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CULTURE AS A SOCIAL PROBLEM: CRITICAL THEORY ON THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD

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Critical theorists have taken a stance against modern culture. They have not succumbed to the idea that modern society is more equitable or free than past societies. In contrast, some social theorists have argued that modern societies possess organic solidarity, and are governed by contracts and a universalistic orientation (Durkheim, 1964; Maine, 1970; Parsons, 1966). We are interested in what critical theory can tell us bout modern culture (e.g., Connerton, 976; O'Neil, 1976) rather than on an nalysis, history, or evaluation of critical heory (Jay, 1973; Slater, 1977; Tar, 1977; Buck-Morss, 1977).

Critical theory has been used to analyze the "superstructure" of society (Therborn, 1970). For critical theorists, modern societies are dominated by a culture which limits the emergence of free and rational societies. This analysis by critical theory may help us to understand not simply what "is" but also what is "possible."

THE EVOLUTION OF SUBJECTIVE REASON. Critical theory has argued that since history has not given us "an economically grounded 'mechanism' of emancipation," we must "detach the criticism of exchange rationality from its fundamental exposition in terms of labor value in the criticism of political economy, and translate it into a criticism of instrumental reason" (Wellmer, 1971:121, 130). Social relationships have become so reified that critical theory must break through the veil of instrumental (subjective) reason. Instrumental reason refers to the idea of finding means for goals which are adopted in any specific instance. Instrumental reason takes existing ends for granted, and disregards whether the goals are rational or irrational. This view of reason contrasts sharply with a much older view in which reason was to set goals or standards. In this more traditional view, reason was always linked with freedom and potentiality Marcuse, 1969:9).

The progenitor of modern subjective reason has been positivism in all of its various disguises. The ideal that positivism pursues is knowledge in the form of a mathematically formulated universal science deducible from the smallest possible number of axioms, a system which assures the calculation of the probable occurrence of all events. Society, too, is to be explained in this way" (Horkheimer, 1972:138). For positivism, the distinction between what an entity appears to be and what it actually is disappears. This distinction reduces reason to the adjustment of entities in existence--the status quo. It removes the idea of potentiality of reason to construct alternative thoughts about the way society should be.

Even the concern for fact gathering, in part, has followed the development of industrial production. The division of labor in intellectual life, for the sake of economy and efficiency, is assiduously applied to the development of theories. These theories, of course, must always "be done with an eye unwaveringly on the facts" (Horkheimer, 1972:191). Critical theory suggests that even the development of theory in the modern world has been appropriated by a industrialized culture. We think of theories in terms like "better," "useful," "appropriate," "productive," and " valuable," which are not scientific value-neutral terms (Horkheimer, 1972:207). Ironically, "the positivists seem to forget that nature science as they conceive it is above all an auxiliary means of production, one element among many in the social process" (Horkheimer, 1974a:59).

In part, the predominance of subjective reason has occurred as an indirect consequence of "enlightenment." Enlightenment thinking was oriented toward the control of nature for the sake of human prograss. Enlightenment thought sought to remove the mythical, religious and superstitious beliefs from our cognitive realm. As a mode of thinking, it not only criticized past religious beliefs but also suggested that "science" could improve the human species. Instead of dominating nature we now dominate each other. The denial of the relative autonomy of nature in man has

led in part, to repression in the human realm.

Horkheimer suggests that the mastery of nature also carries implications for the mastery of internal human nature. The exploitation of nature's resources and their subsequent use by humans implies that a peaceful social order is necessary for the just distribution of resources. But continual mastery of nature has not led to the satisfaction of material needs. In part, this is because "the mastery of nature has been and remains a social task, not the appurtenance of an abstract scientific methodology or the coincidence of scientific discovery and technological application" The domination of nature is related to the domination of man and consequently to social conflict. While the machine and factory system have expanded the productivity of labor, there also occurs "a qualitative leap in the intensity of social conflict" (Leiss, 1974:154). Why? Leiss, in a provocative analysis of Horkheimer's work suggests five reasons. First, as economic surplus expands it stimulates the development of new needs and satisfactions and subsequently conflict arises over this surplus. Second, certain natural resources are confined to various geographical regions of the world and the producing countries expand their control into these areas. As a consequence, given the non-equitable distribution of the world's resources, conflict arises between the separated geographical-political units. Third, the mastery of nature is differentially distributed among societies, including the mastery of destructive weapons, as a consequence some societies are subject to whims and caprices of their neighbors. Fourth, is the growth of technological domination through extensive and intensive propaganda. Finally, the rising expectations of the population have a decisive impact on heightening the potential for social conflict (Leiss, 1974: 156-158).

The evolution of subjective reason has had a decisive impact on modern civilization. Critical theories argue that subjective reason has led us away from a concern with ends. Insofar as ends are discussed, it is mainly in terms of survival value for what already exists. More importantly, critical theory suggests the possibility of an objective reason. And, objective reason would mean; 1) truth conceived in non-utilitarian, non-majority and non-relative terms, and 2) a relationship with nature which would not lead to the continued domination of some parts of humanity over other parts.

THE MECHANICS OF CONFORMITY

Although the evolution of subjective reason has been important for determining the characteristics of modern culture, so also the bourgeois family has perpetuated the subjugation of the individual to external authority. Critical theorists analyze the modern bourgeois family from the perspective of what it was once like. From this vantage point, they tend to perceive the family in dialictical relationship both to the larger milieu and to individual behavior. For example, family relationships are developed from authority relations. Whether certain forms of authority are progressive or reactionary can only be understood in the context of their times and their contribution to an emanicpatory philosophy of history. Recently, however, "the relation of individuals to authority is determined by the speical character of the work process in modern times and gives rise, in turn, to a lasting collaboration of social institutions in producing and consolidating the character types which correspond to the relationship" (Horkheimer, 1972:97-8).

The bourgeois family, though it has lost many of its original functions (e.g., education), still prepares youth for adaptability to the market situation. The father is master of the house because he earns or possesses the money and determines how it is to be spent. Wives and children are his possessions. They put their lives in large part into his hands for guidance and orders. The minor son may think what he wants of the father but in practice the father is "always right". The father was no doubt meeting a genuine social need in this educational and governing function when the family was still an economically productive unit. However, when the family has shrunk to a consumer unit, the father's position "is acquired essentially by the money he brings in and involves all the more momentous consequences for his family" (Horkheimer, 1972:108). Because

the family is separated from the father's professional life, and the father is submissive in most cases in social life, he cultivates the same submissive stance in his own children. The children learn to . . .

> ". . . trace every failure back to its social causes but to remain at the level of the individual and to hypostatize the failure in religious terms as sin or in naturalistic terms as deficient natural endowment." Horkheimer, 1972:109).

The modern bourgeois family has capitulated to the same criteria as modern industry. Marriage must be rich in results. The family becomes another social instrument for the means of production (Horkheimer, 1974b:17, 89). The adolescent soon learns that "the renunciations of instinctual urges expected from him are not adequately compensated, that, for instance, the sublimation of sexual goals required by civilization fails to obtain for him the material security in the name of which it is preached" (1974a:111).

Although, the bourgeois family is one of the major agents for stimulating conformity in modern society, there are others which interact dialiectically and perform the same function. This brings us to the critique of some other dimensions of modern culture. Some phenomena critical theorists have examined are: the loss of interiority, the effects of articles of consumption, modern advertising and concomitantly communications, and the growth of large organizations. All of these elements are viewed, in part, as detrimental for the survival of objective reason in modern society.

Today social power means control over things. Interestingly enough, the more an individual desires to control things the more they will come back to dominate him (Marcuse, 1964). The mind will "be transformed into an automation of formalized reason" (Horkheimer, 1974a:129-130). The modern individual in pursuit of things comes to work for larger and larger organizations. As a consequence of belonging to so many organizations, he/she is no longer an individual (e.g., Work in America, 1974). There is no place to retreat to or stand apart from the web of organizations. Labor unions and their members as well as corporation leaders all begin to resemble each other (Marcuse, 1964:27-31; Mills, 1948:153). Labor and capital "are equally concerned with holding and extending their control. The leaders in both groups contend to an increasing extent that theoretical critique of society has become superfluous as a result of the tremendous technological progress that promises to revolutionize the conditions of human existence" (Horkheimer, 1974a:151). The victory of the technological era brings a new kind of injustice. The radiance of the individual person is submerged. Contemporary influences leave the individual no room for spontaneity.

Today the young men leave their families unencumbered by a strong sense of interiority (moral conscience). In the past, as long as a person stayed within the law, the individual was responsbile to no one but his conscience. However, the joy of making personal decisions and freely exercising the imagination has withered away (e.g., Riesman, 1967). "Machinery requires, for its operation no less than its invention, the kind of mentality that concentrates on the present and can dispense with memory and straying imagination". With rapid social mobility and changing social roles, each person must be prepared to have a coworker later appear as the boss. "This develops in him the reserve and suspicion of strangers which used to be characteristic of village life." Even conversations become superficial and convictions a kind of a burden. Various machines (i.e., radio, television) which do away with conversation have made their appearance at the right time. "They provide models for behavior and give muteness the illusion that something is being said." Contemporary individuals lose all sense of time out from society. "The machinery of mass opinion--newspapers, radio, cinema, television--must provide guidance for men as they relax from their duties , and must carry for them the burden of all divisions not connected with their work" (Horkheimer, 1974b:22; also Vidich and Bensman, 1968).

Even the customer is no longer king, according to critical theorists. In the past,

customers had to be wooed and flattered if the seller was to compete successfully against others. Today, the customer no longer counts. ". . . price and quality are determined somewhere far from the place of the transaction and are minimally subject to bargaining, the resigned gestures of the old-style housewife as she tests the proffered goods may still be justified in exceptional cases but they are nonetheless as antiquated as she is" (Horkheimer, 1974b:128). At one time culture meant the non-obediance to social authority (Birnbaum, 1971:106-166). Today, the opposite is true. "Not to conform means to be rendered powerless, economically and therefore spiritually" (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1072:133). Ironically, even amusement under capitalism is the extension of work. "It is sought after as an escape from the mechanized work process, and to recruit strength in order to be able to cope with it again" (Ibid:137; also, Hearn, 1975).

Critical theory suggests that modern culture sublimates the individual to an overwhelming, impersonal kind of control. The individual exists in a world that is out of his/her control. Given that the massive production of consumer items raises the material standard of living it also divides and separates people (Horkheimer, 1974b: 140-1). For critical theorists, the modern family, the workplace, articles of consumption and the mass media all help structure the loss of individual atuonomy. They, of course, assume that it is possible to restore individual initiative. In their purview, one of the major losses is moral conscience. In short, the individual lacks a place to step back. The sublimation of the individual, in part, has resulted from the development of scientific-technological legitimation which permeates the modern era.

SCIENTIFIC-TECHNOLOGICAL LEGITIMATION. According to critical theorists that Marx's critique of capitalism must be extended to include an analysis of a fundamentally new form of false consciousness--scientism. In Marx's age unmasking the ideology of equivalance exchange was appropriate. But a current critique of modern society must include scrutiny of science itself. "Scientism" is the fundamental false consciousness of this age. Scientism consists of the view that: 1) knowledge is inherently neutral; 2) there is a unitary scientific method; 3) the standard of certainty and exactness in the physical sciences is the only explanatory model for scientific knowledge (Schroyer, 1970:210). Scientific-technocratic legitimation separates the subject and object of knowledge. It, for the most part, takes the language of science as if it were observationally given. For critical theorists, this view overlooks a number of distinct aspects: 1) it denies the possibility that predefinitions of the object of knowledge are given to us by prior experience; 2) it overlooks the societal milieu in which research takes place and the consequences of this for the analysis of theory and data; 3) positive science is unable to reflect on its own presuppositions (Schroyer, 1970:211). In short, positive science operates with the myth of autonomy. It assumes most importantly that scientific-technological progress will automatically bring about social and moral progress.

There is little doubt that science and technology have developed more efficient means of producing material surplus. But is is by no means clear that the human species is better off because of it. In some senses, as outlined in the last section, the potential for social conflict has made a qualitative leap for the worse. Critical theorists, unlike positive science, are interested in analyzing the consequences and role of science in the modern world. They do not take the "self-evident" progress of science and technology for granted. Critical theory undertakes an analysis of how it is that the myth of an autonomous positive science has come to pervade the modern era, and also seeks to eliminate this aspect of false conciousness. The development of a science to control nature which was indirectly as well as directly applied to the human realm is not inherently ideological (Leiss, 1974:179). Nor should the growth of scientism be equated with capitalist development alone (Marcuse, 1961).

For critical theorists, Marx's distinction between the infrastructure (material forces) and superstructure (ideology) is inadequate

for analyzing the plight of modern societies. These Marxian analytic devices are replaced by an analysis of the three subsystems of action--work, language, and power. These analytic devices allow us to apply them to the realm of the sciences themselves. The sciences are analyzed from their guiding cognitive interests, which illuminates whether some sciences are repressive of liberating in their social-historical context (Habermas, 1970, 1975; Marcuse, 1965).

The empirical-analytic sciences (work) are interested in the covariance of particular observable events. Given a set of initial conditions, predictions may be possible when all other things are equal. The cognitive interest of this science is certainty and control--technical exploitability. In part, the emergence of this interest was based on the desire of some humans to control nature and other humans. The historical-hermeneutical sciences are less interested in technical control but more concerned with the extension of intersubjective understanding (language). "Access to the facts is provided by the understanding of meaning, not observation" (Habermas, 1971:309). This practical cognitive interest strives for a consesnus of meaning among various actors. It is interested in the mediation of broken communicative traditions--the re-establishment of a consensus of meaning (Schroyér, 1970). The technical (empirical-analytical) sciences cannot account for their own continued existence from within their own theoretical framework. Science-technology as an end-in-itself is taken to be self-evident. Likewise, the interpretive sciences lack the capability for self-reflection about their own ends and purposes. Why is it important to understand meaning and repair broken communicative traditions? What interest is presupposed in the pursuit of meanings? Critical social science, however, is not satisfied with either producing nomological knowledge or the mediation of broken "meaning" traditions alone. Critical sociology determines the "meaning" or "validity" of propositions through self-reflection. And "self-reflection is determined by an emancipatory cognitive interest" (Habermas, 1971:310).

Jurgen Habermas has indicated that his critical work on the interests of the various sciences (1971, 1974) and the internal crises of modern societies (1975) is meant as a philosophy of history with a practical intent. "The 'meaning of history' is simply its possible future which is realized through action" (Pilot, 1976:258).

Conclusion for critical theorists, modern science tends to be equated with the empirical-analytical sciences and their technical exploitability. More importantly, these sciences have a tendency to be used in the realm of human behavior where the results become exploitative. Social science is used against the workers in support of management. The workers are reduced to objects of manipulation and control. The hermeneutical science, on the other hand, which stress understanding and the importance of language leave society as it is--untouched. It is only from the basis of improving the existing state of affairs that an emancipatory science can make sense. And, indeed, this is the declared purpose of critical theory.

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BAIL AS A MECHANISM OF LATENT JUSTICE

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THE PROBLEM: It is recognized that a considerable variance exists between the ideals of criminal justice and its practice. These differences can best be explained in terms of manifest and latent functions. Judicial 'ideals', that philosophical model based upon due process and the presumption of innocence, reflects the manifest or intended function of criminal adjudication, while judicial short-cuts or modification of these ideals, such as bargain justice and bail manipulation, illustrate latent or unintended functions. Variables such as discretion, court case attrition, bargain justice, inequitable sentences and bail all play important roles regarding the overall issue of selective justice. Bail is an ideal indicator of selective justice. It reflects the basic ideals of the criminal justice system - that of probable cause, reasonable doubt and due process, and it documents biases concerning the accused. Patterned biases, in turn, provide insight into the nature of selective bail, bringing to light the underlying latent functions served by this process.

This study looks at the selective process of bail within a visible criminal justice system - that of New Hampshire. The universe consists of the entire superior (trial) court docket for a two year period (1970-71). The analysis is based on Blumstein's (1974) research on the perceived seriousness of criminal offenses. Thus this study tests the fit of this model for the target area - New Hampshire.

Bail is one of the important constitutional guarantees provided for the defendant in his contest before the adversary court system. It is crucial since it is closely linked to the major premise that the defendant is assumed to be innocent until guilt is proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, bail often means the difference between defendants being free to prepare their cases or their being incarcerated awaiting arraignment. This is important since it is not unusual to have defendants incarcerated for excessive periods, sometimes more than a year, prior to arraignment (Task Force Report: Courts, 1967). Bail can also be used in the period between conviction and appeal. In either case, bail can constitute one of two types of release: money bail or personal recognizance. Money bail involves posting bond, while personal recognizance means giving one's word that he or she will appear before the court. Money bail can be abused either through the administering of excessively high bail or refusal to grant bail. Personal recognizance can also be abused by failure to appear. Both are so abused that the 1964 National Conference on Bail and Criminal Justice concluded that the present bail system is both wasteful and unfair (Task Force Report: Courts, 1967).

The only legal and constitutional use of bail, according to our judicial ideals, is to guarantee the appearance of the defendant at the prescribed court hearing. It is not to be used as a vehicle of discrimination or as punishment. Yet, the Task Force Report (1967) pointed out that bail is widely misused, usually reflecting class biases. Money bail abuse most often reflects discrimination against defendants from minority and lower strata backgrounds, while personal recognizance, as a form of bail, is widely used for middle or upper class defendants. The high level Watergate defendants were not only exempted from posting money bail but were spared the common practice of being fingerprinted and having their "mug shot" taken, once indicted. The irony of the existing bail system, then, is that often those who can afford money bail, mostly those members of society from the upper classes, are released without having to post bond, while those who are from the lower class are forced to do so. One recommendation stemming from the Task Force Report is that personal recognizance be more widely used among those who cannot afford money bail. This would also help rid the judicial system of the lucrative and highly questionable profits made by bail bondsmen.

"The Manhattan Bail Project" (1963) surveyed the major bail studies within the last fifty years and concluded that: "every serious study published since the 1920's has exposed defects in its (bail) administration. Yet proof of the need for reform has

produced little in the way of fundamental change," (Johnson, et. al., 1970: 146). The authors (Aver, Rankin and Stury) went on to say that the bail system fails to perform its theoretical function in several respects, such as misuse of professional bondsmen, misunderstanding of bail-setting procedures by local magistrates, and the improper use of bail as a pretrial device to "punish" defendants. The Manhattan Bail project summarized the current status of bail as being used to punish, to insure detention, to aid the prosecution, and to satisfy public and journalistic clamor. All these functions are contrary to its constitutional mandate, to insure the defendant's appearance before the court. Again, the Manhattan Bail Project presented arguments similar to those later reported by the President Task Force. The latter concluded that a central fault of the existing bail system is that it detains too many people, with serious consequences for defendants, the criminal process, and the community. They suggested that the aim of reform must be to reduce pretrial detention to the lowest level without allowing the indiscriminate release of persons who pose substantial risks of flight or of criminal conduct (Task Force Report: Courts, 1967: 38).

Richmond and Aderhold, in their work New Role for Jails (1969), elaborated more on the selective nature of bail. They stated that the system which permits accused persons with money to be free awaiting trial, while those without resources have to stay in jail, is one of the greatest blots on our notions of equal justice. By equal justice they referred to the judicial ideal that every accused person, rich or poor, is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty (Carter, et. al., 1972: 386). It becomes apparent from the available literature that bail is widely misused. Limitations restrict this inquiry to the availability of money bail. In fact, no provisions were made in the court records for anything other than money bail. More recently, the American Friends Service Committee (Wahrhaftig, 1977) argued for the adoption of model bail reform legislation such as that introduced into the Pennsylvania legislature in 1974. This bill, which did not pass, called for pre-trial release in most, if not all cases, along with an end to money bail, preventive detention and discretionary decision making by bail setting authorities. This approach is similar to that offered by the Journal of Legal Sutdies (1973) which stressed the social, economic and legal benefits derived from pre-trial liberty suggesting that this practice provides beneficial gains to both the defendant and the community.

THE RESEARCH SETTING: New Hampshire provides an ideal setting for a study such as this due to the visibility of its criminal justice system. The state has a relatively small population with a clearly outlined criminal justice system. The state's nearly 300,000 residents are distributed throughout the state; with the vast majority (85%) residing in the industrialized southern half, while the other fifteen percent live in the rural northern half. In addition to its low population density, the state has few non-white residents (less than 2%). These factors account for New Hampshires Low crime rate which is less than half the national average.

Hence due to the low population density, racial homogeneity, and stable residence patterns, the control process in New Hampshire does not suffer from many problems which plague other states. The state has thirteen chartered cities and 221 towns with the overall population distributed nearly equally between the towns and cities. The criminal justice agencies operating under the jurisdiction of the cities and towns constitute the lowest levels of organization of the criminal justice system in the state. Local police agencies, municipal or district courts, and overnight holding jails comprise the major components of the system at these levels. The next level of the criminal justice system is the county, where we have the sheriff, state trial court, county attorneys, holding jails, houses of detention (serving jails) and other regional facilities. At the state level there is the state police, the supreme court, the attorney general's office, the state penitentiary, and the state industrial school (juvenile facility). The state also constitutes a federal district court jurisdiction with a federal marshal, a regional F.B.I.

office, and a U.S. attorney's office.

The state trial (superior) court convenes twice yearly at the county level. It consists of ten judges, each assigned to one county. It is the only court empowered to hold jury trials and has appellate jurisdiction over all lower courts. This study analyzes the nature of bail for those cases processed before this court system. The universe involves all felony and misdemeanor cases brought before the New Hampshire state superior court for calendar years 1970-71. Bail here could involve a number of circumstances. It could be used between arrest and arraignment and jury trial. Bail could also be used for the period between a lower court conviction and a trial court appeal as well as for habeas corpus writs. All told, some 2,000 cases were processed during this two year period; however, only major crime categories were analyzed, thereby reducing the total file to 1,310 cases. These offenses were then classified according to "type of offense": personal, property, and non-victim. The Federal Bureau of Investigation's "Crime Index" comprised a special sub-classification. These cases were then evaluated according to three bail classifications: bail awarded, bail awarded-but not met, and bail denied.

Personal Offenses: crimes in which another person is directly threatened. Criminal homicide, assault, rape, muggings and robbery are common personal offenses. This type of offense is considered to be the most serious in our culture.

Property offenses: These crimes involve the illicit possession or attempt to possess personal property. Personal contact with the victim is usually avoided while deceit is often used when personal contact cannot be avoided. These crimes include larceny, burglary, breaking and entering and larceny, auto theft, forger, uttering, and a wide variety of con games.

Non-victim offenses: In these crimes either no one else is involved in the criminal act such as in unlawful flight, violation of parole or probation, narcotic possession or use, and suicide; or the victim freely accedes to the criminal act, as in illicit sexual activity, gambling, and narcotic sales.

The three money bail categories signify the different options allowed the judge in his discretionary powers to release or retain a defendant awaiting subsequent court action. Bail awarded usually implies reasonable bail, bail in which the defendant has little difficulty securing bond for his release. Bail awarded - but not met, on the other hand, most often means excessive bail for the accused. Here bail is often used as a device for retaining the defendant assuming that it will not be met. Involved here is the class factor whereby the lower class suspect (a large proportion of those arrested for 'Index' crimes) often finds money bail in the thousands of dollars unreasonable even through bondsmen. On the other hand, a wealthy suspect such as Patty Hearst or Robert Vesco can afford high bail, such as Ms. Hearst's million dollar bond. Bail denied is self-explanatory. The accused is held in lieu of bail.

THE FINDINGS: Regarding personal offenses (Table 1.1) murder had the highest rate of bail denied while manslaughter and vehicle homicide had a considerable proportion of their cases (75% and 87%) resulting in reasonable bail. Similarly over 80 percent of the rape and aggravated assault cases resulted in reasonable bail. Armed robbery had a high proportion of unreasonable bail (65%) while robbery itself had 38 percent of its cases resulting in bail being denied. Overall 66 percent of the personal offenses resulted in reasonable bail, 21 percent in unreasonable bail while only 3 percent had bail denied.

For property offenses (Table 1.2) most cases (76%) resulted in reasonable bail, 21 precent in unreasonable bail while only 3 percent had bail denied. Similarly, 80 percent of the non-victim cases (Table 1.3) resulted in reasonable bail, 17 percent in unreasonable bail, while again 3 percent had bail denied. The exceptional property offense was auto theft with half of these cases resulting in excessive bail while for misdemeanor offenses, property destruction had a high rate of denied bail (36%).

TABLE 1
BAIL STATUS FOR OFFENDERS

1.1 (N=243) Personal offenses	Bail: Met	Not met	Denied
Murder	2	1	8
Attempted murder	3	2	3
Manslaughter	6	2	3
Kidnapping	2	1	1
Rape	17	2	1
Assault to rape	2	2	0
Attempted rape	5	1	1
Aggravated assault	87	15	3
Assault & robbery	5	4	0
Armed robbery	4	11	2
Robbery	13	5	11
Vehicle homicide	13	1	1
Incest	2	2	2
1.2 (N=769) Property offenses			
Grand larceny	64	12	2
Burglary	365	110	14
Break & enter	7	3	1
Attempt burglary or larceny	30	8	2
Auto larceny	7	8	1
Forgery	20	7	1
Fraud	7	1	0
False pretense	4	2	0
Attempt false pret.	11	3	0
Receive stolen goods	21	3	1
Conceal stolen goods	12	1	0
Possess weapons	3	1	0
1.3 (N=97) Non-victim offenses			
Lascivious behavior	6	3	0
Lewd & lascivious	3	0	0
Unnatural acts	9	1	1
Narcotic sales	59	11	0
Jail break, escape	1	1	2
1.4 (N=756) Index crimes			
Criminal homicide	2	8	1
Forcible rape	17	1	2
Aggravated assault	94	4	18
Armed robbery	9	2	15
Grand larceny	64	2	12
Burglary	365	110	14
Auto theft	7	1	8

TABLE 2
VIOLENCE VERSUS PROPERTY OFFENSES (N=756)

	Bail: Met	Not met	Denied
Violent offenses	122	15	36
Property offenses	436	113	34

$x^2 = 41.7$, $p = .001$

TABLE 3
FELONY OFFENSES (N=1109)

	Bail: Met	Not met	Denied
Personal crimes	161	49	33
Property crimes	581	165	23
Non-victim crimes	78	16	3

$x^2 = 43.7$, $p = .001$

DISCUSSION: Most of the cases (75%) resulted in reasonable bail thus indicating that the New Hampshire criminal justice system subscribes, for the most part, to the ideals governing the use of bail. For those cases in which either excessive bail was used or bail was denied outright a discernable pattern emerged, that corresponds closely with Blumstein's assertion concerning our cultural perception of serious offenses. Blumstein found a strong correlation between the F.B.I.'s Index Crimes and the Sellin and Wolfgang index. From this Blumstein concluded that personal crimes and common property offenses are viewed as posing the most serious threat to our society. This study supports this contention. Of those cases in which bail was not readily available personal offenses had the greatest proportion of cases resulting in bail being denied (14%) while both property and per-

sonal offenses shared the highest proportion of excessive bail situations. When "Crime Index" offenses were analyzed the same held true. Bail was denied in a fifth of the violent offense cases while a fifth of the property offenses resulted in excessive bail.

On the whole, over a quarter (26%) of the "Index Crimes" resulted in unreasonable bail or bail being denied. This compares with 34 percent for all personal offenses, 24 percent for all property offenses, and 20 percent for non-victim offenses. It can be concluded that the latent function of bail in a relatively smooth running criminal justice system, such as New Hampshire, is to restrain those suspects charged with "serious" crimes. Inference beyond this study to other jurisdictions could prove difficult since many of these suffer from additional factors such as chronic court congestion, significant non-white populations and high degrees of transitory residents. Controls on these variables would allow for a reasonable replication.

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WEIGHTED KOPPA: A STATISTIC TO CONSIDER PREDICTED SKEWNESS

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There are many measures of association that the social scientist can use to analyze data. They all have certain advantages and disadvantages, and researchers may limit their choice of measures of association to those computed in the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) "crosstabs" program. This may produce a myopic view of statistics. The measure of association should be chosen for its potential to answer questions, not because of its availability.

A statistic known as "koppa" (or little q) developed by Kruskal in 1958 is easy to use because of its extreme simplicity. One could speculate that koppa has been ignored because it is too simple. Koppa is defined as: ". . .the number of concordant units minus the number of discordant units divided by the total number of units. Thus, it is the difference between the proportion consistent minus the proportion inconsistent." (Frideres et al. 1971, 108)

The choice of a cutting point for each variable is: ". . .somewhat arbitrary, but a rather natural one is to take. . .the median" with 2 x 2 tables (Kruskal, 1958, 810), hence the term "coefficient of medial correlation." Koppa may be written as the probability set:

$$\Pr(X \; x_o \text{ and } Y \; y_o) \text{ or } (X \; x_o \text{ and } Y \; y_o) \quad 1.1$$

where x_o and y_o are the cutting points. The computational formulas are:

$$q = \frac{\text{concordant} - \text{discordant units}}{\text{concordant} + \text{discordant units}} \quad 1.2$$

$$\text{for the 2 x 2 case: } q = \frac{(a+d) - (b+c)}{a+b+c+d} \quad 1.3$$

where:

		X: below median	X: above median	
Y	below median	a	b	a+b
	above median	c	d	c+d
		a+c	b+d	n

A simple example: in one situation an anthropologist listed names of 30 societies in cell format to demonstrate a relation between political structure and severity of socialization (Stephens 1963, 372). However, no measure of association was given. A simple computation revealed the association was relatively strong (koppa = .47).

Although originally formulated as a "quadrant association" for 2 x 2 tables, the logic of koppa can be extended to j x k tables with cutting points which divide variables into roughly equal marginals (Kruskal 1958, 819; Hildebrand 1977, 25). The only need is a basic theoretical prediction rule defining success (concordance or continuity) and failure. If one's theory predicts a non-linear relation, koppa can still compute a measure of association. For example, where X indicates success

		X: 1	X: 2	X: 3
Y	1	X		X
	2		X	

There has been increasing attention directed to Kruskal's koppa: in an analysis of social constraints on attitudes and behaviors (Frideres et al. 1971); in development of a test for significance of difference between two koppas (Warner & Gray 1973, 1978); and in a text on ordinal level analysis (Hildebrand et al. 1977). More work of this kind is needed.

A problem with koppa, as with most measures of association, is susceptibility to skewed marginals (Reynolds 1977, 17). Skewness affects the numerical value of koppa. To illustrate we will use hypothetical data with extremely skewed marginals:

		X		
		1	2	
Y	1	95	1	96
	2	1	3	4
		96	4	100

Computing the koppa of these data yields a coefficient of .96 which is uninterpretable. A glance at the table shows that variables X and Y are not related to this degree. The spuriously high koppa is due to skewed marginals. Reynolds comments that: ". . . an investigator has to pay particular attention to marginal totals. When one or both variables are highly skewed, he should decide whether or not the relative absence of variation is substantively meaningful. If he wants to know what more even distributions would produce, he can adjust the observed data . . . or select a less sensitive measure. . . On the other hand, the lack of variation may itself be theoretically important and in that case, he would want to preserve the original marginal distributions" (1977, 17; emphasis added). While the problem is legitimate, Reynold's solution is less than ideal. He appears to advocate a post hoc decision rather than an a priori control. Retaining skewed marginals is a crude way to handle data which is predicted by theory to have unequal marginals. As Cohen points out: ". . . the weights are part of any hypothesis being investigated. An obvious consequence of this is that the weights, however determined, must be set prior to the collection of the data" (1968, 215).

