CONFLICTING AND SHARED LIFEWORLDS OF PRACTICE:
ARCHITECTS AND PLANNERS

James M. Mayo, University of Kansas

ABSTRACT

Architects and planners have professional conflicts with each other, but they share common external constraints and opportunities in practice that shape their actions. These constraints include professional controls, societal ideologies, and organizational functions that dictate how architects and planners can practice. Their opportunities are grounded in the prescriptions that they can make. Architects and planners share work processes and ways of designing that they confront in problem solving. These constraints and opportunities are often found in the organizations within which architects and planners practice. Moreover, changes in the political economy similarly influence both professions in the work inputs and outputs that they experience.

INTRODUCTION

Architects and planners share similar visions of designing the good city, but they also have conflicts as to the best way to reach that end. They see their own lifeworlds of practice as justifiable without fully comprehending the dimensions of the other profession's limits and opportunities for practice. As a result, each profession often criticizes the other for a lack of effectiveness. Architects and planners often do not analyze the practice boundaries that functionally separate them. More important, architects and planners can fail to see how they share similar work habits and ways to prescribe solutions in professional practice. Their shared lifeworlds of practice are not static, because the dynamics of the political economy can simultaneously influence architects and planners in how they conduct practice in everyday life (Habermas 1987).

PROFESSIONAL PRECONDITIONS TO PRACTICE

There are important institutions that shape the lifeworlds of architects and planners that are not directly a part of their lifeworlds of practice. They have been educated within their individual fields of work. Each profession sustains organizations that purport certain principles that aim to guide individuals in practice. The lifeworlds of architects and planners are initially shaped by their educational degree programs. Architectural students spend many hours in the design studio. Although they take other classes, their educational world is aimed toward the development of architecture as an artful object. Architectural students usually take an obligatory course in city planning, but they often lack any education in the political and social dynamics of the city. Their formal education does not provide for teaching them who are the political players when they enter practice. Some architectural schools become involved with projects that are devoted to improving the housing and recreational conditions of have-nots. However, this involvement is present in some schools and absent in others (Boyer, Mitgang 1996). In contrast, many students in city planning come from the social sciences where they have attained some basic familiarity with public issues. In courses for planning theory and practice, students confront public interest dilemmas that private development poses in professional practice (Friedmann 1996). Planning students, however, often lack a basic understanding of designing the physical environment. Depending upon their specialization, some students need this training whereas others do not. To ensure that students are properly educated, professional organizations relevant to each profession have an oversight role. The National Architectural Accrediting Board and the Planning Accreditation Board require mandatory reviews to ensure that minimum educational standards are maintained. Thus, educators and institutional overseers play a role in forming the lifeworlds of future architects and planners by anticipating expectations that they will face in their respective professions.

Professional organizations have a role in shaping the practice lifeworlds of architects and planners. Both the American Institute of Architects (AIA) and the American Planning Association (APA) maintain lobby interests to influence any federal legislation that may influence their professions. State chapters have an equivalent but a weaker role in reviewing state legislation. At the city level, local chapters may comment on current issues but they typically have little to no influence in shaping public policy or shaping the debate in controversial development projects. Nonetheless,
the AIA and the American Institute of Certified Planners (AICP) each have a code of ethics that mentions the importance of supporting the public interest. As a final hurdle, to evaluate individual competency, the AICP and the National Council of Architectural Registration Boards (NCARB) examine practitioners for their competence. Passage of the NCARB exam enables a practitioner to be a registered architect and a full member of the AIA. Passage of the AICP exam allows planners to join this organization, which is equivalent to a registered planner, but state registration of planners is uncommon. All of these practice institutions provide architects and planners a general set of principles to uphold for urban betterment, but these organizations do not police practitioners with rules requiring them to uphold the public interest.

These professional institutions play an essential role in the education of their members and in sustaining a set of beliefs toward practice. They provide the norms and performance expectations that shape how a person perceives oneself as an architect or a planner. Although these professional groups provide the high ground for professional identity, there is the practice lifeworld that is less high-minded and equivalent to surviving in a swamp. Practitioners may lack knowledge for problems that their formal education did not address, and their solutions are the best guesses as to what should be done. Sometimes they succeed, and other times they fail. Nonetheless, they muddle through a problem terrain and learn to survive within it (Schon 1982).

