As the general concern of this journal issue is the relevance of Wittgenstein’s thinking for the philosophy of architecture, I will take the task quite literally. Accordingly, the aim of my paper is to explore whether there is evidence for systematic ideas about architecture in Wittgenstein. Reading *Culture and Value*, it may well seem as if architecture ranked among the subjects Wittgenstein did think about—at least from time to time. I will provide some context concerning the status of these remarks—as well as that of some others not included in *Culture and Value*—in Wittgenstein’s work.

All things considered, there is not much to be found in Wittgenstein’s writing concerning the arts or aesthetics in general. There are, to be sure, some editions of student’s notes of lectures on the subject of aesthetics [1], and numerous opinions reported in correspondences and biographies, but only a few remarks devoted to art both in the single book Wittgenstein published in his lifetime, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, and among the 20,000 pages of text he left in his *Nachlass*. Most of these remarks contain reflections about music, especially musical meaning and understanding. In relation, there is even less Wittgenstein specifically wrote on the subject of architecture. The fact may be striking, since Wittgenstein, while having temporarily abandoned philosophy, famously took part in designing and building the city mansion for his sister Margarethe Stonborough-Wittgenstein in Kundmannsgasse, Vienna, between 1926 and 1928. He even considered himself an architect by trade.
There is much to be said, and in fact much has been said about Wittgenstein’s architectural practice, but I do not intend to contribute to that discussion [2]. Nor will I make reference to the frequent metaphors from the realm of building that Wittgenstein makes use of, for instance in the *Philosophical Investigations* or in *On Certainty*. In my mind, the parallels between Wittgenstein’s activity as an architect and his being a philosopher, or between his architecture and his philosophy, are often overstated. Compared to Nana Last’s reading of the Kundmannngasse house as a bridging between different spatialities in Wittgenstein’s thought or Roger Paden’s interpretation of the house as a manifestation of mysticism, there are more modest proposals. In a recent reevaluation of the links between the house and Wittgenstein’s philosophy, for instance, David Macarthur nonetheless refers to Wittgenstein’s “ideas” or “reflections” on architecture, drawing on *Culture and Value* [3]. On closer inspection, though, most of the ideas are actually Adolf Loos’, serving Macarthur as a matrix of interpretation for Wittgenstein’s own remarks. My aim, instead, is to focus exclusively on what Wittgenstein actually wrote about the subject of architecture, and to determine the philosophical status of these remarks in their own right.

In the first section of my paper, I will present a survey of more or less everything Wittgenstein specifically (in the strict sense) wrote about architecture. Most of these remarks, it will turn out, are no more than sketches or rough ideas. Some of them belong to the context of art or aesthetics as Wittgenstein conceived of it. This connection will be discussed in the second section. In other cases, Wittgenstein uses architecture as an object of analogy, or comparison. In the third section, a commentary on one remark comparing architectural to philosophical practice is provided. Section IV will conclude that the value of Wittgenstein’s remarks read as contributions to a philosophy of architecture is limited; while Wittgenstein’s broader reflections on aesthetics are significant in terms of content and method, if often neglected, the same cannot be said of the scattered paragraphs on architecture [4].