There are many instances where theory would predict skewed marginals. However this should be controlled by weighting rather than by letting the measure of association be affected by the data. Skewed data should always be standardized, even when the skewness was predicted. As a second step, the table may be weighted as required by an a priori theory.

One of the simplest ways to standardize or "smooth" a table is to compute percentages and treat these as raw frequencies (Reynolds 1977, 18). Whether one standardizes on variable X, variable Y, both variables, or iterates until all the marginals are approximately 100 will depend on one's standards or one's theory. For the present example, computing percentages on X or Y will be the same:

		X		
		1	2	
Y	1	98.96	25.0	123.96
	2	1.04	75.0	76.04
		100.0	100.0	200.0

$$q_s = \frac{173.96 - 26.04}{200} = .74$$

The result of standardization is to reduce the value of koppa, in this example, from .96 to .74, or a decrease of .22.

If skewed marginals are predicted by theory it seems reasonable to weight for this. In the example; variable X, category 1 may be single college students and category 2 may be married college students; or category 1 may be those with an I.Q. above 100 attending college and category 2 may be those college students with an I.Q. below 100. In either case, the researcher would predict the marginals to be unequal. One might weight "success" cells appropriately. Weighting koppa is relatively straightforward. As Cohen puts it: " . . . These weights can be assigned by means of any judgment procedure . . . In many instances, they may be the result of a consensus of a committee, of substantive experts or even, conceivably, the investigator's own judgment" (1968, 215). To weight the X variable, one standardizes the table, multiplies the "success" cell(s) by some whole number greater than zero, and computes koppa with the resulting n. The formula is:

$$q_w = \frac{(w_1a+w_2d) - (w_3b+w_4c)}{n+a(w_1-1)+d(w_2-1)+b(w_3-1)+c(w_4-1)} \quad 1.4$$

where w = weights assigned and the table format is 2 x 2. There is no intuitive reason why the weighting scheme cannot be extended to j x k tables, with varying weights, depending on the sophistication of the theory. The formula is less complex than it

appears, and generally reduces to a simple computation. In the present example, if one expects four times more married respondents than single respondents then $w_1 = 4$ and w_2, w_3, and $w_4 = 1$. The generic formula reduces to:

$$q_w = \frac{(4a+d) - (b + c)}{n + 3a} \qquad 1.5$$

The table changes to:

		X		
		1	22	
Y	1	395.84	25.0	420.84
	2	1.04	75.0	76.04
		396.88	100.0	496.88

and koppa is:

$$q_w = \frac{470.84 - 26.04}{496.88} = .90$$

which is an increase from q_s (.74) of .16.

Note that the degree of weighting is not an arbitrary decision. There must be a clear theoretical rationale for the weight assigned. Many theories can supply such a rationale. In this example, we assume a rationale which demands a weight of 4 applied to cell a. If the cell had been weighted by 2 or 10, koppa would, of course, be different. However, the change is koppa would not be extreme since, with every increase in a weighted cell, the n increases correspondingly. Because of this, koppa retains a range of +1 to -1.

In summary, the effect of standardizing and weighting can be illustrated by comparing the three koppa coefficients:

1. raw data: q = .96
2. standardized but unweighted: q_s = .74
3. standardized and weighted: q_w = .90.

When koppa is computed from data with highly skewed marginals, it is uninterpretable. Therefore, skewed data should always be standardized which removes the effects of skewness. However, if the theory predicts a degree of skewness or unequal marginals, then it makes sense to put back in the amount of skewness which the theory would predict by an appropriate weighting decision. In this way, koppa becomes more accurate and flexible while retaining its simplicity.

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SUBLIMINAL SEDUCTION: POPULAR VOCABULARIES OF MOTIVE AND THE MYTH OF THE MENTAL MASSEUSE

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INTRODUCTION. In recent years we have seen rekindled the concern of the 1950's that the buying behavior of the average American is being subliminally manipulated by the mass media via hidden persuaders (Packard, 1957). The media, following McLuhan's well-known thesis, brings us not only messages but also massages our psyches and arouses our "unconscious libidinal drives" in a successful effort to sell us automobiles, liquor, cigarettes, and soap flakes (McLuhan, 1965, 1968, 1969; Key, 1973, 1976). Advertising agencies, capitalizing on the wide-spread belief that people's minds can be manipulated, have sold ad copy allegedly composed of hidden persuaders to businesses for handsome prices, promising, with expansive rhetoric, an increase in sales.

The concept of "subliminal advertising" is rooted in a traditional philosophical perspective in causality in which the mind is construed as the primary cause of behavior, albeit buffeted by outside forces, precipitating factors, and environmental events. With the exception of a few behaviorist and social behaviorist perspectives, the assumption that minds produce or cause behavior is commonly accepted in the social sciences. Rarely does one encounter theorists who raise serious questions about the assumed causal status of the mind, or, as Gilbert Pyle puts it, the official doctrine of "the ghost in the machine" (Pyle, 1949; Blumet, 1964; Szasz, 1961; Brisset & Edgley, 1975).

The social sciences, particularly social psychology, have contributed to the popular view of the mind by a more-or-less continual quest for answers to the question: "What causes behavior?" This quest, spurred by a positivistic conception of social psychology, has been based on a mechanistic metaphor that views man-in-society as basically like the components of a machine, his actions being outcomes of determinate processes in the world at large and/or results of the action of a "conscious," "unconscious," "subconscious," or "preconscious" mind within.

A SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW OF MOTIVATION

The view of motivation that informs speculations about subliminal advertising is distinctly psychological. Motives are regarded as causes of behavior: "triggers" which energize the passive organism to overt action. The tack we wish to take here, however, is based on a sociological theory of motivation which avoids the imputation of "mind," in the various ways it has been subdivided, as a "force" which propels human action. Instead of causes, motives are seen as rhetorics through which a social actor interprets his conduct to others. This perspective derives primarily from John Dewey's action philosophy which needs no "forces" to motivate already existing action (Dewey, 1922, 112): "In truth, man acts anyway, he can't help acting. In every fundamental sense, it is false that a man requires a motive to make him do something. . .While a man is awake he will do something, if only to build castles in the air. . .It is absurd to ask what induces a man to activity generally speaking. He is an active being and that is all there is to be said on that score."

The most systematic statement of motives as communication is found in the much-neglected work of Kenneth Burke (1945, 1950). In 1940, C. Wright Mills adapted Burke's work to a sociological context, suggesting that motives are organized into "vocabularies" which vary historically and culturally, forming a basis for social organization by rendering action understandable to both the actor presenting the motive and the audience reviewing it. In this sense, motives do not compel us to act, they enable us to act, and an understanding of these rhetorics necessarily involves not only those motives which begin an action, but also those which sustain and terminate interactional episodes. This point of view on motives has been amplified in recent literature by Peters (1960), Blum and McHugh (1968), and Scott and Lyman (1971).

The dismissal of causation as relevant for social psychology has engendered the most severe criticism, and perspectives such as dramaturgical analysis which dispense with

causation are routinely dismissed as "unscientific." (Goffman, 1959; Edgley and Turner, 1975.) However, the best critique of traditional social science views of motivation is offered not by a social psychologist, but by an action philosopher named A.R. Louch (1966). Louch constructs a devastating logical critique of the social sciences, focusing on its incredible view of motivation.

Louch begins by noting that motives are ascribed to individuals in situation entitling them to act. They do not impel people to act, however, they entitle them to do so, this "certification to act" stemming from the definition of the situation. But in most varieties of social science, motives are construed as coercive forces and are given two quite incompatible meanings: first they are used to describe a certain sequence of behaviors (which is reasonable), but are then used secondarily as an explanation for the same sequence. Obviously, the term motive will simply not stand this kind of abuse. Such circularity is standard procedure in social science due to its deterministic view of motives as causes, which assures that triviality, redundancy and tautology will be the outcome of most behavioral science research.

Given this critique of conventional motive schemes, and the outline we have sketched for what we consider to be a more appropriate view of how motives work in human affairs, considerable insight can be gleaned from applying this view to the notion of subliminal advertising. That subliminal advertising can seduce the "unconscious" section of the mind into purchasing commodities is one of those trivial tautologies which has been exploited by some entrepreneurs as a vocabulary of motives to justify, make credible, and create a demand for subliminal advertising.

WHAT IS SUBLIMINAL SEDUCTION?

Subliminal refers to "below the limen" or threshold. Subliminal seduction is characterized, then, by overt behavioral responses (buying) being determined by stimulation below the threshold of conscious awareness. Unconscious defense mechanisms (repression, fantasy, projection, sublimation, etc.) which govern perception and motivation are being titilated and massaged by hidden manipulators in advertising copy; the consumer is unaware of the stimulus prompting the response or the relationship between stimulus and response. However, the consumer may be aware of some unexplained good feelings, sexual stimulation, etc. from viewing the advertisement, but is unaware of the subliminal stimulus and the relationship between the stimulus and his response.

This view that advertising influences people is based on a large body of literature in behavioral psychology concerning the influence of stimulation on overt action (Dixon, 1971). Many definitions, perspectives and controversies concern stimuli and response, conscious and unconscious thresholds. The "subliminal seduction" campaign that has been created and sold by advertising agencies is a quixotic mix of Freudian ideas, perception psychology, neurophysiological data, and speculations about how the mind works.

In the subliminal seduction thesis, there is an assumption of how minds work, although the admission is made that the question of how minds work has never been satisfactorily answered (Wisdom, 1978). Even with an admitted lack of knowledge of how the mind works, those who sell subliminal advertising tell us how minds work unconsciously. The unconscious, by its own definition is below consciousness and therefore unknowable, is however, supposed to be manipulated by cunning advertising men who miraculously have knowledge of the unconscious, and how to facilitate fantasy. The unconscious, seen as the most basic and emotional part of the mind, is a rich storehouse of the basic attitudinal and perceptual frames of reference--a house to be broken and entered. The unconscious is imputed to be superior to the conscious mind in many respects; it is more comprehensive and rapid in its performance, missing virtually nothing among the innumerable stimuli that are seen to bombard it constantly. The unconscious has ultimate control over the conscious and is said to possess a more extensive repertoire of symbols.

The significance of the unconscious in the subliminal thesis is necessitated by the fact that once a subliminal message is deciphered

or made apparent to the conscious mind, its influence, impact, and manipulative potential is lost. Why the unconscious mind refuses to be directed by "unseen manipulators" that have been discovered by the conscious mind is neither questioned nor answered. The "two-minds" thesis works as a convenient tautology to "explain" both normal and abnormal behaviors which have no apparent cause. As the unconscious became an accepted rhetoric for many behaviors, it lost its metaphorical emphasis and became reified as a cause of those very same behaviors used to infer its existence initially. Szasz has carefully exployed the historical transition of mind, mental states, and mental illness from metaphor to myth, demonstrating how behavioral descriptions were spuriously converted into their own causes.

In the unconscious mind reside the imputed targets of subliminal advertising: human drives such as sex, hunger, aggression, thirst, territoriality, etc. These drives are alleged to be extremely vulnerable to subliminal seduction. Hidden persuaders deviously facilitate fantasies, trigger fears of rejection, and exploit a host of mental processes to solicit surreptitiously the purchase of an advertised commodity.

THE VOCABULARY OF SUBLIMINAL MOTIVES. The vocabulary of subliminal symbols postulated and then used in advertising is unending; the repertoire of seductive symbols range in impact and capability from slight sensuous stimulation of the errogenous zones of the mind to calculated rape. Designed into autos, cosmetics, packaging, and ad copy, the subliminal symbols comprise a foreign language of the conscious mind; however, the unconscious allegedly interprets the words or objects in its own way. It is this unconscious dictionary to which subliminal advertising is supposedly directed.

Several examples will serve to make the point. The word "taste," which is empasized in most cigarette advertisements, is read by the conscious mind to mean that brand X has better flavor than brands Y or Z. But, the unconscious mind sees "taste" as "testes," a genital word providing for fantasy, stimulation and an overwhelming interest in the product. Likewise, a "pint" of gin or bourbon comes through on the unconscious printout as "penis," "whose" reads "whore," "come-on" reads semen, etc. Being sensuously aroused by such covert sexual language, the unconscious supposedly motivates an affinity for the product advertised in the context of what would be to the conscious mind "dirty language." The unconscious inherently has its "mind" on the base side of human nature wherein it finds thrills and satisfaction; likewise, the unconscious deviously manipulates the conscious mind in order to secure fulfillment of its sexual, aggressive, food, and territorial desires.

Numerous objects which are utilitarian in nature to the conscious mind connote sexual behavior, death, utopia, etc. to the unconscious. According to subliminal advertising specialists, phallic and virginal symbols, artistically hidden, sell products. These symbols prod the prime mover, the unconscious, to favor and purchase merchandise saturated with sexual connotations.

Anything slightly longer than it is wide is seen as a phallic symbol whereas objects round or elliptical in shape are in the unconscious language representative of the vagina. The most common phallic vocabulary includes neckties, autos, arrows, pencils, keys, cigars, cigarettes, hockey sticks, candles, snakes, trees, cannons, bottles, etc. The virginal vocabulary is comprised of lips, eyes, eggs, olives, cherries, apples, oranges, faces surrounded by hair, drinking glasses, etc. (Key, 1973, 58).

The sexual union of these male and female symbols are likewise innumerable: keys inserted into locks, nuts being screwed onto bolts, drinking glasses being filled by a bottle, swizzle sticks in glasses, etc. A phallic symbol, a cigarette for example, indicates the availability for sex. A cigarette held in a vertical "up" position means the holder is ready for sex, a horizontal position means, "I'm warming up" for sex and a vertical "down position means, "I'm post-climax and satisfied."

Other representations are based on Jungian archetypes (1958) without explanation as to why a "contemporary unconscious" would have any knowledge of ancient symbolic terms. Implicitly it is assumed that all unconscious minds have a basic vocabulary.

Figure 1. Subliminal sex: phallic symbols include the bottle cap and the jutting swizzle stick, while the word "sex" glows dimly in the ice cubes.



Volcanoes symbolize the genital origin of life and fertility, mice speak of the devil, wolves are symbols of evil, lizards of distrust, birds are carriers of human souls to paradise, scissors and other "V" shaped objects of castration, and an orange being peeled is archetypal of a female being seductively undressed. Varieties of obscene acts are hidden in ice cubes--different strokes for different unconscious preferences: oral, anal, genital, heterosexual, homosexual, etc. In the ad game, symbols in this lengthy dictionary are combined in seductive configurations in ad copy to go unattended by the conscious but strike the cords of the unconscious which knows the language and responds to the message.

CONCLUSION: THE UNCONSCIOUS AS FOLKLORE. Human societies could hardly exist without some conventional wisdoms or vocabularies of motives about how and why people act the way they do. Because we are condemned, so to speak, to a world of meanings, such conceptions become part of the folklore of any society. It seems to us that unconscious mental processes seen as triggers to overt action have become the prevailing folklore of industrial man in the post-Freudian age. Coupled with some ideas of motivation drawn from behavioral psychology, subliminal advertising uses this folklore to justify their business of selling advertisements. However, this brand of advertising has never, to our knowledge, been demonstrated to cause people to buy products.

Different mythologies are needed to deal with different classes of events. Modern meteorology is the prevailing mythology used to "explain" rain, and modern psychology with both its Freudian and Skinnerian versions is the current folklore being pressed into service to "explain" human behavior. As sociology, this contention is designed not to diminish psychology or meteorology, but to elevate the significance of folklore. At the same time, because sociology deals with materials that are essentially moral, questions can and must be asked about the nature of our folklore.

The final irony may be that businesses which purchase subliminal advertising copy in order to manipulate the consumer may themselves be manipulated by advertising agencies, at least to the extent that they believe that subliminal seduction really works. Agencies have cooled out their marks with rhetoric that resembles the classic sting: if you can't see our hidden persuaders, it's because they are effectively hidden.

The rise of social science in modern society has not occurred in isolation. Its rhetoric, findings, conclusions, and implications are becoming part of the fabric of everyday life. It is not surprising that an idea as complex and even doctrinaire as the unconscious will have social uses. But among the thousands of motives offered to explain social behavior, subliminal advertising--the mental masseuse--has to be one of the most

(Concluded on p. 22)

LABELING VERSUS CONTAINMENT THEORY: AN EMPIRICAL TEST WITH DELINQUENCY

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INTRODUCTION

Sociological literature frequently reports negative relationships between deviancy, particularly juvenile delinquency, and dimensions of self image (cf. Reckless, 1967; Dinitz, Dynes, and Clark, 1969; Jensen, 1972; Fitts and Hamner, 1969). A variety of views which are seemingly inconsistent if not contradictory, are offered to explain why delinquents tend to have "negative" views of self. For example, containment theory (Reckless, 1967) tends to regard conceptions of self as independent variables, elaborating on how positive self images create inner containment against committing delinquency and hence shield youth from being processed as delinquent. Labeling theory (Schur, 1971), on the other hand, tends to treat conceptions of self as dependent variables, focusing on how self images result from processes which select and label certain persons who commit delinquency. This study attempts to test some of the implications of these two views.

In containment theory, inner containment is considered to operate as a buffer against external stresses and pressures conducive to delinquency. Inner containment is conceptualized as "the ability of the person to follow the expected norms, to direct himself" (Reckless, 1967: 475) and is thought to consist of four dimensions: favorable self image, goal orientation, frustration tolerance, and retention of norms. A favorable self image represents such things as feelings of acceptance, belonging, responsibility, reliability, and honesty. Persons who have such self images are apt to act accordingly, and by acting in this way, they are unlikely to engage in delinquency. Similarly, an orientation toward socially approved goals functions as an aid in inner direction and provides some insurance against committing delinquency. Similarly, the ability to tolerate frustration and the commitment to the morals, norms, and laws of society are also considered to be insurance against delinquency. Since inner containment is considered to be a strong force against committing delinquency, we would expect to find persons who display more inner containment, as indicated by positive self images to be less involved in delinquency.

According to labeling theory, delinquency is not a consequence of the way persons view themselves. Instead, labeling theory points to the effect of apprehension and branding as a delinquent on the way persons view themselves. The emphasis is on what others do to those who commit delinquent acts. The process of being selected from the law breaking population, and being labeled delinquent through such procedures as arrest and arraignment, is thought to have a stigmatizing effect on the way persons view themselves. The labeling process is depicted as a degradation ceremony where negative stereotypes of faulty character and behavior patterns are attached to the person, and where the elements of the person's past that reinforce the stereotypes are activited. In addition, the labeling process fosters social isolation from non-delinquent groups. The label then becomes the basis for interaction with others: the person so labeled comes to accept the label and the expectations attached to it; eventually the individual accepts delinquency as a way of life. Whatever the original causes of delinquency may have been, they are consdidered unimportant in the wake of the disapproving, degradational, and isolating reactions of society to persons labeled delinquent. Since labeling is considered to generate feelings of disapproval and delinquent self images and stereotypes (negative self images), we would expect to find persons who have been more involved with delinquency defining agencies such as the police and the juvenile court to have more negative self images.

Containment theory suggests that those with less positive self images commit more delinquency while labeling theory indicates that those with more involvement with defining agencies develop more negative self

images. These two expectations, of course, could both be substantiated by research as they are not necessarily contradictory; i.e., those with less positive self images could commit more delinquency, and more involvement with defining agencies could create more negative self images. The contradication between containment and labeling theories comes from the explanation each would provide for such findings. Containment theory could argue that those with less positive self images are not only more delinquent but also have more involvement with defining agencies, since these agencies are more involved as delinquent behavior increases. A relationship then might be found between the individual's involvement with officials and the degree of negative self images. But since this relationship results from the impartiality of defining agencies, rather than a causal relationship, it should disappear when the extent of delinquency is statistically controlled. Labeling theory, on the other hand, argues that involvement with defining agencies causes negative self images. From this perspective, persons with more negative self images might commit more delinquency; such a finding, however, would tend to be small in comparison to the relationship between involvement with officials and negative self images. From this perspective, persons with more negative self images might commit more delinquency; such a finding, however, would tend to be small in comparison to the relationship between involvement with officials and negative self images. In addition, since the relationship between involvement with officials and negative self images is causal, it would not disappear when the extent of committing delinquency is controlled.

METHOD. Data were collected in 1974 by anonymous questionnaires administered . . . in male physical education classes in two metropolitan-fringe community high schools in Oklahoma, yielding a final sample of 264. Less than 7% of the respondents were nonwhite, and 95% indicated fathers as head of household. The social class distribution, according to father's occupation, was 29% lower, 57% middle, and 14% upper class.

There has been considerable confusion and disagreement over what constitutes "positive" and "negative" self images as well as over which images are important. But considering the orientation of containment and of labeling theory, three self images were operationalized: delinquent self image, self-acceptance, and mainstream self. Delinquent self image was measured by asking the subjects to respond to on seven-point agree-disagree contiuum to the statement: I am a delinquent.

Scales were developed to measure both self-acceptance and mainstream self. Both scales consisted of direct statements followed by seven-point agree-disagree continua, were scaled by the method of Summated Ratings, and were analyzed for internal consistency and item acceptability. The Self-Acceptance scale was constructed in an attempt to identify self-acceptance independently from the kind of person one is, resulting in 12 direct statements focusing on the degree of respect, liking, and acceptance one has for one's self. The Mainstream Self scale was constructed to measure the extent of identification with dominant social values believed to be important for young adults in this society. The items came primarily from existing literature (cf. Dietz, 1972; Rosenberg, 1965) and are assumed to reflect the concept of inner containment. Typical of the 14 items of this scale are: I have a lot of self control; I'm proud of my school work; I can compete well with others; and others can depend on me.

The extent of involvement in delinquency has also been measured in a variety of ways, although the distinction between having committed delinquent acts and having been adjudicated as delinquent is frequently ignored. Recent literature (cf. Farrington, 1973; Hardt, 1965), however, suggests self-reported delinquency to be reasonably valid measurement. Consequently, a modified version of the Nye-Short (1957) 11-item scale, which asks subjects how often they have engaged in a variety of serious-nonserious illegal acts, was utilized for this. For example, taking things worth more than $20 (a felony in Oklahoma) was used instead of $50. Items concerning forgery and assault were added to identify

more serious offenders. In addition to asking the subjects how often they had engaged in each illegal act, the subjects were also asked how often they had encountered the police and the juvenile court for each act. Sorting out and summing the three responses for each of the items we then combined seriousness and frequency into measurement of the extent of self-reported involvement in delinquency, with police, and with the juvenile court.

The Nye-Short (1957) reliability checks were also employed. Five respondents indicated that they had never disobeyed their parents, were eliminated. Eight who indicated that they had done all the acts a maximum number of times were also eliminated, as were three whose responses were completely patterned or haphazard.

RESULTS. The distribution of respondents on an increasing scale of seriousness and frequency of delinquent acts was similar to that found in other studies of high school students. Four percent had never committed delinquent acts; 24% had drunk beer, driven a car without a license, and stolen objects worth less than $20; 29% had higher frequency of these acts, and had vandalized and skipped school; 34% had stolen things worth more than $20; and 9% had committed forgery and assault. The extent of police encounter again, shows some relationship to delinquent self image, to self-acceptance, and to mainstream self. And as before, the strongest relationships are between extent of juvenile court encounter and delinquent self image, self-acceptance and mainstream self. The nature of these correlations indicates that extent of delinquency is virtually unrelated to self images but the greater the contact with police and particularly with the juvenile court, the greater the delinquent self image, the lower the self-acceptance, and, to a lesser degree, the lower the mainstream self. The strength of these relationships, however, is not impressive.

At the same time, in all four groups extent of juvenile court encounter is negligibly related to extent of delinquency. The extent of police encounter, on the other hand, is substantively (although not impressively) related to extent of delinquency.

TABLE 1
CORRELATION OF SELF-IMAGE WITH POLICE AND COURT ENCOUNTERS

1.1 Total Sample. N=264 Decimals omitted.
$r_{05} = 13$

		1	2	3	4	5	
Police encounter	1						
Court encounter	2	84					
Delinquency	3	43	15				
Delinquent image	4	15	10	18			
Self acceptance	5	-08	-08	-10	-31		
Mainstream self	6	-13	-11	-16	-44		54

1.2 Police encounters. N = 91
$r_{05} = 21$

		1	2	3	4	5	
Police encounter	1						
Court encounter	2	63					
Delinquency	3	30	18				
Delinquent image	4	22	23	12			
Self acceptance	5	-19	-30	01	-33		
Mainstream self	6	-18	-27	-12	-56		55

1.3 Court encounters. N = 33
$r_{05} = 34$

		1	2	3	4	5	
Police encounter							
Court encounter	2	74					
Delinquency	3	37	17				
Delinquency image	4	26	27	-11			
Self acceptance	5	-29	-35	10	-05		
Mainstream self	6	-18	-27	-03	-43		48

1.4 Both police & court encounters
$r_{05} = 35$

		1	2	3	4	5	
Police encounter	1						
Court encounter	2	72					
Delinquency	3	38	16				
Delinquent image	4	31	35	-11			
Self accepatnce	5	-35	-37	07	-11		
Mainstream self	6	-18	-29	01	-40		49

The first-order patrial correlation coefficients between self images and extent of encounters while controlling for extent of delinquency, for all gour groups, is presented in Table 2. As would be expected from the presentation of the zero-order correlations, the relationships between self images and extent of encounters remain essentially the same. That is, those with more encounters

TABLE 2
PARTIAL CORRELATION OF SELF IMAGE WITH EXTENT OF ENCOUNTER, CONTROLLING FOR DELINQUENCY
(Decimals omitted)

2.1 Total sample. $N = 264; r_{05} = 16$	Police Encounter	Court Encounter
Delinquent self image	08	08
Self acceptance	-04	-07
Mainstream self	-09	-08
2.2 Police cases $N = 91 \quad r_{05} = 25$		
Delinquent self image	20	21
Self acceptance	-20	-31
Mainstream self	-15	-25
2.3 Court cases $N = 33 \quad r_{05} = 42$		
Delinquent self image	33	40
Self acceptance	-35	-37
Mainstream self	-18	-27
2.4 Police & court cases combined $N = 30 \quad r_{05} = 43$		
Delinquent self image	38	37
Self acceptance	-41	-39
Mainstream self	-20	-29

have more negative self images independently of the extent of delinquency committed.

DISCUSSION. We do not interpret these findings to be highly supportive of containment theory. In this research, self images (i.e., delinquent self image, mainstream self which we think reflects the concept of inner containment, and self acceptance) seem to be virtually unrelated to extent of self-reported delinquency among the total sample as well as among sub-samples of those who reported at least one encounter with police or with the juvenile court. In addition, among those who reported at least one encounter with police or with the juvenile court, having more encounters with police and especially with the juvenile court is substantively and consistently related to having more negative self images. Furthermore, these relationships between self images and official encounters retain the same strength when extent of delinquency is controlled. Thus the contention of containment theory that negative self images cause delinquency which in turn brings about involvement with legal authorities is not supported.

Labeling theory , on the other hand, is consistent with most of our findings. As previously mentioned, more official involvements are related to more negative self images; and these relationships are not explained by the extent of delinquency. Labeling theorists also contend that there are more important factors, such as visibility and social category, rather than extent of delinquency, that bring about encounters with the law. We find that reporting more delinquency is not related to having more juvenile court encounters but, contrary to labeling theory, it is substantively related to having more police encounters.

Labeling theory asserts that once a label such as delinquency has been applied, the labeled will come eventually to accept themselves as delinquent as well as to accept delinquency as a way of life. But we do not find self images (including delinquent self image) to relate to self-reported delinquency. Nor do we find greater self acceptance to relate to greater delinquent self image among the labeled. It is possible, of course, that a longitudinal study of more sophisticated measurement would generate such results. But a possible explanation for the present findings is that the extent of delinquent behavior may have little to do with this whole phenomenon. That is, negative self images may, either through demeanor or something else, bring about official encounters that may foster more negative self images which in turn bring about more official involvement. All of this may happen quite independently of the actual commission of delinquent acts. Both containment and labeling theories assume that there is consistency, at some point, between a behavior and the response to it. Our data suggest that such an assumption

may not hold for delinquency. Containment theory may actually be trying to explain why people get processed as delinquent rather than why people commit delinquent acts. The concept of role engulfment in labeling theory may in reality refer to how people are treated by others rather than to how delinquent their behavior becomes.

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SHAKESPEARE AS A SOCIAL PHILOSOPHER

Focusing on Antony and Cleopatra

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Long did I die in the dust of Egypt
Silent and unaware of the seasons
Then the sun gave me birth and I rose
And walked upon the Nile
Singing with the days and dreaming with the night
And now the sun treads upon me with a thousand feet
That I may again lie in the dust of Egypt,
But behold! A marvel and a riddle
The very sun that gathered me cannot scatter me
Still erect am I, and sure of foot do I
Walk upon the banks of the Nile.

Kahlil Gibran
from Sand and Foam

Shakespeare presents in Antony and Cleopatra an underlying theme of existential awareness. There is something new and vibrantly alive in Antony and Cleopatra. It is as if Shakespeare had exhausted, in all that had gone before, the usual themes--man's concept of duty; his place in "The Great Chain of Being;" the sway of the elements in nature--and now considers himself free to draw up a brief on what lies ahead for man. It is as if Shakespeare has relinquished his nominally religious point-of-view, and perhaps thrown himself beyond it, in favor of a philosophy that argues: with the whole person all things are possible; feeling is real; the universality of humanity is forever being made. Antony and Cleopatra, then, is a critical examination of a classical story, from an early-existential point of view.

If we see the play through the eyes of Philo, we are misled. Antony has no simple choice, as does Troilus; there is no simple choice between Cleopatra and the world because they are part of each other. We are made aware, in the play, that the Philos of this world will always appeal to the narrow legalistic view; always glean dust off the surface but never mine nuggets in the earth; always have a biased hand on the scale of life, weighing and measuring merely the externals and merely half the product. Yet, when Enobarbus garbs Cleopatra in all the gilt and glamour of majesty, we begin to see that the play presents no a priori good, no absolutes; that values must be relative on a plane where people travail with people, and with themselves.

The technique of presenting the play--its structural construct--compliments the message and meaning Shakespeare wishes to express. The quickness of the action, the movement and mixing of the scenes, the diversity of the characters, the swift traverse of time and space from Egypt to Rome and around the Empire seem to create the feeling that all life is a montage of interrelated events, interdependent and inseparable.

