ARCHITECTURE IS CONCEALED UNTO ITSELF: HELMUTH PLESSNER AND HIS INFLUENCE ON TWENTIETH-CENTURY ARCHITECTURE

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INTRODUCTION

"Nestling in, moving along, feeling one’s way, occupying space, the thousand ways of living within our postures and giving the silent image of spaces and planes through such postures an immediate connection to me, these are the ways to understand architecture. We always have to feel such an image and its ideal system of expression on our own body in order to taste the sense of a building. The purely ornamental, the effect of light, the qualities of materials form a meaningful structure, if not consciously, then in a more or less immediate reaction to the artificially formed world of space."

By any measure, this is an inspiring, evocative, and illuminating text that feels absolutely of the moment. That it was written almost one hundred years ago by an aspirant former student of zoology on his way to obtaining a chair in philosophy at the University of Göttingen, gives pause for thought. The writer was Helmuth Plessner, and the field of study he made his own was Philosophical Anthropology. The purpose of this paper is to elucidate Plessner’s thinking and the relationship Philosophical Anthropology had with architecture.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Helmuth Plessner was born into an affluent family of Jewish descent in Wiesbaden, in 1892.
A bright schoolboy, he went on to study medicine, and then zoology and philosophy in Heidelberg. On the eve of the First World War he moved to Göttingen to study phenomenology under Edmund Husserl. He was appointed professor of philosophy in Cologne in 1926, having already published his first major work, *The Unity of the Senses* (*Die Einheit der Sinne*, 1923). Within two years at Cologne he had published what is generally regarded as his magnum opus, *The Levels of the Organic and Man* (*Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch*, 1928). Seven years later he was dismissed from his post, and, after a short stay in Istanbul, was offered refuge in Holland with a chair in sociology in Groningen. As the war progressed, he went underground in Holland but returned to Germany in 1951. Numerous writings followed, leading to his collected works being published by Suhrkamp by 1985, the year of his death.² Plessner, who wrote his key texts in the years of the Weimar Republic, has been largely absent within architectural discourse, especially in comparison with the attention afforded his contemporary, Martin Heidegger, with whom Plessner shares some common interests, particularly as regards the architectural implications of his thinking. His work on the concept of what he termed ‘ex-centricity’ is the cornerstone of *Philosophical Anthropology*; indeed, similar to Heidegger, Plessner’s language—his images and metaphors—make explicit references to human spatial relationships, and indeed to the culture of architecture. Plessner deserves to be seen in the light of the great upsurge in philosophical enquiry and critical thinking emanating from Weimar Germany in the 1920s, alongside the likes of Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin, Ernst Cassirer, Arnold Gehlen, Martin Heidegger, Siegfried Kracauer, and Max Scheler.³

**PLESSNER’S HOUSE**

Before dealing with Plessner the philosopher let us consider the house he commissioned for himself and his wife in Göttingen (Figure 1). On his return to postwar Germany in 1951, Plessner took up the newly-founded chair in sociology at the University of Göttingen, married Monika Tintelnot, and commissioned the architect Lucy Hillebrand (1906-97) to build their house in the eastern suburbs of the town. Hillebrand was an inspired choice, being both local as well as a convinced and thoughtful Modernist.⁴ From the north entrance side the house appears single storey; this belies the fact that it is built into a sloping site. It is rendered white, with a low-pitched hipped roof: *sachlich*, simple and straightforward, a 1950s rendering of a 1920s *Neues Bauen* house. The layout of the (upper) ground level is surprising, the orthogonal lines of the exterior softening
into an organic essay of a curved staircase leading down to the guest bedrooms beneath. The private quarters of Plessner, hard by the entrance, give onto a free-planned workroom. Beyond, visible through glass doors and panels, is a narrow gallery lined with bookcases, enveloping the top section of a double-height void overlooking the guest and reception areas beneath (Figure 2). These give directly onto the garden. The house is one of a family of villas designed by Hillebrand in post-war West Germany, all of which continue the theme of external restraint combined with internal freedom of layout.\(^5\) Evident from the plan, the house abounds in fluid spatial transitions from one area to the next;\(^6\) its organic composition resembles that of the houses of Hans Scharoun and Hugo Häring, and as the sociologist Heike Delitz has recounted, “Hillebrand designed by virtually dancing through her spaces. Bodily movement in space was her guiding principle; […] Plessner explained ‘designed’ more precisely, in that she drew for him, and they ‘spurred each other on’
in this creative work, as Monika Plessner has recounted [...] A Bauhaus, then, instead of Heidegger’s hut.”

Delitz’s point with this final, acid aphorism is that Plessner’s engagement with Modernism and the development of architecture was a positive and creative one, immersive in the practice, theory and politics of contemporary design, as opposed to the Freiberg professor’s haughty withdrawal from it in his Todtnauberg retreat. In the words of Tom Spector, “while Plessner was engaging the modern condition, Heidegger was retreating from it. While Heidegger bemoans modern alienation, Plessner tells us that such alienation is actually the human condition. Whereas Heidegger wants to get at the headwaters of conventions, Plessner prefers to take us as we present ourselves. Where Heidegger retreats, Plessner is convivial.”

