

## **Senator Bronson Cutting and the Philippine Independence Movement: Fulfillment of a Pledge or Economic Interests?\***

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### I

The speech ended with reference to "a statesman, a friend of the Filipino people, one of the ablest advocates of Philippine freedom—Bronson Cutting."<sup>1</sup> Senator Harry B. Hawes (Democrat, Missouri) was the speaker, and the legislature of the newly established Commonwealth of the Philippines was the audience. The date was 16 November 1935, and the occasion was the presentation by Hawes of a portrait of Cutting to the Philippine government. Cutting had been dead since 6 May, victim of a plane crash near Macon, Missouri.<sup>2</sup> What had he done to deserve the praise given him by Hawes?

### II

Bronson Murray Cutting was born in Oakdale, Long Island, New York, on 23 June 1888, into a wealthy family of English and Dutch descent. He attended Groton and Harvard, and distinguished himself academically at the latter institution by graduating with honors and being elected to Phi Beta Kappa.<sup>3</sup> Because of ill health, he moved to New Mexico in 1910. There he went into the publishing business by acquiring the controlling interest in the New Mexican Printing Company. His most important publication was a newspaper, the *Santa Fe New Mexican*.

Cutting very soon became interested in politics. He had little success until he began to court the large Spanish-American segment of the population of the state. He gradually built up such a formidable political machine that he "determined the outcome of state elections for almost two decades."<sup>4</sup> Cutting tended to be a Progressive Republican, but he often helped Democrats get elected. As one writer put it, "Nominally a Republican, party regularity does not seem to have been for him too stern a taskmaster."<sup>5</sup>

Although he had yet achieved no elective office, Cutting's power was such that, in December of 1927, when New Mexico's Democratic Senator A. A. Jones died, Republican Governor Rich C. Dillon appointed him to fill out the term. He was elected to a full term in 1928, and again in 1934.

In the Senate, Cutting soon established his reputation as a progressive because of his advocacy of such measures as initiative, referendum, recall, and corrupt practices acts. He was a somewhat unpredictable progressive, however, and often shocked his colleagues by such actions as saying that parts of the "Holy American Constitution" would best be thrown into the trash can and advocating various Communistic practices after a 1930 trip to the Soviet Union. The irony of Cutting's progressive position was that he by no means represented a progressive constituency. Perhaps, however, it was because of the very fact that he had no mandate from his Spanish-American followers that he felt free to air his own views on any question.<sup>6</sup>

Senator Cutting served on many committees during his years in the Congress, including Agriculture and Forestry, Public Lands and Surveys, and Foreign Relations, but the one on which he served most consistently was the Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs.<sup>7</sup> The problem of the Philippine Islands and their proposed independence fell in the jurisdiction of this committee.

### III

Senator Cutting's name first became associated with the cause of Phil-

ippine independence on 5 March 1930, when Senator Hawes introduced a bill (S. 3822) for that purpose into the Senate and claimed himself and Cutting as joint authors. Cutting was present that day, but made no remarks on the measure. Hawes, in the course of his comments, said that the bill probably would not satisfy the extremists of either side, but that it should provide a reasonable basis for adjustment and compromise. The bill should not be considered from a partisan viewpoint, said the Senator, and he emphasized in this connection the fact that he and Cutting were from different parties.<sup>8</sup>

The provisions of the Hawes-Cutting bill, as the measure soon came to be commonly called, were fairly simple. The bill authorized the Philippine legislature to call an election for choosing delegates to a constitutional convention. The constitution, when completed, was to be submitted to the Filipinos for approval or disapproval. If they approved, it was then to be submitted to the United States Congress. If Congress, in turn, approved the constitution, the Philippine people were to choose officials and the new government was to begin. This was not yet complete independence, however, but merely the beginning of a 5-year transitional period, during which tariffs on Philippine-American trade goods were to be introduced and gradually moved up to normal level. The United States was also to retain control of foreign affairs during this period. At the end of the 5 years, the Filipinos were to vote on whether or not they desired complete independence. If they did, the United States was to withdraw. If they did not, Congress was to decide on the next step.<sup>9</sup>

The Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs, after conducting hearings,<sup>10</sup> reported the bill favorably on 2 June 1930. Three minor amendments were made, dealing only with matters of wording. The report was submitted by Hawes, but acknowledged Cutting's help in both the bill and the report itself. The most interesting part of the report was its list of 14 conclusions: (1) It is the policy of the American government to free rather than to retain the Philippines. (2) The Philippine people are justified in their plea for independence. (3) The Philippines have made remarkable strides in self-government. (4) They are conducting their own governmental affairs now with few exceptions. (5) They are aware of the difficulties independence will bring. (6) They prefer to risk these difficulties now, while confident of their ability to endure them. (7) As far as American interests in Philippine trade are concerned, it is better to grant independence now than after still deeper ties have been established. (8) The uncertainty now prevailing is harmful in all aspects of Philippine life. (9) There are important elements, both American and Philippine, whose interests demand *some* action. (10) Our action will determine our prestige in the Orient. (11) The Philippines are of doubtful trade advantage now, and perhaps would even be a liability in time of war. (12) Postponing of the date of independence will only promote deeper ties, perhaps making the granting of independence impossible. (13) No selfish motives should interfere with our pledges to grant independence. (14) The Philippine people are unanimous in their demand for early and complete independence.<sup>11</sup>

The second session of the 71st Congress took no action on the Hawes-Cutting bill, nor did the short session which followed. In the 72nd Congress, however, the Philippines very quickly became an issue. There were two reasons for the increased interest. First, the depression was causing the farm groups to clutch at anything which promised them relief. Second, there was a shift in political control in Congress.<sup>12</sup> Actually, there were 48 Republicans, 47 Democrats, and one Farmer-Laborite in the Senate. Hoover, however, summed up the situation pretty well when he said, "But actually we had no more than 40 real Republicans, as Senators Borah, Norris, Cutting, and others of the Left wing were against us."<sup>13</sup>

Hawes introduced a bill (S. 2743) identical to the original Hawes-Cutting bill on 7 January 1932. He had made a trip to the Philippines in the summer of 1931, however, which caused him to reconsider certain parts of the measure. Although convinced even more fully than before that the Filipinos desired their independence,<sup>4</sup> he felt that certain changes in the trade provisions of the bill were necessary. In conference with Cutting, he came up with a new bill (S. 3377). The only real change was that restrictions were set on the amount of Philippine sugar, hemp, cordage, and coconut oil which could be imported duty-free into the United States.<sup>5</sup>

On February 11 and 13, the Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs conducted hearings on the latest version of the Hawes-Cutting bill.<sup>6</sup> Testimony was heard from individuals of every shade of opinion on the question of independence for the Philippines, but the most outstanding thing about the hearings was the role played by Secretary of War Patrick J. Hurley. He too had made a trip to the Philippines, and had drawn entirely different conclusions from those of Hawes. He felt that the Filipinos did not all desire independence and that they certainly were not ready for it. Because of his view and his manner, Hurley several times turned the hearings into a fiery exhibition. From the beginning, he clashed with Hawes and Senator William H. King of Utah. Indeed, at one point, after a heated exchange with King in which the Senator objected to the Secretary referring to the Hawes-Cutting bill as a "cowardly" solution to a serious problem, Hurley completely lost his temper and made a fool of himself by stalking out of the room.<sup>7</sup>

Cutting did not have too much to say in the hearings, but even he clashed once with the Secretary of War. When Cutting asked him if he agreed that the Jones Act of 1916 made a promise of independence to the Filipinos, Hurley rambled on for some time about our obligation to prepare the Filipinos for independence before giving it to them. When he finally finished, Cutting said, "Mr. Secretary, if you will pardon me, when I asked you what I thought was a simple question, I did not expect a stump speech in reply." Hurley certainly did not appreciate the remark. For after a few more sarcastic exchanges, he expressed the feelings that any opinion he voiced to the committee which differed from theirs was considered "a stump speech, but what you gentlemen say is the height of statesmanship." Cutting said the charge was false, and urged Hurley to give an answer to the most recent question, his definition of a stable government. Hurley profoundly defined it as "a government that can exist." Cutting let the matter rest after that, but later made it clear that he was not satisfied with the Secretary's answers.<sup>8</sup>

