

EXPLORING THE “INSIDE/OUTSIDE” DICHOTOMY: VIEWS OF OKLAHOMA LOBBYISTS

JAMES A. DAVIS
Oklahoma State University

AMY BLOSE
Oklahoma State University

Do lobbyists observe techniques beyond the “inside/outside” dichotomy? This manuscript reviews existing interest group literature and lobbying research. The response data of Oklahoma lobbyists to items on fourteen lobbying techniques suggests there are four, not two, factors. These are labeled: *electioneering and personal persuasion*, *information and advocacy mobilization*, *publicity and legislative strategizing* and *decision-implementation*. Only the fourth factor is composed of the alternative in the dichotomy — i.e., “inside” lobbying. The results may raise as many questions as they settle. However, they clearly show more than two lobbying domains. In fact, Oklahoma lobbyists often mix “inside” and “outside” techniques.

Since the early 1980s, much of the research on interest group politics has classified all lobbying techniques as either “inside” or “outside.” “Inside” lobbying tactics are used in situations in which lobbyists deal directly with public officials. By contrast, “outside” lobbying, also known as “grassroots” lobbying, is an indirect tactic. It occurs when interest group representatives persuade key individuals, opinion leaders, constituents and/or interested publics to voice their concerns to public officials (Hrebener 1997, 105-190; Mahood 2000, 54-63; Nownes 2001, 87-130, 169-189; Rosenthal 2001, 147-210; Thomas and Hrebener 2004, 110-112; Wilcox and Kim 2005 and Andres 2009.

17). To some extent, a similar dichotomy is used in scholarly research on lobbying (Gais and Walker 1991, 103-121; Kollman 1998, 34-50; Evans 1991; Green and Bigelow 2005; Hojnacki and Kimball 1999, 999-1024; Hunter 1999, 102-103; Victor 2007, 826-841; and Wilcox and Kim 2005, 129 – 139).

Over the years, some researchers have discovered that this “inside/outside” lobbying categorization is changing (Boehmke 2005; Nownes and Freeman 1998). For instance, different interests at both the national and state levels have come to augment their “inside” repertoire with “outside” tactics borrowed from grassroots interests. As a result, a single lobbying effort may be defined as both “inside” and “outside,” rather than one or the other. This combination, especially if it becomes institutionalized, may become a new category of lobbying. To more accurately understand lobbying, it will require a better definition of lobbying techniques.

If recent reviews suggest lobbying is changing from the simple “inside/outside” categories at the national and state levels, one must ask if such changes are occurring universally throughout the American political system? Smaller and less heterogeneous states, such as Oklahoma, would be expected to shift toward new lobbying techniques later than national or large state politics, since the competition between groups is less competitive and innovative. In short, if lobbyists evince more than a dichotomy of lobbying techniques in Oklahoma, the odds of fundamental changes in lobbying are likely to be universal.

To find out, we mailed a questionnaire to all lobbyists registered with the Oklahoma Ethics Commission during the winter, spring, and summer of 2006. The major question raised, among others, was whether Oklahoma lobbyists see a change in technique similar to those observed by political scientists in national or large state situations. Specifically, *are more than two domains of lobbying techniques observed by Oklahoma lobbyists? And, do Oklahoma lobbyists mix “inside” and “outside” techniques?*

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

In 1980, the late Jack L. Walker developed a list of twenty-two items dealing with the importance of various interest group activities to 558 group representatives at the national level. Much of the results

were analyzed in 1983 by Walker but were not published until 1991 by Thomas Gais (108) and others. Gais used Walker's 1980 data in taking a step beyond the classic works of Kay Schlozman and John T. Tierney in the 1980s (1983, 1986) on national lobbying techniques. In 1985, Gais' principal-axes analysis of the eight items from the twenty-two items used in Walker's 1980 data yielded two uncorrelated factors (110). Varimax rotation, by far the most widely used rotation method in the social sciences (Garson 1998, 13), maximized the variance of the loadings. The eight items included four "inside" techniques and four "outside" techniques. The four "inside" items dealt with: *legislative lobbying, administrative lobbying, litigation, and electioneering*. Walker's four "outside" techniques included: *working with the mass media, protest or demonstrations, providing speakers for groups, and sponsoring lay conferences* (Gais and Walker 1991, 110). The two factors produced by principal-axes analysis produced a set of "inside" and "outside" techniques (Gais and Walker 1991, 110). An important question that could have been raised at the time was whether factor analysis of all twenty-two items would have produced only "inside" and "outside" techniques, as did the subset of eight. Would more than the "inside/outside" dichotomy have been produced for all twenty-two items?

