INTRODUCTION

This paper departs from a problem that architects often face: do they really have to choose between their interest in the production of built objects (in their shape, their spatiality, etc.) and their commitment to broader social concerns? Must architects focus on social concerns at the expense of the built object in order to be morally responsible? These questions touch on the relations between autonomy and criticality which have been fiercely debated in recent architectural theory: does criticality rest on autonomy? After introducing these controversies and disentangling the notion of autonomy at their center, I propose to look into the philosophical tradition of pragmatism as offering a way out. Following some recent interpretations of pragmatism, this paper addresses the possibility of an immanent critique, the reconciliation of ethics and aesthetics, the way ethnographies show architectural objects as active participants in design practice, and investigates how a pragmatist view of ecology invites sensitivity to objects’ moral claims.

1. “ENGAGING AUTONOMY”: OBJECTHOOD AND RESPONSIBILITY

Responsibility is acquainted with everything but the object: its relations, its origins, its use, life and context. A focus on the building and its objecthood and certainly on its form is simply irresponsible.' Sarah Whiting used these words to introduce a lecture entitled “Engaging Autonomy,” which she gave at SCI-Arc in Fall 2013. She presented her talk as “a plea to acknowledging the importance of the
object, for them not to be thrown out in the name of responsibility.” Her words demonstrate a real concern regarding architecture’s autonomy and its relation to responsibility; she wonders how to maintain architecture’s definition as a specific practice, with specific concerns and skills (designing space and objects), without being dismissed as indifferent to larger moral and social concerns.

Whiting is worried about what she calls the “context-object opposition,” which tends to polarize two opposed postures: the autonomous architect concerned with the production of objects versus the social architect immersed in moral negotiations. These two poles define a scale on which it would be possible to situate every architectural practice, a scale between the object and the context, between forms and procedures, between autonomy and engagement, but also between aesthetics and ethics (Figure 1). This scale represents the frequently discussed “intractable conflict between an aesthetically autonomous architecture […] and an ambitious social agenda for the built environment.”

By introducing her position as one that is “engaging autonomy,” Whiting attempts to bridge the extremes: she articulates an ambition at the level of the object’s singularity and at the level of its context. However, by assembling such a contradictory pair of terms, Whiting does not really escape the opposition she tries to tackle between the autonomy of the object and the architects’ responsibility to engage with its consequences. When looking at Whiting’s own architectural projects, one can see that they are highly formal and conceptual, using disciplinary games based on historical references (e.g., the X House based on a distortion of Palladio’s plan, Figure 2) or geometrical variations (e.g., the Golden House based on the development of the box-like volume of the entrance hall) (Figure 3). One can thus wonder with what context these objects are engaged at all. Whiting’s assessment does keep the object well to one side, and “its relations, origins, use, life and context” to the other.

Yet, Whiting’s concern needs to be considered seriously: how to maintain objects at the center of architects’ preoccupations without isolating them from moral concerns? Opting for a pragmatist perspective, this paper will challenge Whiting’s assertion by the following programmatic proposition: responsibility is acquainted with the object only as far as that object is
FIGURE 2: X HOUSE, (UNBUILT).

FIGURE 3: GOLDEN HOUSE, 2010, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY.
dependent on its relations, origins, use, life, and context. Actually, dealing with this problem pragmatically implies that we care for the consequences of our propositions. Therefore, this issue will not just require that we expand our definition of built objects; it will also rely on a redefinition of the ‘moral’, shifting our understanding of the term from a delineated domain in which (built) objects are occasionally and graciously included, and often are not.

2. CRITICAL OR NOT: DISENTANGLING AUTONOMY

Whiting developed the notion of “engaging autonomy” as an answer to the criticisms she had to face after she had been involved in a vast debate about architects’ autonomy and responsibility. In 2002, Whiting co-authored with Robert E. Somol a provocative paper in an issue of the journal Perspecta entitled “Mining Autonomy.” The editors wanted the issue to “examine the evolving legacy of architectural autonomy and its relationship to architecture’s potential to act as a critical agent.” Whiting and Somol’s paper proposed to overthrow what was then called ‘critical architecture’ in favor of an alternative posture, which they named ‘projective architecture’. Critical architects had chosen to act from within tight disciplinary limits and to take an oppositional posture to the rest of culture, a posture based on distance and negation. They founded their ‘criticality’ on the autonomy of the discipline, which allowed detachment from contemporary phenomena. Criticality, autonomy, and responsibility were tightly bound together. Instead, Whiting and Somol proposed to “shift the understanding of disciplinarity as autonomy to disciplinarity as performance or practice.” More importantly, they refused to rely upon “oppositional strategy.”