DIFFERENCES AND CONFLICTS IN PRACTICE

Although architects and planners play a role in producing the built environment, they are quite different in how they understand and direct their practice. Architects typically think of space as a built form to be physically shaped by their expertise. In contrast, planners usually conceive of space as social constructs that constitute the distribution of activities and resources (Dagenhart, Sawicki 1992). These professions also differ in their emphases on means and ends for the built environment. Architects have traditionally related practice to the design of the building artifact, an emphasis on ends. Planners, however, have placed less emphasis on physical planning and more on the policies and procedures to modify space, a focus on means. Whereas both professions historically emphasized physical form, such as during the City Beautiful movement, planners have increasingly identified their work endeavors as much broader in scope than existed in the profession's early stage of development. Thus, the conceptual and practice conditions of these professions are often split and conflicted although both groups promote the need for a well-designed built environment.

The conflicts between architects and planners relate to how their spatial conceptions and emphases on means and ends are embedded in their most common practice institutions — private firms and public agencies. In land development, private firms usually focus upon accomplishing ends — preparing and implementing plans for clients. Public planning agencies primarily focus upon formulating and maintaining policies that guide project development from the private sector. The orientations of these organizations toward means and ends strongly influence the work of architects and planners.

Most architects and a minority of planners work in private firms. We take for granted that architects will work in an architectural firm, and in doing so, there is an agreement to certain assumptions. Architects work for profit, and they must develop a clientele to continue the survival of the firm. They can have both private and public clients, whose interests are served by the firm. There are partners who own the firm and dictate what work will be done, and employees will follow their aims unless they decide to leave (Cuff 1991). Planners also work in private firms. Some firms strictly contain planners, but planners also work in architectural and engineering firms. Their clients are most often municipalities that lack the expertise or planning staff to address local planning needs, from the preparation of a general plan to specialized plans, such as environmental impact statements. Planners sometimes are hired to work on large-scale projects that developers wish to implement, but the private-firm planner is primarily devoted to public planning. Thus architects tend to work more on projects with private clients than do planners. As a result, planners in private firms weigh public interest concerns in their consulting deliberations more than architects do.

The majority of planners work for public agencies whereas there are very few architects employed in these organizations. In the planning agency planners do not work for a
profit, and they see their clientele as the public. They do not serve private interests, but planners can serve minority interests when their work aims to redistribute justice and thus forward the public interest. When architects do work for public agencies, their work is highly specialized. Historic preservation agencies sometimes hire architects to review proposed plans that alter historic structures. Some cities have employed architects to oversee the implementation of public projects to see that buildings are properly constructed, but these positions are few. Compared to architects, planners have a significant presence in public agencies.

The conflicts between architects and planners have historically been most apparent when development projects require rezoning. Architects and landscape architects working in private firms typically prepare plans for land redevelopment. They must meet with planners in public agencies who review the land use and urban design character of their proposals. In these reviews planners typically propose changes that enable the plan to conform to existing controls. But there are no assurances that the planners will recommend to the planning and city commissions that the plan will be accepted. Increasingly there is another cadre of planners who may not confront architects directly but with whom they have conflicts. Planners in housing, transportation, and other fields help to shape policies that influence what can be built, but many of these planner types are not involved in plan reviews for ongoing projects. The practical conflicts between these two professions occur most often when architects must serve the private interests of developers and planners must foil any developer proposals that threaten the public interest.

SHARED CONTINGENCIES OF PRACTICE

The aims of private development are the primary factors that shape the conflicts between architects and planners, but despite these problems, they share a similar terrain for practice that is part of their work endeavors. Ideology, function, process, and design shape their practice lifeworlds.

