The practice of architectural criticism is supercharged with ethical evaluations. We praise certain works of architecture for their sustainability, their inspiring and enlivening character, their encouragement of an autonomous and satisfying life for their users, or their contribution to the peaceful cohabitation of different social or ethnic groups. We criticize other works for the harm they cause to the environment, for their negative impact on the health or well-being of human beings, for the morally reprehensible attitudes they convey or the morally despicable functions they serve. Such assessments of architectural works are of an ethical nature, or at least possess an ethical dimension. I take this feature of architectural criticism seriously and wish to address two questions: Do ethical assessments of architectural works have any bearing on their value as works of architecture? And how is the ethical value of an architectural work related to its aesthetic value? The answers I defend are, roughly, that the ethical value of an architectural work has a bearing on its architectural value, and that the ethical and aesthetic value of such a work have a bearing on each other. More precisely:

1) A work of architecture will in some cases be architecturally flawed (or meritorious) due to the fact that it has ethical flaws (or merits).
2) A work of architecture will in some cases be aesthetically flawed (or meritorious) due to the fact that it has ethical flaws (or merits).
3) A work of architecture will in some cases be ethically flawed (or meritorious) due to the
fact that it has aesthetic flaws (or merits).

In claims 1 to 3, “work of architecture” is to be understood in a very broad sense, including works of artistic as well as of everyday architecture, and buildings as well as other elements of the built environment, such as bridges and squares. Such a broad notion of an architectural work suits my purpose since buildings and other elements of the built environment can – regardless of whether they are artworks or not – be judged from an ethical as well as from an aesthetic point of view, and it certainly makes sense to assess their overall value, what I call “architectural value”.

The questions about the relation between ethical, aesthetic and architectural value arises thus for architectural works in the broad sense. Moreover, this broad notion is of great importance since our built environment contains much more than buildings, and most of what it contains are not (or, at least, are not typically considered to be) artworks.

In this article, my main concern is to defend claims 1 to 3. In my argument I will mention particular works of architecture, but any detailed examination of specific works is beyond the scope of this article and will have to wait for another occasion. Before I defend my three core claims (sections 2 to 4), I first further specify the proposed view these claims substantiate, distinguish that view from opposing views and explain what is at stake in holding the view (section 1).

1. Moderate Moralism

Claims 1 to 3 define what I call *moderate moralism* with respect to architecture. It is a form of moralism for two reasons. Firstly, it claims that there is some ‘interaction’ between ethical assessments of architectural works and their aesthetic and architectural assessments, where claims 1 to 3 define the nature of that interaction. This distinguishes moderate moralism from *autonomism*, which holds that ethical flaws or merits are never aesthetically and/or architecturally relevant; either because it makes no sense to morally evaluate works of architecture (radical autonomism), or because the ethical assessment and the aesthetic or the architectural assessment of an architectural work never interact (moderate autonomism). Secondly, moderate moralism claims that the relations between the ethical value and the aesthetic and architectural value are invariant and symmetric, i.e. positive ethical qualities are always associated with positive aesthetic and architectural qualities and negative ethical qualities are always associated with negative aesthetic and architectural qualities. This distinguishes it from *contextualism*, which agrees with moderate moralism that the ethical value of a work of architecture can have a bearing on the
aesthetic and architectural value, but takes it to be a contextual matter whether an ethical flaw or merit is aesthetically and/or architecturally meritorious or defective. According to contextualism, the relations between ethical, aesthetic and architectural values are complex and invertible, i.e. negative ethical qualities can in certain cases be associated with positive aesthetic or architectural qualities, and *vice versa*. In this respect, moderate moralism is more demanding than contextualism.⁴ What makes it nonetheless a moderate form of moralism is that it does not claim that ethical assessments of architectural works and their aesthetic and architectural assessments always interact.