Despite the admonitions of Hurley, a majority of the committee decided to report the bill favorably, though with several amendments, and did so on 24 February 1932. The report was quite similar in nature to the one on the earlier version of the bill. It pointed out the harmful uncertainty prevailing, the moral obligation to grant independence, etc., then proceeded to an explanation and justification of various measures of the bill. The amendments increased the transitional period to 15 years, set up a more rigid schedule of restrictions on duty-free goods, stipulated that funds taken in from the tariffs were to be used to pay off Philippine indebtedness, limited immigration of Filipinos into the United States to 100 per year, and called for a conference of Philippine and American representatives at the end of the transitional period to discuss future trade relations between the two countries.<sup>9</sup>

Cutting, in the meantime, had begun to make his first comments on Philippine independence in the Senate. He did not usually make long speeches, and did not talk at all unless he had some specific point to make. For instance, on 18 February 1932, he obtained the floor simply to introduce and have printed in the *Record* a letter from the Philippin<sup>10</sup>

commission in the United States stating that the Hawes-Cutting bill (and its House counterpart, the Hare bill) provided "a sound and statesman-like solution of the question of Philippine independence." Similarly on 8 June he had printed in the *Record* an article from the *Harvard Business Review* by Rufus S. Tucker entitled "A Balance Sheet of the Philippines." He called it "authoritative" and said it "demonstrates rather conclusively, I think, that the islands have cost us more than they have repaid us." The article also played down the military usefulness of the islands.<sup>21</sup>

On 13 June Cutting made the first of his major speeches on Philippine independence. He began with a summary of the bill, then pointed out that he considered section nine, which provided for a vote by the Philippine people on the question of independence at the end of the transitional period "the basis of this whole bill," and later "the fundamental section in this bill." The bill, he said, was admittedly a compromise, but one which the majority of the committee considered "the best way of meeting the difficulties which it had to face."<sup>22</sup>

At this point in his remarks, Cutting was interrupted by Senator King, who asked why the bill provided for 15 years as a transitional period rather than the original 5. Cutting replied that the sponsors of the bill had previously thought that 5 years would be enough for the necessary adjustments. After testimony before the committee, however, they had become convinced that at least 15 years would be required.<sup>23</sup>

Cutting continued his remarks, and quoted from statements of every president since McKinley which he called "pledges" for Philippine independence. He gave special emphasis to the Jones Act of February, 1916, which he said was a definite pledge of independence as soon as a "stable government" was established in the islands. By the commonly accepted definition of a stable government, i. e., the ability to maintain order and observe international obligations, he said the Philippines had one, and indeed had had one since as early as 1919. It was at this point that Cutting brought up, in a derogatory way, Hurley's remarks about economic independence necessarily coming first. Few, if any, nations in the world could meet such a test, said Senator Cutting.<sup>24</sup>

Farmers, labor, and other groups favoring independence for the Philippines for their own interests, were mentioned by Cutting, but these were secondary to him. "I think that the first note which must be struck in any discussion of Philippine independence," he said, "is that we are bound as a nation to keep our pledges made to the Philippine people in the face of the world." And further, even if we had never promised the Filipinos their independence, "it is illogical and improper for any government which professes to be based on the theory that all men are created equal to hold in subjection any people against their will." That was why he considered the plebiscite so important. He concluded:

All I wish to say in conclusion is this, that to my mind everything else is secondary to the question of giving the Filipinos a chance to decide for themselves. I would not do anything to drive from under our flag any people who wanted to stay there. On the other hand, I do not believe in keeping under our flag any people who prefer to go it alone.

The period of time fixed will allow the Filipinos a chance to create a new economic system suitable for the new conditions under which they will have to exist after independence. After five years of experience I feel that they will be in a better position than they are now to decide whether or not independence is the course best adopted to their own national welfare.<sup>25</sup>

Congress adjourned in June of 1932. Before it reconvened in December, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Democrat, had been elected President on a platform advocating Philippine independence.

The new session of Congress took up discussion of the Philippines immediately. Cutting played a central role in the debates. On 9 Decem-

ber he introduced an amendment to the pending measure for Philippine independence calling for application of the quota system to Filipino immigration into the United States immediately upon ratification of the bill by the Philippine legislature. The American Federation of Labor wanted such a provision, said the Senator, and the Philippine representatives considered it agreeable."