In his early writings, Wittgenstein virtually does not mention architecture at all. As far as we can tell, it is only after having finished the house in Kundmannngasse that he starts to write down thoughts about architecture, but there are usually long stretches of time in between. In 1930, he notes: “Today the difference between a good & a poor architect consists in the
fact that the poor architect succumbs to every temptation while the good one resists it” [5]. In this aphoristic remark, we are given no hint as to what kind of temptation Wittgenstein could have in mind, or what the difference between a good and a poor architect could have been before today. We can only guess whether Wittgenstein is thinking of someone or something particular here. Shortly after, there is some criticism of contemporary architecture (as an expression of a culture and civilization alien to the author) in the “Sketch for a Foreword” dating from the same year, probably written for the Big Typescript [6]. Both comments can be read as fragments of criticism, rather than theory. In contrast, a recurrent aesthetic concept is introduced in 1933; Wittgenstein notes: “Remember the impression made by good architecture, that it expresses a thought. One would like to respond to it too with a gesture” [7]. Consequently, in 1938, in a rather sketchy remark, Wittgenstein tentatively thinks about, “Phenomena akin to language in music or architecture” [8]. Then, in 1942, the motive of gesture becomes explicit again: “Architecture is a gesture. Not every purposive movement of the human body is a gesture. Just as little as every functional building is architecture” [9]. Here, the link between architecture and gestures seems even closer. Moreover, Wittgenstein seems to draw a distinction between mere building and architecture, the distinction being that architecture is a gesture, while mere building is not. In a remark existing in several variations, he writes in 1947: “Architecture glorifies something (because it endures). Hence there can be no architecture where there is nothing to glorify” [10]. One alternative version mentions gestures, too; it reads: “Architecture glorifies something because it is a gesture which endures. It glorifies its purpose” [11]. Taking up, perhaps, the thought that architecture is some kind of petrified gesture designed with the purpose of glorification, Wittgenstein writes in 1948: “A great architect in a
bad period (van der Nüll) has a quite different task from that of a great architect in a good period. You must again not let yourself be deceived by the generic term. Don’t take comparability, but rather incomparability, as a matter of course” [12]. The bottom line in this case, however, is not so much aesthetic as linguistic, since Wittgenstein claims that one and the same *allgemeine Begriffswort* (“generic term”) can have two different meanings relative to context, so that the term great architect can attribute different qualities to a person depending on the cultural context she is working in. It is not easy to see, though, why Wittgenstein is talking about generic terms here; it seems rather trivial that being called a great architect can rest on different accomplishments, or tasks, for it evidently depends on aesthetic judgments. Without any context, the remark is rather mysterious; it would have been interesting to know what Wittgenstein takes the task of the great architect in a good or in a bad period to be, respectively. All we can assume is that Wittgenstein seems to have appreciated van der Nüll’s architecture (the most prominent example of which is the Vienna State Opera) [13].

Almost all of these remarks can be found in the collection *Culture and Value*. In German, the volume has been published under the more appropriate title *Vermischte Bemerkungen*, calling its content what it is: miscellaneous or mixed remarks, mixed not by Wittgenstein, but by his editors, Georg Henrik von Wright in this case. This is what they (or he) found worthy of being published after almost everything remotely resembling a book, say, abandoned publication projects or typescripts and even more or less coherent manuscripts like those that have come to be known as *On Certainty*, had already been published. This is not to say that the remarks thus collected, including those on architecture, are not worthy of attention, but that we should keep in mind that they do not constitute something like a book or coherent body of text that Wittgenstein devoted to questions of “culture” and “value,” let alone architecture.

Some of the remarks on aesthetics and music included, in contrast, can be traced back to comparatively rich sequences of reflections on art in Wittgenstein’s later manuscripts. There are good reasons for taking these series of remarks to be serious, if condensed, contributions to philosophical aesthetics. Joachim Schulte and Graham McFee argue convincingly to this effect [14]. Additionally, the published lectures can provide an impression of Wittgenstein’s position in aesthetics. This holds even if we leave aside the importance for aesthetics of Wittgenstein’s remarks on aspect-perception in what has come to be known as the second part of the *Philosophical Investigations*. Nothing of this sort can
be said about Wittgenstein’s more or less isolated remarks on architecture.

Apart from quantity and context, another criterion for the importance of a thought is the further use Wittgenstein is providing for it within his characteristic working method of writing down remarks, clipping manuscripts, reassembling remarks, clipping again and so forth [15]. Now, only in a few cases did Wittgenstein copy pertinent remarks about architecture into typescripts. It is apparent that most of these deal with the subject rather indirectly. The following remark from a 1930 manuscript will reappear in the so-called Big Typescript: “Work on philosophy—like work in architecture in many respects—is really more work on oneself. On one’s own conception. On how one sees things. (And what one expects of them)” [16]. I will come back to these lines in the third section. The aforementioned remark saying architecture expressed a thought to which one would like to respond with a gesture reappears in TS 219 (which is part of the process of reworking manuscripts and typescripts leading from the Big Typescript to Philosophical Investigations) [17]. In TS 229, published under the title Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology I, Wittgenstein takes up the following manuscript note: “One employment of the concept ‘looking in this direction’ is, e.g., as follows: One says, perhaps to an architect: ‘This distribution of the windows makes the façade look in that direction.’ Similarly one uses the expression ‘This arm interrupts the movement of the sculpture’ or ‘The movement should go like this’ (here one makes a gesture)” [18]. And, in the same typescript:

His name seems to fit his works. —How does it seem to fit? Well, I express myself in some such way. —But is that all? —It is as if the name together with these works, formed a solid whole. If we see the name, the works come to mind, and if we think of the works, so does the name. We utter the name with reverence. The name turns into a

“[The remarks] do not constitute something like a book or a coherent body of text that Wittgenstein devoted to questions of culture and value, let alone architecture”
While both of these remarks seem to be concerned with questions from the domain of aesthetics, if in a specifically conceptual way, architecture surely is not their main focus. Note that both remarks mention gestures (one way or the other) in the same breath as architecture.

With all of this source material in place, first, the idea (or ideas) that architecture is a gesture, or demands a gesture, is related to Wittgenstein’s general, if only adumbrated, corresponding ideas about art and especially music. Second, Wittgenstein’s comparison between the work of the architect and the work of the philosopher will be revisited when considering the context of this analogy in the *Big Typescript*.

The motive of gesture obviously is the one prominent thread in the remarks quoted, so there is reason to suppose Wittgenstein took it seriously—at least to a certain extent. In the remarks taken from the later typescripts, he almost seems to take the motive for granted—while being occupied with different subjects. The second of the quotes from TS 229 seems to equate gesture and architectonic form; both serve to illustrate the relation between name and works. This is the light we should see the notion of gesture in. Wittgenstein is mentioning architecture in passages where he is thinking about expressiveness in various contexts, not only in the context of architecture itself. If we consider the remarks taken together, we can discern two reoccurring claims that Wittgenstein is putting forth. First, that architecture is a gesture. As a gesture, its relationship to building simpliciter can be compared to the contrast between corporeal gestures and purposive bodily movements. Yet, second, architecture also provokes, or demands, gestures. Good architecture seems to express a thought, Wittgenstein feels—he does not claim that it actually does express thoughts—in a way that one feels compelled to respond to it—the thought? the architecture?—with a gesture.

A gesture, understood minimally, is a kind of expressive behavior. It is, characteristically, not only an intentional bodily movement, but a movement that will at least accompany and emphasize, sometimes contradict, a particular utterance, sometimes even replace it [20]. In the latter case, a gesture may appear as the appropriate mode of communication, the right expression for what we want to convey. In this sense, a gesture can be an alternative to verbal language. It may be tempting to think that architecture, or art in general, is to be understood as a gesture in exactly this sense.
Initially, Wittgenstein’s intuition seems to be something like that—that works of art express something ineffable in spoken language, beyond its limits—thus the aesthetic quietism in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and continuing in the transitional *Lectures on Ethics* [21]. In the *Philosophical Investigations*, and even more extensively in his *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*, he acknowledges different forms of expressiveness in language, in expressive behavior, and still even more in art. He begins to conceive of the relationship between art and language in a more nuanced way: it is the differences as well as the similarities we have to take into account. His later thought about aesthetics tackles the question of the expressiveness of art not in competition with language, but in comparison. The notion of gesture is of importance in this respect [22]. The following provides a closer look at the two directions of Wittgenstein’s claims:

(1) If architecture is a gesture, while a mere functional building is not, we can suppose that they can be told apart by their expressive potential. Both are functional or serve a purpose. But Wittgenstein seems to use the concept of architecture as a term of praise. Obviously, he is drawing a line between mere building and building as an art, restricting the concept of architecture to the second form. This, by the way, stands in stark contrast to Loos’ view that architecture is not an art [23]. In its expressiveness, architecture, as Wittgenstein indicates, can be compared to music, and both can be compared to language.