Because they rejected such forms of ‘criticality’, their paper became the target of fierce objections against what came to be known as the ‘postcritical’ generation. Those objections largely rested on the assumption that criticality is the only safeguard against irresponsibility and is inevitably bound to autonomy: if deprived of the necessary distance, architects end up driven by market-forces, vulnerable to the pressures of contemporary society and unable to serve for better ends. Whiting and Somol were accused of ‘compromising with the real.’ Because they wanted to engage the contingencies of actual situations, they were doomed to lose any criticality, which was bound up with distance and resistance. The detractors of the postcritical were not ready to envision an alternative view on criticality itself; they refused to consider a responsible position which would not be based on autonomy.

Whiting uses her expression “engaging autonomy” to deny she has ever been ‘postcritical’: she reaffirms her rejection of a distant posture (she wants to engage fully contemporary phenomena) while saving the
specifics of the discipline and of the objects produced there. Yet, her contradictory expression remains trapped within the dichotomy it tends to escape. A convincing way out of this sterile opposition still needs to be worked out; this paper seeks to contribute to that issue.

The discussion above can only be fully grasped if two related ways of understanding ‘autonomy’ are disentangled. First, autonomy relates to the strict delineation of the field of architecture. Second, autonomy relates to the distance and resistance that are considered to be necessary conditions for criticality. Both are fully modern conceptions, inherited from Kant: first, his notion of arts’ disinterestedness; second, his view on morality as a capacity belonging to autonomous intentional beings facing moral laws. In this context, arts and morality are neatly separated domains: aesthetics on the one side, ethics on the other. But both rely on a certain understanding of autonomy.¹³

Consequently, the scale between autonomy and engagement drafted earlier needs to now organize itself around (at least) three poles instead of two: autonomy of the field, autonomy of the critical subject, engagement with the context (Figure 3).

This triangular shape greatly helps to understand the positions taken in the debate: ‘critical architecture’ builds its moral criticality on the autonomy of the field; Whiting reasserts the

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**FIGURE 3: RE-ORGANIZATION OF CONTEXT-OBJECT OPPOSITION.**

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“*Objections largely rested on the assumption that criticality is the only safeguard against irresponsibility and is inevitably bound to autonomy.*”
specificity of the field (as producing and caring about objects) but not its mission of resistance; the objections against the postcritical (critical practice) reaffirm both the necessity to engage the context and to do so critically, meaning from a position of moral autonomy. Yet criticality—and moral responsibility with it—remains bound to autonomy in either case, be it of the field or of the subject.

In order to take a position in these discussions about architecture’s autonomy and its relationship to criticality, this paper will examine ways in which some interpretations of the philosophy of pragmatism prove useful to overcome the dichotomies that remain.

### 3. Pragmatism 1: Soma-Aesthetics for an Immanent Critique

Interestingly, this much-commented controversy about criticality in architecture has become associated with pragmatism. At some point, the ‘postcritical’ position and its propositions were indeed grouped under the label “A New Architectural Pragmatism.” This expression relates to pragmatism in the common sense of the word: the young architects involved were reasserting practice over theory and were eager to realize actual buildings. But—more surprisingly perhaps—the ‘postcritical’ has also become associated with American pragmatism, i.e., the philosophical tradition initiated by Peirce, James, and Dewey in the late nineteenth century and recently revived in various fields of academia. Indeed, a few years before Somol and Whiting’s provocative paper, a major conference was organized in New York, which built propositions for architecture upon the philosophical tradition of pragmatism. As this initiative shared a number of the same people and the same issues with the postcritical discussion, it is sometimes considered as a precedent.

Richard Shusterman, one of the contemporary pragmatist philosophers invited to the conference, took part in the debate for the very reason that it had been associated with pragmatism. Shusterman’s work takes over from Dewey’s aesthetic philosophy. Shusterman’s position is interesting for the present discussion because he is one among those who picked up Dewey’s legacy in order to reconcile ethics and aesthetics. For him, pragmatism has the advantage of opposing the Kantian legacy by negating both the idea that aesthetic judgment is disinterested and that ethics is based on general rules of behavior. Shusterman considers that art and aesthetic judgment should not be seen as totally distinct from ethical considerations and sociopolitical factors. At the conference on architecture and pragmatism, he explains how a pragmatist aesthetics inherited from Dewey is closer to the experience of art and how it does not restrict itself to abstract arguments formulated outside of this actual experience. Shusterman calls the field that he develops from these assumptions “soma-aesthetics.”