Contradictions are to be found everywhere in this drama of power and love. The play of opposites against one another, the seeming polarity that exists on all levels--private life versus public life, self versus world, love versus honor--all argue to the point that Antony and Cleopatra are human characters and the play is life-resembling drama at its finest. But the play resembles life to us only if we have some idea of what life truly is, and only if we divorce existence from the bonds of time and space, life and death, good and evil, temporal and qualitative phenomona. We are called to rise above the conflict of east and west, lover and warrior, Caesar and the Serpent. We are presented with a world where the ultimate act of transcendence is training "toward the reasonances of the white dawn aorta." (#18 Cinema Calenduer De Coeur Abstract, 1918).

If we are hasty to assign any exclusive set of values to the play, we miss the mark. It is as if Shakespeare is saying to us, any exclusive fundamental set of values is inappropriate to life. The world does not turn on love or order, it turns on both. The Philos of life naively assume that the world, for everyone, is exactly as they see it. They accept the evidence of perception uncritically. They do not realize that their

visual perception is mediated by indirect inference systems; they assume that the evidence of vision is directly, immediately, unmediately given. Socially, one important aspect of this "phenomenal absolutism" is the observer's assumption that all other observers perceive the situation as he does and that if they respond differently, it is because of some perverse willfulness rather than because they act on different perceptual content.

This leads us into a consideration of that area of tension that prevails between simplistic judgments and transcendence in Antony and Cleopatra. The general critic is so steeped in an absolutist view of his culture--the Western Heritage, the Christian bias, the Protestant Ethic--that he cannot perceive the message of universality in this work. For example, the average critic turns down his mouth when considering the scene on Pompey's barge, but the actors had their mouths turned up in transcendant glee. Cleopatra's love is often pictured as lust, because acceptance of this love on Antony's part would, to the general run of critical spirits, brand him a cross-cultural derelict, forgetful of his place, honor, station. Montaigne said in 1580:

> I think there is nothing barbarous and savage in that nation, from what I have been told, except that each man calls barbarism whatever is not his own practice; for indeed it seems we have no other test of truth and reason than the example and pattern of the opinions and customs of the country we live in.

Craig's moralistic bias shows through his critical onionskin in many places, but never so clear as when he says:

> Antony is a great soldier and a man of vast ability, but his greatness suffers before our eyes when he lets passion betray his reason.

Thus, a passion of love should not have equal time with reason, and that the sexual play of the lusty young should forever defer to duty is a common Western puritanical bias. In sociological terminology, the vivid directness of ethnocentrically enculturated moral judgments is conveyed emphatically in settings of mutual revultion in which impropriety and disgust are perceived as attributes objectively adhering to the act observed rather than as conditioned preferences of the observer.

The critic who sees in Cleopatra only the "childish shrew" and in Antony "the foolish man of passion," is the living personification of the point made above. Cleopatra, like Eve, possesses "the temptation that imperils the human destiny," but she is also the ever-flowing fountain of transcendant love typically, and specifically, the vessel of Antony's love that would cut him free from all the duplicity and paucity of public existence on Roman terms.

In social-psychological terms, Antony suffered from a severe case of cognitive dissonance. Festinger's theory rests on the assumption that the individual attempts to "establish internal harmony, consistency, or congruity among his opinions, attitudes, knowledge, and values, . . ." Pairs of "cognitive elements" may exist in irrevelant, consonant, or dissonant relationships with each other. In the case at hand, dissonance would obtain in Antony's conflict between his desire in Egypt and his duty in Rome. The principal of dissonance operates mainly when a person has made a choice he believes is free, in which he acts of his own volition and is not coerced. If the individual has no choice at all in following an action that is contrary to his pre-existing beliefs, he does not feel any need to change his attitudes toward the action, but if he makes the choice to perform the action freely, dissonance is created and he feels a measure of pressure to reduce it.

It is plain that Antony is aware of his problem, and is extremely agitated over his personal dichotomy, in his conversation with messengers in Act 1.

> O, then we bring forth weeds when our quick minds lie still, and our ills told us is as caring.

It is clear that he wants to delay making any decision because he instructs the mes-

sengers to have at it with full license, and "Fare thee well awhile." But when he hears of Fulvia's death, he becomes fully aware of the duality of his life and proceeds to tear himself away from his love relationship, with which he has been able to transcend, for a time, the magnetic pull of his culture;

> Ten thousand harms, more than the ills I know,
> My idleness doth hatch.

And later, before Caesar, Antony confesses having swerved from the Roman rule; he did not deny arms but

> Neglected rather;
> And that when poisoned hours had bound me up
> From mine own knowledge.

Antony felt that to be bound up from his own knowledge was to tread dangerous ground, and he thought that Cleopatra should know that his sword made weak by his affection, obeys affection at all cause.

Enobarbus speaks for the typical Elizabethan viewpoint in his understanding of Antony's weakness. When Cleopatra asks, "Is Antony or we in fault for this?" regarding the failure of the sea fight, Enobarbus replies,

> Antony only, that would make his will
> Lord of his reason,

In the previous plays Shakespeare generally wrote of action in terms of the relation maintained among the faculties of the soul. He presents great characterizations where the mental and physical "parts are at war with each other." This concept is almost thematic in King Lear. In Romeo and Juliet, Friar Lawrence urges:

> These violent delights have violent ends,
> And in their triumph die, like fire and powder,
> Which as they kiss consume. The sweetest honey
> Is loathsome in his own deliciousness
> And in the taste confounds the appetite;
> Therefore love moderately; long love doth so;
> The swift arrives as tardy as too slow.

And Shakespeare has Hamlet say:

> Give me that man
> That is not passion's slave, and I will wear him
> In my heart's core, ay, in my heart of heart,

The Elizabethan soul depended for its utility upon the body and the spirits. The microcosm is subject in many ways to influences from the macrocosm. Unless one had a massive strength of will, any variation in the humors or in temperament produced a corresponding variation in thought and action. Further, the faculties of the soul were by nature inclined to rebel against each other. From these principles, fundamental in Elizabethan thinking, arises a conception of life different in an important respect from that to which we have become acculturated and therefore significant in any critical appraisal of Shakespeare's method of handling character.

The Eighteenth, Nineteenth, and Twentieth Century literary critics have been constantly exposed to socio-psychological treatises that accord high status to the individual who is at all time master of himself. They enumerate devices to be used in control of the passions, and continually urge us to patience; yet they represent life as a series of conflicting purposes and inexplicable actions.

The Elizabethan did not search for unity in human behavior. His theory of the soul and of its relation to the macrocosm accounts for constant inconsistencies in the life of the tragic hero or the common man. "Our actions," Montaigne tells us:

> Commonly contradict one another so strangely, it seemeth impossible they should be parcels of one warehouse.

And Charron put it even more cogently:

> We are perpetually moving and turning; and in the very change of our posture is so frequent as to be and uneasiness and trouble to us. No man continues to wish and design the same thing two days together . . . Thus we shift our characters each moment, and act a thousand parts . . .

Our modern psychology finds unity in human behavior--apparent dominant strains of unity--and so we have come to demand of our literary artists efforts that are well knit in purpose, impeccable in characterization, and to a certain extent, stagnated and sterile in purpose. In judging Shakespeare's work, we have allowed ourselves to forget that Elizabethans stood on the brink of a great age of transition, and that their thinking emphasized variability and even inconsistency in conduct. Witness the Player King in Hamlet say:

> Our wills and fates do so contrary run
> That our devices still are overthrown;
> Our thoughts are ours, their ends none
> of our own.

Shakespeare, always a leader in the formulation of the views and opinions held by his contemporaries, was never greatly concerned with consistency in characterization. In fact the growth patterns, positive or negative, that occurred in the lives of all his characters, was almost an organic thing. When we look for absolute unity, immobility, or even for support for some absolute, dogmatic truth in his characters, we are searching for something that he did not recognize as valid--except as an ideal rarely attained--and consequently we attempt to discern an attribute that he could never have striven to portray in the tragic sense. Shakespeare's people are never black and white. They show a definite progression out of the age of feudalism, across the "Great Chain" bridge towards some supremely natural, yet transcendent existential awareness.

We do not receive a group of convenient solutions in the play. In fact, we may well be left with the disturbing feeling of mixed emotions, a slightly disoriented relationship vis-a-vis our personal value bank, some degree of cognitive dissonance of our own to deal with. If we recoil emotionally at Octavius' desire to Romanize Eqypt, Octiva's wish to domesticate Antony, Caesar's ability to impose his will on Antony and Cleopatra at every earthy circumstance, we may still fail to gain a full understanding of the death-transcendence principle. For we are left behind with a mere intimation that the lover's death experience is the ultimate act of copulation, performed in the face of a world that could not accept sexual passion as one valid measurement of love. Pure agape, in the Greek sense, is not love; the union of two times three, soul and body and spirit, is love.

As Erich Fromm maintains, in The Sane Society:

> Love is the union with somebody, or something, outside oneself, under the condition of retaining the separateness and integrity of one's self.

Ultimate union can be achieved, by our lover's, only in death. In life Antony failed miserably to fulfill his boast in Act 1:

> Let Rome and Tiber melt, and the
> wide arch
> Of the ranged Empire fall! Here is
> my place.

and herein lies a strong tragic theme of the play. Antony was socially unable to rise above the influence of his Roman duty ethic, and this tragedy in his life experience has been proliferated throughout our normative system to the present day.

Antony and Cleopatra were able to transcend the world of Caesar and all its miniscule motivations of greed and territorial imperative. We see this transcendent theme most clearly in Cleopatra's dream-song--one of the most beautiful songs in classical literature--and especially in her Socratic resignation, made possible by a love so dynamic that it required a new heaven and new earth to contain it.

In the final analysis, Antony and Cleopatra leave us in a world dominated on all sides by the Roman legacy.

> And we are here as on a darkening
> plain
> Swept with confused alarms of struggle
> and flight
> Where ignorant armies clash by night.
>
> Mathew Arnold

And thus do we of wisdom and of reach
With windlasses and with assays of bias,
By indirections find directions out.

Hamlet, Act II, i, 64

FIGURE 1
ANTHONY'S WORLD VIEW

Lover at play

I laughed him out of patience; and that night I laughed him into patience; and next morn ere the ninth hour, I drunk him to his bed; Then put my tires and mantles on him, whilst I wore his sword.

Free Choice

There's not a minute of our lives should stretch without some pleasure now.

What our contempt doth often hurl from us, we wish it ours again.

World of purity

Now, for the love of Love and her soft hours. Let's not confound the time with conference harsh.

I here importune death awhile, until of many thousand kisses the poor last, I lay upon thy lips.

World of Constraint

Stagnation
Regression
Ingratiation
Oblation
Obfuscation
Roman need to achieve

The World

for

Anthony

World of Freedom

Progress
Development
Passion
Affection
Clarity
Egyptian need to affiliate

World of Paucity

And then when poison'd hours had bound me up from mine own knowledge. As nearly as may, I'll play the penitent to you.

Determinism

These strong Egyptian fetters I must break, or lose myself in dotage.

. . . but the letters too . . . Of many our contriving friends in Rome, petition us at home . . .

Soldier at Work

O Love, that thour couldst see my wars today, and knew'st the royal occupation! Thou shouldst see a workman in't.

INTRAFAMILIAL INTERACTION PATTERNS

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Family Interaction as a Research Problem

The more widely used frameworks for the study of the family include the institutional, structural-functional, interactional, situational, and developmental approaches. The interactional approach, as described by Schvaneveldt (1966,199) uses naturalistic observations, assumes a family process which is in flux rather than in equilibrium, as manifested communications, and in which social objects are interpreted by each individual. One advantage of the interactional approach is that the family may be studied in vivo, to get information on the basic patterns of action, exchange, and communication. If the study can be spread over a sample of families in which the children range reasonably well over the preschool and elementary school ages, it may also be possible to develop evidence on the developmental and growth processes which are believed to result, in part, from internal interaction processes within the family. A second advantage of the interactional approach which is based on direct observation is that much of the interaction among family members is directly manifested in verbal and linguistic exchange which is fairly clear to the trained observer. The speaker's intent may be somewhat in doubt, even to the speaker himself, but there is much less doubt among those who heard distinctly as to what was said. Disadvantages of the observational approach are 1) the large requirement for time for data collection and transcription, and 2) the distorting effect of injecting the observer into the family situation. Observer effect can be somewhat modified if the observer can maintain a relatively passive profile as he or she records the sequence and content of intercation between family members.

Differences in the linguistic development of children are well marked by age level. For example, two and three year old children responded with the same complying behavior regardless of the order of pronouns and nouns in simple sentences, like "Bring me the truck" and "Bring the me truck." (Whetstone and Friedlander, 1973) Four year old children improved measurably in language and thinking skills used in problem solving when they were trained to recognize alternatives and to use correctly the alternative pairs: some-all, same-different, happy-sad, and-or, are-aren't. (Spivack and Shure, 1974,24) Generally, children in free play, from the ages of three to five used responsive speech to engage each other in cooperative and purposeful play. (Garvey and Hogan, 1973) Language in the form of organized speech has two functions, as specified by Piaget; one is internal or egocentric speech and the second is externally directed or socialized speech. (Piaget, 1959, 9) The child closely associates egocentric speech with the thinking process, or with a "voice in the head". (Piaget, 1960,39) Various authorities have affirmed Piaget's findings on some of the major developments in reasoning powers in the growing child. (Piaget, 1928, 101) The five year old child has difficulty recognizing how many brothers and sisters his own brothers and sisters have, including himself, from their point of view. The ten year old child readily understands the relational situation from the viewpoint of the other. The ten year old has a more exact and accurate understanding of word associations (Wityrol, 1971); he is more able to infer a relationship between successive pictures (Willoughby, 1973); and he is far more likely to take account of the intention of the actor in judging an action bad or good. (Costanzo, 1973)

The daily exchange of social action among members of the family in the home constitutes a crucible of socialization in which maturing children develop and display specific kinds of skills in dealing with parents and siblings. (Clausen, 1968) The quality, direction, and amount of social exchange within the family necessarily varies with the age of the child from the infantile period through the school years to later adolescence. We would, therefore, expect that an accounting of the stream of verbal exchange among family members would reflect basic changes in the volume and

quality of transactions, and implicitly, in the changes in the social relations in the family as the children mature.

HYPOTHETICAL AND THEORETICAL FACTORS. If the family operates as an integrative, stable social action system, most interaction among family members should be positive and should support ongoing relations. We have applied Horney's basic trichotomy of "moving toward", "moving against", and "moving away" for categorizing interpersonal contacts between family members. (Horney, 1945) For any member who is successfully maintaining a position in the family, most of his actions relating to other family members should be positive, or "going toward" others in the family. The positive approach by an initiator of a contact may generate some initial resistance by the receiver, particularly if the receiver is already committed to some other endeavor. We therefore expect positive approaches to entail some resistance, but at a lower level. The alternative to resistance on the negative side is withdrawal. Withdrawal may be appropriate when the receiver of social approaches is not able to respond well enough to sustain the action. Since the drive of the family interaction system is to develop capacity and techniques for social intercourse, the retreating member can sustain this tactic only briefly, and as a kind of extreme measure. Therefore, withdrawal or "going away" should be less frequent than resistance as a mode of response.

In the middle class in an industrial society where the mother's primary role is that of homemaker and child manager, the mother should dominate the interaction among family members. As the "expressive specialist" for internal family affairs, the mother is the source of security, nurturance, and acceptance, while the father is the "external specialist" who meets the instrumental demands of the objective world. (Parsons and Bales, 1955, 80) This suggests that the mother should be the center for most of the transactions among family members in the home, and particularly as they regard action relating to food, children's activities, and conversational relations of an expressive type. As the father is the source of instrumental evaluation, he should manifest a higher rate of control, and punitive action in the application of normative requirements. For this reason, we would expect the children to feel closer to the mother, and for those seeking maternal approval to be high achievers as compared to children less strongly bound to mother. (Weinstein, 1968)

It is generally recognized that the child enters a stage of accelerated speech development at about age three. From 2.5 years to 3.0 years of age, Elkonin documents a doubling of the vocabulary in use, going from a mean of 446 words at age 2.5 to a mean of 896 words at age 3.0, (Elkonin, 1971, 131) Montessori said that this explosion of speech came within a period of about three months, well after the age of two, initiating a new period of speech development after the age of 2.5 years. (Montessori, 1969, 114) If these estimates can be generalized, we would expect an acceleration of vocal and verbal participation in social action in the family starting when the child is three years old, and increasing for several years thereafter. As the child gains autonomy, in the later years of elementary school, he or she spends more time outside the home, as compared to younger siblings, and we would expect the participation rate to decline. If the adult sex role modeling concepts are correct, the participation rates of boys should move toward that of the father, and the participation rate of girls should move toward that of the mother.

Social development mainfested in the family interaction pattern can be measured in part by the talk/listen ratio. It is obvious that the very young child who is slowly learning to speak will have a talk/listen ratio well below unity. As he becomes more articulate and more skilled in social interaction in the family, this ratio should approach unity sometime during the later elementary school years, and should exceed unity in early adolescence. The parental set should represent the maximum within the family on this index.

METHOD. College students in marriage and family sociology classes were used as low-profile participant observers in 100 families.

These observers were put through a series of training sessions on observing and recording interpersonal transactions, coding the actors, and supplying explanatory cues to supplement the verbatim record where necessary. They were instructed to respond to approaches from family members only to the minimum required by politeness, and to explain their presence by saying they were doing a school assignment. This explanation was immediately accepted by all family members, including parents. They kept written notes, supplemented in a few cases by tape recordings. Observers were instructed to remain in the family setting, or with the family, if the entire family went out for shopping or refreshment. The mean length of observation was 9.06 hours, and a mean of 467 acts of interpersonal relation were recorded per family, at a rate of about .86 interactions per minute. This underestimates the full interaction rate within the family because the observer could record only one interaction set in those cases where interaction was occuring in more than one portion of the family, and some statements were lost when the observer could not keep up with a rapid exchange. No attempt was made to record the audible portion of telephone conversations, recitations, or the lyrics of songs. What was recorded probably includes 80 to 90 percent of the observable action in the family.

The families selected constitute an analytical sample of those containing preschool or school age children, including not more than five members. There were 254 children in the sample, or a mean of 2.54 children per family. They were families well known and accessible to the student observers, but they were not the students' own families. Many of the observations were made during school vacation while the students were away from the university, and the families were distributed in various towns in Oklahoma and surrounding states. They were all middle class families, classified by the father's occupation, and by the parents' educational attainment at the college level. Other research has shown that middle class families are more articulate than working class families. (Jones and McMillan, 1973) For this reason, the sample is probably not representative of working class families.

A small group of coders was trained to code each recorded action. These codes were developed after several trials, based on Horney's general trichotomy, incorporating several subcategories developed in Borke's intrafamily observation (1967). Coder teams compared results in practice trials and discussed discrepant classifications until agreement was reached. All coder teams reviewed all disagreements on coding until there was full consensus on the trial coding. Coder agreement on the final coding was 99.7 percent. The total of 58 codes was condensed into nine types of relationship to simplify analysis. The "going toward" category with 20 subcategories was grouped into four interaction types. Cuing includes initiator acts which initiate or support the action of the other. They may react to his action or redirect his action. Engagement sustains contact and involvement directly between dyadic partners and requires complementary or coordinating action from him. This represents the core of communion and shared action in the contact dyad. It calls for equal participation by both partners. Explanation is one-sided or monopolar communication which transmits information. It represents an initial step in developing consensus and common understanding, but it tends toward disequilibrium in the verbal exchange and may lead into a lecture. Expression reveals the feelings and emotions of the speaker. The "going against" category with sixteen subcategories was grouped into four action types. Attack includes a hostile approach which is not designed to control the other's action. Control includes directions, orders, and requests where the initiator prescribes and attempts to force a course of action on the other. Punishment is the application or threat of pain on the other, usually with the appearance of retaliation. Resistance includes the attempt to ignore, evade, or escape control of the other. The "going away" category was not grouped into action types, despite the fact that it includes twelve subcategories, because there was relatively little of this type of action in the sample and the loadings would have been too low for meaningful analysis with

this data base. Since the action system is at least temporarily destroyed by the "going away" tactic, it appears to be a self-limiting type of strategy in a game on which the player is almost inescapably dependent. This action does terminate the immediate action sequence, but the disengagement is usually of short duration.

Age levels 1 and 2 were excluded from this calculation to avoid the distortion due to near-zero participation in verbal interaction in the sending mode.

FINDINGS. There is a strong predominance of positive action in the family interaction profile for all ages above age 1 as indicated in Table 1. The rate for "going toward" is five to eight times greater than the rate for "going against", and the latter rate is two to five times greater than the "going away" rate. A positive pattern of nurturance and social support is evident in these 100 families, and the withdrawal strategy, although employed at all age levels, represents a fairly rare element in the interaction stream. As a relatively long-enduring group, the interaction in the family apparently requires positive and supportive relations which consistently generates a low-order friction in the form of opposition and resistance. The overall rate indicates that the mother generates about twice as much interpersonal action as other members of the family, and that she is the primary source of verbal and social stimulation. A second factor which emerges in the distribution or rates in the childhood years is the very rapid increase in action rates from ages 1 to 4. The greatest relative increase occurs in the transition from 2 to 3 years of age, by a factor greater than 2. The two-year-old child is rather peripheral to the verbal action in the family, but the three-year-old is a full participant in generating conversation and exerting influence on other family members. The four-year-old child is the more talkative and the most involved. The general pattern, taken from the overall rates of Table 1, and graphically illustrated in Figure 1 shows that both sexes have a similar pattern of increase maximizing at age 4, and declining rather sharply, relative to other age levels to the ages of 6 and 7. Thereafter, the boys indicate a declining trend to age 13 which appears to be approximating the low level of participation of the father. The girls show a much less consistent pattern which reaches a minimum markedly lower than that of other family members at ages 10 and 11, with a rapid rise toward the maternal level after age 11.

The positive forms of action are manifested by all or nearly all family members after age two, at varying rates. Of the four oppositional forms of action, only the resist form appears to be universally or near universally applied. The rate of resistance is generally similar to the rate of cuing and expressing during the childhood years. The punish, attack, and control actions occur at a very low rate, and these three are generally similar in rate of occurrence to the "going away" category. The most frequent of all action types of the explanation category in which some form of information is being transferred from one family member to another. Since this type of action is about equal to the sum of the other three forms of positive interaction, the main burden of interaction within families is symbolic in the sense of sharing information between persons, and that the social juxtapositioning implicit in cuing, expressing, and engaging are complementary and to some degree secondary to the symbolic communication process. The pattern for males is generally similar to that for the females except for the low level of participation of the father. Our results do not agree with those of Mueller, in that we do not find significant differences in the rate of talking comparing boys and girls of ages 3, 4, and 5. (Mueller, 1972).

The two positions least incorporated into family interaction are the father and the one-year-old. Father directs considerably more of his conversation to teen-age children. Mother directs significantly more of her conversation to children aged 2 through 5, and has less to say to father than to the children other than the ten-year-olds.

Among the children, the highest rates of communication occur between children aged 7 and 8, while the ten-year-old children have no high level of communications received from any family member. The

TABLE 1
DIRECTIONS FOR INTRA-FAMILY COMMUNICATION BY SEX AND AGE
(Harmonic mean rates per 1000 vocal acts emitted; Total: 46,728)

Age	Going Toward		Going Against		Going Away		Overall Rate		N	N
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	M	F
Parent	42	346	6	44	2	2	48	417	77	100
13	94	165	17	20	4	3	108	204	9	6
12	65	157	64	22	14	4	85	192	4	3
11	116	58	18	9	9	10	115	67	11	4
10	126	51	15	11	6	4	151	22	6	6
9	86	174	9	20	4	6	115	202	13	12
8	89	110	20	15	4	2	121	127	10	10
7	78	99	9	7	4	9	101	121	13	5
6	132	78	16	17	4	4	174	120	12	11
5	181	154	26	14	3	3	216	189	6	7
4	196	195	28	31	4	6	240	255	16	14
3	142	120	30	24	9	3	203	162	11	23
2	51	58	6	12	6	4	73	82	9	12
1	7	6	4	7	6	5	8	13	10	11

highest hark rates for dyadic communications received from others were attained by mothers, teen-agers, and preschool children from 2 through 5. The lowest rates were reached by fathers, ten-year-olds and one-year-olds.

DISCUSSION. The centrality and influence of the mother among minor children in the middle-class urban home are clearly in evidence. The part she plays in face to face interaction in the family far outweighs the direct influence of the father, particularly with children of elementary school and preschool age. As Iversen notes, the classification of effects at the individual ang group level helps to clarify the variation in the data for the individual. (Iversen, 1973) The young child, initially excluded from the main tempo of interpersonal relations among the family members due to his limitation in verbal skills and vocabulary, reaches a reasonable level of parity in the action by age 3, and shows the maximal output for children of all ages by age 4. The bulk of the interactions are positive and supportive. Other research has shown a positive and significant correlation between supportive relations from parents to sons and supportive relations from sons to parents. (Alexander, 1973) Negative or oppositional types of communications are primarily in the form of resistance to the approaches and suggestions of other family members, which indicates a moderate conflice between control and submission. Punishment as such is not much in evidence and cooperation is attained, as suggested by Erlanger, by various other means. (Erlanger, 1974) Suggesting new lines of action, cuing, and withdrawal for a short period probably serve to reduce resistance. The general tone of the 100 protocols, each containing 25 to 40 pages of verbal interaction, is one of domestic comfort with a with degree of action and response. Expression of affection is rather rare, and the bulk of the communication is practical, rational, and matter of fact. The protocols almost universally indicate well established discipline and an orderly routine which is well understood even by very young children. The constant stream of explanation, suggestion, and rationalization seems to commit the child's evaluation processes to his mother's main orientations, and the child's intensive involvement during the preschool years offer little opportunity for developing deviant lines of thought or action. (Jensen, 1972) The conflicts which arose were primarily concerned with changes in the direction of action, possession of toys, games to play, or television programs to watch. The relative plenitude of good alter-

natives tended to moderate the frequency and intensity of conflict among siblings.

The reliability of findings in this study is somewhat reduced by the fact that the data were recorded by 100 different observers. There was no way to insert a second observer into each family during the period of observation and we have had no alternative to acceptance of the protocols at face value. In many cases the mothers read over the observer's record out of curiosity but all gave permission for the material to be used in the study, and none of them applied any censorship. The participating families were assured anonymity in the published results, but the original protocols carried the full names of all family members, family income, and street address. There appeared to be little concern with privacy, under the assumption that the observation was benevolent and directed to a worthwhile academic purpose.

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(Condluded on p. 37)

RECENT PUBLICATION PATTERNS IN THREE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY JOURNALS

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The changing interests and methods of sociologists have long been of interest to sociologists (see for example, Lundberg, 1931; Duncan and Duncan, 1953; Simpson, 1961; Brown and Gilmartin, 1969; McCartney, 1970; Stehr and Larson, 1972). Some of the later authors (and numerous other authors not discussed here) have concentrated on status hierarchies in the profession. They have not, however, analyzed the effects which the publication patterns of the journals have on the profession. In this paper we examine some specific publication patterns of the "top" journals. In particular we shall present evidence that the patterns of publications are related to the prestige of substantive areas in the profession and that this fact may affect the publication rate for women in the profession.

METHOD. Articles from *The American Sociological Review*, the *American Journal of Sociology,* and *Social Forces* for the years 1970 through November, 1975, were coded by sex of author(s) and by primary substantive area using the 36 subfields listed in the Directory of Members, 1973-1974, of the American Sociological Association. These journals are the top three journals of the profession according to the Glenn (1971) study on prestige of sociological journals and were considered "core" journals by Lin and Nelson (1969) in their study of bibliographic reference patterns. All three are national, general journals, not regional or specialized journals and thus generally publish articles on interest to the full profession.

Both authors of this paper independently coded all articles for the three journals over the six year period. Initial coder agreement was 85 percent. Disputed coding was resolved by rereading and discussion. In some previous work (Seater and Jacobson, 1976) we asked a random sample of 315 professional sociologists drawn from the Directory to rank the substantive specialties in sociology (from 1 = very low prestige to 5 = very high prestige). Two hundred fourteen respondents returned usable questionnaires. A clear status or prestige ranking emerged (see Table 1). We also found that most members of the journal editorial boards do their work in high prestige areas.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION. The Pearsonian correlation between the prestige ranking and the number of articles published in ASR, AJS, and SF for the years 1970-1973 (see Table 1) in each of the specialty areas was .518 (Kendall's tau = .287, N = 36, p .01).

It might be argued that a preponderance of articles on methods and theory should appear in these journals since they are the general journals of the field. We specifically avoided coding articles under these two specialties unless the central thrust was actually theory or methods. We did not use them as umbrella areas for articles that could not be classified in other substantive areas. Furthermore, the relationship between specialty prestige and number of articles published still holds if theory and methods are excluded from the analysis. The Pearsonian correlation drops, but only to .457. The general trend was for these journals to publish more articles from the high prestige specialties than from the low ones and suggests that it is more difficult to publish in some substantive areas than in others in these journals.

The best way to conclusively establish that editors and reviewers devalue work in some substantive areas but not others would be to analyze both rejected articles and reviewers comments. Of particular interest would be articles rejected from the "top" journals which are eventually published by lesser or regional journals. This is not feasible at present, however, since the journals routinely discard rejected articles at preset dates after rejection and confidentiality of both the authors and reviewers would be seriously compromised. Thus, the substantive content may influence the final disposition of a paper and one's specialty can have a profound effect on one's career in terms of visibility among one's colleagues. It is true that some of the low prestige areas such as the sociology of education

TABLE 1. ARTICLES BY SUBFIELD IN ASR, AJS AND SF, 1970-1975

(N=913; figures are percent of total)

Subfield by prestige level	Rank	Articles
High Prestige		
Theory	4.54	4.2
Methods/Statistics	4.14	9.0
Knowledge/Science	3.86	4.1
Stratification/Mobility	3.81	8.8
Mathematical Sociology	3.71	.9
Social Psychology	3.63	11.9
Formal/Complex Organization	3.62	6.2
Social Organization	3.59	2.6
Demography	3.51	1.9
Urban Sociology	3.41	1.5
Medical Sociology	3.39	2.0
Medium Prestige		
Social Change	3.31	1.3
Comparative Sociology	3.24	.4
Occupations/Professions	3.23	3.0
Race/Ethnic Relations	3.10	8.5
Social Control	3.15	.2
Deviant Behavior	3.13	2.3
Small Groups	2.98	.9
Collective Behavior	2.97	.9
Law and Society	2.96	.4
Human Ecology	2.92	2.3
Community	2.91	1.4
Cultural Sociology	2.90	.1
Low Prestige		
Mass Communications	2.87	1.0
Economy and Society	2.86	.7
Crime/Delinquency	2.85	2.7
Industrial Sociology	2.81	.9
Marriage/Family	2.68	4.8
Military Sociology	2.56	.5
Sex Roles	2.54	1.2
Applied Sociology	2.50	.1
Religion	2.44	4.3
Education	2.39	2.2
Leisure, Recr., Sport, Arts	2.13	.9
Rural Sociology	2.05	.2

and the sociology of religion have their own journals in which they can publish, but this is also true of middle range specialties such as small groups, and high prestige specialties such as medical sociology, demography, social psychology and methodology and statistics. In some cases, specialists may prefer to publish in these specialized journals in order to reach a more select audience, but we believe this is not generally the case. Most members would prefer the national, larger visibility and the higher prestige that accompanies publication in ASR, AJS, or SF. Thus the selectivity of these journals tends to structure the profession in a traditional if not conservative way.

