Heidegger’s reflections on dwelling point us to a distinct ethos, a distinct way of being in the world. As he puts it in “Letter on Humanism,” “Dwelling is the essence of Being-in-the-world.” He thus explicitly relates the theme(s) of ‘being-in’, themes raised in his early work, to that of dwelling, and thus to thinking about ethos. As Heidegger frequently reminds us, ‘ethos’ (ἦθος) means “the dwelling of man, his sojourn in the midst of all that is.” Already at this juncture, it is decisive to hold on to the idea that ethos, understood as sojourn, always relates us to an obligation of sorts. This much transpires if we consider that being without sojourn indicates a state of up-rootedness. And a person who is uprooted, without sojourn, is a person who ‘stands’ nowhere, and may well not understand much of her own position either.

In the course of the present paper I would like to show, accordingly, that Heidegger’s philosophy not only essentially comprises a reflection on ethos, on man’s sojourn in the world, but also that this reflection queries a genuine obligation man enters. That reflection thus queries whether there is an appropriate way of residing or sojourning, and seeks to articulate an exemplary dwelling for man. And if (as remains to be shown) there is furthermore an appropriate way of human sojourn, of ethos, then this trajectory will also contain, or afford, direction and guidance. It contains direction insofar as exemplary ethos denotes something we need to seek. It is not the case that humans, by their very nature, are endowed with an appropriate ethos. Ethos is rather, and actually, a becoming—is...
something that exists historically, or that happens in existence. Dwelling, as Heidegger frequently puts it, “is something we have yet to learn.” He emphasizes repeatedly how we always are already in the world—always already enjoy a sojourn in it of sorts. And even so, we have to obtain a certain distance from the very form of ethos we are most familiar with, an ethos we enjoy as a matter of course and without much reflection. Such lack of reflection accrues from the routines of our everyday life and a certain obliviousness towards being itself. By gaining a distance from that familiar ethos we can make truly ‘our own’ both the world and ourselves. Without such distance, everyday phenomena comprising things, fellow human beings, and one’s own being lose the very value that makes them themselves. Heidegger beckons us towards a particular form of sojourn not only in his late works, but also in his early Freiburger lectures or even in *Being and Time*. But his late works, this paper will show, deal with the matter and related themes more directly and explicitly than previous works.

**DWELLING AND THE FOURFOLD**

Concerns with spatiality exert a formative influence on Heidegger’s language in his late works, and constitute a cornerstone of his reflections in those works. In his late thought, the problematization of man’s sojourn receives explicit elaboration. Words like ‘dwelling’, ‘sojourn’, and ‘ethos’ now feature in the foreground of his (so-called) ‘ontic-historical’ reflections. While a certain reflection on ethos forms a recurrent theme across Heidegger’s thought, it is only in the context of his ‘topology of being’ that Heidegger begins to explicitly reflect on human sojourn and human dwelling.

Unlike in *Being and Time*, Heidegger’s late work is no longer concerned with the essential and inessential modes in which Dasein or a distinctly human way of being takes on existence. Rather, his main concern is now with the essential and inessential ways in which humans design or conceive of their being, their Sein. In this regard, dwelling is central. His essay “Building Dwelling Thinking” makes it rather clear that ‘dwelling’ is not merely conceived of as one’s having or possessing an abode or roof over one’s head; it rather designates “the main feature of human existence (Dasein).” On the one hand, we are to think of human existence as arising from dwelling; on the other, the nature of (making) poetry is to be determined as (a form of) building. Dwelling, in its inner contours, has to be traced to and thematized as dwelling and (the making of) poetry. Just as dwelling can only be obtained through building, true building only happens to further dwelling. Heidegger here refers to an etymological relation between ‘I am’ (ich bin) and ‘building’ (Bauen). In that regard, the
'I am' that goes with ‘building’ actually denotes ‘I dwell’. He writes, “The way I am and you are, the way in which we humans are on this earth – that is building, that is dwelling.” Making poetry and dwelling are likewise related in their origin. To make poetry is not merely one (of many possible ways of) “letting oneself dwell”: it rather denotes “the actual ways of letting oneself dwell.”