In the meantime, Kay Schlozman and John Tierney published a list of twenty-seven lobbying techniques in 1983, used by a sample of 175 government-affairs representatives in Washington-based organizations (354). The Schlozman and Tierney list became the basis for much of the research that followed—e.g., Nownes & Freeman, "Interest Group Activity in the States", 1998. In fact, the fourteen items used in our research derive from the lists of Schlozman and Tierney and Nownes and Freeman with minor modifications (See Table 1).

In 1998, Ken Kollman interviewed a number of national interest groups about twenty-five lobbying activities (169-170). He judged twelve to be "outside" lobbying techniques, eight to be "inside" lobbying techniques and five to be "organizational maintenance" techniques (Kollman 1998, 35). His "organizational maintenance" items included: *entering coalitions with other groups, sending letters to group members, polling group members on policy issues, fundraising with direct mail, and advertising to attract new members* (Kollman 1998, 35). These five items were neither "inside" nor "outside." This suggests that there were more than two lobbying domains, at least by 1998.

Kollman judged eighteen of the remaining twenty-five items to be either “inside” or “outside” tactics. Confirmatory factor analysis of these eighteen yielded only “inside” and “outside” dimensions, as with the Gais/Walker index of eight items. Again however, this does not prove that only “inside” and “outside” domains will emerge from analyzing diverse lobbying techniques. Rather, it proves that if one’s assumptions are confirmatory rather than exploratory, and only “inside” and “outside” items are selected, it is probable that only “inside” and “outside” dimensions will emerge. At this point, the literature had not produced a considerable number of diverse lobbying items which, when analyzed, would yield only “inside” and “outside” dimensions.

In 2005, Frederick Boehmke appeared to do just that (129). Like Kollman, as well as Schlozman and Tierney, Boehmke studied the importance of each of twenty lobbying techniques used by group representatives in lobbying Congress. Factor analysis produced only two dimensions. Initially, these appeared to Boehmke to be the familiar “inside” and “outside” domains. However, Boehmke qualified his results. Several items that fell in Boehmke’s “inside” dimension are typically seen as “outside” techniques (Boehmke 2005, 128-129). This was explained as the augmentation of several traditional “inside” techniques with several “outside” techniques. Boehmke felt this suggested a third type of lobbying, which he referred to as, “modern inside lobbying” (129 -130). He explains that modern lobbyists may incorporate some “outside” techniques into what is otherwise considered “inside” lobbying (Boehmke, 129-130, Rozell, Wilcox and Madland, 27-28). For instance, the techniques of having influential citizens call policy makers or seeking public endorsements are normally “outside” tactics. However, they appear in Boehmke’s “inside” dimension. (129)

Boehmke may be right. “Inside” lobbyists have discovered that they can increase their influence by borrowing “outside” tactics such as grassroots lobbying that work for other interests (Hrebennar 1997, 157). For example, the National Rifle Association (NRA) employs professional lobbyists year round to directly interact with members of Congress. But the NRA also has the ability to generate half a million letters from constituents in three days to key members and committees of Congress (Hrebennar 1997, 158). Other groups, which commonly employ “inside” tactics, such as the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, have used grassroots efforts to encourage the passing of certain legislation.

For instance, in 1982, the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association encouraged eighty newspapers to write 130 editorials that supported the extension of the patent life of certain drugs (158). Other interest groups that have used similar hybrid tactics include the Cosmetic, Toiletry and Fragrance Association, the Solar Power Industry, and the People for the American Way (Hrebenar 1997, 163).

