SENATOR ALBERT B. FALL AND THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES

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This paper deals with one of the more important aspects of the career in the U.S. Senate of Albert B. Fall of New Mexico, *i.e.*, his opposition to the Treaty of Versailles at the end of World War I. An attempt is made to assess his motives and the significance of his actions.

Albert B. Fall's political career in New Mexico has been covered rather extensively; his controversial years as Secretary of the Interior have also received considerable attention; his years in the U.S. Senate, however, from 1912 to 1921, have been largely ignored. Fall, a Republican, was a leading critic of Democratic President Woodrow Wilson's Mexican policies. About the only time he ever agreed with Wilson was when the Zimmerman note was released on the eve of American entry into World War I (1). Fall's support of Wilson on the Zimmerman note was an exception in the relations between the two men on Mexican affairs, but it was the rule throughout World War I, when Fall was an ardent supporter of the United States and its war policies. At the end of the war he once again became a leading critic of Wilson on the Treaty of Versailles.

In July, 1918, Fall wrote an article for *Forum* magazine which, although poorly written, left no doubt as to his opinion of Wilson. "It is presumptuous in me," he wrote, "a humble Senator from a little known and far Southwestern State . . ." The tone was humble, but falsely so, for Fall had a tendency to begin humbly and then go on to denounce vehemently, as he did here. In differentiating between a politician and a statesman, he implied that Wilson was certainly no statesman and that possibly only four men in the country at the time could be considered as such, namely Elihu Root, Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, and Leonard Wood. Wilson, he felt, was completely unqualified to deal with foreign affairs. Pointing out that some of Wilson's admirers credited him with being a combination of the best qualities of Washington, Jefferson, and Lincoln, Fall compared Wilson with each of the three; each comparison proved to be to Wilson's distinct disadvantage. In conclusion Fall said that we must be patient and uphold and sustain the President, but the responsibility must rest upon his shoulders (2).

Wilson was also quite outspoken in his dislike of Fall. On October 28, 1918, in a telegram replying to the question of a New Mexican as to what his attitude toward the re-election of Fall would be, Wilson said:

> Your question whether I would be able to depend upon Senator Fall . . . is easily answered. I would not. He has given such repeated evidence of his entire hostility to this Administration that I would be ignoring his whole course of action if I did. No one who wishes to sustain me can intelligently vote for him. If that is the issue the voters of New Mexico wish to vote upon it is easily determined. (3)

A certain amount of opposition to Wilson and the Treaty of Versailles from Republican leaders in the Senate was probably inevitable in 1919, but Wilson added to it in several ways. Probably the two most important were his appeal to the people, on October 24, 1918, to return a Democratic Congress in the coming elections (an appeal which backfired) and his decision to take no prominent Republicans and no Senators to Versailles.

The Republican majority in the Senate placed Henry Cabot Lodge, Republican of Massachusetts, in the chairmanship of the Foreign Relations Committee. Lodge became the main leader in the opposition against Wilson and the Treaty of Versailles. He had a bitter hatred for Wilson. Whether there was a close personal relationship between Fall and Lodge cannot be determined from the available sources, but certainly they had a number of things in common. Fall obviously shared with Lodge his low opinion of Wilson. They were both Republicans, both were on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and thus vitally interested in the Treaty of Versailles, and both, judging from certain of their

actions, were rather violent in nature.

On February 15, 1919, the day after the completed draft of the Covenant of the League of Nations had been presented to the conference, Wilson embarked for home. Before leaving Paris, he cabled an invitation to members of the Foreign Relations Committees of both the Senate and the House to a conference at the White House to discuss the Covenant and, in effect, asked that debate in Congress be postponed. Within 24 hours, Wilson's request and the Covenant itself were subjected to attack by Senate Republicans. A strong trend toward opposition was, therefore, already under way before Wilson reached American soil (4, pp. 118-121).