Heidegger terms the essential and actual (or proper, eigentlich) dwelling a sojourn in the Fourfold (Geviert). This ‘Fourfold’ denotes the gathering of four domains or ‘quarters’, namely heaven and earth, divine and mortal. And this gathering receives expression in a “world play,” that is, denotes the actual form in (and as) which human existence realizes itself or manifests in a world of things. Accordingly, the truth about (human) being becomes manifest in this Fourfold: “We thought of the truth of Being in worlds[,] of ‘world’ as the mirror play of the Fourfold of heaven and earth, of mortals and immortals.”

More precisely, Heidegger conceives of the dwelling in the Fourfold as a poetic way of dwelling.

**DWELLING POETICALLY**

If man dwells in the Fourfold, he dwells poetically. Heidegger takes over Hölderlin’s poetics of man’s ‘poetic dwelling’: “Full of merit is the man who in his toil manages to produce works.” Human toil and creation of a work is here interpreted as an accomplishment (such as, for instance, man-made culture). But that accomplishment does not suffice, by itself, to understand human existence or Dasein in its foundation, insofar as culture is only a derived consequence of the more original ‘poetic dwelling’ of man. In his lecture on Hölderlin (winter semester, 1934-1935), Heidegger gives a clue for understanding ‘poetic dwelling’: “By this I mean: the historical existence or Dasein of man is borne from a foundation, and directed by that [mode of] being which poets experience ahead [of the rest of us],
which they put into verbal garb for the first time and thereby bring to the people.”  

It follows that the poetic has to be understood as an originating and measure-bestowing endowment, because to found something means “the foundation of what hitherto was not.”

Poetic (use of) language brings to the fore a design or concept of being for an entire community. The way that ‘being’ beckons man (here) corresponds to how the ancients conceived of the divine to beckon in poetic creation. This leads Heidegger to say that “the poet […] is a founder of being.” If Heidegger says (with Hölderlin) that poets found “what persists,” what exactly does this founding moment denote? For poetry neither discovers, nor invents, the historic dimension of human existence as such. Rather, that dimension is being ‘founded’ in this sense: poetry corresponds to the enunciation of being itself. In the unconstrained creation of poetry, the boundary between the merely possible and the real is created anew. The poet’s “dream yields the not-yet-appropriated fullness of the possible and preserves a transfigured remembrance of the real.”

That remembrance of the real is such that “the possible and (more precisely) what is still to come, arrest our expectations, and arise as one where art bestows history, a dream.” This new order of things—Heidegger calls it the poets’ “dream”—is “terrible, because for those it shows itself to, the dream rips them out of a careless sojourn in a reality they are used to, and throws them into the horrors of the unreal.”

The expression “horrors of the unreal” refers to the infinite expanse of the possible; that expanse appears as “horror” because its fleeting nature cannot be grasped by purposive or practical rationality. The horror it instills is the terror of the unknown and uncertain, a horror man attempts to evade and flee along his life’s path. The poet does not reside or remain in “a careless (mode of) residing” but copes with the fleeting nature (and contingency) of human existence through his creative work.

For Heidegger, dwelling poetically ultimately means sensitive attention to things. This dwelling is a stance “in the presence of the divinities,” a stance of solemnity “towards the nearness of things’ essence.” The poet attends (and respects) in his poetic dwelling the gathering of things in a way that respects their diversity and coherence. The poet dwells in a manner that itself is a preservation happening in poetic dwelling. But this is only possible so long as the poet remains awake and sober in relation to those things.

Accordingly, the stance in dwelling poetically must be sober and attentive:

*To acquire free use of one’s own ability means to ever more exclusively acquiesce in being open towards what one is assigned – acquiesce in alertness of what is yet
to come, in a sobriety that [...] retains only what is needed. A sober, attentive openness towards the sacred is at once a concentration on the quiet, corresponding to that ‘resting’ on which the poet dwells and thinks. This resting is an ability to remain in one’s own.27