In 2004, a year before Boehmke's book on state politics was published, Clive Thomas and Ronald Hrebenar wrote a chapter in *Politics in the American States* dealing with state interest group activity (100 - 128). Especially evident in their research was the increasing reliance on money, the courts and ad hoc coalitions. According to Thomas and Hrebenar, this reliance has resulted in the combination of "inside" and "outside" lobbying techniques at the state level (111-112). Thus, Thomas and Hrebenar came to conclusions quite similar to Boehmke's. "Inside" and "outside" techniques could be combined in "modern state lobbying." Furthermore, Anthony J. Nownes and Patricia Freeman in "Interest Group Activity in the States" (1998, 101-102; 105, 108) concluded that the mixing of "inside" and "outside" tactics was inevitable. In fact, they assert the "inside/outside dichotomy" to be "hazy at best" and perhaps, obsolete at the state level (101-102).

Besides the cues provided by these latter authors, there are intuitive reasons for believing that the myriad of lobbying techniques will produce more than two domains. The concept of "inside" and "outside" lobbying is too simplistic for today's lobbying profession. Past research shows that lobbyists are no longer bound to specific tactics, but are branching out and combining traditional techniques with modern initiatives (Boehmke 2005; Nownes and Freeman 1998; and Hrebenar 1997). We feel that the "inside/outside" categorization of lobbying techniques is outdated, even across states. We suggest that the dichotomy be replaced with a new conceptual framework. A better paradigm would lead to an enhanced understanding of the more sophisticated lobbying techniques used today.

We expect at least three domains of lobbying techniques will emerge through factor analysis of the response data of Oklahoma lobbyists. For these reasons, we expect that more than two broad categories of lobbying tactics will emerge through factor analysis of the response data of Oklahoma lobbyists. Moreover, we expect unidimensional factors to emerge that mix "inside" with "outside" items.

RESEARCH DESIGN

To test these propositions, we administered four waves of an original questionnaire during the winter, spring and summer of 2006. Four waves were used to increase the total number of lobbyist respondents. The questionnaires were mailed to 369 lobbyists registered with the Oklahoma Ethics Commission (Oklahoma Ethics Commission 2006). Some 163 questionnaires (44%) were completed by respondent lobbyists (see table 1). Our response rate of 44% in Oklahoma was similar to those of Nownes and Freeman (1998, 90) in California (45%), Wisconsin (45%), and South Carolina (36%). Our sample of 163 is a comparable size to the 197 completed questionnaires in South Carolina, the state nearest in size to Oklahoma in the Nownes and Freeman research. In fact, the ratio of lobbyists to state legislators is 2:1 in both Oklahoma and South Carolina while it is 6:1 in Wisconsin and 10:1 in California (Center for Public Integrity 2006). Still, a sample of 163 with four response options may produce a few cell populations considered to be too small (see Table 1). For this reason, the four response options to the question regarding the observed frequency of each of the fourteen lobbying techniques were collapsed into two response sets of “less” and “more” for factor analysis.

The questions on lobbying techniques were derived with several minor modifications from Schlozman and Tierney (1983, 357; 1986, 415 – 418; 2006, 206), and more particularly, Nownes and Freeman (1998). While Schlozman and Tierney list twenty-seven lobbying techniques and Nownes and Freeman use twenty-three items in their study of three states, we use only fourteen items. Our initial interviews with Oklahoma lobbyists led to the elimination of items such as *helping draft legislation, regulations, rules or guidelines or engaging in protests or demonstrations*, since these were too infrequently seen to discern a pattern. For these reasons and because brevity improved response rates, the present study used only fourteen items. More items might have produced more or somewhat different patterns of techniques. However, our primary purpose was to find if more than two domains emerged with as few as fourteen lobbying techniques. Also, we wanted to know if “inside” and “outside” items were mixed within factors. If more than two dimensions were found in Oklahoma, and if factors usually mixed “inside” and “outside” items using a set of only fourteen, it would

stand to reason that there would be more than two domains and similar mixing in more diverse, complex and competitive group politics.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Initially, principle component analysis extracted three components from the data yielded by lobbyist responses to the fourteen items. Varimax rotation also produced three factors. When these three were, in turn, factor analyzed, the first factor divided and became Factors 1 and 2. The ultimate products of the data on lobbying techniques were four one-dimensional factors. These are given in Four Factors in Oklahoma Lobbying.