The data also indicate that women were underpublished in these journals for the selected years. While they constitute 14.1 percent of the doctorates in sociology, social psychology and rural sociology in the Directory of Members 1970, and were an increasing proportion in graduate departments (from 9 percent in 1970 to 18.5 percent in 1974, see Harris, 1975), all-female authored publications, whether single, dual, or triple authored accounted for only 7.1 percent of the total publications. All-male authored publications accounted for 83.2 percent of the total articles or over ten times the number of all-female authored articles. An additional seven percent of the articles were jointly authored by males and females. It is difficult to assess credits or responsibility for these multi-authored articles, but if sex of the first author is used, female authored publications still represent only 10.5 percent of the total articles. The percentage of female-authored articles may be inflated, however, since AJS devoted the January issue of 1973 to sex roles which included 22 articles, 20 of them authored by women only.

However, AJS also devoted one particular issue to the sociology of knowledge, but all of the articles were written by men. We suspect that with the exception of sex roles, editors for special editions are for the most part men who solicit articles primarily from other men--the old "buddy system" in action.

The number of female authored articles in the three journals increased from six in

1970, eight in 1971, ten in 1972, to twenty-five in 1973, the year of the special issue. The number dropped back to seven in 1974 and nine in 1975 (through November). Many of the special edition articles were concerned primarily with substantive areas other than sex roles but were included in the particular issue because of some focus on sex roles. These articles were appropriately classified when coded, but it is not known whether they would have been published if the particuar issue had not been devoted to sex roles. If the January, 1973 issue of AJS had been excluded from our sample, the percentage of female authored articles would have been a low five percent, not seven percent, and the data would show that there has been no increase over the years 1970-1975.

In recent years there has been a strong effort on the part of American sociologists to remove obstructions to full acceptance of women in the profession. A larger proportion of women now occupy faculty positions in graduate departments. The number of women Ph.D.'s granted in sociology increased gradually but consistently from 15 to 25 percent during the years 1966 to 1972-73 (see Hughes, 1973 and Harris, 1975). And total participation of women in the annual meetings of the A.S.A. increased inconsistently from 9 percent in 1967 to 20 percent in 1973 (see Hughes, 1973). Our data indicate that this increased participation has yet to be translated into an increase in professional articles in the "top" journals.

Other researchers have examined the productivity of men and women in sociology, but the evidence is inconclusive and often contraductory. However, among those who have examined publication in only the top sociology journals, there is a consistent pattern. All found women to be underpublished (see Seater and Jacobson, 1975). Several possible reasons for the lower productivity among women have been suggested in the literature. Most of them relate to the position of women sociologists in the social structure of the profession: lack of social networks, underrepresentation in the higher professional ranks, underrepresentation of the high status departments, disproportionate teaching of undergraduates, teaching out of specialty areas, and professional age (see Seater and Jacobson, 1975 for a summary of this literature).

When sex of authorship by substantive area was examined, another definite pattern emerged. Women claim expertise in all 36 specialty areas of the profession and with a few exceptions are proportionately represented in substantive areas of sociology (Jacobson and Seater, 1975). But in terms of publishing in ASR, AJS, and SF, 78.5 percent of the female authored articles were in nine specialties: education, marriage and family, occupation and professions, race and ethnic, social psychology, sex roles, stratification and mobility, knowledge and science, and theory. The same specialties comprise only 44.2 percent of the articles published by all male authors. Furthermore, 46 of the 74 mixed sex articles were in these same areas. (A full report is available from the authors.) Perhaps as women are more accepted into the American sociological profession they will participate more fully in all areas.

When the prestige areas are collapsed into high, medium and low prestige, male authors have a clear preponderance of higher prestige articles (Chi Squared = 7.39; df=2; p=.025). The number of male-authored articles in the upper third of the prestige specialties is approximately three times the number published in the low and medium prestige areas. On the other hand, the number of female authored articles in the high, medium, and low prestige levels is nearly the same. These differences by sex are significant at the .05 level. Note that marriage and the family, sex roles, and education are all traditional women's areas. Education and especially marriage and the family were also specialty areas in which we had previously found women overrepresented (Seater and Jacobson, 1975). Sex roles was not listed as a substantive area until the 1974 directory was issued. Thus the data indicate that women have concentrated to some extent on specialties that are accorded relatively low status in the profession. And though these low prestige specialties are published in these three journals, they are published less often than high prestige specialties. This may account in part for the different

publication rates observed for female and male sociologists.

CONCLUSION. In summary the data presented here indicate that the publication patterns in the three journals (ASR, AJS, and SF) affect the structure of the profession through differential exposure of some substantive specialities to the exclusion of others. The data also indicate that women sociologists publish less in these journals than men. However, controls on the variables affecting women's productivity, namely their "place" in the profession, are needed to assess this finding adequately. Both formal and informal structural factors need to be examined. The data further indicate that women sociologists, although listing expertise in all areas of the profession, publish work in these journals primarily in a quarter of the specialties. And women sociologists published disproportionately in low presstige specialties in these journals. Thus, women sociologists appear to be studying different phenomena than men and perhaps study it differently.

It would be difficult to say that the research conducted in the low prestige specialties is less or more valid and important than the other research. It is simply different. Perhaps it is more important, but ignored. In any case, the recent publication patterns of these three journals appear to structure the profession adn have important implications for both individual careers and the profession as a whole.

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THE QUESTION OF WEBER'S CRAFTSMANSHIP

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INTRODUCTION. The argument of this essay is simple: Weber was an imaginative thinker, but a careless scholar. The importance of his contributions rests on the seminal value of his creativity, but they are flawed by his poor detailing. This is especially disastrous where it seems least visible - in the philosophic and scientific foundations of his work. And the sins of omission are more grave than the sins of commission. Weber ignored many of the great intellectual changes of his time. Such defects are not peculiar to Weber: they mar the work of all of the founding fathers.

THE GENEOLOGY OF IDEAS. Sociologists too easily overlook the historical growth of ideas. The sociology of knowledge has been concentrated on inner directions (Marx & Engels 1968; Mannheim 1936; Durkheim 1954; Merton 1949; Coser 1941). Social philosophy is filled with very uneven scholarship. Bold ideas attract, but their support is often cosmetic. Scholarship and research must be added (Kuhn 1970). Except in mathematical sociology, theories all across the spectrum, from Marx to Parsons, lack potent directive and deductive force. Their infrequent models coordinate vaguely defined variables in over-generalized oversimplified assertions. Such theory cannot direct research precisely, and materials are not selected systematically.

WEBER'S NEGLECT OF PHILOSOPHIC SOURCES. Social scientists often acknowledge their dependence on philosophers, mathematicians, logicians, and natural scientists for guidelines to organize theories, to seed and prepare evidence, to confide in intellectual enterprise, and to narrate ethical connections. The intellectual foundations of sociology rest in philosophy, including ontology, cosmology, logic, language, epistomology, and ethics. The elder heroes, who led the exodus from philosophy transferred their interests to sociology, with their own academic background, loyalties, heroes, anti-heroes, and teachers. Marx's pantheon included Hegel, Rousseau, French and English socialists, the materialists, and British empiricists and economists.

Weber seems to have been influenced by Kant, Knies, Schmoler, Marx, and Nietzsche. His own intellectual friends were oriented toward history, economics, law, and politics, with men like Sombart, Michels, and Simmel. Others included his brother Alfred, Troeltsch, Tonnies, Windelband, the philosopher Hensel, and the psychiatrist-turned-philosopher, Jaspers (Marianne Weber 1975; Gerth & Mills 1958, 20).

Even more important are the ideas which were available at the time, but ignored by Weber. Such assumptions are easily forgotten by sociologists who are not educated to find them. As a result, both theorists and critics lose sense of foundation and proportion. Despite disagreements in perspective and theory, most commentators repute Weber to be a major scholar who is superbly educated and painstakingly well-read (Parsons 1937; Freund 1968; Mitzman 1960; Wallerstein 1974). In fact, Weber was less than widely read, often careless in his selections, and superficial in his understanding.

THE IDEAL TYPES. One of Weber's major contributions, concept formation, nowadays may seem archaic, even arcane. The literature is filled with references to ideal types (Becker & Barnes, 1952: Coser, 1971). Unfortunately, Weber's own guidelines are usually overlooked (Weber, 1947, 1949: 89-110, 139-142; 1964; Gerth & Mills, 1946; Freund, 1968). Basically, these procedures operate: 1) to integrate in an historical causal context; 2) to apply as an heuristic means; 3) as a paradigm of typical spiritual or mental attitudes; 4) to abstract and generalize the conditions producing these characteristics, to interpret their basis and express the rule representing the class-concept; and 5) to eliminate confusing elements of special groups or periods. The total pattern must be represented as a consistent whole, so the concept can provide an unambiguous meaning to otherwise disparate elements.

Construction of ideal types began with a borrowing from the existential world.

Types were used for the construction of arguments but were not to be confused with exact portraits of life. The parentage of ideal types appears mixed. The idea may have come to Weber through his friend, Simmel, or from Nietzsche, especially his concept of the Alexandrine man, Socrates (Kaufmann, 1968; Nietzsche, 1964). Nietzche's conception "ubermenschen" became Freud's "uberich" (superego) (Freud, 1961:7), and had effect on Jung, Jaspers, Scheler, and many others (Kaufmann, 1968). Other sources mentioned by Weber may have been Rickert, or Windelband, or Breysig, in a relevant discussion of concepts, typical characteristics, rules, laws, and heuristic instruments. Perhaps Rickert was the most likely. In any event, the ancestry of ideal types probably sprung from Hegel's use of moments and notions in the Science of Logic (1969) and may have proceeded through Husserl's ideal universals, which Husserl thought were proposed by acts of ideation (1969). Before the publication of The Protestant Ethic, Husserl had already proposed that perception involved the intentional synthesis of a variety of perspectives (1969, Giddens, 1977:24-33). This was especially apt for science, in which evidence clearly depended on the rigorous active coordination of scientific act and object. Physical, intellectual, and psychological elements can be separated by reduction. Husserl's ideas were developed in many directions, sometimes by men also associated with Weber, like Max Scheler, who moved toward ethical problems. Parallel to Husserl's work, and at about the same time, Russell clearly separated signification from denotation (1905). Thus use of concepts was liberated from strict empiricism.

Weber did not recognize the tremendous effects of the revolutions begun by Planck and Einstein, about the same time as the publication of Weber's Protestant Ethic. The bases of the new theories of radiation and relativity involved more use of imagination. Their confirmation required more instrumentation and less raw observation. They did supercede the Newtonian concepts of celestial mechanics. In its place arose shifting ideas and arbitrary assumptions, tied more to the limits of language or technique, but much more closely resembling the conceptions of social science (Feigl, 1953; Zilsel, 1953; Schlick, 1974; Scheffler, 1967).

It seems unfortunate that concept formation has not been developed further in sociology; failure has befallen most conscious efforts to regularize sociological concepts (Lazarsfeld and Barton, 1951; Lazarsfeld and Rosenberg, 1955). The classic study of norms by Festinger, Schachter and Back (1955), treating them as an inferential construct, remains all but ignored. Weber's reputation seems to have spared ideal types, if only as museum pieces.

In sum, while Weber seemed unaware of the best thinking available, his use of concepts was ahead of his time among sociologists. His requirement that ideal types include normative and motivational elements is consistent with his systematic efforts to develop a theory of action though it too greatly narrows the domains for which concepts can be proposed (Weber, 1947; Parsons, 1937; Coser, 1971).

WHAT PROTESTANT ETHIC? Sometimes nothing is better fun than a controversy. One of the best concerns the origins of capitalism. One side of the issue is dominated by Weber's classic study of how Calvinism enhanced the growth of rationality in modern capitalism, and this hypothesis retrenched the generalizations of Marx and other historical materialists (Weber, 1930, 13-26, 55, 181-183; Green, 1959; Bendix, 1962; Wallerstein, 1973). Though Weber's proposals were subjected to persistent review by theologians, economists, historians, and sociologists (Harkness, 1931; Robertson, 1933; McNeill, 1948; Calvin, 1960:724n; Hirst, 1976), Fischoff (1944) showed how much of this commentary was superficial and defective. Still, it remains absolutely clear that in characterizing Calvinism, Weber neglected much in Calvin's Institutes, and there is no evidence that Weber read his sermons (1930: 98, 220, 224, 228). Calvin's doctrine concerning vocation and performance on which Weber based so much is a very minor part of the Institutes (1960:724). To Calvin, vocations simply represent one of God's many

providences, an opportunity to occupy a person's time to avoid sin. It is associated with his doctrine of esthetics. Similarly, in His mercy God provides many natural joys on which people may freely and pleasantly spend their time and avoid corruption. In contrast, Merton is on much surer theological ground in examining the relation of Protestant science to Calvinist teachings, where the duty to know God as well as possible is central (1973). According to Calvin, such knowledge may be sought through Jesus, justification, and regeneration; through scriptural study; and through study of the universe (1960).

Weber's argument that Calvinism extended rationality is so seriously oversimplified that it endangers the credibility of his hypothesis. Early Protestant theologians, and Calvin most clearly, stressed that reason suggested men could be saved by obedience to God's laws, especially the commandments of Moses or Christ. However, these requirements were so stiff that, in practice, salvation must come through faith. For this purpose God sent His son to be sacrificed, to offer the new covenant. Thus the early reformers continued the thinking of evangelical radical Christian prophecy, which could be traced through Augustine to the gnostics. These Protestants insisted that will was more important than reason. It was will that responded to the call or vocation, particularly in baptism, the remaining significant sacrament. It was will that men were reminded to apply to their daily lives; to help their neighbors, to keep busy with practical demands, to restrict their pleasures to the simple beauties God so providentially supplied (Calvin, 1960). In fact, the consequences of the Reformation included the revival of humanism, led by Protestants, with the destruction of a highly developed medieval logic (Boshenski, 1962; Ong, 1974). The interest in humanism, and the successes of science, later helped return a concern with classical logic, Roman law, and reason in general. The reascendence of reason peaked again in the 18th century, closer to the time of Franklin and Weber. Again, the passionate denials of reason evoked in early romanticism commonly originated among Protestants, and especially Calvinists. However, the Protestants' use of mathematics in science obscured their rejections of rationality, Thus the most gifted and most scrupulous modern critics are captured by Weber's error, even when they disagree with him, by accepting his sources of religious information (Bendix, 1962, 55-79; Ch. 8; Giddens, 1975, Ch. 2, 78-81). To put this problem in perspective, both Bendix and Giddens recognize the independent importance Weber gave political organization. Giddens cites Weber's account of the role of the Eastern junkers in creating capitalism, which was bureaucratic but not bourgeois and Giddens notes that Weber saw that modern capitalism depends upon and generates an expropriation of workers in many institutional domains beyond economics (1975, 49; 1973, 45, 139). More to the point, Bendix examines Weber's less known hypothesis that the political autonomy among institutional domains in Western civilization, especially the medieval cities, made a ready seed bed for Protestantism (Bendix 1962, 52, 70-79).

Bendix excuses Weber from causal imputation in The Protestant Ethic, saying that Weber only suggested an affinity between theology and a worldly code of conduct (1962:280). However, this contradicts Weber's own handling of ideal types and concepts and Weber's contention that he was demonstrating the limitations of materialism by showing how ideal interests promoted the early growth of economic rationality (1930:26). Thus it is fair to consider serious errors in Weber's methodological design (Robertson, 1933; Fischoff, 1944; Hirst, 1976). First his evidential criterion fitted the method of joining concepts he developed with ideal types. It does not allow inferences about causation. Instead, he seeks superficial agreement among 1) his independent variable, the ideal types of Calvinist theology, 2) his intervening variable, the Franklin work ethic, and 3) his dependent variable, modern rational capitalism. These descriptions were composed rather freely, allowing considerable bias to intrude.

Second, Weber postdated his description of Calvinism by a century, which quietly minimized discrepancies among his variables (Tawney, 1930). A serious historical distor-

tion resulted. For example, the emphasis put on bonds of brotherly affection by Governor Winthrop in 1630 stressed the duties to love enemies and assist the poor (1931; Morison, 1958, 73). One should lend money cheerfully to potential bankrupts, intending to forgive the loan if necessary. The importance Winthrop gave affection contrasted sharply with the formulae of the Westminster Confession of 1647, or the views of Baxter, in 1678, or of Bailey or Sener, on whom Weber relied extensively (Weber, 1930:224).

Third, Weber did not consider alternative cases: cases in which Calvinism either did not enhance capitalist growth or in which capitalism grew without its influence (1927; Tawney, 1930).

During the gap between the 1530's and the 1670's, ignored by Weber, vast changes occurred in science and education, some of them more directly promoted by Calvinist religious interests (Merton, 1970; 1973). In turn, these enhanced the growth and spread of technology. Weber was aware of the importance of technology too (Giddens, 1975:140). On the whole, he may have been right about the Protestant ethic, but for the wrong reasons. Fundamentally, he did not recognize the essential inferential paradox created by harnessing the logic of the experiment to continuous variables, such as time. Since continuities are infinitely divisible, the possibility of interference cannot be rejected. This was recognized by the Greeks (Schrodinger, 1950). The question of the missing century in Weber's argumentation is not idle. It contains the secret of whether a more elaborate, corrected version of his hypothesis is valid or not (Tawney, 1930:8-10).

MEANING AND METAPHYSICS: SPIRIT AND MATTER. To understand Weber's ideas, it is crucial to understand "meaning": the meaningful content of action or relationship is "a case of the meaning imputed to the parties in a given concrete case, on the average or in a theoretically formulated pure type. It is never a normatively 'correct' or metaphysically 'true' meaning." (1947: 118). Meaningful processes are "subjectively understandable" (1947:90). But to interpret meaning requires evidence, information, intuition, rules of procedure, judgmental criteria (1947:90, 87; 1949:135-147): thus, experience, empathy, taste, communication, imagination, formal models, empirical conventions, refined cultural standards of science, law art, or epistemology. To have meaning, something must be related to purpose, thus to action as either means or ends (1947:93). However, "the ideal type of meaningful action where the meaning is fully conscious and explicit is a marginal case" (1947:112). Altogether, meaning must have a coherence which can be generalized in terms of some experience, pattern, rule or model (1947:95, 99). Establishing a statistical uniformity based on behavior alone, as in natural science, gives no interpretation of meaning. Understanding requires connecting motives and outcomes. Weber's discussion regularly involved the observer, as reference, in such determinations. He was concerned more with meaning as method than substance, sharing Dilthey's view (1949:106, 124, 138; Giddens, 1977: 19). On the other hand, he was vulnerable and hypersensitive about, the possibilities of anthropomorphism (1949:186). Yet he preferred to approach motives from value-analytic interpretation and to avoid textual-linguistic analysis (1949:146). Thus Weber chose to ignore the crucial role of language as the medium of intersubjective experience and discourse (Giddens, 1977:19, 23-33). Giddens compared the simplicity of Weber's conception of meaning, and the primitive use he attached to social action, with the complexity of the issues raised by Schutz, following Husserl, in criticism of Weber (Schutz, 1967). Schutz maintained a closer contact with philosophy, and his work was more philosophically informed, though his interests and views differed widely from those of most philosophers. Even from a purely sociological interest, Weber missed the crucial dimensions of perspectival differences, the very basis of social relationships; thus of the reflexive concerns in meaning; of the linguistic problems of syntax, semantics, pragmatics.

Weber's notions seem plausible and useful until they are contrasted with the richness of their philosophical context. Then it is

clear that many of his most important ideas are drab, oversimplified, and even impotent. To gain perspective on Weber's ideas, we must review the outlines of Western philosophy, because their neglect perpetuates Weber's weaknesses. His conceptions of ideal types, meaning, and rationality, in particular, depend upon postures relative to the long metaphysical division among materialists, nominalists, and idealists within Western thought (Nilsson, 1964; 1969; 1972; Dodds, 1951; Lovejoy, 1964). However, this division was extracted in the debates between medieval Platonic and Aristotelian schoolmen on the distinction between spirit and matter and the relative independence of ideas, and existence or material nature. Epistemologically, this controversy focused on how information can cross the boundary between matter and mind, and how information can be assimilated. The issue covered logical rules, theories of proof, observation and experience, faith, psychological principles, learning, language and communication. The two principal sources of meaning are: 1) the associations of language with existential conditions, mediated by experience, thus with semantics or pragmatics; 2) the relationships among linguistic expressions or assertions, mediated through structure, thus with syntax.

In the tradition of Hume, Mill concerned himself with inductive logic and formalized the model of the experiment (1949). In 1880, Peirce explicitly recognized the indipendence of issues of inference and of existence: hence, within a logical system, the necessity of adding independent premises to introduce existential indications or conclusions (1931). Peirce's insight refracted this division into the much more precise problems of later positivism, with meaning and knowledge tied either to public experimental validation or to linguistically regulated proof. Russell tried to resolve the ontological dilemma by comprehending the existence of symbolism and meaning. These ideas were current intellectual topics, and available to Weber long before his death. Men of Weber's time proposed ways to resolve some of the epistemological, ontological, and sociological problems of the mind-body dualism by accommodating idealism to modern science, or to pragmatism) Lovejoy 1960; Russell 1905; Whitehead 1927; Northrop 1946; Heidegger 1972, 1977; G.H. Mead 1934, 1964).

WEBER'S CONCEPTS OF RATIONALITY AND RATIONALIZATION. Weber identified clear and verifiable "proof of understanding (in interpretation) as either of a rational, i.e., logical or mathematical, or an emotionally emphatic, artistically appreciative character" (Weber, 1972:30). Weber used rational action as an ideal type with which it is possible to compare deviations as various instances of irrational action (1947:92). A rational model is developed by the sociologist, using his knowledge of the actor's ends and circumstances. Rational understanding of motivation "consists in placing the act in an intellegible and more inclusive context of meaning" (1947:95). Parsons, the translator, elucidated various modes of such meaningful relations, including logical consistency, esthetic harmony, or appropriateness of ideas to an end, distinguishing these from systems of causally interdependent elements (1947:95n).

In this context, Weber discussed different types of rational action. Wertrationalitat "is distinguished . . . by its clearly self-conscious formulation of the ultimate values governing the action and the consistently planned orientation of its detailed course to these values" (1947:116). Zweckrationalitat occurs when "the end, the means, and the secondary results are all rationally taken into account and weighed. This involves rational consideration of alternative means to the end, of the relations of the end to other prospective results of employment of any given means, and finally of the relative importance of different possible ends" (1947:117).

Weber differentiated formal and substantive rationality of economic action. Formal rationality designated "the extent of quantitative calculation or accounting which is technically possible and which is actually applied" (1947:184). Substantive rationality referred to the degree to which a course of economic action adequately provides goods to members of a given group. Variants of rationalization (1947:123) included the

independent rational calculation of self-interest evident, sometimes, in market action; the conscious rationalization of ultimate values, or the reduction or replacement of emotional or traditional values; and the development of a morally skeptical type of rationality, at the expense of any belief in absolute values. Giddens summarizes Weber's approach to rationalization as a dependence on "an interpretation of the fundamental significance of technique in modern social life" (1974:275). It is accomanied by loss of enchantment and by the substitution of rational legal prescriptions for religious, magical, or traditional norms.

However much Weber wrote about reason and logic, it is clear that he did not grasp their meaning. In discussing the structure of theories, for instance, Weber said "the history of the social science . . . remains a continuous process passing from the attempt to order reality analytically through the construction of concepts - the dissolution of analytical constructs . . . and the reformulation of a new of concepts . . ." (1949:105). "Progress . . . occurrs through . . . the perpetual reconstruction of concepts" (1949:105). Weber dispatched "the naturalistic prejudice that the goal of the social sciences must be the reduction of reality to laws" (1949:101). While he believed that efforts by Marx, Constant, and others to formulate laws or hypotheses were useful, they must be transcended by systems of concepts. Weber understood classification systems as hierarchies of ideas readily derived from a few easily formulated definitional principles (1949:96). He missed the basic point that deduction can only be made from one set of sentences to another, within a set of rules of inference. Further, the output of such operations is a sentence of some form. Weber's conception of progress is closer to the old Hegelian aim of increasing the completeness, reality, and necessity of conceptualization (1969).

Weber's conceptions are, unfortunately, ambiguous about the ontological status of rationality. Is his image of rationality to be associated with the rules of inference of logistic, thus with arbitrary, ideal rules? Or is it to be tied to semantics instead; ultimately to observable patterns or ideas about them? Or is it a term for a particular sort of social, material activity? On closer analysis, Weber's conception of rationality is technical and material, not logical.

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NOVEMBER 18, 1978 IN JONESTOWN: STATISTICAL EFFECTS OF A MICRO-DEMOGRAPHIC EVENT

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DEMOGRAPHIC STATISTICS. Most demographic statistics are derived from macro-demographic research. The comparison and analysis of changes in size, composition and distribution of national, state, and city populations have had greater usefulness than the study of smaller groups and areas (Thomlinson, 1976:7). Consequently, many demographers have been more concerned with the collective and longitudinal effects of population dynamics than with single events taking place at one point in time. Periodic census-taking, life tables, cohort analyses, and other data-gathering and projective methodologies implement this macrodemographic approach.

These techniques for the structuring and quantification of social data have imputed a scientific legitimacy and authroity to demography not always enjoyed by other social sciences. Demographic data, unlike most that the sociologist analyzes, are collected and quantified by government agencies. National census-taking and registers of vital statistics, despite intrinsic problems with complete and systematic enumeration, are widely accepted and assumed to generate valid and reliable information (Petersen, 1965:2).

> Demography would not truly exist without statistics . . . Statistics is not its only tool, but it is in many ways a precious instrument. Demography is indebted to the development and progress of statistics for a large part of its own development and progress (Laundry, 1945:28-29).

It is not surprising that we who teach demography and conduct demographic research and analyses may be overconfident in our statistical data. It is the purpose of this paper to extend a caution that we dare not lose our sensitivity to the possible impact of single microdemographic events that, when taken together, comprise the data with which we so often work.

A DEMOGRAPHIC EVENT. The world was stunned on November 18, 1978 over reports from Jonestown, the People's Temple commune in a remote corner of the South American Country of Guyana. Bit by bit the fact emerged that 911 American men, women, and children had died together under strange and horrifying circumstances.

Subsequent investigations have revealed that the violent tragedy was neither accidental nor altogether spontaneous. Death drills had been a common practice among cult members. Reverend Jim Jones, their leader, had code-named his ultimate contingency plan "The White Knight." Others have given the incident less romantic names. First reports from Guyanese troops rushed to the scene referred to it as "mass suicide." A few disenchanted defectors for the People's Temple called it "mass murder." At this time, American State Department and Congressional investigations are still incomplete and inconclusive. The final and definitive explanation of the Jonestown incident may never be known since few actual witnesses survived and the jungle moves swiftly to reclaim the Jonestown clearing (United Press International, 1978).

Nevertheless, this brief report has relevance to those involved in demographic research and analyses. For we are not concerned here with the religious, legal, and ideological etiology and implications of the Jonestown tragedy. Rather, our focus is on the 911 Jonestown deaths of November 18, 1978 as a vivid and contemporary example of statistical chaos inflicted by a single demographic event.

A DEMOGRAPHIC DILEMNA. The underlying demographic issue regarding the Jonestown tragedy is whether to include the 911 deaths in the 1978 statistical records of the United States or Guyana. Although the deceased persons were all American citizens, there is considerable evidence that their residence at the Jonestown settlement was to have been permanent. In support of this point, recent investigations have revealed that before they immigrated to Guyana, cult

members were required to turn over all personal property to Reverend Jones. In addition, it was Jones' aversion to U.S. scrutiny of his operations that primarily motivated the move to Guyana. Finally, it was the decision of several cult members to depart with U.S. Congressman Leo Ryan on November 18 that apparently precipitated the wholesale death of Jonestown residents (United Press International, 1978). The statistical impact and complexity of the Jonestown event may be dramatically illustrated by projecting it into three analytical operations commonly employed by demographers.

CRUDE DEATH RATE. The simplest measure of mortality is the crude death rate (C.D.R.) which gives us the rate at which people in a country are dying. The crude death rate of Guyana is 7.6 which is the number of deaths occurring per year (1968) per 1,000 population (United Nations Statistical Yearbook, 1976:70). If the comparatively small Guyanan population of 774,000 must absorb the 911 Jonestown deaths for statistical purposes, the nation's C.D.R. for 1978 would soar to 8.8. If the 911 Jonestown deaths are included in the 1978 mortality statistics of the United States, there would be very little increase in the Crude Death Rate due to a national population of nearly 212 million (United Nations Statistical Yearbook, 1976:69).

SUICIDE RATE. It is likely that we will never know, with any degree of certainty, exactly how many of the Jonestown residents actually committed suicide, how many were forced to commit suicide, or how many were killed by others. Federal investigators and insurance companies will be a long time reconstructing their meager information into motivational categories for the 911 deaths. Meanwhile, those who must compile and summarize the 1978 demographic data for Guyana and the United States will have to arbitrarily consign the 911 deaths to specific statistical categories.

A Suicide Rate reports the rate at which people in a country commit suicide in a given year. For example, Guyana's 1969 Suicide Rate of 37.2 means that 37.2 suicides per 100,000 population occurred in Guyana in 1969. (United Nations Demographic Yearbook, 1976:402). This very high rate of suicide could be inflated to an astonishing 1978 rate of 154.9 for Guyana if the 911 Jonestown deaths are included with suicide statistics from the rest of the country. Thus, the Jonestown event of November 18, 1978, if statistically recorded in the usual way, would give Guyana the highest Suicide Rate of any country, in any year, since such data have been recorded!

Even if the 911 Jonestown deaths are included in the total number of suicides reported for the United States in 1978, the U.S. Suicide Rate would be inflated from the last available figure of 12.7 (United Nations Demographic Yearbook, 1976:402) to about 13.1 suicides per 100,000 population. This would be a significant increase, considering that we are computing the proportional increase of American suicides in a huge national population based on the events of just one day!

Furthermore, most of the Jonestown residents were Black Americans. Consequently, if just 75 percent of them were added to the annual suicide total for American "Black and other nonwhites" (Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1977:174), their race-specific Suicide Rate for 1978 would suddenly rise from the present 10.6 to an incredible 14.1! Again, the statistical chaos precipitated by the demographic happening at Jonestown is underscored.

HOMICIDE RATE. Guyana, formerly British Guiana, did not gain independence from Great Britain and membership in the United Nations until 1966. As a new nation, Guyana has not fully developed its techniques for collecting demographic data. The few statistics from Guyana that are reported to the United Nations do not include homicide rates.