Nine years later, for a conference at the Bauhaus, he elaborates on
this claim and proposes what it could mean for architecture. He decides to address the postcritical controversy because he believes that a pragmatist insight might prove useful. His view is that Somol and Whiting’s projective proposition has been abusively called ‘postcritical’ due to the reductive idea that “a critical attitude is supposed to require an external and autonomous position—at the same time detached and disinterested.” Instead, Shusterman’s soma-aesthetics proposes “a model of immanent critique in which our critical perspective does not require one to situate oneself completely outside of the situation at hand, but simply necessitates one to look reflexively at that situation without being absorbed by immediate feelings; this is a perspective where the posture is more decentered than external.” His definition of critique is based on the capacity of the body to discriminate among experiences: the body poses critical judgments. He applies this model of “immanent critique” to architecture as he believes—along with the so-called ‘postcritical’—that “[architects] cannot stand outside of what entangles them in the world […]. The architect can only be complicit and tangle with it.” Shusterman thus affirms that pragmatism is far from being incompatible with criticality: it offers a helpful alternative view on criticality.

In the same text, Shusterman attempts to defend a second aspect of Somol and Whiting’s projective architecture: their emphasis on the atmospheric quality of architectural production. For Shusterman, there is a critical potential in those qualities, which is rarely recognized: “Suspicion always weighs on these dimensions, which are in principle considered as ungraspable and useless for exercising criticality.” This view echoes Whiting’s concern that what architects are dealing with (designing objects, spaces, atmospheres) is regrettably not associated with any moral or critical capacity. But Shusterman explains why he believes that atmospheric qualities and affective dimensions of architecture do have a critical potential: our attention to these aspects can be practiced; they
can become the object of conscious (critical) judgments. For Shusterman, the challenge of criticality in architecture is in the development of our sensibility to these somatic perceptions.

4. THE PROBLEMATIC CONFLATION OF ETHICS AND AESTHETICS

Such a reconciliation of ethics and aesthetics features many promises but it still needs to overcome certain objections deriving from the fact that architects are more often accused of confusing ethics and aesthetics than they are of keeping them separated. They often pretend to deal with ethical issues directly through the aesthetic dimensions of their oeuvre. They do this by assimilating good aesthetics with morality, by attributing moral virtues to tectonics and forms.

In a book that takes the form of a pamphlet against architecture’s autonomy, Jeremy Till denounces this fact because “ethics are thus detached from their essential condition of being worked out through shared negotiation and instead are situated in a very controlled environment that positions the architect as arbiter.” Till denies that ethical properties may be attributed to materials or objects or configurations themselves. He denounces the claim that if a brick wall is carefully built, it is not only a source of aesthetic pleasure or technical mastery but also becomes morally valuable. This critique thus brings us back to the ‘object’. Till notes that such a conflation of aesthetics and ethics can only happen “in the parallel universe where morals are attached to objects.” And he believes that it is a very dangerous conflation, as architects absolve themselves of a part of their responsibility regarding other humans just because they have been faithful to the tectonic properties of the bricks. Or even worse, the bricks are made responsible for the consequences rather than those who designed them. That is what happened with modernist social housing, accused on its own of all social troubles, as if the buildings could be detached from those who decide for them, design and maintain them, live in them. Till is radical on this topic: “To put it simply: a brick has no morals.” He firmly stands on the side of those who upset Whiting by stating that “a focus on the building and its objecthood and certainly on its form is simply irresponsible.”

Actually, Till’s problem is not with architectural objects in general but with the way they are considered as isolated from their social setting and from their consequences on the human beings affected. The problem with “objecthood” is when it is all about static objects, produced from the inside of an autonomous field of practice, as if they were independent of external matters. What is needed might then just be, as Stefan Koller notes, “a proper ontology of architecture [which] will individuate architectural entities in a way that accommodates social relations.” The question is thus not just about the possible reconciliation of aesthetics and ethics but
about the way architectural entities are considered. To readdress our moral relationship to objects, we must reconsider the ontological weight we attribute to them.

5. PRAGMATISM 2: ETHNOGRAPHY OF ARCHITECTURAL ‘THINGS’

In the face of that question, yet another pragmatist thread in architecture might be traced. This one appeared under the form of ethnographic accounts of architectural practices. Such work consists in attentive depictions of architects at work. Ethnographic accounts borrow their methods from similar works conducted in Science and Technology Studies (STS), and their views from the Actor-Network Theory (ANT). The main exponent of this thread is Albena Yaneva, whose first major publication is subtitled “A Pragmatist Approach to Architecture.”