My use of the terms in italics differs from their usage within the recent debate on the relationship between art, aesthetics and morality.⁵ This is partly due to the fact that I deal with architecture whereas the recent debate is focused mainly on the representational arts, such as literature and painting. The main difference is that moderate moralism or (as Berys Gaut calls it) ethicism is usually defined only by a claim regarding the influence of the ethical on the aesthetic, i.e. by a claim of type 2. In particular, it does not involve anything which corresponds to the distinction between aesthetic and architectural value, and thus no claim of type 1. The value of a piece of literature or a painting is its aesthetic or, maybe, artistic value, but the value of architectural works in my broad sense is, as we will see, not exhausted by their aesthetic value, and it cannot generally be identified with their artistic value since most buildings and other elements of the built environment are not artworks. Moreover, moderate moralism as it is usually defined does not include any claim regarding whether the aesthetic value of a work has a bearing on its ethical value. But this question, addressed in claim 3, is especially pressing in the case of architecture since due to their public character architectural works unavoidably affect people’s well-being. Hence my version

“My version of moderate moralism is more ambitious than the view is often characterized.”
of moderate moralism is more ambitious than the view is customarily characterized as being.

Whether architects should regard themselves as moderate moralists has important implications for how they should conceive of their profession. If moderate moralism is correct about the relation between ethical, aesthetic and architectural values, then ethical considerations belong to the core of architecture and must play a crucial role in design, planning and construction processes. Architects cannot dismiss ethical criticisms of their works as irrelevant or misguided in principle. Moreover, they cannot defend ethical flaws of their works by arguing that these flaws contribute to the aesthetic worth of the works, as would be possible if contextualism were right; at most, they can argue that the ethical flaws in question are neither aesthetically nor architecturally relevant.

Before I turn to claims 1 to 3, here is what I mean by ethical, aesthetic and architectural values of works of architecture. Firstly, I construe the ethical in a wide sense, according to which it concerns normative questions regarding what is morally right or wrong, as well as evaluative questions regarding the good life. Thus the ethical value of an architectural work includes its positive or negative contributions to the good life and the well-being of people, as well as its promotion or violation of moral rights or duties. Secondly, the aesthetic is also to be understood in a wide sense, according to which it concerns questions regarding aesthetic experiences and properties (aesthetic questions in a narrow sense), as well as questions specifically regarding artistic architecture, for instance, about artistic style, expression, genre and art-history. Beside its capacity to yield aesthetic experiences (aesthetic value in the narrow sense), the aesthetic value of an architectural work with art-status thus also includes, for example, stylistic, expressive and art-historic qualities, which contribute to the artistic value of the work. Aesthetic value cannot generally be identified with artistic value since we can aesthetically experience buildings and other elements of the built environment which are not artworks. Such structures can thus have aesthetic value (in the narrow sense) even if they do not have artistic value. Finally, I construe architectural value as the total value of a work of architecture as such. It includes all qualities appropriate to consider when evaluating an architectural work. Aesthetic properties are certainly among these qualities, but even in the case of architectural works with art-status they do not exhaust them. Thesis 1 claims that at least some ethical properties should also go into an overall evaluation of an architectural work. I leave it open which further properties or values constitute architectural value, but it seems likely that utility, durability, social values
and cognitive values are also among the qualities that should be considered in an overall evaluation of a work of architecture. Architectural value can thus not be equated with the aesthetic or the artistic value of an architectural work.

2. ETHICAL VALUE AND ARCHITECTURAL VALUE

Claim 1 states that architectural value partly depends on ethical value in such a manner that a work of architecture will in some cases be architecturally flawed (or meritorious) due to the fact that it has ethical flaws (or merits). This might seem uncontroversial if the architectural value represents the total value of an architectural work. However, autonomists raise two objections against this first thesis. According to the first objection, we morally assess people (their actions, motives, intentions and characters), but it makes no sense to morally evaluate artifacts such as architectural works. Moral evaluations of such works, so the objection goes, are based on a category mistake since moral criticism assumes moral responsibility and thus moral agency, but architectural works have no mental states and can thus not be moral agents. 