On the other hand, complete and longitudinal data on a multitude of variables are available for the United States. For example, the mean U.S. Homicide Rate for 1973, 1974, and 1975 is 10 per 100,000 population (Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1977:71). In other words, an average

of 10 out of every 100,000 Americans during those years were victims of homicide. If, somehow, it was authoritatively determined that 800 of the Jonestown residents were murdered, and using the 1975 U.S. population for hypothetical computational purposes, the addition of the 800 Jonestown victims immediately raises our Homicide Rate to 10.37. Thus, again we have demonstrated how a single demographic event, occurring on one day, can artificially inflate and invalidate demographic statistics.

CONCLUSION. At the least, the single demographic event of November 18, 1978 at Jonestown, Guyana will require an explanatory footnote for many years to come in the demographic records of Guyana, the United States, and the United Nations.

At the most, this event has reinforced the point previously made by many thoughtful scholars that suicide and homicide data should not be included in demographic studies or statistics. In general, they have argued that cross-cultural differences in law-enforcement and criteria for defining suicide and homicide drastically affect the accuracy and significance of available data (Barrachough, 1972; Sainsbury, 1972; Wilkins, 1967).

Finally, it is our hope that the Guyanan tragedy has illustrated the impact of micro-demographic events and their possible effect on the validity of macrodemographic statistical summaries.

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MYTHS AND REALITIES OF DIRTY BOOK BUYERS

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INTRODUCTION

In spite of the growing debate regarding the legal status of obscenity in the United States, the President's Commission on Obscenity and Pornography (1970) could not find a single empirical study reporting on the characteristics of people who purchased erotic materials. Responding to this lack of information, the Commission funded a few pilot studies of the patrons of adult bookstores and theaters. The results of these studies were published in the Technical Reports of the Commission (1971) and represent the "observation" technique of data collection. The research reported here sought to confirm, with survey data, the findings published in the Technical Reports of the Commission (1971) regarding the consumers of pornography.

The paucity of hard data regarding the consumer of pornography is primarily the result of the research techniques used. Five studies of consumers are presented in Volume IV of the Technical Reports of the President's Commission on Obscenity and Pornography (Finkelstein, Kutschinsky, Massey, Nawy, and Winick). All gathered their data from the observation of customers in "Adult Book Stores." In addition, Massey interviewed six owners of such stores and used post cards inserted in customer packages as a mail-back means of gathering data. Observers in each instance gathered approximately the same kinds of information: age, ethnicity, sex, socioeconomic class, appearance, costume, and whether alone or with companions.

The data were not reported in a uniform way by the five researchers, so that simple comparisons and summarizations are not possible. For example, Kutschinsky (1971: 270) reported age data for 128 customers as percentages of the 128 divided among 9 five year span categories (20-24, 25-29, etc.) and a 65+ category. Winich (1971:232) reported age data as the mean percent in each of four categories 19-27, 28-40, 41-60, and 61+ of persons observed patronizing several book stores. Finkelstein (1971: 119) reports age in three categories, persons in their 20's, those in their 30's, and those 40 and over, in numbers in each category. Nawy (1971: 171-172) interviewed owners of bookstores and asked them to estimate the percentage of their customers who fell within four age categories, 19-25, 26-35, 36-45, and 45+. Massey reported age for observed customers (1971: 53) as percentage of those observed by six categories: under 18, 19-25, 25-35, 35-45, 45-55, and over 55 and for post-card returnees as the number responding to each of the six slightly different categories (no doubt changed for self-reporting): 18 and under, 19-25, 26-35, 36-45, and 55 and over. Massey (1971: 38) also asked six owners of bookstores what percentage of their customers were over age 30. Keeping in mind these variations in the reporting of the data and the imprecision it imposes upon any attempt to summarize the data, one can pull together a reasonably coherent profile of the consumer of pornography.

The average age of the customers of "Adult Book Stores" falls within the 30's and 40's categories. The vast majority are Caucasian, from a low of 70% reported by Mawy's interview data (1971: 171-172) to a high of 95% reported by Finkelstein (1971- 119). And, with a few exceptions, those who bought in the shops observed were male. These middle-aged, male, caucasians are generally middle and upper middle class. Observers dealt with several factors in assessing class--appearance, and clothing being the basic criteria. Using these factors, Winick (1971: 237) estimated that 44% of the customers were lower class, 47% middle class, and 9% upper-middle class. Finkelstein (1971: 119) simply reported by manner of dress--with the majority attired in coat and tie, 51.1%; the next largest category was "casual" dress, with 38%; then work clothes, 7.3%; "dishelved," 3.2% and military uniform .4%. Massey (1971: 53-55), also reported his data in terms of type of dress, and concluded (1971: 54): "These data reinforce the importance of the white-collar occupation class as primary purchasers of sex-oriented materials."

Massey gathered marital data in two ways: using the returned post cards, and observing whether or not customers wore a wedding band. He found that of the 44 who filled out this portion of the post card, 52% were married, 7% re-married, 14% single-divorced, and 27% never married. Through observation (1971: 55-56), he discovered that 26.1% of the customers wore wedding rings. If jeweler's estimates, as he cites, are correct in saying that 50% of married men wear wedding rings, then a majority of customers are married men.

Massey's post cards yield data on three additional characteristics: education, income and specific occupation (1971: 61-62). None of the respondents indicated less than 12 years of education completed, with a mean of 16 years. The modal income category was $10,000 - $15,000. Occupations were heavily weighted toward the business-professional end of the continuum: e.g., accountant, engineer, musician, lawyer, teacher, salesman, banker, air force, retired, farmer, construction worker, labor relations.

Taken together, these studies suggest that consumers of pornography are middle-aged, middle class, married, Caucasian males with high status occupations and above average income. These data would seem to satisfy the requirements for information if the assumptions of the observation technique are accepted. Social scientists in general, and the authors in particular were reluctant to settle for what might be considered "soft" data. It is worthy of note that all the above mentioned investigators reported a great degree of difficulty in obtaining the cooperation of the customers in adult bookstores. The response rates in the studies involving interviews or surveys were all below 50 percent. It is at least possible that these low response rates introduced an undetermined bias into the reported results. However, since the demographic data generated by the interview and survey techniques have been similar to those reported by the observation technique, the data reported have been accepted as fairly representative.

METHODOLOGY. The methodology sections of reports dealing with survey data generally concentrate on the design of the instrument, sampling procedures, number of cases, and similar technical issues. However, since difficulty in obtaining the cooperation of the subjects in question has been utilized by previous investigators to justify the choice of the observation technique and the failure of other techniques to produce abundant data, the authors feel that the methods used to obtain the cooperation of subjects in adult bookstores deserve some exposure first.

Although the data presented here were gathered through the use of a self-reporting questionnaire during the months of October through December, 1972, the actual work on the project began in January, 1970. For a period of 13 months, approximately 3 hours per week were spent in the adult bookstore in an attempt to gain the confidence of the manager prior to requesting permission to administer the questionnaire to be developed. During this period of conversation the manager of the bookstore was friendly, helpful, interested in the study, and totally on guard. At the end of the "confidence gaining" period, the authors had not broken through the "us" versus "them" barrier. However, the time spent had not been a total loss. It was now evident that permission to interview would be worthless. What was obviously needed was the active support of the bookstore staff: the manager would have to "administer" the questionnaire.

Any standard text on research methods holds out the promise of rewards to be gained through the application of all the "rules of research) and hard work. Too little is said about the role of fate in the research process. Such will not be the case here. At a time when the towel was being readied to "throw in" fate intervened. The bookstore manager was arrested and large quantities of adult material confiscated. By virtue of a growing reputation as the only local "experts" on pornography not connected with any religious organization, the investigators were contaced by the legal representative of the national corporation owning the local adult bookstore. We had become "us" instead of "them."

What had been an attitude of mistrust became one of almost too much cooperation: the bookstore owners offered to underwrite the complete cost of the proposed

study. To avoid the appearance of bias and remain true to the canons of science, but mostly because the research was already funded, the financial support was declined.

With the cooperation of the manager assured, two forms of a survey instrument were developed. Each form gathered basic demographic and socioeconomic data. In addition, half of the questionnaires gathered data regarding political attitudes and behaviors.

One hundred and fifty-five customers of an adult bookstore were surveyed through a self-reporting questionnaire during the months of October through December, 1972. The questionnaires and a locked box were put on prominent display in the store. The manager asked customers to fill out the questionnaire and leave it in the locked box. The customers were assured, by the manager, of anonymity. All visitors to the bookstore during this period who actually purchased material were asked to respond. There were no refusals. Many of the respondents volunteered further information with the questionnaire indicating a real interest in the study. A frequent suggestion was to "put this in the newspaper so 'they' will know the truth about 'us'." We did, and received a series of negative phone calls from forces of good in the community, as well as many expressions of support and appreciation from consumers of pornography and their families.

FINDINGS. The questionnaire data were similar to that gathered through observation by those who contributed to the technical report of the President's Commission on Obscenity and Pornography. Due to the variable categories used in the technical reports of the Commission, no statistical comparisons were possible. The typical subject had an average of 32 years. The age range of the sample was from 18 years to 66 years. 51.4 percent of the sample were between the ages of 23 and 33 years, while the median age was 30 years.

A typical member of the sample would be classified as married, since 61 percent of the chosen sample were in this category, while only 24 percent were single and 11 percent divorced. This compares favorably with the estimated 60 percent married reported by Nawy (1970). These data are summarized in Table 1.1. Data generated by the present survey not available through observation indicate that the majority of the respondents reside with the wife, as indicated in Table 1.2.

TABLE 1
SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF PORNO BUYERS

		Percent N = 155
1.1	Family Status	
	Single	23.9
	Married	61.3
	Divorced	11.0
	Separated, widower	3.9
1.2	Residential status	
	Live alone	25.8
	Live with parents	7.1
	Live with wife	58.1
	Live with another man	7.1
	Cohabiting with woman	2.6
1.3	Education in years	
	10 or less	1.2
	12	19.4
	13	11.0
	14	18.7
	15	8.4
	16	12.9
	17 or more	28.4
1.4	Occupations status	
	None	9.7
	Unskilled	4.5
	Semi-skilled	11.6
	Sales	13.5
	Clerical	7.7
	Managerial	15.5
	Professional	33.5

Concerning the annual income of the usual subject, the average income was $11,313. The yearly salaries ranged from $500 to $78,000, with the most often reported income being $10,000 (12.3%). 82 subjects (52.7%) claimed salaries between $8,000 and $15,000.

The total family income of the subjects was, on the average, $13,296. This value ranged from $900 to $99,000. The yearly incomes for the families clustered around $10,000 (11%) as being the usual income

reported. The data indicate also that 52.6 percent of the sample claimed a total family income between $9,000 and $20,000 a year, with the median income being $10,843. These data support the notion of the consumer of pornography as a member of the middle class economically.

As can be seen from Table 1.3 the sample norm is, or at one time has been enrolled in college, since just 19.4 percent completed only high school, and 79 percent have had some college experience, with 28.4 percent continuing their education after graduation from college.

In this sample, 33.5 percent had professions such as doctors, lawyers, teachers, engineers, etc. Managers and proprietors composed 15.5 percent of the sample. Those having skilled (foremen, craftsmen), semi-skilled (machine operators, delivery men), and unskilled and service jobs (porters, laborers) comprised 20.0 percent of those sampled. These data are summarized in Table 1.4 and tend to support the profile suggested in the Technical Reports of the Commission.

In summary: 61% of the customers surveyed through this research were married; modal income was $10,000, mean educational level was 14+ years (modal frequency 17+ years of schooling completed), 49% were in business and professional occupations, sales and clerical workers made up 21% of the sample, skilled workers comprised 12% of sample, and semi-skilled and unskilled workers 9%; and all were male. No data were gathered on ethnicity.

Compared to the population in the Metropolitan area which the bookstore is located, the surveyed sample is: older, better educated by three years, of higher incomes working in high-status jobs, and approximately the same proportion married.

CONCLUSION. What is striking about the data now available concerning consumers of pornography is the agreement found regarding his demographic and socioeconomic characteristics regardless of how or where these data are gathered. It appears that observation is a viable technique for gathering most of these data, particularly when difficulties prevent the collection of survey or interview data. Note, however, that the survey generates data which cannot be gathered through any other technique. The present investigators are convinced that it is worth any reasonable effort to obtain survey data. Even an unreasonable effort may pay off if fate intervenes.

A cautionary note: the profile of the consumer of pornography presented in the Technical Reports of the Commission and confirmed in this report can only apply to patrons of public adult bookstores. Pornography is expensive, particularly if purchased in adult bookstores. Consumers appear to belong to the middle class primarily because the lower economic class members can't afford to shop there (there are alternatives) and the wealthy can afford to shop by mail. In other words, the profile of the consumer of pornography as opposed to the public consumer of pornography has not been developed yet. Given the difficulties of the problem, it may never be.

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VERBAL FLUX IN DYADIC CONVERSATION

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INTRODUCTION. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the application of various measures and mensurable properties to natural dyadic conversation. The term "verbal flux" refers to dynamic stream characteristics of the conversational process, as it progresses in real time. Such measurement techniques provide a means for sociologists to get hard data in micro-social processes, and to apply and test dynamic theories. The source data for this research was 74 tape recorded five-minute conversations between dyadic pairs of college students. They were instructed to talk to each other about anything of mutual interest for about five minutes, and that the researchers would later use this material to trace out the way people talked. For a more extended treatment of this research, see Allen and Guy (1978).

Psychologists have been much concerned with speech process, vocabulary development, and word association. Ruesch (1957, 1961) and Laffal (1965) have reviewed processes and problems in psychiatric therapy. Goldman-Eisler carried out detailed analysis and measurements of pauses on oral interview speech (1968). Pittenger and his associates produced a detailed analysis of the behavior on one psychiatric patient in a single five-minute interview (1960). From Chapple's early work in measuring duration of speech and silence, sociologists have developed new information on group processes. Bossard and Boll stressed the importance of verbal interaction in the socialization process for children (1964). Bales analyzed verbal behavior in considerable detail on the interaction process in task-orientated groups (1952). Hertzler has provided a general review of language from the sociological perspective.

PROPERTIES OF VERBAL FLUX. The stream of speech generated between two persons in conversation has four properties which vary in farily orderly patterns. First, the speech stream appears in a sequence of cycles. The first cycle begins when the first partner starts emitting one series of verbal acts, and ends when the second partner completes his verbal response. The verbal acts which a speaker may emit include assertions, questions, supports in the form of simple affirmation or negations, interjections, laughs, and fragmentation. Assertions and questions are verbal information carriers by virtue of the order and relations among the syllables which they contain. Supports seem to help the flow of conversation although they make up a rather small portion of the output. Laughter, fragmentation, and interjections appear to have fairly low value for transporting detailed information but they, like the supports, may have a positive function in maintaining the flow of speech.

A cycle in which each of the two partners have injected assertions and/or questions is called a responsive cycle. A cycle in which only one partner emits assertive material, and the other emits only non-assertive material, such as supports, laughters, or fragmentation, is called a narrative cycle. A cycle in which both partners emit only non-assertive material is called a null cycle. The responsive cycle is more balanced and is effective in maintaining a tighter bond of verbal action between partners. Each is active in developing the sequence of speech and each must edit and integrate his own and his partner's outputs in a somewhat unpredictable and uncertain sequence of action. Responsive cycles require close coordination of thought and action between actors. The narrative cycle is of greater value in transferring extensive and complex information from the one who has it to the one who lacks it.

Assertions and questions vary in amplitude or length of syllable string. They also vary in the extent to which an unbroken series of assertions are banded together without other kinds of verbal acts intervening between them. Variation in the amplitude of assertions and questions is suggestive of the quality of the verbal contact, as when we contrast extremely short assertions of one or two syllables to elaborate and grammatically developed sentences of 20 to 30 syllables. The sequence of assertions in

FIGURE 1: NARRATIVE AND RESPONSIVE FLUX PATTERNS

	Small	Large
Vertical scale, inches per syllable:	.01	.04
Horizontal scale, inches per verbal act:	.01	.04

Narrative Pattern

Syllogram 19



Responsive Pattern

Syllogram 65







Legend for Large Scale Syllograms

Assertion completed: 

Support, Affirm, or Deny: 

Assertion interrupted: 

Fragmented syllable string: 

Question: 

Laughter. Eg, "Ha-ha-ha": 

an unbroken series is referred to as clustering. The clustering measure permits identification of the pattern of single assertions preceded and followed by a low information bearing element, and sets of two, three, or more assertions in uninterrupted sequence. The extent of clustering of assertions indicates the degree of organization of the verbal output and is probably related to the density of information emitted, provided the amplitude is not too low.

A consistent pattern of increase or decrease in the amplitude of a series of assertions is called crescence. It indicates the speaker's tendency to invest increasing energy in a series of outputs within his half-cycle, or the opposite tendency to decrease the length of successive assertions. For this report we will define crescence as a continuing increase of three or more syllables from one assertion to the next in a series of at least three assertions, within a half-cycle, or alternatively, a decrease of at least three syllables per assertion over a series of at least three assertions. Non-assertive acts may be interspersed among the assertions without affecting the crescive property, as we treat it here.

Finally there is the property of fluency, which we define as the proportion of assertions and questions to the total number of acts within the half-cycle. Fluency is at a maximum when a half-cycle contains only a series of assertions. Fluency is at a minimum when a single assertion is accompanied in a half-cycle by an extended series of non-assertive verbal acts. It is believed that a higher degree of fluency facilitates the transfer of information, and that it denotes a more effective use of time.

HYPOTHESIS ON THE PROPERTIES OF CONVERSATION. We have developed a series of hypotheses based on assumptions about the developing nature of the conversational contact. The conversational episode is generally marked by short exploratory assertions in the beginning of the contact and near the end. We have predicted that (1) the mean amplitude of assertions measured in syllable length will be less in the initial and end portions and greater in the middle portion of a 5-minute conversation episode. (2) Males will manifest greater mean amplitude than females in male-female pairs in conversation. (3) Greater amplitude will be manifested in male-male conversing pairs than in female-female conversing pairs. (4) Males conversing with males will not have higher amplitude than males conversing with females. That is, the sex structure of the dyad will not affect assertion amplitude in the male. (5) Females conversing with males will have a lower mean amplitude than females conversing with female partners. The sex structure of the dyad will affect the assertion amplitude by the female.

We expect (1) that the crescive property of the half-cycle will be predominantly positive, based on the tendency of an assertion of a given length to contain information elements which will require elaboration in the following assertion. The ensuing elaboration is therefore likely to be longer than the assertion which gave rise to it. (2) Since crescence is more evident if amplitude is greater, we expect that the positive crescence will be greater in males participating in male-female dyads, than in the females. However, (3) we expect that positive crescence will be evident in all sex structures, and in the middle portions of the conversation.

The clustering property depends on the ability of the speaker to generate uninterrupted sequences of assertions and questions, and we expect a strong inverse relation between the extent of the cluster and its frequency.

FINDINGS. An inspection of the large scale flux vector (Figure 1) indicates the cycling process where the first actor emissions are plotted above the origin and the second actor emissions are plotted below. The contrast between narrative and response cycles is evident. The narrative cycle is marked by a well developed profile only on one side of the origin and a short abbreviated output on the other side. The response cycle is marked by well developed profiles on both sides of the origin. The large scale plot (.04 inches per act on the horizontal axis and .04 inches per syllables on the vertical) is more informative regarding action

TABLE 1
SYLLABIC AMPLITUDE OF ASSERTIONS*

Dyad Category	Half Cycles	Mean Amplitude	s	t-test t & p
End vs	3690	7.9	4.8	-3.32
Middle	5234	8.3	5.0	.001
Male-Male vs	2119	8.4	5.2	2.36
Female-female	2139	8.0	4.6	.008
Male vs	2567	8.3	5.0	3.48
Female	2099	7.8	4.8	.001
Male vs	2567	8.3	5.0	.74
Male-male	2119	8.4	5.2	.266
Female vs	2099	7.8	4.8	1.78
Female-female	2139	8.0	4.6	.035
Narrative vs	1898	8.0	4.7	-2.34
Response	2381	8.3	5.0	.009

*One tailed t-test.

TABLE 2
CRESCENCE STANDARDIZED BY DYAD

Dyad Category	Crescent Cycles:	half- N, p	Direction +	−
End	1368	.37	2.6	1.4
Middle	1882	.36	2.8	1.7
Male-male	749	.35	3.2	1.7
Female-female	781	.38	3.1	1.9
Male	942	.37	2.6	1.3
Female	779	.37	3.1	2.0
Narrative	1345	.34	3.0	1.7
Response	1903	.49	3.1	1.8

sequence: the distribution of fragmentation, assertion, support, and interjection. The small scale plot (Figure 2: .01 inches per act and .01 inches per syllable,) represents a lower level of magnification and better indicates cycling regularity, balance, and narrative and response exchange patterns. It provides an economical signature of the pattern of verbal intercourse between any two actors.

The results of the analysis of amplitude (Table 1) show support for the hypothesis that amplitude is greater in the middle portion of the 5-minute conversational contact. The absolute difference is about .5 syllables, and the standard deviation is relatively high, which indicates a broad distribution of assertion lengths. Male pairs show somwhat greater amplitude than female pairs and a greater variability of assertion lengths. Male pairs show somewhat greater amplitude than female pairs and a greater variability of assertion amplitude. In the male-female dyad, males average higher amplitude on about the same scale, but variability of assertion length for both males and females is reduced. The male amplitude mean is not significantly different when the male-male mean is compared to the male amplitude mean in the mixed dyad. However, females talking to other females manifest a higher amplitude in assertions than do the same females talking to males, and hence, the fifth hypothesis on amplitude is supported.

The crescive property (Table 2) is predominantly positive in all comparisons, and the hypothesis is well supported. (There is no support for the proposition that males manifest greater positive crescence, or more extreme levels of crescence than the females. We also fail to find support for the proposition that crescence is greater in the mid-portions of the conversational contact than in the beginning and end. The extent of clustering demonstrates a consistent inverse function of frequency in all comparisons, a finding which is virtually implicit in the concept. (Table 3) It does not appear to vary consistently according to sex the structure of the dyad, or according to the temporal portions of the conversational episode.

None of the hypotheses regarding differences in fluency receive support. No negative interpretations are implied as regards the relation of fluency to structure of the dyad or the relation of temporal segments. Although the attempt to measure fluency was successful, the level of fluency seemed to be almost constant in all comparisons.

TABLE 3
ASSERTION CLUSTERS PER MINUTE

Dyad Category	Minutes	Assertions/Cluster 1	2	3	4+
Ends	148	3.5	2.0	1.2	2.2
Middle	222	3.2	1.9	1.1	2.6
Male-Male	90	3.4	1.9	1.1	2.6
Female-female	85	3.1	2.3	1.4	2.5
Male	111	3.2	1.7	1.1	2.5
Female	84	3.8	2.0	1.1	2.2
Narrative	149	3.4	2.1	1.2	2.2
Response	221	3.3	1.9	1.1	2.6

DISCUSSION. The primary finding in this paper concerns the assertion amplitude measure. Amplitude appears to vary systematically in relation to dyad structure and temporal regions. It has the advantage of simplicity both conceptually and empirically. There is good reason to believe that assertion amplitude has a significant fundamental relation to the verbal communication process. It is probably the most useful measure of those discussed here. Amplitude is a substrate variable for the crescence property and it is probably operating within rather definite limits. Factors affecting these limits remain to be examined. Amplitude is potentially a suitable measure for the amount of information exchanged between conversing partners. Clustering could afford an index of the level of concentration of the speaker on what he is saying. Clustering also has implications for the concept of fluency, although we have not attempted to identify the relation.

The property of crescence suggests a measure of elaboration in the assertion sequence. There is probably a generic difference between crescive cycles and cycles which contain assertions of relatively uniform length. The crescive property may indicate an expansion of interest as well as an expansion in the degree detail conveyed. The crescive cycles are predominantly positive, and they appear to enliven the stream of verbal outputs.

Assertions appear predominantly (about 80 percent of the time) in clusters. The clustering is a potential measure of speech integration and of efficienty in delivery. The degree of clustering is probably inversely related to the speaker's familiarity with what he is trying to convey. A person anticipating a verbal confrontation will sometimes rehearse what he plans to say in order to increase his familiarity with the syllable strings he will emit. This should improve delivery, reduce fragmentation, and should be indicated by an increase in the clustering of assertions.

Fluency may not be measured most efficiently in terms of assertions and questions. It is possible that some admixture of supports, laughter, fragmentation, simultaneous speech and interjection lends impetus to the conversational flux, and serves to highlight the assertive content. If this is the case, it will be necessary to search for the limits of the mix, and for the optimal ratio.

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TOUCHABLE-UNTOUCHABLE INTERCASTE MARRIAGE AND FERTILITY IN INDIA

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More than a score of studies over the past thirty years have tended to show that the effects of intercaste marriage in India and the United States are similar. The purpose of this paper is: 1) to determine the effects of touchable-untouchable, high-low intercaste marriages on fertility in India and 2) to identify demographic factors of intercaste married couples in India.

Two hypotheses are suggested: 1) intercaste couples will have lower fertility than intracaste couples; and 2) in intercaste marriages, fertility will be lower when the husband is a low caste untouchable, than when the wife is a low caste untouchable.

METHOD. The analytical sample included 49 intercaste couples, 49 high caste couples, and 49 low caste couples in India. All were aged 21 or more at the time of marriage, legally married, with the wives exposed to fertility risk for at least ten years. The couples were located by the referral or "snowball" technique, from the Lucknow, Kanpur, Allahabad, Agra, Raipur, Ludhiana, Banaras, Lakhimpur-Kheri, and Delhi areas of north India. They were intensively interviewed from 1970 to 1977. The lack of randomization in sample selection demands caution in generalizing. Moreover, the "snowball method leads to a homogenous sample, since referrents are likely to know others like themselves who have intermarried. Since marriages between high caste touchables and low caste untouchables are relatively rare in India, the referreal method is the only practical way to locate intercaste couples. Many of these marriages are performed in civil courts, in temples with a few friends, or in private homes with a few people. No uniform records are kept for such marriages. Since the sample was limited to only a few large urban and industrial areas of north India, inferences should be limited to these areas.

RESULTS. The dominant pattern of intercaste marriage in the sample is between low caste (untouchable Harijan) males and high caste (touchable) females. The minor trend (5 cases) in between high caste males and low caste females. These intercaste marriage patterns parallel those of an earlier study (Das 1971a).

The mean number of children born to intercaste couples (1.5) is much lower than high caste couples (2.4) and low caste couples (3.5).

TABLE 1
FERTILITY DIFFERENTIAL FOR INTERCASTE AND INTRACASTE MARRIAGES

Fertility Level	Intercaste	High caste	Low caste
Above mean	.29	.45	.63
Below mean	.71	.55	.37
Total	1.00	1.00	1.00
N	49	49	49

TABLE 2
MEAN FERTILITY OF INTERCASTE AND INTRACASTE MARRIAGES

Marriage Type	Couples	Mean Fertility
Intercaste		
Husband high	5	1.8
Wife high	44	1.5
High Caste		
Brahmin	19	2.0
Kshatriya	16	2.5
Vaishya	14	2.9
Low Caste		
Chamar	21	3.1
Dhobi	13	3.6
Bhangi	15	3.8

Results in Table 1 support the hypothesis of lower fertility for the intercaste married couples, as compared to intracaste married couples. The data also show that fertility is perhaps slightly lower in intercaste marriages of a low caste husband with a high caste wife, but the number of cases is too low to allow a test of statistical significance, and the question remains in doubt (Table 2). However, intercaste marriages in which the husbands are older than the wives have a higher rate of fertility than marriages in which the wives are older than husbands (Table 3).

TABLE 3
FERTILITY OF INTERCASTE MARRIAGE BY HUSBAND'S CASTE LEVEL AND AGE COMPARED TO THOSE OF WIFE

Husband's Caste	Age	Couples	Mean Fertility
High	Older	4	2.0
	Same	1	1.0
	Younger	0	
Low	Older	5	1.6
	Same	26	1.9
	Younger	13	.6

TABLE 4
FERTILITY OF INTERCASTE MARRIAGE BY HUSBAND'S CASTE AND EDUCATION COMPARED TO THOSE OF WIFE

Husband's Caste	Education	Couples	Mean Fertility
High	Higher	0	
	Same	2	2.0
	Lower	3	1.7
Low	Higher	41	1.5
	Same	2	1.5
	Lower	1	1.0

The effects of differences in education between husband and wife in intercaste unions is not sufficiently established by the data in Table 4, because the great bulk of the cases concern the lower caste husband with a higher education level than that of the higher caste wife. Education differences permit no meaningful comparison.

DISCUSSION. The prediction was that intercaste married couples are more likely to have lower fertility than intracaste married couples in India, and empirical findings tentatively support this hypothesis. Results of this study paralleled findings that Jewish mixed marriages (in which only one partner was Jewish) had fewer children than homogamous couples (Goldstein and Goldscheider, 1968:167; Goldscheider and Uhlenberg, 1959:351-372; Sly, 1970:443-459; Sinnott and Marshall, 1971:588-601). This is also true of Protestant-Catholic marriages, in which the fertility of the intermarried was lower than that of homogamous marriages of Catholics or Protestants (Kiser and Whelpton, 1958:1327).

One of the reasons for lower fertility in intercaste married couples may be the alleged instability and poor adjustment that result from the differences in caste identification of the spouses.

In India, many modern and liberal people believe that intercaste marriages should be accepted. (Such marriages are legally permitted in India.) However, as they know the problems entailed in this basic change, they are not always willing to pioneer it. All of the intercaste marriages were against the wishes of the high caste parents, although the low caste people tended to be more tolerant of these marriages. In most cases, high caste people had found the expected opposition from their families at the time of the marriage.

In addition to the operation of psychological and sociological variables, Bresler (1961:17) suggests that biological factors in the mixture of different racial and ethnic genes may account for lower fertility in high-low caste married couples.

The results did not support the hypothesis H_2 that low caste husband-high caste wife marriages were more likely to have fewer children than high caste husbands-low caste wife marriages. However, the data suggest that the fertility may be slightly lower in intercaste marriages which involved low caste husband-high caste wives than intercaste marriages which involved high caste husband-low caste wives.

Most of the high caste women respondents reported that they planned a small family because they were aware that the children if intercaste marriages are always considered Shudra (low caste) and may suffer, as do their parents, the restrictions and deprivations of the Shudra caste. By marrying low caste men of high achievement level, high caste women of low achievement level tended to raise their achievement level, but to lose their higher ascription status (Das, 1971a:25). Though low caste husbands may decide to have more children because

om their point of view their children would be attaining a higher ascription status, the wife is the one who finally decides whether to have or not to have children.

Conversely, low caste women who married high caste men were not so concerned about the consequences which their children might suffer. They felt they were raising their ascription level by marrying men of high castes. They were not careful in using contraceptives and reported that they wanted more children.