Plessner’s Göttingen house, in its ‘natural artificiality,’ its ‘mediated immediacy,’ and its ‘utopian transcendence,’ resembles in all its complexities the houses of Josef Frank, with their inner spatial gymnastics contrasted with their external simplicity of form, plane, and line (Figure 3). We shall deal with these three concepts, the lynchpins of Plessner’s Philosophical Anthropology, in the main section of this paper, and then explain the relevance of the Viennese-born architect Frank (1885-1967). Plessner was straightforward and uncomplicated in his understanding that “[a]rchitecture, on account of rationally understandable functional concepts, presents the object with its meaning, a house, a staircase, a garden.” For Plessner, these ‘functional’ elements are also clear conveyors of ‘cultural’ meaning: we see a staircase, and know that it will take us up to the floor above.

It is wonderful to imagine Plessner and Hillebrand ‘dancing’ the Göttingen house into being. And yet Plessner had already described such an embodied approach to space, anticipating Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s later writings, as the extraordinary passage from his 1923 book The Unity...
of the Senses quoted at the start of this paper makes clear.

Plessner built an edifice through his work in Philosophical Anthropology based on human positionality. It is complex and nuanced, and has ramifications for architecture that are similarly complex and nuanced and that are, moreover, suspicious of radicalism for its own sake. Having given a sense of Plessner’s architectural interests and preferences, it is now time to delve into his concepts of Philosophical Anthropology and the all-important term ‘positionality.’

PLESSNER’S PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

Philosophical Anthropology deals with questions like ‘what is man?’ and ‘what is man’s place in the nature of things?’ as opposed to the more philosophically fundamental ‘what is being?’ The German sociologist Joachim Fischer (president of the Helmuth Plessner Society from 2011 until 2017) has distinguished Philosophical Anthropology (the capital letters denote its distinctiveness), the
special movement within German philosophy of the 1920s, from a more generalised philosophical interest in anthropology. Following Fischer’s distinction, this paper will capitalise ‘Philosophical Anthropology’ to demarcate philosophical anthropology (no capital letters) from Plessner’s particular take on it.

Plessner’s claim for Philosophical Anthropology is that it provides “a clarification of the position of man in the world.” Plessner formulated his thinking about Philosophical Anthropology at the same time as Martin Heidegger conceived his fundamental ontology, although it derives from very different premises. In brief, where Heidegger’s ontological starting point is man’s temporal sense of being (‘Dasein’, roughly, ‘being’, or ‘being-there’, to use a word of Heidegger’s) in the world, Plessner begins with man’s spatial relationships, with other humans, creatures, and the wider environment. With this in mind, it is all the more surprising that he has been so neglected by architectural culture, especially in light of the ‘spatial turn’ in the humanities of recent years. Plessner came from a background in the natural sciences, a field of knowledge requiring plain and straightforward language, a language that, moreover, has to act as an adjunct to non-verbal forms of communication, such as drawings, diagrams, and photographs, akin to architectural communication. Immersed in transcendental philosophy in parallel with and subsequent to studies to those in medicine and zoology, Plessner sought to answer Goethe’s wish that Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (Kritik der reinen Vernunft) be completed by a Critique of the Senses (Kritik der Sinne). In a nutshell, this was to be Plessner’s contribution to knowledge, initiated with his The Unity of the Senses and substantiated with his main text The Levels of Organic Being and Man five years later. In this book we find Plessner’s one substantive contribution to philosophical vocabulary: the word ‘ex-centric’ in the sense of “out of the centre.” The Levels failed to sustain the same degree of interest as the key contemporaneous work of phenomenological philosophy, Heidegger’s Being and Time, either in the field of philosophy or, as this paper focuses on, that of architecture. The reason, perhaps, is due to its interdisciplinary nature: Plessner was a trained biologist, and indeed of the seven chapters of The Levels, it is only the final one, ‘The Sphere of Man,’ that fully fleshes out his Philosophical Anthropology.

MAN’S EX-CENTRIC ‘POSITIONALITY’

Plessner posits that, at the (human) observable scale of biological life, each organism’s position relative to that of others, and to the environment,
is a decisive factor in our understanding its motivations and *Dasein*. Viewed in terms of an ascending hierarchy in the natural world, plants have fixed positions in the world, whereas animals move freely. They have, according to Plessner, different kinds of ‘positionality.’ Human beings have the additional characteristic of being aware of their positionality and of being able to reflect upon it. They have ‘ex-centric positionality.’

Seen in the context of architecture, the concept of man’s ex-centric positionality has interesting implications, both for the way we perceive our position in the world, in reference to our surroundings, and in the way designers conceive, propose, and make such environments. First of all, architecture provides a way of understanding ex-centricity through the developing means of representing buildings in the early decades of the twentieth century where, in avant-garde circles, the axonometric projection began to be favoured by architects in preference to the perspective, as a means of conceiving and representing the objective realities of a building’s formal composition.\(^{19}\)

The axonometric, famously, is a more analytical representation of a building from which we are able to scale off accurate dimensions, and does not depend upon the single human observer and viewpoint demanded by the perspective. It is emblematic of a disinterested abstraction, ‘ex-centric,’ as opposed to the perspective’s centredness on the human (and one particular human’s) eye. The human viewpoint of the perspective, as opposed to other apparently more dispassionate and objective architectural projections, is the main topic of Robin Evans’s groundbreaking study, *The Projective Cast*, and Alberto Pérez-Gómez and Louise Pelletier’s book *Architectural Representation and the Perspective Hinge*.\(^{20}\) These were published in the late 1990s, in the wake of a renewed and sustained interest in architectural drawing for its own sake, on the part of avant-garde
architects and students, and on the brink of the computer revolution in architectural practice that would fundamentally change the way buildings are imagined and produced. In recent years, the ubiquity of digital means of representation and architectural production has multiplied the questions regarding man’s position with respect to architecture, in an era where images are commonly projected onto flat screens and scaled up or down at will into virtual space.

