Oklahoma Politics



Oklahoma Political Science Association

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2009 Volume 19



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NOTES FROM THE EDITOR

Welcome to the 2009 edition of *Oklahoma Politics*! Readers of previous editions of the journal will note several changes The first thing you may notice is that we have a different look to our cover. Last year, in conjunction with our editorial board, we decided to modernize the cover and tie it more to the organization's activities; specifically, the new cover design will reflect the site of the previous year's OPSA convention. Last year's cover was of the state capitol, the site of the 2007 conference. This year's cover is of Cameron University, the site of the 2008 conference. Future covers will continue this pattern.

We are also implementing plans to publish the conference address of the key speaker from the previous OPSA conference and we begin the Book Review Section with a retrospective review of a classic on Oklahoma Politics—in our inaugural review, Dusty Darr takes a new and insightful examination of James Scales and Danney Goble's Oklahoma Politics. We plan to continue presenting the major conference address and at least one retrospective review of a classic on Oklahoma politics in future editions.

Not surprisingly, elections dominate the articles for this year's edition. Leading off is Georgetown University historian Michael Kazin's OPSA address from last year's conference at Cameron University. Kazin's insights into the similarities and differences between the 1908 and 2008 presidential elections make for thought-provoking reading. Andrew Dowdle (University of Arkansas and Editor of American Review of Politics) and colleague Gary Wekkin of the University of Central Arkansas present a probing study of the impact of evangelical and conservative voters on the presidential vote in Oklahoma, Arkansas and Ohio in the 2000 and 2004 elections. Bob Darcy, Regents Professor of Political Science and Statistics from OSU and Gary Jones, State Republican Party Chair have joined forces with several of Darcy's students to explore mathematical models they used to predict the outcome of Oklahoma's state legislative races in 2008. And Rick Farmer, Director

of Committee Staff for the Oklahoma State House of Representatives and Brian Rader, Professor of Political Science from NSU present an intriguing exploration of all Oklahoma ballot measures since statehood. Jim Davis and Amy Blose of Oklahoma State University offer a fascinating study on lobbying, lobbyists and the Oklahoma State Legislature. A number of fine book reviews rounds out this fine collection of scholarship on issues central to Oklahoma politics and history.

MANUSCRIPT SUBMISSION

Oklahoma Politics invites and encourages submissions that explore the broad context of politics affecting Oklahoma and its place in the surrounding region. We are especially interested in submissions that bring to bear a variety of methodological, analytical, and disciplinary perspectives on state and local politics of the central-south region of the United States: Oklahoma, Kansas, Colorado, New Mexico, Texas, Arkansas, and Louisiana. Because "politics" cannot be thoroughly explored from only a single disciplinary point of view trans-disciplinary and collaborative projects are encouraged. Though we are the journal of the Oklahoma Political Science Association, we encourage submissions from economists, sociologists, environmental scientists, policymakers, analysts, as well as political scientists and other scientists and practitioners whose substantive research bears on the politics and issues of the state and region.

Oklahoma Politics is a fully peer reviewed journal. Each submission receives at least three anonymous reviews and each is reviewed by the editors before a decision is made to accept a manuscript for publication.

MANUSCRIPTS

Manuscripts should be no longer than 30 pages, double-spaced; text, graphics, notes, and references included; no extra space between

paragraphs. Do not indent paragraphs. Type font: New Times Roman; 12 point. Notes should be endnotes, not footnotes; references included last. Graphics (tables and figures) submitted separately, one per page, with internal reference indicating the approximate placement in the body of the text (i.e.: "[Table 1 about here]"). Tables/figures must not be larger than a single page.

Internal note style: endnotes, sequentially numbered superscript (e.g. [1], [2], [3], [4]...).

Internal reference style: (authorlastname year); e.g. (Jefferson 2007).

Internal reference with page number: (authorlastname year, page#); e.g. (Jefferson 2007, 32). Multiple internal references separated by semi-colon; alphabetical first, then by year: (AuthorA 2007; AuthorB1994; Author CA1 2007; Author CA2 1992).

Reference and note style:

Manuscripts and Book Reviews must follow the general format and citation styles found in the journals of the American Political Science Association: *American Political Science Review*, *Perspectives on Politics*, and *PS: Political Science & Politics*.

Examples:

Journals: Author last, author first or initial. Date. "Article Title." *Publication* Volume (Number): Page-Page. Example: Budge, Ian. 1973. "Recent Legislative Research: Assumptions and Strategies." *European Journal of Political Research* 1 (4): 317-330.

Books: Author last, author first or initial. Date. *Title*. Publication City: Publisher. Example: Green, Donald, and Ian Shapiro. 1994. *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Chapters: Author last, author first or initial. Date. "Chapter Title." In *Book Title*, ed. Book Author First, Last. Publication City: Publisher. Example: Mezey, Michael L. 1991. "Studying Legislatures: Lessons for Comparing Russian Experience." In *Democratization in Russia: The Development of Legislative Institutions*, ed. W.H. Jeffrey. New York: M.E. Sharpe.

Table and Figure style:

TABLE 1

Votes Missed, of First 100, by Term Limited

	Mean*	SD
Not Term Limited (n = 72)	2.4	7.5
Term Limited (n = 28)	5.0	8.6

*Difference significant at the .10 level

Organization/Headings:

MAJOR SECTION HEAD (BOLD CAPS & CENTERED)

SUBSECTION HEAD (CAPS & LEFT; NO PERIOD)

Sub-sub Section Head (Title Caps, Left, & Italicized; No Period)

MANUSCRIPT SUBMISSION

Manuscripts must contain: A cover page with title, author, and author affiliation and contact information; a separate cover page with title only; an abstract of no more than 150 words; and, the text of the manuscript. Authors whose manuscripts are accepted for publication must submit a short biographical sketch for inclusion in the journal.

BOOK REVIEWS

Book Reviews should be no longer than 1500 words. Reviews should be of books on topics relevant to the journal as delineated above, especially if written by Oklahoma-based authors. Review style should follow that of the journal as a whole. Full bibliographic information (to include ISBN and price, if available) should be included as the heading to the review.

Manuscripts (or ideas for manuscripts) should be submitted to:

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E-mail: KennethHicks@rsu.edu

Manuscripts and book reviews must be submitted electronically, in either Microsoft Word 2003 (or later) format (.doc/.docx) or Rich Text Format (.rft). No other forms of submission will be accepted. Manuscripts not in format compliance will be returned to authors without review.

John Ulrich
Editor, Oklahoma Politics

THE MEANING OF REFORM: 1908 AND 2008

MICHAEL KAZIN
Georgetown University

To a political historian, there is no reason to assume one can learn anything useful by comparing two elections a century apart. Everything is different: the context, the issues, and, of course, the candidates. Any similarities are usually just coincidental. Compare 1828 to 1928, for example. Andrew Jackson's victory in 1828 was possible only because, for the first time, most white men had the right to vote and exercised that right. And his party, the Democrats, were the first truly mass political party. The 1828 election was thus a pivotal moment in U.S. history and, even, in the history of the world. What about 1928? Herbert Hoover's landslide win that year was mostly a sign that American voters wanted more of the same – to continue the pro-business policies of the Republican Party and to keep a Catholic, Democrat Al Smith, out of the White House. Or compare the election of 1880 to that of 1980. Both times a conservative Republican was the victor: James A. Garfield and Ronald Wilson Reagan. But to compare Garfield, an intelligent man but a mediocre politician, to Reagan is like comparing a Triple Crown winner to a horse who stumbles in first at a country fair. They belong to the same species, but the skill of the competitor and the size of the purse make all the difference. So although we all have affection for centennials, we should be wary of imputing significance to elections that took place 100 years apart.

Once in a while, however, the perspective of a century can yield insights into how the nation has changed – and also how much has stayed the same, in our politics if not our technology. We continue to wrestle with certain big issues that are difficult to resolve and the struggle is often most apparent during a presidential contest. That was the case both in 1908 and in 2008's long and furious campaign.[1] Of course, the nation has changed in major ways over the past century. In 1908, the population was less than a third what it is now. More people lived in rural than in urban areas. The main form of daily transportation was still a horse, a mule, or one's own two feet. And, the only way to move commerce long distances was the train. In 1908, near Detroit, workers employed by Henry Ford were beginning to produce a new machine that would change all that: the Model T became the first automobile cheap enough for a farmer or middle-class urbanite to afford. The economy was far smaller in 1908 than now. Then, the country's Gross Domestic Product was $30 billion; today's GDP is $14 trillion. Annual government spending then was less than $3 billion; it is $5 trillion now. The average wage then was about $2 a day and prices were perhaps 1/12th what they are now.

There were political differences as well. The suffrage was more restricted in 1908 than it is now: women had the right to vote in only three states; African-Americans had the legal right to vote everywhere—but white legislatures and voters in various Southern states were disenfranchising black people through various legal subterfuges. One of the more blatant of those subterfuges was, of course, Oklahoma's own "grandfather clause" to the state constitution, passed in 1910.

One thing has remained the same between 1908 and now. In 1908, immigration was booming—though mostly from Europe rather than Asia or Latin America. The US was a multicultural society in 1908, as it is now. However, most native-born Americans then were not willing to accept that fact.

Despite all these differences, the central issue of the 1908 campaign was eerily similar to that of 2008. It was the economy, stupid. In each case, before the election, a long bull market had been followed by a stock market panic. By the early 1900s, trust companies were booming; their assets had grown by almost 250% since the late 1890s. During the same period, the assets of the biggest national banks almost doubled.

Then a stock market panic occurred, which focused everyone's attention on the power of large corporations to affect the lives of all Americans—whether for good or ill.

The Panic of 1907 cut stock prices by half—but it was essentially over before the campaign began, thanks to the intervention of J.P. Morgan who famously ordered various bankers and industrialists to his luxurious library on Madison Avenue and locked them in until they agreed to loan money to banks that were at risk of failing. Still, the economy didn't recover until the spring of 1908—and fear that it could happen again rippled through the rhetoric of that year's campaign.

So the key question of the 1908 campaign was: how should Americans reform the economy to regulate the operations of big businesses and the privileges of the rich and to help ordinary working Americans? In other words—how to balance the benefits of an untrammeled or "free" market with the public's strong desire to be treated fairly and equally as workers and consumers? This is really the basic question in any capitalist economy—how can private wealth and investment produce democratic results? So it's not surprising that, a century later, we still haven't come anything close to an agreement about how to accomplish this. What it means to *reform* the economy remains a matter of fierce debate.

There are some intriguing similarities between the major candidates in 1908 and 2008 as well. In both years, the Democrat was the challenger to the incumbent party: William Jennings Bryan then, Barack Obama in 2008. In both cases, he was a man in his late 40s, who came out of the left-wing of his party, and was an exceptionally stirring orator who had little experience in national office. In fact, Obama has been in the U.S. Senate for little less than 4 years—the exact same time Bryan served in the House of Representatives. Both men were even nominated at a convention held in Denver. Bryan ran on a platform, which he had helped to write, that thundered against "private monopoly," "the sins" of Wall Street "speculators," and "the partnership which has existed between corporations of the country and the Republican party." The parallel with Obama is obvious.

In both years, the Republican candidate was a man with a long record of government service. In 1908 it was William Howard Taft. In 2008 it was John McCain. Although he had never run for office before, Taft had been a state judge in Ohio, a federal judge, solicitor general,

the Governor-General of the Philippines (then an American colony), and had served as Secretary of War since 1904. Like John McCain, he was trying to succeed a two-term president of their own party. But there the comparison breaks down: Taft was the hand-picked candidate of Theodore Roosevelt, who would have easily won re-election if he'd chosen to run. In 2008, McCain tried mightily to separate himself from the incumbent president of his party. But most important, both Taft and Bryan portrayed themselves as candidates who would regulate big business and help the ordinary American worker and small businessperson. The difference was how they proposed to do it.

Taft followed the lead of his mentor, Teddy Roosevelt. Roosevelt was an essentially conservative man, but he feared that unregulated capitalism was a danger to the maintenance of a capitalist democracy. In 1906, TR said, "I do not like the social conditions at present. The dull, purblind folly of the very rich men; their greed and arrogance...and the corruption in business and politics have tended to produce a very unhealthy condition of excitement in the popular mind, which shows itself in socialistic propaganda" (Coletta, 2052).

TR always reminds me of my favorite fictional conservative, a young Sicilian aristocrat named Tancredi in the novel, The Leopard, by Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa. Tancredi is learning to adapt to the modern world instead of trying to shut it out, as his fellow aristocrats long to do. He tells the old guard, "If we want things to stay the same, things will have to change."

Taft in 1908 tried to be faithful to this world view. He wanted to strengthen the Sherman Anti-Trust Act to eliminate loopholes that made it difficult to stop monopolies from being formed. To address the anxieties of people with money in the banks, he proposed a system of postal savings banks, where the funds would be protected by the government. He also spoke vaguely of improving conditions for railroad workers, a key constituency at the time. But as a state and federal judge, Taft had ruled that most strikes and all boycotts were criminal conspiracies. During a national railroad strike in 1894, he fumed, "They have killed only six of the mob as yet. This is hardly enough to make an impression." In 1908, he continued to oppose any increase in the power of organized labor.

In general, Taft followed the policy of Roosevelt towards corporate power: big businesses that behaved themselves, that acted responsibly,

would continue to be the engine of prosperity, a prosperity that would extend to the middle and lower classes. The real danger came from radicals who wanted to destroy business – and to redistribute wealth.

Some sections of the GOP platform of 1908 sound remarkably like speeches that John McCain and Sarah Palin gave in the final weeks of the 2008 campaign: "The trend of [the Democratic Party] is toward socialism, while the Republican Party stands for a wise and regulated individualism. Socialism would destroy wealth, Republicanism would prevent its abuse. Socialism would give to each an equal right to take; Republicanism would give to each an equal right to warn...Ultimately [the Democratic Party] would have the nation own the people, while Republicanism would have the people own the nation"(2110).

However, there is one difference. In 1908, Americans actually had a Socialist party to vote for. The Socialists ran the former union leader Eugene V. Debs for president. Debs denounced both the Republicans and Democrats as being "capitalist" parties that had nothing to offer to working-class Americans. Debs won only 3% of the national vote in 1908. But he scored one of his best totals — almost 9% — in a fast-growing state full of tenant farmers and workers who were outraged at the gap between their earnings and the wealth of big land-owners and employers. That state, of course, was Oklahoma – home to one of the strongest Socialist parties anywhere in the U.S.

What was Bryan's solution to the economic problems of the nation? Interestingly, Bryan was the first Democratic presidential candidate to espouse a principle that nearly every nominee from his party has echoed since then—from Wilson, to FDR, to Johnson, to Clinton, to Obama. Bryan stated this principle succinctly the first time he ran for president in 1896 when he was just 36 years old: "There are two ideas of government," he declared. "There are those who believe that if you just legislate to make the well-to-do prosperous, that their prosperity will leak through on those below. The Democratic idea has been that if you legislate to make the masses prosperous their prosperity will find its way up and through every class that rests upon it." A week before this year's election, Barack Obama echoed that view when he told voters in Ohio, "you can turn the page on policies that have put the greed and irresponsibility of Wall Street before the hard work and sacrifice of folks on Main Street."

To that idea of bottom-up economics, Bryan added support for strong regulation of the trusts and, perhaps, breaking them up completely. He spoke of big corporations in the most derogatory of terms. Using an agrarian metaphor, he said, "One of the most important duties of government is to put rings in the noses of hogs." He also favored a progressive income tax to replace the tariffs on imported goods that were the main source of federal revenue at the time. But he assumed that the level of income would be set so high that only the richest five percent of Americans would actually pay any federal tax.

In sharp contrast to Taft, Bryan had long been a supporter of labor unions in his home state of Nebraska and throughout the nation. In 1908, for the first time, the main labor organization in the US, the American Federation of Labor, endorsed and worked to elect a major-party candidate for president. Samuel Gompers, president of the AFL, even passed on the language of each platform plank that mentioned labor. And the Democratic nominee for vice-president, an Indiana politician named John Kern, was on the ticket largely because he had a strong pro-labor record.

Bryan's type of economic reform had always scared conservatives in both major parties. They saw him, as they now see Obama, as an exceedingly dangerous man. Here's what the New York Times, then a conservative paper, wrote about Bryan in 1908: "Let Bryan nominate himself upon a platform of hostility to the courts, hostility to property interests, class legislation for labor, the income tax, popular election of senators, the initiative and referendum...and all the other doctrines of Bryanite radicalism..."(2075).

So the terms of the contest were set. Neither Taft nor Bryan had any difficulty winning their party's nomination. There were few primaries back then, and both men lined up enough delegates at state party meetings before their national conventions. For most rank-and-file Republicans, the fact that TR wanted Taft to succeed him was enough, including conservatives who thought he might be less given to denunciations of the rich. And Bryan was the only Democrat with a reputation as a far-reaching reformer. He had built up a large following since 1896: "To be suspected of disloyalty to Bryan in those days," a journalist later recalled, "was almost like buying a ticket to private life."[2]

I wish I could say that the 1908 campaign was as exciting as the 2008 one was. But Republicans were the majority party and Taft would

have had to have made some colossal mistakes to lose. Still, it had its moments—some of which point to Bryan's difficulty at pressing his idea of reform against that of a popular president. Bryan had focused each of his two previous campaigns on an issue of great emotional salience: inflating the money supply through the coinage of silver in 1896 and opposing the new American empire in 1900. But, in 1908, despite their rhetorical differences, the two parties often seemed to be quibbling over small distinctions of policy.

One example was the thorny issue of whether to make public the names of campaign contributors and the totals of their donations. Bryan demanded the publication of all campaign donations over $100 *before* Election Day; Taft preferred to issue such a report *after* the voters had spoken. But only Taft favored a full account of how both parties had *spent* their cash. A year before, Congress, at TR's urging, had deflated some of the public's concern by banning direct contributions by corporations. Of course, individual businessmen could keep donating as much as they liked.

Bryan did advocate one proposal that most Republicans despised: a requirement that national banks insure the funds of their depositors. The year before, Bryan had helped write the constitution for the state of Oklahoma that included a tax on each bank for this purpose. During the campaign, Bryan defended the idea: "There are only 20,000 banks," he said, "while there are 15,000,000 depositors, and I do not hesitate to declare that in a conflict between the two, the depositors have a prior claim to consideration." But outside of Oklahoma, this was a new idea, and it was unlikely to persuade most bank customers, who were Republicans, to abandon their party allegiance.[3]

"Shall the People Rule?" asked the Democrats' campaign slogan. The abstract, plaintive nature of the question suggested Bryan's great weakness. No one in America could rival his outrage, grounded in Scripture, against the corrupting influence of big business on public life. "I am willing to go down on my knees and ask my heavenly father: 'Give us this day our daily bread,'" he told a large crowd in Roanoke, Virginia, "...I am not willing to make millions of my countrymen get down on their knees and say to some trust magnate: 'Give us this day our daily bread,' and have him reply: 'I will, if you vote the ticket I want you to vote.'"[4] Bryan charged that "predators" in expensive suits were bankrolling the GOP because they knew Republicans would never

sabotage their vital interests. Democrats pressed this attack through populist imagery. They distributed a cartoon showing a lean Bryan shoveling hay for exercise; while the corpulent Taft awkwardly swung a golf club as part of a twosome with John D. Rockefeller, the symbol of corporate wealth and power.[5] Yet it was not enough to tell voters a gripping story about "the people" vs. the plutocrats.

Bryan had no grand solution to corporate misconduct that was distinct from that espoused by TR and Taft. Each man would intervene, with the help of Congress and the courts, to force big business to heed the public's desire for a marketplace governed by rules of fairness and equity. None would attempt to destroy the oligopolies on which increasing numbers of Americans depended for goods, services, and jobs. Audiences cheered when Bryan vowed to humble the trusts and restore an economy where the little man could thrive. But neither he nor his allies had more than the vaguest idea of how to bring that about.

Bryan tried to assure anxious voters that he was not the radical figure that Taft made him out to be. "The Democratic Party seeks not revolution but reformation," Bryan explained, "and I need hardly remind the student of history that cures are mildest when applied at once; that remedies increase in severity as their application is postponed."[6] But his opponents didn't buy it. William Van Cleave, president of the National Association of Manufacturers – founded in 1903 to combat militant unions – told his members, "regardless of party," that it was their duty "to bury Bryan and Bryanism under such an avalanche of votes" that neither man nor movement could rise again. Taft called the deposit guarantee "wrong in principle and impossible in practice" because it would give bankers an excuse to foist their problems on the government. The influential journalist William Allen White charged that Bryan's party "is a Democracy advocating Federal control of everything that is out of joint." It had "all the childish courage of the mob." Who could trust a man like that to grasp the complexities of governing a modern, industrial nation?[7]

The Democrats did manage to put together an impressive campaign apparatus. By Labor Day, over five thousand Bryan-Kern clubs were busy handing out literature and registering voters. A finance committee, headed by a tobacco manufacturer, also collected a lot of small donations. By Election Day, the Democrats had attracted some 75,000 contributors, five times more than the GOP. But most wealthy Americans still viewed

Bryan as their enemy. He was able to raise only a third as much cash as did Taft.[8]

Both candidates also exploited a novel and inexpensive way to reach the public. During the 2008 campaign, it was the Internet. In 1908, it was recorded speeches. The technology invented by Thomas Edison two decades before was still quite primitive. Bryan and Taft had to speak loudly and slowly into the massive horn of a phonograph, which transferred the sounds onto a thick slab of vinyl or a wax cylinder six inches high. Recordings could last no more than four minutes and static marred the results.[9]

No sales totals exist, so it's impossible to tell how the recordings affected the campaign, if they did at all. One phonograph company issued large print ads announcing, "Mr. William Jennings Bryan Wants to Talk to You Personally." The slogan suggested a momentous change in the conduct of political campaigns. For the first time, potential voters did not have to attend a candidate's speech in person. They could experience something of the same experience just by sitting in their parlor. There's a direct line from those scratchy wax cylinders to YouTube clips.

As in 2008, the Democratic candidate had a more enthusiastic following than did his rival. Bryan's crowds were huge and they seemed to prize the man as much as his message. "A stamping, shouting, laughing multitude that seemed frantic with joy" greeted him in Poseyville, Indiana. In Brooklyn, New York, a boisterous ovation lasting ten minutes almost prevented him from speaking at all. At night, crowds surrounded his railroad car, demanding that he get out of bed and speak to them.[10]

Bryan also received a small mountain of fan mail, as he had since 1896. Almost none of it survives, but reports totaled it at two thousand letters and telegrams a day. Many admirers dwelled on Bryan's stalwart character and crusading Christian faith. "Your magnificent stand on all occasions for the advancement of God's Kingdom," wrote a YMCA official from New York, "has won a very warm place in the hearts of Christian men, regardless of political affiliations."[11]

Such mass affection may have made a difference if Bryan were running against an opponent with an unattractive personality. Two years before, Taft had told his wife, "Politics, when I am in it, makes me sick." Indeed, Bryan lampooned his opponent's reticence to speak up on any issue TR hadn't tutored him about. Taft would have preferred to

issue written statements about his record and leave the oratory to others.

In the late summer, GOP leaders fretted that Bryan may have been pulling ahead in swing states in the Midwest and in New York. Roosevelt urged his protégé to offer voters not an "etching" of his views but a "poster" with "streaks of blue, yellow, and red to catch the eye." So, in mid-September, the large man with a winning laugh and a pleasing voice starting stumping from Indiana to the Rockies. Taft read most of his speeches verbatim and said nothing worth remembering. Still, he kept a broad smile on his face and assured everyone he would continue the reforms Roosevelt had started. It would be almost like re-electing the president after all.[12]

Bryan's only real chance for victory lay in mobilizing a new coalition of the discontented from the working-class precincts of Eastern and Midwestern cities. Aside from his own campaign rhetoric, that task fell primarily to union labor. In 1908, most AFL political operatives received paychecks from the Democratic Party and passed out over five million pieces of literature prepared by Bryan's campaign.

But organized labor proved to be a vulnerable ally. Outside the South, a large number of skilled unionists were Republicans, and many bridled at their leaders' unprecedented attempt to influence their political choice. "When were you told to tell me how to vote?", one West Virginia wage-earner wrote across a pro-Bryan leaflet. "I'll vote to suit meself. Hurrah for TAFT!"

The GOP quickly seized on such resentments. Sounding a theme their party would exploit for decades to come, Roosevelt and Taft accused Gompers of ordering his members to vote against their will, of acting despotically in the name of protecting democratic rights.

While the Democrats were attempting to leap into the political future with labor, they were rejecting a possible alliance across the color line. Theodore Roosevelt had angered African-Americans in 1906 when he ordered dishonorable discharges for an entire battalion of black soldiers after a handful of them may have "shot up" the border town of Brownsville, Texas. Taft fully backed the president's decision. "The greatest hope that the Negro has," Taft smugly advised, "is the friendship and the sympathy of the white man with whom he lives" in the South.

For W.E.B. DuBois, it was time to make a change. His Niagara movement vowed to gain equal rights at the polls, in the economy, in every sphere of society. They raised the vision of a future alliance with

"the white laboring classes," perhaps within the Socialist Party. Niagara activists knew most blacks still able to vote would stand by the party of Lincoln, even if it seemed to be deserting them. But why not punish such "false friends" by aiding its opponents? DuBois declared, "If between the two parties who stand on identically the same platform you can prefer the party who perpetuated Brownsville, well and good! But I shall vote for Bryan."[13]

The Democratic nominee had not always spurned black support. But now he was anxious not to give his base – the white South – any reason to doubt his commitment to white supremacy. Bryan's anxiety to guard his racist reputation seemed pragmatic at the time. The eleven states of the former Confederacy accounted for 120 electoral votes, almost half the total needed for victory. Add Border States like Kentucky, Missouri, and Oklahoma (voting for the first time), and a Democrat would need only a few big industrial states to push him over the top. But accepting the backing of a group of black Americans who wanted their equal rights would have angered and splintered his white base. By 1908, the disenfranchisement crusade had triumphed nearly everywhere in the South. Nowhere in Dixie did black voters pose a potential threat to the power of the white majority. Even if Bryan had begun to rethink his racial views, there was nothing to be gained from accepting the endorsement of W.E.B. DuBois and a great deal to lose.[14] It would take another forty years for Democrats to see the error of their ways, politically and morally.