The low caste women who married high caste men were aware of the special provisions granted to the "backward" caste by the Indian constitution. They realized that even if their children were considered Harijans (Shudras or untouchables) they would have no problem in giving them high school or college education because government scholarships were available to "backwardcaste" students. Also, in the agencies of central and state governments, one post in eight of those filled by competitive examination was reserved for backward castes. Standards and age limits were adjusted to their proper education. Thus, high caste husbands-low caste wives would be encouraged to have more children than the low caste husbands-high caste wives. Since Harijan women came from large fammilies, they may tend to have more children.

The data on differentials in fertility and intracaste marriage in India indicates that fertility is generally higher among low castes than among high castes. Therefore, the higher fertility among Harijans may also be due to their lower socioeconomic status. They seem to have fewer opportunities for other forms of entertainment due to their economic handicaps (Das, 1971b:232).

Other variables, such as education, occupation, place of nativity, religion, community size, "intercourse variables," "conception variables," and gestation variables" may affect fertility (Davis, 1955:33).

The data suggested that in India intercaste marriages in which the husband was older than his wife had higher fertility than those in which the wife was older than the husband. This may be due to recent changes in childbearing which have occurred in age cohorts 15 to 19, 20 to 24, and 25 to 29 years (Bogue, 1969:683). All of our women respondents were below 30 years of age. The lower fertility in Indian intercaste marriage in which the wife was older than her husband may also be attributed to the fact that eight women who married low caste men had become pregnant before their marriage. Hence, they delayed having additional children due to feelings of guilt.

The data showed a strong inverse relationship between the amount of educational attainment and the level of fertility. Marriages in which a high caste husband had more education than his low caste wife had lower fertility than those in which a wife had more education. Conversely, marriages in which a low caste husband had more education than his high caste wife had higher fertility than those in which the wife had more education.

CONCLUSIONS. The analysis of intercaste and intracaste marriages in India suggests that the intercaste marriages result in lower fertility. When the intercaste marriage is between low caste men and high caste women, the mean number of children born is comparatively lower than the mean number born to high caste husband-low caste wife. An increase in intercaste marriages could contribute to a reduction in population growth. Moreover, as intercaste marriages increase in number, they could help to eliminate caste distinctions, discrimination and segregation. As India gradually moves toward industrialization and urbanization, however, the traditional caste system will increasingly become unstable as secular norms oppose and replace older Hindu religious norms. Thus, some of the factors affecting the fertility rate of intercaste married couples will cease to operate as tolerance increases and discrimination decreases.

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COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT IN BARBADOS: A STUDY OF A LONG-TERM EFFORT

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INTRODUCTION. This paper has two objectives: 1) to delimit and define Community Development more precisely on the basis of empirical data, and 2) to test the hypothesis that Community Development depends on success in permanently and progressively developing total human and material resources.

This is not an attempt to validate this hypothesis with only one case study. Adequate testing will require the analysis and statistical treatment of a large number of similar cases, in some of which community development principles will have been followed and in others not. It is hoped, however, that this study will encourage a research trend and that it will widen Community Development's perspective and perhaps increase its usefulness to the Third World.

At the Second International Consultation on Community Development held at St. Thomas University, New Brunswick, Canada, in June 1974, the group discussed the subject "What is Community Development?-Definitions, Theories, Models" differed on many points of definition etc., but came up unanimously with the following as "indispensable community development criteria" (Hynam, 1974):

1. Conscientisation, or the awakening of the people's awareness of the true state of affairs.
2. Education motivation, until the people concerned consider the undertaking as theirs.
3. Participation in decision making.
4. Emphasis on the whole community.
5. Self help toward maximizing the use of indigenous resources.
6. Creating effective linkage with external influences.

It is generally accepted historically that "Community Development has grown out of the earlier concept of 'mass education', a term used by the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on Education in its report entitled 'Mass Education in African Society'. The publication of the report in 1944 can be taken as a starting point in the evolution of community development as an arm of Government policy" (H.M.S.O., 1968, p.l.).

SOCIO-HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT. It is the Thesis of this paper that if the "indispensable community Development criteria" listed above are used as indicators, then Community Development was, intuitively as it were, initiated by a political leader, Samuel Jackman Prescod, the grandson of a slave, in the little island in the then British West Indies about 100 years before it was officially recognized elsewhere; and that following its initiation Community Development procedures have been continued, wittingly and/or unwittingly, up to the present with outstandingly good results.

Barbados is so small and "insignificant" that it is not surprising that the early initiation of Community Development being claimed herein would have been completely overlooked by Community Development chroniclers, but Prescod, who is claimed as the initiator, has not been entirely ignored by historians. Hoyos stresses the fact that he was far ahead of his time. "The remarkable thing," he says, "is that at a time when ideas on the subject were quite confused, he saw clearly the vital difference between representative and responsible government. It was in 1847 that he first put forward practical proposals for an Executive Committee for Barbados . . . The point I want to make here is that Prescod submitted his scheme one year before Lord Elgin introduced responsible government in Canada and seven years before an Executive Committee was set up in Jamaica." (Hoyos, 1961, p. 5.)

To return to the matter of the introduction of Community Development procedures, the setting in the British West Indies in the earlier part of the nineteenth century was ripe of courageous innovation.

There was a social revolution of major proportions when the former Negro slave took his place alongside the white citizen

in schools, in churches and in other ways. But power remained in the hands of the "planters," who had no intention of lowering the franchise sufficiently to allow an appreciable number of ex-slaves to vote. By 1839 it was obvious to the Colonial Office in London that the abolition of slavery had not been followed by reduction in economic exploitation; in fact, opportunities for gross economic exploitation were greater since the planters no longer had the responsibility for the health and well-being of those who worked for them.

The Colonial Office was sincere in the belief that the 'salvation of the West Indies lay not in representative government but in Crown Colony rule. Under this system the Crown would undertake the direct protection of the unrepresented classes . . .' And the Colonial Office soon implemented their thoughts by abolishing representative government in all of the British West Indian Islands, except in Barbados. (Hynam & Hobart, 1965, pp. 8-9)

The exception resulted from Prescod's intervention. That he had the motivation and courage to intervene is amazing. Here was a population of about 15,000 whites and, apart from the Free Coloureds, about five times as many Negroes who had recently been freed from complete subjugation to the whites by a benevolent Crown. Now it was being announced that the Crown was again coming to the assistance of the Negroes.

The Colonial Office must have been surprised and puzzled when, instead of gratitude and jubilation from the Barbadian ex-slaves who they were trying to help, they came up against resistance. Such resistance was undoubtedly due to the extraordinary powers of persuasion and stimulation of a leader who was motivated by visions of the future. In 1834 he got himself elected to the House of Assembly (the first coloured man in such a position), which meant that many whites must have voted for him. He was also helped in his campaign against the paternalism of Crown Colony rule by the fact that he published a newspaper of his own- "The Liberal".

Hereunder are brief comments indicating the relevance of the "indispensable community development criteria" mentioned above.

Criteria 1, Conscientisation and 2, Education-motivation until the people consider the undertaking as THEIRS, can be considered together:

Prescod saw the value of representative institutions and recognised the necessity of fighting to preserve them. Secondly, he realized that such institutions must be reformed and adapted to meet the conditions of a new society. Thirdly, he managed to enlist the support of the emancipated classes and imbued them with a genuine love of representative government . . . The goal he had set himself was to show that his people could work out their salvation by training themselves in the business of self-government instead of relying on the benevolence of English statesmen. (Hoyos, 1961, pp. 24-25)

Re. criterion 3, Participation in decision-making, Prescod was deeply concerned with getting more and more people to take part in deciding who were to govern them. "Prescod's first triumph was to win a vote for the free Coloured People from the Colonial Office . . . his initial success and his continued agitation of the question entitle him to be called the 'Father of Franchise Reform'" (Hoyos, 1961, pp. 24-25) in the island.

Criterion 4, Emphasis on the whole community and 6, Creating effective linkages with external influences, can also be usefully considered together. Prescod was sent to England by the House of Assembly to support Barbados' plea to the Colonial Office for retention of representative government. He was:

"shrewd enough to know that in the great battle he had undertaken he must have the support of powerful allies abroad. It is of no small significance that Prescod enjoyed the friendship of Lord John Russell, the famous English statesman who was the first Secretary of State for the Colonies and later Prime Minister of England . . . He [Prescod] was particularly interested in the great parliamentary reforms framed by Russell and Durham. His contact with these two

English statesmen strengthened his conviction that self-government was the precious thing which all Barbadians, whether white, coloured or black, should unite to defend." (Hoyos, 1961, pp. 25-26)

With regard to criterion 5, Self-help toward maximizing the use of indigenous resources, there are those who claim that the representative of government, as they did, feeling sure that it would only be temporary; confident that the Barbados government would, sooner or later, have to apply to the Mother Country for a grant-in-aid. If this had happened, in keeping with one of the unwritten rules of British Colonialism - he who pays the piper must be allowed to call the tune - Barbados would almost certainly have lost her existing status and become a typical Crown Colony. But strong belief in the principle of representative government and the fear of losing it undoubtedly stimulated people of all colours (albeit for different reasons) to an achievement, which surely must be one of the most outstanding in the history of small "underdeveloped" territories with limited resources. She balanced her budget without external financial aid and has continued to balance it year after year up to date including the critical year 1975 when the oil crisis wrecked the economies of countries that were very much richer in natural resources than Barbados.

From Prescod's time up to today, self-help has become a way of life in Barbados, and in this connection there are many very interesting individual and family histories awaiting the historian, novelist or social scientist.

SELF HELP IN BARBADOS TODAY

Barbados is the most easterly of the former British West Indian (now Commonwealth Caribbean) islands. When first settled by Englishmen in 1627 it was uninhabited, although there is evidence that Arawak Indians had not long before occupied it, or at least visited it regularly. Today it is one of the most thickly populated islands in the world. A census in 1971 gave a total figure of 243,757 on its 166 square miles- a density of over 1460 per square mile. "At present its population is predominantly of negro extraction, descendants of slaves brought over mostly in the seventeenth century from Africa to work in the sugar-cane fields, white, and mixed people almost entirely African and white with a very small number of East Indians. The relative figures in 1970 were 224,318 negro, 9,534 white, 9,305 mixed and 675 East Indian." (Barclays Bank, 1975, p. 76.)

A government supported Planned Parenthood program has been active in the island since about 1950. "The population of Barbados reversing the general pattern for Caribbean countries decreased from 244,000 in 1965 to 239,000 in 1975. (Population Reference Bureau, 1976, p. 158)

The island has had representative government directly under the British Crown (except for a short period (1958-1962) when it became a sovereign state and a member of the Commonwealth. Its House of Assembly is the secondest oldest outside of the United Kingdom.

The present Constitution calls for a Government comprising the British Queen Elizabeth, Queen of Barbados and The Commonwealth, a Senate and an elected House of Assembly.

Another example of community self-help is the fact that not only did the island balance its budget in 1975, but in that year it also "managed to cut its inflation rate within half . . . its wages restraint programmes, the improvement of its system of distribution of imports and the world wide easing of commodity prices helped in this direction." (McKinney, 1976)

Worthy of note also is that from her own resources Barbados has managed to raise its National old-age pensions to the very poor (those with an income of $15.00 per week or under) from $1.80 per week in 1961 to $16.00 per week in 1977.

The writer resided in Barbados as a participant observer from May 1977 to May 1978 and it is abundantly evident to him that not only self-help but all of the other criteria referred to above are today part of the modus operandi of the Barbadian political and civic system and, in some cases, increasingly so since complete Independence in 1966. For instance, with reference to criteria

1 and 2, Conscientisation & Education-motivation until the people concerned consider the undertaking as THEIRS, during the year when the writer was in residence there was hardly an issue of the leading daily newpaper which did not refer to some seminar, meeting or lecture whose purpose was to make citizens at all levels - bus drivers, 4H Club-members, social workers, Youth Clubs, medical technologists, etc. - more and more aware of their duties and responsibilities and/or motivate them to better community service.

With regard to Criterion 3, Participation in Decision-making, Prescod would have been pleased if he could have heard the following statement made by the present Prime Minister two days after his party was swept into power in 1976 by a large majority: "I consider myself a Democratic Socialist-one who is prepared to make the necessary compromises to preserve democracy. What is most important is that the voters have the chance to throw you out when they decide your time has come;" (Larkin, 1976, p. 12)

In connection with people participation at lower levels, for about three centuries up to 1959, eleven Vestries of the Church of England, one for each of the 11 parishes of the island, formed the system of local government. For a short period after 1959 (less than a decade) Bridgetown, the capital, was made a Municipal City and the rest of the island adminstered by a Northern and a Southern District Council. Such Councils gave wider representation than did the Vestries and also simplified taxation. Following the report of a Specialist, however, these Councils were dissolved in 1967 and their functions transferred to an interim Commissioner for Local Government. In 1969 he, in turn, was relieved of his duties, and responsibility for the various services concerned was assigned to the Central Government. This centralization enabled certain National projects to be more easily established, e.g. the National Insurance Scheme and Old Age pensions for the very poor, and contact was maintained with the general public by the creation of a number of statutory Boards, with Constitutions and functions laid down by law. Some of these Boards have very wide powers. In addition there is a great variety of non-government Associations, Committees, Clubs etc., some of whom, like the Chamber of Commerce, the Barbados Workers' Union and the Barbados Christian Council, are powerful enough to influence Government decisions.

Recently (October 1977) Government has taken steps to:

fulfil an election pledge on workers participation in management with the appointment of an 11-member committee to examine and submit recommendations on the matter. . . After due consultation with workers' and employers' representatives and all other interested parties the Party will institute appropriate measures to achieve full worker participation and representation in management.

The present owners of capital will be encouraged by tax incentives and otherwise to institute profit sharing and share incentive schemes so as to broaden the basis of the country's wealth. (Advocate-News, 1977, p.1.)

In connection with Criterion 6, Creating effective linkages with external influences, in late 1977 the island had ambassadorial, consular and/or other representational arrangements with 36 countries, the Pan-American Health Organization and the Organization of American States. Other links are in the process of being forged.

The External Affairs Minister recently declared that "Government's policy on opening diplomatic relations with all countries should now be well recognized. He submitted that ideology was a fact of life but so too was intercourse between nations . . . Mr. Forde [the External Affairs Minister] believed that parliamentary democracy was too well established in Barbados for it to be easily thrust aside by Barbadians opening relations with countries of Eastern Europe. (Burrowes, 1977, p. 1.)

The small Government-run Community Development Division existing in Barbados today evolved as an offshoot from a Social Welfare Department established in 1949 following civil disturbances in the previous decade. Over the years it has been variously attached to the Ministries of Health, Trade, and

Education; now it is within the Ministry of Labour and Community Affairs. It appears to be quite efficiently run within its limited sphere.

Data presented so far establish that Community Development Procedures (as per criteria listed) were established by Prescod in the middle of the nineteenth century and that such procedures are being actively followed today. Also, such data together with the following quotations covering the years from about 1838 to 1977 support the assumption that Community Development procedures were continuous from the days of Prescod up to today:

Many people said that emancipation, [which was completed in 1838], would bring a train of evils upon Barbados. . . that the cost of producing sugar would go up; that the amount of sugar produced would go down; that the slaves would refuse to work after freedom had been granted to them. . .

But none of these things happened in Barbados. It is quite true that in most of the other colonies the end of the old order meant the complete overthrow of the planter. But this was certainly not the case in Barbados. (Hoyos, 1960, 125-127)

The Barbadians formed a compact community whose members recognized their dependence upon one another in spite of racial and social divisions and had worked out an acceptable method of living together. The economic stability of the island was shown by the way in which it weathered the economic storms of the eighteen-forties and maintained its production of sugar. (Parry & Sherlock, 1956, p. 216)

The white people of the island numbered only 5 per cent of the population. . . A social revolution of no little significance has taken place during the past few decades, for the descendants of the slaves, who once cultivated the land under a system of forced labour, now, [1962], occupy the high places and govern the island. (Times, 1962, ii) . . . .

And so it was until the seizure of political power by non-whites. To understand the rapidity and extent of change in the past 20 years, one must remember its racial and demographic context. As in Jamaica, the gradual dwindling of the white population coupled with the growth of a sizable mulatto population helped to define the relevance of race to the boundaries of status groups . . .

Hence, when the whites lost absolute political power, an educated, ambitious elite of non-whites stood ready to exploit their opportunities.

Furthermore, despite recognized social differences between colored and black Barbadians, the political ideology of the new leadership tended to ignore these distinctions; (Mack, 1967, p. 158)

By the 1940's, the legislature of Barbados . . . was the oldest in the region, and already was representative of all races and classes; its standards of education for young people of all races was the best of all the territories; and, it was the most stable and peaceful of them all. Colour discrimination had vanished and not just put into reverse as has happened in some unforturate independent countries; living conditions for the poorer people had improved; and wage rates had reached a high level. All this had been achieved without a bill of rights. (Blackburne, 1976, p. 87)

Barbados is a mixed, free enterprise economy with a system of [elected] government that lays down the ground rules and like a good umpire, ensures that these are kept by the many enterprising members of the most vibrant and exemplary economies of the area. In fact, their traditions of management and national efficiency are in no way altered, endangered or upset by changes in government. Even though the roads are narrow, they are well paved and smooth. Their telephone system is modern and works. Their buses are clean and on time. Their water system is an example to the region. And, of course, one must not forget that . . . [Barbados] is the backbone of our cricketing success.

There are other virtues to Barbados such as the way they manage to import such a

wide range of consumer goods that even we in Trinidad do not see, and yet are still able to run a tight and steady ship of state.

Thus, armed with a system, will power and generous imputs of genuine hard work, Barbadians are making Barbados a highly respectable country beholden to no one and on their knees to no other country. (Trinidad Guardian, 1977, 3)

CONCLUSION. Reference is made once more to the opening paragraphs of this paper, where it is stated that this case study, and, hopefully, others to follow, is concerned with the relation between community development procedures and success in permanent and progressive development of total human and material community resources. The main reason for Barbados' success, in my view, is more than one hundred years of a community development political, civic, and social program.

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A CONTRIBUTION FOR AN EMPIRICALLY GROUNDED SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM

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1979

Symbolic interactionism (hereafter abbreviated as SI) has come to be understood as the "loyal opposition" within sociology (Mullins, 1973). In contrast to "standard American macrosociology," SI involves an alternate epistemology, research method (i.e., qualitative) and a conception of society emphasizing a dynamic of loosely related "social processes" rather than tightly integrated "structures" (Blumer, 1954;78, Manis and Petras, 1970:46-7). While sometimes applied to larger scale phenomena, the central focus of SI has been on the interpersonal interaction between a subject, or actor, and "others" and the implications of this interaction in defining self, others, and situations. Language and the development of symbolic meanings are viewed as the crucial medium as well as by-products of this interactive process.

This is, of course, an oversimplification. There have been periodic but often unnoticed attempts to conduct SI research which is "empirically grounded" in the conventional quantitative sense. The most notable and sustained effort was that of Manfred Kuhn and his students at the University of Iowa. This effort spanned the decades of the '50s and '60s. Unfortunately, it was connected with the fate of a particular research instrument (the "twenty statements test" or "who am I") about which critical questions regarding its stability, validity and utility remain unanswered (see Spitzer et al., 1966; Tucker, 1966, and Tucker and McPhail, 1972). While the "twenty statements test" was used in over 100 researches prior to 1970, its utilization in the sociological literature since that time has been far less frequent.

In spite of the attempts of Kuhn and others, the major impact of SI in sociology has been that developed at the University of Chicago by Blumer and his students. Emphasizing the qualititative aspects of self-other interaction and larger-scale phenomena as dynamic social processes (e.g., collective behavior and social movements) this "Chicago interactionism" has become so pervasive and diffused within so many specialty areas, that it has almost become the way of understanding SI research among sociologists. While the criticisms of this school of thought are still germain, it is widely utilized and has a large number of research and interpretive practitioners, audiences, and functions within the discipline. It is no longer, however, a "badge" for a radically different sociology. Though the orientation deserves to be understood as a serious scholarly framework in its own right, it has also functioned to produce a colorful body of research attractive to many and to provide a "sense of understanding" about the phenomena of everyday life in various contexts. With regard to such an emphasis on the "everyday life contexts" of social life, interactionism now competes with other related, though different, theoretical orientations. Notwithstanding Denzin's proposal (1969) for an alliance between interactionism and ethnomethology, both ethnomethodology and "phenomenological sociology" appear to be developing independently of Chicago-style interactionism. Additionally, there seems at this time little transaction between Chicago interactionism and major trends in macrosociology.

While it is probably too severe a judgement to imply, as does Mullins (1973:98) that SI has 'run its course' as a set of ideas, it does seem that Chicago-style interactionism is not now dealing with any really new research questions, modes of interpretation, or evidence about the nature of the social world that have not been developed during the last two decades. The argument being made here is not that SI has indeed exhausted its potential but rather that the time is ripe to continue the development of an empirically based interactionism--"empirical" used here in the conventional positivistic meaning.

TOWARD AN EMPIRICAL SYMBOLIC-INTERACTIONISM. Several justifications can be offered about why the present time is a propitious one for a renewed effort to develop an empirically based SI. First,

although the Chicago interactionists cite Mead as their seminal figure, recent analyses of the origins of Mead's thought suggest that the subjectivism of the Chicago school seriously distorts Mead's thesis. Thus according to Lewis ". . . there are serious discrepancies between the methodological position of SI and Mead's philosophy of science. In some respects, SI shows more similarity to aspects of pragmatism of William James and John Dewey. [and further that] . . . Because symbolic interactionists construe Mead as advocating a phenomenalistic conception of knowledge and scientific theories (Desmonde, 1970; Stone and Farberman, 1970:111-2), they have moved toward a subjectivistic conception of scientific activity in the social sciences. This subjectivistic tendency is especially apparent in the work of Herbert Blumer (1976:347-8)." In contrast with this approach developed by Blumer and his students, it is contended that

> . . . the realist social psychology of Pierce and Mead implies the methodology of social behaviorism . . . the meaning of a significant gesture is public; it means what the community says it means . . . this does not involve the conception of man as passive responder to external stimuli. People still think, plan, anticipate, and in short construct responses: however, they do so within the perspective and language of some community. (Sewis, 1976:357).

Finally Lewis suggests that there is much similarity between Mead's use of the term "significant symbol" and Durkheim's conception of "collective representations." These interpretations suggest that there are at least ample theoretical reasons for the attempt to develop an empirically based SI.

Second, in addition to theoretical justifications for such an effort, it must be remembered that the analyses of self concept instruments (Wylie, 1961; Gergen, 1871; Wells and Marwell, 1976) do not conclude that the attempt to develop an empirically based self concept literature is futile--but rather that the voluminous literature represents an underdeveloped field, in terms of (1) fragmentation, (2) lack of vigorous instrument development, (3) the lack of cumulative development, and (4) variation in conceptualizing and operationalizing self concept instruments (so that they are of unknown equivalence).

Third, aside from Kuhn and his students there have been (1) a significant number of seldom noted efforts to develop empirically based research not utilizing the TST instrument (e.g., Miyamoto and Dornbusch, 1956; Quarantelli and Cooper, 1966; Kinch, 1963; Reeder, Donohue and Biblarz, 1960; Franks and Marolla, 1976; Williams, Bean, and Curtis, 1970; and Schafer, Barito, and Bohlen, 1976) and (2) attempts to formalize interaction theory in roughly conventional ways (e.g., Kinch, 1963; Lauer and Boardman, 1971).

The beginnings made by these investigations (which treat SI in conventional theoretical and methodological contexts) need to be developed and extended. What they need is the kind of cumulative development which has occurred within the Iowa and Chicago orientations.

Fourth, and finally, in spite of the attenuated development of an impirically-based SI within sociology, there has been and continues to be such interests within other sidciplines that parallel the substantive inverests of sociologists (e.g., clinical and developmental psychology). Other disciplines have in fact, probably contributed more than sociology toward the development of an empirical literature exploring aspects of the self 9e.g., studies cited in Hamacheck, 1971). While sociologists could profit from such related research and perspectives of other disciplines, those disciplines could be enormously enriched by and empirical literature which locates the genesis and maintenance of the self within structural contexts. This could be, in fact, an issue for the development of enhanced rapport and transaction between disciplines. Thus, in sum, there seem to be sufficient theoretical, empirical, substantive, and pragmatic reasons for a renewed effort to develop an empirically-based SI at this time. What issues should be addressed by such an attempt?

To the extent that the foregoing analysis is plausible, it requires a program of development with the following major directions:

(1) Instruments developed over time in a cumulative fashion, to facilitate the development of known parameters for sampling distributions in various populations.
(2) An emphasis on utilizing previously developed instruments, in so far as it is feasible, so that the issue of criterion validity (Phillips, 1971:198-99) can be addressed.
(3) An emphasis--ultimately--on the development of data bases from which multivariate analysis could at least address the issue of causal order among variables, a historic weakness of symbolic interaction theory.
(4) An emphasis on the conceptual and operational nature not only of the self, but also of the "other" (significant other, orientational other, reference group, etc.) which has been the neglected side of the interactionist equation (for notable exceptions see Denzin, 1966 and Perinbanayagam, 1975).
(5) An emphasis on studying interaction variables within the broad context of larger structures (e.g., the family, complex organizations, stratification systems, etc.) to construct a linkage between SI and conventional macrosociology. In other words, as Lofland (1970) has suggested, there is the need to spell out the broader implications of symbolic interaction theory and research.

The point worth emphasizing again is that while there seem to be a number of practical difficulties in addressing such questions, none of them are theoretically beyond our reach. Notwithstanding the argument of Mullins, (1973), it is here argued that there is still much "unmined potential" within the SI orientation, which has been limited by the vagaries of its own historical development.

SOME ILLUSTRATIVE INSTRUMENTS AND DATA. What follows is an attempt to suggest some examples of instruments and data around which a program along the above lines could be developed. These illustrations could be taken to address, in a preliminary way, the feasibility of points 1, 2, 4, and 5 (but not 3) raised above.

The research population in this instance (Harper, 1974) was a sample of 286 families with 4 or 5 year old children in a midwestern urban area. Families were selected as part of a frequency matching design to permit controls for family structure variables, SES variables, and the child's participation in pre-school child care centers (These illustrations derive from a larger research project aimed at understanding the sociological contexts of self concept development in pre-school children). Interviews were conducted in homes during which the following kinds of data were collected: (1) an assessment by mothers of the "developmental and social adjustment adequacy" of the child's behavior, (2) scores from a self concept inventory administered to the child by the interviewer, and (3) information about a variety of structural and demographic characteristics of the family.

Relevant instruments were chosen because of their accessibility in the various professional literatures and because of their appropriateness for the goals of the previously mentioned larger study. With regard to the first kind of data (the mother's assessment of the developmental "adequacy" of the child's behavior) an instrument called Behavior Disorder Checklist developed by Glidewell et al. (1957) was utilized. Using this instrument involved asking the mothers about the occurrence, duration, frequency, and severity of the child's behavior difficulties in the following areas: (1) digestion, (2) getting along with grownups, (3) unusual fears, (4) nervousness, (5) getting along with other children, (6) sleeping, (7) eating, (8) temper tantrums, (9) daydreaming, (10) saying things that are not true, (11) destructiveness, and (12) stealing. These, according to Glidewell et al., are symptoms of "social and psychological disturbances in children when they occur with great frequency and severity. The authors found a positive correlation between scores on the checklist and blind clinical assessments of children. In addition, Williams, Bean, and Russell (1970) have used the checklist to generate scores which related meaningfully

to the impact of parental constraint on the development of social and behavioral maladjustments in children. Mothers were asked whether or not the child had ever exhibited the symptom, how frequently, and how severe and long the symptom had persisted. The responses were then converted into rank order scores, and a percentile rank assigned to each respondent for each dimension. Finally, the standard scores for each dimension were simply added to produce a single index number, termed the "social behavior adjustment index." For the present purposes, these scores can be understood as "assessments of a significant other" toward a subject self (the child).

For the second typed of data (a self concept inventory score administered to the child) the U-scale developed by Ozehosky and Clark (1970) was utilized. This instrument is a projective-type self concept inventory desgined to measure aspects of the self concept of children, but unlike most such instruments it (1) has explicit scoring protocols, and (2) makes rather few imaginative demands on the subject. The instrument consists of a series of bi-polar outline drawings of children in various positive and negative situations designed to tap such self concept dimensions as autonomy, competence, appearance, sex role identity, and interpersonal relations with adults and other children. The child was asked to indicate which drawing in each case is more like himself. A value of 1 was assigned for each positive choice, and 0 was assigned for each negative choice. The summed self concept score is merely the summed scores for each card. It is important to emphasize that the U-scale measures only selected aspects of the self concept: not the self in its idiosyncratice totality, or even all such "aspects" of the self that might be interesting.

Ozehosky and Clark (1970) found that when administered to pre-schoolers the U-scale discriminated at the .01 level between levels of "school readiness" as measured by the Metropolitan Readiness Test. Also, of interest to the present concerns, is the fact that Ozehosky and Clark judged the U-scale to be superior to several "free-response" projective instruments in discriminating between levels of school readiness.

This instrument was pre-tested and refined in several ways. First, it was thought that there might be a significant variation in response patterns for white and non-white children. An initial pre-test suggested no important differences when sorted into these ethnic categories. Second, an item analysis was undertaken to select those cards from the U-scale most strongly associated with high overall scores. The computation of a point-biserial correlation suggested that there were about seventeen items from the whole set of fifty cards which were highly predictive of high overall scores. For this reason, as well as the desirability of a somewhat shorter inventory those seventeen cards were used in the study. Subsequent data analysis suggested that there were modest postive correlations between the various dimensions of the test, ranging from r = .20 to .38.

TABLE 1
CORRELATION OF FAMILY FACTORS WITH CHILD'S SELF CONCEPT

r_{05} = 16, N = 268, decimals omitted.

		1	2	3	4
Socio-economic status	1				
Less trouble with child	2	33			
Maternal warmth	3	22	19		
Social behavior adjust.	4	08	20	25	
Self-concept score	5	-03	07	26	36

Each variable was measured with drastically differing types of research instruments (a verbal descriptive set of responses by the significant other and a projective type inventory by the "subject self") both of which, it is argued, are amenable to parametric data analysis. Furthermore, the relationship between these two variables becomes even stronger when various other factors are controlled. Partial r's between self concept and behavior adjustment controlling for the educational status of the parent equals .409, for family structure complexity equals .447, for family economic status equals .470. Casual order, if any, among these variables is uncertain from these data, but the fact the r^2 values obtain for the partial correlations which approach 22% seems rather dramatically to establish

the existence of a relationship between the self concept and assessments of significant others.

The SI perspective suggests, of course, that this self-other relation is not merely correlational, but "causal" (in a rather loose genetic and interactive sense"). Or as Perinbanayagam suggests:

> "The other should . . . be viewed as exercising power over the emergent self and, to a certain extent, determining the character of that self" (1975: 502).

That there is an active, casual relationship between the assessments of significant others and the emergent self is consistent with these data. Definitive demonstration of this interpretation awaits more rigorous multivariate analyses.