Architects and planners have their practice externally constrained by ideological and functional conditions. Both professions allow their practices to be shaped by ideologies that they embrace. Their professions' ethics and educational requirements, discussed earlier, certainly play a role. But architects and planners must also conform to ideologies that systematically permeate their practice institutions (Forester 1985). In the U.S. architects typically accept, if not agree with capitalism and its free enterprise conditions. Planners, on the other hand, may accept capitalism, but their position in a public agency puts them within the reasoning of socialism. The local planning agency does not own the means of production, but it does regulate capitalist development plans. Both professions realize that their professional practice is shaped by a strong emphasis of capitalism and a modest degree of socialist tendencies, whether or not they approve of these influences. James Coleman (1982) notes that a separation between benefit rights and usage rights has occurred in the U.S. The result has been that people owning real estate properties have the right to benefit from them but they do not necessarily retain the right to control property usage. Coleman gives the example of a household owning a house that is a historic landmark. Owners can sell such a house but the local government can restrict how they can alter the landmark’s design and structure. He later argues that when government behaves as a corporate actor in controlling usage rights, there is a trend toward socialism. The rise of city planning in the twentieth century has largely been characterized by a shift from a purely capitalistic determination of property rights to local governments regulating control of the built environment.

In addition to prevailing ideologies, architects and planners also realize that their practice is also bounded by functions — such as economics, programming, cultural norms, and current issues. These functions are material constraints to any alternatives that they may prescribe. A developer places economic and programmatic constraints on a design project before the architect can analyze the design problem and provide solutions. The planner cannot ignore the current political issues that shape urban development or the public costs that a project may entail (Hoch 1988). A community’s culture manifests itself through the design regulations and requirements that limit private development. Planners are obliged to enforce these controls, and architects cannot ignore them without community objections. Thus, many battles that architects and planners have between each other are integrally related in meeting the ideological and
functional constraints that limit what they can propose.

The two professions, however, are not powerless in their work, because architects and planners are involved in work processes and make design proposals that shape outcomes. Their efforts are constrained by prevailing ideologies, and political, economic, and cultural functions limit their design proposals and plans. Nonetheless, their professional processes and conceptual designs play a definite role in shaping built outcomes.

Architects and planners have similar work processes and experiences in preparing prescriptions. Within their firms and agencies they influence their respective sources of power through the roles that they embrace. Architects may position themselves as star designers, pragmatists, or facilitators with their clients. Planners may embrace the roles of technician, politician, or a hybrid of these two to direct their practice (Ackerman 1969; Howe 1994; Mayo 1985). Both professions must become adept in negotiation and maintain a work process that results in producing effective design proposals. First, they must analyze problems and develop programmatic requirements. Next they develop alternatives to problems that comply with these requirements. Once choosing a plan or design alternative, they must see that their proposals are properly implemented. Finally, they evaluate the performance of their solutions and recommend revisions for the current project and future ones.

Architects and planners have similar aspirations for design as an achieved end. Architects are often providing design alternatives that meet their utopian ideas for good design. They can see a design outcome as a form of advertising to promote their firm. Both aims are for the future, but for the present architects can consider their designs meeting conventional needs or being a physical form of advocacy for their clients' needs. Planners have similar concerns. They construct design policies that will hopefully create visual unity. In reviewing rezoning cases, they become advocates for their design policies which architects and developers threaten with their building proposals. Thus, architects and planners have parallel prescriptive aspects of professional practice, although their prescriptions can be antagonistic to each other.

Although ideology, function, process, and design influence the practice of architects and planners, the importance of these contingencies is unevenly distributed between the professions. As argued earlier, architects tend to focus more on ends versus means and the reverse is true for planners. It becomes apparent that the nonmaterial aspects of practice, ideology and process, are means whereas the material conditions, function and design, are ends. More simply, architects may see their work primarily limited by functional constraints and therefore they emphasize design. In contrast, planners can be more concerned about the ideologies that limit their efforts, and for them, process is the key issue for being effective in their work.