FOUR FACTORS IN OKLAHOMA LOBBYING

Does factor analysis produce only “inside” and “outside” clusters? It does not. Instead, four one-dimensional factors are produced. What about “outside” and “inside” items – are they mixed within factors? Three of these four one-dimensional factors are composed of both “inside” and “outside” items. The fourth factor is composed of three “inside” items only.

Factor 1 – *Electioneering and Personal Persuasion* – is so named because it includes two sets of lobbying techniques. The first involves “outside” lobbying characterized by campaign help, endorsements, etc. and holding other candidates to public account (*d* and *e*). The other set is “inside” and exemplified by means of personal persuasion (*a* and *h*). Why would electioneering and personal persuasion be linked in the minds of lobbyists? Perhaps because a lobbyist is more persuasive if their words are reinforced with action in the field.

The specific lobbying techniques of Factor 2 – *Information and Advocacy Mobilization* – again include “outside” and “inside” items. The first three items (*j*, *k* and *b*) involve “outside” resources such as influential constituents, grassroots pressure and public imagery. The latter two (*g* and *f*) are “inside” techniques involving the provision of expert or policy-related information and testimony. Like Factor 1, Factor 2

TABLE 1

OBSERVED FREQUENCY OF LOBBYING TECHNIQUES

HOW OFTEN DO YOU SEE EACH OF THE FOLLOWING LOBBYING TECHNIQUES USED BY OKLAHOMA INTEREST REPRESENTATIVES TODAY?

LOBBYING TECHNIQUES

1) RARELY 2) LESS OFTEN 3) MORE OFTEN 4) VERY OFTEN

a. Engaging informal contact with officials (i.e., socializing)

1) **3%** n=4 2) **18%** n=29 3) **31%** n=49 4) **49%** n=78

b. Promoting interest's public image through media campaigns

1) **14%** n=23 2) **24%** n=38 3) **48%** n=77 4) **14%** n=23

c. Sharing information with people in the media

1) **13%** n=21 2) **26%** n=41 3) **41%** n=66 4) **20%** n=28

d. Helping in campaigns (e.g. volunteers, endorsements)

1) **9%** n=14 2) **34%** n=54 3) **41%** n=66 4) **17%** n=27

e. Publishing voting records of candidates or elected officials

1) **18%** n=29 2) **21%** n=34 3) **46%** n=74 4) **15%** n=24

f. Testifying at official hearings (either legislative or executive)

1) **5%** n=8 2) **23%** n=37 3) **48%** n=76 4) **24%** n=39

g. Use of legal research or analysis and technical expertise

1) **2%** n=3 2) **17%** n=27 3) **54%** n=86 4) **28%** n=44

h. Directly trying to persuade officials of interest's needs and views

1) **0%** n=0 2) **4%** n=6 3) **37%** n=60 4) **59%** n=95

i. Helping government officials plan legislative strategy

1) **6%** n=9 2) **20%** n=31 3) **48%** n=76 4) **26%** n=41

j. Getting influential constituents to contact officials directly
 1) 2% n=3 2) 6% n=9 3) 40% n=65 4) 52% n=84

k. Mounting grassroots lobbying efforts (e.g. letter writing)
 1) 4% n=6 2) 8% n=13 3) 41% n=65 4) 48% n=76

l. Attempting to influence appointments to public office
 1) 11% n=18 2) 23% n=37 3) 47% n=75 4) 18% n=28

m. Affecting the policy application process (i.e., the interpretation)
 1) 4% n=7 2) 25% n=39 3) 51% n=80 4) 19% n=30

n. Filing suit or otherwise engaging in litigation
 1) 30% n=47 2) 39% n=61 3) 22% n=34 4) 9% n=14

FOUR FACTORS IN OKLAHOMA LOBBYING

Factor 1^a: *Electioneering and Personal Persuasion*

d.Helping in campaigns (volunteers, endorsements, etc.)	.788
e.Publishing voting records of candidates or elected officials	.739
a.Engaging in informal contacts with officials	.718
h.Directly persuading officials of interest's needs & views	.539

Source: Authors' calculations using response data from questionnaire.
 Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax¹
 with Kaiser Normalization. ^a Only one component was extracted. The solution
 cannot be rotated.