Turning briefly to several "contextual" variables, we find that the "assessment of the significant other" is positively related to other indices of parental behavior (observations of maternal warmth) and attitudes (the perception that the child is becoming easier to deal with). As with the original self-other relationship, controlling for various factors (family SES and family structure complexity) produces partial r's stronger than the zero order relationship. Furhter, these parental attitudes and behaviors are in turn positively related to family economic and education status. Thus these data enable one to begin to address point five (above), namely to examine the self-other relation within the context of larger structures and social forces. The findings here about the relationship between family SES, parental behavior and attitudes, and the self concept development of the child are broadly consistent with the findings of Kuhn (1969), Bernstein (1964) Coopersmith (1967). Thus these data would suggest at least the plausibility of empirically examining the self-other relation in the broader contexts of diverse organizational, occupational, and sub-cultural structures and settings, and hence establishing linkages between symbolic interaction theory and "standard American Macrosociology".

In conclusion this paper has attempted to provide theoretical, pragmatic, and empirical justification for a continued attempt to develop an empirically based SI which is not as insulated from "standard American sociology." Further, an attempt was made to suggest an agenda of issues, both methodological and substantive that future research could address.

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THE "WAR" OF BUREAUCRACY WITH SOCIETY

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Bureaucracy is a new culture, society is an old culture and bureaucracy is at war with society (Hummel, 1977: 56, 57; 77-79). This war can be seen in the conflict of normative prescriptions for social action of the two cultures. Bureaucracy prescribes precision, stability, discipline, reliability, calculability of results, formal rationality, formal impersonality and formal equality of treatment. Society prescribes justice and freedom, violence and oppression, happiness and gratification, poverty illness and death, victory and defeat, love and hate, salvation and damnation. Bureaucracy is systemic, society is humanistic. The bureaucratic prescriptions are one-way directives for meeting system needs. The social prescriptions are twoway consensual understandings for meeting human needs. If bureaucracy wins this war, the administrator, the coordinator, the con artist and the social engineer will replace social consensus with one-way system decrees.

W. I. Thomas anticipated the intellectual warfare of man with himself as a conflict of the elements of spontaneity and organization in man, with the statement; there is "Always a rivalry between the spontaneous definitions of the situation made by a member of an organized society and the definitions which his society has provided for him" Thomas, 1966:42). This rivalry is between individual thought and cultural prescriptions, between living thought and directives of the dead hand of the past. This is warfare of the living with the dead with the burden of the dead being to kill the living and the burden of the living being to resurrect the dead. Viewed from either side the task is of great magnitude for mortal humans. When the welfare of humanity is imprisoned in this kind of either/or logic of war, it is a tribute not to superior ability to reason but to the inherent need to submit to some external "absolute" such as that postulated by natural law, by natural science or by death itself. People's anxiety in the process world, or a nonroutinized world has driven them to a self-execution logic from which they seem unable to escape. This is a logic of habitual, routinized, bureaucratic absolutes that are binding upon the spontaneous definitions of everyone.

Karl Mannehim has prescribed the methodology employed in the warfare; "Only in a world in upheaval, in which fundmental new values are being created and old ones destroyed, (read the new values as bureacratic and the old ones as social) can intellectual conflict go so far that antagonists will seek to annihilate not merely the specific beliefs and attitudes of one another, but also the intellectual foundations upon which these beliefs and attitudes rest" (Mannheim, 1966:57). This is the method of warring against oneself resulting in the annihilation of the intellectual foundations of human thought. When these intellectual foundations are destroyed, humanity no longer has the ability to form abstract concepts of self and relate them to lower level concepts of self. Thus, one cannot conceive of oneself as both an empirical person and a rational person or as a particular person and general person. This inability to hold oneself together conceptually makes room for abstract and general ideas of one's human nature to appear legally and rationally as superior to and more powerful than the less abstract and more particular idea of mankind. Where this is the case a person perceives one intellectual construction of self as good, true and useful while at the same time one is forced to perceive another intellectual construction of the self as bad, false and useless. In this internal conflict, me perceives a good, true self at war with a false, bad self wich seems impersonal and anonymous. Thus the warfare between social man and bureaucratic man is fought at an abstract conceptual level which is difficult if not impossible for the whole person to comprehend. One can no longer form particular and general concepts of self and relate them together, but is captured intellectually by forces external to the self which are routinized, bureaucratized, systematized, and generalized self concepts.

Humanity's captivity is enhanced by an

either/or Aristotelian logic to which Western people have become habituated through conversion and devotion to the mythical demands of "natural science", "natural law", and "objective facts". The logic of "natural science" requires that a wide range of perspectives be destroyed in favor of a single perspective thus, making possible a dogmatic assertion of an "absolute" or the "truth". This conceptual warfare which is used to convert social humanity into scientific humanity is the same logic used to capture social humanity by bureaucratic humanity and is a conversion from two-way social logic to one-way bureaucratic humanity and is a conversion from two-way social logic to one-way bureaucratic decree. This intellectual slavery to Aristotelian polarized thought is particularly devastating to personal, social and cultural data as they are forced into a single absolutist perspective by "objective" observers and interpreters aspiring to be "natural scientists" and by administrators operating in one-way bureaucratic structures.

Aristotelian thought is a technique of thinking which destroys many perspectives of thought by magnifying a single perspective to be the whole of thought. A spade is a spade is a spade forever instead of spade^1, spade^2, spade^3, and so forth, where spade^1 is not spade^2 and spade^2 is not spade^1 and so forth as in non-Aristotelian thought. The habitual and unquestioning acceptance of Aristotelian techniques of thought makes possible the exaltation of one-way bureaucratic routinized thought as truth and destroys the intellectual foundations of two-way social thought. By one-way thought, we mean rigid, directive, and unyielding thought. By two-way thought, we mean adaptive, flexible and accomodative thought. One way thought is decisive, and definitive; two way thought is reflective and abstract. Fortunately, one-way logic is not the only kind of logic available to social humanity. If this were the case, there could have been no society in the first place as the very foundations of society rest upon a two-way logic in which two or more separate social entities not only exist, but are legitimized in their existence. This two-way social logic allows a whole person to conceptualize the self at the same time as both a subjective and an objective human; as both social and a bureaucratic person without invalidating one perspective or the other and without forcing one intellectual perspective into conflict with another.

In *Science and Sanity,* Alfred Korzybsky gives examples of non-Aristotelian logic which allows the same person to be both Smith^1, and Smith^2, Smith^3 and so forth (Korzybsky, 1958: Introduction XXX). Aristotelian logic requires that there be always only one Smith. The use of this one-way logic as social thought makes impossible the recognition of whole ranges of social data and prevents examination and explanation of these data. This is annihilation of the intellectual foundations of social thought so that spontanteous definitions which rival routinized, habitual definitions cannot be formed because of conceptual strangulation.

Aristotelian logic is like the bed of Procrustus, as a technique for thinking. If data exceed the size of the bed, then chop them to fit; if they fall short, then stretch them to fit. Where the social person is both an "I" and "Me" chop her to a "Me", where the social person is both particular and general stretch her to the general. C. H. Cooley explained consciousness in a non-Aristotelian manner, "There are, then, at least three aspects of consciousness which we may usefully distinguish: self-consciousness, or what I think of myself; social consciousness (in its individual aspect), or what I think of other people; and public consciousness, or a collective view of the foregoing as organized in a communicating group. And all of these phases of a single whole" (Cooley, 1956:12). Cooley's use of two-way social thought allowed consciousness^1, consciousness^2, through consciousness^3, to exist as valid and legitimate while at the same time they formed a single whole. In this view whole consciousness is consciousness^1, through consciousness^3, not consciousness^1, or consciousness^2, or consciousness^3.

Talcott Parsons and George Homans departed from Cooleys' two-way social thought as a means of analyzing social data and chose to explain social humanity by

means of the technique of one-way, routinized logic of the bureaucracy. Homans' and Parsons' use of Aristotelian logic forces social humanity to be either particular psychological humanity, as theorized by Homans or to be general systems humanity, as theorized by Parsons. This polar view of the person as particular at the one pole, and general at the other pole introduces an irreconcilable conflict between the subjective and the objective person. The one-way logic of science and bureaucracy immediately raises the question: "Is the subjective, spontaneous person real valid and legitimate, or is the objective, constructed, general person real, valid and legitimate?" The answer can be provided by one-way logic only by a war between Man^1, as subjective man, and Man^2, as objective man in which Man^1 survives and Man^2 is destroyed or where Man^2 survives and Man^1 is destroyed. Either one in particular destroys humanity in general or humanity in general destroys humanity in particular. Only then can real humanity shine unclouded by the shadow of any other person. This issue becomes more clear as we follow the argument between Homans and Parsons. Parsons criticizes Homans' explanation of social behavior based upon psychological principles, "The point is that Homans has never attempted to show how the 'reduction' of sociology to psychological principles is useful at the macroscopic levels, yet he generalized his doctrine to sociology as a whole" (Parsons 1961:207). Homans' reply to Parsons is "Let them therefore specify what properties of social behavior they consider to be emergent and show, by constructing the appropriate deductive systems, how they propose to explain them without making use of psychological propositions. I guarantee to show either that the explanations fail to explain or that they in fact use psychological propositions, in however disguised a form" (Homans 1971: pp. 167, 376).

The one-way logic used in the above argument prevents both Homans and Parsons from theorizing that the whole person or the social person is both a psychological and a systems person and that to conceptualize the social person as both particular and general is valid and legitimate.

The whole issue of the psychological versus the systems person resolves itself into an ideological conflict between sociologists as to who shall define social action. Either social humanity defines itself spontaneously, or it is defined by some external system by a system definition. This warfare has little value for understanding the social person in his full range from the particular person to the general person. It seems evident that psychological constructs externalized, formalized and given political power along with mass media dissemination are in a position to contend successfully with the subjective personal repertoire of facts possessed by many persons and successfully to dominate these persons' spontaneous definitions. In this way, they become general social facts when accepted by the masses. Where this is the case of the social facts which can explain the psychological facts of the accepting masses cannot explain themselves. To do so they must relinquish their generality and their superiority as they become individual psychological facts of the person who formulated them, either a politican, a theorist, or an ideologist. Thus system facts and psychological facts are one, and social facts are both generalized and particular facts. They are Macro-Micro aspects of the same definitions of the situation. One is not socially complete without the other. In the same way a person is inseparable from his shadow when in the sunlight and from his foot prints when walking in the sand and from his finger prints, when touching things. But one's shadow does not fully explain one's behavior nor does one's behavior fully explain one's shadow. Neither do one's foot prints nor one's finger prints fully explain one's actions, nor one's actions fully explain one's foot prints or finger prints. It seems trite to mention these things in this way and yet in organizational structures the paper shadow (file) of the organizational person is more important than the social person because it is used to explain fully social man who is casting the shadow. One's use of habit as having a threefold meaning sheds some light on this process of inversion.

1. Habit is a way of life that one is "used to doing", that he does regularly.

2. One follows this way or norm which he has established for himself as a binding command. His subjective creation now has objective form and validity and is applied to his behavior as prescriptive, demanding, commanding.

3. This way or norm becomes expressive of ones' volition or will; of his psychic disposition to act, reinforced by the sentiment of pleasure, he loves it is attached to it and wants to preserve it as it compels him to a certain conduct and action (Tonnies 1971: 29-31).

Bureaucracy is a habit, a "lazy brain" way of life were the individual acts one-way, means one-way not only in bureaucracy but habitually in society as well. Where a person in particular is an individual man and the person in general is a bureaucratic person, one-way thought tends to become habitual for the person in particular as personal needs are successfully blocked by the defined needs of humanity in general. Habitual commitment of the whole person to the goals of the bureaucracy requires a displacement of personal goals. This goal displacement is achieved by habitual Aristotelian rationalization so that bureaucratic goals are seen as superior to goals of the social person. Habit requires a projection of awe upon the bureaucracy which denies the social person and regresses him psychologically to the lower animal needs for subsistance, forcing the individual to surrender the higher human and social capacities of defining and achieving personal and social needs.

It may be that the task of being fully human through the maintenance of two-way social relations has become too burdensome and abstract for the social person so that the cost of being human must be reduced to the economy and efficiency of bureaucracy, and from the one-way commands of bureaucracy to nothingness and death. Habitually one loves bureaucracy, becomes attached to it, and wants to preserve it, as it compels one to conduct and actions of self-destruction. Humanity at war with itself may very well succeed in destroying itself. It is certain that the burden of being human falls fully upon the intellect of each individual. Bureaucracy has declared war upon such nonsense.

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LEARNING IN LARGE INTRODUCTORY CLASSES

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Our introductory sociology courses aim to increase student knowledge and to foster personal growth. The first goal - "knowledge" - includes the retention of subject-related information, an understanding of approaches or perspectives as well as the creative integration of these facts and ideas. While knowledge is a generally recognized course objective (Vaughan and Peterson, 1975:8), there has been little discussion of personal growth.

"Personal growth" is a primary interest of many group workers, humanistic educators and personality theorists (e.g., Lieberman et al., 1973; Maddi, 1968:77-80; Cross, 1976:148-51; Galyean, 1977:142-56) and so the term has been used in different contexts. Some, for instance, discuss personal growth with reference to therapeutic areas like the release of repressions, the relief of distress or the management of feelings about one's actions.

Others discuss personal growth in ways that are not necessarily "therapeutic." For example, Frank Bruno (1977:30) uses the term "personal growth" as a synonym for the process of self-actualization. Lieberman et al. (1973:92-93) refer to personal growth as individual change in "hoped-for" ways in areas such as:

1. general self-awareness
2. basic attitudes toward self (self-acceptance, self-esteem) and others (e.g., prejudice, collaboration)
3. sensitivity to others' feelings and perceptions
4. effectiveness in interaction (role performance, managing situations)

As we use the term "personal growth" it does not cover therapeutic areas and it is not defined in a very general or "global" way. Rather, personal growth is viewed as course specific with attitude changes more likely to occur in certain emphasized areas rather than others. For example, the topic "majority-minority relations" is approached in such a way that one might reasonably expect changes among some students in terms of their "degree of prejudice."

Personal growth focuses on changes on the micro - or individual - level but these changes are fostered in our introductory courses through the development of a macro sociological perspective. The instructor continually emphasizes the impact of the broader social settings in which individual actions occur. It is through the development of a "sociological imagination," then, that personal growth occurs.

The teacher and the textbooks, however, are not the principle tools of learning (c.f., Light and Keller, 1975; Gross, 1977). Implicit in that approach is the conception of the student as a passive entity who receives, reacts and responds to teacher and texts.

In our view, the student is an active agent who uses awareness of the causative and contingent factors of social life to analyze and interpret immediate situations, make judgments and decide on courses of action. We agree with Pape and Miller (1967) that "learning does not take place unless there is personal involvement." (See Vaughan and Peterson, 1967; Baker and Behrens, 1971; Wallis, 1973; and Petras and Hayes, 1973.)

Further, we maintain that student involvement should occur in a group context. For as Wallis (1973) and others have pointed out, it is the group experience which facilitates individual knowledge and personal growth. (Lakin and Costanzo, 1975; Lortie, 1968; O'Keefe, Kernaghan, Rubenstein, 1975; Reighert, 1970; and Lieberman, Yalom, and Miles, 1973).

Even in the large class, which Baker and Behrens (1971) and Wallis (1973) assess as having some effect on the quality of instruction, the group may be utilized as a catalyst for learning. Large classes may present special problems (e.g., balcony seating, control, simultaneous distribution of materials, hearing student responses) but may still be conducted effectively using a student-centered approach.

We have employed heuristic techniques with classes of 50 or more students using group experiences with small, multiple groups or the class-as-a-whole as the working unit. As a result, students become aware of the "collective ability of the group" (Faris, 1971), develop some concern with each others' input and feedback, form a degree of responsibility to each other and are encouraged to develop sociological imaginations.

TECHNIQUES

Within our classes we have supplemented the traditional lecture-discussion approach with means of instruction which involve the student as an active participant in group experiences. While there are many ways to encourage individual participation and group cohesiveness, we will discuss common experience, dialogue, class humor, class exercises, tests and scales, and small groups.

THE COMMON EXPERIENCE

Shared events can generate a great deal of class discussion. Some of the common experiences that have been incorporated in our courses are: films, institutional visits, guest speakers and paired assignments. (See also, Gross, 1977.)

Film. A film - or part of one - can be used as a vehicle for discussion and debate among class members. One film that we have used for this purpose is "Understanding Aggression" (29 minutes, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1971). While it may not be the best film for understanding aggression, it does generate discussion.

Students, after viewing the film, have talked about the following issues: (1) aversive environments, (2) the various theories of human aggression, (3) the irony of a researcher who talks about peace and love and spends his time shocking monkeys and (4) the irony of a sociologist who talks about peace and love but then rents or buys a film which support people who are shocking monkeys.

Frederick Wiseman's films also are recommended for class use. We have used Wiseman's "Titicut Follies" (85 minutes, Grove Press, 1967) - a film about activities at a state institution for the criminally insane - to discuss institutionalization as well as interpreted realities. (For comments on the Wiseman film see Hecht, 1972, 48.)

In discussing the film, students have disagreed about whether Wiseman has captured the realities of the situation and about whether his filming techniques have added to or detracted from the film's effectiveness. As a result, they have developed new insights about the film and become more aware of their own and others' value systems.

Institutional visits. We have taken classes to visit correctional and mental institutions where they have met with staff and inmates. These trips have generated a great deal of discussion and have affected the students in a variety of ways. Some students had friends or relatives who spent time in such institutions. For these students the class visit "was painful" but also profitable as it helped them "put things in perspective." A number of students, on the basis of their work experience in other closed environments, discussed the difficulties and effects of working in such institutions.

These visits made many students uncomfortable. Some felt very uneasy because they "didn't like to see wierd people," they were afraid or they thought "we made the inmates feel like they live in a zoo." Students sometimes found it difficult to talk with patients in the mental institutions because they were strangers or because some patients didn't converse in a normal way. We have found that any or all of these feelings and experiences, to the extent that they were shared, helped get the students involved with each other and encouraged them to analyze their own thoughts and actions.

Guest speakers. After the class has visited an institution or organization, it's very useful to schedule a speaker who presents an opposing view of the institution or its operation. The outside expert instead of the instructor leads the discussion and presents a strong challenge to the student to think through what she/he previously saw and heard. In this way the student must arrive at her/his own decisions after listening to differing and often polarized views.

The speakers who have been regarded most favorably were those who made very short initial statements, spent most of their time in discussion and who also were flexible enough to initiate or allow shifts in the direction of that discussion.

Paired assignments. At times we have paired all students in the class and asked the pairs to undertake a similar experience such as taking part in a police ride-along program. The student pair made its own arrangements for the activity and submitted one very brief report about the experience. Throughout the semester, we

begin some of the class sessions by asking pairs to discuss particular aspects of their experiences. We used this information inductively to develop an understanding of the concepts, methods, or theories that were being studied. This technique is more effective in the smaller classes as everyone who has taken part will have an opportunity to discuss her/his experiences.

DIALOGUE

An "arranged" dialogue between the instructor and selected students can be very helpful particularly when the topics to be discussed are quite difficult. In this way the instructor is assured that at least several people are very familiar with the topic and will be able to speak with some confidence.

Similarly Petras and Hayes (1973) suggest that classes should be dialogues rather than lectures. However, they use a dialogue between the instructor and the assistant as the learning vehicle and encourage student participation in the process.

In our use of dialogues, the students are directly involved. Three students are assigned a particular subject (e.g., structural-functionalism) and they are expected to research it and then write a three-page summary of their collective thoughts on the subject. Before the in-class discussion of this topic takes place, the students are asked to keep the discussion as informal as possible by not reading to the class and by allowing the instructor to direct the discussion in order to permit wide participation.

The three students also are asked to sit in different parts of the room so that they will be seen as class members who are participating rather than as a panel of experts. We have found this technique has encouraged other class members to join in the dialogue.

CLASS HUMOR

Humor that is shared by a teacher and students can enhance the group's sense of cohesiveness. The use of class jokes can strengthen the "we" feeling of the group and, if necessary, can be used to lighten the atmosphere. Humor must be used carefully, however, as its misuse or overuse may lead to tension.

Repetition. Recognizing the heuristic function of repetition, we have asked students the same recitation question in successive class meetings. The request itself as well as the repeated enumeration of the series of concepts, theoretical approaches, names or stages of development can become something humorous that is shared by the teacher and the students.

Creation-of-a-word. We have encouraged the generation of class-specific argot or "esoteric" language to develop the students' understanding of concepts such as symbols, language and reality construction. The students have enjoyed creating these words and the continuous employment of these terms helps to establish the class' sense of uniqueness.

CLASS EXERCISES: TESTS AND SCALES

Theoreticians such as Jourard (1964) and Mowrer (1964) have "hailed self-disclosure as the primary mechanism and sine qua non of growth" (Lieberman et al., 1973:356). The kind of self-disclosure that takes place in a sensitivity training session, however, is not possible in a large class. Moreover, a large class is hardly the place for intimate levels of self-disclosure, due to undesirable reactions. Nevertheless, some self-disclosure may be achieved through the use and analysis of paper-and-pencil tests and scales. By discussing their responses to these tests, students gain an understanding not only of the tests as scientific instruments but of their own "unique" responses in relation to normative patterns. Three of the measures that we have used are: a social awareness test (Marwell, 1966; Robertson, 1977; and Bogardus, 1933), Manford Kuhn's Twenty Statements Test (Kuhn and McPartland, 1954) and Emory Bogardus' social distance scale. The first two measures have been analyzed in class on the day of administration or during the following class meeting. The social distance scale has been administered at the beginning of the course but analyzed when the topics of race and ethnicity were discussed later in the semester.

The three tests generate a great deal of discussion. The social awareness test serves as a catalyst for community when used at the beginning of a course and all three tests help make the student aware of her/his own values in relation to others. However, some students object that such

tests force competitiveness, and others were concerned about "right" and "wrong" answers.

SMALL GROUPS

One way of creating bonds in larger classes is to incorporate some type of small group experience in the classroom setting. Any of a number of exercises ranging from buzz groups on assigned readings or topics to values-clarification or prisoner's dilemma exercises may be used. (See Berquist and Phillips, 1975; Simon, Howe and Kirschenbaum, 1972; Pfeifer and Jones, 1969.)

Group exercises are effective particularly during the first few weeks of a course as they allow students to meet new individuals and to feel less anonymous. Many of the exercises also free the instructor to talk informally with groups and individuals as the exercises take place. Small group exercises also have been used as a valuable preparatory experience for the final examination (Fritz, 1979).

EVALUATION

We have employed two of the standard course evaluation methods - examinations (Dubin and Taveggia, 1968) and student evaluations (Jiobu and Pollis, 1971; Petras and Hayes, 1973; Linsky and Straus, 1973) - and have found them to be practical but limited measures.

Examinations are a measure of our first course goal, knowledge acquisition, and provide us with some indication of a basic element of the growth process. Examination questions require the student to recall, creatively integrate, and evaluate information.

The evidence which emerges from our experiences and those of others (Clark, 1974; Keller, 1968; Ferster, 1968) is that unconventional methods of instruction may make differences in examination performances. We have observed that student examination grades were higher in courses where less conventional teaching techniques supplemented the traditional approach.

The main reasons which seem to explain this better performance, however, are predisposition and integration. Students committed to our objectives are more likely to enroll and remain enrolled in the courses. Our students, then, are favorably disposed and are likely to perform well on examinations (Clark, 1974). Also, students who are less committed but must remain in our courses are integrated by our techniques into teacher-student and student-to-student networks. This mutual involvement and responsibility encourages them to contribute and perform on at least an average level.

Student course evaluations. Given our objectives, a more appropriate method of evaluating the means of instruction is through the student course evaluation. Linsky and Straus (1973:105) have referred to these as "important as an index of student reaction to teaching."

The student evaluation forms which we use consist not only of traditional questions about readings, films, exercises and class discussions; they also include several self-reflective questions which we also use to assess personal growth. Students responded favorably to the techniques which we employed and over one half of those recently enrolled indicated some personal change, beyond conventional learning (Fritz and Pozzo, 1978).

CONCLUSIONS

Methods of instruction. While there are conflicting opinions (e.g., McGee, 1974; Pape and Miller, 1967) about the impact of teachers and teaching methods on learning, we have been encouraged by our teaching experiences to believe that when personal growth is a course objective it is essential to employ methods of instruction which emphasize student participation in group experiences.

Personal growth. If, as Maslow (1971:168) says, "the function (or) goal of education... is the 'self-actualization' of a person," then we need to learn much more about personal growth within the classroom. It is essential, then, that we more clearly define the concept of personal growth as an individual and group related process.

Evaluation. We have defined personal growth as one of our course goals, have developed some techniques by which it may be fostered and have attempted to evaluate it. But, admittedly, our ability to evaluate

this goal is limited. For as Wahrman (1974) has pointed out with regard to the intensive group experience, the techniques to evaluate personal growth are neither well developed nor rigorously used.

It is necessary, then, to clearly define the concept of personal growth, develop ways of adequately measuring it and more systematically research it as both an individual and group related process. Future research on factors affecting the teaching and learning of sociology should focus on these problems and issues.

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SHOPLIFTING AND RESIDENCE IN COLLEGE

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INTRODUCTION

Causal factors for criminal behavior have been sought both in the social environment and in the make-up of the individual. Shoplifting, as a widely distributed type of offense, can be evaluated in terms of influences on the shoplifter. Comparing the effect on shoplifting in a college population of such variables as sex, type of college, size of college town and time in school contribute positively to shoplifting, and then criminogenic attitudes favoring shoplifting become more diffused among the students with time in school.

In the sociology of crime, it is generally recognized that criminal behavior, like any other behavior in society, is the end-product of a process (Becker, 1953, 1963; Matza, 1964; Cohen, 1965). This assumption calls for a sequential model considering the interplay among psychological and social factors in a process yielding criminal behavior as an end-product. Becher's study on marijuana smoking illustrates such a model (1963). This study applies a sequential model in which pressures or dispositions toward crime are seen as developing in the actor's associational milieu - the subculture - which surrounds and precedes the criminogenic situation. (See Sykes and Matza, 1957.) We believe that the criminal act is done not only to situational prompting, but also on the level of aggressiveness of the personality.

Attitudes favoring shoplifting are thought to be embedded in the college subculture. This subculture is not definable in terms of shoplifting attitudes of the student, but contains these attitudes in addition to attitudes toward conforming behavior patterns which characterize the subculture (Matza, 1965, Ch. 2). Subcultural attitudes related to shoplifting constitute the criminogenic attitudes. Through interaction between criminogenic attitudes and a favorable situation, selection of the shoplifting act becomes possible and the actor chooses to shoplift. The level of aggressiveness of the actor combined with the level of excitement regulates the response to opportunity in the shoplifting situation. An aggressive personality leads to shoplifting only when supported by other factors in triggering a criminal act.

HYPOTHESES

The incidence of criminal behavior is affected by a combination of conditions in the social environment, and by certain relevant attitude sets in those individuals. Therefore, it is necessary to discriminate the factors, and to establish the direction of their effect. For this purpose, we have tried to isolate a low-order type of criminal act which is relatively widespread, and to relate it to some well-differentiated environmental conditions which seems likely to affect the incidence of the criminal act. The crime of shoplifting is suitable for this purpose because it is widespread in juvenile subcultures in urban settings, and because admission of such an offense is not likely threatening to the respondent (Cameron, 1968). The college campus provides a source of juveniles in late adolescence among whom the shoplifting offense may be assumed to be differentially distributed. Controls for size of campus town, type of college, length of time in the college subculture and sex of the respondent are readily applied.

The size of the campus town is expected to affect the extent of opportunity for shoplifting, if the magnitude of difference is on the order of 100 percent, starting with very small towns. In very small towns, specialized stores tend to be smaller, fewer in number, and more limited in passageways and exits. There is a higher degree of diffuse acquaintance among shopowners, clerks, and local citizenry. Shopping crowds are less dense, and the relation between the clerk and even the casual shopper tends to be more personal. Merchandise displays are less massive. These factors make the individual shopper more conspicuous, and the shoplifting opportunity less frequent. Therefore, we expected that students would shoplift significantly more in larger towns than in smaller towns.

Public colleges are open to a wider spectrum of students in terms of socio-economic background and personal resources. Private colleges impose higher tuition and living expenses and draw stu-

dents from higher income families where the inclination to petty theft should be reduced. Therefore, we expected that the public college students would have a higher frequency of shoplifting.

As time in school increases, the college student shares more of the permissive attitudes of the students subculture, and becomes more accepting of the behavior of other students. Since shoplifting attitudes and behavior like other forms of delinquent behavior tend to become diffused among students over time, we expected that shoplifting behavior would increase with time in college.

It is believed that sex differences have no significant effect on shoplifting, attitudes of the student, and the personal aggressiveness of the student. It is predicted that strong criminogenic attitudes toward shoplifting will be associated with increased shoplifting. Since males tend to be somewhat more assertive and less conforming to cultural expectations, we expected a higher absolute frequency of shoplifting among college males.

METHOD

To test this model, the method of self report was preferred over the use of official records, because the statistics on criminal offenses do not treat shoplifting as a separate category, and because of other weaknesses in such statistics (Sellin and Wolfgang, 1964; Sellin, 1937; Conrad, 1942; Schwartz, 1945). Two state colleges were chosen from campus towns of 11,000 and 48,000 population in Illinois and Wisconsin. In each state, one private college was chosen in towns of 22,000 and 104,000 population. In each of the four schools approximately equal numbers of male and female students were randomly drawn from the undergraduate student cohorts representing each of the eight semesters of the four-year college student population. Black students were not included because they were severely under-represented in the private colleges. Slight variation in the numbers available resulted in a sample of 1509 respondents in a design which called for 64 cells of 25 each, totaling 1600. Cell frequencies ranged from 20 to 29, with a mean of 23.6.

The research instrument was a 41-item questionnaire incorporating identification data, a ten-element group of situations on shoplifting to indicate attitudes, and a nine-element group from the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, to show aggressiveness, and four items on the respondent's own shoplifting behavior. The situational items were non-redundant shoplifting situations involving students, in which premeditation, money value, and sanction were systematically varied. A Likert scale of five levels of approval permitted aggregate scoring of attitudes favorable to shoplifting over 40 scale points. The shoplifting situation items developed gave consistent results on an independent sample (reliabilty coefficient = .79) and comparable results on the aggressiveness scale (reliability coefficient = .85).

FINDINGS

Personal characteristics of college students appear to have only a limited relation to frequency of shoplifting. The shoplifting attitude of the student is positively and significantly related to shoplifting frequency. About half of the students approved of shoplifting, and shoplifted five times or more frequently than students who disapproved of shoplifting. The sex variable has no significant relation to shoplifting frequency, although the females reported a slightly higher frequency than the males. Thus, the female students were not more conforming to conventional ethical standards regarding property rights and theft.

A similar outcome appears when we compare the public college to the private college. Contrary to the hypothesis that students from more affluent families would do significantly less shoplifting, the difference is too slight to be statistically significant, and the direction is reversed.