We cannot claim that buildings and places have any views of their own positions in the world, be they objective or subjective. What may be argued, though, is that people who imagine or make buildings and places, ‘architects,’ have, in modern times and places, steadily developed an ex-centric view of their work that has tended to locate them outside, and separate from, the work itself, and, moreover, with heightened abilities to reflect on their work dispassionately. To be ‘outside the work itself’ means having the mental ability to regard the world dispassionately, where ‘outside’ is seen as being increasingly separate from the sentient self, while ‘heightened abilities’ may be understood as belonging to the increasingly independent and ‘professional’ architect, no longer (quite so) subservient to the whims and interests of a powerful and socially superior patron. Such an ‘ex-centric’ position is a particularly twentieth-century, ‘modern,’ disposition of architects as practitioners, theorists, and historians who stand broadly against the ‘autonomy’ of architecture, seeking instead to couple it with other disciplines, most notably sociology in the 1960s, linguistics in the 1970s, critical theory in the 1980s, and so on. The ‘criticality’ at large in the humanities and social sciences has noticeably extended into architectural design and has gained increased traction in the last decades. Examples from the last decades would be Post-Modernism in architecture, where criticality issuing originally from linguistics has been a powerful influence upon architectural theory and practice (for instance, in the work of Charles Jencks, Denise Scott Brown, and Robert Venturi). ‘Critical Architecture’ has had a significant impact on post-1980s design theory and practice, where psychoanalysis, feminism, and most notably Derridean Deconstruction has had a profound influence upon architects as diverse as Jennifer Bloomer, Daniel Libeskind, and Peter Eisenman.

The architect, as artist and agent, is emblematic of a renewed philosophic interest in the question of “how to combine the perspective of a particular person inside the world with an objective view of that same world, the person and his viewpoint included. It is a problem that faces every creature with the impulse and the capacity to transcend its particular point of view and to conceive of the world as a whole.”
Plessner’s emphasis on space and position as opposed to time and occasion is probably his most important contribution to architectural culture, and is the subject of the next section of this paper.

THE FINITUDE OF HUMAN BEINGS

Published in the same year as the now more famous Being and Time, Plessner’s The Levels similarly explores the philosophical implications of man’s finitude. The substantive difference is that whereas Heidegger sees finitude in its temporal sense (‘we will all die’), Plessner regards our spatial limitations and relationships as more compelling (‘we are all located in different places, and in a constantly changing relationship to those places’). He goes on to maintain that ‘human beings live in three worlds: an outer world (Aussenwelt), an inner world (Innenwelt), and the shared world of culture (Mitwelt). This more nuanced and holistic sense of the world, derived from a biological understanding of plant, animal, and human life-forms, challenges Cartesian dualism and is furthermore at odds with Descartes in an additional elaboration. Plessner maintains there is a ‘double aspectivity’ to life, at least as it appears to us humans. We experience the world ‘from an inner and outer perspective’ and have a double vocabulary when describing ourselves in the world. There are contrasting outer-world concepts such as ‘body’ (Körper) or ‘living body’ (Leib) and inner-world ones such as ‘soul’ (Seele) and ‘lived experience’ (Erlebnis); and, as far as the Mitwelt (a word translated by Jos De Mul as [shared] world of culture) goes, ‘I’ (ich) and ‘we’ (wir). This is indeed an elaboration, or perhaps a circumvention, of the mind-body problem bequeathed by Descartes.

PLESSNER’S THREE ANTHROPOLOGICAL LAWS

In the final chapter of The Levels, ‘The Human Sphere’, Plessner outlines his three anthropological
laws that follow from his understanding of man’s ex-centric positionality and his finitude. These are (i) the law of natural artificiality, (ii) the law of mediated immediacy, and (iii) the law of the utopian standpoint.

1. NATURAL ARTIFICIALITY

The law of natural artificiality, in a clear nod to Heidegger’s thinking, states that man uses artificial means (technology) to overcome his ‘constitutive homelessness’.28

As an excentric being standing in disequilibrium, out of place and time, constitutively homeless, [man] has to “become something” and form his own equilibrium. […] Man wishes to escape the unbearable excentricity of his being, he wishes to compensate for the dichotomy [Hälftenhaftigkeit] of his own life-form and he can only manage to do this with things that are sufficiently heavy to weigh on the scales of his existence.29

Plessner goes on to specify what it is that supplies this corrective to man’s ex-centricity: culture. To put it simply, as Jos De Mul does in his introduction to his edited book on Plessner, “[t]he world of culture and technology is the expression of the desire of human beings to bridge the distance that separates them from the world, their fellow man and themselves.”30 What better combination of culture and technology is there than architecture? Plessner understands architecture as ‘artificial,’ certainly, but its artificiality is natural to man as he is currently constituted. Here Plessner makes common ground with his contemporary, the philosopher Arnold Gehlen, for whom man, the deficient being (‘Mängelwesen’), has to build his own world, before he can ‘be’: “Man is naturally a cultural being.”31 Plessner’s law of natural artificiality is an ontological response, one that answers man’s existential need for a secure place in the world. Plessner recognises that

since man is compelled, through his type of existence, to lead the life that he actually lives, that is, to make what he is – since he only is when he accomplishes things—he needs a complement of an unnatural nature to which he is unaccustomed. Because of this he is by his very nature, by dint of his form of existence, artificial. As an ex-centric being that is not in equilibrium, standing in the void, placeless, timeless, constitutively homeless, he has to “become something” and to create his own equilibrium. And he creates this only with the assistance of unnatural things that emerge from his creation when the results of this creative making are granted their own heft.32

Plessner makes it absolutely clear that culture, the very essence of natural
artificiality, requires both mind and hand; it is, as he puts it, “sucked out of the fingers: intelligence and manual dexterity lie at the root of the origin of the use of tools and of culture.”

