

ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN: A NEW IDEOLOGY?

Doug Satterfield, Pennsylvania State University

INTRODUCTION

More than the people of any preceding age, thinkers in recent centuries have held firmly to the conviction that the mind could comprehend the universe and subordinate it to human needs. Growth became the god of society, inspired by the abundance of a new frontier. This abundance led them to a new conception of the universe based on an "infinite" amount of materials and goods; utilizing new ways of thought and behavior, they set about the task of creating a new world based on growth and progress. Progress, became the ideological foundation of the present age. Growth and abundance were the twin pillars of progress as an ideology.

PARADIGM VERSUS IDEOLOGY

In order to understand our present position, it is necessary to start with the concepts of "paradigm" and "ideology." Thomas Kuhn (1962) developed a model to expose the fallacy that knowledge is gradually accumulated. Kuhn saw a science at any given point in time as dominated by specific "paradigm." "Normal science" is a period of accumulation of knowledge in which scientists work to clarify and refine the reigning paradigm. Such work inevitably spawns "anomalies," or "data" that cannot be explained by the existing paradigm. A "crisis stage" occurs if these anomalies mount, which ultimately end in a "revolution." If a new paradigm is found to offer good explanations of these anomalies, then the existing paradigm is overthrown and a new one replaces it. The stage is now set for the cycle to repeat. It is during the period of revolution that great changes in science take place. Kuhn's model may be represented in Figure 1.

Masterman (1970) recognized Kuhn's vagueness concerning the concept paradigm, and developed it on a threefold typology of uses. Ritzer (1975, 7) offers a synthesis of this threefold typology: "The paradigm is the broadest unit of consensus within a science and serves to differentiate one scientific community from another. It subsumes, defines, and interrelates the exemplars, theories, and methods and instruments that exist within it."

Although Ritzer applies this concept to the scientific community, others Ophuls, 1977; Pirages, 1978; Rodman, 1980; Dunlap, 1980) have recognized a broader use for the term. Paradigms, then, may be found at the intradisciplinary and interdisciplinary levels, as well as at the institutional level and at the cultural level. It is at the cultural level that I contend paradigms merge into ideology.

The term *ideology* may be thought of as a system of interdependent ideas. Such ideas are held by a social group or society which reflects, rationalizes, defends, and guides its particular social, moral, religious, political, and economic institutional interests and commitments (Theodorson: 1969, 195). In addition, Karl Marx (1960, 26) gave the concept great prominence when he defined it as a system of ostensibly logical ideas that in reality are a justification for the vested interests of a particular social class; where the dominant ideology in a society is that of the ruling class. It is not unrealistic, after a comparison of the concepts ideology and cultural paradigm, to view these terms as coequal.

The emergence of a new environmental ideology is amazingly similar in structure to many old and immensely powerful ideologies. If such a shift is taking place, then a greater acceptance of the fundamental ideas within this ecologically-oriented ideology should be evident.

STRUCTURAL SIMILARITIES

Any cognitive model, either scientific or ethical, set forth by humans goes through structural changes, although the intensity and direction varies through out its history (Catton: 1981, 2). For example, one of the basic pedagogical methods is that learning should proceed from familiar to less familiar, from concrete to abstract. Also, in the cases of mathematics, biology, and physics, solutions to all contradictions of their scientific paradigms were attempted in old paradigms. Only after a series of failures, could a new model, usually provided by a young outsider, solve all contradictions with a new paradigm.