Despite multiple handicaps, Bryan thought he had a good chance to win. Not since the early 1890s had Democrats been so united and they were running on an anti-corporate platform that seemed in synch with the reformist mood of the nation. Bryan spent most of his time stumping in New York and the industrial Midwest, and the size and passion of the crowds always buoyed his confidence.

Then in mid-September, William Randolph Hearst tried to hijack the race. The publisher released private correspondence from 1905 disclosing that mighty Standard Oil had traded cash for favors from several leading politicians. One of these politicians was Charles Haskell – the governor of Oklahoma and treasurer of the Democratic National Committee. The documents grabbed the headlines, but they also tarred prominent Republicans, and Haskell quickly resigned from his post in the party. "The tide seems to be running in our favor still, and I do not

know how they are going to stop it," Bryan wrote to his campaign manager in mid-October. "With a large slush fund on election day, they can, of course, do something, but...it looks to me like our chances are good."[15]

It was the worst prediction of his long career. Taft's victory on November 3 was a decisive one. The first-time candidate who loathed the political fray beat his more seasoned opponent by over 1.2 million votes, about half TR's margin in 1904.

The Republicans swept every state in the Northeast and along the Great Lakes. They even carried most of the major cities – and every one in the Northeast and Midwest. Of the most fiercely contested prizes, Bryan came close only in his running mate's home state of Indiana. Outside the Old South, the Democrat managed to capture only Kentucky, Nevada, Colorado, Oklahoma, and his own Nebraska – and only 43% of the vote. "We have beaten them to a frazzle," gloated Teddy Roosevelt.[16]

Bryan had campaigned diligently on his issues, believing voters would view him not as a cautious former judge, but as the authentic spokesman for anti-trust feeling in all classes and the welfare of working Americans. But in 1908, Republicans had a better grasp of what moved and alarmed the Northern electorate at a time of general prosperity. They were led by a brilliant president with an insurgent, mildly pro-labor reputation, and this muddied policy distinctions between the parties.

Republican campaigners also persuaded voters not to trust Bryan. After all, the Democrat had once advocated inflation, had opposed an Asian war the U.S. was winning, and seemed, by allying with the AFL, to have taken one side in a class conflict most Americans were not fighting. "Get After Bryan; Forget Platforms," read a newspaper headline about GOP strategy.[17] They made the election about Bryan, and they won.

Republicans followed much the same strategy in 2008, but the result was rather different. Why? Unlike Taft, McCain moved away from his reputation as a reformer and allied himself with the right-wing of his party. And, of course, his party was in far worse shape than Taft's a century ago. In the differences between the two elections, one stands out: William Howard Taft was the heir apparent to Theodore Roosevelt. John McCain, despite his oft-expressed admiration for TR, was running to succeed George W. Bush.

But there's a larger difference between 1908 and 2008 that might give us pause. Even as we slid into recession in 2008, Americans were certainly better off in many ways than we were in 1908. To be poor in 1908 was to work 12 hours a day at a job with no workmen's comp, union protection, health plan, or retirement security. And that's if one could find work at all. Most Americans in 2008 considered themselves to be middle-class, and few worked at dangerous jobs or wondered where their next meal was coming from. But the status of the nation itself in 2008 and beyond may not be so rosy. In 1908, for all its troubles and discontents, the US was a nation on the rise: the Panama Canal was under construction with a huge workforce from all over the word, US was on the verge of becoming the leading manufacturing nation, and it was a technological leader in many fields – from automobiles, to photography, to electrical utilities, to oil refining, to steel. Within the decade, the US would turn the tide in World War I and take over from Great Britain as the leading investor in other nation's economies. But in 2008 we were a nation on the decline. Our financial system was in ruins and our manufacturing base had been shrinking for several decades. The gap between the rich and everyone else was as wide as it had been since about a century ago. And the 2008 election turned on the question of who gained and who lost in the economy.

A historical perspective can't guide us to a better future. And contrary to the popular cliché, history does not repeat itself, except, perhaps in metaphor. But if the current crisis in our economy has taught us anything, I think it has reminded us that some of our ancestors had a nice way of phrasing certain eternal political truths. One of the main duties of government is to put rings in the noses of hogs.

NOTES

[1] Some of the material for this address is drawn from the author's biography of William Jennings Bryan, *A Godly Hero: the Life of William Jennings Bryan*, Anchor Books, 2007. Used with permission.

[2] Arthur Wallace Dunn, quoted in Sarasohn, Ibid., 38. On Taggart's role, see Ralph M. Goldman, The National Party Chairmen and Committees: Factionalism at the Top (Armonk, NY, 1990), 215 and Taggart bio tk.

[3] History of American Presidential Elections, 1789-1968, Vol 5, ed. Arthur M.Schlesinger, Jr. (New York, 1985), 2091-2101; Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, A Brief History of Deposit Insurance in the United States

(Washington,DC, 1998), 16-23; Bryan, "Guaranteed Deposits," Speeches of William Jennings Bryan, Vol. 2 (NY, 1909), 159.

[4] Quoted in Atlanta Journal, 9/16/06, 1.

[5] The cartoon, evidently from a Democratic campaign book, was copied for me by Harry Rubenstein of the National Museum of American History.

[6] "Shall the People Rule?", August 12, 1908, Speeches, Vol. 2, 103, 117.

[7] Quotes from Henry F. Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft, Vol. 1 (New York, 1939), 363 (Van Cleave); Coletta, "Election of 1908," 2085 (Taft); William Allen White, "Twelve Years of Mr. Bryan," Collier's, Oct. 17, 1908, 12-13.

[8] The Campaign Textbook of the Democratic Party of the United States (Chicago, 1908); Isaac F. Marcosson, "Marse Henry": A Biography of Henry Watterson (New York, 1951), 177-79; Washington Evening Star, Sept. 9, 1908, 9; Louise Overacker, Money in Elections (New York, 1974 [1932]), 73, 136.

[9] On the technology and commerce of early phonographs, see Andre Millard, America on Record: A History of Recorded Sound (Cambridge, Eng., 1995), 37-64.

[10] Quote from Indianapolis News, Sept. 10, 1908, 1, 3. The News was a Democratic paper, which made its failure to report the content of Bryan's speech particularly suggestive. On nocturnal fans, see Washington Evening Star, 9/10/1908, 12. The most complete account of the campaign tours is Edgar A. Hornig, "The Indefatigable Mr. Bryan in 1908," NH 37 (Sept. 1956), 183-99. He recounts the Brooklyn story on p. 193.

[11] Remarkably, this is one of only *four* letters written during the ten months before Election Day that survives in BPLC. On the volume of mail, see New York Times, 9/6/1908, Sect. 5, 5. For post-election mail, see below.

[12] Quotes from Donald F. Anderson, William Howard Taft: A Conservative's Conception of the Presidency (Ithaca, 1973), 27 (Taft); Pringle, Life and Times, Vol. 1, 359 (Roosevelt). For Bryan's imitation of Taft, see Lawrence Glen Buckley, "William Jennings Bryan in American Memory," PhD dissertation, University of Hawaii, 1998, 66-7.

[13] Quotes from "Third Annual Meeting of the Niagara Movement, Aug. 26-29, 1907," in Pamphlets and Leaflets of W.E.B. DuBois, ed. Herbert Aptheker (White Plains, NY, 1986), 76; David Levering Lewis, W.E.B. DuBois: Biography of a Race, 1868-1919 (NY, 1993). On the political furor and its consequences, see Emma Lou Thornbrough, "The Brownsville Episode and the Negro Vote," Mississippi Valley Historical Review 44 (Dec. 1957), 469-93.

[14] On the chronology of disenfranchisement, see J. Morgan Kousser, The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restriction and the Establishment of the One-Party South, 1880-1910 (New Haven, 1974), 239; Alexander Keyssar, The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the United States (New York, 2000), 111-116.

[15] WJB to Daniels, 10/19/1908, Daniels Papers, Box 69. On the Archbold letters, see Nasaw, The Chief, 221-3; Sarasohn, Party of Reform, 50-51.

[16] TR quoted in Coletta, "Election of 1908," 2087. Third parties did poorly and had only a marginal impact on the result. Thomas Hisgen, of the Independence League, drew 82,600 votes, and Tom Watson only 28,400, most of it in his home state of Georgia. Eugene Debs drew 420,000 for the Socialists, less than three percent of the total. In Indiana, his vote was larger than the plurality for Taft, but the Prohibitionist candidate did better there. Congressional Quarterly, Presidential Elections Since 1789, Fourth Edition (Washington, 1987), 113, 135.

[17] Indianapolis News, 9/1/1908, 1. It's not clear how greatly Roosevelt feared a Bryan victory. His aide, Archie Butt, quoted TR's belief that Bryan was "a wonderful man and would make a strong, able President." But the editor of Butt's letters had gained a more negative impression after corresponding with Roosevelt during the 1908 campaign. The Letters of Archie Butt, 91, 46-7.

EVANGELICAL AND SOCIAL CONSERVATIVE SUPPORT FOR GEORGE W. BUSH IN THE 2000 AND 2004 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: EVIDENCE FROM OKLAHOMA, ARKANSAS AND OHIO

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Little scholarly research has been done to explain the effects of State Question 711 on the 2004 presidential election in Oklahoma. Recent research however has called address this issue in Ohio and Arkansas. However a debate still exists about the precise role of social conservatives in each state. To help address these questions, this paper (1) tries to determine whether this lack of effect is just limited to evangelical voters in one state or region by examining the states of Oklahoma, Ohio, and Arkansas, all of which had a similar issue on the ballot, and (2) attempts to differentiate between white evangelical voters and social conservatives. We find that Bush ran strongly in socially conservative areas in 2000, well before gay marriage became a major issue in any of these states. We also conclude that while there is certainly overlap between social conservatives and evangelicals in Oklahoma and the other two states, they acted as separate electoral groups in 2000 and 2004.

The emergence of political issues often seems random and haphazard.[1] However as Carmines and Stimson (1990) point out, there are processes that many, if not most, important controversies undergo. Two elements that they identify as important elements in issue evolution are the existence of external disruptions and the role of strategic politicians in using policy conflicts to form winning electoral coalitions.

At the beginning of 2004, concerns such as national security and economic growth were anticipated to dominate political discourse. A new contender emerged at the start of the election year, however. In February, the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled that the state had "failed to identify any constitutionally adequate reason" to deny same-sex marriage. At the same time in California, San Francisco began to issue same-sex marriage licenses. Fitting Carmines and Stimson's model, it seemed obvious that strategic politicians would use this "disruption" for electoral advantage. President George W. Bush, for example, announced that he would support a Constitutional amendment that would define marriage as a strictly heterosexual institution (O'Brien 2004). By November, activists in no fewer than eleven states, nine of which were eventually won by President Bush in 2004, had petitioned successfully to get voter initiatives banning same-sex marriage on the ballot and secured voter approval of these measures (McMahon 2005, 25).

It became almost an article of faith for some observers that the president's announcement signaled a re-election strategy of rallying religious conservatives to the polls to vote against gay and lesbian marriage (and *for* the president opposing it). Karl Rove claimed that the gay and lesbian marriage ban initiatives had a small but significant net effect on increasing turnout among social conservatives in 2004 (Halperin and Harris 2006).[1] Many of the measures' opponents also grudgingly admitted that the strategy was politically fruitful for the GOP. Since previous research has also supported the link between partisanship and individual votes on ballot measures (Branton 2003), it might be reasonable to speculate that popular ballot measures could boost support for one party's candidate(s). Smith et al. (2005) found some increase at the county-level for President Bush in Ohio in 2004 based on support for Issue One, which banned same-sex marriages. However both they and, in the case of Arkansas, Dowdle and Wekkin (2006; 2007) began to question the over-simplicity of the conventional wisdom.

Despite the large number of state-level studies in this area, no published research has examined its effect on Oklahoma. To further examine the impact of state gay marriage ban ballot measures on the 2004 presidential election, we look at Oklahoma and two states (i.e., Arkansas, and Ohio) to see the effects that the 2004 voter initiatives—Amendment Three, Issue One, and State Question 711 respectively —

that would ban same-sex marriages had on the general election.[2] We selected Arkansas because it is similar demographically to Oklahoma, especially in the key area of a high concentration of evangelical voters (Gaddie and Copeland 20002; Dowdle and Wekkin 2006). Ohio is used as a third case because it was one of the few states with a ballot measure that was not similar to Oklahoma demographically. Thus it should expand the scope of our findings beyond states with large Evangelical populations.

On the surface, the strategy of linking Bush's fortune in Oklahoma to these initiatives seemed to be a politically sound one. Bush's share of the presidential vote in the state also jumped from 60.3 to 65.6 in Oklahoma during that period. While many people credit the Bush campaign's use of this and other wedge issues for boosting both turnout among social conservatives and Republican vote totals in the 2004 general election, there are other possible alternatives. Using data from 2000 and 2004 election returns from these three states, we test two possible hypotheses: whether (1) the already high levels of social conservative support for Bush and other Republican candidates were boosted by their support for State Question 711 in Oklahoma, Amendment Three in Arkansas, and Issue One in Ohio or (2) Republican votes in 2004 owed primarily to Bush's appeal to social conservatives, as was also the case in 2000, before the same-sex marriage controversy had occurred.

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The presidential support for state ballot initiatives that banned same-sex marriage generated almost immediate debate in both scholarly and non-scholarly circles. Gay conservative Bush supporter Andrew Sullivan set Washington on its ear the same day as Bush's February announcement by characterizing the announcement as a betrayal—a "Declaration of War" on gays. Bloggers such as Barbara O'Brien (*Mahablog.com*), John Hawkins (*rightwingnews.com*), Robert Garcia Tagorda (*tagorda.com*), and others quickly responded to the effect that Bush's announcement was entirely predictable, given strategist Karl Rove's argument that Bush had lost the popular vote in 2000 because he had turned out *too few* religious conservatives (O'Brien 2004, ch. 3; see also Ceaser & Bush 2005, 133-34). Within three months, an article in *Perspectives on Politics* by Rutgers political scientist Jyl Josephson

began with the words, "When President Bush endorsed a federal constitutional amendment to prohibit same-sex marriage, he confirmed an electoral strategy of using "gay marriage" as a wedge issue in the 2004 elections" (Josephson 2004, 269).

Validating this conventional wisdom was the even larger volume of political commentary portraying the looming 2004 election as a culture war between "two" Americas—one a bicoastal, better-educated, cosmopolitan, ethnically and religiously tolerant society of urban-dwelling gourmands and theatre-goers and the other a "fly-over" hinterland dominated by Bible- and gun-toting white Anglo-Saxon protestants whose narrow middle-American values would make lemmings and the characters of Sinclair Lewis novels homesick with nostalgia. James Davison Hunter (1991, 1994), Gertrude Himmelfarb (1999), and Terry Teachout (2001) are some of the big-thinkers who opened the doors of the two-hue, red-and-blue schoolhouse of American studies that depicted the 2004 American national elections as being as much about a "war" at home as about the war against terror. These issues have a particular resonance in Oklahoma where presidential elections have had a significant effect on down-ticket races (Gaddie and Shapard 2010).

Embracing this characterization thoroughly, William Crotty's post-election analysis titled *A Defining Moment: The Presidential Election of 2004* intoned, "Two opposing visions of the United States and its future were presented to the American public; one would prevail and set the country's course domestically and in relation to the international community for years, if not decades and generations, to come. They had little in common" (Crotty, 2005, 3). Echoing this theme, James Ceaser's and Andrew Busch's *Red Over Blue: The 2004 Elections and American Politics* depicts the 2004 election as a decisive, even realigning election in which "As one could see from national red-blue maps—or better yet, county-level purple maps showing gradations of voter concentration—Democrats were highly concentrated in the major urban centers and in a sprinkling of college towns; Republicans were spread more evenly across the rest of the country" (2005, 148). As our results for geographical support levels of State Question 711 will show, Oklahoma witnessed a similar pattern in 2004.

According to the logic of the "culture-war" literature presented above, the same-sex marriage issue should highlight "red-versus-blue" differences, insofar as "whites without college degrees had significantly

more positive feelings toward the Republican party than toward the Democratic party" (Shiraev & Sobel 2006, 173), and only 16 percent of Americans with high school diplomas and 18 percent of those with less than a diploma support the legalization of same-sex marriage, compared to 48 percent of those with post-graduate education (Shiraev & Sobel, 2006, 172, 175). Knowing this to be the case, Bush, "a divider, not a uniter" (Jacobson 2007), and Rove, who "believed that Bush lost the 2000 popular vote because millions of evangelical Christians failed to go to the polls" (Abramson et al. 2006, 46), had the "long-term strategic vision" to take advantage of the "manna from heaven [that] had fallen into their laps in the form of the same-sex marriage debate" (Ceaser & Busch 2005, 134). In so many words, the initiatives banning same-sex marriage that subsequently cropped up on the ballots of eleven states were consciously pushed by the Republican White House as part of its re-election strategy, and worked as planned. The turnout of evangelical Christians is supposed to have risen from 15 million in 2000 to 22 million in 2004 (McMahon 2005, 24), and Bush won 78 percent of their votes, carrying 9 of the 11 states holding such initiatives, including the critical state of Ohio, where "some thought that Republican turnout in the south and west of the state was driven partially by the amendment, and some credited Bush's improved showing in Appalachian Ohio to it as well" (Ceaser & Busch, 2005, 162). While evangelical voters were an important part of the story in Oklahoma, we argue the role that they play is not as simple as this picture suggests.

On the other hand, the Bush presidential campaign's manager, Ken Mehlman, and chief strategist, Matthew Dowd, told questioners at Harvard's quadrennial post-election campaign managers' conference that the President's endorsement of a Constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage had been a "reluctant" response to the then-recent events in San Francisco and in Massachusetts, rather than a strategic ploy to galvanize Christian conservative turnout, and that it played little role in the increased turnout of such voters (JFK School, 2006). Neither the Democratic managers nor the campaign correspondents present disagreed with this characterization, and opposing strategist Steve Rosenthal of America Coming Together (ACT) confirmed that self-identified "moral values" voters seldom had brought up gay marriage during exit-interviews or post-election polls and discussions (JFK School 2006, 232). According to John Green, the Bush White House's

enthusiasm for banning same-sex marriage was so obviously faint during the 2004 campaign that Christian conservatives were actually "deeply troubled" by mid-year (Green & Bigelow 2005, 205), prompting evangelicals such as James Dobson to say immediately after the election, "I'm sure he [President Bush] will fail us. He doesn't dance to our tune" (ABC *This Week*, 12 November 2004), and David Kuo, late of the White House's Office of Faith-Based Initiatives, to call for Christian conservatives to "fast" politically for a while (Kuo, 2006).

However empirical confirmation for this hypothesis is harder to find. Smith, DeSantis and Kassel (2005) address this issue in a recent paper when they test whether and how the evangelical Protestant populations in Michigan and Ohio affected the 2004 election outcome. At first glance, it appears that an increase in evangelical Protestants support may have had a positive effect for Bush in 2004.

Smith et al. test three hypotheses on a county-by-county basis: (H1) the higher the number of evangelicals, the higher the support for the ballot measure; (H2) the higher the number of evangelicals, the higher the turnout rates in 2004 over 2000; and (H3) the higher the number of evangelicals, the higher the Bush votes in 2004 over 2000. They discovered that a county's proportion of evangelical Protestants was not statistically significant in the models. The county-level data did not help to predict any of the three hypotheses; in fact these results appeared to contradict some of the individual-level survey literature on the subject. The authors were unable to find any evidence to convince them that Karl Rove, the social conservatives or the media was correct – that the evangelical population would seal the election for the Bush camp. Smith et al. posit that Bush's support was likely bolstered by the measures, particularly in Ohio, but the evangelicals should not be given the exclusive credit for his reelection.

These findings raise the issue of whether evangelicals are necessarily political social conservatives. Two important assumptions that are being made about evangelicals is that (1) they also have conservative political values and (2) they are willing to vote for Republican candidates if the Republican are linked to these political issues. And if Gay, Ellison, and Powers' (1996) assertion that significant diversity of opinion does exist among conservative Protestants, does this mean that not all evangelicals will support Republican candidates who represent traditional moral values?

Most previous studies have supported the first assertion but there is some question about whether religious affiliation, attendance and/or theological beliefs influence political attitudes. Some scholars conclude that religious affiliation provides a strong factor in predicting political attitudes (Green et al, 2005; Bolzendahl and Brooks, 2005). Layman (1997) makes a strong argument that interdenominational divisions within Protestantism provide better explanations of the influence of religion on political behavior than traditional splits between Protestantism and Catholicism or Judaism. Williams et al. (2007) posit a strong correlation between conservative religious values, such as religious fundamentalism and evangelicalism, and conservative political values in areas such as civil liberties. Similarly Tuntiya (2005) finds that a belief in Biblical literalism and demographic factors are more likely to influence political tolerance than denominational affiliation. Burdette et al. (2005) conclude however that all three factors (i.e., conservative religious affiliation, church attendance and belief in Biblical literalism) all have a positive correlation with negative political attitudes towards civil rights for gays and lesbians.

The question then is why? Besides theological concerns, Linneman (2004) believes much of the source of anti-gay political attitudes rests not with homophobia but with a backlash against secular society's attitudes toward Christian conservatives. Campbell (2006) further builds on this external threat hypothesis by finding that the greater the influence of secularists in their community, the more likely that white evangelicals were to vote for the Republican presidential nominee in 1996 and 2000. Did the Republican Party and its candidates then have the ability to channel this backlash to their electoral advantage?

This link between conservative theological and political ideas certainly does allow other conservative elite groups to find common policy ground with evangelicals. As Urban (2006, 1) concludes "there is an important 'fit' or 'elective affinity' between the aggressive foreign policies of the Neoconservatives and the millenarian vision of the *Left Behind* series." A popular president can serve to further the relationship between two groups with somewhat related agendas. In this case, Urban credits Bush as the linchpin that ties Neoconservatives and evangelicals together in an electoral coalition. Zurbriggen (2005) goes as far as positing that the existence of a condition termed "Betrayal Trauma Theory" makes culturally beseiged religious conservative inordinately maleable

to Bush's appeal. However it is important to remember that despite the appearance of shared ground on some issues not all evangelicals are conservative (Woodberry and Smith, 1998) and that it shouldn't be assumed that conservative social values among voters automatically translates into political action (Olson et al., 2006). Much of the conventional wisdom assumed otherwise though in 2004.

IS THE "CULTURE WAR" A NET VOTE GENERATOR AMONG EVANGELICALS IN OKLAHOMA, OHIO AND ARKANSAS?

In this article we intend to investigate the impact of Arkansas, Ohio and Oklahoma's 2004 amendments banning same-sex marriage, which passed with 75, 62, and 76 percent of the vote respectively, upon statewide support for President Bush in the 2000 and 2004 general elections among evangelical voters. We take this approach not out of respect for the word of the president's campaign managers, but rather because of the serious questions raised by Morris P. Fiorina and his associates (2004) about the widely used "culture war" interpretation of the 2004 election. Was the already high level of social conservative support for Bush boosted by the presence of the ballot measures or did Republican voting support in 2004—as in 2000, before the same-sex marriage controversy—stem primarily from Bush's appeal at the top of the ticket?

Despite the question of whether the divisions of the culture war had trickled down to the mass level, one of the more universal assumptions of the 2004 elections was that the presence of a ballot measure prohibiting same-sex marriage had helped Republican candidates in Oklahoma, as alleged elsewhere such as Arkansas and Ohio.

At first glance, this conclusion seems accurate. Previous research (Dowdle and Wekkin, 2006; Dowdle et al. 2007) shows that Republican candidates in 2002 did not run particularly well in the more culturally conservative counties that would support Amendment Three or State Question 711 two years later. To be fair, two of the three 2002 Arkansas GOP nominees for major statewide and federal office had problems that may have resonated negatively with culturally conservative voters. The GOP's lieutenant gubernatorial nominee Win Rockefeller, like his

father before him, was viewed by many as representing moderate as well as traditional wings of the state Republican Party that had been surpassed by the growing influence of Christian conservatives within the party. Rockefeller's strong showing in the faster growing, mostly suburban counties, by contrast, suggests a potential division in the GOP ranks between primarily rural social conservatives and suburban party supporters (Dowdle & Wekkin 2006). Tim Hutchinson, a Baptist minister and the Republican incumbent in the U.S. Senate, had been involved in a scandalous affair and divorce that cut into his support.

However James Inhofe, Oklahoma's own conservative Republican senatorial candidate, also did worse in such areas in 2002. Two GOP candidates who on the face should have performed strongly in the socially conservative areas also did no better than Bush in 2000 and 2004. The incumbent Republican Governor of Arkansas, Mike Huckabee, was also a Baptist minister without such political or personal liabilities, and he did not perform strongly, either, in the culturally conservative counties that would support Amendment Three in 2004. The Oklahoma GOP gubernatorial nominee, Steve Largent, was also a well-known socially conservative Christian. By contrast, Bush did well in 2004 in the culturally conservative counties that had not been so kind to Republicans in 2002 (Dowdle et al., 2007).

A reflexive reaction is to credit the same-sex marriage ban on the 2004 ballot with swaying voters in these areas away from the Democratic side. However, there are two problems with this conclusion. First, there was also a positive correlation between Bush's 2000 results and the vote for the ballot measures in Arkansas in 2004 (Dowdle & Wekkin, 2007). While Bush did especially well in the culturally conservative areas of Arkansas and Oklahoma in 2004, he also did so in 2000, well before the same-sex marriage issue became a major controversy (Dowdle et al., 2007). The question then once again becomes why?