There are differences in how architects and planners emphasize the external constraints that influence their work. It is too much to say that architects ignore ideology and planners forego functional limits. Planners have typically worked in public agencies grounded in public interest aims and regulations. As a result, their recommendations typically confront developer proposals that are capitalistic in nature. Planners constantly have to balance the rights of free enterprise development against the need to defend the public interest through public policy (Forester 1993). Architects typically have fewer problems confronting the planners' dilemma of conflicting political ideologies. Architects often assume the rightness of capitalist dynamics, because when they organize as private firms, they expect that this is how architecture is to be done. Moreover, they see their primary purpose is to serve their client's interests, not the public interest.

The differences between architects and planners are more apparent in the prescriptive character of their work. Clients expect architects to design a product. In contrast, the public, developers, and others largely expect planners to provide an orderly process that enables physical development to progress or to be limited, depending upon their interests. Considering the external constraints that influence their work, it is incorrect to say that architects deny process and planners reject design, but their emphases on these prescriptive practice conditions are uneven. Architects are concerned about how well they work with their clients, but their clients, building users, and design critics tend to focus on how well they provide good design ends. Similarly, the public expects planners to provide plans that typically forecast a city's
Table 1: Economic Structure and Practice Conditions

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<tr>
<th>Economy Type</th>
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<th>Planners</th>
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<td>Production</td>
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<td>Institutional Structure</td>
<td>Strong Delivery</td>
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<td>Work Inputs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Teams for Mass Production</td>
<td>Bureaucratic Officials for</td>
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<td>Specialized Workplace</td>
<td>Policymaking</td>
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<td>Work Outputs</td>
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<td>Rational Design for Efficiency</td>
<td>Comprehensive Plans</td>
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<td>Institutional Structure</td>
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<td>Work Inputs</td>
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<td>Small Batch Production</td>
<td>Policy Entrepreneurs</td>
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<td>Multiple-Skilled Workforce</td>
<td>Project Negotiation</td>
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<td>Work Outputs</td>
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<td>Spectacles, Packaged Design for Market Appeal</td>
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design. But many planners believe that their political astuteness in formulating policies (which are means) is more important than specifying loosely-defined goals and specific objectives (which are ends). They see implemented policies as part of the everyday life of practice whereas they may never see the accomplishments of goals and objectives. Both architects and planners emphasize either the prescription of process or design that most directly affects their work, and the resulting differences provide the conflicting views that one profession uses to criticize the other.

POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE STRUCTURE OF PRACTICE

The political economy of the U.S. has transformed in the twentieth century, and this transformation has redirected the conditions of practice for both architects and planners. Whereas the nation once had an economy that stressed production, currently there is a far greater emphasis on a service economy. The city is less a space for industrial production than it is a space for the festival marketplace and its related economic activity. David Harvey (1989) notes that the economic character of the nation’s cities has shifted from instrumental efficiency — a production economy of Fordism — to marketing — a service economy of flexible accumulation. This new flexible economy is characterized by structural unemployment, rapid construction and reconstruction of skills, modest gains in the real wage, the roll back of trade union power, and small core work forces with temporary employees used to supplement responses to market demands.

This shift in the nation’s economy has affected the practice of architecture and city planning. Table 1 illustrates how this new economy has transformed the organizational structures, work inputs, and work outputs that architects and planners experience in their firms and agencies. DiMaggio and Powell (1991) note that coercive controls, imitative processes, and normative pressures help to reconfigure organizations. For architects and planners, the demands for design and planning in the business world have played a key role in the reconfiguration of their workplace.

CHANGES IN ARCHITECTURAL PRACTICE

Architects and their firms have spent most of the twentieth century designing Modernist buildings that have furthered this nation’s historic orientation of an economy devoted to production. Whereas classical designs were devoted to an aesthetic formalism, Modernism was aimed at efficiency. Modernism played a role in factory design to implement Taylorism — to maximize production through scientific management. Architects, such as Albert Kahn who designed Henry Ford's automotive factories, played a key role in demonstrating how Modernist design led to efficient, profitable production. Just as important was the development of high-rise office buildings. Employees were arranged to work more efficiently although the assembly line produced paperwork rather than goods. Even suburban housing was streamlined with the introduction of new materials, efficient layout systems, and mechanical systems. All of these
Modernist improvements were aimed at efficient work and living. For workers to accept the conditions of a production-oriented economy, they wanted to consume the benefits of it (Harvey 1989). Thus, business interests appropriated Modernist approaches to suit their own economic ends of efficiency for profit-making.