However, such artifacts as laws and constitutions, for instance, are also subject to moral evaluation. Hence, there is no general objection against artificial products of human activity being subject to ethical assessment. Moreover, a closer look at critical practices reveals that we can and do morally evaluate architectural works. Firstly, we morally evaluate such works with respect to their planning, design, and construction processes. A building can, for instance, be ethically criticized due to a violation of moral rights during its construction phase, at least in certain instances. Secondly, we morally evaluate architectural works with respect to their impact on the environment. A building can, for instance, be ethically criticized due to its disproportionate emission of pollutants,
energy consumption, and waste of resources. Thirdly, we morally evaluate architectural works with respect to their impact on individuals and society. A building can, for instance, be ethically criticized because it negatively influences the health, well-being, or behavior of individuals, and because of its negative social ramifications. Finally, we morally evaluate architectural works with respect to their functions, symbolic meanings, and forms. Clearly, such aspects can be ethically evaluated regarding their impact on human beings and the environment. However, there may be reasons for ethically evaluating them regardless of their impact. Some functions seem to be ethically objectionable, regardless of whether they actually impair any person’s well-being. The symbolic meaning of a building that expresses morally abject attitudes seems to deserve a negative ethical evaluation, regardless of its actual influence on people. And Nigel Taylor has argued that the form of a building which has obviously not received requisite care is ethically objectionable, regardless of how it actually influences the well-being of persons. The first three ways to morally evaluate architectural works determine their extrinsic ethical value, since such evaluations concern the conditions under which the works are developed, as well as their causal effects. The last one establishes the intrinsic ethical value of an architectural work, since such an evaluation concerns features of the work itself, regardless of how it affects people and the environment. Within the debate about the relation between ethical and aesthetic values of artworks, the ethical value is often restricted to the intrinsic ethical value which, in turn, is typically construed solely in terms of the ethical features of attitudes that the artwork manifests. However, such a conception of ethical value is too narrow for architecture and rules out consequentialist considerations from the beginning.

Thus there are senses in which judging architectural works along ethical lines appears reasonable and is common practice. But how should such ethical judgments be interpreted? It has been argued that such judgments should be re-described as evaluations of what is done through the works by those who have participated in their realization and maintenance, and can be meaningfully considered responsible for. According to this view, the ethical appraisal is primarily directed towards people who commission, design, construct or use an architectural work, and only obliquely towards the work itself. Others have argued that we can at least take particular moral assessments of architectural works at face value if we distinguish between moral responsibility and moral accountability. From such a perspective, an architectural work itself can be morally accountable, even though it cannot be made morally responsible due to its lack of moral agency. My answer to the first objection against claim 1 does not require any decision.
as to which strategy is more promising.

The second objection against claim 1 grants that architectural works can be morally evaluated, but insists that the ethical cannot be architecturally relevant since some architectural works are good or even great works of architecture, even though they are severely ethically flawed. Some (architecturally) great works are ethically flawed due to a violation of moral principles during their planning and building phase; perhaps corruption was involved, or exploitation, or discrimination, forced labor, even the use of slaves, as is the case for the Egyptian pyramids. Other great works are ethically problematic due to harm they cause to the environment, as is the case for minimally insulated modernist buildings with ecologically wasteful heating systems. Further great works are ethically deficient due to negative impacts on the health or well-being of humans, either due to immoral intended use (as with the Roman Coliseum), or due to functional unsuitability (as in case of Mies van der Rohe’s Farnsworth House, where comfort is sacrificed for the sake of aesthetics). There also exist great buildings that are ethically flawed due to morally objectionable attitudes or views they express; an example is Giuseppe Terragni’s Casa del Fascio, which is often described as symbolizing fascist ideologies.¹⁴

This objection applies only to an extreme moralism, according to which architectural value is exclusively determined by ethical value. Such extreme moralism is implausible since we evaluate works of architecture with respect to a wide variety of qualities, such as their beauty, originality, site specificity, durability, functionality, or clarity. A moderate moralist should be a pluralist with regard to architectural value and acknowledge that, beside ethical values, architectural value also encompasses aesthetic, design, and use-values, as well as art-historic, social and cognitive values, among other
things. Then he can hold that a building is architecturally flawed as it is ethically flawed, but that it has many architectural merits, which make it a good or even great work of architecture overall.

3. ETHICAL VALUE AND AESTHETIC VALUE

The main argument for my second claim – that an architectural work will in some cases be aesthetically flawed (or meritorious) due to ethical flaws (or merits) – is that it best suits our evaluative practices. This can, for instance, be demonstrated with reference to the role functional considerations play in architectural criticism.