These ethnographic descriptions of architectural ‘objects’—architecture’s so-called products and tools: buildings, plans, models, etc.—show how far such objects are from being static. By observing how they are mobilized and circulate in a given situation, the ethnographer can point to the fact that objects are acting upon people; they are not only being used. Some of these studies focus on the devices used by architects (models, plans, sketches) and depict such devices as active participants in the design process instead of as mere passive tools. Others show how a building in the making—which has not been built yet and may not be built—does already have a (moral) life of its own as it gathers lots of concerns around it:

Following the proactive powers of architectural projects to mobilize heterogeneous actors, convincing, persuading or deterring them, buildings will be tackled here as becoming social (instead of hiding behind or serving the social), as active participants in society.

These ethnographies show how poorly architects are armed to understand the situations they are in and which involve humans as well as nonhumans, in strangely symmetrical ways. Usually, nonhumans are neatly separated from humans: they are considered
as static and passive, they are at best useful, at worse constraining; and if they show any traces of activity at all, it is only in support of humans’ projections. Together with Bruno Latour, Yaneva regrets that the object is always detached from the concerns it actively provokes:

*A building is always a ‘thing’ that is, etymologically, a contested gathering of many conflicting demands. [...] And yet we either see the uncontested static object standing ‘out there,’ ready to be reinterpreted, or we hear about the conflicting human purposes, but are never able to picture the two together!*

These descriptions of architectural practices offer a radical perspective on nonhumans and the way they engage moral problems posed to architects at work. The authors, however, do not suggest any form of programmatic ambition, except for a methodological agenda. Yet, new ways of representing the practice ‘as it actually is’ can result in surprising accounts for practitioners themselves, who might have to reevaluate their practice. These precise (and potentially powerful) descriptions will hopefully nourish more conceptual (more philosophical) and more speculative works in architecture. Indeed, when ethnography starts to “repopulate” social sciences with nonhumans, it opens many philosophical and moral questions: let us admit these beings do play an active role; are they to be considered ‘moral’ as well? Once their claim to be taken as such is heard, the contours of the moral itself are redrawn, precisely along these claims.

6. PRAGMATISM 3: AN ECOLOGY OF THINGS

Several works in moral and political philosophy address these questions from a pragmatist perspective. Two of them seem particularly relevant here: Emilie Hache’s “Propositions pour une écologie pragmatique” and Jane Bennett’s “A Political Ecology of Things”. Both opt for a pragmatist approach departing from empirical descriptions of problematic situations on which they then build their moral or political philosophy. Their approaches and concepts are based on a double pragmatist legacy: that of the ‘founding fathers’ (mainly James’s moral philosophy and Dewey’s political theory) and that of Bruno Latour (his pragmatist sociology as well as his pluralist empiricism). Although they are not dealing with architecture at all, they address our responsibility regarding ‘things’ when their ability to claim is recognized. They might thus serve as sources for further developments in architecture, regarding the problem addressed here.

Emilie Hache’s work provides a pragmatist account of moral responsibility in the face of the present ecological crisis. Hache opts for a version of responsibility that is ‘heteronomous’. It is not based on the autonomy of the moral subject who must be responsible for her actions. On the contrary, responsibility is understood as ‘responsiveness’, meaning that one has to respond to claims that are pronounced by others. And with the
ecological crisis, more and more things start to make claims. Also, things—which used to be mute—are much louder when their existence is threatened; humans also become more attentive when they understand that they are directly concerned. Hache borrows this idea from Latour’s work in political ecology, where he describes the ecological crisis as “a general revolt of the means”: more ‘objects’ or ‘nonhumans’ require to be considered as ends; they impose themselves as such. Their claims impinge on human beings in the form of concerns: glaciers are becoming moral, as they gather concerns around them. Opting for a pragmatist perspective, there is no point saying that glaciers are moral as such. For Dewey, values are not prior abstract principles; they are not definitely inscribed into things either; instead they manifest themselves in the way we care for things. Things thus become moral in situations, to the extent that moral concerns gather around them. But it is unfair to consider them as mere material stuff unable to claim: they have their own path of existence, which is now in danger, and which comes into calling for our attention. A pragmatist ‘heteronomous’ responsibility thus allows us to consider things as being made moral. But their morality is not imposed upon them—projected on them—by human beings, who choose once and for all what can be declared moral or not. Instead, moral responsibility lies in the relationship one maintains with things. “The moral dimension comes from a certain way to be well treated by another, from the way one addresses another.” An idea of morality built on pragmatist philosophy is thus relational: no one and no thing is moral on its own; the question is always about “becoming moral together.” Responsibility relies on the attribution of unforeseen competences to another, forming attributes that did not preexist the relation.