On the evening of February 26, the Foreign Relations Committees of the Senate and House gathered at the White House for discussion of the Covenant. Fall and William E. Borah, Republican of Idaho, did not even bother to attend (5). Wilson, somewhat disturbed by the attitude of some who attended the conference and, possibly, of those who did not attend, decided to make a public address defending his position before returning to Paris. He chose to speak in New York on the evening of March 4. Before he spoke, he learned of a new and important development.

Around midnight on March 3, Lodge stood up in the Senate and introduced a resolution which stated that the League Covenant "in the form now proposed" was not acceptable. It said further that the urgent task of negotiating peace should be dealt with by the conference immediately. After this was settled, the matter of some sort of league could them be given "careful consideration." (6, p. 4974).

One Democrat immediately objected to introduction of the resolution. Said Lodge, "Objection being made, of course I recognize the objection." He then read a list of the names of 37 Republican Senators who, he said, would have voted for the resolution had they been given the opportunity (6, p. 4974). Fall's name was not on the original list, but was added by telegraph the next day. One other name was also added, making a total of 39 (4, p. 155). Only 33 votes were necessary to defeat a treaty.

Perhaps part of the purpose of this so-called "Round Robin" was to drive Wilson into a rash act. If so, it succeeded. His speech on March 4 was a mistake. It attacked the Round Robin, and showed that Wilson was completely unwilling to compromise. His opponents, in the Senate and elsewhere, became even more determined to defeat anything which Wilson might propose. The speech also was to make his work in Paris much more difficult. The rest of the "Big Four" at the conference, Vittorio Orlando, Georges Clemenceau, and David Lloyd George, realizing that Wilson did not have the full support of his country, would, very likely, begin to drive even harder bargains.

Republicans in the Senate were by no means the only group which showed opposition to the treaty. Some of the others were: ex-President Theodore Roosevelt and his associates; the idealists, disillusioned because the treaty did not meet their standards; the hyphenate groups, especially the Irish-Americans, who were angry with Wilson because he did not press the cause of Irish independence at Paris and because they felt the treaty was designed to benefit Great Britain; the powerful Hearst newspaper chain; finally, the isolationists, a group which included a very large segment of the population.

Within the Senate itself there were basically three different attitudes toward the treaty. First there were those, almost exclusively Democrats, who favored immediate ratification with no amendments or reservations whatever. A second group of twelve to fifteen Senators, mostly Republicans, became known as the "irreconcilables" or "bitter-enders" because they were opposed to virtually everything about the treaty. Borah and Brandegee were important irreconcilables. The third group somewhere between the other two became known as the "reservationists." They wanted treaty ratification, but felt that some reservations were necessary to protect certain basic policies of the United States. Out of this group there later developed the mild reservationists and the strong reservationists. Lodge can probably be counted among the strong reservationists. Fall is difficult to categorize. Certain of his actions make him appear as an irreconcilable; the over-all pattern, however, indicates that he was nearer to the sentiment of the strong reservationists (4, p. 380).

Wilson, aware of the building opposition,

arrived in Washington on July 8, 1919, after the treaty had been signed on June 28. Obviously in a fighting mood, when asked by a reporter whether the treaty could be ratified if reservations were added by the Senate, Wilson replied, "I do not think hypothetical questions are concerned. *The Senate is going to ratify the treaty.*" (7).

When Wilson presented the treaty to the Senate on July 10, his mood was different, but hardly more conducive to compromise. He now spoke largely in idealistic abstractions, going beyond the treaty itself to philosophize about America's destiny. He insisted that all the major conferees at Paris had seen the formation of a league as the main objective of the conference. He concluded on a highly idealistic and optimistic note, "We cannot turn back . . . America shall in truth show the way. The light streams upon the path ahead, and nowhere else." (8, p. 13).

After his speech, Wilson left the chamber. Lodge immediately took the floor and moved that the treaty be referred to the Foreign Relations Committee. The motion carried and "The light upon the path ahead flickered and grew dim" (9, p. 331). For when the Treaty of Versailles was referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, it came before a group with a majority of Republicans, all but one of whom had shown their sentiment toward the treaty by signing the Round Robin. Lodge, as chairman, had the formidable task of preventing a split in his party, regardless of his personal feelings. He handled the job well. Lodge and Borah apparently came to an agreement. If Borah and the other irreconcilables voted with the regular Republicans for attaching reservations to the treaty, they could still vote against final passage of the treaty if they chose. If the treaty failed, they would have achieved their objective. If it passed, certainly it would be less objectionable with the reservations than without them.