Such considerations are crucial for evaluations of architectural works since architecture is essentially functional. It does not only deal with shapes and forms, but these shapes and forms must be arranged such as to provide a suitable framework for specific human activities. As I have pointed out, functional considerations have a bearing on the ethical evaluation as functional suitability of an architectural work can influence the well-being of its users. We can, for example, praise a building ethically for spatial adequacy and user-friendliness. However, functional considerations frequently influence also the aesthetic evaluation of an architectural work. It is widely assumed that we can, for example, aesthetically praise a building due to its functional beauty. A building can be functionally beautiful if it is, and also appears, fit for its function, since the expectations triggered by our knowledge of its function appear to be satisfied. Thus many Art Nouveau residential buildings appear to offer a place suitable for living. A building can also be functionally beautiful if it exhibits a pleasing tension with respect to its function, given that it fulfills its purpose yet shows some surprising features in relation to its functional category. Mies van der Rohe’s Boiler Plant at the Illinois Institute of Technology, for instance, functioned well though its tower-like chimney and high clerestory windows made it look more like an early church. Finally, an architectural work can be functionally beautiful if it is elegant with respect to its function, by meeting our expectations and fulfilling its function in efficient or ingenious ways. Robert Maillart’s Salginatobel Bridge, for instance, crosses a steep valley in a bold and elegant manner without employing unnecessary elements. In this way, functional adequacy (or inadequacy) can be an ethical as well as an aesthetic merit (or flaw) of an architectural work. Hence, there are ethical merits (or flaws) of architectural works that constitute aesthetic merits (or flaws). This is what 2 claims.

In the remainder of this section, I further defend my second thesis by addressing four objections. The Irrelevant Dimensions Objection insists
that not every ethical flaw of an architectural work is aesthetically relevant: A building during construction of which human rights of workers have been violated, or a building which uses materials produced under inhuman conditions, may be ethically flawed, but it is doubtful whether such a building is consequently aesthetically flawed. This, however, is not an objection against my second thesis, since 2 only claims that ethical flaws or merits of architectural works will in some cases be aesthetically relevant. Moderate moralism postulates only that an architectural work is aesthetically flawed (or meritorious) when it contains an ethical flaw (or merit) which is aesthetically relevant. This raises the question whether there are general conditions of aesthetic relevance with regard to architecture. It seems unlikely that there exist strict criteria, but we might hope to find symptoms of the aesthetic relevance of ethical flaws or merits. As a rough idea, an ethical flaw or merit tends to be aesthetically relevant if it is essentially connected to at least one main feature of architectural works; frequently mentioned candidates for such features are (a building’s) form, function, structure, and meaning. An ethical flaw is essentially connected to such a feature if the feature could not have been realized or maintained in morally legitimate ways, or if the flaw consists of ethically problematic aspects or effects of this feature. A general account of aesthetic relevance is certainly desirable, yet not necessary to argue successfully for 2.

Autonomists (as defined in section 1) often invoke another argument against 2: the Aesthetic Attitude Objection. It claims that ethical flaws or merits of an architectural work are never aesthetically relevant because we adopt an aesthetic attitude when we assess works aesthetically, and this attitude is insensitive to moral considerations. The aesthetic attitude is generally characterized in terms of disinterested attention to the aesthetic object. It has been questioned whether such a specific aesthetic
attitude exists, but even if it does, a dilemma arises. Either the aesthetic attitude is understood as precluding any appeal to functional considerations, or it is understood in some other way. In Jerome Stolnitz’s approach, for instance, disinterestedness requires a deliberate withholding of concepts so that the very attempt to conceptualize an object in terms of its function is incompatible with adopting an aesthetic attitude. If the attitude is understood in these terms it is too narrow for capturing everything that is aesthetically relevant, since functional considerations are aesthetically relevant. Alternatively, the aesthetic attitude is understood in such a way that it may include an appeal to functional considerations. According to Glenn Parsons and Allen Carlson, for instance, disinterestedness only requires an object to be appreciated for its own sake rather than for some personal benefit it may signify, but this does not entail experiencing an object without applying any concepts to it. If the attitude is understood in this manner it need not be insensitive to moral considerations, since functional considerations are ethically relevant. Hence, the aesthetic attitude is either too narrow or not necessarily insensitive to moral considerations.