On 14 December because of "strong feeling in the Senate that the time should be cut down," Cutting secured approval of another amendment which cut the time required for attaining complete independence from 15 years to 10." Obviously, Cutting was perfectly willing to give and take on the time element, feeling that not this, but the plebiscite, was the most essential.

One further change was made in the bill before the vote was taken. The plebiscite, on which Cutting had continually placed so much emphasis, was removed. Instead, it was decided that the vote of the Filipinos on the constitution would also be taken as an expression of their desires on independence. One writer put it in words with which Cutting would doubtless have agreed when he said, "What a *reductio ad absurdum* of the plebiscite principle this was! It meant that the Philippine people were thus explicitly denied the right to make a final decision on the basis of a dozen years' experience with the transitory regime."

The greatly amended version of the Hawes-Cutting bill passed the Senate on 17 December without a record vote. Because the Hare bill in the House was slightly different, a conference was necessary. The final compromise bill was accepted by the Senate on 22 December and by the House a week later. It was sent to President Hoover on 3 January 1933. He returned it without approval on 13 January.

In his veto message, Hoover said the bill failed completely to fulfill our obligations to the Philippine people, to the American people, and to the world. Becoming more specific, the President said that the time provided for was too short to allow the Filipinos to adjust adequately, expressed fear that the Philippines would be unable to preserve their independence against internal disorders and outside aggression, and, finally, said that the economic interests of American farmers, laborers, and business men were inadequately protected."

President Hoover's veto triggered Senator Cutting into his second major speech on the Philippine problem. It was 16 January 1933. Ninety-three of the 96 senators were present. The Senator from New Mexico was at his best. "Mr. President," he began, "for the first time in history, so far as I know, a great nation, of its own volition, is proposing to give freedom to a people whose domain has formed an integral part of its territory." "I think. . . that ought to be a source of pride to both peoples," he continued. "This action may well form an important landmark in world history. . ."

After these high generalities, Cutting came down to earth. Referring to the letters of four Hoover cabinet members which the President was using in "an attempt to bolster up his cause," the Senator pointed out that the letters contradicted not only each other and the President, but were in some cases even self-contradictory. He was especially critical of the letter of Secretary of War Hurley. "The President, in general, has combined the inconsistent arguments of his four Cabinet officers into a veto message which in its nature must be as inconsistent as the sources from which he drew it." The message, he pointed out, had been proclaimed to the country as "statesmanlike and farseeing," and Congress had been criticized for passing a poor measure. The committee had worked hard and carefully on the bill, and though it doubtless had faults, so would any other measure which could be drawn up."

Cutting even threw in a little humor as he moved along, something which was rather rare in his speeches. Hoover, he pointed out, was fond of using the word "spiritual," and often used it when most people would consider the matter purely material or practical. "The President sees a spiritual side to the number of telephones and the number of automobiles which are owned in the United States," maintained the Senator. He then became more serious, saying, "I submit to the Senate that Philippine independence is neither a 'spiritual aspiration' nor a 'spiritual boon.' It is a plain pledge" which we made to the Philippine people, especially in the Jones Act. When the President says that the pledge is subject to our responsibilities to the Philippine people, the American people, and the world, "he is merely saying something which is equally applicable to any legislation this Congress may pass." Any bill passed, contended Cutting, would injure someone in one or more of those three places."

The speech concluded with a reference to the so-called "selfish interests." As he had done before, Cutting said that these groups had every right to look after their interests. The main purpose of independence for the Philippines, however, was "to do justice to the Philippine people."

This speech doubtless had some influence in bringing about the 66 to 26 over-riding of President Hoover's veto on 17 January.<sup>24</sup> The House had passed the bill over the veto four days earlier, so with the Senate action the Hawes-Cutting bill (sometimes called the Hare-Hawes-Cutting bill since the compromises with the House version) became law.