2. MEDIATED IMMEDIACY: IMMANENCE AND EXPRESSIVITY

Plessner’s second anthropological law, mediated immediacy (subtitled ‘immanence and expressivity’), speaks of the centrality of culture and technology in enabling man to express himself and his ex-centric position in the world. “Man can only invent insofar as he discovers,” in other words, man can only mediate things and conditions that are immediately available to him. “[Man’s] productivity is only a pretext by which discovery becomes occurrence and gains substance,” a sentiment that finds an immediate echo in the writings of his contemporary, the architect Hugo Häring (1882-1958). Häring asks us to “call on things and let them unfold their own forms. It goes against our nature to impose forms on them, to determine them from without, to force upon them laws of any kind, to dictate to them.” Form finding has become the mantra of organic architecture ever since and shares its vitalism with that of Plessner and others from the first decades of the twentieth-century. However, we would be mistaken in thinking that the architectural implications of Plessner’s second law are limited to the organic: let us not forget the adjective ‘mediated’ that Plessner couples with ‘immediacy.’ Cultural activities may well begin with the world as experienced, but they soon develop trajectories of their own, ‘aesthetics’ if you will, in order to express and make intelligible any particular ethos. Certainly, reading the speech that he gave at the German Werkbund’s twenty-fifth anniversary conference in Berlin, in 1932, it is evident that Plessner alludes to the architecture of the Bauhaus, and to the benefits of the flat roof, while criticising the overtly aesthetic tendencies of the International...
Style and its followers. For instance, in answer to the question of how a designed object should appear, and what it should look like, Plessner (ironically) replies, “It should be beautiful!” He then goes on to explain that “This painterly view is somehow to be seen as superseded. [...] A room is there for living in. A chair is there for sitting in.”

By the end of the section on this second law, Plessner has expanded his thesis. He can now claim that, as a “law, [...] in the end people do not know what they do, but only experience it through history.” This second law is one that poses problems for those seeking a single architectural direction from Plessner, for surely the demands of extreme functionalism, exemplified by the organic architecture of Häring, compete directly with those of formalism and historicism. However, for Plessner, culture is always at least one step removed from the body’s physiology; his phenomenology never leads to an over-simplistic manifestation of function, which for him is always historically embedded. The architectural import of his second law leans more towards the claims of history and the memorability of received forms of buildings, and chimes with Plessner’s own maturing views by 1932 elaborated in the following section, with an inclusiveness and largeness of character that leads to an ‘open’ architecture, and one, moreover, that is able to accommodate historical precedent. Plessner is reticent as to what ‘open form’ might actually mean for architecture. In his Werkbund speech in which he alluded to such epicentres of avant-garde design as Dessau, Rotterdam, and Amsterdam, Plessner praised asymmetrical layouts and (especially) the flat roof, both emblematic of Bauhaus architecture, as examples of ‘openness.’ The flat roof, in particular, lacks a conventional termination, and so is open to possibilities of buildings being stacked one on top of another.

This second law is, therefore, ambiguous regarding its implications for architecture. On the one hand, and of great relevance to one strand of the Neues Bauen, it has an obvious relationship with the organic functionalism of Häring; on the other, with the demands of history and the importance of a continuing tradition, it represents the antithesis of Functionalism. Josef Frank’s interwar work—about which more later—comprising well-wrought buildings and pithy writings, represents perhaps the ideal balance between the demands of invention and of tradition. One aspect of tradition that links Viennese aesthetics with Plessner’s demand for expressivity is the mask. Here one thinks of Plessner’s playful and insightful essay “The Smile,” concerning the subtleties of the facial expression that is for him the most human of all our (dis)guises. The mask was certainly something that Adolf Loos railed against in his
writings even if his executed buildings, with their spatially rich interiors of Raumplan, their mixed palette of materials, and with their owners’ eclectic furnishings, are all ‘hidden’ by the white-painted render of their exteriors. His buildings, especially the houses, invariably have clear boundaries, even if these boundaries belie complexities within. Loos believed that the exterior of a building should have a neutral public presence. This would be apostrophised by the professor of literature Helmut Lethen as ‘public coolness,’ which Plessner “[sought] to turn […] into a medium that accepts vitalizing boundaries.” The mask for Plessner acts as an essential distancing mechanism, a human mediation of the immediacy of the external world (Aussenwelt) that allows human beings to be in the world. For Lethen,

Plessner’s sociological discovery of roles as a protective medium is informed by Nietzsche’s claim that every profound spirit needs a mask; his anthropology centres on this paradox: ‘Only masked is man entirely real’. Oscar Wilde’s motto – ‘Man is least of all himself when he speaks in his own name. Give him a mask, and he will tell the truth’ – echoes through Plessner’s code of distance.