An *ideology* will answer each of these four

FIGURE 1	FIGURE 2	FIGURE 3	FIGURE 4	FIGURE 5
<i>Kuhn's Model Of Science Development</i>	<i>Ideology Structure Model 1</i>	<i>Ideology Structure Model 2</i>	<i>Environmental Paradigm Model 3</i>	<i>Ideology Structure Model 4</i>
1 Paradigm 1	Natural Communism	Paradise	Relative Scarcity	Primitive Society
2 Normal Science	Division of Labor	Original Sin	The "Great Frontier"	Increasing Complexity
3 Anomalies	Class Antagonism	City of the Devil, B.C.	Environment As Resource	Intellectual Growth
4 Crisis	Marx' Laws of History	Chirst	See Environs are limited	Moderns Win: Man Infinite
5 Revolution	Workers vs Bourgeoisie	City of the Devil, A.D.	Frugality vs. High Living	Technologic & Real Growth
6 Paradigm 2	Revolution	Second Coming of Christ	Resource Crisis	The Golden Age
7	Socialism	Last Judgment	Transitional Society	
8	Communism	New Paradise	Steady-State Society	

questions¹ (Kinloch: 1981, 8-14):

1. Where did I and my society come from? Historical
2. Who am I and what is my society? Existential
3. Where am I and my society heading? Destitutional
4. What is right and wrong? Ethical

In religious and dogmatic readings, it is possible to see very strong similarities between the structure of an old ideology and that of the new one. Such structural similarities exist in the following pairs: Epos of Gilgamesh and the Old Testament's Genesis; early Christianity and the development of philosophy in the Roman empire; Rousseau's fall of natural man and Christianity's fall of God's man. We can also witness another kind of similarity between physical historical evolution and mythological historical evolution of a particular culture, the heavenly battle between tribes of gods of Aesir and Vanir in Germanic mythology and the Germanic dominance of northern Europe.

ENVIRONMENTAL IDEOLOGY STRUCTURES

During the period when an old ideology faces a crisis, there is a certain kind of open championship for a new ideology. Kuhn (1962) and Mannheim (1936) suggest that the winner

of this contest is that major ideology that optimises the answer to the contradiction which lead to the crisis and that structurally converges as much as possible to the old ideology. Then the structure of a new major ideology is, to a large degree, similar to the structure of the previous major ideology of a given culture.

Augustinian Christian ideology was the major ideology of Europe for a thousand years. It reached its golden age between the 10th and 13th centuries. The Renaissance, which marked the transition from medieval to modern during the 14th, 15th and 16th centuries, presented the first major crisis to this ideology. For Webb (1951, 63) the crisis may have developed when institutions of the late Middle Ages disintegrated on contact with the frontiers of the New World. This process of disintegration left the individual temporarily institutionless in the presence of the new master, Nature. In this era of great material abundance, commerce, industry, and science with their different evolutionary ontologies destroyed the major Augustinian ideology in Europe states of the late Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. This historical process took more than 200 years, during which new ideologies took their roots mostly in a new ontological method.

In *Ideology and Utopia*, Mannheim notices

similarities between Marxian and Christian ideologies. Russel (1945) Price (1957) Servier (1971) present us with more recent analysis of these similarities. However, none of them show these similarities to such a degree as Berdjajev's in his sociological work (1920).

MARXIAN IDEOLOGY

The first social unit in a historical development of mankind was an enlarged family operating in the stage of natural communism, i.e. on the basis of natural distribution of labor (McClellan: 1977, 162). Some of these families merged with other families and created a tribe. This change became a new element in the force of production and through it was introduced a new concept of a division of labor. It corresponds to the underdeveloped stage of a production at which people live by hunting and fishing; by the rearing of beasts, or, in the highest stage, agriculture. This division of labor leads necessarily to an introduction of wage-labor systems. These global changes in forces of production lead to a change in the mode of production and finally the changes in the whole base lead to a change of superstructure. The tribal society is replaced by an ancient communal state. The development of a division of labor reaches such a level that we have two kinds of an ownership: communal and private. With the further development of private property, the division of labor has introduced class antagonism.

With the fall of the Roman Empire, a new political superstructure is introduced to the history of mankind: feudalism. Over the next few centuries, discoveries of new markets, new resources, new foods, and new industry are made. This changes the forces of production and the mode of production to such a degree that the feudal superstructure collapses. Marx concludes that an owner of the means of production takes away part of the worker and attaches it to the commodity, thus alienating it from the worker.