Certain anti-independence people had always doubted the sincerity of the Filipino drive for independence. Both Hoover and Hurlay claimed that Manuel Quezon and Sergio Osmena, two of the outstanding Filipino leaders, told them that they realized the Philippines were not ready for independence. When Hoover, in a White House meeting, asked the two why they supported independence, they replied that it was merely to retain political support among their people. Hoover claimed to have been so angered by this that he told them never to come to the White House again.<sup>25</sup>

Perhaps it was in part the realization that they were not ready for independence which led such important Filipino leaders as Quezon and Emilio Aguinaldo to oppose acceptance of the Hawes-Cutting bill, but if so they were not willing to admit it. Aguinaldo criticized the bill as "a relief measure intended to mitigate the acute economic crisis . . . for American farmers." Quezon used a similar phrase, but then went on to claim that his chief objection was the retention by the United States of military and naval establishments after Philippine independence.<sup>26</sup>

Quezon became the leader of the group opposed to acceptance of the terms of the Hawes-Cutting bill. Their fight was successful. The resolution of 17 October 1933 by which the Philippine legislature rejected the offer of independence, listed four chief objections to the bill: the provisions for Philippine-American trade relations would doubtless prove very detrimental to the Philippines; the immigration clause was offensive to the Philippine people; the High Commissioner's powers were too indefinite; and, the retention by the United States of naval and military reservations after independence was most objectionable. The resolution also provided for a commission to go to the United States to attempt to secure a more acceptable independence bill.<sup>27</sup>

On 13 January 1934, Cutting reported that the sponsors of the bill would make no attempt to give the Filipinos a chance to reconsider by extending the time of expiration beyond 17 January. He could not conceive of Congress taking the matter up, and even if it did, he was convinced that no bill could be passed which would be as good as the present one.<sup>28</sup>

Congress did take the matter up. Quezon, as leader of the Philippine commission, met with President Roosevelt and found him sympathetic to two of the four complaints as given in the 17 October resolution. Roosevelt sent a message to Congress urging an independence bill with the desired changes on 2 March 1934. One was quickly pushed through the House under the leadership of Alabama's Representative John McDuffie. An identical measure in the Senate, sponsored by Senator Millard Tydings of Maryland, was passed by a vote of 68 to 8 on 22 March. Cutting was among the 68. The Tydings-McDuffie bill was reported favorably on 15 March. President Roosevelt signed it into law on 24 March."

Actually only one of the four points to which Quezon objected was changed. Army bases of the United States in the Philippines were to be given up when complete independence came, and the matter of naval bases was to be negotiated. Probably convinced that they could not get a better bill, the Filipinos accepted the Tydings-McDuffie bill on 1 May.

Senator Bronson Cutting of New Mexico was dead five days later. Only 46 years old, his life was taken in a tragic plane crash. He did not live to see the independence of the Philippines come about on 4 July 1946, or even the inauguration of the transitional Commonwealth of the Philippines on 15 November 1935. Senator Harry B. Hawes was doubtless correct when he said on 16 November 1935, that Cutting would have been filled with happiness at yesterday's scene in Manila."

#### IV

Though Bronson Cutting could hardly be considered the central figure in the Philippine Independence movement, he was, as we have seen, consistently interested in the issue during his tragically brief career in the Senate. His role is worthy of greater attention than it has received. In attempting to evaluate the part he played in the movement, the essential task is to determine, if possible, his motives. Was he, as Hawes claimed, "a friend of the Filipino people," or was he simply a friend of the special interest groups in the United States who desired independence for the Philippines purely to protect their own interests?

If Cutting's speeches can be taken at face value, there is no doubt of his motivation. As we have seen, he spoke most often of our pledge of ultimate independence to the Philippine people. He emphasized the Jones Act of 1916 as the principal pledge, but was also fond of quoting from statements by the various Presidents to show that every one since McKinley had agreed that the Filipinos were ultimately to have their independence. Cutting even went so far at one time as to express the feeling that we would have had a moral obligation to the Philippine people to grant them their independence had we never promised it to them. In other words, it was un-American to hold any people subject without their expressed consent. It was for this reason that Cutting considered the plebiscite such an essential part of the bill.

Although he did sometimes mention such factors as the interest of farm and labor groups, and once even noted the economizing theory—i. e., the idea that the Philippines were costing us more than they were profiting us—Cutting was always careful to point out that these issues were secondary. The fundamental issue was justice for the Philippine people.

Since Senator Cutting helped write the 2 June 1930 committee report on the Hawes-Cutting bill, it too might be taken as reflective of his opinions. Only three of the 14 conclusions of the majority report even so much as hinted at economic motivation. All the others emphasized such things as the harmfulness of the prevailing state of uncertainty, our pledges to the Filipinos, our prestige in the Orient, and the desires of the Philippine people.