In a certain sense, people can and certainly do speak of languages of architecture [24]. But in what sense? There seems to be an obvious difference between their respective communicative potentials. A linguistic utterance can express a proposition, definite content, one might think, while it is far from clear whether music or architecture can do so. Yet, we should look at it exactly the other way...
around, in Wittgenstein’s view. One kind of remark Wittgenstein keeps reiterating points to a change of direction necessary to understand the analogy between music and language in the right way. Take this passage from the Brown Book:

What we call ‘understanding a sentence’ has, in many cases, a much greater similarity to understanding a musical theme than we might be inclined to think. But I don’t mean that understanding a musical theme is more like the picture which one tends to make oneself of understanding a sentence; but rather that this picture is wrong, and that understanding a sentence is much more like what really happens when we understand a tune than at first sight appears. For understanding a sentence, we say, points to a reality outside the sentence. Whereas one might say ‘Understanding a sentence means getting hold of its content; and the content of the sentence is in the sentence’ [25].

The problem lies in the model of transfer. It is this model that is misleading—and it is misleading in language as well as in the arts. From the Philosophical Investigations on, and more specifically in his Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Wittgenstein discards the idea that expressiveness can be explained by reference to an inner something, connecting thought and external world, and existing before and independently of its actual expression. This is why Wittgenstein, as regards the arts, prefers referring to the non-verbal, bodily mode of communication of gestures. Instead of overestimating the role of contents, he thus highlights the understanding of expressiveness in a specific context or situation, as Stephen Mulhall emphasizes: “In such contexts [of aesthetic judgment] he emphasizes two features of the concept’s grammar: the inseparability of a gesture’s meaning from the gesture itself, and the importance of the context of the gesture in accounting for its impact on us” [26].

(2) This is why understanding a work of art, in Wittgenstein’s view, starts with our own immediate reactions or responses to it [27]. The way we understand art as expressive is precisely by reacting to it, with one or the other verbal utterance, emotional response, movement, or, for that matter, gesture. Interestingly, the notion of an aesthetic reaction, in Wittgenstein’s Lectures on Aesthetics, is introduced by an example from the domain of architecture (or rather building in general). Here, Wittgenstein imagines an architect at work, in the process of meticulously judging and altering the dimensions of doors and windows. We can imagine that it is exactly the expressed “thought” or “gesture” of a building, its artistic expression, that is thus altered and improved [28]. The dimensions and placement of doors and windows of a house will, again, evoke particular reactions. These can be put or circumscribed or refined in words if we
are competent critics, but in many cases they will remain what they are: immediate, bodily responses.

Music, in the Brown Book and beyond, is the paradigm case for this kind of connection [29]. We are often inclined to think that a musical phrase says something, that it is meaningful [30]. But, although there are certain rules governing composition, meaning is not determined by them. Nor is it fixed by the transfer of an emotion or other content from the artist to the listener. Instead, musical meaning lies in the structures of the phrase or piece themselves [31]. Drawing on a distinction Wittgenstein introduces in the Brown Book, it has been argued that he conceives of aesthetic expression as well as understanding in an “intransitive” sense [32]. This is to say that expression in these cases, although meaningful, cannot be unraveled by some kind of translation, but only pointed to by calling attention to details or by interpretative comments. Grasping the meaning of a work, along these lines, will often find its basic outward expression in appropriate gestures. But these are reactions informed by our understanding of music (as well as other arts) in general; their context is the whole culture we share. Understanding music means both appreciating its structure and perceiving it according to the cultural context it is part of, the history and practice of music as well as the other arts [33].

Gestures figure on both sides of the equation, so to speak. Understanding a work of art builds on ways of retracing or following its respective design. If a work of art is a gesture, its meaning is determined by the context of its being made, while simultaneously the expression is present in the work. This is why the appropriate guide to artistic meaning is our own responses to it, in our being immediately involved with an object (or event).