Dowdle et al. (2007) concluded that Bush's appeal as a candidate—not the placement of any particular issue on the ballot— was what convinced culturally conservative voters to vote for him. This additional support was particularly striking when compared to the 2002 statewide results. Second, there was no evidence to believe that candidates who made this issue a central part of their platform benefited from it. The results for the 2004 Senate races certainly call into question whether candidates who emphasized their endorsement of the measure were

particularly helped by that support. Republican challenger Jim Holt was a candidate with little statewide recognition before the race, and too little financial support ($148,682 spent, versus Sen. Lincoln's $5.8 million) to achieve the kind of visibility that would alter that fact. When Holt nonetheless pulled 44 percent of the vote, many observers credited Holt's unexpectedly strong showing to his centering of his campaign around Amendment Three (Blomeley & Kellams 4 November 2004): "Protect Marriage" signs had even been attached to "Holt" signs late in the campaign.

Once again, this conclusion looked plausible at first glance. A multivariate model initially showed that Holt did better in areas where support for Amendment Three was strong even when demographic and political factors are included. However, the variable became insignificant when Bush's 2004 support was included. This finding was particularly odd since Holt's campaign centered around his support for Amendment Three, while Bush's campaign did not. The Oklahoma Republican senatorial nominee, Tom Coburn, also did not get any additional boost in these conservative areas. To understand why, we believe that differences in electoral support patterns between social conservatives and evangelicals need to be analyzed in more detail.

MULTI-STATE ANALYSIS

In a perfect world, we would use individual-level panel data that tracked changes in vote decisions among individual voters in these three states between 2000 and 2004. The problem is that no public information among these lines that is available to scholars exists. However there is data that exist at the county-level.[3] Therefore our data consist of voting results for the 75 counties in Arkansas, 77 counties of Oklahoma and 88 counties in Ohio, obtained from the Elections Division of the Arkansas Secretary of State, the Oklahoma State Elections Board and the Elections Division of the Ohio Secretary of State. We obtained demographic data for each county from the U.S. Census for 2000 and the Association of Religious Data Archives (ARDA), which is part of the Pennsylvania State University's Sociology Department.

To test these relationships over time, we run four models that look at the presidential elections in Oklahoma, Ohio and Arkansas in 2000 and 2004 as well as the three 2004 ballot measures prohibiting gay

marriage in those states. In each of the four models, we control for past Republican strength in major statewide races. For the 2000 models, we use *Governor 98* (the totals received by Republican nominees in those respective races).[4] For the 2000 models, we use *Bush 2000* (George W. Bush's percent of the 2000 presidential vote). To account for various demographic influences, we control for four additional measures in the 2000 and the 2004 models: *Growth rate* (which represents the county's population growth rate from 1990 to 2000); *Population Density* (which measures the county's population density per square mile in 2000); *African-American* (the percentage of the 2000 population that is African-American);[5] and *Evangelical* (a measure of the percentage of the 2000 population that is classified by ARDA as belonging to a non-African American evangelical denomination). These measures represent demographic control variables used in previous studies (Donovan et. al 2005; Dowdle et al. 2007) and control for differences between (1) fast-growing and slower growing areas, (2) urban and rural constituencies, (3) counties with higher and lower-level concentrations of racial minorities who may or may not have been influenced to support the marriage bans, and (4) counties with higher and lower-level concentrations of evangelical voters who were supposed to be the targets of the marriage bans.

To represent the percent of voters supporting Amendment 3 in Arkansas, Issue One in Ohio or State Question 711 in Oklahoma, we created an independent variable called *Ballot Measure.* This variable is a measure of the percent of votes in each county that were in favor of the proposed state ban on gay and lesbian marriage. The dependent variable in the 2000 models is George W. Bush's percent of the 2000 presidential vote in each county and in the 2004 models is his 2004 presidential vote percentage.

Initially we examined the influence of the various individual independent variables on Bush's support in 2000 and 2004. While the necessity of using the 1998 governor's race instead of the 1996 presidential race may cloud the issue, it seems evident in Model One that Bush in 2000 was running well behind previous Republican candidates in areas with large evangelical populations. Model Two, on the other hand, seems to show clearly that he did rather well in those same areas in 2004. At first glance, that finding seems to justify the conclusion that the much of the reason for his 2004 electoral victory in

MODEL ONE: MULTIPLE REGRESSION CORRELATES OF REPUBLICAN VOTE SHARE IN 2000 PRESIDENTIAL CONTESTS IN OKLAHOMA, OHIO, AND ARKANSAS

Contest	*Variable*	*B*[a]	*SE B*[b]	*Beta*[c]
President-2000	Governor 98	.576***	.095	.423
	Growth rate	-.001	.030	-.001
	Pop. Density	.003*	.001	.096
	African-Amer.	-.200***	.033	-.106
	Evangelical	-.165***	.027	-.349
	Ballot Measure	.576***	.095	.423
	Constant	-21.013***	6.348	
	(adj. R^2 = .66, sig. F = .000, N=240)			

MODEL TWO: MULTIPLE REGRESSION CORRELATES OF REPUBLICAN VOTE SHARE IN 2004 PRESIDENTIAL CONTESTS IN OKLAHOMA, OHIO, AND ARKANSAS

Contest	*Variable*	*B*[a]	*SE B*[b]	*Beta*[c]
President-2004	Bush 2000	1.009***	.018	.918
	Growth Rate	-.014	.011	-.017
	Pop. Density	.001	.001	.017
	African-Amer.	-.057***	.062	-.106
	Evangelical	.056***	.011	.108
	Ballot Measure	.163***	.040	.109
	Constant	-10.140***	2.459	
	(adj. R^2 = .96, sig. F = .000, N=240)			

NOTES: Correlates are obtained by regressing GOP candidates' vote share in the 240 counties against county demographics and county returns for other statewide races. *Bush 2000* = George W. Bush's percent of the 2000 presidential vote; *Growth rate* = population growth rate from 1990 to 2000; *Pop. Density* = population density per square mile in 2000; *African-Amer.* = percentage of the 2000 population that is African-American: *Evangelical* = percentage of the 2000 population that is classified by ARDA as belonging to a non-African American evangelical denomination; *Ballot Measure* = percent of voters supporting Amendment 3 in Arkansas, Issue One in Ohio or State Question 711 in Oklahoma; *Governor 98* = totals received by Republican nominees in those respective races.

[a] Slope coefficient [b] Standard error of slope coefficient [c] Standardized regression coefficient *** significant at .01 level, **significant at .05 level and * significant at .10 level.

these sates was that these measures rallied evangelical voters to his camp.[6]

However two caveats jump out to temper that conclusion. First, Model One shows that Bush ran strongly in 2000 in the areas that would support the gay marriage bans four years later. Second, we ran a new series of models with an interaction term that representing support for the respective bans and the percentage of evangelicals in a county. These equations, represented in Models Three and Four, present a much different picture.

When these figures are divided up into three categories — Evangelicals, Social Conservatives (represented by support for the ballot measures) and Socially Conservative Evangelicals (represented by the interaction term), 2004 look surprisingly like 2000. Though these evangelicals may share certain values, these common beliefs may not translate into commonly cast ballots. As Olson et al. (2006) point out, evangelical affiliation is more likely to play a role in shaping attitudes about same-sex marriage than determining electoral behavior itself.

SUPPORT FOR STATE QUESTION 711 IN OKLAHOMA

In Oklahoma, State Question 711 won by a significant margin with slightly more than three-fourths of Oklahoma voters supported the measure. By contrast, 38 percent of Ohio voters opposed Issue One. What is more interesting than the statewide margin is the high level of consensus throughout the state in terms of support for State Question 711. Only five counties (i.e. Cherokee, Cleveland, Oklahoma, Payne, and Tulsa) polled below the 75 percent threshold. These counties included the two largest urban centers and the homes of the University of Oklahoma and Oklahoma State University. As such, they would have been expected to be the largest centers of opposition to the measure. Even "high levels of opposition" is a very relative term though. The lowest level of support for the measure was still 68 percent in Cleveland County and more than 70 percent of voters in the other counties supported State Question 711.

By contrast, the median level of support among the counties was slightly higher than 80 percent. Though counties with high levels of support tended to be in the Western part of the state, no clear pattern existed. Harmon

MODEL THREE: MULTIPLE REGRESSION CORRELATES OF REPUBLICAN VOTE SHARE IN 2000 PRESIDENTIAL CONTESTS IN OKLAHOMA, OHIO, AND ARKANSAS (WITH INTERACTION TERM)

Contest	*Variable*	*B*[a]	*SE B*[b]	*Beta*[c]
President-2000	Governor 98	.718***	.045	.651
	Growth rate	.019	.029	.026
	Pop. Density	.001	.001	.029
	African-Amer.	-.178***	.032	-.214
	Evangelical	-1.433***	.027	-3.025
	Ballot Measure	.229**	.116	.168
	Evang/BM	.016***	.003	2.847
	Constant	5.349	8.132	
	(adj. R^2 = .70, sig. F = .000, N=240)			

MODEL FOUR: MULTIPLE REGRESSION CORRELATES OF REPUBLICAN VOTE SHARE IN 2004 PRESIDENTIAL CONTESTS IN OKLAHOMA, OHIO, AND ARKANSAS (WITH INTERACTION TERM)

Contest	*Variable*	*B*[a]	*SE B*[b]	*Beta*[c]
President-2004	Bush 2000	.909***	.023	.828
	Growth Rate	.007	.011	.008
	Pop. Density	.001	.001	.013
	African-Amer.	-.071***	.013	-.078
	Evangelical	-.341***	.105	-.655
	Ballot Measure	.163***	.040	.109
	Evang/BM	.005***	.001	.767
	Constant	-3.814	3.074	
	(adj. R^2 = .97, sig. F = .000, N=240)			

NOTES: Correlates are obtained by regressing GOP candidates' vote share in the 240 counties against county demographics and county returns for other statewide races. *Bush 2000* = George W. Bush's percent of the 2000 presidential vote; *Growth rate* = population growth rate from 1990 to 2000; *Pop. Density* = population density per square mile in 2000; *African-Amer.* = percentage of the 2000 population that is African-American: *Evangelical* = percentage of the 2000 population that is classified by ARDA as belonging to a non-African American evangelical denomination; *Ballot Measure* = percent of voters supporting Amendment 3 in Arkansas, Issue One in Ohio or State Question 711 in Oklahoma; Evang/BM = Interaction term that multiplies *Ballot Measure* and *Evangelical*; *Governor 98* = totals received by Republican nominees in those respective races.

[a] Slope coefficient [b] Standard error of slope coefficient [c] Standardized regression coefficient

*** significant at .01 level, **significant at .05 level and * significant at .10 level

County, with the highest level of support at 87.62 percent, borders Texas. The next most supportive jurisdiction, Beaver County, is in the Panhandle. Support in the eastern part of the state tended to be lower, but 82 percent of LeFlore County voters voted in favor of the measure.

While the focus of this article is not to explain support for State Question 711 but to explain the effect or lack of effect the measure had on the 2004 presidential vote, answering the original question involves some understanding of the base of support for State Question 711. To address this question, we ran a regression model using the independent variables in Model Two minus the ballot question variable, which we then used as the dependent variable. We then looked at the variance between the predicted vote and the actual vote.[7]

The results of the equation suggest that some possible issues about specific model specification for Oklahoma are not major concerns. As we mentioned earlier, Cherokee County, which is the capital of the Cherokee Nation, had a relatively high level of opposition to State Question 711. At first glance, that result might warrant the inclusion of a variable to represent the Native American population in each county. However the gap between the model's prediction of support and the predicted value for the county is only 0.7% of the vote. The only outlier of more than 5 percent is Payne County, where the model under-predicts opposition by 5.51 percent. While that finding may suggest the need for a variable representing the presence of a university, the "no vote' in Cleveland County is under-predicted by less than 3.5 percent. The lack of drastic outlier, coupled with a mean error of 1.64 percent per county, suggests that the model does a satisfactory job of capturing the dynamics of support for State Question 711 at the county level.

Though the precise effect that State Question 711 had upon support for George W. Bush among evangelical voters is complex, it should not overshadow the strong support that the measure had. The bivariate Pearson correlation between support for the measure in a county and the percent of the population that were classified as evangelical was .49. However, as in the three state model, social conservatism was the driving force in the increase in Bush's support at the county level – not percentage of evangelical voters.

CONCLUSION

There are some obvious shortcomings to this study; more research needs to be done to test our findings. While county-level information was the only available data to address the subject of this study, individual-level data would address more definitively our original question and sidestep the problem of possible inferential issues. Oklahoma and Arkansas are only two states and arguably their unique characteristics such as the highest concentration of evangelicals in the country (Gaddie and Copeland, 2002) prevent us from applying our conclusion beyond it. Ohio is a state from another region and usually considered a good bellwether, but the amount of attention from the two candidates, the two parties, various interest groups, the news media and others make it an atypical state as well in 2004. This difficulty in translating the use of wedge issues to mobilize certain groups of conservative voters was demonstrated again in 2006 in Arkansas when Jim Holt, who ran this time for lieutenant governor on the Republican ticket on a platform of anti-illegal immigrant appeals, was unable to translate that issue into any significant electoral support (Price, 2007). And though some of our other research concerning the 2006 elections in Arkansas and Oklahoma seem to confirm Price's and our (Dowdle et al., 2007) findings, the 2008 electoral cycle should tell us more about how much of the linkage between these voters and the GOP is personality-driven and how much of it rests on social conservatism.

Our findings do suggest that George W. Bush is popular in areas where there are high levels of support for traditional moral values in Oklahoma even when pre-existing levels of Republican are taken into account. However we conclude that much of that support is of a personal nature and therefore limited primarily to support for Bush. Since Bush also had done well in these areas in 2000, it seems unlikely that Amendment Three in 2004 was the cause for any surge in 2004. Our conclusion, which is similar to a previous study showing stability between 2000 and 2004 in the vote patterns of conservative Christians (Langer and Cohen, 2005), seems to be buttressed by previous findings that none of the other Republican candidates in 2004 were unable to draw any additional support from this quarter even if they centered their campaigns on "moral values" issues.

We also question the nature of Bush's 2004 surge in Oklahoma. Though it initially appears that an upsurge of evangelical support helped Bush in 2004, a closer look calls that finding into question somewhat. Though some areas with a large number of socially conservative evangelicals supported him in 2004, many of these same areas provided support for him in 2000 as well. We believe that only by better understanding the nuances (and in some cases, the differences) between social conservatives and evangelicals, will we finally be able to account for what happened in the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections.

NOTES

[1] The authors would like to thank Martin Johnson for his comments on an earlier version of this manuscript, as well as the comments from the two anonymous reviewers of this article. The authors will also to thank Jared A. Stewart and Leslie Piatt for their research assistance.

[2] Scholarly appraisals of the success of this electoral ploy are divided. Some political scientists find no significant electoral effect (Abramowitz. 2004; Burden, 2004; Hillygus and Shields, 2005) while others (McDonald, 2004; Donovan, Tolbert, Smith, and Parry, 2005) do conclude the tactic was effective.

[3] Please see Appendix A for the precise language of the three measures.

[4] As a result of this data limitation, we attempt in this paper to limit our conclusions to counties (or "geographical areas") instead of individuals. While we realize that there are arguments and methods that would allow us to do just that, we believe it is better to err on the side of caution and limit our the scope of our conclusions to minimize the chance of ecological fallacy. Hanushek et al. (1974) do argue that correct model specification minimizes the possibility of this type of error, and King (1997) offers a methodological solution to the problem. However others (Herron and Shotts 2000) caution against assuming that these remedies are solutions. We prefer to err on the side of caution and would limit our conclusions to counties, not individual voters.

[5] We avoid using the 1996 presidential vote totals since Bill Clinton is a native of Arkansas.

[6] We also examined the percentage of Native Americans and Hispanics in initial analyses since they are a significant percentage of the population in some counties. We did not include the variables in our final model since they were insignificant.

[7] We tested models for each individual state for the four models and found no significant differences between the three states. We did not include the twelve sets of results because of space issues.

[8] Because of space issues we did not report the entire model.

APPENDIX A:
TEXT OF GAY MARRIAGE BAN BALLOT MEASURES

Arkansas Constitutional Amendment 3 (2004), Oklahoma State Question 711 (2004), and Ohio State Issue 1 (2004) each are commonly defined in Wikipedia as "a so-called 'defense of marriage amendment' that amended the [Arkansas] [Oklahoma] [Ohio] Constitution to make it unconstitutional for the state to recognize or perform same-sex marriages or civil unions."

The wording of each as it appeared on the ballot is as follows:

[ARKANSAS CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT THREE]

"1. Marriage. Marriage consists only of the union of one man and one woman.
2. Marital status. Legal status for unmarried persons which is identical or substantially similar to marital status shall not be valid or recognized in Arkansas, except that the legislature may recognize a common law marriage from another state between a man and a woman.
3. Capacity, rights, obligations, privileges, and immunities. The legislature has power to determine the capacity of persons to marry, subject to this amendment, and the legal rights, obligations, privileges, and immunities of marriage."

[OHIO STATE ISSUE 1]

"Only a union between one man and one woman may be a marriage valid in or recognized by this state and its political subdivisions. This state and its political subdivisions shall not create or recognize a legal status for relationships of unmarried individuals that intends to approximate the design, qualities, significance, or effects of marriage."

[OKLAHOMA STATE QUESTION 711]

"(a.) Marriage in this state shall consist only of the union of one man and one woman. Neither this Constitution nor any other

provision of law shall be construed to require that marital status or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon unmarried couples or groups.

(b.) A marriage between persons of the same gneder performed in another state shall not be recognized as valid and binding in this state as of the date of the marriage.

(c.) Any person knowingly issuing a marriage license in violation of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."

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PREDICTING OKLAHOMA STATE LEGISLATIVE RACES WITH OCKHAM'S RAZOR

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Predicting elections accurately has long been a useful exercise. For scholars, prospective prediction is a test of their understanding of electoral dynamics. For candidates and activists, prospective prediction helps efficient resource allocation. For the public and the media, prospective prediction helps in following and understanding campaigns (see Lewis-Beck and Rice, 1984; Jones, 1999).

The 2008 Oklahoma state legislative elections were historic. Although nationally the tide was strongly in the opposite direction, Republicans, for the first time, took control of both state legislative houses. It might be thought that predicting the outcome overall and for the 125 individual legislative races would involve taking formal notice of some dynamic new forces. More likely, the 2008 result was the product of a gradual change, a slow strengthening of the Republican Party, and a corresponding weakening of the Democratic side of the electoral equation. A robust prediction method would have measures that incorporate these changes.

What are the parameters of the Oklahoma legislative election equation? Losers typically attribute the outcome to their party's weakness, not getting enough of the promised support and problems at the top of the ticket. Winners attribute the outcome to their campaign's staying on the high ground, focusing on the issues, and knocking on doors. In sum, losers blame others while winners credit themselves (Kingdon, 1968).

Political observers have long noted incumbents usually win. In Oklahoma this is because people rarely run against them and Oklahoma does not permit write-in votes (Van Ness, 1992). In 2008, 104 of the 125 candidates were incumbents. Exactly half had no major party opponent. Term limits took effect in 2004, retiring entrenched Democrat incumbents, opening the door for Republicans (Farmer, 2007). By 2008, a majority of the incumbent candidates were Republicans (59), not Democrats (45).

Party can mean several things. It can represent the direction and force of political winds blowing outside and around the district, it can represent the political composition of the district and it can represent the recent voting tendency of the district. While the political winds were blowing the Democrats' way nationally in 2008, they were blowing Republican in Oklahoma (Overall and Lindley, 2008). District political composition is measured by party registration, Oklahoma being a state that registers voters by political party. The district's voting tendency is measured by the normal vote (Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes 1966:9-39). The Republican Normal Vote (RNV) was calculated by averaging the 2006 Republican vote for four minor state-wide offices, Lieutenant Governor, Auditor and Inspector, Labor Commissioner and Insurance Commissioner. As these offices are murky and, at best, dimly perceived by almost every voter. They give a good base for predicting a district's anticipated Republican vote. For House districts there was little relation between party registration and the RNV ($R^2 = .054$); for Senate districts voting in 2008 the relationship was much stronger ($R^2 = .875$).

Money is important. People are more willing to give, and give more to candidates they think will win. So, in a sense, how much money is raised is a gauge of a candidate's chances, similar, in a way, to how parimutuel betting establishes odds at racetracks. Likewise, money can make a candidate better known and improve chances of winning. Money on hand August 15th was used as a measure of money raised.

Political scientists attribute any particular legislative race's outcome to incumbency, party and money (Darcy, Brewer and Clay, 1984).

DATA

Data used for the various models was information available from public records prior to August 15, 2008. Most of it was collected from the websites of the Oklahoma Ethics Commission, or the Oklahoma State Election Board. While we did not use U.S. Census data here, state legislative district level information is available on line.[2]

Quantified variables used were District Party Registration (DPR), Aggregate Total Campaign Receipts (ATCR), Funds Remaining as of August 15, 2008 (FR), Candidate Incumbency (CI), District Outcome in the Previous Election (RE) and the RNV.

District Party Registration, overall, favored Democrats for both House (average 49%-39%) and Senate (47%-41%) districts. The two party Aggregate Total Campaign Receipts favored Republican House (64%-36%) and Democratic Senate (53%-47%) candidates. Incumbency favored Republican House (49-36) and Senate (10-9) candidates. The District's Previous Election outcome favored Republican House (57-44) and Senate (14-10) candidates. The RNV favored Democrats in the House (47%) and Senate (48%).

ADDITIVE PROSPECTIVE MODELS

An additive election prediction model is one in which a variable's impact on the prediction is the same regardless of the status of the candidate or district on other variables. We developed three additive models that differed in the variables included as well as the weights assigned them. Weights all summed to 1 while variables were all coded so as to range from zero to one. Thus, each variable contributed a known proportion to the additive models' predictions. Models gave each candidate a score. The candidate with the higher score in the district was the predicted winner. The three prediction equations are shown in Table 3.