An answer to our initial problem starts to appear here: architects’ responsibility also depends on the attribution of moral capacities to ‘objects’ as far as we interact with them. Also, it becomes clear that it is not a matter of definitely inscribing ‘objects’ into
the realm of moral, even under certain conditions; the realm of the moral itself is redefined in a pragmatist way. As William James notes, there is no moral *in vacuo* and there can be no definition of moral outside of given situations where concerns emerge.\(^{37}\)

Jane Bennett’s work follows arguments close to Hache’s and she is very explicit on the agenda this entails. She affirms that “the ethical task at hand here is to cultivate the ability to discern nonhuman vitality, to become perceptually open to it.”\(^{38}\) Despite of all the similarities with Hache’s pragmatist moral philosophy, Bennett’s appeal to “vital materialism” introduces more than a difference of vocabulary. By insisting on things’ vitality or vibrancy, vital materialism tends to attribute to things a certain degree of life which is independent from their relation with humans. Yet, Bennett situates our ethical responsibility in the “assemblages in which we find ourselves participating,”\(^{39}\) and thus also insists on the relational aspect of responsibility. By defining ethics as “a cultivated discernment of the web of agentic capacities,”\(^{40}\) she insists on the responsibility which a pragmatist moral philosophy imposes on every practitioner: an inquiry on all beings concerned, characterized by an increased attention to their demands to be heard, and followed by the obligation to respond to them.

7. CONCLUSION: CONSIDERING OBJECTS OTHERWISE

All these pragmatist insights provide a promising answer to the issue raised by Whiting’s concern that “responsibility is acquainted with everything but the object: its relations, origins, use, life and context”. This problem matters and requires a proper answer: can we care for objects and still be morally responsible? Would it be possible for architects not to be forced to choose among these concerns, not to consider them as mutually exclusive? As formulated, this problem may lead us to seek moral attributes in objects themselves, in order to include them in the definition of a moral domain populated with moral beings. The question then becomes: under what conditions can an object be considered moral? But this question cannot be asked nor answered in general. It is not enough to reverse Whiting’s sentence and argue that ‘responsibility is acquainted with the object, only as far as it is dependent on its relations, origins, use, life and context.’

Responsibility is a matter of considering objects otherwise,\(^{41}\) recognizing their agency, hearing their ability to claim, and acting in the face of their consequences. But, opting for a pragmatist perspective, the aim is not to define objects as moral once and for all, to include them in the realm of moral, while leaving the moral domain untouched. Indeed, following William James, the moral has nothing to with a delineated domain where some things are included while others are excluded. According to him, situations become moral as soon as claims emerge, because they imply
obligations to be dealt with. Thus, pragmatism does not allow philosophy to decide which objects are generally to be considered moral or not. Instead, morality is a matter of situation; the philosopher can only inquire on ever more ways of being moral, ways which are always situated. Consequently, morality requires those who are involved in a given situation (designers among others) to note how objects claim and to invent ways to make them matter. It is in this sense only that Whiting’s sentence can be reversed, and experimental answers can be tried with in architectural practice.

ENDNOTES
2. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
Design Magazine Reader (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2007).
19. Ibid., 36.
20. Ibid., 34.
21. Ibid., 46.
23. Ibid., 174.
24. Ibid., 177.
32. Bruno Latour’s work is exemplary of such a continued enterprise: departing from a series of ethnographic inquiries into modern practices (science, law, economics, etc.), the anthropologist lately turned into a philosopher: his Inquiry into Modes of Existence turns the empirical material collected into the ontological project of pluralizing modes of existence.


39. Ibid., 37.

40. Ibid., 38.

41. In a way, my proposition follows David Leatherbarrow’s when he proposes an “architecture oriented otherwise,” an architecture “oriented beyond itself,” which would accommodate forces beyond the architect’s control. But only in a way, because Leatherbarrow’s notion of orientation focuses more on the way architectural objects inscribe themselves or distinguish themselves from their physical surroundings, and less on the way the physical environment can be taken into account and thereby be made moral. See David Leatherbarrow, *Architecture Oriented Otherwise* (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 2008).