The Republicans intended to attack every article of the Covenant; they pictured it as a creature "bred in infamy," the "evil thing with the holy name" (9, p. 311). They would do so until the people conceived of it as demolishing their rights and bringing on more terrible wars than the world had ever known. They realized much time would be required to educate the people to this viewpoint. Time was to be gained by delaying the treaty as long as possible in the Foreign Relations Committee. Lodge began by reading the entire text of the treaty aloud, sometimes to an empty committee room. This took two weeks. He then arranged for open hearings, an unprecedented step in the consideration of a treaty, to begin on July 31. Fall did not participate in the hearings nearly as much as did some other committee members. When he did ask questions or speak, he was usually aggressive and often sarcastic. He seemed to delight in controversy, especially with Senator John Sharp Williams of Mississippi (10, p. 209).

One argument which became widely used against the Covenant was the manner of voting in the assembly of the League. It was argued that Great Britain would have a definite advantage over the United States because she would have six votes to only one for the United States. Fall, addressing himself to David Hunter Miller, stated this argument well when he said:

> You gentlemen over there around the peace table gave six votes to Great Britain—that is, to the United Kingdom one vote, to Canada one vote, to Australia one vote, to South Africa one vote, to India one vote, to New Zealand one vote, or six votes altogether, and you did not give a vote to the state of California, or to the State of New York, or to any one of the 48 States of our Union. (10, pp. 423-24)

Wilson, deciding that he must attempt to answer all the various arguments against the treaty, invited the Foreign Relations Committee to confer with him at the White House on August 19. When the conference convened, before opening the floor for discussion, Wilson said, "Every element of normal life amongst us depends upon and awaits the ratification of the treaty of peace." Every objection pointed out to him on his brief return to the United States in February, he said, had been accepted by the commission on the League of Nations at Paris and the problems had been cleared up. These included express recognition of the Monroe Doctrine, a provision that the League was to have no authority in domestic affairs, express recognition of the right to withdraw from the League, and an acknowledgment that Congress was to continue to have the sole right to decide matters of peace and war. Article 10 of the Covenant was one of the main points of attack. Wil-

son considered it "the very backbone of the whole covenant." Without it, he said, the League would be nothing more than "an influential debating society." It brought on a moral obligation, but not a legal one; Congress was still free to interpret as it might choose in any particular case (11).

After Wilson completed his statement, he conducted a question and answer period which lasted approximately three and a half hours. Fall left before the conference ended, saying he had an appointment with his wife, who was ill. Before leaving, he submitted a written list of twenty questions for Wilson to answer at his leisure. The only important oral question he asked Wilson about was the matter of the feasibility of amendments and/or reservations. He asked if it were correct that, since Germany was not to be a member of the League at first, any amendments to the Covenant proposed by members prior to her coming in would not be submitted to her. Wilson answered that the matter had not occurred to him, but that they would not be submitted to her. Fall said, "Then so far as we are concerned we could make a recommendation in the form of an amendment." Before Wilson was able to respond, Senator Pittman commented, "She has already agreed by this treaty that she has signed that the members may amend it." Wilson then said, "Yes" (10, pp. 16-17). Fall later showed that he considered this to mean that Wilson agreed completely with him on the matter of amendments.

Fall's questions which he submitted to Wilson in writing at the conference were printed in the *Congressional Record* on August 22, along with Wilson's answers. Fall, apparently trying to make the point that normal relations could be restored without ratification of the treaty, asked whether Wilson, as President, had the power to declare a state of peace. Wilson's answer was no, not before proper ratification of the treaty of peace. In another question, Fall pointed out that Wilson had said the cost of living would be lowered by rapid ratification of the treaty, and asked why this would be. Wilson said this would come about simply by restoring production and commerce to normal strength. Fall asked several questions as to why the United States was to serve on commissions for settling certain European problems. Wilson's reply in each case was that the United States would add a useful element of disinterested judgment (8, pp. 4176-78).