But this, to be sure, is nothing specific to architecture. Or, to put it another way, when it comes to architecture, Wittgenstein generally seems
to model its meaning and its understanding on the case of music. The understanding of architecture he is thinking about is an understanding of architecture as art. The basic understanding of artworks, to him, is an understanding of meaningful configurations in their respective contexts, and it starts as a kind of (somatic) resonance with the features of their design and organization [34].

This section returns to the remark quoted in the first section, comparing the work of the philosopher to the work of the architect. In the Big Typescript, the remark reappears. It is given pride of place there, right at the beginning of the chapter called “Philosophy” (which is an obvious precursor of the famous remarks on philosophy in Philosophical Investigations, § 89-133). The remark is singled out as more than a casual or preliminary thought, but is put to service as an opening of reflections on what philosophy is, or should be. (Note that this remark was not included in the “Philosophy” chapter of the Philosophical Investigations, while there are a number of other remarks from the Big Typescript that were.) The title of this first subsection of the Big Typescript’s chapter on philosophy is: “Difficulty of Philosophy not the Intellectual Difficulty of the Sciences, but the Difficulty of a Change of Attitude. Resistance of the Will Must Be Overcome.” Philosophy, for Wittgenstein, is serious work, but not solely because of the intellectual challenges it may provide, but because of obstacles concerning one’s attitude. The heading thus opens up two topics: a contrast between philosophy and “the sciences” and the topic of a necessary change of attitude. In a Tolstoyan tone, it is this change that is presented as meeting resistance of the will. Following this heading, there is the remark about architecture again, in its new context:

As is frequently the case with work in architecture, work on philosophy is actually closer to working on oneself: On one’s own understanding. On the way one sees things. (And on what one demands of them.) Roughly speaking, according to the old conception – for instance that of the (great) western philosophers – there have been two kinds of intellectual problems: the essential, great, universal ones, and the non-essential, quasi-accidental problems. We, on the other hand, hold that there is no such thing as a great, essential problem in the intellectual sense [35].

For one thing, the second part of the remarks distances philosophy from the (presumably natural) sciences, which is a common thread running all the way through Wittgenstein’s thinking [36]. Rather than solving, or even conceiving of, problems the way the sciences do, Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy aims—as he puts it here—at a change of perspective,
at a different attitude towards the puzzles we are confronted with. This different attitude clearly involves the rejection of essentialist intuitions. All philosophical problems, Wittgenstein seems to imply, are equally important. Now the problems of aesthetics, Wittgenstein keeps on stressing (see Lectures on Aesthetics), are not like scientific problems either. They are not to be solved empirically, by research on causes of reactions, for instance [37]. When we deal with art, in Wittgenstein’s words: when we are faced with aesthetic puzzles or conduct aesthetic investigations, we are looking for a different perspective, that is for alternative reasons a work is designed as it is we did not think of before. In this respect, as recently explicated by Simo Säätelä, aesthetics, in Wittgenstein, can be seen as a kind of paradigm of philosophy: “[A]n aesthetic investigation, in Wittgenstein’s sense, bears a close similarity to a philosophical investigation (also in Wittgenstein’s sense): both aim at putting things ‘side by side’ and change one’s way of perceiving” [38].

This, to be sure, is rather what an art critic will do, not necessarily the work of the artist. Yet Wittgenstein does not sharply distinguish between performance and reception, nor between artistic creation and criticism. What a competent art critic can do is to persuade us of such a different perspective, to give us reasons for seeing something in a new way. She can help us change our attitude, so to speak. Being involved in the creation of a work of art includes such critical processes—in this sense, the artist is her own critic. The architect in Wittgenstein’s analogy has to train her perception, her way of seeing things—especially in relation to detail: there is nothing inessential, accidental. This is the sense in which her work is a work on herself, on enhancing her capacities of judging and responding to the features of her work. We can see this as a model of how, for Wittgenstein, work on philosophy also contains both aspects, procedures of (self)criticism as a part of finding the right
Why is Wittgenstein comparing the practice of philosophy explicitly to the work of an architect, and not, say, to that of a composer or a painter? Perhaps because the attention to detail here not only concerns artistic expressiveness as an end in itself, but can simultaneously be a matter of the functional value of a building. In this sense, the comparison could be meant to bring out an existential dimension of philosophizing. If so, this could resonate in Wittgenstein’s approval of the stanza from Henry Wadsworth Longfellow’s poem “The Builders,” which he considered using “as a motto” (whether for one of his books or for himself as philosopher we are not told): “In the elder days of art, / Builders wrought with greatest care / Each minute and unseen part; / For the gods see everywhere” [39].