Human beings’ ex-centric positionality is due to the ‘membrane’ that separates them from their environment. The German architect Heinrich Tessenow’s executed buildings, drawings and writings—an oeuvre that reached its maturity exactly contemporaneous with Plessner’s halcyon years of the 1920s—have uncanny echoes of much of the philosopher’s work. In an earlier essay, “Objectivity or Truth in Craftsmanship,” Tessenow (1876-1950) wrote: “It would be more beautiful, we would form closer human bonds, if we were able to openly show our sorrows and joys or the pipes of our houses and streets etc, everything that concerns us as humans; but we lack the ability to do so, lest such frankness embarrass or hurt us, and so we
have much to hide.”

Tessenow acknowledges the mask-like function of architecture that conceals the dreary if not dire facts of human life, and so makes it possible for us to live. His thinking concedes that suppression is necessary in order to allow meaningful expression to emerge, and concurs with Plessner’s view that there must be “in every artistic reading [...] a distortion of the work, a partisanship, a choice, an emphasis, in a word a distancing alienation, in order to see the object.”

It is in the city of Vienna, the birthplace of psychoanalysis, that ‘mediated immediacy’ found its most obvious outlet, though without the directness and polemical purity that are the hallmarks of Weimar Germany’s protagonists of the Neue Sachlichkeit (New Objectivity), cognate with interwar modern architecture (Neues Bauen). Within Viennese critical writings, too, there is frequently a mismatch between texts and buildings. Texts are by their very nature one step removed from the objects they describe or analyse, and so tend to be more polemical and uncompromising than the buildings designed by the same author. One only has to compare Loos’s shrill and hectoring writings, for instance, “Ornament and Crime,” with the architect’s nuanced buildings and interiors, embedded in Viennese traditions of Biedermeier (the comfortable bourgeois aesthetic of Central Europe, between Neoclassicism and Romanticism) as they undoubtedly are.

On the other hand, in the era of ‘Red Vienna,’ exactly contemporary with Weimar Germany in the 1920s, we have the suave cynicism of Frank, who later wrote (in his Swedish exile), in his famous essay “Accidentism”: “The formal rules of art have been preserved through tradition, even though their validity cannot be proven; for that reason, there can be no art without recourse to tradition. Since these rules have been consistently observed from the earliest times up to the present day, one can regard them as axioms.”

Frank’s pragmatic and non-partisan views clearly relate to Plessner’s more nuanced thinking at the dawn of Nazi rule in Germany, a point that will be elaborated in the final part of this paper. The tenor of Frank’s writing is on a par with the wry wit evident in his buildings and other design work: his architectural thinking is always mediated via understandable and stylistically knowing writings and buildings. This accords well with Plessner’s ‘mediated immediacy’ of his second anthropological law, and his recognition that culture and technology are key human faculties that comprise our ontology.

3. UTOPIAN STANDPOINT: NOTHINGNESS AND TRANSCENDENCE

The third and final law of man’s utopian standpoint is the one that connects Plessner most profoundly with questions of philosophical
ontology. It builds on the mediating role of the second law with the implication for architecture that it is to be located firmly within a historical tradition. Its subtitle, ‘nothingness and transcendence,’ seems more distant from the scientific underpinnings of the previous laws, and yet man’s ex-centric being can only result in a belief in transcendence, as a bulwark against nothingness (i.e., the belief in God), or its profane equivalent, a hope in and striving for a brilliant (and atheist) future. “The ex-centric form [of] human existence drives man to engage in culture, it awakens needs that can only be satisfied through a system of artificial objects.” Buildings are obvious examples of such objects, produced within each society’s architectural culture.

Architecture is central to Plessner’s Philosophical Anthropology as it simultaneously acts in the inner, outer, and ‘with-worlds,’ with the architect as ex-centric agent: “[human existence’s] ex-centric form compels man to engage in culture, it awakens needs that can only be satisfied through a system of artificial objects […] Its constitutive rootlessness bears witness to the reality of world history.” History, together with its twin, memory, is a central human faculty that affords us utopian transcendence, and with this third law, Plessner’s philosophical anthropology broadens out to encompass man’s historical nature. It is the law he expresses most succinctly (at some five pages right at the end of The Levels, it is significantly shorter than the preceding two laws), but the one to which he returns in his postwar writings in a more expansive mode. He considers the implications that man’s ex-centric position has for history, and for historiography, in his book The Belated Nation where he states that “only one thing remains of life: memory.” And in a late essay he writes:

Thus man never returns. We have to renounce the romanticism of alienation and homecoming inherent in Marxism and admit to ourselves its illusionary
character. In its optimistic linkage of progress and homecoming Marxism is based on an outmoded anthropology, which, still under Hegel’s spell, ignores the consequences of insight into the impenetrability of man and the essence of his historicity.\textsuperscript{54}

This is (late) Plessner, at his most hard-boiled and without any illusions. It is in complete contrast to the romanticism of Heidegger that suggests that appropriate architecture could provide such a refuge from modernity. Such a homecoming, expressed in the late 1960s but harking back to the antagonistic polarities of late Weimar Germany, would be satisfied neither by the nostalgia offered by Ferdinand Tönnies’s ‘community’ nor by the rigidities of Marxist society.\textsuperscript{55} Instead, according to Lethen, “Plessner contrasts the identikit picture of community as a symbiotic companionship with an idea of society that lacks idyllic features. It is an open system of unencumbered strangers.”\textsuperscript{56} An open political and social system, moreover, that finds its architectural equivalence in the open form typified by Walter Gropius’s Bauhaus ensemble (1925-26) at Dessau. This characterises Plessner’s pragmatic turn away from the abstract idealism inherent in Marxism to a transcendence which is just out of our reach, lying in the future of some utopian dream, or as Plessner concluded in \textit{The Belated Nation}, “[e]ven in the apparent finality of fundamental dogmatism [the philosophy of life] remains linked to historical change and in truth ready to awaken those unknown forces that herald what is coming.”\textsuperscript{57}

