>	<i>Total White</i>	<i>Total Black</i>	<i>Total Am. Ind.</i>	<i>Total Asian/PI</i>	<i>Total Other</i>
33	31,311 100.00%	26,512 84.67%	2,241 7.16%	1,569 5.01%	812 2.59%	177 0.57%
34	30,963 100.00%	27,688 89.42%	1,124 3.63%	1,059 3.42%	937 3.03%	155 0.50%
35	31,700 100.00%	28,349 89.43%	341 1.08%	2,852 9.00%	60 0.19%	98 0.31%
36	31,483 100.00%	21,920 69.62%	4,286 13.61%	5,090 16.17%	46 0.15%	141 0.45%
37	31,769 100.00%	28,247 88.91%	810 2.55%	2,312 7.28%	193 0.61%	207 0.65%
38	30,614 100.00%	28,269 92.34%	275 0.90%	1,751 5.72%	70 0.23%	249 0.81%
39	31,868 100.00%	28,605 89.76%	1,140 3.58%	1,622 5.09%	122 0.38%	379 1.19%
40	30,717 100.00%	27,343 89.02%	1,714 5.58%	843 2.74%	421 1.37%	396 1.29%
41	30,501 100.00%	29,183 95.68%	456 1.50%	570 1.87%	170 0.56%	122 0.40%
42	30,400 100.00%	27,761 91.32%	373 1.23%	1,976 6.50%	74 0.24%	216 0.71%
43	31,304 100.00%	29,019 92.70%	568 1.81%	944 3.02%	522 1.67%	251 0.80%
44	30,860 100.00%	26,363 85.43%	1,151 3.73%	1,308 4.24%	1,732 5.61%	306 0.99%
45	31,865 100.00%	28,134 88.29%	1,376 4.32%	1,676 5.26%	392 1.23%	287 0.90%
46	30,547 100.00%	27,920 91.40%	355 1.16%	1,808 5.92%	158 0.52%	306 1.00%
47	30,461 100.00%	27,155 89.15%	1,528 5.02%	1,384 4.54%	112 0.37%	282 0.93%
48	30,071 100.00%	23,574 78.39%	3,439 11.44%	2,647 8.80%	117 0.39%	294 0.98%
49	30,477 100.00%	26,538 87.08%	838 2.75%	2,626 8.62%	65 0.21%	410 1.35%
50	30,596 100.00%	27,898 91.18%	938 3.07%	1,041 3.40%	129 0.42%	590 1.93%

STATE OF OKLAHOMA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DISTRICTS

<i>District</i>	<i>Total Pop.</i>	<i>Total White</i>	<i>Total Black</i>	<i>Total Am.Ind.</i>	<i>Total Asian/PI</i>	<i>Total Other</i>
51	30,503 100.00%	27,867 91.36%	197 0.65%	1,867 6.12%	62 0.20%	510 1.67%
52	30,649 100.00%	24,433 79.72%	2,863 9.34%	533 1.74%	392 1.28%	2,428 7.92%
53	31,911 100.00%	29,054 91.05%	520 1.63%	1,401 4.39%	584 1.83%	352 1.10%
54	31,107 100.00%	27,894 89.67%	656 2.11%	1,688 5.43%	418 1.34%	451 1.45%
55	31,419 100.00%	27,874 88.72%	1,171 3.73%	1,379 4.39%	92 0.29%	903 2.87%
56	30,337 100.00%	22,172 73.09%	733 2.42%	6,787 22.37%	67 0.22%	578 1.91%
57	30,560 100.00%	26,054 85.26%	1,005 3.29%	2,024 6.62%	175 0.57%	1,302 4.26%
58	31,259 100.00%	30,071 96.20%	74 0.24%	615 1.97%	92 0.29%	407 1.30%
59	31,159 100.00%	28,552 91.63%	627 2.01%	1,379 4.43%	53 0.17%	548 1.76%
60	30,692 100.00%	27,978 91.16%	958 3.12%	672 2.19%	68 0.22%	1,016 3.31%
61	30,792 100.00%	28,699 93.20%	181 0.59%	364 1.18%	72 0.23%	1,476 4.79%
62	31,343 100.00%	22,203 70.84%	6,332 20.20%	678 2.16%	1,228 3.92%	902 2.88%
63	31,446 100.00%	23,370 74.32%	3,903 12.41%	2,119 6.74%	430 1.37%	1,624 5.16%
64	30,891 100.00%	22,301 72.19%	5,241 16.97%	1,298 4.20%	874 2.83%	1,177 3.81%
65	30,542 100.00%	21,847 71.53%	5,477 17.93%	1,553 5.08%	564 1.85%	1,101 3.60%
66	31,617 100.00%	26,904 85.09%	1,955 6.18%	2,278 7.20%	199 0.63%	281 0.89%
67	31,765 100.00%	29,868 94.03%	602 1.90%	572 1.80%	598 1.88%	125 0.39%