On August 18, the day before the conference at the White House, Fall made a brief speech in the Senate. He said that he was opposed to the altruism and idealism of Wilson in regard to the treaty only insofar as they might prove detrimental to interests of the United States, *i.e.*, in such ways as perpetuating, rather than preventing, war. He was convinced that certain parts of the treaty (he mentioned none specifically) would do just that (8, pp. 3922-23).

The day after the conference, Fall spoke again in the Senate. He argued, as he had at the conference, that amendments would not be submitted to Germany as she was not to be an original League member and had already agreed that members might amend the treaty. Fall claimed that Wilson was in agreement with him on this matter (8, pp. 4057-59).

On August 27, Fall made the first of his two major speeches on the treaty. He sounded like an irreconcilable. He began by criticizing those who opposed discussion of and changes in the treaty without even having read it. He also asked for patience and toleration on the part of those who favored the treaty with those who opposed it, or certain parts of it. He compared the situation then existing with the Civil War. After pointing out that secession in 1860 had not been just a political issue, but that some had actually favored it and believed it right, he said:

> I say to you, Senators, that to-day the same spirit which would then have disunited this Union is abroad in this country. In my judgment the joining of the United States with the nations of Europe and of the world with which she has nothing in common . . . would just so surely destroy this great Government of ours, which was maintained by the loyal people from 1860 to 1865, as would the efforts of those who believed to the contrary had they been successful in 1860 (8, pp. 4408-10).

Fall insisted that those who wanted immediate ratification, "those who take it as it comes from the White House typewriter," knew that the longer the treaty was discussed the more the people of the country would learn about it, and they feared informed public opinion. According to Fall,

if people understood the treaty, they would be opposed to it.

Visitors in the galleries broke into applause when Fall said:

> I may be in error. My judgment is entirely fallible. If I err, I err through an excess of patriotism. I err because I am an American citizen and because I can see no other body in the political firmament than the United States of America and her welfare (8, p. 4410).

There were three ways of bringing about peace, he said. These were conquest, cessation of hostilities (armistice), and treaty. The latter was the best method if the terms of peace themselves were laid down in the treaty. The Treaty of Versailles absolutely failed in this respect. There was nothing in it with reference to the conditions of peace between Germany and the United States as they would exist if the treaty were ratified (8, p. 4411).

Fall was extremely critical of Wilson. Wilson, he said, had but one idea in mind, and that was the formation of some sort of league. He thus overlooked the material portions of the treaty. He was anxious to "foist upon us a supergovernment because our government apparently does not suit him." Fall concluded by saying the treaty "means war in every line of it" (8, p. 4415).

The tactics of Lodge, Fall, and associates eventually drove Wilson into a rash act, a speaking tour for the treaty. Wilson was sixty-two years old, and the strain of the past few months had made him appear even older. He was advised by his doctor, his wife, and many friends not to go on the tour. He paid no heed to their warnings, but said that, "Even though, in my condition, it might mean the giving up of my life, I will gladly make the sacrifice to save the treaty." (12)

Wilson left Washington on September 2, heading into the very regions where isolationist sentiment was the strongest. Within twenty-two days, he travelled approximately eight thousand miles, delivering thirty-two major addresses and eight minor ones. Such a strain would have been hard on any man; for Wilson, it was to be too much.

He considered the purpose of his trip to be helping the people to understand exactly what was in the treaty. Generally, however, his speeches were pitched at the high level so typical of him. One of the best speeches of the tour was the last one, delivered at Pueblo, Colorado, on September 25. The conclusion was filled with emotion. The arrangements of the treaty were just, he said, but in order to stand they needed the support of all the great nations of the world. They would have that support.