Obviously, the kind of reasons Cutting emphasized for favoring independence sounded much better than such things as protection of New Mexico's sugar beet growers against competition from Philippine sugar, exclusionist ideas, and protection of American labor unions against cheap Filipino labor. Was he sincere, then, in emphasizing the idealistic motives as opposed to the economic ones? Look at what historians have said of the movement in the American Congress for Philippine independence:

The Independence Act of 1934, then and since advertised to the world as an exemplary deed of renunciation, found probably 90 per cent of its motivation in a cynical desire of American producers to close the American market to the Filipinos at whatever cost to the latter. Independence was granted when the wiser Filipino leaders had ceased to desire it and upon terms almost certain to produce economic disaster in the Philippines.

The action of that group was determined at almost every turn by economic pressure-groups who sought to advance their special interests, with no regard for the general welfare of either the Philippines or their own country.

"The basic motives were not altogether high-minded," said another, whose section dealing with the movement was entitled "Freedom For (From?) The Filipinos."<sup>10</sup> Such statements could be multiplied almost endlessly.

Whether these accusations are just when applied to Senator Cutting is open to debate. It is true, however, that certain ties, indirect though some of them may be, can be shown between the Senator from New Mexico and certain of the so-called "selfish-interest" groups. Hawes, in his book on the Philippine problem, listed seven such groups: (1) three national farm organizations—the National Grange, National Farm Bureau Federation, and Farmers' Union; (2) two national dairy organizations—the Cooperative Milk Producer's Association and National Dairy Union; (3) the American Federation of Labor; (4) groups in 19 beet-sugar states and 8 cane-sugar ones; (5) exclusionists; (6) American investors in Cuban sugar; and (7) an element fearing Filipino competition with Negroes for jobs which had traditionally been held by that group.<sup>11</sup> Cutting can be connected in some manner with at least three of these.

The best case can be made in connecting Cutting with the American Federation of Labor, or at least with labor in general. As we have seen, he acknowledged the Federation's influence in one of his own remarks in the Senate, when he secured approval for an amendment provided for the quota system on Filipino immigration immediately upon their approval of the independence bill. In addition to this, evidence of a close tie with labor showed up soon after Cutting's death. A senator delivering a memorial address said, "Labor lost an ally and a friend when Bronson Cutting died." And two labor unions sent resolutions to Congress in appreciation of Cutting's services as a friend and champion of their cause.<sup>12</sup>

Another reasonably close tie can be implied between Cutting and the sugar interests. New Mexico was one of the 19 beet-sugar producing states which had a group actively pushing Philippine independence.<sup>13</sup>

The third possible tie, admittedly somewhat weaker, is with the exclusionists. The American Legion issued a statement supporting the stand of this group; Cutting was an important figure in the American Legion.<sup>14</sup>

Three other points might be mentioned as possible "selfish" motives on the part of Cutting. First, one author pointed out that Philippine embroidery products met with no serious competition from United States products from such states as Arizona, Texas, and New Mexico, because the Philippine products were of a higher quality.<sup>15</sup> Perhaps it is possible that the few people of New Mexico who were involved in this line of work would have appreciated elimination of the Philippine products. Second, the Spanish-Americans of New Mexico might have tended to sym-



pathize with the Filipinos and favor their independence because of a common language and religion. If so, Cutting would doubtless have been influenced by this sentiment, since so much of his support came from the Spanish-Americans. Third, there was a family connection which could possibly have had some influence. Cutting had an uncle, Robert Fulton Cutting, of New York, who had been a member of the old Anti-Imperialist League and was a director of the American Sugar Beet Company.<sup>4</sup>

Mention of the old anti-imperialist movement of 1898 leads to another interesting consideration. One writer considered the remnants of this group an important part of the support for independence in the 1930's. An authoritative study of the old movement pointed out that it was "based almost exclusively on grounds of abstract political principle." The anti-imperialists of 1898 felt that it was against the basic American political doctrine of the consent of the governed to subject alien peoples to our rule. The study concluded by pointing out that it was a very different combination of forces which secured passage of the independence act later on.<sup>5</sup>