Exploitation of the workers develops and in the end the impoverished workers have no choice but revolution. The proletariat, after the revolution, creates a new temporary stage of history: socialism. The important point in the decision making process of the proletariat is the knowledge of historical laws discovered by Marx. In the last stages of socialism, the pro-

letariate negates itself as a class by nationalizing private property. Mankind now enters into a qualitatively and quantitatively different stage of historical development, communism. Communism is a classless society resembling the higher stage of historical development called *natural communism*. The sequence of stages is shown in Figure 2.

CHRISTIAN IDEOLOGY

Adam and Eve lived in paradise, joyful and happy until the Devil seduced Eve with an apple. She then seduced Adam. God became wroth and threw them out of paradise into an antagonistic world of man and the devil. No hope, no law, no light in the darkness, until God sacrificed his only son, Christ. He reveals to us the light in darkness, the truth of salvation, and presents us with an explanation of history and the future. Man now has hope, although he lives in the city of the Devil. The second coming is at hand. After the second coming, the last judgement will decide whose name was written in the book of life, who are the sons of Israel, and who will live in the city of God, the new paradise (Russell, 1945). The sequence of stages is shown in Figure 3.

ENVIRONMENTAL PARADIGMS

For most of recorded history, societies have existed at the ecological margin, or very close to it. In the words of Hobbes (1651, 107), the life of man in an anarchic "state of nature" is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." Lovins (1977, 143) further notes that under these conditions, an equal division of income and wealth would condemn all to a life of shared poverty. Only a small elite can enjoy the fruits of civilized life. Indeed, until recently, resources (and energy) have been so scarce that serfdom and slavery have been the norm. Aristotle (1975) in his *Politics* justifies this, because otherwise civilization would be impossible.

Before the discovery of the New World, the population of Europe pressed hard on its means of subsistence. With the opening of the new frontiers in the Americas, Africa, and Australia, Europe faced seemingly limitless ecological riches. This bonanza of found wealth lifted the yoke of ecological scarcity and, coincidentally, created all the peculiar institutions and values characteristic of modern

civilization: democracy, freedom, and individualism. Although man had been a part of nature, now he is the exploiter of nature, an anthropocentric (White, 1967; Moncrief, 1970).

The character of the modern age is due in large measure to the fact that it had a frontier setting, that it grew up in an economic boom induced by the appropriation and use of frontier resources, and that its institutions were designed and modified to meet the needs of a booming society. The whole modern age is truly abnormal.

But the boom is now seen to be over. The found wealth of the Great Frontier is all but exhausted. Thus, a scarcity at least as intense as that prevailing in the pre-modern era, however different it may be in important respects, is about to replace abundance, and this will necessarily undercut the material conditions that have created and sustained current ideas, institutions, and practices.

The core of an environmental paradigm is the ecosystem dependence of mankind. Today, ecological scarcity created by humans appears to have produced a need for a society in which limits are recognized so that resources will no longer be consumed at high rates (Meadows: 1972, 194). It is seen that a "No-Growth," "Equilibrium," "Stationary State," "Steady-State," or "Sustainable" Society must be reached, else the Earth's ecosystem is in danger of collapse. The historical stages and relations are shown in Figure 4.

A COMPARISON

One can readily see a structural identity between models I, II, and III. The structure of each element of the set of historical stages is different although among them there is a certain similarity. If we were to assign a positive or negative value to each element or relation of this model, the similarity is more evident in Table 1.

Such a procedure enlarges the scope of Kuhn's theory of scientific revolution and suggests a much more dialectical process in the creation of a new ideology. Likewise, it appears to place limits on the freedom of man to create successful cognitive constructions. Useful to us here, is the speculation that environmental paradigms, as they agree with such an ideological structure model, can indeed become a highly influential force.