Table 1. House Data

	November 4, 2008 Candidates or Filing, Primary Winner[1]		Incumbent[2]		2006 Result[2]		Campaign Receipts[3]		Party Registration[4]				Funds Remaining[5]		
Dist	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep	D	R	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep	Ind	Total	Dem	Rep	2006 RNV[6]
1	Bailey	Farley			1		9,719	4,100	13,453	1,960	887	16,300	119	2,255	0.3844
2	Smithson	Mann	1		1		18,432	600	14,016	3,717	1,256	18,989	9,842	50	0.3776
3	Brannon		1		1		3,900		13,107	3,440	1,724	18,271	9,241		0.3519
4	Brown		1		1		7,400		13,621	5,089	2,377	21,087	29,829		0.3338
5	Kerr	Cox		1		1	13,077	134,850	12,060	7,688	2,081	21,829	2,898	79,707	0.4379
6	Hoskin		1		1		48,693		12,765	6,263	1,772	20,800	36,742		0.3747
7	Glenn		1		1		5,550		12,189	4,727	1,949	18,865	11,588		0.3428
8	Sherrer		1		1		30,150		11,309	7,156	1,704	20,169	32,999		0.3930
9	Snyder	Jones		1		1	22,530	68,726	11,573	10,828	2,837	25,238	15,788	53,999	0.4880
10	Epperson	Martin		1		1	3,977	41,625	9,142	8,257	2,413	19,812	2,101	71,389	0.4936
11		Sears		1		1		41,633	7,885	13,874	2,693	24,452		32,691	0.5683
12	Rousselot		1		1		32,350		11,751	7,771	1,736	21,258	4,656		0.4226

18	Harrison		1		1		875		16,039	3,790	1,676	21,505	16		0.3279
19	Pruett		1		1		1,350		17,241	2,360	1,456	21,057	10,939		0.2821
20	Roan		1		1		14,364		15,823	3,005	1,305	20,133	12,190		0.3074
21	Carey		1		1		4,500		14,759	4,251	2,489	21,499	1,870		0.3279
22	Hilliard		1		1		43,400		13,315	4,178	1,490	18,983	7,555		0.3887
23	Dodson	Tibbs		1		1	1,947	27,378	7,222	6,858	2,103	16,183	273	21,940	0.5033
24	Kouplen				1		60,436		13,618	4,044	1,544	19,206	8,306		0.3402
25	Starns	Thomsen		1		1	39,044	68,985	13,773	5,276	2,308	21,357	10,322	45,935	0.4143
26		Steele		1		1		39,508	10,819	6,750	2,424	19,993		17,421	0.4198
27	Kozara	Jett		1		1	800	22,350	10,432	6,434	2,249	19,115	41	115,465	0.4398
28	Kiesel	Shepard	1		1		52,846	2,400	12,027	4,738	1,432	18,197	35,214	1,760	0.4097
29		McNiel		1		1		64,430	9,416	7,758	2,007	19,181		56,422	0.4646
30	Crowder	McCullough		1		1	61,030	37,238	9,185	8,660	2,142	19,987	22,119	16,474	0.5078
31	Sherrill	Murphey		1		1	2,542	11,473	8,392	13,668	2,966	25,026	1,763	6,993	0.5905
32	Morgan		1		1		30,362		10,390	8,062	2,108	20,560	135,315		0.5215
33	Pierson	Denney		1		1	13,045	35,557	9,473	8,380	2,256	20,109	2,420	79,929	0.5098
34	Williams	Carlson				1	18,478	31,864	9,073	10,691	3,297	23,061	2,424	8,250	0.4725
35	Ensign	Duncan		1		1	1,450	14,675	10,177	8,480	1,914	20,571	324	10,149	0.4893
36	Bighorse	Fields	1		1		57,830	16,650	11,140	7,021	1,813	19,974	35,479	7,615	0.4281
37	Luttrell	Colle	1		1		11,450	303	8,111	9,301	2,298	19,710	27,876	200	0.5259
38		Dewitt		1		1		21,242	7,813	9,910	1,953	19,676		46,730	0.5175
39	Guhl	Cooksey		1		1	19,612	69,281	7,712	17,592	3,634	28,938	9,371	25,869	0.6177
40	Jones	Jackson		1		1	0	49,840	6,140	8,979	1,561	16,680		62,579	0.5670
41		Enns		1		1		69,396	7,304	15,630	2,294	25,228		0	0.6252
42	Perry	Billy		1		1	4,600	36,206	13,188	7,003	2,297	22,488	290	69,025	0.4626

	November 4, 2008 Candidates or Filing, Primary Winner[1]		Incumbent[2]		2006 Result[2]		Campaign Receipts[3]		Party Registration[4]				Funds Remaining[5]		
Dist	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep	D	R	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep	Ind	Total	Dem	Rep	2006 RNV[6]
43		Schwartz		1		1		35,392	7,883	13,604	2,799	24,286		22,910	0.5649
44	Nations	Barrett	1		1		34,175	2,618	10,106	7,395	3,238	20,739	39,189	139	0.3466
45	Collins	Stiles	1		1		58,192	16,703	11,163	9,405	3,363	23,931	44,054	6,511	0.4305
46	Norman	Martin		1		1	1,214	42,611	10,643	12,627	3,094	26,364	729	23,398	0.5169
47	Jackson	Osborn				1	22,950	39,836	10,250	11,173	2,880	24,303	2,387	3,893	*0.5342*
48	Moore	Ownbey				1	16,265	50,815	13,534	5,613	2,608	21,755	12,276	26,161	0.4753
49	Buck	Oliver			1		6,700	2,375	15,043	4,776	2,025	21,844	2,795	830	0.4323
50	Lawler	Johnson		1		1	22,312	49,297	12,389	7,066	1,724	21,179	19,576	30,561	0.4542
51	Cosgrove	Holland			1		18,734	86,875	13,114	6,323	2,015	21,452	13,999	12,331	0.4355
52	McMahan	Ortega			1		30,975	31,396	9,431	5,030	1,324	15,785	15,919	18,524	0.4965
53	Green	Terrill		1		1	7,010	61,467	9,116	12,832	3,093	25,041	1,905	30,784	0.5584
54		Wesselhoft		1		1		27,715	8,256	10,686	2,887	21,829		12,868	0.5457
55	McMullen		1		1		1,150		11,460	5,094	1,408	17,962	14,048		0.4292
56		Richardson		1		1		15,922	10,919	6,003	1,608	18,530		15,777	0.4356
57	Adams	Wright			1		33,940	51,374	10,008	8,174	2,034	20,216	952	8,047	0.5245
58		Hickman		1		1		300	7,186	11,217	1,953	20,356		10,091	0.5501
59	Russell	Sanders				1	2,260	74,589	7,602	10,471	1,246	19,319	1,241	1,168	0.5796
60	Walker	Gambill	1		1		32,295	11,965	12,800	5,853	1,832	20,485	20,012	458	0.4657
61	Shearer	Blackwell		1		1	5,050	5,277	6,291	9,517	2,069	17,877	3,038	44,421	0.6657

62	Warren	Shannon		1		1	1,500	75,674	8,873	5,433	2,232	16,538	1,450	10,077	0.4791
63		Armes		1		1		14,050	11,298	4,859	1,833	17,990		36,240	0.4155
64		Coody		1		1		900	9,197	4,867	2,573	16,637		25,648	0.4343
65	Dorman		1		1		6,360		8,361	3,898	1,492	13,751	3,530		0.4221
66	Lamons	Ramey	1		1		69,711	550	8,557	6,137	2,554	17,248	168,017	512	0.4043
67	Lantos	Peterson		1		1	6,220	17,195	6,263	18,313	2,898	27,474	4,488	28,656	0.6669
68		Benge		1		1		61,175	8,349	9,320	2,250	19,919		79,348	0.4960
69		Jordan		1		1		33,175	7,346	17,543	3,288	28,177		21,421	0.6286
70		Peters		1		1		75,873	8,444	13,584	2,242	24,270		169,943	0.5197
71	Bullock	Sullivan		1		1	10,176	33,981	8,558	9,962	2,670	21,190	3,753	22,767	0.4869
72	Scott	Kirkpatrick			1		36,637	0	8,141	2,613	1,829	12,583	1,254	0	0.2828
73	Shumate		1		1		47,960		14,539	1,545	1,526	17,610	19,739		0.1127
74		Derby		1		1		59,179	9,049	15,393	3,134	27,576		32,130	0.5561
75		Kirby				1		18,215	6,934	9,659	2,428	19,021		166,235	0.5384
76		Wright		1		1		12,080	6,503	13,823	2,563	22,889		21,681	0.6043
77	Proctor		1		1		39,433		7,889	5,696	2,309	15,894	53,094		0.4218
78	McDaniel	Matlock	1		1		18,500	2,320	9,199	8,885	2,410	20,494	42,508	2,320	0.4494
79	Hawkins	Watson		1		1	950	29,990	7,140	11,803	2,385	21,328	881	21,562	0.5750
80		Ritze				1		28,162	7,134	15,177	2,616	24,927		0	0.6130
81		Miller		1		1		102,580	7,281	14,019	3,035	24,335		120,999	0.5574
82	Anderson	Liebmann		1		1	5,284	106,311	9,055	17,019	3,220	29,294	4,072	97,532	0.5953
83	Holzberger	McDaniel		1		1	990	37,975	9,748	13,876	3,250	26,874	1,081	48,254	0.5561

	November 4, 2008 Candidates or Filing, Primary Winner[1]		Incumbent[2]		2006 Result[2]		Campaign Receipts[3]		Party Registration[4]				Funds Remaining[5]		
Dist	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep	D	R	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep	Ind	Total	Dem	Rep	2006 RNV[6]
84	Marlett	Kern		1		1	6,610	24,129	7,260	8,862	2,501	18,623	1,048	17,139	0.5706
85	Robey	Dank		1		1	43,609	147,385	9,412	11,428	2,357	23,197	24,026	18,287	0.5178
86	Auffet		1		1		22,025		12,881	5,546	1,499	19,926	6,081		0.3995
87	Orwig	Nelson				1	29,716	41,099	9,052	8,118	2,747	19,917	21,834	10,060	0.4728
88	McAffrey		1		1		27,717		7,791	4,414	2,712	14,917	14,837		0.3352
89	Hamilton		1		1		9,693		4,847	2,365	1,941	9,153	9,610		0.3828
90	James	Key		1		1	6,225	20,399	6,371	6,810	2,375	15,556	5,831	9,886	0.5475
91		Reynolds		1		1		40,016	9,142	14,206	3,101	26,449		150	0.5542
92	Morrissette		1		1		75,560		7,746	4,492	2,597	14,835	58,547		0.4133
93	Castillo	Christian			1		23,029	25,542	7,035	4,431	2,273	13,739	1,242	7,553	0.4539
94	Inman	Coulter	1		1		48,135	2,749	9,235	6,745	2,893	18,873	42,853	986	0.4812
95	Walker	Joyner		1		1	18,428	27,037	8,500	7,653	2,675	18,828	7,639	24,735	0.5177
96	Hunter	Moore				1	48,231	21,407	8,958	14,099	3,099	26,156	25,238	11	0.5739
97	Shelton	Lott	1		1		31,027	500	15,533	4,317	2,159	22,009	5,158	13	0.2575
98	Frederick	Trebilcock		1		1	5,635	63,600	7,781	13,257	2,493	23,531	308	3,581	0.6002
99	Pittman	Linzy	1		1		36,347	1,710	13,405	3,017	2,239	18,661	8,208	-332	0.2086
100	Baggett	Thompson		1		1	11,899	137,972	7,601	10,849	2,812	21,262	6,213	117,260	0.5801
101	Lewis	Banz		1		1	5,933	42,793	9,994	9,670	3,070	22,734	3,116	20,080	0.5150
		Total	36	49	44	57			1,037,594	820,960	228,958	2,087,512			

1 *Candidates for State Elective Office 2008* Lists all candidates who filed for office June 2-4, 2008 http://www.ok.gov/launch.php?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.elections.state.ok.us%2F; Candidates For General Election November 4, 2008. Lists all candidates on November 4, 2008 Ballot http://www.ok.gov/launch.php?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.elections.state.ok.us%2F

2 List of State Senators of Representatives Elected in 2006 or 2004 by District http://www.ok.gov/launch.php?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.oksenate.gov%2F; List of State House members Elected in 2006 by District http://www.okhouse.gov/Members/MemberListing.aspx

3 Oklahoma Ethics Commission. http://www.ok.gov/oec/

4 *Party Registration by Oklahoma State Legislative District September 2008* made available from the Oklahoma State Board of Elections.

5 Oklahoma Ethics Commission. http://www.ok.gov/oec/

6

Computed from precinct level 2006 voting results aggregated into legislative districts. The Republican Normal Vote (RNV) is the average of the district percent of the vote gained by the Republican candidate for Lieutenant Governor (Hiett), Auditor and Inspector (Jones), Labor Commissioner (Reneau), an Insurance Comissioner (Case).

Table 2. Senate Data

	November 4, 2008 Candidates or Filing, Primary Winner[1]		Incumbent[2]		2006 Result[2]		Campaign Receipts[3]		Party Registration[4]				Funds Remaining[5]		
Dist	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep	D	R	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep	Ind	Total	Dem	Rep	2006 RNV[6]
1	Wyrick		1		1		61,791		26,094	12,753	4,316	43,163	53,745		0.4160
3	Wilson		1		1		6,550		29,472	11,146	4,061	44,679	2,752		0.4179
5	Ellis	Miller			1		28,082	0	31,176	4,396	2,330	37,902	7,459	0	0.3547
7	Lerblance	Sherrill	1		1		144,532	66,600	34,659	6,713	3,067	44,439	79,990		0.3482
9	Garrison		1		1		84,390		29,369	10,336	4,820	44,525	50,764		0.3606
11	McIntyre		1		1		45,335		23,395	4,273	3,601	31,269	46,490		0.1811
13	Paddack		1		1		359,929		29,097	9,500	4,092	42,689	295,437		0.4022
15	Drum	Nichols		1		1	100,660	232,510	22,068	23,545	6,372	51,985	85,619	177,172	0.4662
17	Laster	Rominger	1		1		150,117	200	21,975	15,431	4,975	42,381	103,903	29	0.4577
19		Anderson		1		1		60,626	13,540	22,242	3,715	39,497		22,341	0.5885
21	Murphy	Halligan			1		69,965	254,273	19,976	19,994	5,932	45,902	58,959	163,388	0.4845
23		Justice		1		1		57,576	20,896	17,321	4,467	42,684		84,595	0.4947
25		Mazzei		1		1		136,402	13,673	34,676	5,839	54,188		81,397	0.6601
27	Peach	Marlatt				1	16,975	70,675	14,387	22,094	4,113	40,594	12,477	17,200	0.6178
29		Ford		1		1		76,982	19,467	21,078	4,880	45,425		71,523	0.5307
31	Erwin	Barrington		1		1	81,940	171,056	23,184	10,070	3,959	37,213	65,506	109,697	0.4292

33	Adelson	Casey	1		1		406,336	2,584	19,231	16,924	5,518	41,673	290,580	0	0.4251
35		Stanislawski				1		147,725	16,722	29,005	5,486	51,213		19,750	0.5700
37	Riley	Newberry	1			1	215,531	136,304	17,396	25,429	5,449	48,274	148,039	39,598	0.5667
39		Crain		1		1		54,725	16,053	21,458	4,744	42,255		47,329	0.5448
41	Taylor	Jolley		1		1	0	123,012	15,655	34,334	7,153	57,142	0	71,417	0.6185
43	Boren	Reynolds		1		1	5,365	134,598	18,661	16,469	6,167	41,297	1,862	135,671	0.5101
45		Russell				1		120,771	16,358	23,485	6,038	45,881		25,110	0.5692
47		Lamb		1		1		48,500	18,063	30,606	6,706	55,375		62,023	0.5860
		Total	9	10	10	14			510,567	443,278	117,800	1,071,645			

1 *Candidates for State Elective Office 2008* Lists all candidates who filed for office June 2-4, 2008 http://www.ok.gov/launch.php?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.elections.state.ok.us%2F; Candidates For General Election November 4, 2008. Lists all candidates on November 4, 2008 Ballot http://www.ok.gov/launch.php?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.elections.state.ok.us%2F

2 List of State Senators of Representatives Elected in 2006 or 2004 by District http://www.ok.gov/launch.php?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.oksenate.gov%2F; List of State House members Elected in 2006 by District http://www.okhouse.gov/Members/MemberListing.aspx

3 Oklahoma Ethics Commission. http://www.ok.gov/oec/

4 *Party Registration by Oklahoma State Legislative District September 2008* made available from the Oklahoma State Board of Elections.

5 Oklahoma Ethics Commission. http://www.ok.gov/oec/

6 Computed from precinct level 2006 voting results aggregated into legislative districts. The Republican Normal Vote (RNV) is the average of the district percent of the vote gained by the Republican candidate for Lieutenant Governor (Hiett), Auditor and Inspector (Jones), Labor Commissioner (Reneau), an Insurance Comissioner (Case).

Table 3. Additive Prediction Models

	Weight		
Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
DPR Party Registration/Total Registration	0.2	0.275	0.29
ATCR Candidate Money/(Candidate Money + Opponent Money)	0.18	0.275	0.33
CI Candidate Incumbent	0.3	0.35	0.38
RE Party Won Seat in Last Election	0.2	0.1	0
FR Candidate Funds Remaining/(Candidate + Opponent Funds Remaining)	0.12	0	0
Total	1	1	1

The goal was a model that could accurately predict election results from months out with the fewest variables.

The models predicted the elections without noticing the overall political tendency, last minute campaign efforts, the campaign itself, or the quality and effort of the candidates. The assumption was that in the competitive environment of the campaign these factors tended to be balanced – or encapsulated within the variables used.

ALGORITHMIC PROSPECTIVE MODEL

The algorithmic model used past election information, incumbency and an assumption about the overall political tendency in 2008. Rather than

being an additive model, it followed a decision tree. The model incorporates four assumptions.

1. If there is only one major party candidate (Republican or Democrat) that candidate will win.
2. The Republican Normal Vote (RNV) represents the vote a Republican candidate in a district can expect, all things being equal.
3. Incumbents can expect to gain an additional five percent over their party's normal vote.
4. There is a trend favoring Oklahoma Republicans in 2008 allowing Republican legislative candidates to expect an additional five percent over their normal vote.

Thus, the effect of a variable on the prediction depends on the status of the candidate on other variables, unlike additive models in which each variable has the same effect on the prediction regardless of the candidate's status on other variables.

PREDICTIONS

Each model, additive or algorithmic, showed a solid Republican house win. Two additive models predicted a 44-57 house split favoring the Republicans, the other a 43-58 split. The algorithmic model predicted the actual 40-61 split. For the Senate, two additive models predicted a Republican victory of 10-14, which would give Republicans control when continuing members were added. The other additive model predicted a Republican victory of 11-13, which, with the continuing members, 13-11, favoring the Democrats, would continue an evenly split Senate. The algorithmic model accurately predicted a Republican advantage (9-15) and a Republican Senate takeover.

Each of the four prospective models produced similar results with the number of prediction errors varying from six (the third additive model and the algorithmic model) to eight (the second additive model). The algorithmic model's six errors cancelled each other out, however, to accurately predict exact House and Senate party balances.

The best models turned out to be the simplest, the additive model using District Party Registration (DPR), Aggregate Total Campaign Receipts (ATCR), and Candidate Incumbency (CI) and the algorithmic model using whether or not there is a contest, incumbency, the RNV and the Oklahoma political tide.

All predictions were made public prior to the election.

Table 4. Algorithmic Model Decision Rule

Decision Rule																		
																		Prediction
How Many Candidates?	⇒			One Candidate			⇒	Which Party?	⇒			R			⇒	R
									⇒			D			⇒	D
									⇒	R	⇒	What is the RNV?	⇒	RNV≥40%	⇒	R
													⇒	RNV<40%	⇒	D
	⇒	Two Candidates	⇒	Is there an Incumbent in the Race?	⇒	Incumbent	⇒	Which Party?	⇒	D	⇒	What is the RNV?	⇒	RNV>50%	⇒	R
													⇒	RNV<50%	⇒	D
					⇒			No Incumbent			⇒	What is the RNV?	⇒	RNV>45%	⇒	R
													⇒	RNV<45%	⇒	D

RETROSPECTIVE MODEL

After the election we examined the accuracy of the predictions as well as the relationship between the election outcome and each of the variables used in the additive models.

We can calculate the number of errors that would be made from predicting the election outcome with one variable in the most efficient manner. The money advantage accurately predicts all but five races, four in the House and one in the Senate while the previous result in the district predicts all but seven and incumbency all but eight House and Senate races. Party registration, in contrast, incorrectly predicts 32 races.

We wrote two OLS regression equations using the additive predictors and the 2008 election results. All variables were coded 0/1 with the election result coded 1 for a Democratic win and 0 for a Republican win. The OLS regression equations were as follows.

House

Outcome = .1100 + .0584 (Democrat is Incumbent) -.0966 (Republican is Incumbent) + .2484 (Democrat won in 2006) + .1396 (Democrat has no Opponent) - .0154 (Republican has no opponent) + .6321 (Democrat raised more money than Republican) - .0425 (Democratic Registration Exceeds Republican) - .1397 (Democrat has more Money at Hand than Republican)

Senate

Outcome = -.1922 - .0425 (Democrat is Incumbent) +.0694 (Republican is Incumbent) + .4512 (Democrat won in 2004) + .0337 (Democrat has no Opponent) + .0831 (Republican has no opponent) + .4936 (Democrat raised more money than Republican) + .1955 (Democratic Registration Exceeds Republican) + .0756 (Democrat has more Money at Hand than Republican)

The equations allow two errors predicting the House results and zero errors predicting to the Senate outcome. The predictions are based on knowing the outcome, however. This can be seen by the difference between the House and Senate equations where six of the nine partial slopes have different signs. Only the aggregate campaign fund

Table 5. House of Representatives Model Predictions

				Additive Models									
				Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			
	November 4, 2008 Candidates or Filing, Primary Winner[1]			Score			Score			Score			Algorithmic
District	D	R	2008 Result	D	R	2008 Prediction	D	R	2008 Prediction	D	R	2008 Prediction	Model Prediction
1	Bailey	Farley	D	0.5977	0.1914	D	0.5204	0.1147	D	0.4714	0.1328	D	D
2	Smithson	Mann	D	0.9413	0.0454	D	0.9193	0.0625	D	0.9136	0.0672	D	D
3	Brannon		D	0.9435	0.0377	D	0.9223	0.0518	D	0.9180	0.0546	D	D
4	Brown		D	0.9292	0.0483	D	0.9026	0.0664	D	0.8973	0.0700	D	D
5	Kerr	Cox	R	0.1306	0.8503	R	0.1762	0.7975	R	0.1894	0.7830	R	R
6	Hoskin		D	0.9227	0.0602	D	0.8938	0.0828	D	0.8880	0.0873	D	D
7	Glenn		D	0.9292	0.0501	D	0.9027	0.0689	D	0.8974	0.0727	D	D
8	Sherrer		D	0.9121	0.0710	D	0.8792	0.0976	D	0.8726	0.1029	D	D
9	Snyder	Jones	R	0.1633	0.8142	R	0.1940	0.7751	R	0.2145	0.7529	R	R
10	Epperson	Martin	R	0.1114	0.8642	R	0.1509	0.8156	R	0.1626	0.8021	R	R
11		Sears	R	0.0645	0.9135	R	0.0887	0.8810	R	0.0935	0.8745	R	R
12	Rousselot		D	0.9106	0.0731	D	0.8770	0.1005	D	0.8703	0.1060	D	D
13	McPeak	Lienhart	D	0.9200	0.0574	D	0.8903	0.0787	D	0.8826	0.0847	D	**R***
14	Blankenship	Faught	R	0.1994	0.7779	R	0.2618	0.7070	R	0.2888	0.6783	R	**D***

15	Canmaday		D	0.9601	0.0287	D	0.9451	0.0395	D	0.9422	0.0416	D	D
16	Shoemake		D	0.9396	0.0431	D	0.9169	0.0593	D	0.9124	0.0625	D	D
17	Renegar		D	0.9577	0.0292	D	0.9418	0.0402	D	0.9387	0.0424	D	D
18	Harrison		D	0.9492	0.0352	D	0.9301	0.0485	D	0.9263	0.0511	D	D
19	Pruett		D	0.9638	0.0224	D	0.9502	0.0308	D	0.9474	0.0325	D	D
20	Roan		D	0.9572	0.0299	D	0.9411	0.0410	D	0.9379	0.0433	D	D
21	Carey		D	0.9373	0.0395	D	0.9138	0.0544	D	0.9091	0.0573	D	D
22	Hilliard		D	0.9403	0.0440	D	0.9179	0.0605	D	0.9134	0.0638	D	D
23	Dodson	Tibbs	R	0.1027	0.8713	R	0.1410	0.8233	R	0.1513	0.8110	R	R
24	Kouplen		D	0.7418	0.0421	D	0.5700	0.0579	D	0.5356	0.0611	D	D
25	Starns	Thomsen	R	0.2161	0.7623	R	0.2767	0.6935	R	0.3063	0.6624	R	R
26		Steele	R	0.1082	0.8675	R	0.1488	0.8178	R	0.1569	0.8079	R	R
27	Kozara	Jett	R	0.1154	0.8611	R	0.1596	0.8081	R	0.1697	0.7962	R	R
28	Kiesel	Shepard	D	0.9187	0.0656	D	0.8948	0.0835	D	0.8873	0.0898	D	D
29		McNiel	R	0.0982	0.8809	R	0.1350	0.8362	R	0.1424	0.8273	R	R
30	Crowder	McCullough	R	0.2725	0.7061	R	0.2972	0.6734	R	0.3382	0.6307	R	R
31	Sherrill	Murphey	R	0.1239	0.8524	R	0.1421	0.8253	R	0.1571	0.8085	R	R
32	Morgan		D	0.9011	0.0784	D	0.8640	0.1078	D	0.8566	0.1137	D	D
33	Pierson	Denney	R	0.1461	0.8315	R	0.2034	0.7658	R	0.2252	0.7423	R	R
34	Williams	Carlson	D	0.1720	0.4994	**R***	0.2091	0.4016	**R***	0.2352	0.3433	**R***	**R***
35	Ensign	Duncan	R	0.1188	0.8625	R	0.1608	0.8136	R	0.1731	0.7999	R	R
36	Bighorse	Fields	R	0.8501	0.1317	**D***	0.8169	0.1581	**D***	0.7980	0.1757	**D***	**D***
37	Luttrell	Colle	D	0.8768	0.0999	D	0.8311	0.1369	D	0.8208	0.1454	D	**R***
38		Dewitt	R	0.0794	0.9007	R	0.1092	0.8635	R	0.1152	0.8561	R	R
39	Guhl	Cooksey	R	0.1249	0.8500	R	0.1340	0.8315	R	0.1501	0.8135	R	R

	November 4, 2008 Candidates or Filing, Primary Winner[1]			Additive Models									
				Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			
				Score			Score			Score			
District	D	R	2008 Result	D	R	2008 Prediction	D	R	2008 Prediction	D	R	2008 Prediction	Algorithmic Model Prediction
40	Jones	Jackson	R	0.0736	0.9077	R	0.1012	0.8730	R	0.1068	0.8661	R	R
41		Enns	R	0.0579	0.9239	R	0.0796	0.8954	R	0.0840	0.8897	R	R
42	Perry	Billy	R	0.1381	0.8415	R	0.1923	0.7796	R	0.2073	0.7631	R	R
43		Schwartz	R	0.0649	0.9120	R	0.0893	0.8790	R	0.0941	0.8724	R	R
44	Nations	Barrett	D	0.8842	0.0845	D	0.8394	0.1176	D	0.8278	0.1269	D	D
45	Collins	Stiles	D	0.8377	0.1342	D	0.7919	0.1694	D	0.7717	0.1876	D	D
46	Norman	Martin	R	0.0893	0.8872	R	0.1186	0.8491	R	0.1262	0.8398	R	R
47	Jackson	Osborn	R	0.1958	0.4805	R	0.2165	0.4009	R	0.2429	0.3427	R	R
48	Moore	Ownbey	R	0.2064	0.4696	R	0.2378	0.3793	R	0.2604	0.3248	R	R
49	Buck	Oliver	D	0.6631	0.1183	D	0.4924	0.1321	D	0.4433	0.1498	D	D
50	Lawler	Johnson	R	0.2199	0.7638	R	0.2466	0.7311	R	0.2725	0.7039	R	R
51	Cosgrove	Holland	R	0.5180	0.2632	**D***	0.3169	0.3073	**D***	0.2358	0.3569	R	**D***
52	McMahan	Ortega	R	0.5643	0.2189	**D***	0.4009	0.2261	**D***	0.3372	0.2585	**D***	R
53	Green	Terrill	R	0.0982	0.8771	R	0.1283	0.8378	R	0.1394	0.8248	R	R
54		Wesselhoft	R	0.0756	0.8979	R	0.1040	0.8596	R	0.1097	0.8520	R	R
55	McMullen		D	0.9276	0.0567	D	0.9005	0.0780	D	0.8950	0.0822	D	D
56		Richardson	R	0.1179	0.8648	R	0.1620	0.8141	R	0.1709	0.8039	R	R