But as the U.S. increasingly became a service economy, business interests changed their demands for design. Marketing was a key element for success, and design was essential to packaging what was sold. Thus, design that attracted consumers was as important, if not more so, than the efficiency of the space to serve them. Cities increasingly became a marketing environment as Ron Drucker, a developer, said bluntly:

My buildings are a product....The packaging of that product is the first thing that people see....I am selling space and renting space and it has to be in a package that is attractive enough to be financially successful. (Schmertz 1987)

The design emphasis on marketing was also furthered in the 1980s when the Federal government curtailed its role in sponsoring public housing and other public-funded buildings. There was a waning of the public client (Larson 1993). Modernism had served architects and clients well in a production economy narrowly based on efficiency, but the style lacked diversity. Postmodernist design provided architects a new design template in a service economy that depended on architectural aesthetics (Mayo 1991).

Just as the service economy was providing the impetus for Postmodernism, it also led to a different emphasis on firm structure. Weld Coxe (1982), an architect, notes the development of three types of architectural firms. Strong-delivery firms emphasize efficient design production. Such firms often specialize in building types and crank out speculative low-cost buildings at a high volume pace. Strong-service firms also emphasize design production, but this firm type includes specialists that can more particularly serve a client's needs. Compared to these two types, the strong-idea firm is smaller and more devoted to providing visually innovative design. It comprises a core of skilled designers, and if these firms need additional expertise, they hire specialists on an as-needed basis (Coxe 1982). The benefits of these firm types vary with the type of economy. The strong-delivery firm, which stresses high-volume outputs, relates better to a production economy than to a service economy. In contrast, the strong-idea firm fits well with a service economy that relies on a small core of permanent employees and a periphery of temporary workers. The strong-service firm sits in the middle as it can sustain production but can hire specialists on a demand basis depending on the design project.

Business corporations have increasingly hired strong-service firms, because they have an organizational structure that parallels their own makeup (Blau 1984). Large architectural firms, such as Skidmore, Owings and Merrill, have thrived on offering a wide variety of services to their corporate clients and offer specialized client needs on demand. Such firms do imitate other business corporations, especially when they establish regional offices to extend their services. Strong-service firms respond to the normative pressures of their corporate clients when they change their organizational structure to match client demands. As their corporate clients have sought to invest in building projects that depend strongly on aesthetic appeal, these firms have restructured their design staff to accommodate this demand (Mayo 1991).

The strong-idea firm conforms well to David Harvey's critique of current trends for companies to retain a core of permanent employees and to hire temporarily new employees to complete certain projects. Blau (1984) found that these firms were the most successful in developing a reputation for good design. The core employees are the key designers to ensure design success without sustaining a large cadre of workers that the firm's principles feel represent more costs than benefits. Although strong-idea firms have existed for some time, they have become more important as companies have sought out well-known designers. These architects design buildings with a unique visual imagery that attracts consumers and increases business profits. In the past architects primarily designed Modernist buildings for efficiency, but today's strong-idea firms realize that the design appeal of their buildings is perhaps more important than efficiency. These firms tend not to reconfigure their organizational structure to fit the needs of their clients as does the strong-service firm. Instead, business clients tend to conform to the design priorities of the strong-
idea firm. These firms can be in such demand that they sometimes choose their clients. Thus, DiMaggio and Powell's (1991) theory of organizational adjustments still applies, but in this circumstance, the architectural firm is applying normative pressures on business clients rather than the reverse.