TABLE 1: SIGN ORDER IN ECOLOGIC MODELS

Stage:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Model 1:	+	-	-	+	-	+	+	+
Model 2:	+	-	-	+	-	+	+	+
Model 3:	+	-	-	+	-	+	+	+
Model 4:	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+

THE IDEA OF PROGRESS

Thinkers in "classical antiquity" had a sense that the great golden age of man was really in the past. This spell was decisively broken only towards the end of the 17th century. It came in the victory of the "moderns" over the "ancients," following a long literary controversy, and the conviction thereafter was that modern philosophy and modern science were not only equal to the ancient world, but immeasurably more pregnant with far reaching developments for mankind (Rossides: 1978, 61-62).

With this victory, as J. B. Bury (1932) was first to point out, the idea of progress became firmly established in the European mind. Mankind could now be seen as advancing, slowly but inevitably in a desirable direction.

Orr (1979) calls this "idea of progress" a "Modernization Paradigm," with two underlying assumptions. 1) The process in which systems evolve toward higher and more complex forms is irreversible. 2) Modern systems have progressively risen above natural constraints. Indeed, the extent of the triumph over nature is the yardstick of modernity (p 78). The orthodox theorists of modern society (Kahn, 1976; Simon, 1980; Bell, 1973), see the future as essentially a further elaboration of economic and technological trends. In other words, any problems can be dealt with successfully on an intellectual or technological level.

Today, however, there seems little doubt that the curve of the development of the "idea of progress" has been one of declining conviction. The seamy underside of pollution and environmental destruction was increasingly displayed to the societies which had advanced furthest. For the first time in the history of industrialism during the early 1970's, the threat of the exhaustion of basic energy resources came clearly into view. Faith in the "dogma of progress" is waning rapidly because of a dramatic erosion of all the fundamental "intellectual and spiritual premises" upon which the idea of progress has rested throughout its

history. The West's intelligentsia, he notes, sees Western civilization as having contaminated, corrupted, and despoiled other peoples of the world, thus, disenchantment with progress would be expected (Nisbet, 1970).

Is the decline of the idea of progress due to its association with "industrialism" or because of a disintegration of "fundamental premises" on which it is based or a combination of factors? Such a decline lends substantial supports the proposition that structurally dissimilar ideologies may not be sustainable over time.

If the Modernization Paradigm, incorporating the idea of progress, were to have its historical stages set into model form, it would appear as shown in Figure 5.

The value (positive or negative) of each period of history is remarkably different. The structure of the Modernization Paradigm, therefore, is unlike that of an environmental paradigm or of Marxism and Christian Ideologies.

The idea of progress had become recognized as an inseparable component of industrialism. Being increasingly characterized this. Progress has become not only weaker as a belief system, but it has progressively lost ground to a more fundamentally ecological oriented mode of thought.