A third objection against my second thesis has been put forward by contextualists (as defined in section 1). They claim that ethical flaws of works are sometimes aesthetic merits at the same time. One major argument for this view is the Immoral Function Objection. As we have seen, an architectural work may be aesthetically meritorious when it is functionally beautiful. However, an architectural work can be functionally beautiful with respect to an immoral function. In such a case, the work is aesthetically meritorious due to the fact that it is ethically flawed. Thus, the ethical flaws of architectural works may be in some cases aesthetic merits. An argument along these lines has been put forward by Andrea Sauchelli. His example is the Basilica of Saint Peter in Rome. A critic of Catholicism might argue that it has the immoral function of promoting an ideological worldview that harmfully influences moral education. However, the critic might, at the same time, appreciate the ingenuity and adequacy of the Basilica’s design to the end of fulfilling this immoral function. The critic might argue that the Basilica is functionally beautiful with respect to an immoral function, thus illustrating a building’s ethical flaw that at the same time is an aesthetic merit. In such cases, though, it is not the ethical flaw as such that promotes the aesthetic merit. The aesthetic merit is based on the function, not on the immorality. In contrast to a comedy that achieves its humor by means of the immorality of its point of view, the Basilica does not succeed aesthetically due to its immoral function, but due to a function that just happens to be immoral. Hence the example does not establish any particular connection between aesthetic value and immorality.
Sauchelli himself ponders such an answer to his objection against moderate moralism.\textsuperscript{25} This may indicate that we should construe his objection as an instance of another objection against 2, i.e. the \textit{Inseparability Objection}.\textsuperscript{26} According to moderate moralism, some moral flaws are aesthetic flaws, so it seems that the removal of such moral flaws should lead to aesthetic improvement of the work – but this is not the case. An aesthetically commendable feature of an architectural work (e.g., its functional beauty) may depend on its moral flaws (i.e., having an immoral function). Hence removing the moral flaw (replacing the immoral function by a morally good one) would not necessarily aesthetically improve the work, since it might then no longer be functionally beautiful. However, as Gaut stresses, moderate moralism does not claim that removal of a moral flaw \textit{invariably} leads to an aesthetically better work. Moderate moralism is formulated in terms of the \textit{pro tanto} principle that an architectural work is aesthetically flawed when it contains ethical flaws; in other words, that ethical flaws of a work diminish its aesthetic value.\textsuperscript{27} But moderate moralism does not hold that removing an ethical flaw must – \textit{all things considered} – aesthetically improve the work. The reason is that removing the ethical flaw (namely, replacing the immoral function) might remove some other aesthetic merit depending on that flaw (namely, its functional beauty). Thus, moderate moralism agrees with contextualism that removing a moral flaw might not aesthetically improve an architectural work, all things considered, but moderate moralism insists that, when a work is ethically flawed, it is aesthetically flawed, too.\textsuperscript{28}

Let me illustrate this claim by using the example of the Farnsworth House. According to moderate moralism, the house is aesthetically flawed due to the fact that it is ethically flawed because of its functional unsuitability. However, this claim does not imply that improving the user-friendliness of the house will improve it aesthetically. This will

\begin{quote}
\textit{Moderate moralism does not claim that the removal of a moral flaw invariably leads to an aesthetically better work.}
\end{quote}
hardly be the case since the house achieves its remarkable beauty precisely because it distills habitability to the breaking point. That many aesthetic qualities of the house depend on its user-unfriendliness does, however, not imply that it is the ethical flaw which makes the house aesthetically appealing. The kind of beauty the house exhibits may only be achievable at the cost of the ethical flaw of being functionally unsuitable, but the ethical flaw is not among the features that we aesthetically appreciate. (I here presuppose that not all beauty a building can have is of a narrowly functional variety.) Moreover, the claim that the house is aesthetically flawed due to its ethical flaw is compatible with claiming that it is excellent from an aesthetic point of view and a great work of architecture. The aesthetic flaw constituted by its ethical flaw is clearly outweighed by other aesthetic merits of the house.

4. AESTHETIC VALUE AND ETHICAL VALUE

Debates regarding relations between ethical and aesthetic values usually discuss whether the ethical value of a work can influence its aesthetic value. The converse question – whether the aesthetic value of a work can influence its ethical value – is rarely discussed. My third thesis affirmatively answers this further question; here is an argument:

P1) An architectural work is ethically flawed (or meritorious) when it impairs (or promotes) human well-being.