STATE OF OKLAHOMA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DISTRICTS

<i>District</i>	<i>Total Pop.</i>	<i>Total White</i>	<i>Total Black</i>	<i>Total Am.Ind.</i>	<i>Total Asian/PI</i>	<i>Total Other</i>
68	31,736 100.00%	27,325 86.10%	1,750 5.51%	2,379 7.50%	144 0.45%	138 0.43%
69	31,900 100.00%	28,124 88.16%	1,631 5.11%	1,293 4.05%	499 1.56%	353 1.11%
70	31,888 100.00%	29,389 92.16%	1,027 3.22%	1,057 3.31%	247 0.77%	168 0.53%
71	31,829 100.00%	26,939 84.64%	3,013 9.47%	1,229 3.86%	343 1.08%	305 0.96%
72	31,093 100.00%	19,662 63.24%	8,043 25.87%	2,329 7.49%	354 1.14%	705 2.27%
73	30,700 100.00%	7,086 23.08%	21,994 71.64%	1,165 3.79%	90 0.29%	365 1.19%
74	31,521 100.00%	28,102 89.15%	479 1.52%	2,734 8.67%	115 0.36%	91 0.29%
75	31,903 100.00%	27,645 86.65%	1,583 4.96%	1,355 4.25%	887 2.78%	433 1.36%
76	31,574 100.00%	28,859 91.40%	1,004 3.18%	1,125 3.56%	366 1.16%	220 0.70%
77	31,530 100.0%	27,548 87.37%	1,066 3.38%	2,398 7.61%	224 0.71%	29% 0.93%
78	31,933 100.00%	28,638 89.68%	1,181 3.70%	1,413 4.42%	445 1.39%	256 0.80%
79	31,925 100.00%	28,489 89.24%	1,637 5.13%	892 2.79%	64 2.00%	267 0.84%
80	31,925 100%	29,043 91.96%	897 2.84%	1,277 4.04%	179 0.57%	187 0.59%
81	31,641 100.00%	28,572 90.30%	1,200 3.79%	785 2.48%	887 2.80%	197 0.62%
82	31,344 100.00%	28,520 90.99%	1,370 4.37%	650 2.07%	642 2.05%	162 0.52%
83	30,996 100.00%	26,062 84.08%	3,625 11.70%	647 2.09%	477 1.54%	185 0.60%
84	31,336 100.00%	27,686 88.35%	1,533 4.89%	1,174 3.75%	539 1.72%	404 1.29%
85	30,870 100.00%	27,807 90.08%	1,602 5.19%	748 2.42%	451 1.46%	262 0.85%

STATE OF OKLAHOMA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DISTRICTS

<i>District</i>	<i>Total Pop.</i>	<i>Total White</i>	<i>Total Black</i>	<i>Total Am.Ind</i>	<i>Total Asian/PI</i>	<i>Total Other</i>
86	31,087 100.00%	18,782 60.42%	18 0.06%	12,152 39.09%	15 0.05%	120 0.39%
87	31,085 100.00%	26,242 84.42%	2,046 6.58%	1,202 3.87%	976 3.14%	619 1.99%
88	30,674 100.00%	19,200 62.59%	5,728 18.67%	1,973 6.43%	1,949 6.35%	1,824 5.95%
89	31,125 100.00%	22,718 72.99%	2,547 8.18%	2,536 8.15%	330 1.06%	2,994 9.62%
90	31,475 100.00%	25,649 81.49%	2,826 8.98%	1,552 4.93%	882 2.80%	566 1.80%
91	30,664 100.00%	26,746 87.22%	1,007 3.28%	1,459 4.76%	932 3.04%	520 1.70%
92	31,242 100.00%	23,502 75.23%	4,431 14.18%	1,471 4.71%	1,092 3.50%	746 2.39%
93	31,171 100.00%	25,144 80.66%	1,189 3.81%	2,294 7.36%	247 0.79%	2,297 7.37%
94	31,083 100.00%	24,285 78.13%	4,073 13.10%	1,583 5.09%	530 1.71%	612 1.97%
95	30,414 100.00%	26,175 86.06%	1,967 6.47%	1,362 4.48%	553 1.82%	357 1.17%
96	30,594 100.00%	27,539 90.01%	1,015 3.32%	1,703 5.57%	134 0.44%	203 0.66%
97	31,037 100.00%	9,604 30.94%	20,611 66.41%	573 1.85%	96 0.31%	153 0.49%
98	30,507 100.00%	27,764 91.01%	429 1.41%	1,112 3.65%	911 2.99%	291 0.95%
99	30,874 100.00%	8,069 26.14%	21,541 69.77%	577 1.87%	341 1.10%	346 1.12%
100	31,056 100.00%	27,158 87.45%	1,817 5.85%	875 2.82%	747 2.41%	459 1.48%
101	31,071 100.00%	21,223 68.30%	8,000 25.75%	1,058 3.41%	476 1.53%	314 1.01%
Totals	3,145,585 100%	2,583,512 82.13%	233,801 7.43%	252,420 8.02%	33,563 1.07%	42,289 1.34%

ORIGINS

ORIGINS (Oklahoma Resources Integrated General Information Network System) is made available by the Oklahoma Department of Commerce, Division of Research and Planning, the University of Oklahoma, Center for Economic and Management Research; and Oklahoma State University, Department of Agricultural Economics and the Cooperative Extension Service. Origins provides "bulletins and databases of various economic and demographic data on the state, counties, and cities in Oklahoma" [ORIGINS User's Guide, page 2]. It includes a range of valuable census data, economic data, the directory of Oklahoma agencies, a listing of our legislators, and an on-line version of the *Oklahoma Statistical Abstract*. The data can be accessed by setting your modem to 7 data bits, space parity, 1 stop bit or to 8 data bits, no parity, 1 stop bit (1200 or 2400 Baud) and calling 325-5883 (in the OKC area) or 1-800-765-6552. Ms. Fariba Williams or Mr. Troy Carpenter at the University of Oklahoma (405-325-2931) can provide assistance and the Guide.

Give the system a try. It seems to have a range of excellent features. For example, you can upload and download data files and it serves as an e-mail system through its personal mail bulletin board.

REVIEWERS

The editors appreciate the very fast and helpful comments of the following reviewers for this issue:

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