REFERENCES

- Aristotle. 1975. "Politics." *August Comte and Positivism: The Essential Writings*. ed. by Gertrud Lenzer, New York: Harper Row.
- Bell, Daniel. 1973. *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting*. New York: Basic Books.
- Berdjajev. 1920. "Pravda i Losch Komunizma." *Wahrheit and Luege des Kommunisms*, Austria: Edition neue mitte (1977).
- Burch, William R. 1971. *Daydreams and Nightmares: A Sociological Essay on the American Environment*. New York: Harper Row.
- Bury, J. B. 1932. *The Idea of Progress*. New York: Dover.
- Catton Jr., William R. and Riley E. Dunlap. 1978. "Environmental Sociology: A New Paradigm." *American Sociologist*, Vol. 13, February: 41-19.
- Dunlap, Riley E. 1980. "Paradigmatic Change in Social Science: From Human Exemptionalism to an Ecological Paradigm." *American Behavioral Scientist*, Vol. 24, No. 1, September/October: 5-14.
- Hobbes, Thomas. 1651. *Leviathan*, ed. by H. W. Schneider, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill (1958).
- Kahn, Herman. 1976. *The Next 200 Years: A Scenario for American and the World*. New York: Morrow.
- Kinloch, Graham C. 1981. *Ideology and Contemporary Sociological Theory*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
- Kuhn, Thomas. 1962. *Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Chicago: Chicago Press.
- Kumar, Krishan. 1978. *Prophecy and Progress: Sociology of Industrial and Post-Industrial Society*, Harmondsworth, England: Penguin.
- Lovins, Amory B. 1977. *Soft Energy Paths; Toward a Durable Peace*. New York: Harper Row.
- Mannheim, Karl. 1936. *Ideology and Utopia*. trans. Louis Wirth and Edward Shils, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
- Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels. 1960. *German Ideology*. New York: International Publishers.
- Masterman, Margaret. 1970. "The Nature of a Paradigm." *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*. ed. by Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- McClellan, David. 1977. *Selected Writings of Karl Marx*. (ed.) Great Britain: Oxford Press.
- Meadows, Donella H., 1972. *Limits to Growth*. 2nd Ed. New York: Signet.
- Moncrief, Lewis W. 1970. "The Cultural Basis for Our Environmental Crisis." *Science*, Vol. 170, October 30: 508-512,
- Morrison, Denton E. 1976. "Growth, Environment, Equity and Scarcity." *Social Science Qtrly*, No. 57: 292-306.
- Nisbet, Robert. 1970. *History of the Idea of Progress*. New York: Basic Books.
- Ophuls, William. 1977. *Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity*. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.
- Pirages, Dennis Clark 1978. *The New Context for International Relations: Global Ecopolitics*. North Scituate, MA: Duxbury Press.

Price, Frank Wilson. 1957. *Marx Meets Christ*. Philadelphia: Westminster Press.

Ritzer, George. 1975. *Sociology: A Multiple Paradigm Science*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc.

Rodman, John. 1980. "Paradigm Change in Political Science..," *American Behavioral Scientist*, Vol. 24, No. 1, September/October: 49-78.

Rossides, Daniel W. 1978. *History and Nature of Sociological Theory*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.

Russell, Bertrand. 1945. *History of Western Philosophy*. New York: Simon Schuster.

Schumacher, E. F. 1973. *Small Is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered*. New York: Harper Row.

Servier, Jean. 1971. "Histoire de l'Utopie." *Der Traum Von der Grossen Harmonie*, Munich: Paul List Verlag.

Simon, Julian L. 1980. "Resources, Population, Environment: An Oversupply of False Bad News." *Science*, Vol. 208, June 27: 1431-1437.

Theodorson, George A. and Achilles G. Theodorson. 1969. *Modern Dictionary of Sociology*. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company.

Webb, Walter Prescott. 1951. *The Great Frontier*. Austin: Texas Press.

White Jr., Lynn. 1967. "The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis." *Science*, Vol. 155 March 10: 1203-1207.

GRAUERHOLZ (From p 111)

these strips off as mere innocuous fantasy is to deny the very real impact of literature.

REFERENCES

Barcus, Francis E. "The World of Sunday Comics," in D.M. White and R.H. Abel, *The Funnies: An American Idiom*, Free Press, 1963.

Berger, Arthur Asa. *The Comic Stripped American: What Dick Tracy, Blondie, Daddy Warbucks, and Charlie Brown Tell Us About Ourselves*, Baltimore: Penguin Books, Inc., 1973.

Tavris, D.J. and C. Offir *The Longest War: Sex Differences In Perspective*. New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977.

Weitzman, Lenore, Deborah Eifler, Elizabeth Hokada, and Catherine Ross "Sex Role Socialization in Picture Books for Pre-School Children," *American Journal of Sociology*, May 1972.

* QJI * QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF IDEOLOGY * QJI *

economics philosophy journalism sociology social work
 history anthropology political science. Manuscripts to:
 Jerry Carr Sociology Dept Old Dominion Univ Norfolk VA
 23508 Subscriptions: \$8 individual, \$10 institutional.