Strong-delivery firms still exist, but their success depends upon attracting corporate clients that need a high volume output of buildings of a particular type, such as firms specializing in the design of discount stores. Unlike the other two firm types, the strong-delivery firm is not devoted to designing buildings with high aesthetic appeal. For example, developers who use firm designs to create festival market places and signature corporate buildings of a particular type, such as firms specializing in the design of discount stores. Unlike the other two firm types, the strong-delivery firm is not devoted to designing buildings with high aesthetic appeal. For example, developers who use firm designs to create festival market places and signature corporate buildings, find strong-delivery firms unable to produce the building design qualities necessary to capture tenants and customers for their consumer-oriented projects (Blau 1984; Frantz 1993). These firms organize their design activities to respond to the normative pressures of their clients who have very specific business objectives. But their architectural work typically places these firms outside of a service economy that depends upon aesthetic building appeal.

An argument can be made that the shift to a service economy has not changed labor relations in architectural firms. Historically, temporary employment and contract labor have been part of the economic conditions of firms. The boom and bust of building cycles have created the conditions that architectural firms must hire temporary employees and provide a labor pool of architects shared with other firms. This tactic is applicable to strong-delivery firms that need a large labor pool to provide a factory-like process for designing buildings. Although temporary labor is an option for strong-delivery firms and strong-service firms, these firms are willing to sustain full employment. In contrast, temporary employment as flexible accumulation is an integral strategy for strong-idea firms, because these organizations purposefully attempt to remain small. The strong-idea firms are the best type of firm to produce market-driven environments that typify a service economy, because these firms are more devoted to aesthetic packaging than the other two types of firms. Strong-service firms, however, have recently been hiring designers with established reputations in order to compete with the strong-idea firms. Strong-service firms that fail to compete with strong-idea firms revert to their previous structure (Gutman 1988). Thus, there is an accommodating link between the flexible accumulation of a service economy and the demand of strong-idea firms to produce aesthetic packaging for that economy.

There are changes in architectural practice that parallel the recent shift to a service economy. Architects are becoming involved with public interest concerns through educational and voluntary means, and some architects are now working for or consulting with public agencies. Architectural faculty members sometimes involve their students in projects that require them to address the needs of have-nots and environmental problems. Local AIA chapters have voiced concerns over projects that their members feel are contradictory to local mores of design (Wallis 1994). The number of design review boards and historic preservation boards has increased significantly in recent years, and architects serve on them to ensure that public interest concerns are met (May 1994). Although quite small, the presence of architects in public agencies does exist. In the recent past, cities have hired architects to fill positions involved with administering historic preservation. State historic preservation agencies hire architects to review building proposals to ensure that preservation policies are followed. The San Francisco planning department has employed architects to ensure that developers strictly follow the city's urban design guidelines. Cities sometimes contract architectural firms to prepare urban design plans. In these circumstances, the actual work is usually performed by an individual trained in both architecture and planning. As public employees or consultants, architects are required to uphold local policies that limit free enterprise initiatives. All of these activities have enabled architects to be more involved in addressing public interest concerns than in the past, but compared to planners, they have a limited role.

These forms of public involvement by architects are unevenly related to the recent emphasis on a service economy, which has played a central role in downtown development. Architectural faculty members and their students have challenged the displacement of low income people, and class projects are devoted to providing them affordable housing in the city. Many cities have attempted to redesign their central cities, and neighborhoods
near them have been gentrified through historic preservation. AIA chapters and design-review boards that object to central city projects slow the momentum of public support for downtown economic development. Historic preservation boards can both serve and hinder development. When these boards object to the destruction of historic buildings that lack the land-use density of proposed buildings, architects play a role in limiting development. On the other hand, historic preservation of central city areas can result in gentrification, either residential or commercial, that aids the reformation of the downtown area into a service economy (Logan, Molotch 1987). Architects who work in public agencies typically do not have entrepreneurial roles. They function as project reviewers to see that proposed plans conform to existing policies. Thus, architects' public involvement is unevenly related to the advancement of a service economy aimed at expanding central-city development.

CHANGES IN PLANNING PRACTICE

The shift from a production economy to a service economy has also changed the planning agency. Planners have traditionally organized their agencies to provide comprehensive planning for the rational distribution of resources. But this strategy was no longer sufficient. The new market character of the city encouraged planners to consider strategic planning, concentrating on directives to accomplish some ends while ignoring others. Planners became more focused on what a city needed to become an effective economic center, and as a result, a new organizational approach that addressed business interests was needed.