Such “learning” of man’s own poetic essence simply requires a radical and attentive willingness to accommodate oneself with the order of the world, an order that arises from the world’s becoming. Or, because we already are poets, we have to become poets. This signals, not merely an element of Pindar in Heidegger’s philosophy, but also the thought that ‘dwelling poetically’ is to remain (persist) in conformity with what is. ‘Dwelling poetically’ is something as yet to be attained—it is, for Heidegger, something one needs to make one’s own. By dwelling poetically one realizes a return to ‘one’s own’, a state rendered attainable through recognition of the foreign or alien: “To be freely able to draw on one’s own, to first acquire free use of one’s own, first requires confrontation with the foreign.”28 Thus man has to become a “traveler,”29 needs “to render oneself, in what is foreign, strong and ready for what is one’s own; for what is one’s own cannot be acquired by a sudden grasp for the (apparent) own.”30 Man must appropriate what is his own, and that requires a process of appropriation intimately related to experience of the foreign. Such self-appropriation is certainly not easy: “What is one’s own is hardest to find and, thus, easiest to miss.”31 Precisely because it is hardest to find, “its search has to be longest, and as long as it’s sought, it won’t be lost.”32 Heidegger calls this search for one’s own a “steady reluctance,” namely “the reluctance of one who dwells long on the same spot, looks forward and backwards, because he searches and persists in a point of transition, a threshold. Finding and appropriating one’s own, is at once a reluctant transition.”33 He who is searching for his own, and understands himself to be ‘on his way’ to himself or journeying to himself,34 dwells poetically.
Heidegger already announced the relation between “self-hood” and actual dwelling in his *Introduction to Metaphysics* (delivered in the summer term of 1935): “Man only reaches himself, and is a Self, in a mode of historicity and questioning.” Man’s self-hood can thus not be attained without a certain stance, an idiosyncratic form of residence or sojourn. Only by dwelling poetically can man be brought to accord with his own essence—meaning, can man realize what he always and already is: the most uncanny. “To be the most uncanny – that is the foundational trait of man’s essence.” Via poetry and the disclosure of historic space—the location of our actual dwelling accomplished in poetry—humans attain access to themselves.

Poetic dwelling has its own measure in persistence. “Return endows the persistence of what is unequal. When that persists, then that persistence alone is in which fate can persist in a state of purity.” Heidegger calls this “persistence of a persisting fate” “the measure of actual dwelling,” as it shows itself in the measure of actual poetic dwelling. And that persistence is precisely a time of celebration, meaning, a time for the unusual and the rare, and thereby the moment in which fertile rupture occurs with one’s customary and familiar relations to the world. The significance—even the reality—of the familiar is put into question, occasioning a return to the uncanny. Dwelling poetically is, in that light, this idiosyncratic persisting in the actual place, in the Fourfold opened up towards whichever thing we face: “To persist is, now, no longer the mere insistence of the ready-to-hand. Persistence happens. It brings the Four into the light of their own.”

**DWELLING AND MEASURE**

Heidegger’s reflections engage the ethical also in another respect—with respect to their ideas of measure and measuring. Here, the heavenly receives special attention: “Man has always already measured himself as (hu)man in relation to something, and in relation to something heavenly.” The heavenly, however, is only gathered by a measure—the divine. When Heidegger, with Hölderlin, tells us that in dwelling man “measures” himself against—that is, competes with—the deity, Heidegger primarily means that existing man always has to find anew the interrelation that gathers things together. That measure is not rendered present by an invention of man—but only occurs in relation to the respective way in which a thing allows itself to be seen. What Heidegger calls “measuring” reveals itself in the act of making poetry.

The poet gathers a measure of all things from the things showing themselves. This measure is, for Hölderlin, an unknown God, always
alien and never familiar. Equating the divinity with a measure—moreover, an unknown measure at that—is, however, problematic: “The divinity as He who He is, is unknown to Hölderlin, and the divinity qua this Unknown is verily the poet’s measure.” That the divinity should be something revealed by the heavens also means that Hölderlin’s divinity—the measure—is to be understood in the respective context of its becoming apparent, in the heavens of the Fourfold.

The divinity is kept open as precisely an open measure through its dwelling in the Fourfold. The poet’s measure is, in this sense, never an external and already decided one, but rather becomes the measure as things command, meaning, [the measure of] the Fourfold: “Building (das Bauen),” which is poetics, “appropriates from the Fourfold the measurements for all cross-measurements of the spaces, which in turn assume [their] space through places that bestow them.” As Heidegger puts it in his 1970 essay “Man’s Dwelling,” “Earthly poets are just those who take measure of a heavenly measure.” Precisely because the poet knows better than anyone else that there is nothing that is unique and bestows measure and meaning for all time, is he able to ever bestow new being: “It bestows higher clarity, one that enables all things to appear in their own and which provides a measure to all that is mortal.” In that regard, the poets’ saying(s) correspond to the voice of being. Since being ever appears under new historical guises, there is a never-finished need for repetition, as occurs through being founded poetically.