This was a valid conclusion; it was indeed a very different combination of forces which made up the pro-independence group of the 1930's. But perhaps Bronson Cutting was one carry-over, at least so far as motivation was concerned. His expressed motives for favoring independence certainly fit with the ideas of the old anti-imperialists. Indeed, he might have been part of the group had he been old enough at the time, for he once said in the Senate that "We should never have gone into the Philippine Islands in the first place." Even one work which was quite critical of Congressional motives as a whole pointed out that Senator Cutting was an exception.<sup>6</sup>

One further consideration is necessary to place Cutting's role in proper perspective, and that is the state of public opinion in the United States on the question of Philippine independence in the early 1930's. Strangely enough, writers have differed widely in their remarks on this subject. Several have stated that the American people as a whole tended to favor independence,<sup>7</sup> while at least one wrote that the matter was of little concern to most Americans one way or the other.<sup>8</sup> Probably it is safe to say that Philippine independence was not a burning issue in the United States at any time, but that more and more people began to favor it, largely for economic reasons, as the Great Depression deepened. Senators George Norris and Sam Bratton both expressed the sentiment after Cutting's death that he had never considered the popularity of a cause in making his stand, but only the rightness of it.<sup>9</sup> Perhaps Cutting really was convinced, as he said, that it was only right to grant independence to the Filipinos.

In conclusion, it should be noted that sincerity was one of Cutting's most often-noted attributes. Senator Norris stated, "I have no fear of contradiction when I say no member of the Senate ever doubted his sincerity of purpose in any legislative struggle in which he participated."<sup>10</sup> The economic and other "selfish" connections mentioned above, then, doubtless played some part in Cutting's actions—indeed, he'd not deny this himself. Perhaps they played a greater role than one would gather from his own utterances in the Senate. However, on the basis of the evidence available, it seems safe to conclude that the reasons for independence which he emphasized were the ones really uppermost in his mind. He was sincerely interested in fulfilling what he felt to be a definite pledge to the Philippines; he really was "a friend of the Filipino people."

#### LITERATURE CITED

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<sup>1</sup>*Cong. Rec.*, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess., 556.

<sup>2</sup>Oliver LaFarge, *Santa Fe: The Autobiography of a Southwestern Town* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1949), 350.

<sup>3</sup>*The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes: The First Thousand Days, 1933-1936* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1953), 359.

<sup>4</sup>W. Eugene Hollon, *The Southwest: Old and New* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), 395.

<sup>5</sup>*New York Times*, 30 December 1927, 18.

<sup>6</sup>Hollon, *The Southwest*, 394-97.

<sup>7</sup>*Congressional Record*, 70th Congress, 1st Session through 74th Congress, 1st Session. (*Congressional Record* is hereafter abbreviated as *Cong. Rec.*)

<sup>8</sup>*Cong. Rec.*, 71st Cong., 2nd Sess., 4794-97.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.* The bill can also be found in 71st Cong., 2nd Sess., *Senate Report 781*.

<sup>10</sup>71st Cong., 2nd Sess., *Independence for the Philippines. Hearings before the Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs, United States Senate*.

<sup>11</sup>71st Cong., 2nd Sess., *Senate Report 781*, 23-24. Part II of this document was the report of the minority. It was signed by four of the committee's fourteen members. One of their principal arguments was that the period of five years was too short for the necessary adjustments the Filipinos would be required to make.

<sup>12</sup>Pedro E. Abelarde, *American Tariff Policy towards the Philippines, 1898-1946* (Morningside Heights, New York: King's Crown Press, 1947), 151.

<sup>13</sup>*The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover, III, The Great Depression, 1929-1941* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952), 101; and Marian C. McKenna, *Borah* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1961), 87 and 271.

<sup>14</sup>"I can say now with the greatest earnestness that although I spoke to many persons in various walks of life . . . not once did any Filipino man or woman who talked to me, or of whom I could hear, say he or she was not for independence."—Harry B. Hawes, *Philippine Uncertainty, An American Problem* (New York: The Century Company, 1932), 5.

<sup>15</sup>*Cong. Rec.*, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 3513-15. The bill can also be found in 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., *Senate Report 354*.

<sup>16</sup>72nd Cong., 1st Sess., *Independence for the Philippines. Hearings before the Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs, United States Senate*.