57	Adams	Wright	R	0.4833	0.2966	D*	0.3455	0.2768	D*	0.2748	0.3160	R	R
58		Hickman	R	0.0706	0.9102	R	0.0971	0.8765	R	0.1024	0.8698	R	R
59	Russell	Sanders	R	0.1458	0.5413	R	0.1163	0.5160	R	0.1238	0.4775	R	R
60	Walker	Gambill	D	0.8736	0.1085	D	0.8225	0.1529	D	0.8020	0.1721	D	D
61	Shearer	Blackwell	R	0.1661	0.8108	R	0.2312	0.7369	R	0.2634	0.7030	R	R
62	Warren	Shannon	R	0.1259	0.8471	R	0.1529	0.8100	R	0.1620	0.7989	R	R
63		Armes	R	0.1256	0.8540	R	0.1727	0.7993	R	0.1821	0.7883	R	R
64		Coody	R	0.1106	0.8585	R	0.1520	0.8054	R	0.1603	0.7948	R	R
65	Dorman		D	0.9216	0.0567	D	0.8922	0.0780	D	0.8863	0.0822	D	D
66	Lamons	Ramey	D	0.8974	0.0729	D	0.8593	0.1000	D	0.8513	0.1058	D	D
67	Lantos	Peterson	R	0.1097	0.8692	R	0.1357	0.8353	R	0.1538	0.8156	R	R
68		Benge	R	0.0838	0.8936	R	0.1153	0.8537	R	0.1216	0.8457	R	R
69		Jordan	R	0.0521	0.9245	R	0.0717	0.8962	R	0.0756	0.8906	R	R
70		Peters	R	0.0696	0.9119	R	0.0957	0.8789	R	0.1009	0.8723	R	R
71	Bullock	Sullivan	R	0.1392	0.8356	R	0.1744	0.7909	R	0.1932	0.7703	R	R
72	Scott	Kirkpatrick	D	0.7294	0.0415	D	0.5529	0.0571	D	0.5176	0.0602	D	D
73	Shumate		D	0.9651	0.0175	D	0.9520	0.0241	D	0.9494	0.0254	D	D
74		Derby	R	0.0656	0.9116	R	0.0902	0.8785	R	0.0952	0.8719	R	R
75		Kirby	R	0.0729	0.6016	R	0.1002	0.5146	R	0.1057	0.4773	R	R
76		Wright	R	0.0568	0.9208	R	0.0781	0.8911	R	0.0824	0.8851	R	R
77	Proctor		D	0.8993	0.0717	D	0.8615	0.0986	D	0.8539	0.1039	D	D
78	McDaniel	Matlock	D	0.8635	0.1130	D	0.8178	0.1499	D	0.8034	0.1625	D	D
79	Hawkins	Watson	R	0.0772	0.9004	R	0.1005	0.8687	R	0.1072	0.8604	R	R
80		Ritze	R	0.0572	0.6218	R	0.0787	0.5424	R	0.0830	0.5066	R	R
81		Miller	R	0.0598	0.9152	R	0.0823	0.8834	R	0.0868	0.8771	R	R

	November 4, 2008 Candidates or Filing, Primary Winner[1]			Additive Models									
				Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			
				Score			Score			Score			
District	D	R	2008 Result	D	R	2008 Prediction	D	R	2008 Prediction	D	R	2008 Prediction	Algorithmic Model Prediction
82	Anderson	Liebmann	R	0.0752	0.9029	R	0.0980	0.8717	R	0.1053	0.8629	R	R
83	Holzberger	McDaniel	R	0.0797	0.8961	R	0.1067	0.8600	R	0.1136	0.8514	R	R
84	Marlett	Kern	R	0.1236	0.8496	R	0.1663	0.7967	R	0.1840	0.7770	R	R
85	Robey	Dank	R	0.1904	0.7893	R	0.1744	0.7977	R	0.1930	0.7775	R	R
86	Auffet		D	0.9293	0.0557	D	0.9028	0.0765	D	0.8975	0.0807	D	D
87	Orwig	Nelson	R	0.2486	0.4238	R	0.2404	0.3717	R	0.2703	0.3097	R	R
88	McAffrey		D	0.9045	0.0592	D	0.8686	0.0814	D	0.8615	0.0858	D	D
89	Hamilton		D	0.9059	0.0517	D	0.8706	0.0711	D	0.8636	0.0749	D	D
90	James	Key	R	0.1685	0.8010	R	0.1769	0.7811	R	0.1959	0.7598	R	R
91		Reynolds	R	0.0691	0.9074	R	0.0951	0.8727	R	0.1002	0.8658	R	R
92	Morrissette		D	0.9044	0.0606	D	0.8686	0.0833	D	0.8614	0.0878	D	D
93	Castillo	Christian	R	0.5047	0.2622	**D***	0.3712	0.2333	**D***	0.3050	0.2671	**D***	R
94	Inman	Coulter	D	0.8854	0.0839	D	0.8447	0.1131	D	0.8341	0.1215	D	D
95	Walker	Joyner	R	0.1916	0.7800	R	0.2356	0.7253	R	0.2647	0.6941	R	R
96	Hunter	Moore	R	0.3131	0.3632	R	0.2846	0.3328	R	0.3279	0.2578	**D***	R

97	Shelton	Lott	D	0.9380	0.0424	D	0.9147	0.0583	D	0.9094	0.0621	D	D
98	Frederick	Trebilcock	R	0.0903	0.8885	R	0.1133	0.8575	R	0.1228	0.8465	R	R
99	Pittman	Linzy	D	0.9406	0.0354	D	0.9102	0.0568	D	0.9035	0.0617	D	D
100	Baggett	Thompson	R	0.0918	0.8817	R	0.1201	0.8435	R	0.1299	0.8318	R	R
101	Lewis	Banz	R	0.1260	0.8470	R	0.1544	0.8085	R	0.1677	0.7932	R	R
		D	40			44			44			43	40
		R	61			57			57			58	61
		Total	101			101			101			101	101
		Errors				6			6			5	6

*Incorrect predictions

Table 7. Type of Race and 2008 Outcome

House	Winner		
Type of Race	Democrat	Republican	Total
Democrat with No Opponent	24	0	24
Republican with No Opponent	0	20	20
Contest	16	41	57
Total	40	61	101

?

? ^{2} = 52.88 df = 2 p < 3.28E-12 V^2 = 0.524

Errors = 16

Table 13. Type of Race and 2008 Outcome

Senate	Winner		
Type of Race	Democrat	Republican	Total
No Opponent Democrat	5	0	5
No Opponent Republican	0	8	8
Contest	4	7	11
Total	9	15	24

? ^{2} = 13.13 df = 2 p < 0.00140 V^2 = 0.547

Errors = 4

Table 8. Incumbency and 2008 Outcome

House	Winner		
Incumbency	Democrat	Republican	Total
D Incumbent	35	1	36
R Incumbent	0	49	49
Open	5	11	16
Total	40	61	101

? ^{2} = 82.56 df = 2 p < 1.18E-18 V^2 = 0.817
Errors = 6

Table 9. Party Registration and 2008 Outcome

House	Winner		
P Registration	Democrat	Republican	Total
D Advantage	38	27	65
R Advantage	2	34	36
Total	40	61	101

? ^{2} = 27.11 df = 1 p < 1.92E-07 V^2 = 0.268
Errors = 29

Table 14. Incumbency and 2008 Outcome

Senate	Winner		
Incumbency	Democrat	Republican	Total
D Incumbent	8	1	9
R Incumbent	0	10	10
Open	1	4	5
Total	9	15	24

? ^{2} = 16.8\79 df = 2 p < 0.000226 V^2 = 0.699
Errors = 2

Table 15. Party Registration and 2008 Outcome

Senate	Winner		
P Registration	Democrat	Republican	Total
D Advantage	9	3	12
R Advantage	0	12	12
Total	9	15	24

? ^{2} = 14.40 df = 1 p < 0.000148 V^2 = 0.6
Errors = 3

Table 10. Money Advantage and 2008 Outcome

House	Winner		
$ Advantage	Democrat	Republican	Total
D Advantage	39	3	42
R Advantage	1	58	59
Total	40	61	101

? ^{2} = 85.24 df = 1 p < 2.64E-20 V^2 = 0.844
Errors = 4

Table 11. Previous Result and 2008 Outcome

House	Winner		
2006 Winner	Democrat	Republican	Total
Democrat	39	5	44
Republican	1	56	57
Total	40	61	101

? ^{2} = 78.36 df = 1 p < 8.578E-19 V^2 = 0.776
Errors = 6

Table 16. Money Advantage and 2008 Outcome

Senate	Winner		
$ Advantage	Democrat	Republican	Total
D Advantage	9	1	10
R Advantage	0	14	14
Total	9	15	24

? ^{2} = 20.16 df = 1 p < 7.12E-06 V^2 = 0.84
Errors = 1

Table 17. Previous Result and 2008 Outcome

Senate	Winner		
2004 Winner	Democrat	Republican	Total
Democrat	9	1	10
Republican	0	14	14
Total	9	15	24

? ^{2} = 20.16 df = 1 p < 7.12E-06 V^2 = 0.84
Errors = 1

Table 12. Money Left and 2008 Outcome

House	Winner		
$ Left Advantage	Democrat	Republican	Total
D Advantage	38	7	45
R Advantage	2	54	56
Total	40	61	101

$?^2 = 68.22$ df = 1 $p < 1.46E\text{-}16$ $V^2 = 0.675$

Errors = 9

Table 18. Money Left and 2008 Outcome

Senate	Winner		
$ Left Advantage	Democrat	Republican	Total
D Advantage	5	5	10
R Advantage	4	10	14
Total	9	15	24

$?^2 = 1.14$ df = 1 $p < 0.2850$ $V^2 = 0.0476$

Errors = 9

Table 6. Senate Model Predictions

	November 4, 2008 Candidates or Filing, Primary Winner[1]			Additive Models									
				Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			
				Score			Score			Score			
District	D	R	2008 Result	D	R	2008 Prediction	D	R	2008 Prediction	D	R	2008 Prediction	Algorithmic Model Prediction
1	Wyrick		D	0.9209	0.059	D	0.8913	0.081	D	0.885	0.086	D	D
3	Wilson		D	0.9319	0.05	D	0.9064	0.069	D	0.901	0.072	D	D
5	Ellis	Miller	D	0.6645	0.023	D	0.6012	0.032	D	0.569	0.034	D	D
7	Lerblance	Sherrill	D	0.8992	0.087	D	0.8527	0.128	D	0.832	0.148	D	D
9	Garrison		D	0.9319	0.046	D	0.9064	0.064	D	0.901	0.067	D	D
11	McIntyre		D	0.9496	0.027	D	0.9308	0.038	D	0.927	0.04	D	D
13	Paddack		D	0.9363	0.045	D	0.9124	0.061	D	0.908	0.065	D	D
15	Drum	Nichols	R	0.1784	0.797	R	0.1998	0.766	R	0.223	0.742	R	R
17	Laster	Rominger	D	0.9034	0.073	D	0.8672	0.1	D	0.86	0.106	D	D
19		Anderson	R	0.0686	0.913	R	0.0943	0.88	R	0.099	0.873	R	R
21	Murphy	Halligan	R	0.3577	0.316	D*	0.279	0.335	R	0.197	0.385	R	R
23		Justice	R	0.0979	0.881	R	0.1346	0.837	R	0.142	0.828	R	R
25		Mazzei	R	0.0505	0.928	R	0.0694	0.901	R	0.073	0.896	R	R

27	Peach	Marlatt	R	0.1562	0.524	R	0.1507	0.471	R	0.167	0.424	R	R
29		Ford	R	0.0857	0.893	R	0.1179	0.853	R	0.124	0.845	R	R
31	Erwin	Barrington	R	0.2278	0.751	R	0.2604	0.71	R	0.288	0.682	R	R
33	Adelson	Casey	D	0.8912	0.082	D	0.8502	0.113	D	0.842	0.12	D	D
35		Stanislawski	R	0.0653	0.613	R	0.0898	0.531	R	0.095	0.494	R	R
37	Riley	Newberry	R	0.577	0.4	**D***	0.6176	0.351	**D***	0.687	0.281	**D***	R
39		Crain	R	0.076	0.902	R	0.1045	0.865	R	0.11	0.857	R	R
41	Taylor	Jolley	R	0.0548	0.92	R	0.0753	0.89	R	0.079	0.884	R	R
43	Boren	Reynolds	R	0.0989	0.871	R	0.1348	0.824	R	0.144	0.813	R	R
45		Russell	R	0.0713	0.602	R	0.098	0.516	R	0.103	0.478	R	R
47		Lamb	R	0.0652	0.911	R	0.0897	0.877	R	0.095	0.87	R	R
		D	9			11			10			10	9
		R	15			13			14			14	15
		Total	24			24			24			24	24
		Errors				2			1			1	0

*Incorrect predictions

differential and the outcome of the past election had strong coefficients. We would not expect these equations to predict with the same accuracy in other election years.

CONCLUSION

Ockham's razor is a philosophical principle calling for a model able to achieve accuracy with the fewest parameters. Retrospectively, the simplest model would be to predict from money advantage. The accuracy of the predictions would be better than any of the prospective additive or algorithmic models. But there is a danger of prospectively predicting with one variable. It assumes future Oklahoma legislative elections will follow the same pattern as the 2008 election. But elections are stochastic. Likely, future elections will follow the broad pattern of 2008 but with differences. Previous election results or incumbency might predict slightly better than money advantage. The differences between these variables and money in 2008 were small. Therefore models using several robust predictors are likely to yield better predictions over time than models using only one variable.

The best predictive model is likely one that includes whether two major party candidates contest the election, incumbency, the result of the previous election in the district, money advantage and the Republican Normal Vote.

NOTES

[1] R. Darcy is Regents Professor of Political Science and Statistics at Oklahoma State University; Gary Jones is Chairman of the Oklahoma Republican Party; Stephen Baldridge, Emily Berry, Chris Hill, Charm Hoehn, Jasmine Johnson and Whitney Martin are Oklahoma State University undergraduate students. The paper was originally prepared for the 2008 meeting of the Oklahoma Political Science Association at Cameron University in Lawton. Oklahoma State University undergraduates Lindsay Barbour, Eric Bloyed, Melinda Carter, Brad Cooley, Brandon Dyer, Jordan Ellis, Michael Gumbs, Matt Land, Austin Linton, Kai Mann, Josh Pillow, Ryan Pitman, Brett Stingley, and Sarah Viele contributed to that earlier paper. The authors are grateful to James Scott for timely assistance with the analysis.

[2]http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DCGeoSelectServlet?ds_name=DEC_2000_SLDS&_ts=209653995859

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DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN OKLAHOMA: EXPLORING THE USAGE AND RESULTS OF INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM

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The Oklahoma Secretary of State maintains an online listing of every proposed state question. The website and its associated primary documents provide answers to a variety of questions related to Oklahoma's use of initiative and referendum. This article explores those data. In the process it identifies and documents some of the naturally occurring political biases associated with initiative and referenda in Oklahoma. It calculates the effects of these structural predispositions on the likelihood of a state question successfully garnering a majority of the vote. The results indicate that some state questions begin the process with little hope of success while others are almost certain to succeed.

Democratic structures have within them inherent political advantages and disadvantages. Debate over republican and democratic institutions was the focus of the Constitutional Convention in 1789. The American founders chose republican controls over the passions of the majority. By the time Oklahoma reached statehood in 1907 the pendulum was swinging in a new direction. Oklahoma's founders feared the concentration of power so they used the devices of direct democracy as a check on their new state legislature.

The Oklahoma Constitution reserves to citizens the rights of initiative and referendum petitions. In addition, the Legislature is constrained by a highly detailed Constitution, limiting the Legislature's ability to make significant changes without a vote of the people. The Oklahoma Constitution also allows the legislature to refer statutory

questions directly to the voters. As a result, Oklahomans have faced 414 ballot propositions in just over 100 years.

This article explores a variety of questions related to initiative and referendum in Oklahoma. The Oklahoma Secretary of State maintains an online listing of every proposed state question along with associated primary documents. Using these data, this article identifies and documents some of the naturally occurring political biases affecting Oklahoma's state questions. It calculates the effects of these structural predispositions on the likelihood of a state question successfully garnering a majority of the vote. The results indicate that some state questions begin the process with little hope of success while others are almost certain to succeed.

ROOTS OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN OKLAHOMA

Direct democracy is deeply rooted in the political culture of many states. Through direct democracy, citizens can accomplish what a representative government may be hesitant or unwilling to do (Radcliffe 1994, 145). Its use is tied to citizen impatience and frustration over the uncertainties of society (Cronin 1989, 150). This brand of reform politics included a belief that there is a "public interest," a collective will of the people that is above an individual's interest and that enlightened people should agree on the public interest (Dye 2003, 370).

Reformers of the early 20th Century, populists and progressives, wanted to restore power to the people. The tools of direct democracy included, among other things, the initiative, the referendum, and the silent vote, each of which was written into the Oklahoma Constitution of 1907. Oklahoma was the first state to provide for citizen initiative and referendum in its original constitution (Rausch 2001, 41).

Oklahoma's preference for direct democracy was a reaction against the influence of big corporations, their lobbyists and their trusts (Thornton 1954, 59). The prevailing attitude was summarized by the Oklahoma Territorial Governor Thompson B. Ferguson (1901-1906) in a 1903 Territorial legislative session when he said, "Had Diogenes been there on one of his traditional excursions to find an honest man, he would have had to use an x-ray instead of a lamp" (Goble 1980,173). As he saw it, corrupt lobbyists and trusts were trying to subvert the political process.

Direct democracy relies on the wisdom of the people to counteract the aims of the powerful. However, average citizens tend to be passive in politics. Morris Fiorina (1999) suggests that expecting people to participate in politics goes against human nature. Using focus groups, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995) found that people do not want to make political decisions for themselves, but they do want to restrain and weaken elected officials.

Establishment politicians of the early 1900s viewed initiative and referendum as radical because it conflicted with the older notion of representative democracy (Berman 1999, 86). Some Oklahomans view the devices of direct democracy as a "tremendous safeguard," while others see direct democracy itself as a tool of special interests (Morgan, England & Humphreys 1991, 136).

Referendum is "the more conventional and less intrusive device for popular participation," according to Alan Rosenthal (1981, 277). Referendum allows the legislature to deliberate and the citizens to render a final verdict. Rosenthal (1981, 278) described the initiative as "a Damoclean sword hanging over the legislatures" because it allowed citizens to circumvent legislative deliberation. More recently, *The Economist* (2009) called ballot initiatives "the crack cocaine of democracy." Essentially, if the legislature fails to act on a popular idea, citizens may very well take matters into their own hands. Legislators are particularly fearful of initiatives that earmark revenue for specific purposes (Berman 1999, 87) like Oklahoma's upcoming State Question 744, the H.O.P.E. petition. Rosenthal (2003, 209) notes that Americans generally favor the idea of initiative, but it clearly benefits some groups more than others, because the process takes momentum and money.

Initiative proponents frequently face apathy from their very own supporters (Radcliffe 1994, 426). In recent years, most successful initiatives have used highly controversial paid petition circulators to collect the necessary signatures. Thus, getting on the ballot is often very expensive (Rausch 2001, 42). In the 1990's a small group of wealthy individuals in Oklahoma supplied the money to promote initiatives that placed limits on government (Rausch 1994, 7-9). As a result, voters faced and approved several state questions to limit government. For example SQ 620 which limited legislative sessions and SQ 640 which restricted the Legislature's ability to raise taxes.

Twenty-four states grant voters the right of initiative petition.

Overall, initiatives have experienced only limited success. Across the country, only about 15 to 20 percent of proposed initiatives actually make it to the voters (Arnold 1995, 19). Beginning with the very first initiative in 1904 through 2008, 2,305 initiatives have been on the ballot in various states, 936 or 41% were successful. Since the 1970s the number of initiatives facing voters across the country has increased in each succeeding decade (Initiative and Referendum Institute 2009).

When in 1999 David Berman observed the number of times citizens brought forward an initiative in each state, Oklahoma ranked 8th. Between 1999 and 2008 Oklahomans proposed 26 initiatives, only two made the ballot. Using data from the National Conference of State Legislatures (2009) the top 10 of Berman's table is replicated and updated in Table 1. Oklahoma remains 8th in its usage of initiatives.

TABLE 1

TOTAL NUMBER OF INITIATIVES IN STATE HISTORY

State	Year Adopted	1999	2008
Oregon	1902	314	363
California	1911	265	328
Colorado	1910	175	210
North Dakota	1914	165	173
Arizona	1910	146	173
Washington	1912	112	140
Arkansas	1909	87	94
Oklahoma	1907	86	88
Missouri	1906	70	82
Montana	1904	67	77
Ohio	1912	62	73

Across the country, 153 state questions of all types appeared in 2008. Overall, 90 were successful and 63 failed. This passage rate of 59% was well below the 2004 and 2006 success rates of 67% (Initiative and Referendum Institute 2008).

DISTINGUISHING FORMS OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY

State questions come to the ballot from both the Legislature and from the citizens. When the Legislature proposes a ballot issue it is commonly described as a referendum. Legislative referenda include both proposed constitutional amendments and proposed statutory changes. In each case a majority vote of the House and Senate can place the issue on the ballot. To maintain consistency with the data reported by the Secretary of State, this analysis refers to both as Legislative proposals.

Citizens also offer both statutory and constitutional amendments through initiative petition. The process begins when a petition is filed with the Secretary of State. Proponents then have 90 days to collect signatures. The number of signatures required depends on the total number of votes in the last statewide general election. Statutory initiatives require the signatures of 8% of the voter, 117,013 in 2010. Constitutional amendment initiatives require 15% of the voters or 219,400 for 2010. Both of these are referred to as initiative proposals in this analysis.

Unless the Legislature declares an emergency with a 2/3rds vote of each chamber, bills do not go into effect until 90 days after the legislative session ends. This allows citizens a window of time to file a referendum petition on a bill recently passed by the Legislature. Referenda need the signatures of 5% of the voters. Based on the 2008 presidential election that is 73,134. These are described as referenda below.

QUESTIONS

The discussion above raises several questions regarding state questions in Oklahoma. Answering these questions will provide some descriptive detail regarding legislative proposals, citizen initiatives and referenda. In addition they will provide some insight into the success or failure certain devices of direct democracy and illuminate the inherent biases associated with these devices.

The following questions are pursued:

1. Which public policy areas do voters face most often in Oklahoma?
2. Given the difficulty of putting an initiative on the ballot, what

are the success rates for proposals from various sources: legislative, initiative and referendum?

3. Given the increased difficulty in offering a constitutional amendment initiative, does the type of proposal, constitutional or statutory, vary by the source?
4. Rausch's (1994) observation that conservatives have used the initiative to promote their agenda raises an interesting question as to the intent of state questions to expand or restrict government?

Three additional political questions also deserve some attention.

5. Recently politicians have speculated that divided party government increases the number of state questions. Does the number of state questions increase when the state faces divided government?
6. Political observers have suggested that the attorney general may be using his position to influence the wording of questions on the ballot for political reasons. Is the current attorney general rewriting more ballot titles than his predecessors?
7. Political strategists have long speculated that ballot questions have a better chance of success if they occur at a time other than a November general election. Does a November general election reduce the likelihood of success?

The final question seeks to measure some of the inherent biases in the use of state questions as a policy device.

8. Do factors related to the development of a state question influence its ultimate success?

Together these questions provide considerable insight into the use of direct democracy in Oklahoma. They point to some biases inherent in the institutions of direct democracy. These biases produce measureable advantages for some state questions.

METHODS

The Oklahoma Secretary of State's website (http://www.sos.state.ok.us/exec_legis/InitListAll.asp) contains a complete listing of all 754 state questions proposed throughout Oklahoma's 102 year history. Primary documents for each question are linked from the list in pdf format. A team of professional researchers read and coded the primary documents. The entries include election results.

A database was constructed using each of the proposals as a single case. That database is now available on line for any researcher to accessat: http://www.OKHouse.gov/Documents/StateQuestionsDatabase.xls. The database was imported into SPSS for statistical analysis.

The data set contains no missing cases and encompasses the entire population of state questions in Oklahoma. As a result, inferential statistics are not used in this analysis. Any discussion of significance is a substantive discussion and not a statistical one.

RESULTS

These data lend themselves easily to answering the eight questions posed above. In general, the data were straightforward and easily coded. However, the first question refers to public policy topics. Topics were among the hardest data issues to resolve. Oklahomans have used state questions to consider a wide variety of topics. Many of them had little in common. Collapsing categories threatened to lose the richness of the data. A set of broad topics with subtopics helped to resolve some of these difficulties. The first question considered is:

1. Which public policy areas do voters face most often in Oklahoma?

Of the 754 state questions originally filed with the secretary of state only 414 actually made it to the ballot. Oklahoma voters have been asked to consider some issues repeatedly. A top 10 list of issues faced by Oklahoma voter is as follows:

- Taxes were on a statewide ballot 85 times. 63 of those votes involved ad valorem taxes.
- Election procedures themselves were on the ballot 41 times. Of those 10 involved the right to vote for disenfranchised groups and 8 were about redistricting.
- Matters related to holding public office were on the ballot 39 times. 8 of those were about legislative compensation. 4 were about term limits for public officials.
- The courts were on the ballot 27 times. Of those 6 involved pardon and parole.
- Public schools, not including ad valorem taxes, were on the ballot 26 times.

- Bonding authority, not including ad valorem taxes, was on the ballot 24 times.
- Beer, wine and spirits were on the ballot 21 times, including prohibition 14 times.
- Higher education was on the ballot 13 times.
- Public assistance was on the ballot 12 times.
- Gambling was on the ballot 11 times.

Clearly taxes were the dominant topic voters' faced; 20.5% of all ballot issues dealt with taxes. On average voters saw at least one property tax question in every two-year election cycle since statehood. They also wrestled with prohibition repeatedly before resolving the issue.

2. Given the difficulty of putting an initiative on the ballot, what are the success rates for proposals from various sources: legislative, initiative and referendum?