Factor 2^a: *Advocacy and Information Mobilization*

j.Getting influential constituents to contact officials directly	.845
k. Mounting grassroots lobbying efforts	.776
b. Promoting interest's public image through media camp.	.733
g. Use of legal research or analysis and technical expertise	.678
f. Testifying at official hearings	.660

Source: Authors' calculations using response data from questionnaire.

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax¹ with Kaiser Normalization. ^aOnly one component was extracted. The solution cannot be rotated.

Factor 3 ^a : <i>Strategic /Tactical Consultation</i>	
c.Sharing information with people in the media	.813
i.Helping government officials plan legislative strategy	.813

Source: Authors' calculations using response data from questionnaire.

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotation Method: Varimax¹ with Kaiser Normalization

^aOnly one component was extracted. The solution cannot be rotated.

Factor 4 ^a : <i>Decision-Implementation</i>	
m. Affecting the policy application process	.912
n. Filing suit or otherwise engaging in litigation	.848
l. Attempting to influence appointments to public office	.835

Source: Authors' calculations using response data from questionnaire.

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotation Method: Varimax¹ with Kaiser Normalization

^aOnly one component was extracted. The solution cannot be rotated.

involves the combining of words and deeds. That is, the “inside” resources of information and expertise are reinforced by developing “outside” resources such as favorable imagery, grassroots advocacy or mobilizing influential constituents.

It might be noted parenthetically that “inside” and “outside” items tend to occur sequentially in Factors 1 and 2. That is, the two “inside” items occur together in Factor 1 followed by the two “outside” items. Similarly, the two “inside” items follow the three “outside” items in Factor 2. This might suggest a slight tendency for lobbyists to continue to think in “inside/outside” terms even as they mix the two in a single lobbying effort.

Like the first two factors, Factor 3 – *Publicity and Legislative Strategizing* – combine “inside” and “outside” techniques. Sharing political tips with the news media (item *c*) is “outside” lobbying while strategizing with legislators (item *i*) is “inside” lobbying. Lobbyists may

associate the encouragement of “outside” support for a measure with the negotiation of that measure through the legislative process because words and deeds are reinforcing as in the earlier two factors. Moreover, publicity and legislative strategizing may be paired because they are two phases or steps in the same legislative process.

Factor 4 is called *Decision-Implementation* because affecting appointments to administrative agencies (item *l*), seeking judicial interpretations of policies (item *n*), or affecting the rule-application process generally (item *m*) are all pertinent to the implementation of decisions (Piotrowski and Rosenbloom 2005, 275-276). They all correspond with how (*m*) and by whom (*l*) policies are administered or adjudicated (*n*) (Almond 1960, 17; Almond and Powell 1978, 15-16). We view the *implementation* of decisions as subsuming Gabriel Almond’s “rule application” and “rule adjudication” functions (1965, 183-214; Almond and Powell 1966, 29-30) during policy implementation phases rather than during policy-making phases.

All three items in Factor 4 - *Decision-Implementation* - are “inside” techniques. In fact, Factor 4 is the only factor among the four that does not put “inside” and “outside” techniques together. As noted earlier, there might still be a slight tendency for lobbyists to see lobbying tactics in “inside” and “outside” terms.

Probably a more important reason is that Factor 4 items also clearly focus on the output or decision-implementation stage (e.g., rule application by bureaucracies and rule adjudication by courts) (Almond and Powell 1965, 29). None of the three items in Factor 4 is part of input processes, unlike all items in the other three factors. Similarly, all three items in factor 4 occur within institutions outside the legislative branch (i.e., executive or judicial). It may be for these reasons that these three items always cluster together whatever analytical methods are used.