Dwelling poetically is the possibility of an actual sojourn of man, in contrast to the careless sojourn in an age of modern technology. In his lecture “Wherefore Poets?,” Heidegger emphatically notes that technology is, so to speak, an illusory or deceptive sojourn of man. It is, “as if there could be – for the relation of essence, by which man is related to the whole of being through the technical
will – a segregated residence in an annex building, an annex able to offer more than a transitory way out of self deceptions (such as taking refuge in the Greek pantheon).”

In poetry, a return to ‘the open’ is drawn—that very open that remains shut in a technical ethos. To dwell poetically thus means to persist in that openness in which things come to the fore first and show themselves in their truth. It is about opening up to, and letting in, the truth of things, the truth of other people, of the world. Insofar as the things-that-are (das Seiende) are conceived in their relative determinacy in relation to their historic origin, these things remain open towards being, in dwelling and thinking: “In thinking we first learn of dwelling in that region, in which occur the overcoming of being’s fate, the overcoming of the constellation (das Gestell).” Only by man dwelling in the Fourfold, a Fourfold realized poetically, is the possibility of ethos in an age dominated by ‘constellation’ possible. Here, the actual ethos is always already latently present in ‘the constellation’. Man cannot but relate to the poetic, cannot but be (in an actual or inauthentic way) poetic, for “even the man of today’s age dwells, in his own way, poetically,” as Heidegger puts it in “Man’s Dwelling.” Yet, on the border of paradox, Heidegger inserts an ethical measure into the poetic, into its very name: “Man of the present age too dwells poetically in his own way – namely, that is, as per (unter) the name of his Dasein, unpoetically.”

Heidegger says, echoing Hölderlin, that our mode of dwelling today is “unpoetic.” It is a mode in which “man seizes measure from an earth that his machinations leave disfigured.”

The ‘unpoetic’ dwelling in the ‘constellation’ is a sojourn in which man relates himself to the whole world (all things in it, other people, and his own being) by seizing domination. If the unpoetic nature of our being in the world today is conceived as such, this means that “there is no measure on this earth, but rather that the earth can give no measure when it is quantified on a planetary scale, that the earth is carried away in the lack of measure.” Poetic dwelling registers this in “the lack of holy names” and “the deity’s death”: only a sojourn in the open region, which smacks of the lack [of holy names], permits insight into that, which today is, but from which it is lacking.” In this regard the poet’s role comes to the fore, paradigmatically: the poet is a paradigm and exemplar, for he not merely gazes but also shows, has “the demonstrating gaze for what is open, an openness in which the divinities alone become guests and men can build an abode within which the True is, and of which men can grab hold of.” Such bestowing of dwelling is the original dwelling of the poet, for this measure originally founds the actual dwelling of man. The poet accomplishes this by having the measure designed with ever a view to allowing himself to get
close to the, ever differently appearing, world. The poet’s measure, put differently, is ever built anew as the situation commands.

POETIC SPEECH AND ITS DWELLING

Dwelling poetically, then, receives prominence in poetic speech. “How does man dwell poetically? He dwells thus because he speaks thus.” The poet draws on “the free use of his own ability,” meaning, he does not use language, but rather takes language for what it originally is, namely as endowment. His bestowing through language is set in conformity with being, and thus his endowment conforms to “the openness for what he is assigned to, the alertness of what is yet to come.” The poetic endowment of words resides thus in the openness for what is to come and ever possible. Such openness for the alien and foreign is the poetic dwelling of the poet—a place of residence that the gods visit where they are [our] ‘guests.’ Only the poet, possessing an “essential gaze for the possible,” may create the very openness necessary to enable the gods to appear. The possible and the possible foundation of all assembly can only appear when room for such an appearance has been opened. The divinities are thus guests in our language. Poetic dwelling must first become hospitality, a friendly waiting on and for the gods. Whether or not man welcomes the gods with hospitality is his own decision. If he decides in favor then his words respond to the claims of the gods. Consequently, man decides in favor of his belonging to the occasion or happening. Poetic language serves conformity with that happening in which the gods only begin to speak (and commit themselves) to us. The word naming the divinities’ claim is the word remaining faithful to the particular (and only) self-display of the phenomena. A description of how things are through poetic language is not a seizing, a determination of a thing, but the literal mirroring of that thing in the very manner it appears in. A

“The poet is a paradigm and exemplar, for he not merely gazes but also shows.”
word’s validity arises for Heidegger not in the “public claim of what is written,” but purely in the word’s relation or obligation to the thing itself.