In Oklahoma about 25% of bills introduced into the Legislature complete the legislative process. Across the 50 states the average in 2008 was also 25% (calculated using Book of the States 2009). The success rate of ballot propositions is not much better. Getting from the proposal stage into law is a difficult road. Only 27.5% of proposed Oklahoma state questions became law.

Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for Oklahoma's proposed state questions, those that became ballot measures, and those that were supported by the voters. State law requires that each proposal be numbered as a state question when the initial paperwork is filed with the Secretary of State. From 1907 to 2009 citizens filed 382 initiatives and 50 referenda with the Secretary of State. The Legislature offered 322 proposals, for a total of 754 state questions.

Far fewer initiatives and referenda actually make it to the ballot. Frequently a petition is abandoned before it is completed. Occasionally legal wrangling prevents them from appearing on the ballot. In a few cases the same issue may be filed several times. For example, State Questions 323 was an initiative petition seeking to repeal prohibition, but was abandoned. It was refilled as State Questions 330, 331, 337, 338, 341 and 342. It finally got a vote as State Question 343 and failed. Another example is State Question 745. In 2009 it sought to overhaul the Department of Human Services. It was withdrawn and refilled as State Question 749, which is currently pending a court challenge. Only 88 of the 382 initiative proposals have actually made it to the ballot. One more, State Question 744, is set for a vote in 2010. Most referenda suffer a similar fate. Only 20 of the 50 proposed referenda have reached voters.

Legislative proposals are much more likely to appear on the ballot. However, the Legislature rescinded some of its own proposals. For example, in 1988 State Questions 605 and 606 were removed from the ballot, amended and presented as State Question 610 and 611. Of the 322 Legislative proposals 306 have appeared on the ballot. 8 more are in queue for 2010.

The success rates of initiatives and referenda are pretty low. Of the 88 initiatives on the ballot only 30 have become law. Of the 20 referenda on the ballot only 6 successfully overrode legislative action. Legislative proposals fared much better. 169 of the 306 passed.

Prior to 1974 the Oklahoma Constitution required that a ballot measure receive a majority of the votes cast in the election and not just a majority of the votes cast on the questions. This "silent vote" provision killed 35 proposals that received a majority of the vote—14 initiatives and 21 legislative proposals. This included 3 in 1908, Oklahoma's very first election. Without the silent vote provision the ratio of success for initiatives would be dramatically different at 50.0% rather than 34.0%. However the result is still significantly below the success rate of legislative proposals, which would have been 62.1% rather than 55.2%.

TABLE 2

NUMBER OF PROPOSALS MAKING THE BALLOT AND PASSING BY SOURCE, TYPE AND EFFECT

	Proposed	**Made Ballot**	**Passed**
Initiative	382	88	30
Referenda	50	20	6
Legislative	322	306	169
Constitutional Amendment	529	345	181
Statutory	217	66	24
Neither	8	3	0
Expands Govt.	414	222	102
Restricts Govt.	162	81	50
Neither	178	110	53

3. Given the increased difficulty in offering a constitutional amendment initiative, does the type of proposal, constitutional or statutory, vary by the source?

By far most state questions faced by voters are constitutional amendments. Oklahomans had a profound distrust of power in 1907. This led to a highly specific constitution which contained provisions normally left to statute. Famously, Oklahoma had the longest constitution ever drafted in 1907. It even set minimum standard for kerosene. This made it very difficult to enact legislation without a vote of the people.

As seen in Table 2, constitutional amendments comprise 529 of the 754 state questions. 345 made it to the ballot. 8 more will appear in 2010. A little more than half, 181 passed. Statutory changes were 217 of the proposals. 66 made the ballot, with 1 more set for 2010. Only 24 became law. 8 ballot questions were neither constitutional nor statutory. They could best be describes as advisory. For example, State Question 334 in 1951 was a legislative proposal urging the US delegates to the United Nations to support a world federal government that could prevent war. The proposition failed, but if it had passed it would not have had any force or effect except to express the will of the people. Of these 8 advisory issues only 3 reached the voters and none passed.

Initiatives are more likely to be proposed as statutes than constitutional amendments. In some policy areas it is difficult to make changes in the law without asking the people to vote on a constitutional amendment. However, constitutional amendment initiatives require significantly more signatures than statutory changes. As a result, 41% of initiatives are statutory proposals, while only 4% of legislative proposals were statutory. Referenda are overwhelmingly statutory because they seek to overturn a law created by the legislature. 90% of referenda related to a statute.

Voters are unlikely to make a distinction between state questions that amend the constitution and those that alter statutes. To them all state questions establish policy in law. The lack of success for statutory changes is probably a result of considerations related to the source of the proposal and not the document it amends.

4. Rausch's (1994) observation that conservatives have used the initiative to promote their agenda raises an interesting question as to the intent of state questions to expand or restrict government?

Some proposals seek to create new programs or new taxes. These were coded as expanding government's authority. For example, State Question 741 in 2008 blocked certain tax exemptions. It resulted in additional taxes for some

taxpayers. Other questions seek to limit the scope of government. They were coded as restricting government action. For example, State Question 743 permitted previously prohibited wine sales. In effect, this reduced government prohibitions on wine distribution in Oklahoma. Some proposals only reorganized current programs and did not appear to have either effect. For example, in 1908 State Questions 3 and 4 related to the location of the State Capitol.

Table 2 indicates that extending government was the intent of 414 proposals. 222 of these or 53.6% reached the voters, with 2 more set for 2010. 102 or 45.9% of those on the ballot were successful. Restrictions on government made up 162 questions. 81 or 50.0% were on the ballot, with 5 waiting for 2010. 50 or 71.7% of those on the ballot became law. These numbers suggest that once on the ballot, issues restricting government have a better chance of passing.

The majority of questions posed by both the citizens and the Legislature would extend government influence. The Legislature is slightly more likely to offer questions that expand government programs than the public. The public is somewhat more likely to propose limiting government than the Legislature. Table 3 indicates, of the 88 initiatives to make the ballot 45 or 51.1% sought to extend government. Only 19 or 21.6% attempted to restrict government. Of the 306 legislative proposals, 170 or 55.6% wanted to extend government and only 55 or 13.1% tried to restrict government. Of the 20 referenda to face voters, 8 would extend government and 7 would restrict it.

TABLE 3

PERCENT OF STATE QUESTIONS PASSING BY EFFECT AND SOURCE

Source (n)	Effect (n)	Majority Vote
Initiative (88)	Expanding (45)	44.4%
	Neither (24)	54.2%
	Restricting (19)	57.9%
Legislative (306)	Expanding (170)	56.5%
	Neither (81)	66.7%
	Restricting (55)	72.7%
Referendum (20)	Expanding (8)	37.5%
	Neither (5)	20.0%
	Restricting (7)	28.6%

The real difference arises when looking at whether or not a question was approved by the voters. Overall 50.0% of initiatives received a majority of the vote. 44.4% of those enhancing government were supported, while 57.9% of those restricting government saw a majority. Overall 62.1% of legislative proposals gained a majority of the vote. A majority supported 56.5% of those enhancing government, while 72.7% of those restricting government enjoyed a majority. Overall, only 30.0% of referenda received a majority vote. 37.5% of the 8 that expanded government experienced a majority, while 28.6% of the 7 restricting government collected majority support.

These numbers suggest that the public is more likely to offer restrictions on government than the legislature is; however, a majority of proposals by both would expand government. Also, legislative proposals to restrict government have the greatest chance of success.

5. Recently politicians have speculated that divided party government increases the number of state questions. Does the number of state questions increase when the state faces divided government?

In 2009 the Legislature proposed 8 state questions for the November 2010 ballot. One initiative is also scheduled. There is some evidence that the large number of proposals is the result of divided party government with Republicans controlling the House and Senate and a Democratic Governor. For example, SB 4 would have required voters to provide identification at the polls. The governor vetoed SB 4 on April 8th. That same day the House passed SB 692 sending the idea to the voters in the form of SQ 746. Senate President Pro Tempore Glenn Coffee is quoted as saying divided government is the reason for so many state questions (Hoberock 2009).

Oklahoma only experienced divided government for 2 years prior to 1963. Republicans took control of the House in the 1920 election, but only held power one term. Democrats were so dominant that the Governor traditionally appointed the Speaker of the House until the late 1950s. With Henry Bellmon's election as Governor in 1962, Oklahoma began a new era of alternating divided and unified government. Since 1962, Oklahoma experienced divided government for 25 years and a unified government for 22 years. The Democratic Party controlled each period of unified government.

Nine state questions seem like a lot, but 10 questions were on the November ballot in 1984. Nine occurred on one ballot in 2002 and

2004. Both 1984 and 2004 were unified Democratic government. Divided government under Republican Governor Frank Keating produced 9 questions on one ballot in 2002. In 1968 when Republican Dewey Bartlett was Governor, voters saw a total of 15 state questions on 5 different election days. So, a large number of questions is not unusual in Oklahoma's recent past and they tend to occur in both unified and divided government.

Since 1962, 346 proposals were filed with the Secretary of State. 176 of those occurred during divided government for an average of 7.0 per year. 170 occurred with unified government for an average of 7.7 per year. Substantively, this suggests that on average in a two year general election cycle at least 1 and often 2 more proposals were offered in unified government than divided government.

Initiatives were more likely to be proposed with unified government. 68 initiatives were filed while government was unified for an average of 3.0 per year. 53 were brought under divided government for an average of 2.1. Again, this suggests that in a two-year cycle 2 additional proposals surfaced under unified government.

Legislative proposals were roughly equal for both unified and divided government. 118 legislative proposals occurred during divided government for an average of 4.7 per year. 100 occurred during unified government for an average of 4.5 per year.

Divided government did spark more referenda offerings. 5 were attempted under divided government, while only 2 occurred in unified government.

Of course, far fewer questions make the ballot than are proposed with the Secretary of State. Since 1962 only 21% of initiative proposals actually made it to the ballot. Voters faced 15 initiatives for an average of .6 per year under divided government and 11 during unified government for an average of .5 per year. Referenda fared better with 4 making the ballot while government was divided. Legislative proposals generally reach the voters. 103 made it under divided government for an average of 4.1 and 100 reached with unified government for an average of 4.5. All 15 of the legislative proposals that were somehow withdrawn occurred under divided government.

These data suggest that divided government does not produce more proposals, in fact it produced fewer overall proposals. Even legislative proposals tend to be virtually equal between divided government and

unified government. Only referenda increased during divided government. When only considering those questions making the ballot divided and unified government were even more equal with the Legislature more likely to withdraw a proposal when government was divided.

6. Political observers have suggested that the attorney general may be using his position to influence the wording of questions on the ballot for political reasons. Is the current attorney general rewriting more ballot titles than his predecessors?

Recently news headlines were made over the exact wording that will appear on the ballot for some state questions. A high profile battle occurred in 2009 over State Question 744, the H.O.P.E. petition. State law gives the Attorney General the final say in determining how a state question will read on the ballot. Attorney General Drew Edmondson changed the wording that was originally filed by proponents. Some legal wrangling occurred, but ultimately the Attorney General prevailed.

The Attorney General rejected and rewrote the ballot title language for all 9 of the state questions scheduled for 2010. This raised the ire of some proponents and caused Oklahomans for Responsible Government (2009) to charge that he was trying "to interject politics in an attempt to defeat the ballot measure by confusing voters."

Attorneys General have been rewriting ballot titles ever since State Question 7. The first 6 state questions were filed with no ballot title and the Secretary of State wrote them. Since that time the Attorney General has rewritten 46.8% of ballot titles. An equivalent ratio of initiatives and legislative titles were rewritten, 47.7% and 47.4% respectively. Only 35.0% of referenda were rewritten. Frequently, the Attorney General rewrote ballot language even though the proposal never made it to the ballot.

Since Drew Edmondson became Attorney General in 1995, 86 proposals were filed with the Secretary of State. He has rewritten 54.7%. Only 21.9% of initiative proposal's ballot titles were rewritten, but 75.5% of legislatively proposed titles were rejected. Of the 5 initiatives to actually make it to the ballot during his tenure he rewrote 3, raising his overall rejection rate to 70.0% for 50 questions that appear before voters.

The Attorney General's rejection of 9 of 9 ballot titles in 2009 and 26 of 41 from 1995 to 2008 may indicate a substantive difference. The ratio suggests that perhaps 3 of the 2010 ballot titles should have survived scrutiny. A careful reading of the proposed and final 2009 ballot titles shows some of the changes to be minimal and others more substantial.

7. Political strategists have long speculated that ballot questions have a better chance of success if they occur at a time other than a November general election. Does a November general election reduce the likelihood of success?

Political strategists often discuss the advantages and disadvantages of placing a measure on a November general election ballot or setting it for a different time, perhaps a primary or a special election. The debate centers on voter turnout. Fewer people vote in primaries and even fewer vote in special elections. Strategists generally speculate that there is some advantage to lower voter turnout. 188 state questions have occurred on even year November ballots. Of those 101 or 53.7% gained a majority of the vote. 32 of those were killed by the silent vote prior to 1974 for an overall passage rate 36.7%.

The success rate of questions appearing at other times is somewhat higher. Voters faced 226 state questions at odd times. Of these 137 or 60.6% gained a majority of the vote. 3 were killed by the silent vote, creating an overall passage rate of 59.3%. State questions have about a 7% better chance of gaining a majority of the vote at some time other than a November general election, when voter turnout is the highest.

Proposals restricting government were even more likely to succeed when placed on a special or primary election ballot, as seen in Table 4. 73.7% of questions that restricted government gained a majority of the vote when placed on the ballot at a primary or special election. 58.1% received a majority when they occurred at a November general election.

TABLE 4

PERCENT OF STATE QUESTIONS PASSING BY TIMING AND SOURCE

Source (n)	Effect (n)	Majority of Vote
November General (188)	Expanding (104)	51.0%
	Neither (42)	59.5%
	Restricting (42)	58.1%
Special (226)	Expanding (119)	55.5%
	Neither (68)	63.2%
	Restricting (39)	73.7%

Presidential and gubernatorial general elections raise the same debate. Voter turnout is significantly higher during presidential years. 99 questions were placed on a presidential ballot. 54.5% of them gained a majority of the vote. Voters faced 88 questions on gubernatorial ballots. 55.7% received a majority. This suggests no substantive advantage to placing a state question on a gubernatorial ballot over a presidential ballot.

Special elections are not available at the whim of proponents. The Oklahoma Constitution limits the Governor's ability to place legislatively proposed constitutional amendments on the ballot at any time other than a November general election. Article 24 Section 1 requires a 2/3 vote of each house of the legislature to authorize a special election. There are five times when Governor Bellmon ignored this provision and set a special election date anyway. They are SQs 604, 618, 623, 624 and 626.

The governor can set the date for an initiative or referenda at any time. Also, he may set statutory changes from the Legislature at any time. Usually, the Legislature specifies when the election should take place in the bill.

8. Do factors related to the development of a state question influence its ultimate success?

Several of these considerations appear to offer a strategic advantage. Specifically, legislative proposals are more successful than initiatives, proposals restricting government are more successful than expanding government and special elections breed more success than general elections. To estimate the relative effects of these predictors, Table 5 displays an OLS regression.

TABLE 5

REGRESSION OF MAJORITY VOTE ON TIMING, SOURCE AND INTENT

Variable	**B**	**P**
Constant	*.342*	*.005*
November Election	-.042	.381
Initiative	.210	.083
Legislative	.335	.003
Expanding	-.086	.130
Restricting	.058	.421
n=414	.042	
R^2		.004
p		

Dummy variables are used to create the equation. The reference categories are special election, referendum and neither restricting nor expanding government. The constant indicates that this reference scenario has a .342 probability of receiving a majority of the vote. The R^2 of the equation is very weak, suggesting that many other factors determine the success or failure of a state question. However, these effects indicate the relative advantage that some questions have over others.

Table 6 calculates the probability of voters approving a state question based on these three factors. The results should be considered a starting point for any such proposal. Specific issues, campaigns and the political climate will determine the actual outcome.

TABLE 6

BASELINE PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS USING SOURCE, INTENT AND TIMING

Scenario			**Probability**
Initiative	Restricting	November	0.567
Initiative	Restricting	Special	0.610
Initiative	Expanding	November	0.423
Scenario			Probability
Initiative	Expanding	Special	0.466
Initiative	Neither	November	0.509
Initiative	Neither	Special	0.552
Referendum	Restricting	November	0.357
Referendum	Restricting	Special	0.400
Referendum	Expanding	November	0.213
Referendum	Expanding	Special	0.256
Referendum	Neither	November	0.299
Referendum	Neither	Special	0.342
Legislative	Restricting	November	0.692
Legislative	Restricting	Special	0.734
Legislative	Expanding	November	0.548
Legislative	Expanding	Special	0.591
Legislative	Neither	November	0.634
Legislative	Neither	Special	0.677

Legislative proposals have the best chance of becoming law. They range from .591 to .734 in probability of having a majority of voters support them. Initiatives are the next most likely to succeed. They range from .423 to .567 in probability. Referenda are clearly the least likely to pass. They range from .213 to .400 in likelihood of garnering a majority of the vote.

CONCLUSION

Structural biases influence which questions find their way to the ballot and their success on the ballot. Some of these influences include how a question is proposed, the intent of the proposal and the timing of the vote.

State questions come to the ballot in Oklahoma both from the legislature and from the citizens. Citizens file the initial paperwork on far more proposals than actually make it to the ballot. Some issues are filed repeatedly until they achieve a favorable vote.

Constitutional amendments are more frequent than statutory acts. Citizens are more likely to propose statutes. The Legislature rarely offers statutory questions.

The majority of questions tend to expand government through tax increases, new programs or in other ways. A legislative proposal is slightly more likely than a citizen proposal to expand government.

Divided party government does not produce more proposals. Legislative proposals tend to be virtually equal between divided government and unified government. Attempted citizen's initiatives decline during divided government. Only citizen initiated referenda increased and they remained rare. Also, the legislature is more likely to withdraw a proposal under divided government, but this remains rare.

The most significant influence on success is the source of the proposal. Legislative proposals are much more likely to be approved by the voters. A little over half gained public support. Only about a third of initiatives on the ballot became law and less than a third of referenda were successful.

Success rates would have been higher in the early years if not for the "silent vote." This structural impediment killed 35 state questions that received a majority of the vote before it was repealed in 1974.

The timing of the election can influence the outcome. Questions

set before the voters on a primary election or a special election ballot are more likely to pass. A November general election reduces the chances of success.

Attempts to expand government also have a reduced chance. A majority of the questions that make it to the ballot pass. However, among those that fail more are seeking to expand government than restrict government.

These exploratory findings indicate that structural biases do affect the likelihood of a state question becoming law. While the success of any one question depends on many other factors, some questions come to the ballot with significant advantages. Others face difficult odds.

Oklahoma's state questions offer many fruitful avenues of research. The Secretary of State's website contains the primary documents needed to enlarge our understanding of Oklahoma's direct democracy and Oklahoma politics in general. This brief exploration of available data just scratches the surface. It would be valuable if students of Oklahoma government would examine more carefully the specific policy agendas found in Oklahoma's state questions. Specifically, a study of legislative vs. citizen agendas would be interesting. Someone should delve more deeply into issues related to divided government. Some things may be obscured by the general nature of this current exploration. In fact, considerable research should be devoted to specific periods of Oklahoma history. Certainly the political environment has changed several times in the past century. Analyzing these data in light of specific environmental factors may yield significant insight into the politics of Oklahoma.

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EXPLORING THE "INSIDE/OUTSIDE" DICHOTOMY: VIEWS OF OKLAHOMA LOBBYISTS

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Do lobbyists observe techniques beyond the "inside/outside" dichotomy? This manuscript reviews existing interest group literature and lobbying research. The response data of Oklahoma lobbyists to items on fourteen lobbying techniques suggests there are four, not two, factors. These are labeled: *electioneering and personal persuasion*, *information and advocacy mobilization*, *publicity and legislative strategizing* and *decision-implementation*. Only the fourth factor is composed of the alternative in the dichotomy — i.e., "inside" lobbying. The results may raise as many questions as they settle. However, they clearly show more than two lobbying domains. In fact, Oklahoma lobbyists often mix "inside" and "outside" techniques.

Since the early 1980s, much of the research on interest group politics has classified all lobbying techniques as either "inside" or "outside." "Inside" lobbying tactics are used in situations in which lobbyists deal directly with public officials. By contrast, "outside" lobbying, also known as "grassroots" lobbying, is an indirect tactic. It occurs when interest group representatives persuade key individuals, opinion leaders, constituents and/or interested publics to voice their concerns to public officials (Hrebenar 1997, 105-190; Mahood 2000, 54-63; Nownes 2001, 87-130, 169-189; Rosenthal 2001, 147-210; Thomas and Hrebenar 2004, 110-112; Wilcox and Kim 2005 and Andres 2009.

17). To some extent, a similar dichotomy is used in scholarly research on lobbying (Gais and Walker 1991,103-121; Kollman 1998, 34-50; Evans 1991; Green and Bigelow 2005; Hojnacki and Kimball 1999, 999-1024; Hunter 1999, 102-103; Victor 2007, 826-841; and Wilcox and Kim 2005,129 – 139).

Over the years, some researchers have discovered that this "inside/outside" lobbying categorization is changing (Boehmke 2005; Nownes and Freeman 1998). For instance, different interests at both the national and state levels have come to augment their "inside" repertoire with "outside" tactics borrowed from grassroots interests. As a result, a single lobbying effort may be defined as both "inside" and "outside," rather than one or the other. This combination, especially if it becomes institutionalized, may become a new category of lobbying. To more accurately understand lobbying, it will require a better definition of lobbying techniques.

If recent reviews suggest lobbying is changing from the simple "inside/outside" categories at the national and state levels, one must ask if such changes are occurring universally throughout the American political system? Smaller and less heterogeneous states, such as Oklahoma, would be expected to shift toward new lobbying techniques later than national or large state politics, since the competition between groups is less competitive and innovative. In short, if lobbyists evince more than a dichotomy of lobbying techniques in Oklahoma, the odds of fundamental changes in lobbying are likely to be universal.

To find out, we mailed a questionnaire to all lobbyists registered with the Oklahoma Ethics Commission during the winter, spring, and summer of 2006. The major question raised, among others, was whether Oklahoma lobbyists see a change in technique similar to those observed by political scientists in national or large state situations. Specifically, *are more than two domains of lobbying techniques observed by Oklahoma lobbyists?* And, *do Oklahoma lobbyists mix "inside" and "outside" techniques?*

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

In 1980, the late Jack L. Walker developed a list of twenty-two items dealing with the importance of various interest group activities to 558 group representatives at the national level. Much of the results

were analyzed in 1983 by Walker but were not published until 1991 by Thomas Gais (108) and others. Gais used Walker's 1980 data in taking a step beyond the classic works of Kay Schlozman and John T. Tierney in the 1980s (1983, 1986) on national lobbying techniques. In 1985, Gais' principal-axes analysis of the eight items from the twenty-two items used in Walker's 1980 data yielded two uncorrelated factors (110). Varimax rotation, by far the most widely used rotation method in the social sciences (Garson 1998, 13), maximized the variance of the loadings. The eight items included four "inside" techniques and four "outside" techniques. The four "inside" items dealt with: *legislative lobbying, administrative lobbying, litigation, and electioneering*. Walker's four "outside" techniques included: *working with the mass media, protest or demonstrations, providing speakers for groups, and sponsoring lay conferences* (Gais and Walker 1991, 110). The two factors produced by principal-axes analysis produced a set of "inside" and "outside" techniques (Gais and Walker 1991, 110). An important question that could have been raised at the time was whether factor analysis of all twenty-two items would have produced only "inside" and "outside" techniques, as did the subset of eight. Would more than the "inside/outside" dichotomy have been produced for all twenty-two items?

In the meantime, Kay Schlozman and John Tierney published a list of twenty-seven lobbying techniques in 1983, used by a sample of 175 government-affairs representatives in Washington-based organizations (354). The Schlozman and Tierney list became the basis for much of the research that followed—e.g., Nownes & Freeman, "Interest Group Activity in the States", 1998. In fact, the fourteen items used in our research derive from the lists of Schlozman and Tierney and Nownes and Freeman with minor modifications (See Table 1).

In 1998, Ken Kollman interviewed a number of national interest groups about twenty-five lobbying activities (169-170). He judged twelve to be "outside" lobbying techniques, eight to be "inside" lobbying techniques and five to be "organizational maintenance" techniques (Kollman 1998, 35). His "organizational maintenance" items included: *entering coalitions with other groups, sending letters to group members, polling group members on policy issues, fundraising with direct mail,* and *advertising to attract new members* (Kollman 1998, 35). These five items were neither "inside" nor "outside." This suggests that there were more than two lobbying domains, at least by 1998.

Kollman judged eighteen of the remaining twenty-five items to be either "inside" or "outside" tactics. Confirmatory factor analysis of these eighteen yielded only "inside" and "outside" dimensions, as with the Gais/Walker index of eight items. Again however, this does not prove that only "inside" and "outside" domains will emerge from analyzing diverse lobbying techniques. Rather, it proves that if one's assumptions are confirmatory rather than exploratory, and only "inside" and "outside" items are selected, it is probable that only "inside" and "outside" dimensions will emerge. At this point, the literature had not produced a considerable number of diverse lobbying items which, when analyzed, would yield only "inside" and "outside" dimensions.