CONCLUSION

These data suggest that lobbying techniques have changed. There are four one-dimensional factors rather than just two – i.e., “inside” and “outside” components. Other evidence of change is that lobbying tends to mix “inside” and “outside” tactics rather than involve only one or the other. What are the limitations and possibilities of conclusions based on

fourteen items responded to by 163 lobbyists in only one state? Does this research suggest more than it settles?

It may, but these Oklahoma data clearly yield four one-dimensional factors. If the number of lobbying items had been doubled, the likelihood of more than two factors would have increased, not lessened. Similarly, if fourteen “inside/outside” items produce “inside” and “outside” clusters in three of four factors, it suggests that what may remain of “inside” and “outside” conceptualizations are quite weak if they exist at all. Instead, these Oklahoma data indicate that both “inside” and “outside” tactics are often used in the same single lobbying effort.

Assumptions of researchers and practitioners may differ because their worlds are so unique. Researchers should rely on the observations of lobbyists more than on their own. Lobbyist observations derive from active learning experiences and practices. For academics, lobbying tactics may too readily be grouped by their locus of operations “inside” or “outside” governmental environs rather than by how they are sequenced or interrelated in actual lobbying situations.

This research suggests several important questions that need to be further addressed. Has lobbying itself changed in recent decades? Factor analysis of data generated by lobbyist observations might turn up configurations of techniques which prove redundant across various lobbying situations and lobbyist samples. However, even these patterns may prove time-limited. Using measures that have been improved by extensive testing, future researchers may find that lobbying continues to change in predictable ways over time.

NOTES

¹ Our thanks go to Ravi Shankar Byrraju and Sai Metla, both Masters level students in Industrial Engineering at OSU, for their help in coding and entering the data and for their early work in data manipulation.

² Principal component analysis extracts four components from the fourteen items. It thereby suggests four clusters that account for a majority of unique, shared and error variability within the inter-correlations of the fourteen items. These four components are uncorrelated or orthogonal.

Factor analysis describes the underlying structure that “explains” a set of variables. Unlike principal component analysis, it only analyzes shared variability not unique or error variability. Because it stresses shared variance, rotation solutions such as varimax simplify factors making them more easily interpreted (Mertler and Vanatta, 249-259). Varimax rotation was used because the factors were uncorrelated. The loadings of each of the items within each of the factors represent the extent of the relationship between each item within

each. The factors are not correlated to one another. Moreover, varimax rotation is much more often used than the other two orthogonal rotation methods, i.e., quartimax and equimax. It also used almost exclusively in the social sciences as compared with oblique rotations such as promax (Garson, 12-13).

Varimax rotation of the initial three factors divided the component then composed of 1 and 2 into two unidimensional factors. As may be seen in Four Factors in Oklahoma Lobbying, there could be no rotation of any of these four factors since only one dimension was extracted making rotation impossible in each (UCLA Academic Technology Services 2007).

REFERENCES

Almond, Gabriel A. 1960. Introduction: A functional approach to comparative politics. In *The politics of developing areas*, ed. G.A. Almond and J.S. Coleman, pp. 3-64. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

———. 1965. A developmental approach to political systems. *World Politic, XVII, 1*.

Almond, Gabriel and Bingham G. Powell, Jr. 1966. *Comparative politics: A developmental approach*. Boston, MA: Little, Brown & Co.

———. 1978. *Comparative politics: System, process, and policy*. 2nd ed. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.

Andres, Gary J. 2009. *Lobbying Reconsidered: Under the Influence*. New York: Pearson/Longman.

Boehmke, Frederick J. 2005. *The indirect effect of direct legislation: How institutions shape interest group systems*. Columbus: The Ohio State University Press.

Center for Public Integrity. 2006. Retrieved from <http://projects.publicintegrity.org/hiredguns/chart.aspx?act=lobtoleg> on January 29, 2009.