IV

Having started with a list of Wittgenstein’s scattered manuscript remarks about architecture, this analysis ends with a particular analogy between art and philosophy. It is not a coincidence, given the argument of the paper. In his typescripts and book projects, Wittgenstein mentions architecture directly only in the context of other subjects he is investigating. In the case of the remark quoted from the Big Typescript, for instance, he is concerned with the methods of philosophy. The allusion to the work of the architect put to use there has to build on an understanding of the subject either working on general intuitions or developed in detail elsewhere. So, the question remains whether the remarks on architecture noted in manuscripts over the years, as presented here, can be viewed as a serious contribution to a philosophy of architecture. Frankly, it does not appear so. In itself, the fact that the remarks are too sparse to constitute a coherent body of thought need not compromise their philosophical potential. Yet additionally, they remain far too vague to illuminate the practice of architecture. There is, to be sure, the recurrent motive of architecture being a gesture. Although this motive only makes sense in the context of Wittgenstein’s general ideas about art and aesthetics, and especially about music, in which the notion of gestures is elaborated much further. These ideas, in turn, should be read in the light of the discussions about rules and linguistic meaning in Philosophical Investigations and about talk of inner states in Philosophy of Psychology. In a sense, then, granting Wittgenstein’s own, rather idiosyncratic understanding of aesthetics, the practice of philosophy can be better understood by comparing it to the practice of art, especially art criticism [40]. It would be exaggerating to claim any special role for architecture in this regard—music is, for
Wittgenstein, the much more interesting case. His remarks on architecture hardly scratch the surface of whatever one could think of as subject matters of a philosophy of architecture, say, problems of the ontology, function, experience, or appreciation of architectural objects, or questions not only of the aesthetic, but also of the ethical, social, or political character of architecture. This is not to say that aspects of Wittgenstein’s philosophy in general and his perspective on aesthetics in particular cannot fruitfully be used for elucidating the practice and understanding of architecture—but Wittgenstein himself, as read here, is not a philosopher of architecture [41].

ENDNOTES


[18] Ludwig Wittgenstein, TS 229 192, *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*


[31] See ibid.


[34] For detailed analyses of the way Wittgenstein criticizes and preserves both formalist and expressivist intuitions, especially with respect to musical meaning, see Béla Szabados, Wittgenstein as Philosophical Tone-Poet: Philosophy and Music in Dialogue (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2014), especially 87-97; Katrin Eggers, Ludwig Wittgenstein als Musikphilosoph (Freiburg: Karl Alber, 2011), 203-227.

[35] Wittgenstein, The Big Typescript: TS 213, ed. and trans. C. Grant Luckhardt and Maximilian A. E. Aue (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 300-301. While Winch’s translation of the remark differs substantially from Luckhardt and Aue’s, Wittgenstein did not change the wording from the manuscript to the typescript version. The German original reads (in both cases): “Die Arbeit an der Philosophie ist – wie vielfach die Arbeit in der Architektur – eigentlich mehr eine Arbeit an Einem selbst. An der eignen Auffassung. Daran, wie man die Dinge sieht. (Und was man von ihnen verlangt.)”


[37] See Wittgenstein, Lectures and Conversations, 19-23. Repercussions of Wittgenstein’s view are clearly visible in Alva Noë’s recent Strange Tools, not only in the repudiation of scientific approaches in aesthetics, be they of an evolutionary or neuroscientific variety, but also in the proposed model of philosophy as providing “perspicuous representations.” See Alva Noë, Strange Tools: Art and Human Nature (New York: Hill and Wang, 2015), especially 17, 49-71, 120-133.


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