> There is one thing that the American people always rise to and extend their hand to, and that is the truth of justice and of liberty and of peace. We have accepted that truth and we are going to be led by it, and it is going to lead us, and through us the world, out into pastures of quietness and peace, such as the world has never dreamed of before. (13).

On the train after his speech, Wilson suffered a stroke. His doctor ordered the train to rush to Washington. Wilson was forced to remain in bed for several months, sometimes in critical condition. While he was down, the Senate put the treaty down also.

Lodge submitted the report of the Foreign Relations Committee on the Treaty of Versailles to the Senate on September 10, while Wilson was on his tour of the West. The report began by defending the committee against charges that it had spent too much time considering the treaty. Since a full six monhs were consumed in making the treaty, it said, the six weeks which the committee took in considering it did not seem excessive. There were, generally speaking, three groups which demanded speed: the administration and its newspaper organs, banking firms which hoped for quick profits, and people who were sincere but uninformed. The Executive had not been at all co-operative in supplying necessary documents, and very little useful information came out of the testimony of Lansing or the conference with Wilson.

After these remarks, the report went on to use the argument, so often employed by Fall, that it would not be necessary to summon the peace conference for consideration of any amendments or reservations which the Senate might make, because it was already in session. In answer to those who worried about the position of Germany, the report said, "When Germany enters the league she will take it as she finds it." (14, p. 3.) A total of forty-six amendments and four reservations were recommended by the report. The amendments were designed

mainly to remove the United States from participation on all commissions and other bodies for which continuing action was provided under the treaty. This was to be done by striking out the words "and Associated" where the treaty said "Allied and Associated Powers" (18). These amendments came to be referred to generally as the "Fall amendments." Briefly summarized, the four reservations were: (a) clarification of the right of the United States to withdraw from the League; (b) for all practical purposes, a nullification of Article 10; (c) reservation to the United States of the right to decide what constituted a domestic matter and clarification of the fact that the League was to have nothing to do with such matters; (d) reservation to the United States of the sole right to interpret the Monroe Doctrine and to carry out any action which might come under it (14, pp. 5-7).

The majority report concluded:

> The committee believe that the league as it stands will breed wars instead of securing peace. They also believe that the covenant of the league demands sacrifices of American independence and sovereignty . . . which are fraught with the gravest dangers to the future safety and well being of the United States. The amendments and reservations alike are governed by a single purpose and that is to guard American rights and American sovereignty . . . (14, p. 7).

Part II was the minority report. It urged early ratification of the treaty without either amendments or reservations, and deplored the "long and unnecessary delay" which had been caused "by the majority of a committee known to be out of harmony with the majority of the Senate and the majority of the people" (14, Pt. II, p. 1).

Fall's second important speech on the treaty came on September 30. Once again, he sounded like a "bitter-ender." The old argument that amendments and reservations would not be submitted to Germany was reiterated, with different wording.

> When Germany makes her application to enter the League, she makes it as the League covenant then stands and knowing what it is. If she does not like the provisions of the League covenant, she has her recourse and makes no application for membership in the League (8, p. 6136).

This was followed by a strong endorsement of the amendments. Their purpose, said Fall, was to eliminate the United States from difficulties in Europe, "to get our soldiers home," and "to attend to our own business for a while" (8, p. 6141).

Fall once again was extremely critical of the League and of Wilson.

> If your high council . . . now sitting in Paris can order the troops of the United States to . . . take part in a difficulty with which we have nothing to do, except under the orders of someone else, what in the name of all that is holy will the league of nations do to us hereafter? And yet we are met with the assertion—not argument, but assertion—that the league of nations has no power! (8, p. 6141)

> The President of the United States was undoubtedly laboring in Paris for the creation of a league which he believed would bring about peace and good fellowship . . . How, in construing it and working it out, it might affect the people of the United States, I think he gave no consideraion at all. His mind was wrapped up in the great vision he had seen . . . (8, p. 6143).

Fall predicted that the people of the country were so hostile to the treaty and the idea of a league that, if the Senate ratified the treaty, they would elect a Congress that would reject it.