What might this mean for architecture? In his Werkbund speech, Plessner claimed that “we have to underline one more point that is important for the success of this train of thought: the dissolution of the private ties through the technical world, the limitation of the private space of human existence, the eradication of private relationships and in place of these eradicated private relationships the gradual coming into being of a public realm.”\textsuperscript{58} He went on to discuss the bankruptcy of aesthetics, since

\textit{the aesthetic attitude is no longer valid, it has become in a quite definite sense a private matter. It is the preserve of people of taste, of those who possess time, money and education, who take pleasure in fine things and know what to do with them: however, it is no longer the preserve of the public sphere, no longer the preserve of that unassuming subjectivity of the masses, in which we all participate, like it or not.}\textsuperscript{59}

So far, so \textit{sachlich}. However, in what at first sight appears to be a volte-face on the part of Plessner, towards the end of his speech he appears to subvert, or soften, his argument:
But the things with which we are concerned here [...] are greater than the things of politics and of political ideology. Not only do we have the firm belief, but we already know that the new form-making and the search for new form does not rely upon the socialist train of thought. The hope that this new form-world can only be completely brought about by dint of a proletarian revolution [...] we can no longer entertain.

Plessner’s decoupling of the Neues Bauen from Marxist ideology is quite startling in the light of his foregoing polemic. The views of the Werkbundists present at the speech are not known, but they—and Plessner—must have seen the writing on the wall: Hitler had become Chancellor by the end of January 1933, and the Werkbund was subsequently disbanded. Yet had the Werkbund audience been familiar with Plessner’s writings, and with his carefully plotted development of his anthropological laws stemming from his understanding of man’s ex-centricity, then they would have taken his words—prophetic, from our post-Communist perspective—in their stride. Nine years earlier, one year after the publication of his The Unity of the Senses, in 1924, he had published Limits of Community: A Critique of Social Radicalism. It is worth quoting some of its opening remarks, in order to gain the full impact of Plessner’s withering assault on dualistic thought, and on the dire consequences such thought would have on political and social life, and, by implication, on architecture:

By radicalism we mean generally the conviction that the truly great and good only come about by conscious recourse to the roots of existence; the belief in the healing power of extremes whose method is to make a stand against all traditional values and compromises. [...] Social radicalism [...] is the native world-view of the impatient, sociologically: of the lower classes, biologically: of youth. [...] Radicalism means dualism. [It is] contemptuous of the conditional, of the
limited, of small things and steps, of restraint, or reticence, of unconsciousness, joyful, but only of great things, devout, but only to the mighty, purist, therefore Pharisaic, principled, therefore inhibited, fanatic, therefore destructive. The enemy of radicalism is nature.\textsuperscript{62}

Plessner is here announcing a new social construct for man, one that recognises its artificiality while acknowledging its anthropological roots in the biological and the natural.

\textbf{CONCLUSION}

The burden of this paper has been to introduce a relatively unknown philosopher, and to outline the implications his thinking had for architecture. Plessner’s Philosophical Anthropology had little effect on his architect-contemporaries, although aspects of his three ‘laws’ had clear resonance with the buildings of the Neues Bauen in Germanophone Europe of the interwar years. We began the paper with a passage from Plessner’s \textit{The Unity of the Senses} of 1923, one that seemed to presage much of the ‘phenomenological’ architecture we are currently experiencing, followed by the postwar house designed for him and his wife Monika by the architect Lucy Hillebrand. We end with some examples of the work—writings and buildings—of the Viennese architect Josef Frank, already alluded to several times.

Frank’s ‘compromised’ architecture is less well known than the designs and writings of his Viennese peers, most notably Adolf Loos. The ‘compromise’ (regarded by Frank as a virtue) is with stylistic purity in the buildings and dogmatic correctness in the writings. The latter, especially those of the Viennese years before his exile, have a pithy irony that speaks to us directly today, as evinced by the recent translation of his collected writings with the foreword written by Denise Scott Brown. In his long essay “Architecture as Symbol: Elements of the German New Building” (1931) Frank writes about

\begin{quote}
imagineing a world in which people live in small houses in meadows, growing tulips and pursuing arts and crafts of that sort, cut off from the world, peaceful and sedate. All they need grows in their garden, and they know nothing of the rocket ship that will soon fly to the moon. Any rush is unnecessary since no one works more than he must, and all find their work fulfilling. Such a way of life will seem strange to most today, even if in its straightforwardness it is not absent of all propagandistic pathos and as an ideal is even preferable in some respects. But how few will even see [any] point in shaping something lacking in any
\end{quote}
pathos, even the pathos of absolute primitivism; alas, very few people accept that a pleasant life is always a via media between all kinds of ideals – no person has the same disposition all the time; and that shaping a pleasant life as a composite of all these ideals is a matter with goals just as consistent and absolute as the goals of those who strive for a single extreme. The fate of modern architecture hinges on achieving this ambition, for its essential function resides in the formation and symbolisation of our lives.63