In 2005, Frederick Boehmke appeared to do just that (129). Like Kollman, as well as Schlozman and Tierney, Boehmke studied the importance of each of twenty lobbying techniques used by group representatives in lobbying Congress. Factor analysis produced only two dimensions. Initially, these appeared to Boehmke to be the familiar "inside" and "outside" domains. However, Boehmke qualified his results. Several items that fell in Boehmke's "inside" dimension are typically seen as "outside" techniques (Boehmke 2005, 128-129). This was explained as the augmentation of several traditional "inside" techniques with several "outside" techniques. Boehmke felt this suggested a third type of lobbying, which he referred to as, "modern inside lobbying" (129 -130). He explains that modern lobbyists may incorporate some "outside" techniques into what is otherwise considered "inside" lobbying (Boehmke,129-130, Rozell, Wilcox and Madland, 27-28). For instance, the techniques of having influential citizens call policy makers or seeking public endorsements are normally "outside" tactics. However, they appear in Boehmke's "inside" dimension. (129)

Boehmke may be right. "Inside" lobbyists have discovered that they can increase their influence by borrowing "outside" tactics such as grassroots lobbying that work for other interests (Hrebenar 1997, 157). For example, the National Rifle Association (NRA) employs professional lobbyists year round to directly interact with members of Congress. But the NRA also has the ability to generate half a million letters from constituents in three days to key members and committees of Congress (Hrebenar 1997, 158). Other groups, which commonly employ "inside" tactics, such as the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, have used grassroots efforts to encourage the passing of certain legislation.

For instance, in 1982, the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association encouraged eighty newspapers to write 130 editorials that supported the extension of the patent life of certain drugs (158). Other interest groups that have used similar hybrid tactics include the Cosmetic, Toiletry and Fragrance Association, the Solar Power Industry, and the People for the American Way (Hrebenar 1997, 163).

In 2004, a year before Boehmke's book on state politics was published, Clive Thomas and Ronald Hrebenar wrote a chapter in *Politics in the American States* dealing with state interest group activity (100 - 128). Especially evident in their research was the increasing reliance on money, the courts and ad hoc coalitions. According to Thomas and Hrebenar, this reliance has resulted in the combination of "inside" and "outside" lobbying techniques at the state level (111-112). Thus, Thomas and Hrebenar came to conclusions quite similar to Boehmke's. "Inside" and "outside" techniques could be combined in "modern state lobbying." Furthermore, Anthony J. Nownes and Patricia Freeman in "Interest Group Activity in the States" (1998, 101-102; 105, 108) concluded that the mixing of "inside" and "outside" tactics was inevitable. In fact, they assert the "inside/outside dichotomy" to be "hazy at best" and perhaps, obsolete at the state level (101-102).

Besides the cues provided by these latter authors, there are intuitive reasons for believing that the myriad of lobbying techniques will produce more than two domains. The concept of "inside" and "outside" lobbying is too simplistic for today's lobbying profession. Past research shows that lobbyists are no longer bound to specific tactics, but are branching out and combining traditional techniques with modern initiatives (Boehmke 2005; Nownes and Freeman 1998; and Hrebenar 1997). We feel that the "inside/outside" categorization of lobbying techniques is outdated, even across states. We suggest that the dichotomy be replaced with a new conceptual framework. A better paradigm would lead to an enhanced understanding of the more sophisticated lobbying techniques used today.

We expect at least three domains of lobbying techniques will emerge through factor analysis of the response data of Oklahoma lobbyists. For these reasons, we expect that more than two broad categories of lobbying tactics will emerge through factor analysis of the response data of Oklahoma lobbyists. Moreover, we expect unidimensional factors to emerge that mix "inside" with "outside" items.

RESEARCH DESIGN

To test these propositions, we administered four waves of an original questionnaire during the winter, spring and summer of 2006. Four waves were used to increase the total number of lobbyist respondents. The questionnaires were mailed to 369 lobbyists registered with the Oklahoma Ethics Commission (Oklahoma Ethics Commission 2006). Some 163 questionnaires (44%) were completed by respondent lobbyists (see table 1). Our response rate of 44% in Oklahoma was similar to those of Nownes and Freeman (1998, 90) in California (45%), Wisconsin (45%), and South Carolina (36%). Our sample of 163 is a comparable size to the 197 completed questionnaires in South Carolina, the state nearest in size to Oklahoma in the Nownes and Freeman research. In fact, the ratio of lobbyists to state legislators is 2:1 in both Oklahoma and South Carolina while it is 6:1 in Wisconsin and 10:1 in California (Center for Public Integrity 2006). Still, a sample of 163 with four response options may produce a few cell populations considered to be too small (see Table 1). For this reason, the four response options to the question regarding the observed frequency of each of the fourteen lobbying techniques were collapsed into two response sets of "less" and "more" for factor analysis.

The questions on lobbying techniques were derived with several minor modifications from Schlozman and Tierney (1983, 357; 1986, 415 – 418; 2006, 206), and more particularly, Nownes and Freeman (1998). While Schlozman and Tierney list twenty-seven lobbying techniques and Nownes and Freeman use twenty-three items in their study of three states, we use only fourteen items. Our initial interviews with Oklahoma lobbyists led to the elimination of items such as *helping draft legislation, regulations, rules or guidelines or engaging in protests or demonstrations*, since these were too infrequently seen to discern a pattern. For these reasons and because brevity improved response rates, the present study used only fourteen items. More items might have produced more or somewhat different patterns of techniques. However, our primary purpose was to find if more than two domains emerged with as few as fourteen lobbying techniques. Also, we wanted to know if "inside" and "outside" items were mixed within factors. If more than two dimensions were found in Oklahoma, and if factors usually mixed "inside" and "outside" items using a set of only fourteen, it would

stand to reason that there would be more than two domains and similar mixing in more diverse, complex and competitive group politics.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Initially, principle component analysis extracted three components from the data yielded by lobbyist responses to the fourteen items. Varimax rotation also produced three factors. When these three were, in turn, factor analyzed, the first factor divided and became Factors 1 and 2. The ultimate products of the data on lobbying techniques were four one-dimensional factors. These are given in Four Factors in Oklahoma Lobbying.

FOUR FACTORS IN OKLAHOMA LOBBYING

Does factor analysis produce only "inside" and "outside" clusters? It does not. Instead, four one-dimensional factors are produced. What about "outside" and "inside" items – are they mixed within factors? Three of these four one-dimensional factors are composed of both "inside" and "outside" items. The fourth factor is composed of three "inside" items only.

Factor 1 – *Electioneering and Personal Persuasion* – is so named because it includes two sets of lobbying techniques. The first involves "outside" lobbying characterized by campaign help, endorsements, etc. and holding other candidates to public account (*d* and *e*). The other set is "inside" and exemplified by means of personal persuasion (*a* and *h*). Why would electioneering and personal persuasion be linked in the minds of lobbyists? Perhaps because a lobbyist is more persuasive if their words are reinforced with action in the field.

The specific lobbying techniques of Factor 2 – *Information and Advocacy Mobilization* – again include "outside" and "inside" items. The first three items (*j, k* and *b*) involve "outside" resources such as influential constituents, grassroots pressure and public imagery. The latter two (*g* and *f*) are "inside" techniques involving the provision of expert or policy-related information and testimony. Like Factor 1, Factor 2

TABLE 1

OBSERVED FREQUENCY OF LOBBYING TECHNIQUES

HOW OFTEN DO YOU SEE EACH OF THE FOLLOWING LOBBYING TECHNIQUES USED BY OKLAHOMA INTEREST REPRESENTATIVES TODAY?

LOBBYING TECHNIQUES

1) RARELY 2) LESS OFTEN 3) MORE OFTEN 4) VERY OFTEN

a. Engaging informal contact with officials (i.e., socializing)
1) **3%** n=4 2) **18%** n=29 3) **31%** n=49 4) **49%** n=78

b. Promoting interest's public image through media campaigns
1) **14%** n=23 2) **24%** n=38 3) **48%** n=77 4) **14%** n=23

c. Sharing information with people in the media
1) **13%** n=21 2) **26%** n=41 3) **41%** n=66 4) **20%** n=28

d. Helping in campaigns (e.g. volunteers, endorsements)
1) **9%** n=14 2) **34%** n=54 3) **41%** n=66 4) **17%** n=27

e. Publishing voting records of candidates or elected officials
1) **18%** n=29 2) **21%** n=34 3) **46%** n=74 4) **15%** n=24

f. Testifying at official hearings (either legislative or executive)
1) **5%** n=8 2) **23%** n=37 3) **48%** n=76 4) **24%** n=39

g. Use of legal research or analysis and technical expertise
1) **2%** n=3 2) **17%** n=27 3) **54%** n=86 4) **28%** n=44

h. Directly trying to persuade officials of interest's needs and views
1) **0%** n=0 2) **4%** n=6 3) **37%** n=60 4) **59%** n=95

i. Helping government officials plan legislative strategy
1) **6%** n=9 2) **20%** n=31 3) **48%** n=76 4) **26%** n=41

j. Getting influential constituents to contact officials directly
1) **2%** n=3 2) **6%** n=9 3) **40%** n=65 4) **52%** n=84

k. Mounting grassroots lobbying efforts (e.g. letter writing)
1) **4%** n=6 2) **8%** n=13 3) **41%** n=65 4) **48%** n=76

l. Attempting to influence appointments to public office
1) **11%** n=18 2) **23%** n=37 3) **47%** n=75 4) **18%** n=28

m. Affecting the policy application process (i.e., the interpretation)
1) **4%** n=7 2) **25%** n=39 3) **51%** n=80 4) **19%** n=30

n. Filing suit or otherwise engaging in litigation
1) **30%** n=47 2) **39%** n=61 3) **22%** n=34 4) **9%** n=14

FOUR FACTORS IN OKLAHOMA LOBBYING

Factor 1[a]: *Electioneering and Personal Persuasion*

d.Helping in campaigns (volunteers, endorsements, etc.)	.788
e.Publishing voting records of candidates or elected officials	.739
a.Engaging in informal contacts with officials	.718
h.Directly persuading officials of interest's needs & views	.539

Source: Authors' calculations using response data from questionnaire.
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax[1] with Kaiser Normalization. [a] Only one component was extracted. The solution cannot be rotated.

Factor 2[a]: *Advocacy and Information Mobilization*

j.Getting influential constituents to contact officials directly	.845
k. Mounting grassroots lobbying efforts	.776
b. Promoting interest's public image through media camp.	.733
g. Use of legal research or analysis and technical expertise	.678
f. Testifying at official hearings	.660

Source: Authors' calculations using response data from questionnaire.

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax [1] with Kaiser Normalization. [a] Only one component was extracted. The solution cannot be rotated.

Factor 3[a]: *Strategic /Tactical Consultation*	
c.Sharing information with people in the media	.813
i.Helping government officials plan legislative strategy	.813

Source: Authors' calculations using response data from questionnaire.
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Varimax[1] with Kaiser Normalization
[a] Only one component was extracted. The solution cannot be rotated.

Factor 4[a]: *Decision-Implementation*	
m. Affecting the policy application process	.912
n. Filing suit or otherwise engaging in litigation	.848
l. Attempting to influence appointments to public office	.835

Source: Authors' calculations using response data from questionnaire.
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Varimax[1] with Kaiser Normalization
[a] Only one component was extracted. The solution cannot be rotated.

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involves the combining of words and deeds. That is, the "inside" resources of information and expertise are reinforced by developing "outside" resources such as favorable imagery, grassroots advocacy or mobilizing influential constituents.

It might be noted parenthetically that "inside" and "outside" items tend to occur sequentially in Factors 1 and 2. That is, the two "inside" items occur together in Factor 1 followed by the two "outside" items. Similarly, the two "inside" items follow the three "outside" items in Factor 2. This might suggest a slight tendency for lobbyists to continue to think in "inside/outside" terms even as they mix the two in a single lobbying effort.

Like the first two factors, Factor 3 – *Publicity and Legislative Strategizing* – combine "inside" and "outside" techniques. Sharing political tips with the news media (item *c*) is "outside" lobbying while strategizing with legislators (item *i*) is "inside" lobbying. Lobbyists may

associate the encouragement of "outside" support for a measure with the negotiation of that measure through the legislative process because words and deeds are reinforcing as in the earlier two factors. Moreover, publicity and legislative strategizing may be paired because they are two phases or steps in the same legislative process.

Factor 4 is called *Decision-Implementation* because affecting appointments to administrative agencies (item *l*), seeking judicial interpretations of policies (item *n*), or affecting the rule-application process generally (item *m*) are all pertinent to the implementation of decisions (Piotrowski and Rosenbloom 2005, 275-276). They all correspond with how (*m*) and by whom (*l*) polices are administered or adjudicated (*n*) (Almond 1960, 17; Almond and Powell 1978, 15-16). We view the *implementation* of decisions as subsuming Gabriel Almond's "rule application" and "rule adjudication" functions (1965, 183-214; Almond and Powell 1966, 29-30) during policy implementation phases rather than during policy-making phases.

All three items in Factor 4 - *Decision-Implementation* - are "inside" techniques. In fact, Factor 4 is the only factor among the four that does not put "inside" and "outside" techniques together. As noted earlier, there might still be a slight tendency for lobbyists to see lobbying tactics in "inside" and "outside" terms.

Probably a more important reason is that Factor 4 items also clearly focus on the output or decision-implementation stage (e.g., rule application by bureaucracies and rule adjudication by courts) (Almond and Powell 1965, 29). None of the three items in Factor 4 is part of input processes, unlike all items in the other three factors. Similarly, all three items in factor 4 occur within institutions outside the legislative branch (i.e., executive or judicial). It may be for these reasons that these three items always cluster together whatever analytical methods are used.

CONCLUSION

These data suggest that lobbying techniques have changed. There are four one-dimensional factors rather than just two – i.e., "inside" and "outside" components. Other evidence of change is that lobbying tends to mix "inside" and "outside" tactics rather than involve only one or the other. What are the limitations and possibilities of conclusions based on

fourteen items responded to by 163 lobbyists in only one state? Does this research suggest more than it settles?

It may, but these Oklahoma data clearly yield four one-dimensional factors. If the number of lobbying items had been doubled, the likelihood of more than two factors would have increased, not lessened. Similarly, if fourteen "inside/outside" items produce "inside" and "outside" clusters in three of four factors, it suggests that what may remain of "inside" and "outside" conceptualizations are quite weak if they exist at all. Instead, these Oklahoma data indicate that both "inside" and "outside" tactics are often used in the same single lobbying effort.

Assumptions of researchers and practitioners may differ because their worlds are so unique. Researchers should rely on the observations of lobbyists more than on their own. Lobbyist observations derive from active learning experiences and practices. For academics, lobbying tactics may too readily be grouped by their locus of operations "inside" or "outside" governmental environs rather than by how they are sequenced or interrelated in actual lobbying situations.

This research suggests several important questions that need to be further addressed. Has lobbying itself changed in recent decades? Factor analysis of data generated by lobbyist observations might turn up configurations of techniques which prove redundant across various lobbying situations and lobbyist samples. However, even these patterns may prove time-limited. Using measures that have been improved by extensive testing, future researchers may find that lobbying continues to change in predictable ways over time.

NOTES

[1] Our thanks go to Ravi Shankar Byrraju and Sai Metla, both Masters level students in Industrial Engineering at OSU, for their help in coding and entering the data and for their early work in data manipulation.

[2] Principal component analysis extracts four components from the fourteen items. It thereby suggests four clusters that account for a majority of unique, shared and error variability within the inter-correlations of the fourteen items. These four components are uncorrelated or orthogonal.

Factor analysis describes the underlying structure that "explains" a set of variables. Unlike principal component analysis, it only analyzes shared variability not unique or error variability. Because it stresses shared variance, rotation solutions such as varimax simplify factors making them more easily interpreted (Mertler and Vanatta, 249-259). Varimax rotation was used because the factors were uncorrelated. The loadings of each of the items within each of the factors represent the extent of the relationship between each item within

each. The factors are not correlated to one another. Moreover, varimax rotation is much more often used than the other two orthogonal rotation methods, i.e., quartimax and equimax. It also used almost exclusively in the social sciences as compared with oblique rotations such as promax (Garson, 12-13).

Varimax rotation of the initial three factors divided the component then composed of 1 and 2 into two unidimensional factors. As may be seen in Four Factors in Oklahoma Lobbying, there could be no rotation of any of these four factors since only one dimension was extracted making rotation impossible in each (UCLA Academic Technology Services 2007).

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BOOK REVIEW SECTION

Danney Goble and James R. Scales. *Oklahoma Politics: A History.* (University of Oklahoma Press, 1982), pp. 351. ISBN-13: 978-0806118246

The contours of Oklahoma politics have undoubtedly changed in the quarter century since the original publication of *Oklahoma Politics: A History.* In 1982, when noted Oklahoma historians Danney Goble and James R. Scales first released this classic account of Sooner state politics, which encompasses a time period ranging from the days of the Twin Territories to the Modern Era, the bulk of Oklahoma's voters remained in the grip of a long and often tumultuous love affair with the Democratic Party. Democrats maintained overwhelming majorities in the State Legislature and six of the eight members of Oklahoma's federal congressional delegation were Democrats. In significant portions of the state, it was virtually impossible to fathom a day when a Republican would be elected to a county office.

Today, however, it is the Republican Party that commands majorities in both chambers of the Legislature for the first time in state history and all but one of Oklahoma's seven congressional delegation members are Republican (the state lost a congressional seat due to the 2000 Federal Decennial Census). In addition, the Republican Party's electoral fortunes have been driven by their new-found electoral advantages in rural Oklahoma. Indeed, it might be argued that Oklahoma has followed the rest of the South in becoming fairly solidly GOP in its voting preferences. Yet, despite the unprecedented rise of the Republican Party and a noticeable shift in voter registration demographics, many of the observations noted in this seminal masterpiece regarding the political nature of Oklahomans remain as true today as when the book was first written.

Oklahoma Politics provides a broad overview of the state's political history. The segmentation of the book correlates with particular historical eras of statehood, with each chapter detailing the various political, social and economic issues that informed the politics of those times. Despite the largely chronological composition of events typical of most history books, Scales and Goble provide a thorough and insightful analysis of past political trends to complement the detailed historical accounts of the aforementioned issues and the individuals involved in the making of Oklahoma's political history. The authors also consistently incorporate election results to assist the reader in processing these analyses, which is particularly useful in understanding local phenomena and issues of class and race.

Upon reading *Oklahoma Politics*, a number of reoccurring themes become apparent. Chief among them is the fact that Oklahoma politics has long been characterized by one-party governance, similar to that of the "Solid South" of the former states of the Confederacy. Scales and Goble, who were known for their arguments that Oklahoma is as much of a culturally southern state as it is a western state, note that aside from a number of relatively isolated electoral anomalies, political power remained firmly in Democratic hands throughout most of the state's history. Despite Oklahoma's progressive constitution and the reform-mindedness of its early years, it did not take long for that spirit to segue to a more conservative approach to governance found in other Southern, predominantly Democratic states.

While there were a number of notable exceptions along the way, such as flirtations with radical factions like the Socialist Party and the Ku Klux Klan, the authors emphasize that a "stubbornly traditional attitude towards governmental policies" was solidified early in the state's history. As typical of "Solid South" states, a persistently conservative approach to race and affection for the patronage system of the "Old Guard" came to dominate many aspects of Oklahoma politics.

Another relevant theme on which the authors focus is the concept of political maturity; that it takes a people both time and history to learn the art of governance. Upon reading *Oklahoma Politics*, the relative inexperience and immaturity of the state's early political culture is apparent. This is clear from the Legislature's overzealous attempts to utilize its impeachment power, both on a number of executives and a seemingly endless array of statewide elected officials, to the resistance

to which the rural-dominated Legislature met its 1960s reapportionment. The authors attribute some of these faults to the state's pervasive and ever-persistent brand of conservative populism, which often manifested itself in the election of grossly under-qualified individuals and in the endless series of referendums peppering voter ballots each election cycle.

To Scales and Goble, it is the frontier spirit and rugged individualism embodied in most Oklahomans that are the contributing factors to the obsession among many past Oklahoma policymakers with fiscal policy. The authors argue that a penchant for limited government, coupled with a "bipartisan hatred of taxes," has come to dominate the history of Oklahoma's politics regardless of partisan allegiances. With the passing of time, however, the authors note that a number of positive reforms have reshaped Oklahoma. For instance, the state's populism has been tempered by the replacement of the patronage system of earlier decades with a state merit system, augmented by court-ordered legislative reapportionment. The reduction of statewide-elected officials and the implementation of judicial reforms as a result of scandals further muted the populist impulses of Oklahoma's political culture.

In many ways, it's hard to imagine a more thorough and comprehensive history of Oklahoma's political evolution than *Oklahoma Politics*. Scales and Goble conclude this classic by noting that: "In the life-span of two generations, Oklahomans had settled a frontier, built a state, and fought a depression and two world wars." In the end, a picture emerges of a state still young and maturing, but whose people largely embody many of the political characteristics of previous generations. The partisan composition of Oklahoma has changed a great deal since 1982. Some would argue that Oklahoma is now a part of a new "Solid GOP South," but while political allegiances shift with time the values held by a people often endure the ages.

Dusty Darr

Rick Farmer, Christopher C. Mooney, Richard J. Powell, and John C. Green, eds., *Legislating Without Experience: Case Studies in State Legislative Term Limits*. (Lexington Books, 2007), pp. 258. $39.95. ISBN-13: 978-0-7391-1144-4

The editors of this book present case studies of six of the fifteen states that had enacted term limits for state legislators as of May 2007 and present in a case study format a collection of papers from the joint Project on Term Limits (JPTL) which began at the Eagleton Institute of Politics at Rutgers University in 2000. Term limits have been around in American politics since the founding. Term limits have their advocates and detractors, and the project was a collaborative effort between the National Conference of State Legislatures, the Council of State Governments, and the State Legislative Leaders Foundation involving 17 contributors. Given the breadth and scope of this study, this is an exceptional book about the operations of state legislatures faced with term limits. For the reader interested in state legislatures and the effects of term limits, this book merits serious consideration.

These studies are organized by levels of legislative professionalism. In each category of professionalism a comparable control state is used that is not restricted by term limits. These control state chapters allow analysis for each section offering the ability to provide single state narratives and analytical chapters in the same volume.

Measures of legislative professionalism have existed since the early 1970s including the Citizens Conference on State Legislatures. In measuring legislative policy making capacity, the scholarship of Peverill Squire is to compare state legislatures with the U. S. Congress in terms of members' pay, average days in session, average staff per member, and general time demands of service. Squire's study of the literature

suggests that membership turnover declines as professionalism increases. The quality of assistance offered to legislators increases as the professionalism of staffing increases, based on credentials and work experience of the staff. Squire's study of the literature suggests that membership turnover declines as professionalism increases. With more professional staffing and heightened work experiences for these staff members, legislators benefit by having more contact with their constituents and become more attentive to citizens and their concerns. Professionalism also relates to the percentage of bills passed and enacted per legislative day, and the interest to reform personnel practices increases with legislative professionalism.

Squire asserts the more days each year that a legislature meets, the better legislators understand the legislative process, including rules and procedures and actually conducting the legislative business of the state. The level of staffing in a legislature improves information made available to legislators, increased job satisfaction, and greater impact on policy making. Higher salaries allow more attention to legislative duties at hand (no second jobs) and may lead to better qualified legislation in terms of academic credentials and occupational status.

Legislating Without Experience examines the effects of state legislative term limits at the state level by using case studies from six of the states that currently impose term limits on their legislative members. The states are grouped by levels of legislative professionalism (professionalized, semi-professionalized, citizen legislatures) based on Squire's articles. The editors use Squire's categorizations to group states by levels according to their degree of professionalism (professionalized, semi-professionalized, and citizen legislatures). In each of the categories of professionalism the states are compared to a case study of a non-term limited state legislature as a control state. These comparisons allowed for separating the effects of term limits from other trends in state legislative politics.

California and Ohio were designated as professional states with Illinois acting as the controlled state. Arizona and Colorado were chosen as semi-professional, with Indiana acting as the control state. Arkansas and Maine were selected as citizen legislatures, with Kansas acting as a control state. Squire's definitions of a professionalized legislature center on credentialed staff members meeting many months each year and which pays their members a full time salary. A semi-professional

legislature is not fully staffed and not fully paid and does not meet full time. The characteristics of the citizen legislature are short sessions, low pay, minimal staff, and dual careers of the legislative members who represent smaller districts. Thus, the eleven chapters contained in this volume offer much insight into the question of term limits, and yet it is an experimental study whose findings are general in nature. The data provide nuts-to-nuts comparisons.

Nevertheless, the full results of studies of legislative term limits will not be known for another decade or more. Only then will trend lines be more clearly defined. For now among the general public term limits remain popular. To eliminate term limits entirely seems unlikely to happen. More than ever legislative bodies are under fire from the public, the media, and interest groups who are relentless in their demands. Levels of cynicism and distrust remain high. Term limits are an expression of the public's distrust of power and the public's hope that term-limited legislators will work harder and be more resistant to the temptations of long incumbency.

Some conclusions with regard to the effects of term limits can be seen in the following categories: composition of legislatures, behavior of legislators, organizational matters, and legislative performance. Looking at these areas, the following observations emerge with term limits: high turnover of legislative bodies, less experienced members, a decline of specialization among members, issue-to-issue thinking members, and an increase in *ad hominem* attacks among legislative members with continued rancor among house and senate members of the legislature, weakening of leadership, and standing committees' jobs more difficult for legislative staff to perform, weaker standing committees making legislative staffs' jobs more difficult to perform. Executive departments and overall weaker legislatures vis a vis governors, state agencies, and executive departments. In short, term limits has functioned to diminish the institutional commitments of leaders and members resulting in more show horses and fewer workhorses.

The public tends to believe that governors and state executives have come out ahead in terms of political power in states of term limits. Legislatures may be weaker institutions because of term limits. The effects of term limits appear to be more severe in the more professionalized states due to a lack of voluntary turnover. Broad changes in society's beliefs about the role of women, minorities, and some

occupational groups in elected office coupled with a myriad of societal forces may be more likely to instigate additional changes in the composition of state legislatures which will further increase the scrutiny of term limits on the legislative process.

Nine of the fifty states were used in this study on the effects of term limits. Future research possibilities would include other states in the categories of professional, semi-professional, and citizen legislatures and compare the states in this study with newly studied states. Oklahoma the first state to enact term limits would certainly be of interest to future scholars to study the effects of term limits on Oklahoma's legislative procedures and results. The inclusion of Oklahoma, the first state to enact term limits, would likely be of interest to scholars interested in the effects of term limits on Oklahoma's legislative membership and effectiveness.