As Heidegger emphasizes time and again, man has to learn actual dwelling as the dwelling of the poet. The poet joyously dwells in that “sparse nearness,” meaning, he knows that what appears is not the only possibility of openness (of becoming apparent), in contrast to man who only abides in the public. And since only poetic man “has the demonstrative gaze for the open,” it is his task to help other people to build their abodes such that in them is truth. The poet’s role is, however, for Heidegger “neither to instruct, nor to educate”, but rather “he permits the reader to let be, so that he may attain by himself an affection towards the essential, to which the friend of the family [the poet] already tends so as to talk to us.” Others don’t yet know that sojourn in “sparse nearness”—they have to yet learn how to dwell. The poet helps others to return to their home. This home is the proximity to the origin. In that home man recognizes himself, not only as “someone learning of things,” but also as someone knowing that things are “in strife.” The fundamental mood of reluctance is “the mood of a thinking come home to the origin.” Akin to the underlying mood of reluctance in Heidegger’s 1936-1938 Contributions to Philosophy, reluctance here is the “knowledge that origin cannot be experienced immediately.” If man persists in this fundamental mood, he knows that the mystery is more encompassing than any specific openness of being, and he remains in a stance open to the possible. In dwelling poetically, man knows that the concealed, the secret, the original, and the indemonstrable can never be transferred completely into the determinate and present.

CONCLUSION: DWELLING AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL ETHOS

Dwelling poetically turns out to be the actual sojourn, the actual ethos of man. Man here remains open towards the possible, alert to how individual phenomena become apparent. If we re-examine that ethos more carefully, it becomes impossible to reconcile with the very possibility of an existence bound by rules a priori. The measure of poetic dwelling only ever arises from the respective sojourn in the company of things, and not from a pre-existing measure. To dwell poetically one has to forfeit the very domain of the moral, a domain in which good and evil have already been decided upon. By poetry, “the region will remain open for the presence of the mortals in [that region].” And yet this forfeiture of morality occurs in favor of an ethos in which the truth of things, of world and others, can attain their validity in their respective and very own way. In this way poetic dwelling connects to a philosophical ethos—because in this dwelling it is paramount to not miss out on the true self-appearance of the phenomena.
Or put differently: the task is to take up a [form of] residence in which the equanimity towards the truth of things is preserved—and not the obstinate will to security.

Furthermore, the philosophical ethos accentuated in dwelling poetically can be said to receive primary articulation as a phenomenological ethos. How the phenomena themselves are to be perceived can never be dictated externally, but exclusively from the phenomena themselves and the very context or correlation in which they appear to us in the first place. The phenomena and their possible characters are precisely what is preserved in poetic dwelling and its poetic, endowing speech.

Dwelling is for Heidegger of such a kind that man has to take responsibility for himself. Dwelling thus carries an insurmountable intrinsic paradox: we always already dwell with what is original; precisely because we do, it remains concealed: “To dwell in one’s own is that which arises last, rarely comes together, and always remains hardest.” And that is why dwelling as dwelling has to be yet acquired when it comes to man, so that man can truly be what he already has been—namely, “uncanny” and foreign unto himself. “The most uncanny of the Uncanny is Man himself.” In his own being uncanny, foreign, and without home, resides man’s essence, even when man himself may not see this.

Humans essentially dwell in the Fourfold, and yet in the exiguous age of modern technology they dwell without awareness of their own existence: “Not yet are the mortals owners of their own essence.” It appears as if man dwells asleep in the Fourfold. Dwelling becomes what is customary, and escapes notice. If it does so escape notice, however, the essence of dwelling “can never be pondered as the foundational trait of being human.” Accordingly, the age of technological domination becomes an age bereft of home and earth. Man has become estranged to his own essential dwelling, and this...
estrangement of his essence constitutes a loss of essence itself.

Just as home is a becoming—namely a return to one’s own through the unfamiliar and foreign,—dwelling in the Fourfold embodies that moment in which we sojourn once again with what is original. Beyond that, dwelling in the Fourfold denotes a specific dwelling radically different from everyday dwelling under the dominance of technology. To at all recognize the “actual want of dwelling” is enough to put us on a path to rescue, even if that rescue can only happen by a re-claiming of essential sojourn, of dwelling in nearness to the truth of being. Heidegger’s thought “that the mortals have to first search for the essence of dwelling, they have to yet learn how to dwell,” directly portends the domain of original ethics and its original ethos.