This function of architecture, to form and symbolise our lives, represents in a nutshell how it serves mankind’s ‘positioned’ existence, as expressed in Plessner’s three anthropological laws. Frank’s house that best exemplifies these twin architectural functions is the Beer House, Vienna (with Oskar Wlach, 1929-30; Figure 4). In its ‘white’ aesthetic, its simplicity and composition of external form, and the ‘flow’ of major internal spaces, it has much in common with the similarly undoctrinaire, yet unashamedly modern, Plessner house of the early 1950s designed by Hillebrand. While they both share attributes of Modernist aesthetics and planning, they are equally unapologetic about their historical and cultural roots: they exhibit the ‘mediated immediacy’ of Plessner’s second Anthropological Law. Frank wrote a sturdy defence of the Beer House, “The House as Path and Place.” To choose just one extract from this admirable essay, one that has a clear relationship to the Plessner house, is difficult; nonetheless, when Frank writes that “[t]he focus of the house is the sitting area, its piazza,” we can see the connection with the doubled-height salon that Hillebrand designed. Frank continues:

Every living room must have a center, around which it is ordered, giving the space its character. In the old days this was more easily accomplished, as there was a fireplace or—even though much less characteristic—the oven. Today [1931], at a time when this focus is, more often than not, absent, the organization of the
plan has become more difficult, as this center has to be created in architectural terms. The numerous means available for this are windows, niches, columns, etc. It is also the absence of the formal center that renders the rectangular room so uninhabitable.  

The concluding remarks of Frank’s essay may be regarded as an architectural formulation of much of Plessner’s positional, human-centred philosophy:

All our commodities, and here we may include the house, are really a compromise between function, material, form, quality, price, and other things, all following a middle (and varying) course, yet the rules for the good house as an ideal do not change in principle and have only to be looked at afresh. How does one enter a garden? What does the route look like from the gateway? What is the shape of an anteroom? How does one pass the cloakroom from the anteroom to reach the living room? How does the seating area relate to the door and the window? There are many questions like this which need to be answered, and the house consists of these elements. This is modern architecture.55

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NOTES

All translations are by the author unless otherwise stated.

ENDNOTES

[2] For the biographical sketch of Plessner’s life from which this is drawn see *Plessner’s Philosophical Anthropology: Perspectives and Prospects*, ed. Jos De Mul (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2014), 12-14.


Nachgeholtes Leben.

[8] Todtnauberg in the Black Forest is the location of Heidegger’s hut where he retreated in order to write, in his refuge from the world. See Adam Sharr, *Heidegger’s Hut* (Cambridge: MIT, 2006).

[9] Tom Spector, in comments to this issue’s editors, and communicated to the author February 27, 2018.

[10] See the Beer House, Vienna (with Oskar Wlach, 1929-30) for a prime example of Josef Frank’s domestic output.


[12] A good overview of philosophical anthropology may be found in Joachim Fischer, “Die ‘Kölner Konstellation,’” in *Plessner in Wiesbaden*, eds. Tilman Allert and Joachim Fischer (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2014), 89-121. Here the three ‘stars’ alluded to are, in addition to Plessner, Max Scheler and Arnold Gehlen. See also Bernhard Beller, “Anthropologie und Ethik bei Arnold Gehlen” (Munich: Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, 2010), unpublished doctoral dissertation, especially “Eine kurze Geschichte der philosophischen Anthropologie,” 12-41, accessed November 13, 2017, https://edoc.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15913/1/Beller_Bernhard.pdf. For the distinction between the specific, 1920s movement and more a generalised anthropological interest for philosophy, see Joachim Fischer, *Philosophische Anthropologie. Eine Denkrichtung des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Freiburg im Breisgau: Alber, 2009), 9. In a similar vein, the term Neues Bauen (‘New Building’) is a specific reference to architecture in the German-speaking lands in the 1920s, an aesthetic reference that cannot be used in respect of architecture, however ‘new,’ in, say, the 1890s or the 1950s.


[17] The German term “exzentrisch” does indeed mean both eccentric and
“out of the centre.” Plessner uses the term “exzentrische Positionalität” in the sense of “being in a position that is out of the centre.” So I have rendered the spelling in translation in order to differentiate its meaning from the English ‘eccentric.’ See Plessner, *Die Stufen*, chapter 7, “Die Sphäre des Menschen,” 288-346, especially section 1, ‘Die Positionalität der exzentrischen Form. Das Ich und der Personcharakter,’ 288-93.


[24] Thomas Nagel, *The View from Nowhere* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 3. Nagel’s is a restatement, in modern terms and times, of a philosophical question that may be traced at least as far as back as Descartes. For Plessner, the only such creature on earth is the human being.


[27] Ibid., 17.


[33] Plessner, *Die Stufen*, 312. Plessner embraces technology in ways that Heidegger found impossible. For Plessner, as for his contemporary, the philosopher Friedrich Dessauer, “[t]echnology is for Germany what sun is for Spain’s wine, for Canada’s grain, for Argentina’s pastures.” (Friedrich Dessauer, *Philosophie der Technik: das Problem der Realisierung* (Bonn: Friedrich Cohen Verlag, 1927), 31.

[34] Plessner, *Die Stufen*, 321.

[35] Ibid., 32.


[37] See Peter Bernhard, “Plessners Konzept der offenen Form im Kontext der Avantgarde der 1920er Jahre” (“Plessner’s concept of open form in the context of the avant-garde in the 1920s”), in *Arhe IV* (July 2007). There is by now a large bibliography on the relationship between biology and architectural modernism. The English-speaking reader will be more familiar with D’Arcy Thompson’s book *On Growth and Form* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961). This is an abridged version of the original book published in 1917. Thomson’s ideas about the relationship between biological and structural and architectural form were taken up with alacrity in the years following its re-edition.