<sup>17</sup>Don Lohbeck, *Patrick J. Hurley* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1956), 93; and William H. Anderson, *The Philippine Problem* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1939), 148. Anderson entitled his section dealing with Hurley's role "Hurley-Burley." The best official statement of Hurley's views is in 71st Cong., 2nd Sess., *Senate Document 180*.

<sup>72</sup>72nd Cong., 1st Sess., *Hearings*, 119-23; *Cong. Rec.*, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 12800.

<sup>72</sup>72nd Cong., 1st Sess., *Senate Report 354*.

<sup>Cong. Rec.</sup>*Cong. Rec.*, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 4205-08; and 12266-70.

<sup>Ibid.</sup>*Ibid.*, 12798 and 12800.

<sup>Ibid.</sup>*Ibid.*, 12798.

<sup>Ibid.</sup>*Ibid.*, 12798-800.

<sup>Ibid.</sup>*Ibid.*, 12800-01.

<sup>Cong. Rec.</sup>*Cong. Rec.*, 72nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 254-64.

<sup>Ibid.</sup>*Ibid.*, 425 and 546-49.

<sup>Grayson L. Kirk</sup>Grayson L. Kirk, *Philippine Independence: Motives, Problems and Prospects* (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1936), 118-19.

<sup>The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover, II, The Cabinet and the Presidency, 1920-1933</sup>*The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover, II, The Cabinet and the Presidency, 1920-1933* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952), 360-61.

<sup>Cong. Rec.</sup>*Cong. Rec.*, 72nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1865.

<sup>Ibid.</sup>*Ibid.*, 1866-67 and 1911.

<sup>Ibid.</sup>*Ibid.*, 1911.

<sup>Cong. Rec.</sup>*Cong. Rec.*, 72nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1915.

<sup>Ibid.</sup>*Ibid.*, 1924.

<sup>Hoover, Memoirs, II, 361.</sup>Hoover, *Memoirs*, II, 361.

<sup>Emilio Aguinaldo and Vicente Albano Pacis, A Second Look at America</sup>Emilio Aguinaldo and Vicente Albano Pacis, *A Second Look at America* (New York: Robert Speller and Sons, Publishers, Inc., 1957), 171; Manuel Luis Quezon, *The Good Fight* (New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., Inc., 1946), 148-49.

<sup>George A. Malcolm, The Commonwealth of the Philippines</sup>George A. Malcolm, *The Commonwealth of the Philippines* (New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., Inc., 1936), 124.

<sup>New York Times, 13 January 1934, 7.</sup>*New York Times*, 13 January 1934, 7.

<sup>Quezon, The Good Fight, 151; Cong. Rec., 73rd., 2nd Sess., 3580-81 and 5164, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., Senate Report 494; and Samuel I. Rosenman (ed.), The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, III, The Advance of Recovery and Reform, 1934</sup>Quezon, *The Good Fight*, 151; *Cong. Rec.*, 73rd., 2nd Sess., 3580-81 and 5164, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., *Senate Report 494*; and Samuel I. Rosenman (ed.), *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, III, The Advance of Recovery and Reform, 1934* (New York: Random House, 1938), 119.

<sup>Cong. Rec., 74th Cong., 2nd Sess., 556.</sup>*Cong. Rec.*, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess., 556.

<sup>The three statements are from: Julius W. Pratt, America's Colonial Experiment</sup>The three statements are from: Julius W. Pratt, *America's Colonial Experiment* (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1950), 291; Garel A. Grunder and William E. Livesey, *The Philippines and the United States* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1951), 210; and Thomas A. Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People* (Sixth Edition; New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1958), 673-74.

<sup>Hawes, Philippine Uncertainty, 221-22.</sup>Hawes, *Philippine Uncertainty*, 221-22.

<sup>Cong. Rec., 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 10166, 7891, and 8417.</sup>*Cong. Rec.*, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 10166, 7891, and 8417.

<sup>Hawes, Philippine Uncertainty, 222.</sup>Hawes, *Philippine Uncertainty*, 222.

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"*Cong. Rec.*, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 2937; and 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 5204-05.

"*Cong. Rec.*, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 2938. See also "Editorial," *The Nation*, CXL, 3645 (15 May 1935), 557; and Owen P. White, "Member of Both Clubs", *American Mercury*, XXV (February, 1932), 189, which was quite critical of Cutting in general, but admitted that he was "entirely free from any taint of hypocrisy."

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