A city planning agency is traditionally equivalent to the strong-delivery firm. Architects, developers, and the planning commission have historically expected agency planners to provide an assembly-line delivery of project reviews and recommendations to the planning and city commissions. Following policies that they helped to design in a comprehensive plan, planners negotiate with developers and architects about changes that they will require. But as planning agencies became larger, planners could bring additional expertise to the negotiation table. The traditional land-use planner was not always alone in project review. Environmental planners could have a voice about what projects revisions might be required to save natural features on the building site. Under these conditions, the agency could be equivalent to the strong-service firm, which acquires additional expertise to address specific design issues. Nonetheless, all of these activities are typically bounded by planners recommending actions that are in conformance with a comprehensive plan.

The most important shift in the planning agency structure has been the introduction of the nonprofit economic development corporation. In cooperation with the city commission, planners in these agencies are entrepreneurial in seeking out development opportunities that can lead to economic improvement for their cities. They typically negotiate with developers using tax abatements and incentives for increased land densities to attract projects that will provide new jobs and economic growth. The number of planners in these agencies is typically less than the traditional city planning agency, and with their emphasis on advancing economic opportunities, economic development corporations are equivalent to the strong-idea firm (Morris 1995). Not surprisingly, it is this type of agency that has played a key role in the development of festival marketplaces, such as Horton Plaza in San Diego and Union Station in Washington, D.C. (Frieden, Sagalyn 1989).

The economic development corporation is usually oriented to development that supports a service economy, but this agency type is also involved with projects in the production-economy sector. Many of these agencies, especially in smaller communities, attempt to capture any form of business that can ultimately increase the local tax base and employment opportunities. Many projects are simple industrial buildings in an industrial park. This form of development places a low demand on architects' skills, but planners must provide the necessary economic analysis to separate the good projects from the bad ones. Although this sort of project exists in big cities, economic development corporations tend to focus on projects that can help to renew the downtown area and its surroundings. In these cases, both the planners' economic analysis and the architects' design skills are essential for successful development projects. In big cities there is a disproportional percentage of tax abatements issued in the downtown area when compared to other city areas of equal size (Frieden, Sagalyn 1989). Just as important these projects emphasize commercial and high-density residential land uses, which
support a city's service economy. Hotels, sports arenas, magnet shopping areas, and condominiums are typical projects that are financially aided with tax abatements (Cummings 1988; Domhoff 1986; Euchner 1993). Cities that allocate tax abatements for such projects often attract industries. In addition to labor market conditions, industrial corporations prefer to locate where urban amenities exist for the benefit of their executives and employees. Thus, economic development corporations are not strictly devoted to the service-economy sector. Downtown projects and other service-economy projects, however, can play a critical role in attracting development projects in the production sector.

This shift in planning from an agency that comprehensively formulates and evaluates public policy to one that is entrepreneurial is the consequence of agencies adapting to business norms of free enterprise. The economic development corporation has become an essential cog that relates to Harvey Molotch's theory of the city as a growth machine. Molotch (1976) argued that "the organized effort to affect the outcome of growth distribution is the essence of local government as a dynamic political force." With the reduced role of the federal grants to instigate local development, cities sought new ways to direct development. Public officials approved the formation of nonprofit economic corporations to entice development. Thus, planners who administered these agencies had to offer enticements that fitted with the economic logic of profits that developers and companies used to survive. Instead of preparing goals and policies within a comprehensive plan, they focused on developing economic incentives that would attract development. Planners put themselves into the shoes of developers by learning their skills. Planners had to imitate the skills and methods of developers to attract them. They focused on evaluating pro forma sheets and internal rates of return on investments, just as bankers do when they approve project loans. Thus, economic development corporations have an entrepreneurial focus and work processes that have become similar to private development corporations. There were also normative pressures. To learn these new real estate skills, planning departments in American universities had to introduce real estate development courses and specialties so that graduates were prepared to enter these nonprofit economic corporations with the necessary skills to practice. There are coercive controls. The Planning Accreditation Board currently sets the standards and controls the accreditation process that legitimates a planning degree that includes real estate development. Thus, DiMaggio and Powell's (1991) theory of imitative processes, normative pressures, and coercive controls is quite relevant to the role that free enterprise has played in shaping the practice of professional planners in economic development.