P2) Since living in an aesthetically appealing environment is essential to human well-being, an architectural work will in some cases impair (or promote) human well-being due to aesthetic flaws (or merits).

C) An architectural work will in some cases be ethically flawed (or meritorious) due to its aesthetic flaws (or merits). (Thesis 3.)

All three steps of this argument are pro tanto claims. The influence of an architectural work on the well-being of human beings is not the only factor to determine its ethical value. For instance, the work can also be ethically flawed because it contributes to violation of moral rights. And having aesthetic merits or flaws is not the only factor to determine whether a work promotes or impairs human well-being, or whether it is ethically meritorious or flawed. The work can, for instance, also promote human well-being and be ethically praiseworthy because it is structurally safe and suits its function. Furthermore, P2 and C are qualified as relevant in some cases, since not all aesthetic merits and flaws are sufficiently significant to be ethically relevant or have serious impact on human well-being.

This argument leaves three big questions to address. The first two
concern P1, the third P2. Firstly, whose well-being should be considered in ethical evaluation of an architectural work? For fairness’ sake, this must encompass all persons affected by the work. Due to their public character, architectural works affect even the well-being of persons not directly involved in constructing or using them. Due to their durability, they affect people for a long time, often over many generations. Hence not only the well-being of architects, workers, and users should be taken into consideration, but also the well-being of neighbours and passers-by, for instance; and not only the current well-being of people, but also their future well-being – even the well-being of future generations.

Secondly, what does it mean to promote or impair the well-being of affected human beings? This depends on the account of well-being. According to a “desire-satisfaction” account, well-being lies in the satisfaction of one’s informed desires, that is, desires one would have if one were fully or at least sufficiently informed about one’s situation. It is likely that these desires include the desire to live in an aesthetically pleasing environment, as well as much more specific aesthetic preferences, which may vary across persons and cultures. The main problem with such accounts is that people may desire things that run counter to their own (and other people’s) well-being, and they may hold such desires even after being properly informed of such.

“Objective list” accounts, on the other hand, hold that well-being lies in possession of all or most of the goods to be found on a list, which is objective in the sense that its items contribute to our well-being even if we do not desire them. Most lists proposed in the literature contain an aesthetic asset – “aesthetic experience,” for instance, or “the awareness of true beauty.” A frequent objection to such accounts is that they ignore reasonable differences among people as to what well-being consists of. This objection can be accommodated

"THE KIND OF BEAUTY THE HOUSE EXHIBITS MAY ONLY BE ACHIEVABLE AT THE COST OF THE ETHICAL FLAW OF BEING FUNCTIONALLY UNSUITABLE, BUT THE ETHICAL FLAW IS NOT AMONG THE FEATURES THAT WE AESTHETICALLY APPRECIATE."
to some extent by admitting that the listed goods can often be realized in very different manners.

A third big question arises relative to subjective preferences, which include aesthetic propensities: Which qualities of an architectural work count as aesthetic merits, and which are considered aesthetic flaws? This may vary with culture and age, but also within a culture during a certain age. There is, for instance, often a divide between the aesthetic assessments of experts and those of laypersons. Architects and architectural critics tend to find certain forms, materials and styles beautiful, which laypersons may find ugly and unfriendly; and laypersons tend to find buildings aesthetically appealing, which experts may criticize as banal or kitschy. Taking aesthetic preferences of laypeople as authoritative might lead to a banal repetition of conventional structures; in many contexts, retro-architecture which imitates a well-established and popular style of the past may be what best fits the aesthetic preferences of the general public. Letting experts determine what is considered an aesthetic merit means adopting a paternalistic attitude. Both are undesirable stances. Since architectural works are part of our living environment, aesthetic preferences of people who use public spaces need to be taken into account in planning contexts as well as in political decisions regarding land-use. These aesthetic preferences, however, should not be regarded as simply given and unchanging, as laypersons may learn from experts who are more experienced in dealing with aesthetic questions. To navigate an intermediate course between uncritical satisfaction of laypersons’ aesthetic requirements and a paternalistic approach demands dialogue between architects and the public, and presents an educational challenge to architects and architectural critics.