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Mickey Edwards. *Reclaiming Conservatism: How a Great Political Movement Got Lost—and How It Can Find Its Way Back.* (Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 240. $ 21.95. ISBN 978-0-19-533558-3

Former Representative Mickey Edwards (R-OK 5th) is well positioned to comment on the status of contemporary conservatism. Edward's book, *Reclaiming Conservativism*, is a relatively early entrant into a burgeoning field of pundits and once and future politicians offering prescriptions for the rescue of conservatism, which has become increasingly linked to the success or failure of the Republican Party's political fortunes.[1] Edwards' recommendation for rescuing conservatism amounts to an act of recovery; lost in the wilderness, Edwards admonishes conservatives to recall the virtues that led to thirty years of political dominance. What emerges is an honest account of a movement by a movement insider, who was in a position to speak knowledgeably about battles won and lost.

Reclaiming Conservatism is organized into four parts. The first part describes how conservatism became the predominant ideology in American politics. Edwards acknowledges the centrality of Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater, and his brand of libertarian conservatism, as the centerpiece of modern conservatism. At the same time, Edwards notes a few of the paths not taken in the recrudescence of contemporary conservatism: he describes the John Birch Society as a fringe group similar to the "Know Nothings" of the mid-19th century, and considers the rise of "Chicago School of Economics" libertarian economic theory as congenial to the country club set but largely irrelevant to the rising appeal of conservatism among blue-collar voters. For Edwards, Goldwater must be credited with inspiring young people, and beginning the process of rescuing the Republican Party from nearly thirty years

of irrelevance in the face of the Democratic Party's embrace of welfare liberalism.

The ideological homogenization of the Democratic and Republican Parties had enormous consequences for Post-WWII America, and Edwards does a good job of highlighting the tensions inherent in the modern conservative movement. He notes the uneasy alliance of Goldwater libertarians and New Right conservatives with the rising traditional and religious conservatives that were part of coalition that gave Republicans a durable majority in national elections for over forty years. Edwards is clearly uncomfortable in noting the movement of southern conservatives into the GOP, and to the rising influence of religious conservatives in Republican primary elections. His shocked reaction when three candidates for the 2008 Republican presidential nominations is a palpable response of someone profoundly distressed by the anti-intellectualism that has become *de rigueur* among vote-seeking Republicans (p. 42-43).

Edwards is equally troubled by the movement of neoconservatives – former Democratic hawks attracted to the Republican standard by Reagan's muscular anti-communist appeals – and credibly alleges that southerners, religious conservatives, and neoconservatives formed the faction within conservatism that would lead to the "Big Government Conservatism" that marked the administration of George W. Bush. Edwards's comparison of the GOP platform of 1964 and those of 2000 and 2004 demonstrate the growing hold of these less orthodox conservative factions. "Whether one agrees or disagrees with the substance of the positions taken," Edwards writes of the contemporary GOP platforms, "two things have become abundantly clear: first, there seemed no limit to those matters upon which the convention delegates would not only pronounce judgment but demand government action; and, second, that religious conviction, more than the Constitution, would serve as the template for policymaking" (p. 58).

The second part of *Reclaiming Conservatism* details the policies that cost the Republican Party control of Congress and its status as majority party. For Edwards, conservatives' principal sin was to allow the erosion of a variety of "walls of separation" erected by the Constitution to secure individual liberties. The increasing reliance upon and deference toward executive power – antithetical to more Constitution-minded conservatives like Edwards – reached its apotheosis in the

administration of George W. Bush. Edwards argues that "No president – in fact, not all of the previous forty-two presidents combined – has so aggressively or repeatedly declared the right to simply ignore laws that would restrict his power" (p. 93). The price of conservatives' quiescence in the face of Bush's arrogance of power was the cataclysmic congressional losses in 2006 and 2008, and the Obama presidency, and the promise of years of wandering in the political wilderness that is the lot of the minority political party in American electoral politics.

Parts three and four of Edwards' detail the values that Edwards believes are central to any interpretation of any brand of conservatism worthy of reclamation. The forty-eight pages of the third section on "conservative values" may strike the reader as somewhat out-of-place in the overall narrative; while authors can rarely suppress the architectonic urge to construct idealized monuments of their ideological preferences, I suspect that Edwards might struggle to find ways of successfully persuading the reader that values such as "freedom," "peace," "faith in the community," and "belief in the rule of law" are uniquely *conservative* values, and not in fact fairly universal values that are congenial to most reasonable ideological perspectives.

Edwards concludes with a series of steps that he believes are necessary for the recovery of the kind of conservatism he values. Some, such as Step #2 – reject the destructive legacy of Newt Gingrich – could by a less generous reader be chalked up to the kind of score-settling that routinely punctuates the writing of political commentaries by former politicians. Others, like Step #4 – support rational federal spending limits – will no doubt resonate with conservatives of all stripes, although the insertion of "rational" opens more room for debate over the reasonable scope of government that seems lacking in contemporary conservative discourse. The final three steps – "rethink the attitude toward government," "reexamine basic values," and "reread the Constitution" – demonstrate the seriousness of Edwards as a committed and principled conservative:

As most Americans now realize, the Republican Congress's greatest failure, and its most radical departure from conservative principles, was in failing to scrutinize President Bush's determination to go to war in Iraq. It bears repeating: the conservative approach to war is based on caution, prudence, a search for ways to keep the peace. Congress is constitutionally charged with the responsibility – and sole

authority – to decide whether the United States should go to war; and Congress, not the president, has sole authority under the Constitution to decide what to do about captured enemy combatants (p. 185).

Edwards conclusion, that the heart of governing power rests with Congress and not the executive, offers an eloquent and persuasive antidote to the theories of a "unitary executive" so popular in the Bush administration's Office of the Vice President, and serve as a reminder of the importance of a commitment to play the game of politics within the confines of the rules circumscribed by the Constitution.

Reclaiming Conservatism is not without certain lacunae that may trouble some readers. As Edwards admits early in his book (p. 16), he is not a trained historian, and was uninterested in locating modern conservatism within a historical context. The ahistorical nature of the book tends to further contemporary conservatives' tendency to portray themselves as underdogs in American politics, thus ignoring the relative predominance of an older conservatism that bears a strong familial resemblance to the conservatism Edwards embraces.

Perhaps more importantly, the success of modern conservatism owes as much to the floundering of liberalism – to student radicalism, to mounting frustration over unsustainably high marginal tax rates, to the rising violent crime rates, to the deep unpopularity of the Vietnam conflict and to the sheer exhaustion of liberal ideas among the body politic – as it does to the attractiveness of the principles that Edwards values. In short, the political climate of 2008 to the present looks quite a bit differently than the environment of the 1970's and 1980's. To avoid the kind of flailing that afflicted liberals of the last thirty years, conservatives need to be able to distinguish between fidelity to core principles and nostalgia for an imagined "golden era," never an easy task for those passionately committed to a movement whose race appears to have been run.

Most "wilderness novels" offer two narrative themes: purification and recovery. Is Edwards the conservatives' Moses, to lead them out of the Wilderness and to the Promised Land? Regardless of one's ideological persuasion, *Reclaiming Conservatism* offers a pragmatic and principled prescription for the ills of contemporary conservatism.

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[1] See, for example, Ross Douthat and Reihan Salam (2008), *Grand New Party*, New York, Doubleday; David Frum (2008), *Comback*, New York, Broadway; Michael Gerson (2007), *Heroic Conservatism*, New York, HarperCollins; Newt Gingrich (2008) *Real Change*, Washington, D.C., Regnery; and Joe Scarborough (2009), *The Last Best Hope*, New York, Crown Forum.

Allen Raymond. *Confessions of a Republican Operative: How to Rig an Election.* (Simon & Schuster, 2008), pp. 256. $ 12.00. ISBN-13: 978-1-4165-5222-2

Republican Campaign Consultant Allen Raymond stood before the court and was asked by the judge: "What about a moral compass?" Raymond had just been given a three-month felony sentence for his role in harassing voters by jamming phones across state lines in the highly publicized 2002 New Hampshire Senate election "phone jamming scandal," despite having consulted with a GOP elections lawyer who had cleared the tactic as legal. As Raymond related in *Confessions of a Republican Operative* (2008), in 2002 "just about every Republican operative was so dizzy with power that if you find two of us who could still tell the difference between politics and crime, you could probably have rubbed us together for fire as well" (p. 1).

At the trial, Raymond testified that he was paid by Republican operatives to call white households asking them to vote for Democratic candidate Jean Shaheen, using the voice of a "ghetto black guy." He also testified that he made similar calls to union households speaking with a heavy Hispanic accent to suppress the vote.

Raymond's narrative describes his slow ascent and rapid descent on the GOP side of elections management. His participation in campaigns ranged from the ill-fated presidential campaigns of Steve Forbes to the more successful House campaigns of Representative William Martini. However, Raymond believed that he was designated by superiors to be a fall-guy when the New Hampshire telephone jamming scandal broke. Not surprisingly, when the Department of Justice knocked on his door, he decided to cooperate: "Why wouldn't I have cooperated? After all, when the shit hit the fan, my political party and my former colleagues

not only threw me under the bus but then blamed me for getting run over" (p. 3).

Raymond's motivations were not purely related to revenge, however. Not only did the Republican's turn on him, party divisions began to surface in his consciousness. Raymond, who aligned with the northeastern Republicans and worked for Representative Martini, had become highly critical of Speaker Newt Gingrich's strong-armed approach to House governance. Raymond was disappointed and resentful when Gingrich and his followers used the "Contract with America" to claim credit for the Republican's historic takeover of the House of Representatives after forty years of Democratic control. Raymond said that the Republican leadership had nothing to do with this hard-fought win in New Jersey: "In fact their pro-life, snake-handling babble could have easily cost us the election, but if you tried to tell that to Newt and his followers they'd march on your office bearing pitchforks and torches. Their special brand of religious doggerel might go over in Oklahoma, but try selling the stuff to a bunch of Springsteen fans in Asbury Park" (p. 87). Confessions of a Republican Operative equates Gingrich's iron-fisted political tactics and religious zeal with Nixon's infamous "Southern Strategy," which was originally utilized to appeal to southern and disaffected lower income voters by focusing on issues such as state's rights and busing.[1] Recently, Republicans' "conservative values" appeal with cultural issues such as "gay marriage," abortion, and religion in order to mobilize their base.

Raymond's prescriptions for what is wrong with the current GOP actually focuses primarily on fiscal rather than religious issues. Contrary to Raymond's findings, especially if Gingrich's "Contract with America" was any guide, his 10 major proposals–i.e., from the Fiscal Responsibility Act to the Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act – were actually fiscally inclined, not religious.[2] In this sense, Raymond's narrative echoes in a Republican key the themes of Thomas Frank's *What's the Matter with Kansas*, which suggested that the Republican alliance of fiscal and social conservatives worked to the economic disadvantage of many religious voters, who were instrumental in bringing the GOP to power in the 1990's. Raymond, much like Frank, identify the same culprits in people like Gingrich, who both accuse of cynically manipulating religious resentments as a way to securing votes.

Certainly, Republicans are not the only ones to succumb to the

temptations of political corruption. Here in Oklahoma, the long history of Democratic dominance has produced notable instances of corruption, including former Governor David Hall, who served a 3-year prison stint for racketeering and extortion, and former Governor David Walter's conviction on misdemeanor violation of election laws. More notoriously, former Democrat State Senator Gene Stipe is often most synonymous with corruption when the Democrats ran the show in the Oklahoma legislature; however, Republicans are now calling the shots.

Oklahoma Republicans do not appear to have learned the right lessons of Democrats' failings. Former OK House Speaker Lance Cargill, for example, was forced to resign last year for his failure to pay state taxes and questionable management of a political action committee he formed in 2006. Given both parties' ethical failings, it appears that Lord Acton's Dictum – power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely – should be upper-most in Oklahoma voters' minds as they choose their representatives.[3]

While Raymond's book may be dismissed by some as mere payback, another important theme is his search for redemption, which is an important part of his conclusion. After he was sentenced, his wife broke down, sobbing, and he attempted to console her. After his sentence was handed down to him, he told his wife who was sobbing, "I can do this. We can do this. It's three months low security, it's nothing. I've been away on campaigns longer than that. We can do this. So, I did it. After ten full years inside the GOP, ninety days among honest criminals wasn't really any great ordeal." It may be an open question as to whether he received his just deserts for his actions and whether Congress will crack down on these practices.[4]

How to Rig an Election is a quick and enjoyable read, giving insight, particularly from a political operative behind party lines. Such a book might be useful for a supplementary text on the ethics, or disregard for them, in the practice of political campaigning.

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[1] *Branch, Taylor. 1999. Pillar of Fire: America in the King Years 1963-65. New York: Simon & Schuster.*

[2] The Republican Contract With America. http://www.house.gov/house/Contract/CONTRACT.html.

[3] Ethics Commission Publicly Reprimands Representative Lance Cargill, The Republican State House Committee and the Oklahoma County Republican Committee for multiple Ethics Rules Violations. http://www.ok.gov/oec/documents/PR-IV-2007-008.pdf.

[4] Cohen, Adam. 2008. "A Tale of Political Dirty Tricks Makes the Case for Election Reform." *New York Times*. January 1. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/01/opinion/01tue3.html.

Jeffrey Crouch. *The Presidential Pardon Power.* (University of Kansas Press, 2009), pp. 208. $34.95. ISBN -978-0-7006-1646-6

As Assistant Professor of American politics at American University, Jeffrey Crouch has done an excellent job of tackling a subject that is oftentimes overlooked, but constitutes a very important aspect of executive power vested in the President of the United States. *The Presidential Pardon Power* clarifies the intriguing and sometimes secretive practice of issuing presidential pardons for scholars interested in this often-fascinating subject.

Crouch begins by providing the reader with an account of the founding fathers and their struggle to create the executive branch at the constitutional convention. More specifically, he describes the sometimes agonizing and arduous task of debating the merits of including a pardoning provision, and in particular whether the presidency as an institution should have such an authority devoid of institutional checks. In particular, he does an excellent job of describing to the reader the original intent of the founders to create the pardon power as "an act of grace" or "for the public welfare." Crouch's long and detailed exploration of federal court cases related to the pardoning power – and how these cases have shaped and influenced presidential pardons — is especially well done. The historic use of the pardon in relation to these high profile cases explores some of the possible motivations behind these particular pardons. Particularly interesting is Crouch's examination of the deeply controversial decision by President Ford to pardon Richard Nixon shortly after Nixon's resignation. More specifically, he suggests that Ford's unprecedented use of the pardon reignited the original constitutional debate concerning the possible abuse of power. The author then

demonstrates how, in the short run, this perceived abuse of the pardon by Ford contributed to a backlash by Congress, who then attempted to reassert itself against perceived executive excesses in the face of mounting skepticism regarding the executive branch's ability to investigate itself.

The remainder of the book devotes itself to the author's primary and underlying theories of pardoning power. Crouch's primary thesis is that a number of the most recent presidential uses of the pardon violate the spirit, if not the intent, of the framers. He does not overtly state that Ford's pardon was an act of purely political maneuvering designed to protect a fellow Republican. But regardless of his intent, Ford's pardoning of Nixon created the deleterious effect of insulating the executive branch from external investigation by the legislative branch. Crouch believes that Ford's actions in the long term have fostered a caviler attitude toward the pardon power that would later be repeated by successive presidents, who, unlike Ford, would indeed engage in the use of the pardon for purely political purposes. Regardless of intent, the three most recent Presidents appear to have deployed the pardon for largely partisan purposes. However, Crouch is careful to point out that the constitutionally of each individual pardon is not so much the problem as is the apparent politicization of the pardoning power.

Crouch does an excellent job of pointing out instances where past presidents like Theodore Roosevelt, Calvin Coolidge, and Harry Truman have refused to use the pardon to shield wrong- doing on the part of members of their administrations. In Crouch's view, Nixon's abuses of executive power provoked reforms that have probably contributed to these recent abuses. For example, the Independent Counsel Statute, designed to facilitate exposure of executive branch misdeeds, has ironically presented recent presidents with frequent rationales for resisting these investigations, and has thus further contributed to an environment ripe for executive abuse of the pardon.

Overall, the work is commendable on a number of fronts. First, the author tends to shy away from the use of complex jargon that would impede a layperson's understanding of the surrounding legal issues. Second, the layout of the material is easy to follow, and builds logical support for the author's conclusion. Third, the author should be commended for his objective and unbiased treatment of the subject. Crouch is even-handed in his criticism of what he takes as an abuse of

the pardon, condemning Republican and Democratic abuses in the same terms, a quality frequently lacking in the often-polemical literature on the subject.

In terms of the resources used to document and research the book, Crouch uses a variety of materials to fully develop the subject at hand. He utilizes traditional books, as well as a series of primary sources such as letters and reports designed to provide the reader with a rich tapestry of source material. The research notes he employs are quite discernible and can be used by any subsequent researcher seeking additional information regarding the topic at hand.

In sum, the book provides an interesting interpretation of an important topic. As such, *The Presidential Pardon Power* is heartily recommended for all with even a passing interest in the presidency in general and the issue of presidential pardoning in particular.

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Henry Waxman with Joshua Green. *The Waxman Report: How Congress Really Works*. (Twelve, 2009), pp. 235. $ 24.99. ISBN-13: 978-0446519250

Mancur Olson warns in *The Logic of Collective Action* and *The Rise and Decline of Nations* that as states mature and narrow interest groups become more entrenched, it becomes increasingly difficult for states to create public policy that benefits the public good. Instead, these entrenched groups use their *de facto* veto power to form an interest group-generated gridlock that freezes out new policy ideas, especially those which supposedly serve the public good. However, Olson's thesis, if true, would render the career of Rep. Henry Waxman highly improbable. In fact, Waxman writes, "To pass the kind of landmark laws that fundamentally change society means you will have to take on, and then overcome, the most powerful special interests" (p. 221). How Waxman confronts and defeats entrenched and powerful interests is at the heart of *The Waxman Report.*

Rep. Henry Waxman (D-Calif.) was swept into Congress in the election of 1974 as 92 new members – many Democratic reformers — flooded into the House of Representatives. After serving as a California State Assemblyman, Waxman was pleased to find that the House committees were not as rigid or stratified at that time as he had been used to in his home state legislature. However, it wouldn't be long before Waxman began to feel constrained by the seniority system under which he would languish for decades. From 1979 until the Democrats lost the majority in 1995, Waxman served as the House Commerce Committee's Subcommittee on Health and the Environment. Waxman was also frustrated by then-Chairman John Dingell's (D-MI) leadership of the powerful Commerce Committee. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s,

Dingell and Waxman sparred over the balance between protecting the American auto industry from stricter emissions standards, and the need for environmental protection and more aggressive enforcement of the Clean Air Act. Although this battle is not discussed in *The Waxman Report*, Waxman finally had enough of playing second fiddle to John Dingell, and challenged him for the chairmanship of the Commerce Committee after Democrats won control of the House from Republicans in 2007. His successful challenge of Dingell must have been particularly satisfying for Waxman, given his evident belief that Dingell had – in addition to frustrating his personal ambitions – engaged in a decades-long obstruction of the liberal caucus of the Democratic Party.

The book is logically divided into two parts: lawmaking and oversight. As Waxman correctly notes that most people are generally unfamiliar with the "nuts and bolts" of lawmaking, he makes a point of instructing the reader on the lengths a member of Congress can go – even a minority subcommittee member –to raise awareness of issues such as fraud or the harm caused by tobacco or steroid use through the strategic use of Congress's oversight powers.

The Waxman Report illustrates Congress's oversight powers with a narration of Waxman's patient and dogged investigation of the tobacco companies. Setting the scene regarding the influence of the tobacco lobby in the 1980's, Waxman notes that most congressional travel at that time was essentially subsidized by Big Tobacco, which even provided a jet for legislators. In such a cozy environment, few members of Congress were willing to challenge the tobacco interests, even in the face of mounting scientific evidence that over 400,000 people annually were dying as a result of tobacco-related illnesses. Waxman began holding hearings in the 1980s as chair of the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment; his target was the ineffectual warning labels placed on tobacco products as a result of 1960's era legislation. By 1994 the industry was on the defensive because of the many hearings that Waxman held, including those which revealed nicotine spiking by the tobacco industry. Oklahoma Democrat Mike Synar played a role in these hearings, pressing tobacco executives to explain just who "Joe the Camel" was targeting, if not children.

Waxman argues that if the Democrats had not lost the House in 1995, he could have accomplished a great deal more to protect American consumers. However, he notes that being in the minority forced him to

resort to more creative tactics. Throughout the period of Republican dominance, Waxman consistently challenged the majority party, and aggressively promoted speaking truth to power. Although corporate interests may be very strong and well-entrenched, Waxman argues that at the center of every moneyed interest lies the dirty little secret of their exploitation of American consumers, which could be exposed through congressional hearings, reaffirming Waxman's abiding faith in government as a force for good in improving the lives of Americans.

The Waxman Report is written from the perspective of a long-time participant in the culture wars witnessing what he perceives as major turning point in American history. While his tenure in the House of Representatives has been characterized by wily procedural maneuvers and glacial, behind-the-scenes coalition-building, Waxman believes that we are on the cusp of an era of progressive resurgence. Waxman concludes by remarking that "The greatest lesson my time in Congress has taught me is that even though significant achievements often seem likely to be long, hard, and wearying, they are nevertheless possible to bring about. Congress, as it always has, continues to produce important public benefits" (p. 224).

A factor that Waxman does not consider, however, is the persistent and mounting mistrust of the federal government among a wide cross-section of the population. This widespread skepticism may pose the most serious challenge to a progressive agenda. Waxman's clearly-articulated faith in progressive politics may do little to ameliorate the skepticism of many Americans that is either unwilling or unable to look out for average citizens. The irony of *The Waxman Report* is that its author may find himself at last in a position to effect profound and lasting change, only to find that a fickle public has lost its appetite for such large-scale transformations of the American political and economic landscape.

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John D. Nugent. *Safeguarding Federalism: How States Protect Their Interests in National Policymaking.* (University of Oklahoma Press, 2009), pp. 330. $45.00. ISBN-13: 978-0806140032

Federalism is one of the more inscrutable of the principles of the American Constitution, and is frequently subject to facile analysis in the service of ideological causes great and small. Conventional wisdom portrays the relationship between the state and national governments as a one-way, zero-sum game in which the national government steadily erodes state autonomy. Against this conventional wisdom, John Nugent's *Safeguarding Federalism* (2009) proposes that state officials and the organizations that defend local interests can effectively employ a variety of means at their disposal to defend their prerogatives. While the cause of state's rights has suffered a number of high-profile defeats (witness the failure of southern resistance to desegregation and the proliferation of unfunded mandates, for example), Nugent persuasively argues that the states have been far more successful than conventional wisdom would suggest, and cogently describes the many subterranean pathways by which states resist, influence, and appropriate national policies to better serve their interests.

Nugent's scope of analysis is deliberately narrow and practical: rather "than presenting a normative grand theory of how state and federal authority *ought* to be divided, I describe and explain the ongoing intergovernmental policy battles that *are* waged in a variety of arenas" (p. 18). Nugent proceeds from the belief that states are not monolithic entities that respond universally to all federal policies. To better relate the complexity of state incentives vis-à-vis national policymaking, he creates a typology of interests that range from universalistic concerns that are articulated by the national intergovernmental lobbying groups

like the National Governor's Association and the National Conference of State Legislatures to more categorical interests that are advanced by regional lobbying groups such as the Western Governors Association to particularistic interests that are advanced by individual state lobbying efforts. Nugent then conducts content analyses of state officials' associations and governor's state-of-the-state addresses to demonstrate that the prevailing attitude among state and local officials and their lobbyists is a general aversion to challenging the legitimacy of a national role in most policy areas. In Nugent's view, brinksmanship is rarely employed because it is so rarely successful in the face of a roused federal government. Other, less visible, means are generally preferred by state actors.

Part of the value of the book is the clear explanation of the variety of approaches state officials and their representatives can use to influence the direction of national policymaking. One of the more interesting segments of Nugent's book is Chapter Three's discussion of the "uniform-state-laws process," which is a little known and largely voluntary effort among states and professional associations to create model laws and commercial regulations for adoption by the other states. Nugent objectively analyzes the work of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUS), which is the wellspring of the bulk of most uniform-laws proposals, and while few uniform-state-law proposals are fully adopted in identical form by all 50 states, Nugent correctly notes that "by developing and passing high-quality legislation in various policy areas, the uniform-laws process generates practical – if not formal, legal – limits on the federal government's reach" (p. 114).

Nugent also effectively analyzes the various points of entry by which state actors can influence federal policymaking. Whether by overt lobbying using intergovernmental associations or by employing the offices maintained by thirty-five of the state's governors, states routinely stay abreast of the legislative process at the federal level, and as Nugent documents, are uniquely effective in advertising their preferences to federal lawmakers. Noting that federal political actors rarely impose severe sanctions on noncompliant state officials, Nugent's analysis reveals the degree to which federal policymakers and regulators are reliant on states for effective policy implementation, which is an often neglected dimension of this relationship.

Nugent's analysis may not please everyone. Individuals determined to sound the tocsin against an imperial federal government will find Nugent's portrayal of the relationship between the national and state governments unpersuasive. Likewise, those scholars with a more behavioral bent will yearn for more in the way of quantitative analysis. Still, *Safeguarding Federalism* is a sound contribution to the growing literature on intergovernmental relations, and provides an objective, nuanced and careful analysis of one of the more sophisticated of the "working parts" of the American system of government, and is highly recommended for scholars interested in the field of intergovernmental relations.

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The editors appreciate the careful reading and helpful comments of the following reviewers for this issue of *OKLAHOMA POLITICS*.

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