Planners have reacted to the emphasis upon a service economy. Their criticisms have been aimed at economic development agencies. City planning departments and design review boards have sometimes objected when these agencies approve large tax abatements, allow big increases in floor space, agree to demolishing historic structures, and ignore design guidelines. As a result, some cities have controlled the negotiation authority of these agencies. In Cincinnati, Ohio, the economic development department "vehemently opposed mandatory review and adoption of design guidelines," because it "preferred to negotiate design quality on a project-by-project basis" (Lasser 1989). Although economic development planners may consider that pragmatism requires them to be sensitive to developer demands, planners in traditional city planning departments do not share their colleagues' propensity to so willingly serve them.

CONDITIONS OF POLITICAL POWER

As much as there may be antagonism between architects and planners, they have experienced similar shifts in how their practice institutions — mainly private firms for architects and public agencies for planners — operate to be effective under the current economic structure. Presently, cities are developing within an economy in which companies create more jobs in the service sector than in manufacturing (Frieden, Sagalyn 1989; Gottdiener 1985). Table 2 illustrates some but not all of the conditions of professional practice in production and service economies. Comprehensive rationality shaped the practice of architects and planners during a period when the nation's economy was mainly oriented to production. Under the current shift to a service economy, both professions are now more entrepreneurial in their institutional structures to produce and control the built environment. As much as architects and planners may debate over their professional aims, the
economic and institutional conditions of their practice have more to do with their practice outcomes than their prescriptions in process and design.

Although architects and planners are highly constrained in their professional practice, they are not powerless. C. Wright Mills once said: "The designer is a creator and a critic of the physical frame of private and public life" (Mills 1963). Lefebvre (1991) also argued: "Change life! Change society! These precepts mean nothing without the production of space." Both professions retain the power to design the good idea that may influence key decision-makers who typically have the final say in shaping the built environment. Yet, architects are politically weak when compared to planners, because planners currently have a wider variety of institutional frameworks in which to exercise their professional voices. Planners work in many kinds of public agencies and consulting firms that shape the built environment through their policies. In comparison, architects are largely confined to one type of institution, the architectural firm. This limitation has political consequences. Architects in firms constantly frame their thinking within the logic of capitalism, because their private clients and the firm itself are bounded by the need to make profits. Planners working in firms and agencies can be capitalistic in their thinking, but the public agency provides the alternative for them to practice with public interest aims (Forster 1993).

The lifeworlds of architects and planners are bounded by their educational programs, professional organizations, and practice institutions. Infusing their practice with a greater commitment to the public interest is typically beyond their individual capabilities. But Habermas argues that such boundedness can lead to problems. If a profession's culture of norms does not address a society's needs, there is a loss of legitimation. As a result, the rationality of knowledge within the profession loses credibility (Habermas 1973, 1987). Architects and planners certainly have credibility on legitimate grounds other than the public interest. Nonetheless, professionals set ideals that are beyond the particular needs of their clients in order to justify how their professions aid in the betterment of society. At this time, architects are currently more limited than planners in their opportunities to address public interest concerns.

Architects and planners need to understand better how their realms of practice are similar. Architects and planners are both actively involved as creators and critics in the production of space that have public interest consequences. But as Dimaggio and Powell (1991) have theorized and as argued here, coercive controls, imitative processes, and normative pressures can play a key role in the development of organizations. Business interests, guided by the dynamics of a service economy, are influential forces upon the structure of architectural and planning practice institutions and the manner in which their professionals conduct their practice. Both professions have modified their practice institutions by responding to the needs of the nation's economy. But at the same time, architects and planners adjust how they conduct their practice. Practitioners can experience a continuous struggle between balancing the public interest with the aims of free enterprise, and influences upon their practice institutions play a significant role in determining that balance.

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