The incidence of student shoplifting is clearly affected by size of campus town, and by the number of years in school, and by the interaction of these two conditions. There is a steady increase in the rate of shoplifting per hundred students, from 13 percent in the freshman year to about 73 percent in the junior year, with a strong proportional increase, semester by semester in the interim. In the largest town, 88 percent of the seniors at the private school have shoplifted at least once. The annual increases in incidence of shoplifting appear in all four schools, which strongly suggests that the student subculture diffuses the

criminogenic attitudes among the college students over time.

When the incidence of shoplifting in the current semester is examined, a rather different pattern of influence emerges. The strong effect of town size is very apparent, as shown in Figure 1, and there is a consistent maximizing of shoplifting in the third year of college, in either the fifth or the sixth semester, with a sharp decline in the seventh and eighth semesters, making up the senior or terminal year for most students. Since the proportion of shoplifters shows a large proportionate decline in the fourth year, it is suggested that the progressive detachment of the individual senior student, who is preparing to leave the student subculture, reduces the effect of these subcultural pressures toward shoplifting. The relationship between year in school and the incidence of shoplifting is curvilinear rather than rectilinear for the first six of the eight college semesters, and hence, is not a simple function of time in school. Instead, it appears to be a function of involvement in the student subculture, which peaks in the third year, and declines sharply in the fourth year. The fourth year withdrawal phenomenon is familiar in social clubs and campus activities groups.

The value of the average single theft is nearly identical in smaller and larger towns or $2.07 and $2.03 respectively. But the increased frequency of student shoplifting in larger towns approximately doubles the dollar value of stolen goods from $2.93 in smaller towns to $6.16 in the larger towns. In terms of student population, the average loss per student in small towns is $0.38, compared to $3.56 per student in larger towns. A force of 10,000 students in larger towns may be expected to shoplift about $35,000. worth of merchandise per college term.

FIGURE I
INCIDENCE OF STUDENT SHOPLIFTING DURING THE CURRENT SEMESTER, BY TOWN SIZE AND TIME IN COLLEGE



(Computer plot by Samraa Moustafa)

DISCUSSION

The three variables, namely, shoplifting attitudes, shoplifting situations, and agressive traits have an effect on shoplifting by college students. The three factors become causally sufficient only when they are combined. When attitudes favorable to shoplifting operate in favorable situations, they yield a high frequency of shoplifting for those who possess high aggressive traits. The model provides an adequate explanation of shoplifting behavior of college students. Two questions may now be raised. First, as a situation becomes criminogenic, do subjective traits of students become momentarily accentuated? Second, in criminogenic situations, do students shoplift even though their attitudes and personal traits are not strongly predisposing? Simply to assert that attitudes and personality traits of students are involved in the process of the perception of the situation gives no clue as to how these characteristics of the actor interact with the situation. The two questions raised above are directly connected with this problem and in answering these questions we may determine how the perception of the situation makes the selection as well the commission of a criminal act possible. It seems very unlikely that an individual would operate in a direction contrary to his subjective controls, unless he were under a condition of strain in the opposite direction. Strain may be a consequence of

direct social pressures from peers, or it may result from more subtle influences exerted on the actor in artificially simulated situations (Asch, 1951). Many kinds of strainful situations may create ambivalence on the part of the actor (Parsons, 1951). The social situation may contain strains which frustrate the actor, and cause him to deviate from his own subjective judgments, or he may quit the situation if he is free to do so. In Merton's terminology, this is the "strain toward deviation" or a negative strain and a negative situation (1938). On the other hand some situations contain strains which may reinforce the pre-existing tendencies of the actor. Following Sumner, we call this the "strain toward consistency," or a positive situation (1907). It should be emphasized that situations may be positive or negative not in themselves, but only relative to the subjective state of the actor. It follows that a situation may be negative for actor A but positive for actor B. The situation is judged as negative or positive because they are perceived as such by the individual actor.

The large town or city situation encourages shoplifting because it facilitates a positive perception of the situation on the part of the student. Since there is no evidence that shoplifting by college students is a gang phenomenon, strain toward shoplifting appear greater in large stores where items for sale are displayed on open racks in such a manner as to invite stealing. Over time the encouragement of shoplifting which appears to come from college peers tends to increase the probability that the student in the provocative situation will shoplift. Attitudes and situational strain only explain selection of objects and predisposition of students to interact with these objects. This is only one phase of the perception of the situation. The second phase involves the perception of situation as being good or not good for stealing the object.

CONCLUSION

Students shoplift as a result of momentary excitement and accentuation in their shoplifting attitudes. As a situation becomes highly favorable for shoplifting, students may do it in spite of their low aggressive personality traits. As Cohen puts it:

> Human action, deviant or otherwise, is something that develops in a tentative, groping, advancing, backtracking, sounding out process. People taste and feel their way along. They begin an act and do not complete it. They start doing something and end up doing another. They extricate themselves from progressive involvement or become further involved to the point of commitment (1965).

The attitudes favoring shoplifting by college students are embedded in the student subculture, and the subculture plays an important role in crime. It predisposes members differentially toward crime and conformity. There is little doubt that college subculture also predisposes its participants toward very highly desirable and approved activites. When students with their shoplifting attitudes find themselves in shops, they become more inclined to shoplift than to pay for the items they want. Some of those inclined to shoplift still do not do so unless they have sufficient aggressiveness to defy the moral and legal codes, and are willing to take the risks. All those who are in the college subculture may not necessarily be predisposed to shoplift and all of those who are so predisposed do not necessarily shoplift. Likewise shops and big stores where shoplifting is possible are not shoplifting situations necessarily. They are primarily places of orderly economic exchange of goods and money. These situations are only conducive for shoplifting for those who enter these situations with a shoplifting disposition.

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DRINKING BEHAVIOR IN HIGH SCHOOL, COLLEGE AND ADULT GROUPS

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INTRODUCTION

The consumption of alcohol by American adults has long been accepted as normal social behavior. Possibly because of this, the emphasis in the recent past has been on the use and the abuse of other drugs, such as marijuana and heroin. However, the use of alcohol has not been replaced by the use of other drugs. According to Dr. Vernelle Fox, Chief of Alcoholism Services at Long Beach General Hospital in California, "The current trend in drug use by youth is shifting back toward alcohol as the drug of choice. It appears that we are passing the peak of drug experimentation, and are leveling out with a more chronic use pattern of mixed substance abuse, with alcohol quite prominent in the picture." (Saltman, 1973, 2)

The increasing use of alcohol has been recognized anew as the major drug problem confronting American society today. Casper Weinberger, as Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, stated that "...the proportion of American youth who drink has been increasing so that currently, it is almost universal." Several major studies in the past twenty-five years have illustrated the increase among high school and college students, and have provided possible reasons of the phenomenon. (Straus and Bacon, 1953; Maddox and McCall, 1964; Harrison et al, 1968; Kane and Patterson 1972; Wechsler and Thum, 1973; Pendergast and Schaffer, 1974) These studies centered on the implications of the parental model, the peer group, and religious values and norms on high school and college students' drinking habits.

One purpose of this research is to incorporate a broader perspective on these casual factors in a more diverse universe. This study was made to assess the effects of the habits of the two role models, parents, and peers, and the effect of prescribed values, and religion on the drinking habits of the individual. The sample was controlled for age, socioeconomic status, and academic status. Socioeconomic status was derived from education level, occupation, and income level. The sample was tested for the use and frequency of consumption of alcoholic beverages. Respondents indicated where and why they drink, and indicated the relative strength of their religious involvement.

RECENT LITERATURE ON ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION

In 1969 the National Center for Prevention and Control of Alcoholism reported that the average American had already taken his first taste of alcohol by age ten, and the first real drink was consumed between the ages of thirteen and fourteen. Thus, virtually every American had at least one drink before entering high school. (Alcohol and Alcoholism, 1969) Another study on Mississippi sixth grade students showed that one-third of the sample were already "regular users." (Harrison, Bennett and Globetti, 1968) These reports indicate the pervasiveness of alcohol use among the young in modern American society. Previous studies in the late 1940's and early 1950's found that 69 percent of college freshmen and 46 percent of first year college women had used alcohol. (Straus and Bacon, 1953) More recent studies demonstrate a higher rate of use among young people today. A study of 20,000 junior and senior high school students in Kentucky stated that only 27 percent of the respondents had never taken a drink. (Kane and Patterson, 1972) A more definitive statement of this increase was given in a 1974 U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare release. This indicated a rapid increase over just the past few years. A Toronto study noted that the proportion of students who had used alcohol within the previous six months increased from 46 percent in 1968 to 71 percent in 1972. A survey in San Mateo, California, reflected a similar increase, and stated that 84 percent of high school sophomore boys have had a drink of an alcoholic beverage (Weinberger, 1974).

It has been seen that while the proportion of persons using alcohol has increased, the age of first use has descended to the pre-puberty age group. Earlier research has established the importance of certain role models and norm systems on individual drinking patterns which provide some explanation for this trend. An exploratory study indicates that differences in alcohol

use or abuse depends on differences in values and norms maintained by groups in the social environment. (Mizruchi and Perrucci, 1962) The Straus and Bacon study (1953) had shown that 92 percent of the male respondents used alcohol when both parents drank, while only 58 percent did so when their parents abstained. The corresponding percents for females was 83 percent and 23 percent respectively. This suggests that the influence of the parents is much stronger on girls than on boys, as regards drinking behavior.

In the study of Mississippi sixth graders, of the non-users, 80 percent of the parents were abstainers. (Harrison et al. 1968) Other studies confirm these results. Maddox stated: "...peer group drinking behavior among adolescents would tend to reflect that of the parental model." (Maddox and McCall, 1964, 8) In another study, Maddox (1970) found that adolescents who drink have at least one parent who drinks, while abstainers said that their parents are also abstainers. In an abstaining rural community in Mississippi, Globetti (1972) found that only 32 percent of the high school students had used alcohol during the previous year, as compared to much higher use levels among high school students elsewhere. In addition to the effect of the parental model, parental approval of drinking is likely to stimulate alcohol consumption by the young.

The influence of peer groups on alcohol use has been studied by several researchers, who have shown a correlation between the two factors. (Straus and Bacon, 1953; Slater, 1952) The Straus and Bacon study showed that 89 percent of males drank if their close friends did so, compared to 16 percent who drank when their close friends abstained. Among women, the figures were 79 percent and 5 percent, respectively. Most of the studies which we have cited agree on the effect of peer drinking. According to Maddox (1970, 107) 91 percent of the males and 82 percent of the females acknowledged strong peer pressure on their social drinking behavior. Of those who felt no peer pressure to drink, only 65 percent of the males and 40 percent of the females drank. Strong associations have also been shown between heavy drinking, illicit drug use, identification with the youth culture, and delinquent behavior. (Wechsler and Thum, 1973) A study by Kane and Patterson shows that drinkers perceived the majority of their classmates as drinkers, while the abstainers believed the majority of their age group to be abstainers. (Kane and Patterson, 1972) The recognition of peer pressure is echoed by the American Medical Association: "...drinking can be a status symbol for those who want to 'belong' to an influential group where alcohol is used freely." (Proceedings, 1973, 7)

Research on the relationship between acceptance of religious values and alcohol use is not as definitive. Snyder (1958) found an association between religious-ethnic affiliation and intoxication. He found that Jewish students directed by prescriptive norms, had a much lower rate of drunkenness than Protestants whose religious norms proscribed drinking. However, this study only considered Protestants who drank, and did not account for the large percentage who abstained. Maddox and McCall (1964) discovered that "...a positive relation was found between reported monthly attendance at organized religious activities and the probability of being a non-user." Generally, drinkers are not likely to define themselves as being either fairly religious or highly religious. (Wechsler and Thum, 1973, 1225) And users of illicit drugs tend to use alcohol more heavily than non-drug users. (Shafer, 1972)

METHODS AND PROCEDURES

Several important social factors have been shown to affect drinking patterns: parental role model, peer group pressure, and religious beliefs. We are particularly interested in these factors, and their power to explain the climbing rate of alcohol use. It is also possible that the declining role of parental authority, and the declining influence of traditional norm system has permitted increased influence of social contacts in changing and directing the drinking behavior.

We wish to determine whether there is a difference in the effect of the parental model, the peer group, and religious convictions on drinking habits. The authority and norm system is defined as the parental role model and the religious belief system. The individual's social contacts are largely made up by the peer group. These function as independent variables to relate to the respondent's level and frequency of drinking. Controls for age and socioeconomic

status were included to provide evidence of the strength of these variables. If similar effects are found across three sub-groups incorporating different age levels and different social situations, this will tend to support the validity of the total study. The hypotheses is that drinking patterns are established by the parental model, peer group influence, and religious beliefs.

Questionnaires were answered by 1886 individuals in three sub-groups. The three groups were (1) 692 white male high school students, (2) 583 male college students, and (3) a wide ranging group of 611 white male independent adults. Discrete groups were randomly sampled to determine whether the factors in question had equal relevance in all groups. There were questions on whether the respondent used alcohol, and if so, how often, and why there was a need to drink. These questions were applied to develop a picture of the pressures which lay behind the drinking habit. There were also items to determine the extent of drinking among parents and peers. Questions did not concern the type of religion, but rather, how often the religious practices occurred, and how deep the respondent considered his religious conviction to be as an indication of the importance of religion for individual behavior.

An unknown bias was introduced by a tornado which shattered the windows of the office where the questionnaires were kept, in Stillwater, Oklahoma. Due to this event 309 questionnaires were lost, flooded, or disassembled. In addition to this loss, 97 questionnaires were incomplete, or incorrectly filled out. The analysis included 1480 analyzable questionnaires.

There are two major criticisms with the design of this research. First is the inherent difficulty of integrating different sub-groups, and particularly subgroups as discrete as these. This can be reduced by controlling the variables for each group separately. The second criticism is more serious. Considering the nature of the independent variables, peer group, parental model, and religious conviction, quantitative measures may not be possible. In the present case, we have accumulated scores from a minimum of five scaled questionnaire items for each variable which can be supported from the questionnaire items relevant to the variable in question. The possibility of personally biased interpretations of the role played by each respondent, and the long-term influence of these factors, which may change through time, make the statistical test in a static situation somewhat doubtful as a means of extracting reliable and useful information. Qualitative or interview methods may be better suited to acquiring reliable and viable results for this kind of research.

FINDINGS

Fairly frequent drinking of alcoholic beverages appears to be almost universal among high school students and college students. In both groups, the correlation of age with the extent of drinking behavior is zero within the limits of sampling error. Only 5 percent of both groups indicated that they never drink. The two groups together cover an impressive age span from 14 to 25 years. With 95 percent of the respondents in both groups indicating the more or less habitual use of alcohol, it is pointless to search for differences in drinking behavior attributable to the parental model, or to ethnic origin within the 5 percent statistical probability limit. The high school group indicated that liquor was kept in 94 percent of the homes. We can conclude that at least some regular drinking is started by the great majority of high school students at some time before they reach high school age. If most students began drinking after they entered high school there would be a positive correlation between age and extent of drinking involvement, at least in the high school sample. Only 3 percent indicated that they drink alone, and 76 percent indicated that they drink with others. More than half of the high school students said that they used marijuana, and 11 percent indicated the use of other drugs. A total of 34 percent stated that they mix alcohol and other drugs.

Only when we examine the data of adult respondents do we find an increased percentage of those who say that they do not drink. In the case of adult respondents 13 percent indicate that they never drink. Moreover only 11 percent of the adult respondents state that they mix drugs with alcohol consumption, which is less than one third of the proportion of high school students who mix drugs with drinking. Is it possible that some high school students are induced to drink and use drugs by strong peer pressures, against their personal pre-

ference? An answer to this question would be highly tentative, since future research may indicate a growing trend toward greater use of alcohol among non-student adults. In both groups there is some peer pressure toward drinking, because only about 2 percent of the respondents among high school students and among adults indicate that none of their friends drink.

The typical individual in modern society, in high school, college, and adult life, meets fairly frequent social occasions where alcoholic beverages are not only offered, but are to some degree required. One can refuse to join friends in drinking, but one tends to disappoint their expectations, and to be set somewhat apart from the drinkers. Neither the socially budding high school student, nor the college student can readily resist such social inducements.

The effect of social status on drinking behavior is vanishingly small. For high school students, whose social status in our account depends solely on family characteristics, such as family income and parental education and occupation levels, there is a negative correlation of $r = -.11$. Thus children from lower status families reflect slightly more drinking involvement. For college students, the correlation between social status and drinking is positive reaching a value, $r = .20$, and $r^2 = .04$ (rounded) for the relation between the college student's social status, and his or her friends' and relatives' drinking involvement. The effect is slight, but perceptible. For adults, there is no apparent relation between social status and drinking.

Religious commitment has a very small negative effect on drinking involvement for high school students, with an r^2 value of about .02. For college students the correlation is also negative, but it is so small that the true correlation may be zero. Data on the religious commitment of adults is not sufficient to permit measurement and assessment. From these results, religious commitment does not materially affect involvement in drinking, and religious commitment is basically neutral to drinking behavior.

The highest correlation ($r = .231$) among factors related for high school students is between drinking involvement and drug involvement, indicating that one variable accounts for about 5 percent of the variance in the other. This low, but statistically significant relation indicates a basic sharing of the drug and drinking subcultures among high school students. Both are persistently conveyed through social pressures, primarily by the peer group, but also, in the same positive direction by the family. This is not to say that high school students' families exert deliberate positive pressure for drug involvement. In fact, the family experience has positive effects primarily on the students' drinking involvement, according to our data. But the secondary and indirect effect of family influence through drinking behavior has some positive effect on drug involvement, since drugs and alcohol go together in many of the high school students' peer group activities.

For college students, there is a strong positive relation between friends' drinking involvement and the respondent's own drinking involvement. ($r^2 \simeq .11$) However, it may be that the drinking patterns among college students merely perpetuate those previously maintained in high school. The majority of college students (64%) recognize no effects from their drinking, and only 4 percent recognize any harmful effects. Drinking involvement has become a habitual and accepted pattern of college life. The tavern is the regular gathering place, and the average college student takes drinking in stride.

Only among adult respondents is there a significant relation between age and social status. Career, income, and age have an opportunity to vary together, and the mutual effect (r^2) is about .17. The relation between drinking and the justification of drinking is the largest of all of the correlations (see Table 4), with a shared variance of 32 percent ($r^2 = .32$). Those with more involvement in drinking show measurably more justification of their involvement. There is also a small negative relation ($r^2 = .02$) both between age and drinking involvement, and between age and justification of drinking. This slightly strengthens the impression that the social influences favoring both drug and drinking involvement are at a maximum in the high school and college years, and that these influences may tend to decline slightly with age. Once again, however, the evidence for this is weak, and merely suggestive. It is quite possible that the present youth cohorts may maintain their drinking and drug use patterns through their adult careers.

CONCLUSIONS

The primary elements which favor drinking involvement seem to be strong, pervasive, and persistent cultural factors. These include drinking in the family, keeping alcohol at home, and the incorporation of drinking, and to a less extent, drug use, in the powerful mechanisms of social life, during the long formative years of high school and college. The finding that this involvement is invariant by age, and the inference that it was deeply established prior to entry in high school is consistent with the findings of other studies. It should lead other researchers to seek the social roots of alcohol and drug involvement in the pre-high school years, and even in the entire life span of childhood experience. It is certainly possible that strong positive orientations both to drinking and to drug use may start in the child in early exposure to adult customs and values at home and in the graphic mass media. There, the cocktail glass is as familiar as the coffee cup, and although drugs are less prominently featured, the concept of self-dosage is widely and vividly advertised.

We are also intrigued by the modest evidence that the compulsion to drinking and drug involvement seem to be somewhat less in older age cohorts. For this reason we urge that others replicate the basic design of this research, comparing mathematically robust sample of high school, college, and adult respondents. The fact that this sample was confined to the New York area is not presumed to bias basic elements of the findings. The cultural pressures and social environments are so nearly identical that we believe other urban locales in the United States would show little difference. But it is worth asking whether high school, college and adult respondents in other countries, such as Germany, Brazil, Iraq, and Japan would reflect similar orientations and involvement with alcohol and drugs.

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A MODEL OF MODERN CHARACTER

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This essay attempts to develop a model of character that is sociological in nature, in that it is 1) role based, 2) deductively approached, and sociohistorically specific.

ROLE BASED ANALYSIS

A sociology of character ought not be directed at the individual's psychic structure which serves the function of translating, organizing, satisying, and channeling organic drives and dispositions in the light of environmental restraints (Gerth and Mills, 1953). Instead, the focus must be restricted to that component of the general personality system linked directly to those environmental restraints called roll obligations (Parsons and Shils, 1951). Three specific levels of analysis must be distinguished: 1) personality, 2) action, and 3) the sociocultural levels.

Personality, in a sociological sense refers to the individual's subjective definition of social roles. Of particular importance to the personality level are the elements of role motivation, role evaluation, and role efficacy. Role motivation is that aspect of subjective definition which consists of justification and rationalization for engaging in role activity (Foote, 1951; Goode, 1960; Gerth and Mills, 1953; Becker, 1960; Bredemeier and Stephenson, 1962). Role evaluation refers to the position of the role in the individual's hierarchy of significance, ego-involvement, and identity (Sherif and Cantril, 1947; Goffman, 1961; Turner, 1975). Role efficacy involves the perceived degree of mastery, control, and competence, in role performance.

The action level describes the situational component of role activity. It is associated with role perception and role playing. By role perception we mean the individual's interpretation of behavior expected in the situation, developed through a process of role taking (Sarbin, 1968; Turner, 1968). Role playing refers to the performance devised and enacted on the basis of that perception (Goffman, 1959). The action level concerns the compliant, cooperative, and conformist aspects of role behavior.

The sociocultural level refers to the objective definition of institutional spheres and interactive systems. The two major elements associated with this level are role function and role location. By role function we mean that roles can be analyzed in terms of their impact on society. Role location refers to the degree to which the matrix of the individual's other roles is socioculturally given. (See Figure 1)

FIGURE 1
THE ROLE ANALYSIS MODEL

Level	Definition	Elements
Personality	Subjective	Role motivation Role evaluation Role efficacy
Action	Situational	Role perception Role playing
Socio-cultural	Objective	Role function Role location

The personality, action, and sociocultural levels are independent, yet interpenetrating levels of analysis. For example, the action level can be viewed as a dialectical process between subjective and objective definitions of concrete social roles. That is, the actor brings to each situation motivational, evaluational and efficacy orientations. At the same time, the actor is aware of his or her place in the social structure, and of what is expected in various situations. Social action can be conceptualized partially in terms of the mutual effects of these two forces, which can vary in their degree of symmetry, conflict, and compatibility. Whereas role function helps shape role performance--role evaluation and role motivation help shape the role structure that is sought out by the individual. In this analysis, the sociology of personality must center on the personality action nexus. To explain this linkage, one must account for the sociocultural factors impinging on and manifested at the action level. The frame of reference applies at the level of the individual actor. Our questions are: How do role motivation, role evaluation, and role efficacy affect role playing? How does role perception (which reflects role function and expectations) help shape role motivation, role evaluation, and role efficacy?

By 'character' we mean the totality of

individual orientations toward role obligations. Such an orientational system consists of: 1) personality orientations, such as role motivation, evaluations and efficacy; 2) action orientations, or role perceptions, and 3) sociocultural orientations or role functions. The individual is oriented to subjective, situational, and objective aspects of social roles.

DEDUCTIVE ANALYSIS

A sociological social psychology must be katascopic in that it begins at the system level, and works down to the level of the individual (Durkheim, 1912). As a deductive strategy, the three levels are analyzed in terms of a cybernetic hierarchy (Parsons, 1977). From an analysis of the sociocultural level, we derive the general structure of the action level, and from this we derive the basis for personality analysis. The starting point of personality and action lies in the macro-level framework, which is independent of human volition. Rather than beginning with the processes of world construction, symbolic interaction, and paramount reality of everyday life as an anascopic view, a deductive strategy analyzes these processes only within the broader sociocultural framework. (See Berger and Luckman, 1966; Mead, 1964; Blumer, 1965; Goffman, 1969; and Schultz, 1962.) While a katascopic approach places the sociocultural level at 'command post' of the cybernetic hierarchy, this by no means indicates a unidirectional flow of influence. Neither does the adoption of a deductive strategy preclude the existence of a dialectical relation between the respective levels.

HISTORICALLY SPECIFIC SOCIAL CATEGORIES

The next step in developing a sociological model of character is the analysis of social categories which relate to the personality, action, and sociocultural levels of analysis. These social categories permeate objective, situational, and subjective definitions, and serve to integrate the macro and individual levels of analysis, which is the major task of sociological social psychology. The categories can be used to interpret and order 1) the functions and expectations of various institutional spheres, 2) the structure of the individual's role complex, and 3) the structure of individual motivation, evaluation, and efficacy.

These social categories are rooted in a sociohistorical context. Only by approaching the study of general processes in the light of specific sociohistorical realities can character analysis be made sociological. Five such general issues can be identified. 1) To what extent is there a disjunction between subjective personality definitions and situational action or objective sociocultural definitions? 2) To what extent should one isolate a model character type as opposed to identifying the multiplicity of potential character adaptations? 3) To what degree is character unitary or segmented in nature? 4) What is the level of self-conscious awareness which individuals bring to their role activities? 5) To what degree must character be viewed as a set of stable orientations extending through life, as opposed to a conception emphasizing the pliancy of character? Character disjunction, uniformity, unity, awareness, and stability must be conceived as variables ranging from low to high in value. Each sociohistorical period is characterized by a particular pattern of distribution along these dimensions.

A MODEL OF MODERN CHARACTER

The first step in developing the model of modern character is to crosscut levels of analysis and social categories. The takeoff point is that the social categories of the sociohistorical period of modernity are the private and the public components, each of which has a subjective, a situational, and an objective definition. The interrelation of levels of analysis and definitions, on one hand, and private and public components on the other hand is shown in Figure 2.

FIGURE 2
DIMENSIONS OF THE CHARACTER MODEL

Level	Definition	Part	Character
Personality	Subjective	1 Private 2 Public	Multiple references
Action	Situational	3 Private 4 Public	Role differences
Sociocultural	Objective	5 Private 6 Public	Structure difference

But what exactly is meant by private and public components (Berger et al., 1972)? And how are they linked with the personality, action, and sociocultural levels, and their corresponding elements? Private and public components can be defined in terms of general attributes of concreteness and abstractness (Simmel, 1971; Zijderveld, 1970). The constituents of the private components are the self and primary groups, which the public component is made up of secondary groupings (Cooley, 1909). But how can the claim be defended that these categories or components represent social categories of modern society? For this we must demonstrate how the categories constitute a common denominator of the analysis of personality, action, and sociocultural levels of modern society.

Let us begin with the sociocultural linkage indicated by Cells 5 and 6 of Figure 2. The sociocultural level is characterized by structural differentiation, one meaning of which involves the autonomy of institutional spheres. This means that each institutional sphere is restricted to a narrow, delimited area of responsibility. For example, the family is responsible for child care and primary socialization, and economic institutions are responsible for the production of goods and services. Similarly, political, educational, and religious institutions are assigned specific functions in society (Parsons, 1971). We will subsume the many functions performed by these institutions under the umbrella headings of private functions and public functions. By private functions we mean the range of expressive functions, including emotional release, a home base as a refuge, and meaning and identity for the individual. These functions are assigned in modern society primarily to institutions such as the family, neighborhood, ethnic, religious, and other types of volutary associations (Cell 5, Figure 2). By public functions we mean the instrumental functions which involve the coordination and organization of activities critical to social survival and adaptation (Parsons and Bales, 1955). Such functions are assigned in modern society to the polity, economy, legal, and educational institutions (Cell 6). Each set of institutions has in common both functions and expectations. Each set of institutions has associated with it either private or public expectations. Private expectations include self-actualization, affectivity, and diffuseness, and the public expectations include specificity, rationality, impersonality, and impartiality (Parsons, 1951).

Not every institution involves both private and public aspects, but some institutions belong in both categories. However, each institution can be categorized as either private or public according to its primary function in the social structure of modern society.

There is another kind of differentiation within the modern sociocultural system: namely, variegated and heterogeneous social locations. Social milieus in modern society are particularly differentiated along urban-rural, social class, life-style, racial, and cultural lines. Each milieu establishes broad parameters for the action and personality levels.

Structural or institutional differentiation is expressed at the action level in the form of role differentiation. The individual in modern society is confronted with a plurality of role demands and expectations (Berger et al., 1972). The important factor at the action level is the individual's perception of role expectations. The individual can act on the basis of either private or public expectations (Parsons, 1951). These can be designated respectively as the private and public roles of the individual. Another factor is the distribution of public and private roles in an individual's role complex. Individuals differ in the amount of time devoted to private and concrete or public and abstract roles, and they vary in their respective participation in either self-centered or primary and secondary or group activities.

Not only are there private and public functions, expectations, and allocations of public and private roles, but there are public and private reference points which are relevant to the personality level. This means that in modern society, the individual in each situation has available the reference points of the self or private primordial groups and organizational public groups, which comprise a continuum of concreteness to abstractness (Shils, 1957; Parsons, 1971; Berger et al., 1972; Merton, 1957). The reference point associated with a role provides the underlying motivation for role performance. For example, the role of father, objectively defined, can have either public or private reference points. Thus, whereas the father who directs his thought to the question of the

subsistence of his family possesses a private reference point, which the father who thinks of leaving his family to serve in the armed forces during a time of national crisis is using a public reference point. Role evaluation enters the analysis in that roles or situations, and their reference points are ranked according to some meaning system into a hierarchy.

The three levels of analysis which in one sense, independent of each other, and in another sense, in a relationship of mutual influence. For example, the independence of the personality and action levels is reflected in what we call personality-action disjunction. There is no necessary correspondence between the nature of a role and the nature of the reference points attached to it. An individual can be acting out a public role, but have a private reference point, and vice versa. Similarly, the action level is not simply the product of the interplay or personality and the sociocultural level, but also a function of independent processes operating at that level. However, the personality and sociocultural levels impinge on the action level, just as the action level acts back on the personality and sociocultural levels. Given the fact that in modern society, there exists a multiplicity of potential orientations for the individual in each situation, it follows that the result would be a multiplicity of character adaptations to that situation among the members of the society.

Role differentiation places a limit on the degree to which character is unitary. Thus, the degree of unity of character is problematic in modern society. Here, there is a significant degree of self-conscious awareness associated with character. An active cognitive posture is required to reconcile the numerous and often discordant role demands imposed on the individual, as well as the plural reference points available to him.

Stability of character in modern society is made precarious for three reasons. 1) Self-conscious awareness which involves the recognition of options often has as one effect, an instability of character orientation. 2) The individual is generally besieged by alternative orientational sets which call into question and possibly undermine the plausibility of one's existing character structure (Berger et al., 1972). 3) Modern society is characterized by sharp delineations in biographical stages, each of which call for and expect distinct orientational sets.

Character in the modern context, refers to the totality of the individual's orientations toward private and public components. By personality orientation, we mean the extent to which the individual is privately or publicly motivated and committed. By action orientation is meant the degree to which the individual perceives roles in private terms, and enacts private and public roles.

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