[38] Helmuth Plessner, “Wiedergeburt der Form im technischen Zeitalter” (“Rebirth of Form in the Technical Age”), in *Arch+* no. 161 (June 2002): 52-57, transcript of Plessner’s speech on October 14, 1932 in Berlin on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the German Werkbund, here 54. (“Es soll schön sein! Diese malerische Blickhaltung wird irgendwie als überwunden empfunden. […] Ein Raum ist zum Wohnen da. Ein Stuhl ist zum Sitzen da.”) Translations from this speech are my own, although a complete English translation exists: Helmuth Plessner, “Rebirth of Form in


[44] Lethen, *Cool Conduct*, 62, citing Friedrich Nietzsche, *Werke in drei Bänden* vol. 2 (Munich: Carl Hanser, 1963), 604. Nietzsche’s actual words are “[j]eder tiefe Geist braucht eine Maske,” literally, “every deep spirit needs a mask.” Lethen further emphasises the point: “Plessner does not tolerate the enactment of ‘naked honesty’ or ‘eruptive authenticity’ either in contemporary design, whether the new objectivity interiors of Bauhaus architecture—‘with overhead lighting and tiled walls’—or in expressionist...
stage sets. Hygiene resides for him at the cold pole, ‘reckless sincerity’ at the warm. He takes aim at all forms of unmediated directness, pleading for moderate temperatures and indirect lighting, for art and literature of whatever type as long as they eschew intimate self-revelation in favor of the regulating practice of distance.” From Lethen, Cool Conduct, 54.

[45] Plessner must have been aware—although his writings do not attest to it—of the Dessau visionary designer Siegfried Ebeling, whose tract “Space as Membrane” was published in 1926. See Siegfried Ebeling, Space as Membrane (London: Architectural Association, 2010), edited and with an afterword by Spyros Papapetros; introduction by Walter Scheiffele; translated by Pamela Johnston based on an earlier translation by Anna Kathryn Schoefert. Originally published in German as Der Raum als Membran (Dessau: Dünnhaupt, 1926).


[49] Adolf Loos, “Ornament und Verbrechen” (“Ornament and Crime”) (1908), in Adolf Loos, Trotzdem (Vienna: Prachner, 1982), 78-88. Originally published in Adolf Loos, Trotzdem. 1900-1930 (Innsbruck: Brenner-Verlag, 1931). Loos’s writings can still appear shocking, especially “Ornament and Crime.” However, his buildings and interiors are remarkably and richly finished and furnished, in complete contrast, for instance, with the generally more polemical German modern architects. To take an extreme pairing, one need only compare, say, Loos’s famous Müller House in Prague (1930) with Hannes Meyer’s starkly ascetic ‘Co-op Zimmer’ installation of 1926.

In our age of scientific thinking, all traditions are gradually being lost; there is no longer any reason to recognize rules that cannot be proven. Thus, concepts such as art and beauty—which cannot even be fully defined—have come under doubt. A person without tradition is forced to invent his own rules of art, which, as a result, must be quite arbitrary. To believe these rules himself and to disseminate the belief in them, he must base them on moral, scientific, utilitarian, or mystical motives.

For a pithy and concise assessment of Frank’s centrality in Vienna’s interwar architecture and debates concerning aesthetics, see Friedrich Achleitner, “Josef Frank und die Wiener Architektur der Zwischenkriegszeit,” in Friedrich Achleitner, Wiener Architektur: zwischen typologischem Fatalismus und semantischem Schlammassel (Vienna, Cologne, and Weimar: Böhlau, 1996), 81-87.

[51] Plessner, Die Stufen, 341.

[52] Ibid.

[53] Helmuth Plessner, Die verspätete Nation (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1959), 97. This book, originally published in 1935 with the title Das Schicksal deutschen Geistes im Ausgang seiner bürgerlichen Epoche (The Fate of the German Spirit at the End of its Bourgeois Epoch) was suppressed the following year. It was only republished in 1959 with its new title.


[56] Lethen, Cool Conduct, xi.

[57] Plessner, Die verspätete Nation, 166.


[59] Ibid., 53.

[60] Ibid., 55.

[61] See Peter Bernhard, “Plessners Konzept der offenen Form.” This is a version of a lecture given by Bernhard at the Plessner Workshop held at the TU Dresden in April 2005. It is essentially a commentary on the position ‘open form’ has in Plessner’s “Rebirth of Form” speech on the occasion of the Werkbund’s twenty-fifth anniversary in 1932. Bernhard alludes to
Plessner’s understanding of open form in the context of technology as well as of life itself. For technical artefacts, such as machines, their ‘open forms’ enable them to change as needs and capabilities change.


[65] Ibid., 209. See also Christopher Long, The New Space: Movement and Experience in Viennese Modern Architecture (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2016), with photographs by Wolfgang Thaler. Here Long enlarges on his earlier monograph on Frank (See Christopher Long, Josef Frank: Life and Work (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2002)) and relates Frank’s concept of Weg (path) to similar concepts of movement and experience in the work of Loos and Oskar Strnad. Long focusses in particular on the Beer House, and cites a contemporary reviewer’s description of the entry sequence that evokes the visitor’s experience of entering the Plessner House: “One enters the hall [from the anteroom] through an unobtrusive door and is at once standing, surprised and moved, in the heart of the structure. The first glance instantly offers a clear understanding of the entire arrangement.” From Long, The New Space, 140, Long’s translation, citing Wolfgang Born, “Ein Haus in Wien-Hietzing,”
Innen-Dekoration 42 (September 1931): 364.