Evans, Diana. 1991. Lobbying the committee: Interest groups and the house public works and transportation committee. In *Interest group politics*. 3rd ed., ed. A.J. Cigler and B.A. Loomis, 257-276. Washington D.C.: CQ Press.

- Gais, Thomas L. and Jack L. Walker, Jr. 1991. Pathways to influence in American politics. In *Mobilizing interest groups in America: Patrons, professions, and social movements*. J.L. Walker. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press.
- Garson, David G., 1998. *Factor analysis: Statnotes*. North Carolina State University. <http://faculty.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/pa765/factor.htm>. Retrieved on January 15, 2009.
- Green, John C. and Nathan S. Bigelow. 2005. The Christian right goes to Washington: Social movement resources and the legislative process. In *The interest group connection: Electioneering, lobbying and policymaking in Washington*. 2nded., ed. P.S. Hermson, R.G. Shaiko and C. Wilcox, 189-211. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.
- Hojnacki, Marie and David C. Kimball. 1999. Who and how of organizations lobbying strategies in committee. *The Journal of Politics* 61 (4): 999-1024.
- Hrebener, Ronald J. 1997. *Interest group politics in America*. 3rd ed. Armonk, NY: M.E.Sharpe.
- Hunter, Kenneth G. 1999. *Interest groups and state economic development policies*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Kollman, Ken. 1998. *Outside lobbying: Public opinion and interest group strategies*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Mahood, H.R. 2000. *Interest groups in American national politics: An overview*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
- Mertler, Craig A. 2005. Factor analysis. *Advanced and Multivariate Statistical Methods: Practical Application and Interpretation* 3rd ed. Glendale, CA: Pyrczak Publishing.
- Nownes, Anthony J. 2001. *Pressure and power: Organized interests in American politics*. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company.
- Nownes, Anthony J. and Patricia Freeman. 1998. Interest group activity in the states. *The Journal of Politics* 60 (1): 86-112.
- Oklahoma Ethics Commission. 2006. *Oklahoma Registered Lobbyists 2006*. From <http://www.state.ok.us/~ethics/> Retrieved Jan. 15, 2006.

- Piotrowski, Suzanne J. and David H. Rosenbloom. 2005. The legal-institutional framework for interest group participation in federal administrative policymaking. In *The interest group connection: Electioneering, lobbying, and policymaking in Washington*. 2nd ed., ed. P.S. Herrnson, R.G. Saiko, and C. Wilcox, 258-281. Washington D.C.: CQ Press.
- Rosenthal, Alan. 2001. *The third house: Lobbyists and lobbying in the states*. 2nd ed. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc.
- Rozell, Mark J., Clyde Wilcox, and David Madland. 2006. Interest groups in American campaigns: The new face of electioneering. 2nd ed. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.
- Schlozman, Kay Lehman and John T. Tierney. 1983. More of the same: Washington pressure group activity in a decade of change. *Journal of Politics* 45 (2): 357.
- . 2006. More of the same: Washington pressure group activity in a decade of change. In *The classics of interest group behavior*. ed. R.M. Alexander, 201-224. Belmont, Ca. Thomson / Wadsworth.
- . 1986. *Organized interests and American democracy*. New York, NY: Harper Collins Publishers.
- Thomas, Clive A. and Ronald J. Hrebendar. 2004. Interests groups in the states. In *Politics in American states: A comparative analysis*. 8th ed., ed. V. Gray and R.L. Hanson, 100 – 128. Washington D.C.: CQ Press.
- UCLA Academic Technology Services. "Annotated SPSS Output: Factor Analysis." Retrieved from <<http://www.ats.ucla.edu/STAT/spss/output/factor1.htm>> on July 15, 2007.
- Victor, Jennifer Nicoll. 2007. Strategic lobbying: Demonstrating how legislative context affects interest group lobbying tactics. *American Politics Research* 35, (6): 826.
- Wilcox, Clyde and Dong-Young Kim. 2005. Continuity and change in the congressional connection. In *The interest group connection: Electioneering, lobbying, and policymaking in Washington*. 2nd ed., ed. P.S. Herrnson, R.G. Saiko and C. Wilcox, 129-140. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