Those who favored the treaty appeared to have the initial advantage in the Senate after the Foreign Relations Committee had submitted its report. On October 2, the Senate began to vote down the Fall amendments one by one. First to be defeated, by a vote of 58 to 30, was an amendment to mark out the words "and Associated" in "Allied and Associated Powers" where it would have the effect of taking the United States out of the business of determining the boundary between Belgium and Germany. Then two amendments which would have taken the United States out of affairs between Germany and Luxembourg were rejected. A 56 to 31 negative vote was registered on an amendment to take the United States off the governmental commission for the Saar Basin. At this point, Hitchcock moved that most, *i.e.*, all but nine, of the remaining amendments be considered as a unit. Fall did not object. The Senate agreed to the motion, then rejected the amendments *en bloc* (8, pp. 6268-77). Six of the remaining nine were then disposed of quickly, with little discussion. The remaining three were not so easily handled.

Amendment number 45 caused a great

deal of trouble. Fall spoke at length in its defense on October 17. He began by explaning the amendment itself; it was to strike out "the United States" on page 261 of the treaty, leaving only Great Britain, Italy, and France to take part in the proceedings of the reparations commission on all occasions. The American member was to attend meetings of the commission, but unless specifically instructed he was to vote on no other measure than the disposition of German commerce. Even this reservation was not as strong as Fall desired. He would have had the United States off the reparations commission completely, but realizing the futility of attempting to do so, settled for the next best thing. No power known, he said, could bring about the carrying out of the terms for dealing with reparations laid down in the treaty. "There are no terms for peace in the reparations commission provisions of the treaty, but there is perpetual war and strife in every line of them." (8, p. 7071)

Fall said, and truly, that he himself had never hesitated in speaking out against the League Covenant, and that, indeed, he considered it his duty to do so. No reservation, he said, could cure its defects. At first he had hoped to sever it from the rest of the treaty, but then decided that if proper amendments could be adopted he would vote for it. Since the amendments were being rejected, he was now determined to vote against the entire treaty. But he would still insist on amendments to make it "as little disastrous or as innocuous as possible." He knew the amendments would not be accepted, but hoped by insisting on them that he could help to inform the people of the shackles and obligations being placed upon them (8, pp. 7070-71).

By a *viva voce* vote, the Senate rejected Amendment 45, and also number 46, which was closely related to it. There was now only one amendment left. It dealt with voting in the league. Fall, in the course of his remarks on this amendment, said that the "proposed covenant of the league of nations is a delegation of authority which we have no right to make, and is unconstitutional under the Constitution of the United States" (8, pp. 7075 and 7678). The Senate then rejected the amendment, thus concluding consideration of the Foreign Relations Committee's amendments and opening the treaty to amendments by individual Senators. Many Senators offered amendments, but the Senate accepted none of them.

After the defeat of the original amendments, Lodge, Fall, and other Republican leaders went to work on a list of reservations, eventually coming up with fourteen (15). Mrs. Wilson saw perfectly the relation of these reservations to the defeated amendments when she said, "The difference between these 'reservations' . . . and the original Lodge-Fall amendments was the difference between Tweedledum and Tweedledee" (16, p. 290). Herbert Hoover and many other friends and associates of Wilson urged him to compromise and accept the reservations. Wilson refused, saying that he trusted true friends of the treaty would refuse to support them (4, p. 395).

On November 19, the Senate voted on the treaty. The first vote was on ratification with the reservations. The Democrats, following Wilson's advice, voted "nay." The irreconcilables joined them, making a total of 55 votes against ratification. The mild and strong reservationists voted together for ratification, but their total number was only 39. Probably hoping to split the Republicans by winning over the mild reservationists, the Democrats then moved unconditional approval of the treaty. This tactic was not successful. A firm Republican majority, this time with the help of the irreconcilable vote, cast 53 votes against unconditional ratification. The Democrats could only bring together 38 votes. Thus, both with and without reservations, the treaty failed to get the necessary two-thirds majority. Fall was out of town when the voting took place. Senator Charles Curtis of Kansas announced on both votes, at Fall's request, that were he present, he would vote "nay" (8, pp. 8786 and 8803).