Human being realizes itself only by a sojourn in the Fourfold and the world of things. Man’s essence only becomes manifest through a particular dwelling: “To spare the Fourfold – to rescue the earth, receive the heavens, expect the gods, and accompany mortals – this four-fold sparing is the simple essence of dwelling.”

Man has to acknowledge this ‘simple essence’ of dwelling. Heidegger’s enlightenment of man’s dwelling indicates the actual and thus highest form of dwelling. Heidegger’s own reflections on ethos constitute a gesture indicating direction. There is a concealed and yet actual and original mode of existence, one we have to seek. Dwelling in the Fourfold is something we have to yet reach. And we will only reach it by coming to recognize it as man’s true dwelling.

ENDNOTES
1. This paper builds on my book, Diana Aurenque, Ethosdenken: Auf der Spur Einer Ethischen Fragestellung in der Philosophie Martin Heideggers (Freiburg im Breisgau: Verlag Karl Alber, 2001), and was translated by Stefan Koller.
2. Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism,” in the Heidegger Gesamtsausgabe (GA), volume 9, page 358.—Translator’s note: The Gesamtsausgabe is an ongoing effort to collect the complete works of Heidegger in German. With the exception of “Man’s Dwelling”, all Heidegger translations in this paper are original to the paper, and are from here on referenced in abbreviated form, by GA volume and page number.
4. Translator’s note: Heidegger’s term for ‘being obliged’ denotes our being bound, existentially rather than morally, to something or other—even the world itself, as Heidegger explains in “Man’s Dwelling.” See Heidegger, “Man’s Dwelling,” GA 13:215.


8. *Translator’s note:* As before, an idiomatic verb for ‘to make poetry’ is sorely lacking in English. Such a verb exists in German and Greek, and denotes not just the creation of verse (rather than prose), but more generally, to make things unconstrained by preconception and established technique.

9. Cf. also Heidegger, Prolegomena, GA 20:213: “I dwell, reside in (and with) the world as my familiar other.”


13. Ibid.


20. Ibid., 33.


23. Ibid.


25. Ibid.

26. Ibid., 42.

27. Ibid., 118. *Translator’s note:* Observe that the German for ‘one’s own’ (das Eigene) here and in the sequel allows an impersonal reading where the English does not; comparable to how English translators of *Being and Time* have to render Heidegger’s decidedly impersonal das Man as ‘the They’.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid., 124.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid., 160.
39. Ibid.
42. *Translator’s note*: The German ‘messen’ can importantly mean both.
44. Cf. ibid., 200-201.
45. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
51. Heidegger, “Man’s Dwelling,” GA 13:219. In order not to clutter the main text, lengthy quotations from this text have been moved to a separate Appendix below. See Appendix, section 31, including a less literal rendering of the present line. See further Appendix, sections 1-9 on how Heidegger sets up his discussion of Hölderlin.
52. Ibid. See also Appendix, section 31.
54. See Appendix, sections 31-32.
55. See Appendix, sections 33-35, and cf. sections 29-30.


63. Ibid., 120. *Translator’s note*: As will shortly become obvious, Heidegger plays here on the German term for hospitality, *Gast-Freundschaft*, lit. kindness to strangers, which in Greek is *xenia* (antonym: xeno-phobia): the stranger or *xenos* is shown hospitality, and the Greek gods would typically travel under the disguise of a foreign visitor or xenos.


65. *Translator’s note*: gathering (*Versammlung*) corresponds in ancient Greek to *ekklesia*, our word for church, as in ‘ecclesiastic’.


68. Ibid., 148.


71. Ibid., 131.

72. Ibid.


74. *Translator’s note*: *Gelassenheit* is cognate with the earlier *einlassen auf*, a verb used earlier to denote how man should be open to things—by letting them be as they are, also in relation to him, as opposed to seeking to control things by technical means or means-ends reasoning.


76. *Translator’s note*: Heidegger plays on the German relation of ‘uncanny’ (*unheimlich*) to the lack of ‘home’ (*Heim*).


79. *Translator’s note*: In German, ‘*Gewöhnung*’ a pun on ‘dwelling’ (*wohnen*).


81. Ibid., 163.

82. Ibid.

83. Ibid., 161. See again the definition of the Fourfold.