**Conclusion**

I have proposed a broad notion of architectural value which includes all qualities appropriate to consider when evaluating a work of architecture. It is beyond dispute that aesthetic properties are among these qualities. My first thesis claims that at least some ethical properties are also among the qualities that should be considered in an architectural evaluation. My second and third theses concern relations between the ethical and the aesthetic value out of the values involved in composing the architectural value. These theses claim that the ethical and the aesthetic value interact in such a manner that an architectural work will in some cases be aesthetically flawed (or meritorious) due to the fact that it is ethically flawed (or meritorious) and *vice versa.*
ENDNOTES

1. However, I do not take for granted that, every time architects or architectural theorists use morally supercharged terminology, the evaluation is of an ethical nature. Since Vitruvius’ age, architects and architectural theorists have often used ethical terms in order to justify aesthetic preferences – e.g. when claiming that it be a moral duty to design buildings true to their materials, not hiding structural support, and expressing the spirit of their period. See Maurice Lagueux, “Ethics versus Aesthetics in Architecture,” The Philosophical Forum 35 (2004): 124-133.

2. “Work of architecture” is often understood in a much narrower sense and reserved for works of artistic architecture, which are distinguished from mere buildings. Nikolaus Pevsner, e.g., opens his Outline of European Architecture (Harmondsworth: Penguin, [1948] 1957, 23), with the famous remark: “A bicycle shed is a building; Lincoln Cathedral is a piece of architecture.”

3. What I mean by ethical, aesthetic and architectural values is further explained at the end of section 1.

4. Technically, the difference between moderate moralism and contextualism is as follows. Moderate moralism takes the value relations to be invariant and symmetric; according to contextualism, they are complex and invertible.

6. It could be argued that we should not be concerned with utility when evaluating a work of architecture as such because a building’s usefulness is disturbingly malleable over time while other features such as its beauty may endure. (Thanks to Tom Spector for raising this objection.) However, I do not think that the variability of a feature is a good reason not to consider that feature in an evaluation of an architectural work. Furthermore, in evaluating a work, we should distinguish between its intended and its actual function. An architectural work may have fulfilled its intended function, even though it is no longer in use (as in case of ancient temples), or it may function well, even though it did not fit the originally intended function (as in the case of Zaha Hadid’s Vitra fire station).


9. Under which conditions can we say that the architectural work itself is morally flawed in such cases? James Harold has suggested a counterfactual test for narrative artworks that can be adapted to architecture: The violation of moral rights during the planning and construction phase of an architectural work influences its moral evaluation if the same work could not have been realized without violating moral rights. See James Harold, “On Judging the Moral Value of Narrative Artworks,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 64 (2006): 259-270.


11. See, e.g., Gaut, Art, 6-9.


16. See Sauchelli, “Functional Beauty.” In contrast to Sauchelli, I assume


23. Positions committed to this claim are sometimes labeled “immoralism.” See Matthew Kieran, “Forbidden Knowledge: The Challenge of Immoralism,” in *Art and Morality*, ed. José Luis Bermúdez and Sebastian Gardner (London:
24. Sauchelli, “Functional Beauty,” 143-144. He admits that in some cases (such as Nazi extermination camps) immoral functions are perceived as so hideous that we are unable to aesthetically appreciate these buildings as functionally beautiful in virtue of their immoral functions.


27. A pro tanto aesthetic principle specifies the contribution an aesthetically relevant feature makes to the aesthetic value of a work, but it does not determine whether the work is aesthetically good, all things considered. In this way, the moderate moralist’s pro tanto principle that ethical flaws of an architectural work diminish its aesthetic value leaves open the possibility that an ethically flawed work is aesthetically good overall. This will be the case if the work has aesthetic merits which outweigh the aesthetic flaws of the work constituted by its ethical flaws (see the last paragraph of section 1).


29. While one could find historical examples, the matter is rarely discussed in the contemporary literature. An exception is Robert Stecker, “The Interaction of Ethical and Aesthetic Value,” *British Journal of Aesthetics* 45 (2005): 138-150.


35. I thank Stefan Koller, Tom Spector, and an anonymous reviewer for their constructive comments and suggestions.