Joseph P. Tumulty, Wilson's secretary, tells of calling Wilson to inform him of the treaty's defeat. Wilson's remark was, "They have shamed us in the eyes of the world" (17). Wilson made it clear that he did not accept as final the defeat of the treaty on November 19. The opposing sides did make some feeble attempts to work out a compromise, but they failed, largely due to the pressure which the irreconcilables applied to Lodge to keep him from giving in on any substantial point. The only ac-

complishment was the formulation of fifteen new reservations which were almost identical to the previous fourteen. When, on March 19, the Senate voted on the treaty for the last time, Fall was again absent. Some Democrats and both groups of reservationists cast a total of 57 votes for ratification, seven short of the necessary two-thirds (18).

Edith Bolling Wilson's judgment of Henry Cabot Lodge was very harsh. "My conviction is that Mr. Lodge put the world back fifty years," she wrote, "and that at his door lies the wreckage of human hopes and the peril to human lives that afflict mankind today" (16, p. 303). Josephus Daniels acquiesced in this indictment, and added that, had Mrs. Wilson written after World War II, she could truthfully have said that "His fight against the League has cost America over a million casualties in World War II and hundreds of billions of dollars. It has put mourning on thousands of homes." (19) To the extent that these judgments are true of Lodge, they are also true of Albert Bacon Fall, because Fall played an important part in the work for which Lodge is given most of the credit (or blame). The judgments, however, are probably too severe. Is it really possible that a small group of men in the United States Senate can be held responsible for the holocaust of World War II, simply because they voted against the formation of the League of Nations? Probably not. Could the League of Nations have prevented another war even if the United States had become a member? It would no doubt have had a better chance, but there is no way to be certain that it could have.

The objectivity and, hence, the value, of Mrs. Wilson's judgments is debatable. She felt very strongly against anyone who disagreed with her husband (as did Wilson himself). "When the oil scandals sent Mr. Fall to the penitentiary," she said, "I could not but recall that this was the man Mr. Henry Cabot Lodge had delegated to pass on the mentality of Woodrow Wilson." (16, p. 299) This supposed reflection on Fall's intelligence is quite naive and completely misses the point. It was not lack of intelligence which Fall showed in his opposition to the treaty. Indeed, he at times showed a great deal of insight into many of the issues involved in the treaty and its acceptance or nonacceptance by the United States. What he did show was the traditional isolationism which was so strong in this country. In other words, Fall followed the same path that many other naive people in the United States followed in the World War I era. He gave whole-hearted support to "the war to end war," then withdrew once again into isolationism. By doing this, he probably did not see that he was helping, at least in some small measure, to transform the settlement coming out of the war into the peace to end peace. But if one must apportion blame for World War II to anyone during this period, might not most of it more appropriately be placed on those who insisted on writing the excessively harsh provisions into the treaty forced upon Germany?

It is very probable that Fall was sincere in every move he made in opposing the Treaty of Versailles. He did not wish to hurt the cause of world peace or the future prosperity of the United States. Indeed, his main purpose, although in the process he admittedly wanted to teach Wilson not to ignore the Senate, was to safeguard the rights of the United States. To accomplish this, Fall considered it necessary to attach strong reservations to the treaty. If he were sincere and had as his main purpose the protection of United States interests, perhaps he should not be judged too severely.

A newspaper reporter asked Fall very late in his life what he thought his place in history would be. Although Fall probably answered with the Teapot Dome scandal in mind, his answer can be useful here.

> Some of my friends believe I will be completely vindicated. They believe the world will see that I did what I thought was best for my country. Others insist I will go down in history in an unfavorable light.
>
> I don't know. I think perhaps I will be vindicated. (20)

Fall played a secondary but important part in the struggle against the Treaty of Versailles. Whether his role was good or bad is hard to say. Such a conclusion still depends on whether one's outlook is isolationist or internationalist. Because of his involvement in the scandals of the Harding administration, then, rather that his part in the Versailles struggle, his hopes for vindication seem ill-founded.

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